The exploration of a new EU Arctic policy: possible policies and implications

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The exploration of a new EU Arctic policy

– Possible policies and implications

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences MSc Political Economy - Master Thesis

Conflict: Political Economy, Colonial Legacy and Foreign Policy

Amber Idema Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan

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Acknowledgement

I am thankful for all those who have supported me during the writing of this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Said Rezaeiejan, for his help and patience. His guidance and critical feedback have pushed me to perform to the best of my ability. I greatly appreciate all the time and effort he has devoted to my thesis. In addition, I would like to thank my second reader, Dr. Philip Schleifer, for the time and effort he has taken to assess my thesis.

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Maps, figures, and tables

Maps

Map 1 The Arctic region

Map 2 The Northwest and Northeast passage

Appendix

Figure 1 The EU’s Arctic Strategy as defined in the 2016 Joint

Communication on an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic

Figure 2 Military presence in the Arctic

Figure 3 Number of Icebreakers per actor

Figure 4 Arctic cooperation frameworks

Table 1 Military power of the Arctic actors

Table 2 Latent power of the Arctic actors

Table 3 Trade interdependency among Arctic states

Table 4 Trade between the Arctic actors as a % of their total amount of trade

Table 5 Bilateral trade dependence between the Arctic actors

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Abbreviations

AC Arctic Council

ASFR Arctic Security Forces Roundtable BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council

CAO Central Arctic Ocean

CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy CFSP Common Foreign Security Policy

CLCS Commission on the limits of the continental shelf DG MARE Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries EEAS European Union External Action Service

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EU European Union

EC European Commission

EPSC European Political Strategy Centre GDP Gross Domestic Product

HR/VP High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy IMO International Maritime Organization

IR International Relations

MS Member State (of the European Union)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEC The Observatory of Economic Complexity

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7 R&D Research and development

UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

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Terminology

For this thesis it is necessary to start with a clarification of certain concepts. This because this thesis will employ certain concepts that can be understood in different ways and hold a prominent position in this thesis. The most important concept that needs clarification is “the Arctic Region”. There are many ways in which the Arctic region can be defined and there is no single correct definition (Arctic Centre n.d.). For this reason, the thesis has chosen to adopt the following definition as this is the most often used definition. According to this definition the Arctic region is defined as the area within the Arctic Circle which is referred to as the southernmost latitude in the Northern Hemisphere. This area is delineated by solar radiation. In theory areas north of the Arctic circle have during a year at least one day without daylight in the winter and one nightless night in summer. The imaginary boundary at the globe is at approximately 66° 33’ N (Arctic Centre n.d.). Building upon this

definition, there are 8 states that hold territory within the Arctic region. Namely Canada, The United States, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark through Greenland. In map 1 this area is indicated with a blue circle.

The second concept that needs clarification are the new shipping routes that become available due to the melting of the ice. These new transportation routes are the North West Passage and the North East Passage or Northern Sea Route (Brigham and Ellis 2019; 21). In map 2 the North West Passage is indicated with an orange line and the North East Passage is indicated with a yellow line. The North West Passage passes through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the Transpolar Route via the North pole. The North East Passage navigates along the Russian coast of Siberia (Zandee, 2020; 8).

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9 Map 1: The Arctic region

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10 Map 2: The Northwest and Northeast Passage

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Section 1. Introduction

During the past decade, the Arctic region has been heavily affected by climate change. The icecaps are melting and scientists do not exclude the possibility of an ice-free Arctic during the summers in the future (Klimenko 2019; 3). The new circumstances threaten the ecosystem and biodiversity in the region. Furthermore, the melting of the ice causes the global sea levels to rise. Consequently, in the future there will be more extreme weather in the form of droughts, rainstorms, and floods. Rising global sea levels will thus have catastrophic global social, economic and environmental

consequences (EPSC 2019; 3).

Yet, climate change also results in new economic opportunities in the Arctic region. Especially the natural resources that the region hold are of interest. Already during previous years, the amount of rich mineral resources discovered in the Arctic had increased (EPSC 2019; 2). In the future, due to the melting of the ice, even more natural resources will become available. Most importantly, it is estimated that under the ice around 30 % of the world’s undiscovered gas and around 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil can be found (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 5). Hence the region holds high economic potential. In addition, due to the disappearing ice, sea lanes become ice free which

provides Asian countries, especially China, with shorter shipping routes to the US and the EU. The new routes will be the Northwest Passage, which is shorter than the Panama route, and the Northeast Passage which is shorter than the Suez route. The shorter routes make shipping less-energy intensive and cheaper (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 5). Nevertheless, still multiple obstacles need to be

overcome before the new shipping routes can be used.

The changed circumstances have not only resulted in a changing physical environment but also in a new geopolitical trade-off. On the one hand states are concerned about the effects of climate change in the Arctic region but on the other hand they also seek to benefit from the new economic

opportunities caused by it. Consequently, economic and military activity within the Arctic has rapidly increased during the past years (EPSC 2019; 1). It is for the first time after the Cold War that the Arctic has become subject of geopolitical tensions again (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 3).

Although the exact economic potential of the region is still being debated, many states have shown interest in the region. In fact, many actors involved have already updated their Arctic strategies. Despite all the commotion, the European Union has not followed this trend. The latest EU Arctic strategy was the Joint Communication published in 2016. This is remarkable since the EU has three Member States – Denmark, Finland Sweden – situated in the region, both Norway and Iceland are

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12 part of the European Economic Area and two of its strategic partners – Canada and the US – are also Arctic states. Hence, the Arctic region is not only an important neighbor, but it falls even under the de facto jurisdiction of the EU (EPSC 2019; 7). Although it must be noted that the EU mostly acts as an external actor. Yet it would be in the interests of the EU to strive for more engagement. On the one hand because the new economic opportunities offer potential benefits for the EU as well. For example, the new shipping routes from Asia to Europe could result in new trade opportunities. Next to that, the EU would be advantaged by the newly available natural resources. On the other hand, the consequences of climate change in the Arctic region would evidently also heavily impact the EU. The EU should therefore seek to become more involved in the region so that it can more effectively help to combat climate change. Hence, there are there are numerous incentives for the EU to become more engaged in the Arctic affairs, but up until now it has failed to do so.

