1 Jasper Bongers- Thesis Bachelor Political Sciences- 2014- Global Justice
Informal World Citizenship:
a New Perspective on the
Debate between
Cosmopolitans and National
Republicans
Jasper Bongers 10267026 Bachelor Thesis Political Sciences
Global Justice 9291 Words
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Introduction
Current debates on republican citizenship seem to be in a deadlock. There is disagreement amongst schools within republicanism, on how the republican goals can best be pursued. On the one hand there is national republicanism, offering the conventional way of theorizing about republican citizenship; and the on the other hand there is cosmopolitanism, criticizing national republicanism but not offering a convincing alternative to it.
The most notable attempt to reconcile national republicanism with cosmopolitanism in the current literature, is statist cosmopolitanism. Statist cosmopolitans convince most scholars that cosmopolitanism is important, but their analysis of republican citizenship stays within the narrow conceptual framework of national republicanism. I argue that by staying within this framework, statist cosmopolitans fail to see the full political potential of cosmopolitanism citizenship.
In this thesis, I will offer a new perspective on the debate between cosmopolitanism and national republicanism. I argue that a degree of cosmopolitan citizenship already exists, although it is not formalized. I call this type of cosmopolitan citizenship; informal world citizenship.
National republicans can convincingly argue that informal world citizenship does not meet the threshold for citizenship. But despite that, the concept of informal world citizenship can help to clarify the debate between cosmopolitanism and national republicanism, by enriching the conceptual toolbox.
To set the stage for the concept of informal world citizenship, I start by explaining what republican citizenship is and what its goals are. Secondly, I will discuss the current debate between national republicans and cosmopolitans. Thirdly, I will analyse the attempt of statist cosmopolitans to reconcile cosmopolitanism with national republicanism. Fourthly, I will introduce the concept of informal world citizenship, and give examples of how informal world citizenship has been exercised in practice. Lastly, I will discuss the relationship between informal world citizenship and formal national citizenship. My conclusion will be that informal world citizenship can help advance the goals of republicanism, as a complement for (rather than as a full-fledged alternative to) formal national citizenship. Together informal world citizenship and formal national citizenship can best combat domination.
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Citizenship
Because there will be different usages of the term citizenship in this thesis, it is necessary to give a basic outline of what is understood under the term citizenship. Scholars studying citizenship notoriously disagree on how to conceptualize it (Leydet, 2014 and Honohan, 2009). However, practically all authors agree with the idea that citizenship entails two elements: (a) membership of a community, and (b) some sort of political relationship. In effect, to be a citizen is to be a member of a political community (Stoker, 2011: chapter 8). Below I will discuss the two elements of this definition.
(a) Membership: crudely put, one who is a citizen is included and one who is a non-citizen is excluded (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010: 696). Those who are citizens form a group, owing allegiance to one another. Regularly this requirement of membership is highly formalized through passports. When I will present the concept of informal world citizenship, I will argue that such a formalization is not necessary to speak of membership.
(b) Political power: in this thesis I will use Miller’s definition of political relationships: a political relationship holds the middle between coercive force and rational discussion. Political relationships provide a way for resolving disagreements that allows compromising and accepting decisions that are not in one’s personal interest (Miller, 2011: 6-9). Later in this thesis, it will be discussed that the conclusions drawn from this definition can vary significantly.
Republican citizenship
Republican citizenship is the benchmark for other concepts in this thesis: national republicans will claim that cosmopolitanism does not meet the standards for republican citizenship; cosmopolitans will criticize national republicans, for being incoherent in applying the republican goals; and most notably, at the end of this thesis I will advocate that informal world citizenship can help advance the goals of republican citizenship.
Generally republicans hold that the collective of citizens should decide on the destiny of their political community. Hence in republicanism, citizenship is for an important part an activity, the
4 activity of deciding what destiny to pursue (Peterson, 2011: 76 and Slaughter, 2012: 90, Dagger, 2003)1. For republicans, citizens stand above the law and the government, because ultimately citizens should have the power to decide what the law and the government are (Amar, 1994). As citizens stand above the law and the government in republicanism, it is closely related to the concept of popular sovereignty. All legitimate authority, whether it is the government or the law, is ultimately derived from the consent of citizens (Peter, 2014). Whilst all republican authors (or: practically all republican authors) agree with the importance of this concept of popular sovereignty; they do not all agree with the conventional interpretation of popular sovereignty. In discussing the debate between cosmopolitans and national republicans, I analyse the differences in interpretations of popular sovereignty.
The most important goal in republicanism is freedom, understood as non-domination. Non-domination is the moral guideline for what citizens should try to achieve with their sovereignty over the political community. As Laborde formulates it: “citizens will be motivated to make sure that they-
or their state- do not dominate others; that they are not dominated by others; and that others are not dominated by others” (Laborde, 2010: 51).
A broad understanding of non-domination
Pettit is the leading author on the theory of freedom as non-domination. For him someone is dominated if another person has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis (Pettit, 1997: 52). Pettit’s account of non-domination seems to imply that domination is necessarily intentional. I will follow Krause in her analysis that domination does not always involve intention. “Domination, as
Pettit conceives it, requires a conscious capacity for control on the part of the dominant party,
whereas much of racism and sexism and other cultural biases that currently constrain the life-chances (…) are largely unconscious and unintentional” (Krause, 2003: 188). As Shapiro explains “domination can be experienced as a by-product of political, social and economic structures. Such structures cannot be reducible to human agency, but they could not exist without it” (Shapiro, 2012: 307). Only
later, when I discuss informal world citizenship, will I analyse the relationship between unintended domination and human agency. For now it is important to explain that I use a broader definition of domination that Pettit does, to include unintended, structural domination.
Some authors make a distinction between domination and oppression. Oppression is rather the unintended domination of particular groups, than that it is the result of choices and policies. “Its
1 Republicanism’s account of ‘citizenship as activity’ stands in contrast to the more passive ‘citizenship as
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causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules.” (Young, 2009: 56).
