The Role of Moral Status in Pragmatic Argumentation: A Pragma-dialectical Approach

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The Role of Moral Status in Pragmatic

Argumentation: A Pragma-dialectical Approach

RMA: Communication: and Information Studies: Rhetoric, Argumentation Theory and Philosophy Student: Aïsha Daw, 10546715

Contact: aisha.daw@student.uva.nl Supervisor: dr. J.H.M. Wagemans Second Reader: dr. B.J. Garssen

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1 Introduction

If you were in a position to save certain endangered animal species, but in order to do so, you had to have other animal species hunted down in order to stimulate the biodiversity in that area—what decision would you make? What is the morally right action to pursue in such a case? Such a question invokes a host of other, even more difficult, questions: which species matter more? How does one weigh their interests against those of others? In complex ethical cases such as this one, what is found to be a good action according to one, can be considered a wrong action according to another. Issues of ‘what is the good thing to do’, among other subjects, can be dealt with through ethics. One of the most well-established ethical theories is utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism, most generally, argues that a moral action is good if it increases the happiness for the greatest number of people (Driver 2014: 2). Effectively, this ethical theory focuses on the amount of happiness (i.e., the utility) the consequences bring about in deciding what moral decision or moral action is deemed good. This amount of happiness is initially viewed quantitatively: most generally, maximal happiness is achieved when the maximum amount of people is made happy by the decision. So, going back to the example, do we just include the animals that are directly affected? Or do we also include groups indirectly affected, such as the residents near that region? And to take it another step further, how do we calculate utility when more entities than just animals or people are taken into the equation, such as future generations, plants, or even entire ecosystems?

Questions such as these highlight how the principle of maximum utility becomes particularly problematic when future people or other non-human entities are included in this ‘greatest number’, i.e., receive moral status. It would seem that one moral decision or action can be deemed good when the interests of just that group are considered, but deemed morally wrong, or at least questionable, when a different group also receives moral status. Depending on which approach to moral status is taken, then, arguments for certain moral decisions when exercising the utilitarian principle may be judged as right or wrong.

At the center of ethical debates about moral status, these questions on which entities should be considered in moral decision-making are discussed. Most generally, theories about moral status are concerned with the entities that moral actions do and do not apply to. There is a general consensus that people should have full moral status, but even this statement renders many complications. For example, some utilitarian theorists take consciousness as a necessary condition for receiving moral status (Jaworska & Tennenbaum 2018: 4). Yet, if moral status was granted on

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the basis of consciousness, cognitively impaired persons, or people in comas would be excluded and their interests would have to be treated as “lesser than”. Other problem cases in the debate include human embryos, or even intelligent animals. And even most recently, another crucial case has taken the world in its grip: the stark reality that some humans are given less moral status than others has become terribly evident with the infamous killing of George Floyd and the message of the Black

Lives Matter movement, proving that black people or people of color regularly have their interests

horribly violated. Seeing that cases concerning the moral status of (certain groups of) people already bring about so much controversy and disagreement, argumentation on the moral status of other life-forms, such as animals, plants or even entire ecosystems remain even more controversial. The complex character of problem cases in the debate on moral status, then, sheds light on the importance of an adequate method of evaluation for utilitarian arguments that take a position in the debate about moral status.

In this thesis, the argumentative approach taken for the analysis and evaluation of ethical argumentation is the pragma-dialectical framework, according to which argumentation must be found reasonable in order to be adequate (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 13-17; 132). In order for the reasonableness of argumentation to be determined, an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation must be conducted. In order to do so, the analyst must reconstruct the argumentation through the use of argument schemes. Argument schemes play a crucial role in analyzing and evaluating arguments, since they express a typical structure of the relation between the standpoint and argument(s) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 96; cited in van Poppel 2013: 66). Once the reconstruction is complete, an evaluation can be conducted through the use of the critical questions associated with a particular argument scheme. Further, individual arguments are evaluated by answering the critical questions associated with a particular argument scheme, so as to assess whether the right argument scheme is employed, and, if so, if the argument supports the standpoint adequately. If all questions are answered satisfactorily, then, an argument can be considered reasonable and the standpoint is accepted.

In pragma-dialectical terms, the utilitarian principle, in which a decision is good if it increases the happiness for the greatest number of people, can be reconstructed through the pragmatic argument scheme (Maassen 2017: 14). In a pragmatic argument scheme, the line of argument is that an action should be carried out if it has desirable consequences, or should not be carried out if it has undesirable consequences. Further, the perspective taken on moral status can determine whether the consequences of an action are deemed desirable or not, and thus whether an

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argument for that action is deemed reasonable, varies accordingly. However, the pragma-dialectical evaluation does not seem to address nor account for this variation.

This thesis essentially brings together ethics as a branch of philosophy and pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentation in order to assess whether all entities that are affected by the consequences of certain policy decisions are adequately taken into account when one evaluates (through the use of critical questions) a pragmatic argument for that policy. As such, the main research question of this thesis is as follows:

1 How can the issue of moral status be adequately accounted for in the pragma-dialectical evaluation of pragmatic argumentation?

This question is answered by the following sub-questions:

1.a How does the role of moral status influence the answers to the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme in a pragma-dialectical evaluation?

1.b How can alternating conceptions of moral status in utilitarian arguments be addressed adequately through the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme?

This thesis answers these questions by first providing a solid theoretical foundation of both the philosophical debate on moral status, including its issues, and the pragma-dialectical framework, including its issues. Next, it shows how moral status is currently addressed in the pragma-dialectical approach by drawing upon two problematic cases in the debate on moral status in which two utilitarian arguments are analyzed and evaluated. The first case examines the issue regarding the moral status of people, whereas the second case aims to further examine moral status as extended to other entities, such as plants, animals and entire ecosystems. Finally, the findings of the two cases are discussed and a solution to the issue of moral status is provided in answer to the main research question.

