University of Groningen
Why going green feels good
Venhoeven, Leonie A.; Bolderdijk, Jan Willem; Steg, Linda
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Journal of Environmental Psychology
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10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101492
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Environmental Psychology, 71, [101492]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101492
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Journal of Environmental Psychology 71 (2020) 101492
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Why going green feels good
Leonie A. Venhoeven
a,c, Jan Willem Bolderdijk
b,*, Linda Steg
caDijksterhuis & Van Baaren, St. Anthoniusplaats 9, 6511, TR Nijmegen, Groningen, the Netherlands
bDepartment of Marketing, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Groningen, Nettelbosje 4, 9747AE, Groningen, the Netherlands
cDepartment of Psychology, Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1, 9712TS, Groningen, the Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O Handling Editor: Sander van der Linden Keywords:
Meaning
Sustainable behavior Positive emotions
A B S T R A C T
Recent research found that when asked explicitly, people associate (future) sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions. This empirical finding implies that policy makers could harness people’s intrinsic motivation to promote sustainable actions. It is however not clear where this association between sustainable actions and positive emotions stems from. Why would people report that going green feels good, given that such actions often require more effort or inconvenience? We argue and show that the previously found relationship between sustainable actions and anticipated positive emotions is not merely a matter of social desirability, but rather a matter of meaning: acting sustainably is often perceived as a moral choice and thus as a meaningful course of action, which can elicit positive emotions. Specifically, we found that participants also associate sus-tainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions when using an implicit association measure – one that reduces the likelihood of socially desirable responses (Study 1). Moreover, participants anticipated more intense emotions when those actions were meaningful to them: they felt more positive about sustainable actions, and more negative about unsustainable actions, when they chose to engage in those actions and when those actions are considered personally relevant to the individual (Study 2). Together, these studies explain why acting green feels good, and support the notion that sustainable actions are indeed expected (not merely reported) to be intrinsically motivating.
1. Why going green feels good
Environmentally-sustainable actions oftentimes involve a certain degree of discomfort or inconvenience. Taking the bike instead of the car to work, for instance, saves emissions, but requires physical effort, and longer travelling time. Washing clothing at lower temperatures saves energy, but may leave stains intact. Recycling requires more effort than putting all garbage into the same bin. Nevertheless, people anticipate sustainable actions will elicit positive emotions and a ‘warm glow’: they report that sustainable actions will make them feel good about them-selves, suggesting that they find it intrinsically rewarding to act sus-tainably (Pfister & B¨ohm, 2008; Smith, Haugvedt & Petty, 1994; Taufik, Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2016; Van der Linden, 2018). Given anticipated emotions often guide our decisions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Mel-lers & McGraw, 2001; Pfister & B¨ohm, 2008; Schwarz, 2000; Taufik et al., 2016; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), this association between sustainable actions and positive emotions offers a hopeful message to policy makers: they could harness consumers’ intrinsic motivation to act sustainably in their messages and
communication.
However, it is currently not completely clear where the association between sustainable actions and positive emotions stems from. Why would people report that sustainable actions (e.g. recycling) would make them feel good, given that those actions often require some level of sacrifice or effort?
One more cynical explanation is that people do not actually have a positive association with sustainable actions, but simply report that sustainable actions would make them feel good when explicitly asked about it. There are several reasons why explicit measures (i.e. self- reports) could allow for such response bias (Thomas & Walker, 2015). First, people may consider it socially desirable to self-report that sus-tainable actions would make them feel good: people may want to appear to themselves (i.e. self-deception) and to others (i.e. impression man-agement) as being concerned about the environment (Ewert & Galloway, 2009). So, when explicitly asked to report their feelings to-wards sustainable actions, people may present themselves as being more intrinsically motivated than they really are. Second, explicit measures could act as ‘prompts’ (Hafner, Walker & Verplanken, 2017). By asking
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: j.w.bolderdijk@rug.nl (J.W. Bolderdijk).
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participants to explicitly report whether sustainable actions would make them feel good, self-reports make the possibility of positive feelings salient in participants, making them report more positive feelings than they would experience spontaneously. Thus, it is conceivable that peo-ple (unintentionally) inflate the claim that they would feel good about sustainable actions in self-reports – the method used in prior empirical work to examine people’s emotional association with sustainable ac-tions (Taufik et al., 2016; Van der Linden, 2018).
We however argue that the previously found association between sustainable actions and positive emotions is unlikely just the result of response bias. We tested this empirically in Study 1, using a method that minimizes the influence of response bias. Instead, we argue people may actually anticipate positive emotions, as sustainable actions can elicit meaning: acting sustainably is often perceived as a morally-good choice and thus as a meaningful course of action, which can elicit positive emotions. Due to meaning, people may associate sustainable behaviors - even those that involve a certain degree of effort or sacrifice - with positive instead of merely negative emotions. We tested the underlying role of meaning in shaping positive emotional associations in Study 2.