It is for this reason that this thesis has adopted the European Arctic policy as its topic of research. The EU is in need of a renewed and improved Arctic policy. However, before a new policy can be created, research is needed to examine and outline potential new strategies and their implications. An overview of possible new EU Arctic strategies and their implications will help to create a well-balanced new EU Arctic policy. This thesis seeks to contribute to the production of new research by sketching two scenarios that outline two possible new EU Arctic policies and their possible

implications. The scenarios will be constructed by using a scenario methodology grounded in a multi-theoretical approach. Two international relations (IR) theories, structural realism and liberal institutionalism, will provide input for the scenarios so that different pathways will be sketched. Although two perspectives are not all-embracing, this thesis believes these theories to be the best suited for its purposes. This because structural realism and liberal institutionalism are based on positivism and rationalism. By using observation and measurement, the theories seek to specify general universal laws which are helpful to not only explain but also predict behavior of actors. The thesis therefore believes these theories to be suitable for conducting future scenarios.

By performing scenario analyses this thesis seeks to provide an answer to the following research question:

“What could be possible implications of a renewed European Union Arctic policy that responds to the recent increase in geopolitical tensions in the Arctic Region?”

In order to answer this question, the thesis will start with a literature review that provides an overview of the current EU Arctic policy and the situation in the Arctic region. This section will analyze the existing literature and outline what recommendations or suggestions have already been

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13 made for a renewed EU Arctic policy. Secondly there will be provided a theoretical framework. In this section the perspectives and concepts of the theories structural realism and liberal

institutionalism will be explained. Thirdly there will follow a methodology overview. Here the scenario methodology will be explained more elaborately, and the data and operationalizations used will be set out. Fourthly, the two scenarios based on structural realism and liberal institutionalism will be developed. The scenarios will start by analyzing the current situation from the theoretical perspectives, secondly the new strategies will be constructed and finally the possible implications of the new strategies will be demonstrated. The thesis will end with the conclusion that the scenarios have contributed to the existing debate by presenting two possible new trajectories for an EU Arctic policy. Nevertheless, before a well-informed EU Arctic policy can be developed more perspectives need to be examined.

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Section 2. Literature Review

It has been demonstrated that there is a need for a new EU Arctic policy. This thesis seeks to contribute to the formulation of a new EU Arctic policy by sketching scenarios that set out possible new policies and their possible implications. Before these analyses will be developed, it is important to be aware of what research has already been conducted. This section will therefore outline the most recent and relevant literature concerning the EU’s Arctic policy and its possible implications. Since the EU has published in 2016 its latest policy statement concerning the Arctic, namely a Joint Communication, this thesis has chosen to only analyze literature published in 2016 and after. Literature published before 2016 has not been based on the new strategy and therefore might have become irrelevant.

In the Joint Communication published in 2016, the EU has set out its core objectives for the Arctic region. The document recognizes that the primary responsibility of the Arctic development is with the Arctic states. However, the EU also believes that many issues affecting the region are of global nature (European Commission, 2016; 1). Hence it believes that these would be more effectively addressed through regional and multilateral cooperation. Consequently, EU engagement is important. The Joint Communication also mentions the increasing economic and strategic importance of the Arctic region and it acknowledges that this might result in increasing tensions in the region. The document therefore emphasizes that it is now more important than ever to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace, prosperity, and constructive cooperation (European Commission, 2016; 4). Consequently, the EU Arctic policy has proposed three priority areas:

1. Climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment 2. Promoting sustainable development in and around the region

3. Supporting international cooperation on the Arctic issues (European Commission, 2016; 4).

The Joint Communication illustrates that the EU seeks to play a key role in all three priority areas. To do this, it is believed that particular attention should be given to research, science, and innovation (European Commission, 2016; 4).

The Joint Communication is issued by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Within the EU the main actors responsible for the EU Arctic policy are the European Commission, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS)

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15 and the Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). In addition, since

September 2017 there has been appointed an ‘EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic’. The

ambassador is responsible for raising awareness of and discussing Arctic issues with the wider public and the EU’s partners (EPSC; 2019, 10). The EU ambassador at Large for the Arctic, used to be Marie-Anne Coninsx but she left office in November 2019 when a new EU Commission was installed. After 2019 there has not been appointed a new EU Arctic ambassador, instead Michael Mann has been appointed as special envoy for Arctic matters by the EEAS since April 1st, 2020 (Borell, 2020; n.p.).

The objectives set out in the Joint Communication of the European Commission are transformed into actionable strategies. The types of action that the EU performs in the Arctic can be found in figure 1 (see appendix). This figure illustrates that the EU has been especially active in the funding and supporting of research initiatives and other projects related to environmental protection and climate change. In addition, the EU has stimulated cooperation in the Arctic by participating in multiple agreements mostly related to environmental protection and sustainable development. Finally, the EU has sought to uphold an active stakeholder management by engaging in dialogue with all Arctic partners, Arctic indigenous peoples, and other important international organizations (figure 1). The Joint Communication acknowledges the importance of the Arctic Council (AC) in governing the Arctic region. The Arctic Council is the most important institution that holds legitimacy to act (Osthagen and Raspotnik, 2019; 6). The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the Ottawa Declaration. The AC consists out of eight permanent members which are the Arctic states and six permanent participants which are organizations that represent the Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants (The Arctic Council, n.d.). In addition, the AC also allows members with the observer status. The observer status is open to non-Arctic states, intergovernmental,

interparliamentary, global, regional, and non-governmental organizations that the Council believes to be able to provide a relevant contribution to its work. Six EU Member States (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Italy) are observers. Other states that have been granted the observer status are China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the UK. The members of the AC have committed themselves to maintain peace, stability, and constructive cooperation in the Arctic. The AC therefore serves as an intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation, coordination and interaction among Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous communities, and other Arctic inhabitants (The Arctic Council n.d.).

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16 The European Union is not a member of the AC, neither has it been granted the observer status. The EU has been nominated for the observer status twice, but both times the request was blocked

(Raspotnik 2018; 65). Nevertheless, the EU has continued to contribute substantially to the Arctic. Furthermore, when the EU was denied the observer status it has been granted an ad hoc observer status. Ad hoc observers must apply to attend the meetings of the AC whereas permanent observers can attend all. In practice the ad hoc observer status and the permanent observer status are thus quite similar (Brozowski, 2019; n.p.). Still, it remains a political drawback that the EU has not been granted the observer status.