In order to answer any of these questions, however, one must first gain an understanding of ethics as a branch of philosophy, utilitarianism as an ethical theory, and the essentials of the debate on moral status specifically, all of which are discussed in chapter 2. Next, chapter 3 deals with the main argumentative characteristics of the utilitarian argument, the pragmatic argument scheme, and

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the critical questions associated with it. Only then can one properly move on to analyze and evaluate problematic cases argumentatively in order to address the research questions. Subsequently, in chapter 4, two problem cases are presented with the aim of investigating utilitarian arguments that are problematic with respect to moral status and the pragma-dialectical evaluation. The topics of the problem cases are, respectively: (1) the effects of climate policy on future generations; (2) the preservation of biodiversity by hunting animals (see the above example). Finally, in chapter 5, the findings are discussed, weaknesses of the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme are identified and, consequently, a solution is proposed. Lastly, the main research question is answered, after which suggestions for future research are provided.

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2 Utilitarianism and moral status

The aim of this chapter is to provide some theoretical background on moral status as a common issue within the field of applied ethics, focusing particularly on the utilitarian approach. Section 2.1 introduces various common approaches within applied ethics, narrowing the scope towards utilitarianism. After this, section 2.2 goes into more depth about the concept of moral status. The aim of this section is to highlight the crucial role of moral status in identifying the entities to which the utilitarian principle can–or should–apply to.

2.1 Applied ethics: the utilitarian approach

When we debate about what it means to be or to do good, what the right thing to do is, whether a course of action should be deemed as desirable or not, we enter into the realm of ethics. This branch of philosophy is concerned with systematizing, justifying and recommending principles of right and wrong behavior. There are three major areas of study within ethics: meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. The first area is concerned with questions about whether ethics exist, our understanding, and our knowledge of it, and what we mean when we discuss what is right and wrong. The second field focuses on fundamental principles regarding ethical actions; how are we supposed to act, in order to act ethically? Finally, applied ethics deals with the specific moral dangers that come up when applying such principles to real-life cases and with the morality of certain choices or actions. Hence, applied ethics has numerous specialized fields such as climate ethics, environmental ethics, health ethics, and so on.

In this thesis, the focus lies with applied ethics. More specifically, applied ethics is concerned with moral considerations that occur in all kinds of spheres– the public, private, health, the professional, etc. The purpose of applied ethics is to identify moral issues that come up in specific cases, situations and circumstances within these fields, and to assess the moral implications and consequences of the ways to deal with such issues (Canfield 2004: 364). There are many recurring controversial cases in applied ethics. An example is the question surrounding reproductive rights: at what point does an embryo become a person and should its interests be taken into account separately from the mother? Another example pertaining to people who do not yet exist, regards future generations: how much do their interests matter? We, the present, cannot in good conscience leave behind a planet ripe for climate catastrophes, without any moral regard for future generations, although they (arguably) do not matter equally as much as the people living in the present

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generation. Questions like these will continue to divide many ethicists and policy-makers alike. In applied ethics, we find two main approaches: the deontological and the utilitarian approach, of which the latter is often mentioned alongside the term consequentialism. Deontological approaches focus on identifying–or formulating–which choices are morally forbidden, permitted or required. This ethical theory assesses our choices of what we ought to do in order to act in an ethical manner (Alexander & Moore 2016). Therefore, no matter how morally good the consequences of a certain action are, some choices are morally wrong. What makes a choice right or wrong is not whether its consequences are deemed morally good or bad, rather it is its conformity to a moral norm, a rule of action.

In contrast to the deontological approach, consequentialism is an umbrella term for any theory of ethics that holds that our choices and intentions should be morally assessed by the consequences that they bring about (Sinnott-Amstrong 2019). There are no ethical norms that are right or wrong in themselves, as the deontologists hold; there are only the desirable or undesirable consequences of our choices, actions and intentions. Therefore, it is fundamental for consequentialists to identify those consequences that can be deemed “good”. Whatever choices or decisions consequentially increase the “good” are morally acceptable and should be carried out. Within the philosophical tradition of consequentialism, one can find several approaches that distinguish themselves from one another on the basis of how they define what the “good” is. One of these approaches is utilitarianism. Two specifications of consequentialism are characteristic of a utilitarian approach as a subtype of a consequentialist approach. First, according to utilitarian philosophy, the “good” should be identified with pleasure or happiness (Alexander & Moore 2016). Second, the utilitarian interpretation of consequentialism adds that an action is right if it brings about the most happiness for the greatest number of people.

This thesis takes the utilitarian approach, due to the fact that it focuses not merely on the identification of principles of morality, but on the implications and consequences of moral decisions on people and other entities. In applied ethics, more specifically, utilitarians are concerned with the moral implications of policies and examine them in real-life cases, often critically. Their criticisms often concern, firstly, that pleasure or happiness as a final end seems human-centered in the context of several specialized fields, and that it thereby does not consider other entities that are affected by moral actions and decisions, but that should be considered. They propose that well-being is a better signifier of utility than happiness, since it refers to the protection of interests of all life-forms, which an emotion like happiness or a sensation of pleasure does not. The second characteristic also causes

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much disagreement when applied to real-life cases, since people are not nearly the only group of entities impacted by certain policy decisions (Danielson 2011: 426-427). The question of which entities should be taken into account when judging the consequences of a certain moral decision or action–thereby resulting in a maximization of well-being or happiness–is central to debates on moral status.

2.2 The utilitarian approach to moral status

An entity can be said to have moral status “if and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity’s own sake” (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 1). These interests generate duties for others to respect these interests in numerous ways. From a utilitarian point of view, moral status is a matter of having one’s interests factored into the equation that determines which action brings about a maximization of utility–i.e., happiness, or, as some prefer, well-being. Many utilitarians view “the protection and promotion of interests” central to morality (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018: 42). This means that the entities deserving of moral status must have interests as a necessary condition for receiving moral status. When these interests are established, an entity receives moral status by its interests being factored into the overall balance of utility, i.e., what utilitarians call the utilitarian calculus.1

In the debates around moral status, people are generally granted full moral status, unfortunately with painful and unjustifiable exceptions occurring in practice, although the debates around what constitutes a person remain heated. Different conditions are proposed for receiving full moral status as a person. An entity’s moral status is often determined by listing necessary and sufficient conditions for moral status. Consequently, disagreements arise on what factors should be considered and whether they are necessary or sufficient (or both or neither). One, often taken, is consciousness. A person should possess some level of consciousness in order to have moral status. Yet, since this disqualifies cognitively impaired humans, for example. Others argue that a biological capacity for consciousness suffices (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 4). A response to this issue is to grant moral status to all members of a species possessing consciousness (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 5). However, ethicists argue that it is rather arbitrary to grant cognitively impaired persons full moral status merely by virtue of their species membership, if they lack any morally relevant characteristics to that species membership: “It is unclear why a token member of a species, a token lacking any of these morally relevant capacities, should get the moral status from the type it belongs 1 Interests can be measured in different ways, such as in terms of the intensity or duration of one’s pleasure or pain when a certain course of action is taken (for more information, see Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018: 1).