The notion that acting sustainably can elicit positive emotions can be traced back to Aristotle, who proposed that well-being can be found in the expression of virtue or ‘doing the right thing for the right reasons’ (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008). This implies that having pleasant hedonic experiences is not the only route to positive emotions (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001); having meaningful experiences can feel good as well
(Petersen, Park & Seligman, 2005). Indeed, morally-good behaviors (such as caring for others) are generally seen as important and mean-ingful behaviors that can elicit positive emotions (Aknin, Dunn, & Norton, 2012; Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Batson & Powell, 2003; Dunn Aknin & Norton, 2008; Grant & Sonnentag, 2010).
Sustainable actions are prototypical of ‘morally-good’ actions. Indeed, many people relate sustainable actions to the prevention of harm, and care for others (Jia, Soucie, Alisat, Curtin, & Pratt, 2017), and thus perceive it as a manifestation of moral behavior (Feinberg & Willer, 2012; Howell, 2013; Pandey, Rupp, & Thornton, 2013; Thøgersen, 1996). Americans, for example, strongly agreed that nature has intrinsic value and that humans have moral duties and obligations to animals, plants, and non-living nature such as rocks, water, and air (Leiserowitz, Kates, & Parris, 2005). Likewise, many people in the UK agreed that people have personal, social and moral responsibilities to address climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007). In as far as people consider acting sustainably to be the morally-right, and thus a meaningful thing to do, they may come to associate actions that promote sustainability with positive, instead of just negative emotions. So how can we test this account, given that asking people explicitly about their associations with sustainable actions may bias response patterns? We employed a two-step strategy. First, we examined whether the association between sustainable actions and positive emotions still exists when measuring associations implicitly, thus reducing the influ-ence of response bias. Second, we examined the underlying role of meaning in shaping people’s emotional associations with (un-)sustain-able actions.
If the previously found association with positive emotions indeed stems from the personal meaning people attach to sustainable behaviors, and is not the result of a (socially desirable) response bias, the associa-tion between sustainable acassocia-tions and positive emoassocia-tions would also be found when associations are measured implicitly, without participants being aware that their associations are measured (H1). Therefore, in contrast to questionnaires that directly ask for people’s explicit associ-ations with sustainable actions (e.g. Taufik et al., 2016; Van der Linden, 2018), in Study 1, we tested the valence of people’s implicit associations with various sustainable actions. Specifically, we used an implicit as-sociation test (the “IAT”, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;
Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) to examine the valence of partici-pants’ overall implicit association with various sustainable actions. The
IAT measures people’s automatic emotional association with a concept via response times. If people also implicitly associate sustainable behavior with positive instead of negative emotions, it would be cognitively easier for participants to pair sustainable actions with pos-itive instead of with negative emotions. Thus, they would respond quicker when sustainable actions (e.g. ‘energy saving’) are presented in conjunction with the word ‘positive’ instead of with the word ‘negative’. In other words, the IAT assumes participants respond quicker when the pairing task is set up to be consistent with their pre-existing, auto-matic associations. On the other hand, participants would respond slower when the pairing task requires them to override any pre-existing associations. By using response times to detect the valence of people’s
automatic associations, the IAT makes it difficult for participants to tell
what researchers are actually interested in, or to exert control over their responses, thus reducing the influence of socially desirable response bias (De Houwer, 2006). In environmental psychology, the IAT has been used to test people’s implicit attitude towards nuclear energy (Siegrist, Keller, & Cousin, 2006), their connection with natural versus built
ments (e.g. Bruni & Schultz, 2010), as well as their implicit environ-mental attitudes and values (Thomas & Walker, 2015). Building on this work, we used the IAT for a new question: do people also associate sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions when such associations are measured implicitly?
In addition to examining the valence of people’s implicit associations with sustainable actions (Study 1), we also tested impact of meaning more directly in Study 2. Because protecting the environment is typi-cally seen as a morally-relevant course of action, people may come to associate environmentally-sustainable actions with positive emotions (e. g. pride). Vice versa, they may associate unsustainable actions with negative emotions (e.g. guilt). Importantly, our reasoning implies that the emotions people associate with both sustainable and unsustainable actions would become more intense when they perceive those actions as being more meaningful (H2).