However, I join critical republicans as Laborde in arguing that republicanism’s goal is to combat intentional- as well as unintentional domination. Critical republicans have “an interest in social
critique and in social change: they start from existing institutions and relationships, identify their dominating and oppressive features, and advocate their transformation” (Laborde, 2010: 50). Later in
this thesis I will discuss three examples of how informal world citizenship can be used to advocate the transformation of dominating structures.
Below I will discuss formal national citizenship, the conventional way in which republicanism is put into effect. After doing so, I will move on to the discussion between national republicans and cosmopolitans.
National republicanism and formal national citizenship
Typically, national republican authors draw a narrow conclusion from Miller’s definition of political relationships, that political relationships hold the middle between coercive force and rational discussion. “So”, say most national republicans, “politics must involve the idea of an authority whose
decisions on some contested issue are taken in general as binding” (Miller, 2002: 8).
National republicans tend to understand citizenship as formal national citizenship, they generally perceive the requirements of citizenship in a formal and narrow way. The membership requirement for citizenship could supposedly only be fulfilled by membership of a national
community; and the political requirement by allowing national citizens to rule sovereignly over their state. Citizens collectively form the, above mentioned, authoritative body. By voting, citizens can direct the state towards the destiny that they think the state should pursue (Saward, 2009: 4).
National republicanism presents “a powerful geopolitical narrative in which the world is
divided up into national-scale sovereign units, each the ultimate authority within its territory”
(Purcell, 2003: 570). Supposedly all these national-scale sovereign units hold different values, and take action to pursue them accordingly (Miller, 2002). A simplified example of this is the following:
State A values wealth over leisure, makes the citizenry work hard, and becomes rich; State B values leisure over wealth, lets the citizenry relax, and becomes poor.
6 Unfortunately, in real life things are not so clear cut (Krehoff, 2008). The picture painted above is troubled by for instance the existence of statelessness, dictatorships, coercion and unfair trade. Besides, as part of the national republican collective of citizens one may have the right to be a co-ruler over one’s respective state; but simultaneously this collective body of citizens holds power over the individual citizens. The course that the collective body of citizens decides to take, will not always be to an individual’s liking (Rosanvallon, 2011: 2). When this happens, citizens can object against the will of the collective body (of which they are a member) but once decisions are collectively enforced, citizens practically “cannot avoid complying” (Ypi, 2008: 67)2.
Despite these imperfections, and more imperfections which will be addressed in the
following paragraphs, formal national citizenship does offer possibilities to combat domination at the national level. Marshall’s famous essay “Citizenship and Social Class” provides an example of how national citizenship can be a force for non-domination. As Marshall explains, citizenship has counterbalanced domineering capitalism in England. Through citizenship, the English working class was able to combat the dominated position of being low-born in the 19th century. By using the political and legal power that citizenship gave them, they could counter unintended structural
domination. Marshall describes how formal national citizenship has been used by the English’ poor to found the welfare state (Marshall, 1950). Which in turn has arguably been the most important mechanism of overcoming the domination by capital over labor (Esping-Andersen, 2003).
This is not the place to dig deeply into Marshall’s essay (a good critique has been written by Turner, 1997). However, it is important to distill the function that formal citizenship can have as a force for non-domination. Formal national citizenship provides clarity: within the formal national framework, all citizens have the same right to power. As Miller argues: “equal citizenship means that
every adult member of the political community must enjoy equal rights and responsibilities which together make up the single status of citizen. This is a one-class status—when we talk about people as second-class citizens, we do so in order to drawn attention to the fact that something has gone wrong, that our institutions are not performing in the way that they should: no one can legitimately be a second-class citizen” (Miller, 2008a: 375).
Cosmopolitans contend that although national republicans do not allow for second-class citizens within the national community; the narrow conceptual framework of national republicanism can create second-classness in the global sphere.
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Cosmopolitanism
A useful conceptual tool for discussing cosmopolitanism is Cicero’s metaphor of the concentric circles of morality. “The innermost circle is made up of our family and friends. Next comes the city, where we
enjoy a complex set of economic, legal and political relationships with fellow citizens. Then there is the wider group which we would now describe as a nation or people: Cicero describes it as the
fellowship of those of the same ‘race, tribe and tongue, through which men are bound strongly to one another. Finally there is the fellowship of all people with each other” (Cicero, 44 B.C.: 22).
Cosmopolitans hold that allegiance is owed, first and foremost, to Cicero’s outer circle of morality; the circle of all-humans (Held, 2005: 153)3.
The idea of cosmopolitan citizenship has evolved alongside national citizenship at least since the time of the ancient Greeks (Miller, 2011). Cosmopolitanism was never the primary conception of citizenship, but it was always critically in the shadow of state-citizenship; “Drawing attention to the
moral shortcomings resulting from the exclusiveness that defines territorial citizenship” (Tijsterman,
2014: 1). For instance by criticizing the effect that the state where one is born, has on the life-chances that one gets. Cosmopolitans tend to argue that where you are born has to do with luck, rather than with individual achievement. As Pogge argues: “nationality is just one further deep
contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth” (Pogge, 1988: 247).
In contrast to formal national republicans, republican cosmopolitans interpret the doctrine of popular sovereignty in a broad sense. The community of world citizens should be sovereign, and not the national community (Held, 2004). So although the national community forms a state, and the world community does not, the national community should be responsive to the world community.
From the cosmopolitan perspective the connection between states and moral partialism is called into question (Heater, 2002). Typically cosmopolitans criticize subsidizing national
entrepreneurs, making tax walls to protect local farmers, or denying of foreigners to enjoy the privileges that national citizens have. According to Balibar, national republicanism leads to a law and order perspective of republican citizens ‘vis-à-vis’ non-citizens (Balibar, 2009: 35). Put bluntly: national republicans hypocritically pursue the republican goals for their own citizens, but not for
3 Cosmopolitans tend not to regard their principles are primarily Western. Has Held states: there is no nation
without a woman who yearns for equal rights, no society without a man who denies the need for deference, and no developing country without a person who does not wish for the minimum means of subsistence so that they may go about their everyday lives” (Held, 2004: 21-25).