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to (the species)” (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 31). These considerations show the complexity in real-life cases regarding the question of moral status. On top of that, moral status does not need to be granted to humans only.

Among utilitarians, there are also those who argue to extend our traditional conception of moral status to include animals. Utilitarianism is known for its view on equal consideration “maintaining that equal amounts of suffering and pleasure should be factored equally into the utilitarian calculus” (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 26). Among those are also many utilitarians, such as the renowned applied ethicist Peter Singer, who argue that interests of animals and humans should be considered equally. Singer argues that not consciousness, but “the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite to having interests” (2002: 7). Hence these interests must be considered equally, "regardless of whether the suffering and pleasure is that of a human or animal” (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2018: 26). Incidentally, as said before, for some utilitarians, having interests presupposes that entity having a consciousness that is capable of forming interests, i.e., “possessing rudimentary cognitive capacities is a necessary condition for having interests” (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018: 26) and according to these utilitarians, most animals are believed to possess such cognitive capacities.

What is more, there are also utilitarians who challenge the equal considerations view, but still wish to extend the scope of moral status to include more entities. According to some environmental ethicists, animals, plants and even ecosystems have interests and thus qualify for moral status, albeit not considered equally to the interests of humans (or animals). Thus, extending (some degree of) moral status to other entities than humans results in their interests counting accordingly in the utilitarian calculus (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2018: 5). In addition, these approaches, such as environmentalist approaches, do not require consciousness as a necessary condition for moral status at all, so that plants or even entire ecosystems can be said to have morally relevant interests of some kind and qualify for receiving (some degree of) moral status. So, how can one address which entities are deserving, to a greater or lesser degree, of moral status in a utilitarian argument?

In order to deal with this issue argumentatively, utilitarian arguments must be analyzed and evaluated. In doing so, this thesis then aims to examine how utilitarian arguments are analyzed and evaluated currently and assess its success in addressing moral status. As stated, this thesis adopts the pragma-dialectical framework. Chapter 3 provides the relevant theoretical and methodological aspects of the pragma-dialectical framework, especially with regard to the pragmatic argument

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scheme and the critical questions associated with it. In addition, chapter 3 discusses some challenges of this approach.

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3 Argumentative characteristics of the utilitarian

argument

This chapter provides a theoretical background of the fundamental concepts of the pragma-dialectical theory. The focus of this chapter is to show how one can provide a pragma-pragma-dialectical reconstruction and evaluation of a utilitarian argument. In section 3.1, the analytical and evaluative role of argument schemes is discussed. The aim of this section is to show how a utilitarian argument can be reconstructed as a pragmatic argument scheme, supporting a prescriptive standpoint conveying a policy. Further, section 3.2 presents the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme and discusses some of the problematic aspects associated with them. Specifically, this section introduces the role of moral status in the evaluation of utilitarina arguments. However, this is investigated in detail in chapter 4.

3.1 Pragma-dialectics and the role of argument schemes

In this thesis, the argumentative approach taken to evaluate utilitarian arguments is the pragma-dialectical framework, one of the most prominent theories within argumentation theory. According to this approach, in order to establish whether a standpoint has been (un)successfully defended, one must assess the reasonableness of the argumentation put forward. Clearly, in order to defend a standpoint, one can put forward one or more arguments, and the reasonableness of each of these arguments should be evaluated in order to assess to what degree they are contributing to the acceptability of the standpoint. In other words, “each single argument must be judged according to the degree to which it justifies (or refutes) the proposition to which the standpoint it directly supports refers” (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans 2017: 81). In order for an argument to be deemed reasonable, each statement that makes it up must be acceptable, the reasoning underlying the argument must be valid, and the appropriate argument scheme must be employed (for an overview of these criteria, see van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans 2017: 81-84).

The pragma-dialectical theory identifies three main types of argumentation: symptomatic argumentation, causal argumentation and argumentation based on a comparison (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 4). Each type of argumentation is indicative of a particular relationship between the standpoint and the argument. When the standpoint is defended by referring to a certain sign, symptom or distinguishing mark of what is expressed in the standpoint, we speak of symptomatic argumentation. If the standpoint is defended by arguing that something referred to in the standpoint

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is similar to something else cited in the argumentation, and that on the basis of this similarity the standpoint should be accepted, this type of argumentation is based on a relation of analogy. Lastly, in causal argumentation, a standpoint is defended by making a causal connection between the argumentation and the standpoint, and on the basis of this connection, the standpoint must be accepted (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans 2017: 84-89). In turn, argument schemes belong to one of these three main types of argumentation.

In pragma-dialectics, argument schemes are sub-types of causal, symptomatic or analogical argumentation that express the structure of the relation between the standpoint and argument. As explicated by van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992: 96, cited in van Poppel 2013: 66), an argument scheme is a “more or less conventionalized way of representing the relation between what is stated in the argument and what is stated in the standpoint.” An argument scheme consists of a (reconstructed) standpoint, argument(s), and a connection premise (Van Poppel 2013: 67). In order to properly determine whether the correct argument scheme is being employed, one must first identify what type of standpoint is put forward.

The pragma-dialecticians distinguish between three types of standpoints: descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive standpoints (Maassen 2017: 66). These are expressed, respectively, through propositions of fact, propositions of value and propositions of policy. An example of a descriptive standpoint can be identified in the proposition of the following fact: “Amsterdam has one airport”. An example of an evaluative standpoint, expressed by a proposition of value, is: “Amsterdam is the most beautiful city in the Netherlands”. Finally, a prescriptive standpoint, expressed through a proposition of policy, has the structure of: “You should visit Amsterdam”.