The biggest challenge that the AC and the Arctic actors need to overcome is climate change. Climate change heavily affects the region. Yet the changing environment of the Arctic has also given rise to new economic opportunities in the region. On the international level interest in the region has increased because of these new opportunities. Actors strive for more engagement in the region. This has resulted in growing geopolitical tensions and a divide between the actors involved. On the one hand, several states as Russia, the US, and to some extend Canada, are supporters of exploiting the new economic opportunities (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 6). These states call upon the

undiscovered natural resources of the Arctic to be further exploited and less protected (Paul, 2019; 3). On the other hand, states as Sweden, Finland, and Denmark prioritize environmental

sustainability and therefore are opposed to exploiting the new economic opportunities. These states emphasize the importance of sustainable resource management and have consensus on the need of environmental protection in the Arctic and the protection of indigenous people (Karlsdóttir and Greve Harbo 2017; 2).

Climate change is believed to be the catalyst for security trends in the Arctic (Zandee et al., 2020; 13). Yet the possibility of conflict has always been present in the region. In 2007 tensions almost escalated when the Russian federation planted a flag on the Lomonosov Ridge seabed. By doing this Russia claimed the Lomonosov Ridge to be a part of its territory (Walker, 2012; 255). However according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) made in 1982, coastal states are only allowed to exploit and extract resources within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles off their coasts (UNCLOS, art. 57). The flag was planted well outside the limit of 200 nm from the Russian coast and therefore the Russian claim did not last under

international law (Walker, 2012; 255). Ultimately, the dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge was solved peacefully and in 2008 all Arctic states signed the Ilulissat Declaration which showed their

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17 Recently, multiple states, as for example great powers the US and Russia, have increased their

military presence in the Arctic to protect their interests (Paul 2019; 3). They believe that security threats are increasing and perceive the Arctic to become an area of power and competition rather than an area of science and cooperation. In one of the latest meetings of the AC in 2019, the US State Secretary Mike Pompeo addressed the elephant in the room and stated that the AC should be more open to security debates. Up until now military issues have been specifically excluded from its mandate and therefore the agenda (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 8). The speech of Pompeo was not well received by the other members of the AC. Nevertheless, also other Arctic states have adjusted their polar security strategies to respond to the current developments. Hence not only the US and Russia believe the Arctic to become increasingly characterized by geopolitical tensions.

The recent developments urge the EU to update its Arctic strategy as well. The latest EU Arctic strategy stems from 2016 and fails to respond to the current situation. Multiple authors have devoted their works to analyzing the current EU Arctic policy and made suggestions on how the policy could be changed. The literature can be divided amongst subcategories based upon the focus of the new policy. The first subcategory therefore sets out suggestions for a new strategy that focuses on the EU as an actor that promotes sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. Within this subcategory the recommended strategies have not given much priority to the geopolitical and security developments in the region. The second subcategory entails a more moderate approach. This means that environmental protection and sustainable development are taken into account as well as the geopolitical tensions. The final subcategory prioritizes the geopolitical tensions in the region and sets out strategies that mostly function as a response to these developments.

The three subcategories help to set out the existing knowledge on possible implications of a renewed EU Arctic policy. The subcategories divide the recommended strategies over different focus areas which explains their different approaches. For instance, a strategy focused on the environment will create a different advice than a strategy focused on security. Nevertheless, to some extend similar recommendations are made. The trends in suggestions will be set out at the end.

2.1 Strategies focused on sustainable development and environmental protection

The first subcategory consists out of strategies focused on sustainable development and

environmental protection. Authors within this subcategory have developed recommendations for a new EU Arctic policy that do not necessarily address the geopolitical tensions in the region but are in line with the current objectives of the EU Arctic policy.

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18 To start with, the European Political Strategic Centre has published in July 2019 a strategic report that explains what a balanced Arctic strategy for the EU could look like. This report was requested by the European Commission as the EPSC is its in-house think tank. The recommendations of this report can be divided into three categories. First of all, the report calls for clarity on the EU’s engagement in the Arctic. The EU is advised to develop a new document that continues to focus on environmental sustainability as this has always been a priority for the EU. Nevertheless, the new strategy should also strive for clearer ‘rules of the game’ (EPSC 2019; 11). The taboo of climate change resulting in new economic opportunities should be lifted so that sustainable ways of pursuing these new opportunities can be discussed. Especially since the EU also has an interest in expanding extraction activities within the Arctic region (EPSC 2019; 11). The second element of the report establishes a more concrete advice of how the EU’s Arctic strategy could be implemented in the EU’s institutional set-up. The overall advice here is to create an overarching cross-cutting strategy (EPSC 2019; 12). For this it would be necessary to create new functions within the European

Commission, establish better cooperation between the EC and the European External Action Service, regularly update the European Council, strengthen the role of the European Parliament, and budget sufficient financial tools to develop the Arctic region in future investments (EPSC 2019; 12). The final element of the report sets out that the EU should increase its engagement with global partners active in the region to ensure that the EU’s / mutual interests are met (EPSC 2019; 12). The report here more specifically refers to actors as Russia, the US, China, and other Asian countries.

To conclude, the report advices the EU to create a renewed EU strategy in the form of a document like the Joint Communication that was published in 2016. The focus areas of the new overarching EU Arctic strategy should be climate protection, sustainable development, and peaceful cooperation that helps to contribute to the security and stability of the region. This should be done by engaging with all interested parties involved in the Arctic region on the basis of multilateral and rules-based democracy (EPSC 2019; 13).

Secondly, the book ‘The European Union and the Arctic’ written by Henriksen, Kirk and Liu

discusses the EU’s potential roles in shaping Arctic. The EU is described as a normative power1_that

is expected to project its core norms. Building upon this, the Arctic is one of the priority areas of the

1_{The concept of the EU as a normative power is defined by Ian Manners. In his work he argues that the EU is a normative power}

because the EU is constructed on a normative basis (e.g. the requirement of democratic conditionality for new member states) and the EU acts in a normative way in world politics (e.g. the pursuit of human rights as the abolition of the death penalty). The EU seeks to redefine international norms in its own image. The EU as a normative power is based on the ontological quality that the EU can be conceptualized as a norms changer in the international system; the positive quantity that the EU acts to change norms in the system; and the normative quality that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international system (Manners, 2002; 253).