8 citizens. This arguably creates precisely the type of second-classness that national republicans call “wrong”. Later in this thesis, the criticism of cosmopolitans on statists will be discussed in more depth.
Cosmopolitans disagree on the extent to which moral partialism should be rejected (Pogge, 2002: 86-87, Singer, 2004). Yet, all cosmopolitans hold that more than New-Yorkers, Chinese or Latin-American, we are humans; that the world community is more important than the national
community; and that citizenship should be organized accordingly (Held, 2005: 167). In the following paragraph I will discuss different positions within cosmopolitanism, on how cosmopolitan citizenship should be organized.
Cosmopolitanism and world citizenship
A variety of perspectives currently go by the name of cosmopolitanism (Murphy and Harty, 2010: 183). Broadly speaking, there are three types of cosmopolitanism that engage in debate with national republicans. Here I will discuss these three forms of cosmopolitan citizenship and explain what role these types of cosmopolitanism will play in the rest of my thesis.
(1) The first type of cosmopolitanism pursues a world government. Under this world government, the whole world would become something like a super-state. For example voting rights, tax-systems and passports would all be organized at the global level. World government cosmopolitans agree with the perspective of national republicans, but they argue for a shift of sovereignty. Sovereignty should be transferred from the national- to the world level.
I will not discuss world government cosmopolitanism elaborately in this thesis. One reason for this, is that world government cosmopolitans have the same conception of citizenship as republicans have (with the notable difference of the world-scale as opposed to the national scale); and another reason for not discussing world government
cosmopolitanism in depth, is the infeasibility of the creation of a world government. As Krasner argues: “World government is (…) infeasible as a solution to global problems because
of the unsurpassable difficulties of establishing “authoritative hierarchies” at the global or international level” (Krasner, 1999: 42). The current state of international relations does not
9 foreseeable future (Faist, 2001)4. Although I will not discuss world government
cosmopolitanism elaborately, I will return to the possibility of a world government shortly when I discuss informal world citizenship.
(2) The second type of cosmopolitanism is multi-level cosmopolitanism. These multi-level cosmopolitans argue that the state should be “another level of appeal, and not the sole and
final one” (Tan, 2000: 101). Multi-level cosmopolitanism is a weaker version of world
government cosmopolitanism. It argues for the dispersion of sovereignty, providing “some
central organs of world government” but allowing national communities to maintain
sovereignty on other issues (Pogge, 1988: 285).
Multi-level cosmopolitans contend that citizenship should be held at all Cicero’s concentric circles of morality. All individuals should have multiple citizenships, reflecting individuals’ simultaneous membership of political communities at a variety of spatial scales and perhaps of non-territorial social groups (such as religions, sexual minorities and ethnical diaspora’s) (Painter, 1998). In the paragraph below I will discuss multi-level cosmopolitanism.
(3) Moral cosmopolitanism is the last type of cosmopolitanism. Unlike multi-level cosmopolitanism and world government cosmopolitanism, it does not have political
aspirations. That is to say, it does not claim to meet the political requirement for citizenship. “Moral cosmopolitanism would be satisfied with the elaboration of human rights and
democracy in states across the world” (Slaughter, 2012: 89).
As I will explain later, moral cosmopolitanism forms the basis for both statist cosmopolitanism and informal world citizenship; “moral cosmopolitanism advances
principles on the basis of which institutions should be justified and criticized” (Slaughter,
2012: 86).
National republican arguments against cosmopolitanism
National republicans contend that citizenship loses its meaning when it is divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality (Linklater, 2002: 23-24). In the paragraphs to come I will discuss national republicans' arguments against cosmopolitanism. National republicans argue that multi-level cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism do not provide convincing alternatives to formal
10 national citizenship. Although moral cosmopolitanism and multi-level cosmopolitanism offer
praiseworthy moral norms, they do not deserve the name citizenship (Miller, 2011). According to national republicans, multi-level citizenship meets neither the political, nor the membership requirement of citizenship.
As moral cosmopolitanism does not even claim to meet the political requirement, one could say that it is unnecessary to discuss moral cosmopolitanism in this paragraph. However, to build a foundation for arguments made later on in this thesis, I choose to address moral cosmopolitanism alongside multi-level cosmopolitanism.
To argue that cosmopolitanism does not meet the political requirement for citizenship, national republicans run the sovereignty argument; and to argue that cosmopolitanism does not meet the membership requirement, national republicans run the threshold argument. This will be elaborated below.
The political requirement and the sovereignty argument
National republicans argue that multi-level cosmopolitanism does not meet the political requirement for citizenship. For national republicans, citizens collectively form a legislative body. Through this collective body, citizens are co-legislators to the laws that structure common life (Tijsterman, 2014: 2-5). As Nagel explains, citizenship is a dual role: “each member plays both as one of the societies
subjects and as one of those in whose name it is exercised. One might even say we are all participants in the general will” (Nagel, 2005: 128). Cosmopolitan citizenship does not meet this requirement of
sovereign co-legislation. From the perspective of the sovereignty argument, multi-level citizenship and the sovereignty of national citizens are incompatible5.
Along the lines of the sovereignty argument, multi-level citizenship would require multiple sovereignties. This would not be conform with a rigid definition of sovereignty, as all-powerfulness (Philpot, 2001). Imagine that sovereignty over the territory of Brazil was held by the citizenship layer of Brazilians, the citizenship layer of South-Americans, and the citizenship layer of all-humans. Then, how could all these layers be all-powerful? In the sovereignty argument, only one sovereign can be
5 According to the sovereignty argument, sovereignty is dichotomous. Pogge’s argument that multi-level
cosmopolitanism provides “some central organs of world government” but allows national communities to maintain sovereignty on other issues; makes no sense along these lines (Pogge, 1988: 285). From the perspective of the sovereignty argument, sovereignty is either ‘here’ or ‘there’, it cannot be shared.