Within ethical debates the most common types of standpoints are of an evaluative or a prescriptive nature. In fact, typically, in ethical discussions one can identify an evaluative claim regarding moral actions, which is expressed in the form of a proposition of value, such as “Stealing bikes is wrong” (Maassen 2017: 8). However, within the field of applied ethics more specifically, ethical discussions are about real-life cases and are, more often than not, characterized by prescriptive standpoints. These standpoints are expressed through propositions of policy, such as “We should not hunt animals” or “We should take action against the climate crisis”. Accordingly, the utilitarian principle, which indicates that an action is morally good if it brings about a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people, can be reconstructed argumentatively as a prescriptive standpoint, expressed by a proposition of policy (Maassen 2017: 14). The standpoint of the utilitarian principle, then, takes the following form: “Action (X) should be carried

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out”, in which (X) stands for a certain policy decision. Once determined which standpoint is put forward, one must choose the most appropriate argument scheme to support the standpoint.

Since the utilitarian principle is concerned with the direct consequences of a policy or decision, it is a type of causal argumentation. Further, the sub-type of causal argumentation specifically suitable for the utilitarian principle is the pragmatic argument scheme (Maassen 2017: 14). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe pragmatic argumentation as based on a causal link between an action and its consequences. Similar to the line of reasoning in the utilitarian principle, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe that pragmatic argumentation “permits the evaluation of an act or event in terms of its favourable or unfavourable consequences” (1969: 266). As such, the form of the pragmatic argument scheme is given below:

1 Action (X) should be carried out

1.1 Because action (X) will lead to positive result (Y), and

(1.1’) (If action (X) leads to result (Y), and result (Y) is desirable, action (X) should be carried out)

With the use of the pragmatic argument scheme, the utilitarian principle can be reconstructed as follows:

1 Action (X) should be carried out

1.1 Because action (X) will lead to a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people, and

(1.1’) (Action (X) leads to a maximization of happiness, and a maximization of happiness is desirable, therefore action (X) should be carried out)

Once the utilitarian principle has been reconstructed as a pragmatic argument with a prescriptive standpoint expressing a proposition of policy, it is time to evaluate the argument by providing successful answers to the critical questions.

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3.2 The critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme

In the pragma-dialectical framework, arguments are deemed acceptable if the critical questions associated with the argument schemes are all answered satisfactorily. In order to evaluate whether the argumentation and whether the argument scheme has been correctly employed, each argument scheme comes with a series of critical questions. In the case of the pragmatic argument scheme, the following critical questions must all be successfully answered in order to allow for the acceptability of the standpoint they defend (Garssen et al. 2011: 23):

1. Does the proposed cause (X) indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result? 2. Could the mentioned result be achieved or counteracted by other means as well?

3. Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with the proposed cause, in order to create the mentioned (un)desirable result?

4. Does the mentioned cause (X) not have any serious undesirable side-effects?

5. Is that what is presented as result (Y) in the argumentation indeed desirable or undesirable? If one question is answered unfavorably, the pragma-dialectical tradition is to reject the argument as a whole. This, then, is a rigorous method of evaluation, especially in the case of ethical arguments such as the utilitarian argument. In these arguments, the critical questions cannot always be answered clearly or satisfactorily, especially if there are various ethical considerations to pay mind to. Gerber states that “critics who analyse the rhetoric of those engaged in racist / hate speech must have an ideological, moral component as part of their methodology in order to identify and investigate the arguments advanced in support of the goals of those rhetors” (2011: 27). In answering the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme, then, the question arises: how should the evaluator assess a course of action, without addressing all morally relevant entities affected by the consequences?

Moreover, when one is answering a critical question, the subjective aspect of reasonableness becomes problematic too. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest, the reasonableness of an argument can be equated with its effectiveness on the evaluator of the argument in question. Therefore, “the norm of reasonableness is potentially relativistic to a high degree” (cited in van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 130). From this perspective, it is clear that who gets included in the scope of moral status and who does not, and therefore the reasonableness of the argument, depends

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largely on which way the evaluation of utilitarian arguments is carried out. Some critics (Curato 2008; Gerber 2011) argue that such potential moral dangers, like disregarding the various views on moral status in the evaluation, are the consequence of a presumption regarding speech validity claims in the pragma-dialectical framework. Curato specifies that in the pragma-dialectical evaluation, the analyst presumes “that what the speaker says is true, sincere, and normatively appropriate” (2008: 8). This is not always true, however, in ethical argumentation generally, and in the case of pragmatic arguments that express the utilitarian principle specifically.

In any case, one must note that the matter of moral status remains problematic throughout different ethical principles expressed through other forms of argumentation as well, and not just utilitarian principles reconstructed as pragmatic arguments. For example, the deontological principle, according to which certain norms are categorically morally right or wrong, can be reconstructed through symptomatic argumentation (Maassen 2017: 12). Similar to the evaluation of utilitarian arguments, the critical questions that accompany the argument schemes under the category of symptomatic argumentation are, too, problematic in their way of addressing what makes a certain moral action desirable or undesirable. Though these are equally important topics, they are not the main subject of this thesis.2

Instead, the focus here is to exclusively examine how moral status is addressed within the pragma-dialectical evaluation of utilitarian arguments reconstructed as pragmatic arguments. Further, this thesis aims to clarify this issue by examining how moral status is currently dealt with in the pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of the pragmatic argument and, additionally, how moral status can be evaluated properly. The following chapter is concerned with how one can adequately reconstruct and evaluate utilitarian arguments from a pragma-dialectical perspective, in order to show what problems can arise when considering moral status in the evaluation. It does so through the use of two cases in the debate on applied ethics with two respective utilitarian arguments that are problematic and controversial in their issues around moral status.