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19 EU for sustainable development. By taking into account the objectives of the EU as set out in the Joint Communication of 2016, the book highlights three aspects that the EU is advised to further address in the future. First of all, the book recommends the EU to use EU law and its power to regulate all EU citizens and companies as tools to achieve sustainable development or combat climate change in the Arctic (Liu et al. 2017; 366). The EU could for instance implement restrictions on drilling in fragile environments or establish more severe measures to prevent oil spills. By

implementing restrictions of this kind, the EU can exercise influence over the exploitation of the resources in the Arctic without having legislative power in the region itself. Hence the EU could take leading steps for the entire international community by using EU Law to indirectly influence the Arctic (Liu et al. 2017; 366). Secondly, the EU could use its economic power to become more involved in the Arctic region (Liu et al. 2017; 367). The EU has the world’s largest internal market that is supported by strong regulatory institutions. The market power of the EU could be used to project EU norms on the rest of the world. The EU has already done this in the past by for example establishing the seal trade ban. In the future, the EU could for instance use its market power to influence Arctic shipping. Most ships will use the Northeast Passage to head towards Europe and therefore the EU could incorporate shipping into the emission trading schemes. In this way, the EU could impact the amount of greenhouse gas emissions from Arctic shipping (Liu et al. 2017; 367). The final characteristic of the EU that it could exploit to stimulate sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic is its supportive role in regional and international cooperation (Liu et al. 2017; 368). The Arctic Council will in the future probably remain the most important institution in governing the Arctic region. Even though EU is not an Arctic Council observer, it can still exert influence through its Member States. Furthermore, also in other indirect ways the EU has the power to influence the decision-making processes in the Arctic. For example, by drawing upon shared interests in other negotiations that are related to sustainable development (Liu et al. 2017; 368).

The book of Liu et al. employs a different perspective than other authors have done. They focus on strengths of the EU that could help to achieve its objectives. The authors have explained how the EU could exploit it strengths to influence sustainable development in the region. Nevertheless, the strengths that the authors put forward could also be relevant for influencing the geopolitical tensions within the region.

Finally, the authors Andreas Raspotnik and Romain Chuffart, both working at the Arctic Institute have written literature that critically analyses the EU Arctic policy in line with its objectives to combat climate change and strive for sustainable development of the Arctic region (Chuffart and

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20 Raspotnik, 2019; 156). The article argues that if these are the goals that the EU seeks to achieve, it should strengthen its position in the region. The EU should seek to become a leader in standard-setting for an adequate sustainable approach towards the region. In this way the EU will make sure to achieve its objectives. The article therefore recommends the EU to enlarge its engagement in the Arctic, but this starts at home. In fact, for a renewed EU Arctic policy, the EU should start with strengthening its own governance framework. A stronger domestic climate governance framework will enable the EU to influence regional governance and standard setting from outside the Arctic region. Making the Arctic more sustainable is not only about Arctic involvement, rather it starts from within (Chuffart and Raspotnik, 2019; 160). The article makes several strong recommendations on how the EU should change its Arctic policy in order to achieve its key objectives, but it fails to take into account the current (geopolitical) developments in the Arctic and how the EU should respond to those.

As a conclusion, the literature of this subcategory mostly develops recommendations for a new EU Arctic strategy focused on the promotion of sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. The authors have expressed different perspectives on how this would best be done. The EPSC report has developed an advice that contains elements which should help the EU to become increasingly involved in the Arctic. Raspotnik and Chuffart on the other hand, emphasize that more EU engagement in the Arctic starts at home. They recommend the EU to focus on changing its domestic governance framework. Finally, the book of Liu et al. advices the EU to draw upon its strengths that will naturally result in increased engagement in the Arctic.

Even though it is important to limit the impact of climate change in the region as much as possible, it would also be desirable for a renewed EU Arctic policy to take into account the geopolitical and security issues that have arisen in the region. The EPSC report briefly touches upon the possible economic opportunities, yet it does not elaborate on how the EU could (in a sustainable way) exploit these. In the next section, such types of strategies will be further analyzed.

2.2 The middle-ground strategies

The second subcategory contains literature that acknowledges both the importance to promote sustainable development and environment protection in a new EU Arctic policy, but also addresses the rising geopolitical and security issues in the region. Therefore, the second category is considered to present middle-ground approaches.

To start with, Raspotnik in cooperation with Stepien has written a policy brief that serves as a critical response to the EPSC report. The policy brief critically analyzes the EPSC strategic report while

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21 presenting recommendations that these scholars believe to be more accurate. The policy brief

overlaps to some extend with the EPSC report. Both works emphasize the need of a new document, as for example a renewed version of the Joint Communication. In addition, the strategy report as well as the policy brief believe that a stronger role for the European Parliament in Arctic issues would be desired (Raspotnik and Stepién 2019; 2). Raspotnik and Stepien recommend the Commission to cooperate with the EP via informal ways rather than institutionalizing a stronger role, as is

recommended in the EPSC report. Furthermore, the policy brief advises to establish a small team that works on Arctic issues for a longer time and emphasizes the need to better include Arctic concerns in decision-making processes (Raspotnik and Stepién 2019; 4). The policy brief criticizes the EPSC report for its suggestion to openly express the potential geopolitical and geo-economical threats of Russia and China. Raspotnik and Stepien believe that by making such statements new conflicts might arise. The policy brief therefore advises the EU to be less open on hard security issues and rather set up bilateral dialogues with China and Russia under a so-called Arctic-umbrella. Next to that, the EU is advised to continue to strive for a stronger role in the Arctic Council (Raspotnik and Stepién 2019; 3). Finally, the policy brief recommends the European Commission to develop a short and concrete list of future-oriented new actions (Raspotnik and Stepién 2019; 3).

Raspotnik and Stepien argue that it is of key importance for the EU to regularly reflect on the Arctic region and engage with regional and Arctic relevant stakeholders. This will boost the ongoing Arctic policy-making processes. The EU should remain focused on the three priorities set out earlier

however it should also address the new geopolitical and security issues. In times of change there is constant reassessment needed, the process is as important as the outcome (Raspotnik and Stepién 2019; 5).

