Online Islamophobia after the Brussels attacks on March 22nd 2016: a critical discourse analysis of Facebook comments on news articles

(1)

Master Thesis

MSc in Sociology: track migration and ethnic studies

Online Islamophobia after the Brussels attacks on March 22nd 2016.

A critical discourse analysis of Facebook comments on

news articles regarding the Brussels attacks by Het Laatste Nieuws and De Standaard

Ezra Dupré (ID: 12759317)

Supervisor: dr. L.M. Hernandez Aguilar

Second reader: dr. M.A. van den Berg

July 6th 2020

(2)

(3)

Abstract

Online Islamophobia in the Flemish context is facing a research gap. Offline Flemish Islamophobia has been investigated previously. However a significant amount of reports on Belgian Islamophobic behaviour took place online. Social network platforms have become full-fledged social spheres where public discourse debates are encouraged. This thesis investigates the dominant narratives of Islamophobic comments on Flemish news articles posted on Facebook within a month after the Brussels bombing on March 22nd 2016. Because of the cultural and linguistic differences between the French speaking community and Flemish speaking community in Belgium, Islamophobia is bound to be affected by these differences. The comments are posted as a response to articles by the Flemish popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws and the Flemish quality newspaper De Standaard. In total 28 416 comments were analysed through Fairclough's critical discourse analysis with an additional focus on semiotic decisions made in the comments. The results indicate that dominant narratives of offline Islamophobic statements conform to online dominant narratives found in the Facebook comments. Dominant narratives supplementary to previously examined offline dominant narratives were detected such as “Muslims do not provide adequate upbringings for their children.” The main Islamophobic themes discussed in the comments cohere and overlap. In conclusion, the different dominant narratives of online Islamophobic comments combine into the online Islamophobia which arose from different forms of prejudice towards Muslims.

(4)

Acknowledgements

Without the following people’s support, writing this thesis would not have been possible. I would therefore like to thank these people ahead of the actual thesis. During the Migration and ethnic studies track, my interest in Islamophobia gradually grew. First of all, I would like to thank the professors in the migration track for sparking my interest. Secondly, I would like to thank my supervisor through this thesis, dr. L.M. Hernandez Aguilar, for the supportive guidance and feedback. His comments, motivation and critical eye always helped me forward during the process. Additionally, I would like to thank my second reader dr. M.A. van den Berg for the helpful advice regarding my thesis proposal. Next I would like to thank my fellow students in my thesis seminar group for giving me the critical feedback I needed. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother and my friends for the support and advice they provided.

(5)

1. Introduction

On 22 March 2016, the Zaventem airport and Maelbeek Metro Station in Brussels were bombed by Belgian members of ISIS causing 31 people to lose their lives and 300 to be injured (Rathore, 2016). Additionally, the Muslim terrorists of the Bataclan in Paris (2015) were Belgian as well. Many far-right politicians blamed the European Union for the attacks because of the Schengen area’s open border system. Far-right European parties undertook a ‘we told you so’-attitude in their reactions to the Bombing (Lorimer, 2016). In Belgium specifically, the discourse regarding the recent Brussel Bombing attacks (2016) has been portrayed in a manner stressing the radicalization of Muslims as the main cause. In the media Islam is almost solely mentioned in combination with ideas of an Islamic State or revolution (Fadil, El Asri, & Bracke, 2014).

During five weeks in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, more than four million Islamophobic tweets were sent worldwide (Miller, Arcostanzo, Smith, Krasodomski-Jones, Wiedlitzka, Jamali, & Dale, n.d.). The majority of these Tweets were Islamophobic insults. In this timeframe 13,800,000 Tweets explicitly touched upon the attacks in Brussels. In Carl Miller et al.’s research (n.d.). five classifications of Islamophobia were recognized. The first classification is ‘Islam is the Enemy’. Hereby Muslims are considered to be tolerant towards violence and hostility towards the West. The second classification portrays Muslims to be more probable to commit sex offences. As a third classification Muslims are described as tolerant of terrorism. The necessity for offline action against Muslims is the fourth classification. The fifth and last classification includes derogatory, abusive Islamophobic comments aimed at other online accounts.