We tested this hypothesis in two ways. We first reasoned that people are likely to feel that their actions say more about them (i.e. are more meaningful) when they choose to engage in those actions. After all, one can hardly claim to have done the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing if one is not responsible for having initiated that action (Heberlein, 1972; Venho-even, Bolderdijk & Steg, 2016; Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 2000). Thus, the emotions people associate with both sustainable and unsustainable actions would become more intense when those actions are perceived as more volitional: instigated by them personally (H2a). Specifically, our reasoning implies we would find interactions between the level of volition and the sustainability of the behavior: people would report feeling more positive about sustainable actions when they
voli-tionally chose to engage in those ‘good’ behaviors. Vice versa, people would
report feeling more negative about unsustainable actions when they chose to engage in those ‘bad’ behaviors (as compared to having no choice). We tested these interactions in Study 2, by systematically varying whether the action was positioned as being sustainable or not (i. e., conducive vs. harmful to environmental quality), and varying whether or not participants chose to engage in those actions volitionally. Second, we reasoned that how positive people expected to feel about sustainable actions (and how negative they would feel about unsus-tainable actions) would be magnified for those individuals for whom acting sustainably is a particularly meaningful course of actions (H2b). Specifically, acting in an (un-)sustainable fashion is likely to mean more to individuals who perceive environmental quality as an important value (Steg, Perlaviciute, Van der Werff, & Lurvink, 2014), and more to those who feel morally obliged to protect the environment. On the basis of this, we expected to find another interaction: individuals with strong biospheric values and a strong personal norm to act sustainably would feel most positive about sustainable actions, and most negative about unsustainable actions.
Journal of Environmental Psychology 71 (2020) 101492
3 1.1. Current research
In two studies, we empirically examined the feelings that people associate with various environmentally-relevant actions. In Study 1, we zoomed in on sustainable actions, and examined whether people also associate sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions when these associations are measured implicitly – via an implicit asso-ciation test (H1). In Study 2, in addition to sustainable actions, we also examined participants’ associations with unsustainable actions. We tested whether the emotions people explicitly associate with sustainable and unsustainable actions become more intense when those actions are perceived as more meaningful: when they are volitional (H2a; Study 2) and considered personally relevant to the individual (H2b; Study 1 and 2). In other words, we isolated the underlying role of meaning by examining interactions between the type (sustainable vs. unsustainable) and meaningfulness (volitional or not, personally relevant or not) of the behavior. Thus, rather than relying on mediation to test a specific pro-cess (see Fiedler, Schott & Meiser, 2011), we used interactions to isolate the underlying role of meaning (i.e. testing a process by experimentally interrupting vs. amplifying the hypothesized process; see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005; Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011).
2. Study 1
We expected participants would still associate sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions when associations are measured implicitly, without participants being aware that their associ-ations are measured (H1). We tested the valence of participants’ auto-matic associations with various sustainable actions, using an implicit association test (Greenwald et al., 1998). Informed consent was ob-tained from all participants. The study was assessed by an Ethical Committee and was approved.
2.1. Participants
First year psychology students (N = 76; 67 female, 9 male; Medianage
= 19.0 years) took part in a laboratory experiment in exchange for course credits. Power analysis indicated that a sample size of 34 subjects was required for the study to have 80% power to detect a medium-sized effect (f = 0.25) at an α level of 0.05 for a repeated measure within
participants with two levels (congruent vs. discongruent blocks, see below), using the default value of 0.50 for the correlation among repeated measures. We stopped collecting data after two weeks in the lab, having reached more than double this number of subjects.
2.2. Materials
Participants first completed a value questionnaire (Steg et al., 2014), which included four items gauging individual differences in the extent to which people consider caring about nature and the environment (i.e., respecting the earth, unity with nature, protecting the environment and preventing pollution) to be important. Respondents indicated how important these values are as guiding principles in their life; scores on value items could range from − 1 = opposed to my principles, 0 = not
important, to 7 = extremely important; Mbiopheric = 3.60, SDbiospheric = 1.46)1.
Next, participants took part in the main part of this study - a computerized Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Various words were shown on a computer screen (See Appendix). Par-ticipants had to assign these words as quickly as possible to either of two categories that appeared left or right in the top of the screen. Specif-ically, using the keyboard keys “Z” (assign word to the category dis-played left) and “M” (assign word to the category disdis-played right), participants had to assign sustainable actions such as ‘recycling’ to the category ‘sustainable’ instead of ‘neutral’2, and assign neutral words
such as ‘mirror’ to the category ‘neutral’ instead of ‘sustainable’. Moreover, they had to assign negative emotions such as ‘unhappy’ to the category ‘negative’ instead of ‘positive’ and assign positive emotions such as ‘proud’ to the category ‘positive’ instead of ‘negative’. We strived for the negative emotions to mirror the positives (e.g. proud vs. guilt, happy vs. unhappy). We logged response times.