Secondly, in the works of Andreas Osthagen written in 2017 and 2019 suggestions are made for a new EU Arctic strategy that supports both sustainable development of the Arctic and addresses the geopolitical tensions in the region. Osthagen acknowledges the new Artic environment in which climate change has accelerated, new economic opportunities have become available and more actors seek to be involved in the region. It is argued that the EU on the one hand has an obvious presence in the region due to its Arctic Member States and its strategic partners. Yet on the other hand certain factors obstruct the EU’s involvement in the Arctic. These factors are “the lack of direct access to the Arctic Ocean, its slightly paternalistic Arctic policy statements portraying the EU as the ‘solution’ to the region’s real or perceived challenges and its fluctuating engagement within the region”

(Osthagen 2019; 16). Direct involvement of the EU in the Arctic is restricted; it is merely capable of assistance and encouragement. Osthagen believes that there is a clear role for the EU in the arctic

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22 region however this role should focus less on direct action and more on awareness and support (Osthagen 2017; 244). This because the EU is not part of the Arctic Council and is therefore not involved in the direct decision-making processes. In his work, clear recommendations are made on how the EU should perform a more indirect role. The EU is recommended to assist and encourage dialogue through institutions as for example the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. Here the EU could be of desired assistance for military intelligence. Secondly, the EU should focus on

engagement and comprehension. In terms of engagement, the EU should establish a systemic role for the Arctic in its relationships with actors as China, the US and Russia and focus less on the regional aspects (Osthagen 2019; 17). In terms of comprehension, the EU should recognize the strategic importance of the region and address issues related to this. This means that the EU should update more often on Arctic developments, especially to the European Parliament. EU decision-makers have not always been well-informed about the region and its challenges. Since the Arctic is one of the three most important regional neighborhoods, this should be a priority (Osthagen 2019; 17). Hence Osthagen urges the EU to act upon the current developments by setting clear and visionary goals which are in line with its own interests.

In summary, the literature within the second subcategory has developed recommendations that address both sustainable development and environmental protection, and the geopolitical tensions in the region. Raspotnik and Stepien advise the EU to make internal changes so that it can better address Arctic issues and recommend it to increase its engagement with Arctic actors and

institutions. Osthagen also believes that cooperation with other actors is an integral part of the new EU Arctic strategy. He emphasizes the indirect role that the EU has, and that the EU should focus on awareness and support through engagement and comprehension.

2.3 Strategies focused on the geopolitical developments and security issues

The final subcategory focuses on strategies that address the emerging geopolitical and security issues of the Arctic. The works emphasize the necessity for the EU to respond to the new developments as these will influence the security of the EU and its Member States. The literature that expresses these perspectives has been written by researchers of Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of

International Relations.

The first article is a policy report written by Ties Dams and Louise van Schaik published in 2019. The policy report builds on the strategy report of the EPSC. The report emphasizes the urgent need for the EU and other European countries to renew their Arctic policies and open the dialogue to address the security and geopolitical concerns in the region. The report mostly serves as a call for

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23 action for the EU to address the “elephant” (geopolitics and security issues) within the Arctic (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 9). To address this Arctic elephant, the report argues that at national level debates on the Arctic region should be reinvigorated. This will help to obtain an integral view on the long-term interests of the EU and its Member States within the Arctic. Next, the report touches upon the content of the new Arctic strategy, here more priority should be given to the security and

geopolitical concerns. To execute the renewed strategy, the EU is advised to establish a Working Party on Arctic Affairs within the EU council (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 9). The Working Party should mainly focus on coordinating security and diplomacy policies. The final recommendation of the report entails that the EU Member States should push for the establishment of an Arctic security and cooperation organization that also includes members as China, Russia, the US and multiple other states (Dams and Van Schaik 2019; 9).

To a certain extent the Clingendael report overlaps with the EPSC report. Yet the Clingendael report puts more emphasis on the geopolitical and security issues of the Arctic region. In fact, the report does not at all refer to combatting climate change or promoting sustainable development of the region.

Tony van der Togt, also a researcher of the Clingendael Institute has published works for the

European-Russia Expert Network of foreign policy. In this work he solely addresses the geopolitical developments taking place in the Arctic region. By doing this, Van der Togt makes several

recommendations on how the EU could address these developments. To start with, he believes that to prevent an escalation of conflict in the Arctic or spillover to military conflicts elsewhere, it is

necessary to discuss these issues in platforms for military-military contacts (Van der Togt, 2019; 2). He believes that there should be (more) cooperation on hard security-related issues but also in areas not related to military security issues. Van der Togt identifies several platforms that could serve these ends. For example, the NATO, OSCE or the creation of specific CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures) within the OSCE. In his opinion the OSCE, and more specifically the CSBMs, would be the most appropriate platform (Van der Togt, 2019; 3). Nevertheless, the EU would have a limited role in this initiative as it is not a participating actor within the OSCE. For cooperation on non-military issues, van der Togt believes that the Arctic Council would be the most appropriate forum. Nevertheless, since the EU has not yet obtained the observer status, for now possibilities for cooperation via the AC are limited. Hence van der Togt demonstrates the need for the EU to address the geopolitical developments in the Arctic region, but he remains vague on how the EU could best do this. The suggestions made by the work of van der Togt all include limited influence of the EU and therefore might not be too helpful.

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24 As a conclusion, within the final subcategory recommendations have been made that focus on the emerging geopolitical and security issues in the Arctic region. Dams and Van Schaik believe that the EU should reinforce the debates concerning the Arctic at national level. This would help to articulate the Arctic interests of the Member States and the EU more clearly. In addition, the EU should make certain institutional changes. Both the articles of Dams and Van Schaik and Van der Togt argue that the EU should strive for cooperation through international organizations. The organizations could also help to better address security issues. Van der Togt suggests the OSCE to be the most

appropriate organization for this however the EU holds a limited role here.

The literature of the final subcategory focusses more on realist topics, however the recommendations made correspond more with a liberalist perspective.

2.4 Conclusion

The literature analyzed has been divided into three subcategories based upon the focus areas of the policies. This helped to cluster the recommendations and advices. Nevertheless, the literature can to some extend also be distinguished by the different recommendations that made are.

2.4.1 Direct or indirect EU involvement

First of all, the literature analyzed is divided over the question whether the EU should strive for direct or indirect engagement in the region. On the one hand, authors as Raspotnik and Chuffart, and Dams and Van Schaik in their articles set out policy recommendations that would result in the EU seeking to exercise direct influence in the region. Raspotnik and Chuffart believe that the EU should strive for leadership in sustainable development in the Arctic region and enlarge its engagement here. Dams and Van Schaik advise the EU to stimulate the establishment of an organization that consists out of Arctic and non-Arctic states to discuss security issues. Here the EU is portrayed as an actor that should be directly involved in Arctic matters.