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4 Moral status: two problematic cases

In the present chapter, two problem cases are presented in order to examine the effect of alternating views on moral status in the pragma-dialectical evaluation of the utilitarian argument. As stated, the evaluation of the utilitarian argument consists of answering the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. After the conduction of this evaluation process, an answer to research question 1.a can be provided:

Research question 1.b and the main research question are answered in the next and final chapter. Section 4.1 provides context on the debate around which entities, other than currently existing human beings, deserve moral status. This discussion is situated within the debates on future generations and the preservation of biodiversity through hunting practices. Section 4.2 focuses on case (1), a debate regarding the interests of future generations of people that have to deal with the delayed effects of human-caused climate change. In this problem case, this thesis focuses on the idea of granting moral status not only to the present generation of people that is affected by the argument expressing a climate policy decision, but also on the potential moral status of future generations, who will, undoubtedly, be affected by climate policy decisions made today. Therefore, the analysis of this case is limited to extending moral status from one group of people to a larger group of human beings, i.e., future generations. Section 4.3 discusses problem case (2), which focuses on the debate regarding the hunting of certain animals as a means of preservation of biodiversity. Here, the issue at stake is, in contrast to the first case, to broaden the scope of moral status beyond humans, be it present or future people to consider all kinds of natural entities, such as plants, animals and even entire ecosystems.

4.1 Context on the debates on future generations and the preservation of biodiversity

Issues on the questionable moral status of groups of people come to light in policy decisions on climate change. Within the applied ethical debate on climate change, a moral action with real life consequences for the present as well as for posterity, usually comes down to making a policy decision. In these policy decisions, people’s short-term and long-term interests often clash. More

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specifically, short-term happiness can be maximized through policy decisions that focus on the benefits for that generation, but often do so at the expense of long-term happiness. Thus, a climate policy that merely focuses on short-term, affordable investments, such as raising the level of dikes in The Netherlands, could be the best policy for the greatest number of people of the present generation, because it is a financially viable solution and its effects on climate change can temporarily be countered. On the other hand, if a climate policy focuses on the long-term, such as investing in a transition to green, renewable energy, the financial cost for the present will be severe and will, slow down the economy—at least for the present (Gardiner 2010: 333). Hence, the damage of a policy that invests in a green economy befalls the present, whereas the gains are for future people. Especially during this time, when the world is nearing a point of no return and governments all over the world are faced with important decisions on climate change, the question remains: to what extent should we protect the interests of the future, if the investments needed are at the cost of those in the present?

With regard to policies on climate change, two types of policies exist, based on two types of strategies for climate change: adaptation policies and mitigation policies. Adaptation strategies

adjust to the expected consequences of climate change. Mitigation strategies are measures aimed at

the prevention of further climate change by cutting greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions, such as through a binding emissions budget per nation. The first type of policy is focused on the interests of the present; the second on the interests of the future. Further, adaptation strategies are typically less invasive to the economy and less challenging to implement than mitigation strategies. Current policy-makers, therefore, have reason to prefer adaptation (focused on the short-term) over mitigation strategies (focused on the long-term). Further, adaptation and mitigation strategies are regularly viewed as two competing policies when financial resources are limited. That is, adaptation strategies will perpetuate the climate crisis in the long term when considered that these resources could have been allocated towards long-term solutions instead, thereby stalling radical action.3

If the maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people is indeed taken as a fundamental principle, the injustice that future people would face due to the policy decisions of the present should, at least, be questioned in the argumentative evaluation of a utilitarian argument regarding climate policy. Most certainly, effects on the climate of the emissions of the present

3 Yet, in some cases, adaptation strategies need to be implemented at present and can no longer be put off, such the raising of land surface in order to prevent floods. For the purposes of this thesis, however, mitigation and pro-adaptation arguments are treated as supporting opposing climate policies.

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generation will lower the quality of life for the future (Gardiner 2004: 576) and, subsequently, their happiness and overall utility.

However, the common idea that well-being and happiness only apply to people becomes questionable when other kinds of entities are considered, such as animals, plants or even entire ecosystems. Human-caused climate change does not harm just humans: animals, plants and ecosystems are by far hit the hardest. Case (2), debating the morality of hunting animals as a means of preserving biodiversity, therefore, is concerned with the debate on moral status when even more entities are at stake in a utilitarian argument arguing for a certain policy on this issue.

As said, case (2) focuses on policy decisions regarding the preservation of biodiversity by hunting certain animals that eat plants that are scarce in number and whose scarcity threatens biodiversity. Not only do the effects of climate change affect people, importantly, “climate change will lead to shifts in the composition of flora and fauna and will harm biodiversity and plant and animal health” (National Climate Adaptation Strategy of the Netherlands 2018: 15). Should we be allowed to hunt certain animals species in service of the preservation of biodiversity? Or should we consider the interests of the animals hunted over the harm their existence could cause on plants and ecosystems? These are some questions that help to assess a pragmatic argument’s reasonableness if such entities are taken into consideration.

From a utilitarian perspective, policies that allow the hunting of animals can be accepted if they result in a maximization of happiness. However, hunting animals can be seen as a cruel and immoral practice according to many, such as Singer (section 2.2), and others who argue for the equal consideration of the interests of both humans and animals. Taking this perspective, then, one might argue for a very different policy, one in which animals are not to be hunted on.4_{In this sense,}

happiness can be reinterpreted as well-being, which refers to having one’s main interests met, such as living peacefully. Further, as added in section 2.2, many environmental ethicists argue for a further extension of moral status (to varying degrees) to take into account plants, and even entire ecosystems. The utilitarian principle must, then, be adjusted so as to not only apply to people (or animals). More specifically, not only is the maximization of happiness of the greatest number of people at stake, the happiness of all natural entities affected by the consequences of a certain course of action should be counted. The traditional utilitarian principle reinterpreted in light of these issues 4 Then again, when the positive indirect consequences for humans, who have interests in living in a bio-diverse environment, are counted, people’s interests may, in turn, outweigh the interests of the hunted animals. However, the interests of humans are the main subject of case (1) and, therefore, are taken out of the analysis and evaluations of the present case.

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on moral status just mentioned, then, goes as follows: “An action is right if it brings about the most

well-being for the greatest number of entities.

These added complexities are indicative of the importance of considering which entities should be taken into consideration when evaluating a pragmatic argument. The following sections go into more depth about cases (1) and (2).

4.2 Case 1: the effects of climate change on present and future generations of people

This thesis limits its focus on the analysis and evaluation of a utilitarian argument in favor of an adaptation policy rather than a mitigation policy. The reason for this decision is that a (exclusively) pro-adaptation argument is more contentious and, therefore, more fruitful for analysis. The reason of its contention has to do with its sole care for the interests of the present generation and, hence, its neglect of those of future generations. For these reasons, the pro-adaptation argument functions as a more fitting example to demonstrate the issues with moral status in the pragma-dialectical evaluation of the pragmatic argument scheme.