Importantly, across blocks, we systematically varied whether or not the category ‘sustainable’ was presented in the conjunction with words from the category ‘positive’ (congruent block) versus ‘negative’ (dis-congruent block). If people indeed also implicitly associate sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions, assigning words such as ‘recycling’ to the corresponding category ‘sustainable’ would be cognitively easier, and thus quicker, when the category ‘sustainable’ is presented in combination with the category ‘positive’ (‘sustainable/ positive’; congruent block) instead of with the category ‘negative’ (‘sustainable/negative’; discongruent block). Similarly, our theory im-plies that assigning positive emotions such as ‘proud’ to the category ‘positive’ would be easier when the category ‘positive’ is presented in conjunction with the category ‘sustainable’ (congruent block) instead of ‘neutral’ (discongruent block).
We examined the valence of participants’ implicit association with sustainable actions by testing whether response times would be lower during congruent blocks (see Appendix, Blocks 3 and 4) than during discongruent blocks (Blocks 6 and 7). In coding response times, we followed standard IAT procedures (Greenwald et al., 2003). To minimize the influence of outliers and error, we excluded trials where reaction times were slower than 10.000 ms (0 cases) and faster than 400 ms (38 cases). Incorrect responses (e.g. participant incorrectly assigning the word ‘mirror’ to the category ‘sustainable’) were penalized and substituted by participants’ mean response time for correct responses in that block +2 SD (238 cases). We used both the practice and test blocks to calculate response times for congruent vs. discongruent blocks. See Appendix for a more elaborate description of the order of the IAT blocks and the exact stimuli used.
2.3. Results and discussion
During congruent blocks (when the category ‘sustainable’ was pre-sented in conjunction with the category ‘positive’), participants responded faster (M = 795.24 ms) than during discongruent blocks (when the category ‘sustainable’ was presented in conjunction with the category ‘negative’; M = 902.82 ms); F(1,75) = 11.86, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.14; IAT effect = 107.58 ms; IAT D = 0.24. Thus, it appears to be cognitively easier for participants to pair sustainable words with posi-tive emotions than with negaposi-tive emotions. This implies that, also when measured implicitly, sustainable actions are more strongly associated with positive than with negative emotions (H1).
Additionally, we tested whether the implicit associations with sus-tainable behavior would be more positive for people with stronger biospheric values – for those who are likely to perceive protecting the environment as being a particularly meaningful course of action (H2b).
1 The questionnaire also included a measure of individual differences in regulatory focus (Van Stekelenburg, 2006) and two questions on meat con-sumption (“How many days a week on average do you eat meat with your main dish?” and “How many grams meat do you on average eat with your main dish, when it contains meat?”). Results on these last two constructs are not reported here, as they are not relevant for the goal of the current paper. The value questionnaire was asked in between the regulatory focus measure and the two questions on meat consumption.
2 We contrasted the category ‘sustainable’ with the category ‘neutral’, because the goal of current study was to test whether people associate sus-tainability words with positive instead of negative emotions, not to test their association with unsustainable words (as in Study 2).
The difference in response times between congruent and discongruent blocks was more pronounced for people with stronger biospheric values, but this effect was modest; r(74) = 0.19, p = .10). This could be due to the specific sample used - we used a relatively homogenous, liberal sample (psychology students).
Summing up, it seems that most participants, regardless of the extent to which they endorsed biospheric values, tended to also implicitly associate sustainability with positive instead of negative emotions. Since we measured automatic associations between sustainable actions and positive emotions, and participants were unaware of the purpose of this study, it is unlikely that these results are strongly affected by social desirability (participants reporting they would feel good about sus-tainable actions out of self-representation concerns; De Houwer, 2006) – or by response bias (explicit self-reports prompt participants to report emotions they would not consider spontaneously; Thomas & Walker, 2015).
While demonstrating that the previously found association between sustainable actions and positive emotions is unlikely to be the result of a response bias, this study does not answer the question: so why do people associate sustainable actions with positive emotions when asked explicitly? Is it due to the fact that such actions provide meaning? Study 2 was conducted to study test this.
3. Study 2
We conducted a questionnaire study in which we experimentally manipulated the type of action that participants envisioned (sustainable vs. unsustainable, and voluntary or not, respectively), and asked par-ticipants to report how they anticipated to feel after engaging in those actions. We now used a broader, non-student sample, and now asked for people’s explicit associations. We hypothesized participants would report anticipating more intense emotions when the same actions were more meaningful (H2): when participants chose to engage in those ac-tions (H2a), and when those acac-tions were considered meaningful to the specific participant (H2b; so among individuals with strong biospheric values and a personal norm to act sustainably). Thus, we tested the role of meaning via examining interactions (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011;
Spencer et al., 2005). Informed consent was obtained from all partici-pants. The study was assessed by an Ethical Committee and was approved.