On the other hand, authors, as Liu et al. and Van der Togt, argue that the EU should take upon an indirect role. They believe the EU to be an actor that is not directly involved in the Artic affairs, but it could exercise indirect influence. Even though the book of Henriksen et al. expresses their beliefs that the EU could play a strong role in the Arctic, the recommendations made by the authors set out an indirect role for the EU. For example, the book highlights several characteristics as EU law and EU’s market power through which the EU could potentially influence the Arctic without being directly involved in its affairs. Van der Togt also believes that the EU’s direct influence over the Arctic (security) affairs is limited. He argues that the EU is mostly able to exercise influence in an indirect way through for example its Member States. Finally, the article of Osthagen clearly states

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25 that the role of the EU in the Arctic is characterized by support and awareness. The EU is merely capable of assistance in the forms of engagement and comprehension.

2.4.2 Internal or external change

The second dilemma that can be found in the literature is whether the EU should strive for internal or external change. For example, the work of Raspotnik and Chuffart emphasizes that first internal change is needed. From their perspective the EU is advised to reform its institutions, set up new working parties, reinforce the dialogue (also at the national levels) and regularly provide updates over Arctic affairs so that these are taken into consideration in decision-making processes. On the other hand, authors as Dams and Van Schaik, and van der Togt argue that the EU should strive for more international cooperation and engagement with other Arctic actors. They believe that this would be the best way for the EU to influence Arctic affairs and express its interests. This line of reasoning holds that the EU should change its role in the Arctic by focusing on external factors.

2.4.3 Contribution to the existing literature

This thesis will seek to employ a different approach than the existing literature has done. Rather than developing an analysis of how the current EU Arctic strategy could best be improved, this thesis will use two theoretical IR perspectives to set out two scenarios that both entail a new EU Arctic strategy and its possible implications. Both strategies will not be perfect but sketching multiple options they will help to foresee issues and find possibilities that one initially might not have thought of. This thesis uses two perspectives that might provide different points of views than the previous literature has done and by that encourage out-of-the-box-thinking. Scenario methodology helps to develop sensitivity to external changes and opportunities. Hence this thesis seeks to contribute by perhaps not setting out the perfect EU Arctic policy but rather by putting forward new perspectives that will start the debate. In this way it seeks to contribute to the development of the best possible renewed EU Arctic policy.

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Section 3. Theoretical Framework

Within this chapter two theories, structural realism and liberal institutionalism, will be set out. These theories provide input for the scenarios constructed later. Their perspectives and assumptions will be explained first. Structural realism and institutional liberalism have been selected to provide

theoretical input since they are based on positivism and rationalism. Consequently, the theories help to formulate a simplified version of reality and have explanatory and predictive value. This is valuable for policy formation (Chernoff, 2005; 23).

Positivism believes that science should be based on systematic observation. It seeks to produce general laws through the collection of data that is generated by repeated observations. This means that for positivism there are causal relations which can be discovered through the detection of regular patterns of observable behavior (Kurki and Wight, 2006; 22). Structural realism is based on

positivism. Waltz emphasized the instrumental function of knowledge; knowledge must be useful, not truthful (Waltz, 1979; 5).

Liberal institutionalism is based on rationalism. Rationalism acknowledges the complexity of the social world but ignores most of it. In this way, it can produce predictions based on particular understandings of individuals (Kurki and Wight, 2006; 24). Keohane has taken the label rationalism from rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is a method constructed from a commitment to a positivist account of science. According to rational choice theory, individuals and especially states should be treated as utility maximizers. Every other aspect of the social being should be ignored. Rationalism does not actually believe that this is the correct description of an individual.

Nevertheless, to treat individuals in this way helps to generate a series of well-grounded predictions concerning behavior based on observed outcomes. Hence rationalism accepts the limitations of the approach but uses it to produce knowledge (Kurki and Wight, 2006; 25).

Both structural realism and liberal institutionalism use observation and measurement with the attempt to specify general universal laws. They make assumptions from which arguments,

explanations, and predictions can be derived (Moravscik, 1997; 513). Nevertheless, the value of a positive account of science, from which both theories are derived, is debated within IR.

Post-positivist theories argue that all observations are theory laden (Chernoff, 2005; 109). Each individual is biased by its experiences, ideology, culture etc. Hence all measurement is fallible. We are unable to measure reality with certainty. In fact, most post-positivist theories believe that the world is socially constructed by our perceptions (Kurki and Wight, 2006; 23). Positivism is thus criticized for

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27 that it fails to acknowledge the possibility that all theories are to some extent politically and socially contextualized (Kurki, 2009; 442). Consequently, positivism might develop predictions that are fundamentally flawed since they do not consider the social context from which they are derived. This thesis is aware of the weaknesses of structural realism and liberal institutionalism but still has decided to employ them. This because they are universal theories. Both theories focus on the bigger picture rather than the individual level. The theories help to formulate a simplified version of reality. They explain general patterns and trends (Chernoff, 2005; 194). This thesis develops scenarios that provide future trajectories for a new EU Arctic policy. For the construction of scenarios,

simplification of reality is needed, just as the explanatory and predictive value of the theories. Hence, although flawed, structural realism and liberal institutionalism remain suitable theories for the aim of this thesis.

Structural realism and liberal institutionalism will facilitate the creation of new insightful EU Arctic policies. Structural realism will develop a policy that focuses on the geopolitical tensions in the region. Critics have argued that the current EU Arctic policy fails to respond to these. Hence a structural realist scenario will be useful to analyze the possible implications of a stronger approach. On the other hand, the perspective of liberal institutionalism is more in line with the current EU Arctic policy. The liberal institutionalist policy focuses on cooperation and institutions, just like the current approach. Yet the liberal institutionalist policy will be less normative and more focused on power. Hence this approach is valuable since it slightly more assertive but also presents the current EU perspective.

3.1 Structural Realism

Realist theory uses concepts as anarchy, power, survival, and self-help to explain the behavior of states. Realism is based upon the assumption that the world is imperfect. Structural realism explains the imperfectness of the world by the structure of the system. Classical realism on the other hand, focuses on human and domestic factors (Morgenthau [1948] 2005; chap.1). Structural realism is better at explaining state behavior at the international level, due to its focus on the structure. Hence this thesis will employ a structural realist perspective as this better suits it purposes.

A prominent structural realist is Kenneth Waltz. In his book Theory of International Politics, he sets out the main tenets of structural realism. He criticizes theories that use the individual and unit-level to explain international politics. According to Waltz, these types of theories have too much variation in their causes to explain international outcomes. (Waltz 1979, 68). Consequently, he created a

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28 theory that focuses on systemic causes to explain the international system and international

phenomena as stability and conflict (Waltz, 1979; 68).