As stated in section 3.1, in applied ethics, ethical arguments often come down to an argument about a policy decision. The standpoint supported by such an argument can be reconstructed as a prescriptive standpoint, expressed by a proposition of policy (Maassen 2017: 14). Finally, the argumentative reconstruction of a utilitarian argument is made through the use of a pragmatic argument scheme. Accordingly, the pro-adaptation argument is reconstructed in figure 1, below:

1. Adaptation policies should be carried out. 1.1a Adaptation policies lead to more good. 1.1b More good is desirable.

1.1a-b’ If adaptation policies lead to more good, and if more good is desirable, then adaptation policies should be carried out.

Figure 1 Argumentative reconstruction of pro-adaptation argument.

In this problem case, one variable is of concern in the evaluation of the above reconstructed argument: the view on moral status. The view on moral status in which it is assumed that only currently living people have (full) moral status, is termed the narrow view of moral status. Accordingly, the view in which future people are also given moral status alongside present people,

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is termed the extended view of moral status. In simple terms, the perspectives represent a vision of moral status that is either pro-future people or con-future people. This distinction is crucial to the evaluation of the argument, since it considers who are affected by the policies, which, as a result, greatly impacts its reasonableness.

Next, the reconstruction given in figure 1 can be evaluated through the use of the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. The evaluations function to judge the reasonableness of the argument and are provided in figure 2 and figure 3 below.

Critical questions: narrow view

1 Do adaptation policies indeed lead to a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of

people?

Yes, if only present people are counted.

2 Could a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people be achieved or

counteracted by other means as well?

No, unless future people are considered as well.

3 Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with adaptation policies, in order

to create a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people?

No, unless future people are considered as well.

4 Do adaptation policies not have any serious undesirable side-effects?

No, unless future people are given moral status, in which case they are treated unjustly by this decision.

5 Is a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people indeed desirable? Yes, according to the utilitarian principle, more good is desirable.

Also, if one sticks to the interpretation of the traditional utilitarian principle in which only present people are given moral status and counted, then yes. However, if one also includes the interests of future people, then no.

Standpoint accepted

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Critical questions: extended view

1 Do adaptation policies indeed lead to a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of

people?

No, unless future people are not considered and only the present is.

2 Could a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people be achieved or

counteracted by other means as well?

Yes, by mitigation policies that take into account the interests of future generations.

3 Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with adaptation policies, in order

to create a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people?

Yes, there need to be mitigation policies present if future people are considered as well. 4 Do adaptation policies not have any serious undesirable side-effects?

Yes, investing solely in this type of policy is detrimental to future generations. 5 Is a maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people indeed desirable?

Yes, according to the utilitarian principle more good is desirable.

However, if one challenges the interpretation of the traditional utilitarian principle in which only present people are given moral status, and extend this principle to include also future people, their interests are only met through the addition of mitigation policies.

Standpoint rejected

Figure 3 Evaluation of the utilitarian argument in favor of a pro-adaptation policy based on an extended view on moral

status.

As seen in figure 2, the standpoint is accepted when a narrow view on moral status is assumed, whereas figure 3 indicates that the standpoint is rejected when an extended view on moral status is presumed. That is, the argument for adaptation policies is reasonable when only presently living people are counted, since they reap the benefits of their investments and the economy need not undergo dramatic changes of which they will not reap the benefits. In contrast, the argument is unreasonable when future people are included in the scope of moral status, since adaptation policies do not protect their interests. In this sense, the maximization of happiness for the greatest number is not reached, since the moral status of a large number is not even included. The complications that the different views on moral status cause for the evaluation, are further evidenced through the difficulty in providing clear-cut yes-and-no answers. All in all, the evaluations show that the perspective on moral status of the person evaluating the argumentation heavily influences the reasonableness of the argumentation and the acceptability of the standpoint.

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In the problem case just presented, the focus has been solely on extending moral status from existing people to future generations. However, similar lines of argument can be put forward in extending moral status beyond humans, to other entities such as plants, animals and even entire ecosystems. The next section examines an argument that concerns these very entities, in order to show that the issue of moral status applies beyond the scope of humans.

4.3 Case 2: the effects on non-human life-forms in the preservation of biodiversity

This thesis chooses to focus on the analysis and evaluation of an argument on policies on the preservation of biodiversity, that affect the interests of certain animal species versus those of plants and ecosystems. Although one can think of various arguments that affect various entities that play a role in this debate, this thesis chooses to center animals, so that their interests are in opposition to those of other life-forms. As such, the interests of these other entities are considered as one group in the evaluation. Such an argument, then, does still consider the moral status of multiple types of natural entities other than people, which is the main function of case (2).

As said, this thesis focuses on prescriptive standpoints conveying a proposition of policy, supported by a utilitarian argument. Further, the argument is reconstructed using the pragmatic argument scheme. Accordingly, the argument for the hunting of certain animals in order to preserve biodiversity is presented in figure 4 below:

1. Policies for the hunting on certain animal species as a means of the preservation of biodiversity should be carried out.

1.1a The hunting of certain animal species leads to more good, because it leads to the preservation of biodiversity.

1.1b More good is desirable.

1.1a-b’ If the hunting of certain animals species leads to more good, and if more good is desirable, then hunting on certain animal species should be carried out.

Figure 4 Argumentative reconstruction of a pro-hunting animals argument.

Next, the reconstruction given in figure 4 can be evaluated through the use of the same critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme as seen in case (1). In contrast to case (1), one cannot, in the present problem case, speak of a narrow or an extended view on moral status, since in this case, one view or moral status is not broader than the other, rather one is just

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different from the other. Nonetheless, the distinction between the views is still crucial to the

evaluation of the argument, since it also manages to examine the moral status of all those who are affected by the policies. According to the first view discussed in the present case, the interests of plants and ecosystems are lumped together and are prioritized over those of the animals being hunted, thereby granting more moral status to the plants and ecosystems than the animals. In the second view, however, the interests of animals are given more moral status and, hence, they receive more moral status than the plants and ecosystems.