3.1. Participants
Participants (N = 132; 60 female, 65 male, 7 unknown; Medianage = 30.5 years) completed a questionnaire that was distributed door-to-door in diverse neighborhoods in a city in the Netherlands, and recollected after approximately half an hour. Power analysis indicated that a sample size of 128 subjects was required for the study to have 80% power to detect a medium-sized effect (f = 0.25) at an α level of 0.05 with two
groups; thus, we stopped collecting data when we reached a bit over this number of subjects. The data of 9 participants were not included in the analyses because they had missing values on at least one of the depen-dent or independepen-dent variables.
3.2. Materials
We asked participants to report what emotions they expected to experience after engaging in different types of (un-)sustainable actions. These behaviors are widely known and prototypical examples of sus-tainable actions to our (Dutch) participants. Participants were first prompted to imagine five behaviors that they engaged in out of their own volition (i.e., using the bike for short distances, turning the light off in an empty room, buying organic products in the cafeteria, separating waste at work, washing clothes at a low temperature) and next imagined five equivalent behaviors they engaged in out of situational constraints (i.e., using the bike for short distances while your car is being serviced,
washing clothes at a low temperature when it is the only available option
on the machine, lights are automatically turned off when leaving an empty
room, buying organic products in the cafeteria when they are the only
available option, separating waste at work because your employer requires it). Half of the participants evaluated sustainable actions (e.g. using the bike for short distances, turning lights off in an unused room), while the
other half evaluated the unsustainable counterparts of the same be-haviors (e.g., using the car for short distances, leaving the light on in an empty room). Hence, all participants evaluated ten behaviors in total, which varied in terms of whether or not they were volitional (within subjects), and whether they were sustainable versus unsustainable (be-tween subjects).
3.3. Measures
Participants reported to what extent they expected that engaging in each action would make them feel ‘proud’, ‘satisfied’ and ‘cheerful’ (averaged to represent positive emotions; α′s for the ten behaviors
ranged from 0.87 to 0.93; αoverall =0.97) and to what extent they ex-pected to feel ‘disappointed’, ‘frustrated’ and ‘guilty’ (averaged to represent negative emotions; α′s for the ten behaviors ranged from 0.87
to 0.94; αoverall =0.97)3. Scores could range from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘very strongly’, with 3 reflecting ‘neutral’. The emotions chosen here are consistent with the emotions typically measured to gauge people’s as-sociation with sustainable actions (see Krettenauer, Wang, Jia, & Yao, 2019; Rees, Klug, & Bamberg, 2015; Rezvani, Jansson, & Bengtsson, 2017). We decided to use a slightly different set of emotions relative to the ones used in Study 1, as to ensure that the results are not limited to a specific set of emotions positive and negative emotions.
Next, participants completed the same values questionnaire as in Study 1 to gauge individual differences in biospheric values (M = 4.18,
SD = 1.47, α =0.874). Additionally, participants indicated the extent to which they felt morally obliged to engage in each of the five sustainable behaviors (1 = not at all to 5 = very strongly; M = 3.49, SD = 0.90, α = 0.81). The scores on biospheric values and feelings of moral obligation to act pro-environmentally were mean centered prior to the analysis5. 3.4. Results and discussion
We first examined whether the emotions (both negative and positive) participants associated with their sustainable and unsustainable actions, respectively, become more intense when those actions are perceived as volitional (H2a).
Fig. 1 shows the results for positive emotions. We ran a mixed analysis of variance (with volitional as the within-subject factor, and sustainability as the between-subject factor). The results show partici-pants who imagined engaging in the sustainable behaviors (e.g. using the bike for short distances) anticipated feeling more positive (Mpos = 2.99, SDpos =.80, so around the midpoint of the scale) than participants
3 For each participant, we calculated aggregate scores for both negative and positive emotions across both voluntary and involuntary behaviors.
4 For half of the participants the value scale was included as the first measure in the questionnaire, and for the other half the value scale was included as the last measure in the questionnaire. The order in which the questions were asked did not affect any of our results.
5 Participants also indicated to what extent they thought each of the five sustainable behaviors (so using the bike for short distances, turning the light off in an empty room, buying organic products in the cafeteria, separating waste at work, washing clothes at a low temperature) had a positive impact on envi-ronmental quality (1 = not at all to 5 = very strongly; M = 4.23, SD = 0.65, α = 0.78). Moreover, participants indicated to what extent they intended engaging in the sustainable version of each of the five voluntary behaviors (1 = not at all to 5 = very strongly; M = 3.96, SD = 0.74, α =0.76) before they rated the environmentally-friendliness and moral obligation towards these behaviors. These results are beyond the scope of this paper but are available upon request.