Within the next section the theory of Waltz will be outlined first as his works have helped to establish the foundation and main assumptions of structural realism. Secondly, the offensive and defensive realist perspectives will seek to answer the question “how much power is enough?” and demonstrate the structural realist focus on relative gains. Next, the possibility of cooperation in a structural realist world will be analyzed. As a conclusion, there will be provided a short structural realist analysis of the current situation in the Arctic.

3.1.1 The ordering principal - anarchy

According to Waltz the system consists out of three components: the ordering principle, the

specification of the units and the distribution of capabilities. To start with, the ordering principle or in other words, the structure of the system, can be defined in two forms. The first is hierarchy, which refers to a centralized and integrated system that is composed of a division of labor (Waltz, 1979; 88). Domestic systems are characterized by hierarchy. The second form is anarchy. Anarchy refers to a decentralized and segmented system with no division of labor. The international system is

characterized by anarchy: at the international level there is no overarching authority that holds actors responsible for their actions (Waltz, 1979; 88).

The theory of Waltz is based on microeconomics. Microeconomics helps structural realism to create a simplified version of reality. This makes it easier for structural realism to explain and predict the behavior of actors (Waltz, 1979; 91). For Waltz, the patterns of behavior of the units emerge from the structural constraints of the system. The structure of the international system, anarchy, results in that the ultimate goal of states is survival. Since the international system lacks a higher authority, states constantly feel threatened by other states. This because the security of a state is never assured. To ensure their survival states must rely on power and self-help. If a state is sufficiently powerful, the risks of being attacked by another state are low. Consequently, according to Waltz states are power seeking units (Waltz, 1979; 93).

3.1.2. The character of the units - states

The main units of analysis are states. States are defined as sovereign political entities that are largely the same (Waltz, 1979; 92). According to structural realism, states can only be differentiated by their capabilities and not by the functions they perform. This because structural realists treat states as black boxes. States are alike in the tasks they face, but not in the abilities they possess to perform

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29 them. The structure of the international system is therefore influenced only by the variation in

capabilities of states (Waltz, 1979; 93).

One might wonder how structural realism can be used to analyze the implications of the EU Arctic policy, when the EU is not a state. Although emphasis is on states, structural realism does not argue that other actors of importance do not exist. Furthermore, in the works of other structural realists as Adrian Hyde-Price and Barry Posen, the EU is also taken as unit of analysis. In fact, Hyde-Price analyzes the EU’s foreign policy and identifies points for improvement through the eyes of a

structural realist (Hyde-Price, 2008). In addition, Posen analyzes whether the EU could be a potential threat for the US (Posen, 2006). Both authors do not specifically state that the EU can be employed as a topic of analysis in the same way as states can. Yet this is indirectly implied as both authors have done exactly this in their articles. Based on their articles, it follows that the EU can be seen as an international actor that influences the behavior of other units in the international system.

3.1.3 The distribution of capabilities

Structural realism thus distinguishes units based on the distribution of capabilities. Variation of structure is introduced, not through differences in the character and function of units but only through distinctions made among them according to their capabilities (Mearsheimer 2006, 72). The distribution of capabilities refers to the amount of power a state holds. For states the amount of power they hold is important to ensure their survival. This because the international system is characterized by anarchy and self-help, therefore the security of a state depends on how powerful it is. If a state is sufficiently powerful, other states will not attack it.

Mearsheimer has identified two forms of power. The first, military power, is defined as the amount of material capabilities that a state controls. This means that the amount of power of a state depends on the amount of tangible military assets a state possesses. The second form of power is called latent power. This refers to the socio-economic ingredients that are used to build military power. Latent power is determined by a state’s wealth and the size of its population (Mearsheimer 2006, 72–3). Hence it is possible for states to gain power via other ways than war. For example, a growth in population or a growth in their share of global wealth also results in an increase of power.

The EU does not directly possess military power, but it does have a common security and defense policy. Through this policy already several military missions have been performed (EEAS, 2016; 1). Hence the EU is able to exercise military power even though it does not directly possess military assets. In addition, the EU possesses a high amount of latent power. It holds a population that is half as large as the population of the US while its GDP being equal to that of the US (Posen, 2006; 152).

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3.1.4 How much power is enough?

Structural realists disagree over how much power is enough. There are two perspectives in this debate. To start with, offensive realism. Offensive realism argues that it is rational for states to strive for as much power as possible. This is the best way to ensure its survival. A prominent advocate of this perspective is Mearsheimer. He has developed 5 assumptions that support the offensive realist line of reasoning. The assumptions, only when taken together, explain why states compete for power. The first assumption entails that states are the main actors in international politics and they operate in an anarchic system. The second assumption holds that all states possess at least some military power (Mearsheimer, 2001; 32). This means that every state, to some extent, can do harm to its neighbor. Thirdly, states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. Some states might be satisfied with the status quo (status quo states) while others would like to increase their amount of power (revisionist states). It would be desirable to know the intentions of other states, yet this is impossible. Even if a state could with some certainty tell the other state’s intentions of today, it will never be able to determine the intentions of the same state tomorrow. The fourth assumption holds that the main goal of states is survival. The priority of states is to maintain their territory and their domestic authority. Although states might pursue other goals, in the end survival will always be the most important. The fifth and final assumption entails that states are rational actors. States create strategies that will maximize their chances of survival. Yet these strategies might not always be successful since states operate in a system with imperfect information (Mearsheimer, 2001; 34).

Based upon these assumptions offensive realism illustrates that in a system of self-help, states fear each other. There is no trust among them, and the other states’ intentions are unknown. Since there is no higher order that will help a state under attack, there is constantly the possibility to be

overthrown. A state must rely on its own capabilities to ensure its survival. It is impossible to determine how much power would be enough to ensure a state’s survival. Hence it is best to always strive for the most power possible. A state is always better off with too much power than too little. Consequently, offensive realism defines states as power maximizers. They will always strive for the highest amount of power possible (Mearsheimer 2001, chap 2).

Defensive realism holds a different perspective on how much power a state needs. Defensive structural realists believe that states should not seek to maximize their power but rather strive for an appropriate amount of power. States need a sufficient amount of power to maintain the status quo and counter potential threats (Waltz, 1979; 40). Yet it would be unwise for states to strive for hegemony. This because if a state seeks to improve its security, it can only do this by increasing its power. However, according to the security dilemma, if the power of one state increases, the security

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31 of other states decreases (Jervis 1999; 49). Hence a state can never improve its position without threatening the survival of others.