11 sovereign over a certain territory6. From the perspective of the sovereignty argument, moral
cosmopolitan citizenship makes no sense at all, since it gives no account whatsoever on where political sovereignty rests.
At the end of my thesis, I shall return to this sovereignty argument. I believe that although it is a quite rigid account, the clarity it provides can be useful in achieving republican goals.
The membership requirement and the threshold argument
In the threshold argument, the membership requirement for citizenship is seen as a threshold concept. Only from a certain degree of reciprocal, communal feelings the membership requirement for citizenship is met. Along the lines of the threshold argument, it can be argued that membership of the national community meets this threshold; and that membership of the world community does not. Although all humans to some extent form a community of all-humans, communal feelings are arguably not sufficiently present at the world level to meet the requirement for citizenship. The threshold argument can be used against both multi-level cosmopolitanism and moral
cosmopolitanism, since from this perspective their claim is the same: that a communal feeling worthy of the name citizenship exists outside of the national community.
Whether world citizenship meets the threshold for citizenship or not, is an interesting topic for further research. Here I will refrain from answering this question, since determining where the threshold should be, is too arbitrary and requires too much empirical analysis for my purposes here. Later in this thesis I will return to this matter, when I explain what role informal world citizenship can play in the global context. Here I will only briefly explain how national cosmopolitans frame the threshold argument.
Authors that run the threshold argument, state that citizenship is anchored in the world of bounded national communities. Cosmopolitans tend to make a-priori statements about all-humans being human, forgetting that communities are built on strong feelings of loyalty and reciprocity, rather than on theoretical statements (Dallmeyer, 2012). According to Miller, cosmopolitans generally think too lightly about the strong communal ties that bind a nation together. As he states: “the civitas must be a political community held together not just by law and constitution, but by
relationships of friendship and solidarity among the citizens” (Miller, 2008b: 133).
6 Interestingly, in multi-level cosmopolitanism also the sub-state level could be potential levels of citizenship. In
this thesis I do not have the space to address this issue; but it could be argued that sub-state citizenship problematizes the bounded national community.
12 Below I will discuss statist cosmopolitanism, the most promising and convincing attempt to merge moral cosmopolitanism with national republicanism. Statist cosmopolitans try to evade the sovereignty argument and the threshold argument; building more on moral cosmopolitanism, than on versions of cosmopolitanism with political aspirations.
Statist cosmopolitanism
Statist cosmopolitanism tries to provide an alternative for the deadlocked discussion between cosmopolitanism and national republicanism. It evades the sovereignty argument, by holding that the national community should remain sovereign; and it evades the threshold argument by maintaining that the moral community of all-humans need not necessarily surpass the assumed threshold required for citizenship (Ypi, 2008: 51). Below I will discuss the argument of statist cosmopolitanism. After I have discussed statist cosmopolitanism, I will argue that by staying within the framework of national republicanism, it is impossible to see the full political potential of moral cosmopolitanism.
Statist cosmopolitans have added to the debate between national republicans and
cosmopolitans, by offering a perspective that merges moral cosmopolitanism with formal national citizenship. Statist cosmopolitans argue that cosmopolitan ideals should be pursued with national means (Slaughter, 2012 and Ypi, 2008). National sovereignty should be used to pursue global ends. Statist cosmopolitans contend that while national republican citizenship is in contradiction with multiple citizenships, the contrast with moral cosmopolitanism is far less problematic (Slaughter, 2012: 93). Statist cosmopolitans hold that the nation-state should be viewed as a potential vehicle for cosmopolitanism, rather than as an opponent to it (Held, 2005).
As Slaughter explains in a republican reading of statist cosmopolitanism; “while
non-domination is a universal goal, it cannot be achieved by universal means” (Slaughter, 2012: 93).
Imagine that Dutch citizens ‘en masse’ decide to distribute an enormous amount of wealth to the global poor. This, according to statist cosmopolitans, would be a form of cosmopolitan citizenship (Dower, 2000: 560-561). Provided that these Dutchmen see themselves (partly) as members of a global community; that they limit their partialism towards other Dutchmen; and that they see the Dutch state as a means towards an end; than they could be called cosmopolitan citizens.
Statist cosmopolitanism leaves the political requirement of citizenship at the national level; along the lines of the sovereignty argument, citizenship is still essentially national. Below I will make the case for informal world citizenship, this type of citizenship can potentially provide political cosmopolitanism, while leaving national formal citizenship intact. I will argue that although statist
13 cosmopolitanism does a good job in showing how cosmopolitanism can play a role besides the national state; there is more to political cosmopolitanism than appears at first sight. By staying within the formal framework of national republicanism, statist cosmopolitans tend to overlook the political potential for cosmopolitan citizenship.
Informal world citizenship
In this part of my thesis I will introduce a new concept into the debate between national republicans, cosmopolitans and statist cosmopolitans; the concept of informal world citizenship. This conception of world citizenship can potentially fulfil the requirements for citizenship without using the
formalized structures of national citizenship. Informal world citizenship interprets Miller’s definition of politics in a broader way than the participants in the current debate do. The commonly made distinction between morality and politics is not as dichotomous as may appear on first sight (Dower, 2000: 567). Informal world citizens can exercise political power by morally criticizing domineering structures. To introduce the concept of informal world citizenship convincingly, I will explain below how membership and political power can be interpreted as informal requirements.
Informal communities
National republican authors have used the threshold argument to state that world citizenship does not meet the requirement for citizenship. However, that does not mean that communal membership does not exist outside of bounded national communities. To some extent all humans are indeed a member of the community of all-humans.