Journal of Environmental Psychology 71 (2020) 101492
5
who imagined engaging in the unsustainable counterparts of those be-haviors (e.g. using the car for short distances; Mpos =1.85, SDpos =.68;
Fpos(1,121) = 72.29, ppos <.001, ηp2pos =.376). Importantly, we found the predicted interaction; F(1,121) = 31.92, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.21. Specifically, participants who considered the sustainable actions antic-ipated feeling even more positive when they engaged in those behaviors out of their own volition (e.g. using the bike for short distances, M = 3.19, SD = 0.90) than out of situational constraints (e.g. using the bike for short distances when your car is being serviced, M = 2.79, SD = 0.81,
Mdifference =0.40, t(60) = 5.40, p < .001). Thus, people associate the same sustainable actions more strongly with positive emotions when such actions are more meaningful: the result of their own choosing (e.g. ‘using the bike for short distances’ as opposed to ‘using the bike for short distances when your car is being serviced’).
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the overall pattern of results for negative emotions seems the exact opposite of the pattern for positive emotions. Participants who imagined engaging in the unsustainable actions anticipated feeling more negative (Mneg =2.50, SDneg =0.81, slightly below the midpoint of the scale) than those who anticipated engaging in the sustainable actions (Mneg =1.48, SDneg =0.45); Fneg(1,121) = 73.61,
pneg <.001, ηp2neg =0.38. Importantly, we again find the hypothesized interaction (F(1, 121) = 26.71, p < .001, ηp2 =0.18): participants who engaged in the unsustainable actions felt more negative when they chose (e.g. not separating waste at work; M = 2.58, SD = 0.87), rather than were forced (e.g. not separating waste at work due to a lack of containers; M = 2.42, SD = 0.83) to engage in those ‘bad’ behaviors (Mdifference = 0.16, t(60) = 2.26, p = .03). In other words, people anticipate feeling relatively less bad about the same unsustainable actions when such ac-tions are not particularly meaningful: not the result of their own choosing.
In sum, consistent with H2a, we find the expected interactions. The emotions (both positive and negative) people associate with their ac-tions become more intense when those acac-tions are more meaningful, i.e. when participants imagine they choose to engage in those sustainable and unsustainable actions, respectively.
Next, we tested whether the emotions (both negative and positive) participants associate with sustainable and unsustainable actions are
more intense among participants who consider such actions personally relevant (H2b). Regression analyses7 showed that participants expected
feeling relatively more positive about sustainable (and least positive about unsustainable) actions when they more strongly endorsed biospheric values (Bbehaviortype x values =0.34, t(119) = 3.71, p < .001, see
Fig. 3 for a visual illustration) and when they felt more morally obliged to engage in those sustainable behaviors (Bbehaviortype x obligation =0.44, t (119) = 3.00, p < .01, see Fig. 3). Thus, we find the expected interaction: sustainable actions are anticipated to elicit more positive emotions among participants for whom such actions are particularly meaningful. Vice versa, participants who strongly endorsed biospheric values (Bbehaviortype x values = − 0.12, t(119) = − 1.50, p = .14, see Fig. 4 for an illustration) and who felt more morally obliged to act sustainably (B be-haviortype x obligations = − 0.37, t(119) = − 2.90, p < .01, see Fig. 4) reported feeling relatively more negative about unsustainable actions (and least negative about sustainable actions). In other words, we again find sup-port for the predicted interactions (H2b): the negative emotions people associate with unsustainable actions became more intense among in-dividuals for whom such actions are particularly meaningful.
In sum, consistent with our reasoning, we found that participants’ self-reported emotions (both positive and negative) become more intense when the actions are perceived as more meaningful: when the (un-)sustainable action is a consequence of one’s own volition (H2a), and when those actions are considered personally more meaningful to the individual (H2b).
4. General discussion
Previous research found that people associate sustainable actions with positive emotions instead of negative emotions (e.g. Taufik et al., 2016; Van der Linden, 2018). But why would people report that sus-tainable actions would make them feel good, given that such actions often involve some degree or discomfort or effort? Is this positive as-sociation perhaps an artefact produced by the explicit nature of the self-reports used in previous research? We proposed people actually anticipate feeling good about sustainable actions, because such actions provide meaning. Consistent with this reasoning, we found that people also associate sustainable actions with positive instead of negative emotions when associations are measured implicitly, instead of
Fig. 1. Anticipated positive emotions after engagement in volitional and non-
volitional (un-)sustainable behavior. Error bars denote standard errors. Fig. 2. Anticipated negative emotions after engagement in volitional and non- volitional (un-)sustainable behavior. Error bars denote standard errors.
6 When we looked at the emotions separately, the same pattern of results was found for all emotions.
7 For each participant, we calculated one score, so averaging emotions across the voluntary and involuntary behaviors. We first regressed positive emotions onto type of behavior (sustainable vs. unsustainable), individual differences in biospheric values (mean-centered), and their interaction term. Next, we repeated this, now including feelings of moral obligation as the moderator. Finally, we repeated both analyses for the negative emotions. Thus, in total, we conducted four regression analyses. No control variables were included. L.A. Venhoeven et al.