Consequently, if a state seeks to increase its power this will be counterproductive. By doing this, a state will provoke hostility among other states as this threatens their security. In these situations, a balancing of power will occur.2_{States will form a coalition to prevent an aggressive state from}

becoming too powerful. According to defensive realism, states should therefore not strive for power maximization as aggression will be shut down by other states. States could best choose to maintain the status quo. By maintaining the status quo there would be mutual security and this is the overall end goal of states (Walt 2006, 99).

Hence defensive realism believes that if possible, in most situations it is best to avoid conflict. The offense-defense balance illustrates that overall defensive strategies are the most beneficial for states to pursue. This because by performing a cost-benefit analysis a rational state will always find war more costly than maintaining the status quo (Jervis, 1978; 214). As a result, for rational states it is more logical to adopt a defensive strategy. Nevertheless, defensive realists do acknowledge that in certain situations conflict is unavoidable.

Both offensive and defensive realism agree that nuclear weapons have little utility for offensive purposes. Except if only one party in the conflict has them (Mearsheimer, 2006; 82). The result of a war between nuclear powers could be mutual destruction and this would be in the interests of neither of the parties. Conventional war between nuclear powers would be possible however unlikely

because of the danger of it to spillover to the nuclear level (Mearsheimer, 2006; 82). Defensive realism adds that states would never engage in a war where the possibility of nuclear exchange exists, as this is not rational. States base their decisions on cost-benefit analyses and the potential of miscalculation resulting a nuclear war would be too costly (Waltz, 1990; 740).

The offensive and defensive realist perspectives help to illustrate that structural realism is focused on relative gains. Offensive realism argues that states are consumed with the amount of power they hold compared to other states rather than absolute power. This because the more powerful a state is

2_{Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or by establishing alliances to prevent or}

deter the territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition (Schweller, 2004; 166). Additional to the balance-of-power theory, there is the balance-of- threat theory. In certain situations, states might choose to

bandwagon. This means that states will form an alliance with the aggressive, more powerful state. Bandwagoning is most likely to occur if the costs of opposing an aggressive state are higher than aligning with the aggressive state. Bandwagoning is therefore an option that is often chosen by the weaker states (Walt 2006, 99).

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32 relative to its rivals, the better its chances for survival (Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 2). The loss in power of one state, means a gain in power of another.

Defensive realism bases its argument on the zero-sum game. This holds that since a gain in territory or power of state A would always come at the expense of another state (e.g. state B), a third state C might also be helped if state C is a rival of state B. Consequently, states are not only focused on how much a state gains itself but also on how much other states gain. If other states gain more, this might be threatening to the security of state A (Jervis 1999; 44).

3.1.5 Structural realism and cooperation

Due to the structural realist focus on relative gains, cooperation is complex. According to offensive realism, states will always consider how the profits or gains of cooperation will be distributed among them. A state will only cooperate if it becomes better, or at least not worse, than any other state in the agreement (Mearsheimer, 1994; 12). However, if all states are focused on the relative-gains logic, cooperation will become difficult to achieve. In addition, states are reluctant to cooperate due to concerns about cheating. States fear that the other side might cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage (Mearsheimer, 1994; 13).

Defensive realism holds a more positive perspective on cooperation. Defensive realism agrees that cooperation is risky and that states will always prioritize their self-interests. However, it does believe that under certain conditions states can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation (Taliaferro, 2001; 130). Defensive realism believes that international institutions would help to diminish the risks of cooperation (Glaser, 2003; 409). They provide information that reduces the costs of cheating, create efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs and sharing resources, and help states to determine the motives of others. Hence according to defensive realism, institutions help to make cooperation as safe and beneficial as possible, and therefore help a state to achieve its security goals (Glaser, 2003; 409).

From a defensive realist perspective, the establishment of the EU is thus rational. Structural realism acknowledges that although security and survival are the most important objectives of states, they also pursue other goals. The EU helps the Member States to effectively pursue their economic interests, it helps to shape the regional milieu and it has come to serve as the institutional repository of the normative concerns of the Member States (Hyde-Price, 2008; 31). Hence the EU helps the Member States to achieve their secondary objectives while reducing the risks of cooperation. In addition, the EU could also be seen as an attempt of the MS to balance against the threat of the US becoming the hegemon. Following the balance-of-power theory, to ensure their survival the MS have

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33 balanced their powers to counterbalance the US (Posen, 2006; 153). Furthermore, the EU increases the security of its Member States through the mutual defense clause of the Lisbon treaty. This clause requires MS to offer military assistance to any Member State that experiences armed aggression

(Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union). A Member State will thus never have to counter an armed attack alone.

3.1.6 Structural realism and the Arctic

From a structural realist perspective, the Arctic region is a clear illustration of how anarchy affects the international system. The region consists out of territory hold by different states. This means that multiple sovereign entities hold the legitimacy to act in the region without there being an overarching authority. Furthermore, for some territory it even remains unclear to whom it belongs. Since there is an absence of a higher authority, governance of the Arctic is difficult. States will need to cooperate to govern the Arctic effectively however all states have different interests to protect. Finding

common ground has proven to be difficult, especially since states do not know the others’ intentions. In addition, several actors, e.g. Russia and the US have acted aggressively. Defensive realists would therefore argue that in this situation the AC would be the best means available for states to achieve their goals. This because the AC provides information on other states’ intentions and increases efficiency. Nevertheless, the current increased geopolitical tensions hinder cooperation. States start to pursue their self-interests and seek to protect these through increasing their military presence. The amount of threats in the region have increased.

The EU Arctic policy has not followed a structural realist path. The EU has disregarded any form of military involvement in the Arctic and has shown little interest in the exploitation of the new

economic opportunities. The EU Arctic strategy is not focused on individual gains, rather it strives for the EU to become a normative power. An EU Arctic policy based on a structural realist

perspective would be much more concerned with the increased geopolitical tensions in the region. The EU would be advised to increase its military presence and pursue its self-interest to ensure its survival.

Since the Arctic policy of the EU has been criticized for its failure to adequately respond to the current developments in the region, structural realism might be particularly helpful. This because critics have argued that the EU is focused too much on normative power and has lost sight of the geopolitical threats. A structural realist policy would prioritize the tensions in the region and develop a stronger EU Arctic approach. The structural realist will thus provide a scenario entirely different from the current EU Arctic policy and might therefore present new insights.

The exploration of a new EU Arctic policy: possible policies and implications