From the perspective of informal world citizenship it can be argued that, although national communities may provide strong communal feelings, national communities are not ontologically privileged. Yack rhetorically asks: whence do national communities derive their boundaries? “On one
hand, it seems like there is a simple and clear answer to the question. A people derives its boundaries from its state. (…) On the other hand, if the people is imagined as prior to the state, as the community that authorizes the establishment of the state's authority and survives its dissolution, then its
boundaries cannot be defined by the boundaries of particular states. (…) The people, it seems, is imagined both as existing prior to the state and as defined by the borders of an already constituted state, or, if you prefer, as both a pre-political and post-political community. In practice, the
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asks questions about the organization of legitimate authority within these boundaries.” (Yack, 1996:
522-523).
Geary takes this line of reasoning a step further. He states that the importance of formal national citizenship rests on a “pseudo-history”. It assumes: “that the peoples (...) are distinct, stable
and objectitively indentifiable social and cultural units, and that they are distinguished by language religion, custom, and national character, which are unambiguous and immutable” (Geary, 2002: 11).
In fact, the boundaries of communities are contested space (Dower, 2000: 563).
All people are members of multiple communities and are somewhere between total inclusion (membership) and total exclusion (non-membership) within these communities. It might be that no one is formally a member of the community of all-humans, and that the world citizenry does not form an authoritative body, but at the end of the day all humans are members of the human community.
To avoid confusion, having a passport to show for, can help individuals to attain inclusion. The perspective of informal citizenship shifts the point of measurement. Not having a passport, but inclusion ‘as such’ is the point of measurement7. Apart from passports, also education, public
discourse and civil disobedience can influence the degree in which one is included (Balibar, 2009: 49). Later in this thesis I will offer an example of how discussing the exclusion of a certain group, has enforced its inclusion.
Although I remain agnostic as to whether informal world citizenship reaches the threshold, it seems obvious that the potential for world citizenship is increasing. The invention of the internet makes global communication on a large scale a lot easier. As Tedesco says: “what delineates the
internet from traditional print and broadcast media, at least in theory, is that its communication network offers ordinary citizens unrestricted access and ability to voice their political agenda to a worldwide audience” (Tedesco, 2004: 510). Although world citizenship may not meet the bar for
citizenship now, it could potentially do so in the future.
This informal world community could in time even become formalized, as world government cosmopolitans want. I cannot a-priori rule out that at some point a directly chosen world government will be feasible. However, for the foreseeable future the nation-state will be the sole provider of a right to power (Soysal, 1998: 193). As Murphy and Harty put it: “we may accept that national
identities are political-historical contingencies that may someday run their course and be superseded by different forms of global or post-national identity, but this is neither the world we face at present nor in the near to medium future” (Murphy and Harty, 2010: 186).
7 Likewise, not everyone with a passport is seen as a citizen. For example third generation immigrants can still
be seen as foreign. From the perspective of informal citizenship, having a passport can help advance inclusion but it is no guarantee (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010).
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Informal power and informal politics
Venomously Foucault states, that authors who understand political power solely as something that has to do with sovereignty, understand less about power than people in the Middle Ages understood about the blood circulation (IJsseling, 1979: 86 and Flyvberg, 1998). That national citizens are
theoretically sovereign does not imply that they are all-powerful in practice. For Foucault, power is located in informal mechanisms, rather than that it rests with individuals (IJsseling, 1979 and
Foucault, 1980). Or as Young interprets it: power lies in “humane practices of education, bureaucratic
administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on” (Young, 2009:
56). Informal power can for example be rooted in (1) language, (2) economic relations and more in general (3) in modes of thought.
(1) Informal power is always rooted in language. Forms of address as ‘girl’, ‘delinquent’ and ‘sinner’ exercise power; they enable and foreclose agency (Butler, 1997: 18). ‘Girls’ supposedly cannot do something that is ‘meant for boys’; ‘delinquents’ are considered untrustworthy; and ‘sinners’ are in a disadvantage when dealing with ‘puritans’.
(2) Informal power is also located in economic relations. This can for example be explained by
putting the previously mentioned example of the national republican in another light. This example was “state A values wealth over leisure, makes the citizenry work hard, and becomes
rich; state B values leisure over wealth, lets the citizenry relax, and becomes poor.” Arguably
that state B is poor, is not because it values leisure over wealth. From the perspective of unintended structural domination, it will probably have more to do with state A’s and state B’s respective positions in the economic world system. Unequal trading possibilities and differences in natural resources are a more likely cause of state B’s poverty, than laziness (Schwartz, 1994).
(3) However, most important for this thesis is that informal power is rooted in ‘modes of thought.’ Every time a person makes a decision, several modes of thought (or
‘governmentalities’ as Foucault calls them) interact within a person’s head (Lemke, 2002). Imagine the following example: Sarah asks Joe to donate money to help save starving children in the Third World. On the one hand, Joe looks at Sarah’s request from a narrowly self-interested perspective, thinking “I could also use the money myself.” At the same time Joe also looks at the matter from a reciprocal perspective, thinking “if I would be a starving
16 child, I would want help.” And from yet another, utilitarian, perspective Joe thinks “actually I think that my money would be better spent if I would give it to another charity organization, since Sarah’s organization is renowned for its inefficiency.” In the end Joe decides to give some money to Sarah, but not too much.
From this Foucauldian perspective Joe is not an autonomous agent, as his thinking is determined by ‘modes of thought.’ For the discussed interaction between utilitarian, communal and self-interested perspectives (and all sorts of other modes of thought) determine Joe’s thinking; rather than ‘Joe himself’ (IJseling, 1979).
The example of Joe and Sarah shows how compromises can also be made within oneself. Joe compromises between the self-interested, communal and utilitarian perspective; choosing to give some money but not too much.
I argue that the compromises that people make in themselves also fit Miller’s definition of politics, if it is interpreted broadly. If politics is a way for reaching compromises, holding the middle between coercive force and rational discussion; the compromising between different modes of thought can be regarded as political. The compromise that Joe reaches (giving some money but not too much) has not been reached because of coercion; and not because of rational discussion either.