Fig. 3. Individual differences in biospheric values (plotted at 1 SD below, at, and 1SD above the mean, respectively) and perceived moral obligation determine how positive people feel about sustainable and unsustainable actions. Error bars 95% confidence intervals.
Journal of Environmental Psychology 71 (2020) 101492
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Fig. 4. Individual differences in biospheric values (plotted at 1 SD below, at, and 1SD above the mean, respectively) and perceived moral obligation determine how negative people feel about sustainable and unsustainable actions. Error bars 95% confidence intervals.
explicitly (Study 1), thus reducing the likelihood of (socially desirable) response bias affecting the results (supporting Hypothesis 1). Study 2 examined why people would explicitly report that sustainable actions would make them good (and why unsustainable actions would make them feel bad). We find that the emotions people explicitly associate with both sustainable and unsustainable actions become more intense when participants see those actions as being more meaningful (Study 2, H2). Specifically, as expected (Hypothesis 2a), participants felt more positive about sustainable actions (and more negative about unsus-tainable actions) when they chose to engage in these actions. Moreover, these reported emotions were more intense among participants for whom acting sustainability is more meaningful: those who care more about environmental protection (i.e., those strongly endorsing biospheric values) and those who feel more morally obliged to act pro-environmentally (supporting Hypothesis 2b).
Together, these results support our theorizing that the previously found relationship between sustainable actions and positive emotions is merely a matter of social desirability, but rather a matter of meaning: acting sustainably is perceived as a moral choice and thus as a meaningful course of action, which can elicit positive emotions.
4.1. Practical implications
It is often assumed that people associate sustainable actions mainly with negative emotions and thus would decrease well-being, as acting sustainably oftentimes requires a certain degree of effort or inconve-nience. The previous finding that people also associate sustainable ac-tions with positive emoac-tions paints a more optimistic picture, and forms the basis for an alternative view on environmental policy: rather than exclusively using extrinsic incentives to motivate sustainable actions, policies and communication campaigns could also be geared toward facilitating individuals to act on their pre-existing intrinsic motivation to act sustainably (Steg, 2016; Van der Linden, 2018). Our work solidifies the empirical basis for this conclusion: the association between sus-tainable actions and positive emotions seems not just the result of par-ticipants showing (socially desirable) response bias. Instead, the association between sustainable actions and positive emotions appears to be rooted in a fundamental psychological need: humans striving for
meaning.
Finding ways to increase the perceived meaning of sustainable ac-tions could thus be a fruitful way to further increase the positive emotional association people have with acting sustainably, and thus boost people’s intrinsic motivation to act sustainably. Stressing the moral nature of sustainable behavior in general, for instance, may make any sustainable behavior feel more meaningful. Campaigns could for instance consider highlighting the societal, collective advantages of sustainable actions (e.g. reducing climate change), rather than solely stressing the individual benefits (e.g. saving money by conserving en-ergy). Moreover, our results suggest that stressing and facilitating the voluntary aspect impact of a particular sustainable behavior may in-crease the meaning of that behavior specifically. For instance, rather than legally requiring people to recycle, policy makers could consider praising individuals who go beyond the call of duty, and recycle out of their own volition. Moreover, strengthening or activating biospheric values and feelings of moral obligation to act pro-environmentally may enhance the extent to which pro-environmental actions are perceived to be meaningful, and thus intrinsically rewarding (cf. Steg, 2016). Future research could test different means to increase the perceived meaning of sustainable behavior, and test whether this indeed increases the positive emotions people associate with sustainability.
4.2. Limitations and future research
We used the IAT in Study 1 to reduce the likelihood that people’s association with sustainability would be biased by social desirability.
Yet, it has been argued that people can ‘fake’ IAT tests when instructed (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). However, participants need to know how to do this – they need to be able to tell apart congruent from discongruent blocks, and intentionally slow down their responses in congruent blocks (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). Therefore, we did not inform participants about the goal of the study (i.e. testing people’s implicit association with sustainable vs. neutral words using response times), making it unlikely that participants ‘caught on’ and intentionally slowed down their re-sponses during congruent blocks. Yet, future research could verify this and control for any participants attempted to ‘rig’ the results.
Study 2 examined the underlying role of meaning. In addition to experimentally varying whether the actions were volitional and sus-tainable (H2a), we explored the moderating role of individual differ-ences (H2b). Here, we find that the emotions associated with sustainable actions are more intense for participants with stronger biospheric values, and those feeling more morally obliged to act pro- environmentally. While these findings support the role of meaning and thus are consistent with our experimental results, future research could an activate rather than measure individual differences in feelings of moral obligation and values, and aim to replicate these findings experimentally.