During the course of 2018, 70 cases of Islamophobia were registered in Belgium (CCIB, 2018). In comparison to other European countries like France or Germany with more than 500 recorded cases this number may seem low. However Belgium’s population is also lower. Out of these 70 cases 29% or 20,3 cases occurred online (CCIB, 2018).

As in other European countries, Islamophobia is already widely spread in Belgium (CCIB, 2018; Mescoli, 2017a). A common feature of Islamophobia has been the forging of a link between terrorist attacks and the Muslim communities in Europe. Against this background, the Brussels bombings enhanced online Islamophobic comments on Flemish news articles.

(8)

8

This thesis will investigate Islamophobic comments in Flemish media outlets in the aftermath of the 2016 Brussels bombings.

1.1. Islam and Islamophobia in Belgium

In Belgium, during the 1960s the demand for foreign workers for the mining and steel industry was high (Juchtmans & Nicaise, 2013). Mostly Muslims from the mediterranean region filled in this demand. This import of ‘foreign workers’ was arranged through bilateral agreements. This organized ‘import of foreign workers’ was terminated in 1974 because of the economic crisis in the 1970s, and then the mines closed in the 1970s (Kanmaz, 2002). In the ensuing decades, more Muslims moved to Belgium under family reunification (Kanmaz, 2002). Since then, Muslims have been seen as competition on the labour market for the lower social class. Due to this increase in visibility on the labor market, Muslims have been portrayed and stigmatized as undesired citizens (Kanmaz, 2002).

The scholarship of Islam is Belgium harks back to the 1980s and therefore is quite young in comparison to anti-Semitism research (Mescoli, 2017a; Taras, 2013). The Belgian discourse on Islam departed in the early 1990. On November 24th 1991, the far right-wing party Flemish Blok (Vlaams Blok) won the elections and increased from two to twelve seats in the parliament. This day is still known as ‘black sunday’. Flemish Blok uses a political discourse centered on Flemish nationalism and racial mindset towards non-EU migrants (Zemni, 2011). Ever since this ‘black sunday’ discourses on migration and Islam became a more significant political matter and led to normalizing Islamophobic slurs and insults.

In Belgium the idea of a homogenic Belgian society as the starting point of the community still rules (Zemni, 2011). In the Belgian public discourse on Islam, Muslims are routinely depicted as a homogeneous group isolated from the general public. These forms of representing Muslims can be seen as what Willem Schinkel (2007) defines as ‘Culturism’, namely, Islam is depicted as a foreign threat to the European values. The so-called issues caused by Muslims are portrayed to be inherent of the Muslim community. Additionally, in this discourse Muslims rarely participate (Zemni, 2011).

In Europe, Muslims are often characterized as ‘the Other.’ (Djelloul & Maréchal, 2014). This orientalist mindset is strengthened by the association of the recent attacks and their alleged Islamic foundation of action (Mescoli, 2017a). The idea of Islam as contradictory to European values is thereby enhanced (Djelloul & Maréchal, 2014). Overall, the Belgian discourse on

(9)

9

Muslims is characterized as a Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’ (Zemni, 2011). A ‘clash of civilizations‘ is a way of measuring a civilization by comparing to another civilization. In this clash the emphasis is put on social issues and the conflict between different cultures and worldviews. In the Islamophobic discourse the current depiction of Muslims is a tool to interpret socioeconomic issues as cultural issues (Zemni, 2011). The clash-of-civilizations, which mostly indicates the demonization of Muslims has been going on for roughly 1 400 years. This timeframe shows that anti Muslims sentiments were present before the concept of Islamophobia arose (Taras, 2013).

In the Belgian discourse the, mostly Islamic, culture of ‘immigrants’ is still seen as the biggest difficulty for integration (Zemni, 2011). In Flanders Muslims are characterized as threats in the media and by politicians (Zemni, 2011). This characterization can generate “xeno-racist” attitudes towards Muslims (Fekete, 2004).