The conclusion that national republicans draw (“so politics must involve the idea of an
authority whose decisions on some contested issue are taken in general as binding”) oversimplifies
reality. Below I will explain how informal world citizens can exercise informal political power by drawing on this informal conception of politics.
Exercising power as a republican informal world citizen
Informal world citizens can exercise power by calling on the morality of citizens with whom they do not (necessarily) share a state. This allows for an exercise of political power that remains invisible from the perspective of formal national citizenship. Structural domination (or: oppression) cannot be eliminated solely by forming new laws. “Because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major
economic, political, and cultural institutions.” (Young, 2009: 6). In other words: to stop the
domination of homosexuals, more would be needed than a legal ban on homophobia. Instead, structural domination has to be combatted by altering the role that human agency plays in unintended domination.
By criticizing an actor that is partaking in dominating structures, informal world citizens can fight unintended domination. “Accusing a person of contributing to domination, questions the
17
legitimacy of the current way a person acts” (Shapiro, 2012: 308). To explain this, it is useful to again
use the example made by national republicans that “state A values wealth over leisure, makes the
citizenry work hard, and becomes rich; state B values leisure over wealth, lets the citizenry relax a bit more, and becomes less rich.” As we have seen, it can be argued that this wealth of state A is likely to
be due to positions within the global economic system; more than to its citizens working hard. Suppose that we take this analysis even a step further. For example, by hypothesizing that state A upholds the breaking of human rights in state B, because of their respective roles in the global economic system.
Informal world citizens could than use their informal political power to protest against the domination of state A over state B. This protest would be more than simply saying “state A upholds
the breaking of human rights”. Instead it says: “state A should stop playing a role in the breaking of human rights” (Dower, 2000). By protesting, a (moral) cosmopolitan ‘mode of thought’ could be
promoted. Of course saying that state A should change its course of action does not directly lead state A to stop playing a role in domineering structures. Usually actors only change their ways after substantial pressure. They “generally only quit their dominating positions if they cannot do
otherwise” (Shapiro, 2012: 330). In practice, it will probably be necessary that other states and their
citizenries join in the protest against state A’s upholding the breaking of human rights (and the breaking of human rights in general). Later in my thesis, I will return to this interplay between informal world citizenship and states.
Cosmopolitanism can play a role in combatting domination that transcends the relationship between individual and state. Informal world citizens can promote the moral cosmopolitan ‘mode of thought’, and thereby exercise political power. Because I understand that this way of excising power can still be a bit vague I will give three practical examples in the following paragraph.
Examples
To further explain how power can be exercised by informal world citizens, I will present three examples in this paragraph. All three examples show how world citizens can exercise power, without using the formal structures of national citizenship.
18
The “sans papiers” and the demarcations of political
communities
The French ‘sans papiers’ (literally: without papers) provide the first example of world citizenship. Although people without passports are regularly referred to as illegals, the ‘sans papiers’ insist on being called paperless. By doing so, they have changed the way that people think about the demarcations of formal citizen communities in France, and in the world.
On 18 march 1996, 324 pasportless migrants occupied a church in Paris, calling themselves the
‘sans-papiers’. “This initial action prompted collectives of sans- papiers to organize across the country and was followed by further church occupations, hunger strikes, demonstrations and petitions” (Mc
Nevin, 2006: 135). The paperless demanded to be treated the same as French citizens. They held that since a passport is only a piece of paper, exclusion on the basis of lacking a passport is illegitimate (Mc Nevin, 2006: 141). The ‘sans papiers’ based their claims in terms similar to the terms that cosmopolitans use (arguing for human rights and criticising the rigid demarcations of political communities).
The ‘sans papiers’ have called the way that national political communities are bounded into question (Mc Nevin, 2006: 138). They have confronted the national sovereign citizens and their bounded political communities, with the critique of cosmopolitanism. As Balibar says: “they have
given political activity the transnational dimension which we so greatly require in order to open up perspectives of social transformation and of civility in the era of globalization” (Balibar, 2000: 43).
However, despite the efforts of the ‘sans papiers’ and the critique they gave on bounded political communities, most people still call the ‘sans papiers’ illegals (instead of paperless). Although they might not have ended the demarcations of political communities, they have made a strong impact on the thinking about national citizenship. Interestingly, the French constitutional court ruled that, “foreigners are not French but they are human beings”, thereby expressing agreement with the ‘sans
papiers’ cosmopolitan claims (Soysal, 1998: 203).
The Occupy movement and the neo-liberal economic system
The Occupy movement (2011) is a second example of informal world citizenship. Although Occupy was a notoriously decentralized movement (there were no leaders and no hierarchies) it was a global movement. The Occupy protests spread over 1500 cities throughout the world (Van Gelder, 2011: 2).
19 According to Van Gelder, the Occupy movement criticizes the unfair distribution of wealth in the world: “The Occupy movement, as it has come to be called, named the source of the crises of our
time: Wall Street banks, big corporations, and others among the 1% are claiming the world’s wealth for themselves at the expense of the 99% and having their way with our governments”(Van Gelder,
2011: 1). So, according to Van Gelder Occupy is a world movement trying to help national citizenries regain control over their respective states.
Hosseini provides a different perspective on Occupy as an example of informal world
citizenship. He describes Occupy as criticizing the dominating effects of a neo-liberal global economic system (Hosseini, 2013: 426). Hosseini admits that the Occupy movement started relatively small. Occupy tried to occupy Wall Street, because the protesters blamed the Wall Street firms for causing the financial crisis. But quickly Occupy branched out in terms of geography, demography, and also in terms of ideas (Hosseini, 2013: 434). The analysis that neo-liberalism was to blame for the financial crisis and the global wealth distribution, was soon present in every Occupy camp (Hosseini, 2013: 429).
One can disagree with the effects of neo-liberalism, and even question the very existence of a neo-liberal global economic system, but that does not change the fact that Occupy criticized supposedly domineering neo-liberalism on a global scale. Occupy gives a perspective on how world citizens can have an impact at the global level; influencing the thinking about a supposedly
dominating system.