The reconstruction given in figure 4 can be evaluated through the use of the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. The evaluations function to judge the reasonableness of the argument and are provided in figure 5 and figure 6 below.

Critical questions: the moral status of plants and ecosystems prioritized over animals

1 Does the hunting of certain animal species indeed lead to a maximization of the well-being for the greatest number of entities?

Yes, because the hunting of certain animal species helps to preserve biodiversity. 2 Could a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities be achieved or

counteracted by any other means as well?

No, unless we consider the well-being of the animals being hunted.

3 Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with pro-hunting policies, in order to create a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities?

No.

4 Do pro-hunting policies not have any serious undesirable side-effects?

No, unless we consider the being of the animals being hunted, in which case their well-being is jeopardized and their interests are violated by this decision.

5 Is a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities indeed desirable?

Yes, according to the revised utilitarian principle, more good is desirable.

Standpoint accepted

Figure 5 Evaluation of the utilitarian argument on policies in which plants and ecosystems are given more moral status

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Critical questions: the moral status of animals prioritized over plants and ecosystems

1 Does the hunting of certain animal species indeed lead to a maximization of the well-being for the greatest number of entities?

No, unless we do not consider the well-being of the animals being hunted.

2 Could a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities be achieved or counteracted by any other means as well?

Yes, by opting for policies that do not allow the hunting of animals in order to preserve biodiversity.

3 Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with pro-hunting policies, in order to create a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities?

Yes, an alternative solution to pro-hunting policies as a means to preserves biodiversity. 4 Do pro-hunting policies not have any serious undesirable side-effects?

Yes, most importantly, the well-being of the animals being hunted is being neglected and their moral status is denied. What is more, a decrease in that number of animals could cause a domino-effect in which other ecosystems are negatively impacted.

5 Is a maximization of well-being for the greatest number of entities indeed desirable?

Yes, according to the utilitarian principle, more good is desirable.

Standpoint rejected

Figure 6 Evaluation of the utilitarian argument on policies in which certain animals are given more moral status than

plants and ecosystems.

In line with the evaluation process presented in case (1), the evaluations in case (2) can be answered differently depending on one’s view of moral status. In the first evaluation, the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme are answered without taking into account the interests of the animals hunted, thereby prioritizing the interests of the other entities affected by their demise, like plants and ecosystems. In the second evaluation, the critical questions are answered by taking the interests of animals into account and prioritizing these over those of plants and ecosystems.

The evaluations function to judge the reasonableness of the argument and the acceptability of the standpoint. Above, it is shown that the argument would be judged as reasonable and the standpoint is accepted when the preservation of biodiversity is prioritized over the lives of certain

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animals. This would be the case if this argument would be evaluated by someone with the same views on moral status as some environmental ethicists, for whom the preservation of biodiversity is the final end.5_{Would the argument, however, be analyzed by someone who does not believe in the}

moral status of plants and ecosystems, as is the case in the second evaluation, the argument would be seen as unreasonable and the standpoint would be rejected. The same would happen if, for example, a utilitarian animal ethicist does agree that plants and ecosystems have some degree of moral status, but that their degree of moral status is still outweighed by the moral status of the animals at stake. This problem case, then, is another example of how the reasonableness of a utilitarian argument can greatly depend on the different existent views of moral status.

After the evaluations in case (1) and case (2), an answer to research question 1.a can be provided:

This thesis concludes that the view on moral status is of great influence in the answers to the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme in the pragma-dialectical evaluation, since it can determine the outcome of the evaluation and, thus, the acceptability of the standpoint. More specifically, in case (1), one can see that if the scope of moral status is extended from the present generation to include future generations, the pro-adaptation argument that was initially considered as reasonable, would become unreasonable when future people also receive moral status. In a similar vein, in case (2), where the moral status of all kinds of non-human natural entities are taken into account, the pro-hunting argument is initially seen as reasonable when only the moral status of plants and ecosystems are considered. On the other hand, the argument is deemed unreasonable when only the moral status of animals is acknowledged, or is acknowledged more in calculating the maximization of happiness.

Moreover, this thesis concludes that the current critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme, as outlined by the pragma-dialectical framework, lack in their ability to address moral status adequately. The next and final chapter, then, addresses the issues with the current critical questions associated with the pragmatic arguments, and proposes a solution.

5 If the argument would be evaluated with only the moral status of humans in mind, in which the preservation of biodiversity can be seen as a positive indirect consequence for humans, the argument would also be accepted.

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5 Conclusion

To summarize, some decisions put us in the position to have to assess what the right thing to do is in a specific situation, what the best course of action is, and to consider those affected by our choices. Such questions, as applied to real-world actions and moral considerations, all fall under the branch of applied ethics. Within this branch, the present thesis has adopted the perspective of one of the most well-established ethical theories: utilitarianism. According to utilitarians, the morally right course of action to take, is one that maximizes happiness for the greatest number of people. Further, in this thesis the concept of moral status is central. In examining the issue of moral status, two issues with the just-mentioned formulation of the utilitarian principle arise. First, this thesis has shown how the term “happiness” has outgrown its meaning when the utilitarian principle is applied in the presented problem cases, and can, within the applied ethical debate, better be termed “well-being”. Second, the qualification to the utilitarian principle of the “the greatest number of people” can be rephrased as “the greatest number of natural entities”, so as to include more types of natural entities, such as future people, animals, plants or even entire ecosystems.

In the analysis and evaluation of utilitarian arguments that express moral decisions, this thesis adopts the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The utilitarian principle has been reconstructed argumentatively as a prescriptive standpoint, expressed by a proposition of policy and supported by a pragmatic argument. In the previous chapter, two problem cases have been analyzed in order to show how the evaluation of a pragmatic argument can be influenced by one’s view on moral status with regard to that argument, i.e., to which entities the consequences of a certain policy decision apply. As shown in case (1), if the scope of moral status is extended from the present generation of people to future generations, one can see how one policy rather than another is deemed as a better course of action to achieve the utilitarian goal of the maximization of happiness for the greatest number of people. In line with case (1), if the scope of moral status also considers the interests of other kinds of natural entities, such as plants, animals and/or ecosystems, the reasonableness of the argument and the acceptability of the standpoint are also highly dependent on which of these entities are taken into account, or which entities’ interests outweigh those of others. This has been shown in case (2).