The political system of Belgium consists of two divided systems. The social and cultural discrepancy between Belgium and Wallonia are its main cause (Billiet, Maddens & Frognier, 2006). Flanders is the Dutch speaking part of Belgium. Being Flemish can be a sub-identity to being Belgian. The conservation of Flemish cultural heritage is related to the Flemish cultural identity. Possible outlooks towards migrants and Muslims are divergent in Wallonia as in Flanders. This divergence could be seen as based on the differences in the Walloon and Flemish sub- identities. While, Walloons worry about the outsider’s economic threat, Flemings worry more about preserving their culture (Billiet, Maddens & Frognier, 2006). This has lead to a regular stereotyping of Flemings being xenophobic. In Flanders, language and religion represent the most present symbolic boundaries between Flemish people and ‘outsiders’.

In addition to separate political systems, culture and media are also completely disconnected from one another. In Flanders there are no Francophone newspapers or other media, and vice versa (Billiet, Maddens & Frognier, 2006). Each community has their own monolingual media station. The differences in cultures, social sensitivities, preferences and customs are enhanced by following state reforms. All these differences combined, make up the decision to only include comments on Flemish newspapers as data.

(10)

10

1.2. Academic and societal relevance

Many existing articles explain the polarisation of Belgian opinions on Muslims and Belgian Islamophobia. However language has an important effect on discourse and the manner in which anger and prejudice is expressed. Therefore it is valuable to explore Flanders as a more specific Dutch speaking research population. Additionally, the cultural identities in Wallonia and Flanders appears to be divergent. Thus Islamophobia in the French and Dutch communities are bound to play out differently as well. Elsa Mescoli (2017a) investigated the discursive content of Islamophobia in Belgium. However, her research was not specified to survey the particularities of Flanders on the operations of Islamophobia on the internet. This thesis seeks to fill in this research gap.

According to different authors (Awan, 2014; Feldman, Littler, Dack & Copsey, 2013; Zemni 2011), online Islamophobia is an under researched subject within the growing literature on Islamophobia. Online newspapers and social media posts on Muslims have been previously researched (Zemni, 2011), however, the readers’ reactions and comments to those news articles have not been analyzed in the Flemish context yet. Independent reactions to news articles on right-wing anti-Islam statements have not yet been looked into in depth (Ekman, 2015). Multiple Flemish newspapers are known for their readers’ extreme reactions on their news websites. Imran Awan (2014) argues that the amount of online anti-Muslim hate and prejudice has been on the rise, and thus cyber hate continues to be a complicated issue. Awan (2014) also urges to explore this field more thoroughly. Against this background, this thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of online Islamophobia.

2. Research questions

The main research question for this thesis reads: Which dominant narratives of Islamophobia are present in the online comments of Het Laatste Nieuws and De Standaard up to one month after the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016? Sub- questions complementing this main line of inquiry are:

- How are the comments on news outlets Facebook pages being used by the commentators to describe and represent Muslims?

- Which are the main differences, if any, in the comments on Islam between the different newpapers the Het Laatste Nieuws and De Standaard?

(11)

11

- How do encoding, decoding and the interaction between the articles and their comments operate?

(12)

12

3. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework guiding this research is based on the conceptualization of online and offline Islamophobia and cyber hate, while being complemented by the Runnymede trust (2017) discussion of Islamophobia and Mescoli’s (2017a) research on the dominant narratives of Islamophobia in the Belgian context.

3.1. Islamophobia

Islamophobia represents not only a challenge in Belgium and Flanders, but as different research has shown Islamophobia has become normalized throughout Europe (ENAR, 2011; Lorimer, 2016; Runnymede Trust, 2017). Islamophobia comprises the discriminatory behaviour towards a minority group (Muslims) whilst paying attention to the cultural practices of that community. This is a typical trait in racism and prejudice. In contemporary Europe, racism lies more focus on cultural practices than on “race” itself. Therefore Islamophobia fits within the classification of anti-Muslim racism (Runnymede Trust, 2017). Islamophobia will be defines in this thesis as:

any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. (Runnymede trust, 2017).