Protests against nuclear weaponry and global security
A third example of informal world citizenship is the protesting against nuclear weapons. After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) the destruction that atomic bombs could do became apparent. Since these bombings, protests against nuclear weaponry have varied in intensity. Although the global superpowers have deterred one another from striking with nuclear weaponry, this need not mean that the international security situation is was (and is) perceived as safe. As Martin Amis has written, the problem with nuclear deterrence is that ‘‘it can’t last out the necessary
timespan, which is roughly between now and the death of the sun”(Amis, 1987).
Arguably the intensity of anti-nuclear weapon protests peaked after the NATO double-decision on 12 December 1979. NATO would place 572 American middle-range rocket launchers in Western-Europe, unless negotiations with the Soviet Union would succeed in the limitation of nuclear weapons (Van der Beek, 2013).
20 The protesters tried to influence the global superpowers to get rid of their nuclear arsenal, using other means than merely the formal parliamentary structures. They tried to create awareness of the possibilities for mutual destruction in a nuclear war. Due to the protesters, the international security situation was discussed globally. The real alternatives in global security issues, the ‘peace movement’ repeatedly insisted, were either “One world or None” (Wittner, 1993: 331).
Naturally, it is impossible to measure the impact that this movement has had. The world has not come to full destruction, so the ‘None world’ alternative is not the case; although the ‘One world’ alternative does not seem to be the case either. However, it is clear that the people protesting against nuclear weaponry have made a worldwide impact on the thinking about nuclear weapons.
Interpreting and comparing the three examples
In all these three examples world citizens criticize dominating global structures to achieve (or bring closer) republican goals. Whilst the ‘sans papiers’ challenge the dominated effects of the
demarcations of political communities; Occupy the neo-liberal global economic system; and the anti-nuclear protesters the fragility of global security since the invention of anti-nuclear weaponry; all three examples show how informal world citizens can enforce a cosmopolitan ‘mode of thought’.
The examples clarify how informal world citizenship can be utilized by people who cannot control the formal structures. Interestingly, the position of passportless individuals can be compared with the position of the 19th century working class (Balibar, 2009: 50). However, contrary to the English working class people, that have been discussed earlier in this thesis, the ‘sans papiers’ were unable to formally negotiate their relation with a state (Balibar, 2009: 40). Where the English working class surpassed its position of being dominated through formal citizenship; the ‘sans papiers’ have no other political means than informal world citizenship to pursue non-domination. I will use the
paragraph below to further define informal world citizenship.
Defining informal world citizenship
Informal world citizenship refers to the exercise of political power by world citizens through informal means. It offers a perspective on meeting the requirements for citizenship, without the usage of formalized structures. It uses a different conceptual framework than national citizenship, but that need not necessarily mean that it is not citizenship.
21 In this framework, the membership requirement is regarded as membership of a community, not necessarily membership of a national community. All individuals can be part of multiple groups, so in that sense they are all members of multiple communities. Informal world citizenship does not answer the question of where the bar for citizenship should be put, it merely states that national communities are not ontologically privileged. If, for instance, membership of a street would meet the threshold for community membership, one could speak of citizens of a street. Informal world
citizenship offers a flexible perspective on membership, being able to expand notions of citizenship. Later I will say more on how this flexibility can be useful in times of globalization.
Informal world citizenship also offers potential for an informal fulfilment of the political requirement for citizenship. Citizens can use informal political power to combat unintended domination. But as with the membership requirement, it is hard to determine whether the political requirement is met completely. It is close to impossible to say how much political power an
individual world citizen can exercise. Probably there will be significant differences between individuals in their possibilities to exercise informal political power. For instance, highly educated Americans will probably have more informal political power than illiterate Kenyans. In informal world citizenship, there is no equal ‘right to exert power’, as there is in formal national citizenship.
It is possible that informal world citizenship does not meet the requirements for both the political- and the membership requirement. But despite that, informal world citizenship can play an important role in the combatting of unintended domination, by promoting a cosmopolitan ‘mode of thought’. In the paragraph below, I will argue that informal world citizenship can be a complement for formal national citizenship.
Informal world citizenship as complementary to formal
national citizenship
In this thesis I have presented two ways to understand citizenship: formal national citizenship and informal world citizenship. Both these perspectives have their limitations. Informal world citizenship might not reach the threshold for citizenship and it does not provide the clarity that national
citizenship provides. Formal national citizenship, on the other hand, fails to perceive the full potential of cosmopolitan citizenship. Both perspectives offer means for realizing republican goals: formalized citizenship gives rights and power ‘on paper’; informal world citizenship provides possibities for challenging global dominating structures.
22 From the perspective of republicanism, informal world citizenship and formal national citizenship can complement one another. Although I agree with Foucault that the theoretical sovereignty of citizens is not (completely) translated to all-powerfulness in practice; I maintain that theoretical sovereignty is not without importance. Theoretical sovereignty gives citizens clarity, by allowing them to dictate the law and giving them a clear point for where to direct their claims. Informal world citizenship can add to national citizenship, by for instance criticizing the negative side-effects of bounded national communities (Bigo, 2005). Informal world citizenship can, in this manner, steer the course that (‘on paper’) sovereign states take. Although informal world citizenship might not reach the threshold for citizenship, it can bring closer a situation of non-domination. It is arguably more important that informal world citizenship helps combat domination, than that it might not reach the threshold for citizenship.
Naturally there will be interplay between formal national- and informal world citizenship. This has been the case when, for instance, the French constitutional court ruled that foreigners are not French but they are human beings (Soysal, 1998: 204). In a sense, the cosmopolitan position has already become a part of formalized statist structures. And on the other hand, the formalized structures are a part of the demands made by informal world citizens. All three examples of informal world citizenship demonstrate this: the ‘sans papiers’ want to be included in the formalized French structures (just like most people who live in France); the Occupy movement wanted governments to limit the power of the financial markets; and the anti-nuclear weaponry protesters wanted states to quit their atomic weaponry. Pogge’s writings also offer a nice illustration of the interplay between formal and informal citizenship. Citizenship of the world community has an effect on national citizenship, “it gives you the duty to act if you find yourself in an unjust state: by positive action
(protesting, lobbying), negative action (a strike or refusing to pay taxes), or leaving the country (which entails both)” (Pogge, 2002: 88).