What has become clear from the analyses and evaluations in chapter 4, is that the reasonableness of the arguments and the acceptability of the standpoints not only depend on the answers to the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme; they also depend on which perspective the analyst is taking with regards to moral status. Since the reasonableness of

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the argument and the acceptability of the standpoint greatly depend on which entities are granted moral status, it is crucial to account for these different views of moral status in the pragma-dialectical evaluation of the pragmatic argument.

In this final chapter, this thesis moves on to answer the main research question, and does so by considering the answer to 1.a given in section 4.3, followed by providing an answer to research question 1.b. To reiterate the answer to research question 1.a provided in chapter 4, the two problem cases make evident that, depending on one’s stance on moral status, an argument can be accepted or rejected. In case (1) on the moral status of future generations in pursuing adaptation policies, the answers to the critical questions pertaining to the pragmatic argument scheme are subject to change on the basis of whether moral status is extended to future generations or not. In the same way, in case (2), the acceptability of a pro-hunting policy does not depend solely on whether the current critical questions are answered successfully, but on the interests of the entities considered to be affected by the consequences of such a policy. Therefore, this thesis concludes that, with regards to research question 1.a, the role of moral status is of great influence in the evaluation of utilitarian arguments with prescriptive standpoints conveying a proposition of policy, such as the arguments discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, this thesis argues that the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme currently lack in their ability to address the pressing issue of moral status, as is elaborated on below.

Research question 1.b is answered by first discussing the current critical questions (‘CQ’) associated with the pragmatic argument scheme one by one, in order to identify the issues that prevent the questions from adequately addressing moral status. Based on this close examination, then, a solution is provided, answering both research question 1.b and the main research question. Below, a close inspection of the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme, and their role in potentially accounting for moral status, follows.

1. Does the proposed cause (X) indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result?

Critical question 1 is concerned with whether the proposed course of action, decision or policy (X) indeed leads to the result outlined in (Y), considered as (un)desirable. If it does not, then the argument can be rejected. However, the question whether the proposed cause, such as a policy decision, leads to the result in question often depends on which groups of entities are taken into consideration when assessing the causal connection between the proposed cause and the result.

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As shown in the cases discussed in chapter 4, granting or not granting moral status to a group of entities determines the reasonableness of an argument in favor of a certain policy. In case (1), the proposed cause (adaptation policies) lead to undesirable consequences for future generations, but not for the present generation. The same goes, however, when the interests of other entities than (future) people are considered. That is, in case (2), the (un)acceptability of the proposed cause (to allow for the hunting of certain animals), the result is greatly influenced by whether we grant (more) moral status to the entities that benefit from the hunting of those specific animals, or if we grant (more) moral status to the animals being hunted. Thus, the different views of moral status canot be adequately addressed in this critical question.

2. Could the mentioned result be achieved or counteracted by other means as well?

Critical question 2 is concerned with the necessity of (X) to achieve or counteract result (Y). If there are indeed other means of achieving or counteracting (Y), it would weaken the argument. Concerning moral status, it could be possible that, if the moral status of some entities is denied in the proposed course of action, this question would be able to address this weakness by bringing up possible alternative means that include these entities and still have a similar outcome. In this sense, CQ2 helps addressing different possible views of moral status in the evaluation of a pragmatic argument. However, yes, CQ2 can propose means that would be optimally desirable for all entities affected and have a similar result, but it would still not render the argument weak or unsound by merit of its moral implications.

Drawing on the cases in chapter 4 helps to clarifies this issue. Turning to problem case (2), if there is an alternative to preserving biodiversity without having to hunt animals, it would come up through this question. If such an alternative is indeed possible, those animals would not be hunted. The same could be said if we refer back to case (1) regarding future generations. Through this critical question a possible alternative to a pro-adaptation argument could be found: one that honors the interests of future generations. However, in this way we are only considering these solutions in there being an alternative out there, and not on the basis of the question: who is affected by (X) and, therefore, should be taken into account when considering the consequences of a policy decision? In this sense, an answer to this critical question may appear somewhat arbitrary, because it does not inquire after the proposed cause intrinsically, by but rather in contrast to other incidentally available means to a similar end.

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What is more, in cases in which there are no alternative means available, CQ2 still fails to address the issue of moral status itself. It could be the case, for example, that there is no alternative to hunting those animals, or to adopting a pro-adaptation policy. In this case, we should deem CQ2 to be answered successfully, adding to the overall reasonableness of the argument. But the fact that certain entities have been denied moral status, then, would still remain problematic and unaddressed. In essence, if CQ2 would be answered successfully, one accepts the proposed course of action (X) just because there is no better alternative available, and not because it is also morally acceptable in itself.

3. Are there any other factors that have to be present, together with the proposed cause, in order to create the mentioned (un)desirable result?

This question effectively inquires after the sufficiency of (X) in leading to (un)desirable consequence(s) (Y). That is, pragmatic argument schemes can become much weaker if the proposed cause is only a necessary condition and not also a sufficient condition of result (Y), the reason being that (X) would not solely be the cause of (Y). If it is revealed, then, that other factors need to be present to create the mentioned (un)desirable result, it would weaken the argument.

This question, too, is not suitable to address the moral status of the entities affected by the proposed cause. It could, for example, be said that (X) is not sufficient and that there need to be more factors present for result (Y) to occur, such as the consideration of the moral status of all relevant entities rather than just one group. In this way, it can be argued that the desirable result can only be obtained when this other crucial factor is obtained. This assumption, however, would lead to a crucial change in the meaning of the proposed cause (X) and result (Y).

For example, in case (2), one could say that more needs to be done to preserve biodiversity than just hunt animals, such as considering the moral status of the animals being hunted. However, this would change the meaning of the proposed cause to hunt animals altogether, since the only way of considering their interests adequately, is to let them live. The only exception to this is if one agrees with Singer’s view of moral interests, who argues that “the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite to having interests” (2002: 7). As such, as long as the factor is added that the animals are killed without having to suffer, Singer argues that their interests are not violated and allows for their deaths if it maximizes the overall utility. With all other views, however, this critical question is not suitable to address moral status adequately.

The Role of Moral Status in Pragmatic Argumentation: A Pragma-dialectical Approach