The elements of Islamophobia by the Runnymede trust (2017) largely overlap with the themes of dominant Islamophobic narratives in Belgium previously illustrated. Therefore I used the the ten dominant Islamophobic narratives by Mescoli (2017a) as the main theoretical framework during this thesis. The narratives take place in three overlapping domains: politics, media and everyday life. During this thesis attention is mostly paid towards the mass-media domain. Within the mass-mass-media domain three main themes tend to recur, namely, “Islam threatens Belgian traditions”, “a process of radicalization of Muslims is underway in Belgium” and “Brussels is turning into a Muslim city (Mescoli, 2017a).” Furthermore, Mescoli (2017a, p.18) describes 10 dominant Islamophobic narratives in Belgium. They are the following;

- Islamic practices need to be secularized to be accepted in Western societies

(13)

13

- Islamic belonging (claimed or assigned) is a prior identity marker

- Islam threatens Belgian traditions

- Brussels is turning into a Muslim city

- A process of radicalization of Muslims is underway in Belgium

- Islam is (and Muslims are) a problem for Western societies

- Islam as an easy target of derision

- Islamic religion legitimates extreme forms of oppression against women

- Mosques do not have their place in the local context

3.2. Islamophobia and racism

In the Islamophobia scholarship hardly any attention is paid to the association between race and Islam (Meer, 2013). Islamophobia can be identified as a type of racism. An additional racial dynamic is brought about by religion, which confirms that racism cannot only relate to ascription of skin color. However, religion does connect to ascription of color (Naber, 2008). Racism against Islam is distinct from previous forms of racism in history. Islamophobia is based on Orientalism (Said, 1985). 1Islam, to Islamophobes, is prove of all that wrong with everything non-Western. Which inevitably confirms what is right about the West (Sayyid, 2011). Nevertheless, the goal of modern anti-Islam sentiments is not to civilize others but to mediate in conflicts based on humanitarian principles. It is not as much seizing resources as it is distributing democracy (Sayyid, 2011).

Modern racism has generated anti-Semitism and anti-Negritude as white suprematist concepts (Taguieff 2008). They were later supplemented by anti-Arabism and anti-Islamism

1_{Orientalism according to Said (1978, pp. 1-2.) is “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the} Orient’s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, and even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.”

(14)

14

or Islamophobia (Taras, 2013). According to Taguieff (2008) these types of white suprematist racism have three things in common. Firstly, they classify people in terms of their imputed community of origin. These communities of origin are seen as a fundament in these people’s identities. Secondly, people within these classifications are excluded and stigmatized in an absolute manner. The pervasiveness of Islamophobic mindsets can be explained through racialization based on religion, race, culture and ethnicity. These variables make it possible to categorize groups of people within a fusion of these variable as inferior and threatening (Bleich, 2006). Lastly, the people in the classifications are regarded as barbaric, uncivilized, uneducated and inferior (Taguieff, 2008).

The anti-immigration and anti-minority discourses in Europe are umbrella notions for the Islamophobic discourse (Taras, 2013). Returning to the topic of the connection between anti-semitism and anti-Muslim sentiments, in contemporary Europe Muslims are portrayed as conspiring in order to take over the world, which may result in the formation of a new entity called Eurabia (Ye’or, 2001).

In public discourse, Islamophobia as form of racism is often contested based of two main arguments: First, by differentiatingreligion from ethnic groups and second by characterizing religion as voluntarily chosen. Firstly, some policymakers believe Islamophobia cannot be categorized as racism because Muslims are not a race. Therefore technically racism against something that does not exist is not possible (Sayyid, 2011), a position that assumes the existances of races. In contrast to these believes Sayyid (2011) argues that race is also affected by social and political circumstances.

Secondly when discussing anti-Muslim sentiments, the argument of racism towards Muslims as a minority cannot be similar to racism towards racial minorities comes up regularly (Sayyid, 2011). This argument is substantiated by the idea that religion is a free choice. Subsequently, being Muslims is seen as a choice, in comparison to race which is supposedly determined by birth. Therefore it is thought that people being victim of racism based on race deserve more legal protection than Muslims. This train of thought on racism against Muslims overlooks that Muslims do not have the choice to be born in a Muslim household (Meer & Modood, 2009).