Our results could be affected by the particular selection of emotions, samples and type of sustainable actions. We used different emotions and samples across Studies 1 and 2, but nevertheless find similar results: participants seem to associate sustainable actions with positive (instead of just negative) emotions. These findings are in line with prior work (Taufik et al., 2016; Van der Linden, 2018), and suggest that the positive associations we found is unlikely an artefact of the particular samples and words chosen for our studies. However, future research should examine whether similar results are found when including other types of emotions, more diverse, non-Western samples. For Dutch participants (our sample) for instance, using the bike to cover short distances is quite common. The same action may elicit more meaning and thus more positive emotions other countries, where cycling is less normalized. Moreover, we tested our reasoning using prototypical sustainable ac-tions (e.g. taking the bike for shorter distances, recycling), but one could argue that these behaviors only involved minor discomfort or effort. Future research should examine whether people still associate sustain-able actions with positive emotions when the behavioral costs (and therefore also the meaning) of the sustainable behavior increases (e.g. not flying anymore).
4.3. Conclusion
Using a combination of methods and materials, our studies suggest that the previously found relationship between sustainable actions and anticipated positive instead of negative emotions is not merely a matter of social desirability, but rather a matter of meaning: acting sustainably is often perceived as a moral choice and thus as a meaningful course of action, which can elicit positive emotions, particularly when people choose to engage in those actions, and feel that acting sustainably is an important personal goal. Vice versa, acting unsustainably, despite that it is often more convenient, can elicit negative emotions, particularly when such actions are more meaningful: when people choose to engage in those actions, and when people feel that acting sustainably is an important personal goal. In conclusion, our results support one expla-nation as to why people report that going green would make them feel good: these actions offer meaning.
Acknowledgements
This project is part of the projects CReating Innovative Sustainability Pathways (CRISP). We thank R. De Masi for her help with collecting data for Study 2.
Journal of Environmental Psychology 71 (2020) 101492
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Appendix
IAT Procedure in detail
Fig. 1. Example choices from the IAT.
Participants completed seven blocks, each consisting of 20 Trials, in which they had to place the target words in the corresponding category, as illustrated above. Words could be placed in the category that appeared on the left by pressing the “Z” key on the keyboard, or be placed in the category on the right by pressing the “M” key on the keyboard.
The categories used in the different blocks were the following: •Block 1: Positive—Negative
•Block 2: Sustainable—Neutral
•Block 3: Sustainable/Positive—Neutral/Negative (Practice congruent block) •Block 4: Sustainable/Positive—Neutral/Negative (Test congruent block) •Block 5: Neutral—Sustainable
•Block 6: Neutral/Positive—Sustainable/Negative (Practice congruent block) •Block 7: Neutral/Positive—Sustainable/Negative (Test congruent block)
The words were presented in randomized order within each of the seven blocks and the order of the blocks was counterbalanced between par-ticipants: all participants started with Block 1, after which half of the participants were first presented with blocks Block 2, 3 and 4 while the other half of the participants were first presented with blocks Block 5, 6 and 7.
The exact words chosen for the sustainable and neutral category were chosen based on a pilot study: they reflected prototypical sustainable concepts that require a certain degree of inconvenience or cost on behalf of those who execute those actions – i.e. “solar power”, “energy saving”, “environmentally-conscious”, “reuse” and “recycling”. The neutral words – i.e. “mirror”, “striped”, “alphabetical”, “elastic”, “figurative” were random concepts that, according to the results of the pilot study, were not related to sustainability, and did not evoke any emotional response (See Table 1).
Categories and Words Used in the IAT Table 1
The IAT was conducted in Dutch. English translations of the used words are included in brackets. The sustainable words, on average, counted more (4.2) syllables than the neutral words (2.8). The positive emotions counted 2.0 syllables on average, the negative 2.6.
Positive Negative Sustainable Neutral
Gelukkig (Happy) Ongelukkig (Unhappy) Zonne-energie (Solar power) Spiegel (Mirror)
Trots (Proud) Schuldig (Guilty) Energiebesparing (Energy saving) Gestreept (Striped)
Plezier (Fun) Naar (Miserable) Milieubewust (Env. Conscious) Alfabetisch (Alphabetical)
Voldaan (Fulfilled) Ontevreden (Dissatisfied) Hergebruik (Reuse) Elastisch (Elastic)
Prettig (Contented) Schaamte (Shame) Recycling (Recycling) Figuurlijk (Figurative)
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2020.101492.
Author statement
This project was funded by the European Commission (FP7), Grant Agreement 265310 (CRISP). Leonie Venhoeven collected and analyzed the data for Studies 1 and 2, under the supervision of Jan Willem Bolderdijk and Linda Steg. LV, JWB and LS conceptualized the work and contributed to the writing and editing of the manuscript.
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