Conclusion
As has been discussed in this thesis, national republicanism offers clarity and provides national citizens with a right to control their state. This is important in republicanism’s struggle against domination; but as cosmopolitans have argued, the national republican perspective can also play a causal role in unintended domination. According to cosmopolitans, national republicans apply the republican goal on non-domination in a too partial manner. In turn, national republicans criticize cosmopolitans for being unable to provide a convincing alternative to national republicanism. Statist cosmopolitans have tried to reconcile cosmopolitans with national republicans. They hold that
23 although national communities hold sovereignty over their states, these national communities should use their states to pursue cosmopolitan ends. Statist cosmopolitans perceive the state as a potential vehicle for cosmopolitanism.
Although statist cosmopolitanism provides a compelling perspective on merging moral cosmopolitanism with national republicanism, it fails to see the political potential of moral cosmopolitanism. I have argued that national republicanism, cosmopolitanism and statist
cosmopolitanism all use too formalized notions of citizenship. The requirements of citizenship can be met outside the context of formalized national citizenship.
In this thesis I have designed the concept of informal world citizenship. I have argued that informal world citizenship can provide an addition to formal national citizenship in pursuing republican goals. Albeit formal national citizenship provides transparency and mechanisms for controlling the state, it also has negative unintended by-products. Currently the state where one is born, determines to a large extent the chances an individual will get in life. Informal world citizenship can add to formal national citizenship by criticizing this unintended domination. By, for instance, advocating the fair treatment of state-less people, criticizing unintended domination and addressing issues of global security, informal world citizenship can help advance republican goals.
Although national republicans can convincingly argue that informal world citizenship does not yet reach the threshold for citizenship, informal world citizenship already plays an important role in criticizing the negative effects of formal national citizenship. In a rapidly globalizing world it can be expected that informal world citizenship will become more prominent in the future.
The concept of informal world citizenship adds to the current debate in three ways: (1) by enriching the conceptual toolbox of the debate between cosmopolitans and national republicans; (2) by addressing a political element of cosmopolitanism that is inviable in from the (otherwise
convincing) perspective of statist cosmolitanism; and (3) by providing a concept with which future developments towards world citizenship can be better understood.
(1) Informal world citizenship provides a perspective with which both cosmopolitans and national republicans can agree. Both schools of thought can discuss their differences within the framework provided by informal world citizenship. From the perspective of informal world citizenship, it can be argued that cosmopolitans are right to say that all humans, to some extent, form a community of all-humans. And it can simultaneously be argued that the national community provides much stronger communal feelings. Cosmopolitans are right to argue that the system of bounded political communities can (unintendedly) cause
24 cosmopolitanism cannot provide the clear and formalized structures that formal national citizenship provides.
(2) Informal world citizenship can add to a political interpretation of moral cosmopolitanism to the formal statist cosmopolitan position. From the perspective of statist cosmopolitanism, it is hard to see how world citizens can have a political impact. Statist cosmopolitans tend to take cosmopolitanism as something that is only moral; failing to see how moral claims can also be political. In other words: informal world citizens can help statist cosmopolitans see the full potential of cosmopolitanism.
(3) In our rapidly globalizing world, it is conceivable that informal world citizenship will become more important in the decades to come. As Isin and Turner when speculating about trends in citizenship: The expansion of citizenship ”happens not because there is an identical polity
that exists at another scale but because struggles for redistribution and recognition expand beyond and across borders. Such expansion occurs primarily because of mobility not only of people but also ideas, images, products, values and concerns across borders. Over the last several decades, with the development and deployment of telecommunications, media and transportation technologies there has been an intensification of social relations—both affinities and hostilities—across borders.” (Isin and Turner, 2007: 14). In this changing world
it will be useful to have a flexible concept like informal world citizenship. Because although informal world citizenship might not meet the threshold for citizenship now, it could do so in the future.
Limitations
Below, I will point to five limitations of the account I have presented in this thesis.
1) A lot more could be said on the interplay between informal- and formal politics. The demands of the formally sovereign national citizenry are arguably the result of informal politics. If the national citizenry, for instance, demands that a certain policy should be executed, it can be assumed that complex moral politics precede this policy demand.
Another important, untouched upon example of this interplay between informal- and formal politics is an international treaty. International treaties create a binding legal norm;
25 that simultaneously limits the sovereignty of national communities. Unfortunately I have not had the space to address these topics in this thesis.
2) My intuition is that sovereignty in theory leads to feelings of control in practice. This feeling of control would in turn advance the republican goal of non-domination. In this thesis I have been unable to empirically evaluate this intuition.
3) It could be argued that in time informal world citizenship would loosen the communal ties that hold a nation together. As Purcell indicates, it could be argued that the system of formal sovereign citizenship can only work if citizens are loyal to their states (Purcell, 2003: 565). In effect, a combination of informal world citizenship and formal national citizenship could lead to the dissolving of national sovereign citizenship. This interesting line of thought is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4) In this thesis, very little has been said on the views that actual individual citizens have on cosmopolitan citizenship. Empirical research can answer important questions as “what is the appetite for moral cosmopolitanism?” and “to what extent do individuals see potential for informal world citizenship?” The results of such empirical research could help determine whether informal world citizenship meets the membership requirement for citizenship.
5) Lastly, and most importantly, a lot of work has to be done in determining where the thresholds should be put for the membership- and political requirements for informal citizenship. To compellingly set these thresholds empirical research has to be done on how much membership and political power are provided by formal citizenship. After these thresholds have been set, the potential for informal world citizenship meeting the requirements for citizenship can be analysed further.
26
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