(15)

15

In public discourses earlier racist worries are often replaced by worries concerning. While historic racism is torn into pieces, Muslims as a anti heros can fill in those shreds in racism (Sayyid, 2011). The scapegoat of traditional racism is replaced with Muslims as a scapegoat.

Islamophobia is commonly refused to be seen as an issue. Complementary this is safeguarded as a practice. Islamophobia is not categorized as racism. Furthermore, it is understood as necessary as a rational reply to the Muslim threat of Western principles (Sayyid, 2011).

3.3. Social media

Possibilities for online communication have advanced immensely the past years. Social media has developed into an essential element in people's everyday lives (Curci-Wallis, 2019). Online communication platforms, among which online social networks, have become more available to a larger public through the availability of laptops and smartphones (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak , 2012).

The notion of public sphere can be transferred to an online social sphere. Public discourse is attainable online through individuals using social media (Çela, 2015; Rasmussen 2008). Social media platforms have revolutionized public discourse (Çela, 2015). Social media platforms can be a new manner to distribute news to a broader audience (Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019). The news is more and more defined by social media networks (Clark & Marchi, 2017).

All kinds of different news outlets that circulate their news, cause there to be more varied news topics going around in the online public discourse. This broader assortment of news messages to a broader audience, consequently generates a broader amount of reactions on these news messages (Rasmussen, 2008). Online social media are fully-fledged public spheres. Just as Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN) and De Standaard (DS) state in their codes of conduct on Facebook, they facilitate and encourage online social dialogue (Rasmussen, 2008). The interactivity is thought to empower the online audience (Beyers, 2004).

Websites whose content is partially created by its users is what En-Chieh Chao (2015) named ‘Web 2.0’ and many social media websites are precisely categorized as ‘Web 2.0’ websites. Online commenting sections are a sub-division of Web 2.0. Below news articles,

(16)

16

readers are encouraged to give comments and discuss the topics touched upon the articles. These online commenting sections offers to the audience a platform to express opinions that would normally not being expressed publicly (Darwish, Magdy, Rahimi, Baldwin, Abokhodair, 2018). Thus, online commenting sections are convenient for spreading hate speech given the benefit of anonymity (Hlavach & Freivogel, 2011).

News outlets have a great share in providing information. This share is even greater regarding to topics the general public typically has little access to. Everyday news outlets decide which news articles to publish. Additionally news outlets make linguistic decisions on wording etc. which will form the public opinion and perception of current matters in the world (McCombs, 2014). In the case of a crisis situation such as a terror attack, the population is in need of mass media to inform oneself and search for explanations to process the event (Heyndrickx, 2014).

3.4. Facebook

Facebook has become an online platform for news outlets to circulate their news messages, next to being an online communication platform. Many news outlets have by now their own Facebook page on which they post their news articles. Facebook users only have to follow a news outlets’ Facebook page to receive notifications of the latest news. Moreover, the majority of news articles shared on news outlets’ Facebook pages are free of charge. This makes these news outlets’ Facebook pages convenient for their readers. The news outlets’ Facebook pages have comment sections for their readers to reveal their opinions on the articles. In the comment sections the readers’ comments on the articles and the articles’ topics are often discussed (Curci-Wallis, 2019).

The most used social media platform in the world is Facebook. In 2019, Facebook had 2 498 billion active users per months (Statista, 2019). Using Facebook is a way to interact with other people. According to Simon Lindgren (2017), interaction with others is what binds a society together. Therefore, Facebook is an element that binds society together as well. Facebook is considered to be the most substantial social network for reading and sharing news (Newman, Fletcher, Levy & Nielsen, 2016). Unfortunately the lack of action undertaken by Facebook itself against cyber hate towards Muslims encouraged even more cyber hate (Oboler, 2016).

(17)

17

3.5. Cyberhate

In the existing literature there is no consensus on a single definition of cyber hate. Awan (2014) defines cyber hate as “the nexus of those communications and concepts where a perpetrator utilizes electronic technology and the convergence of space, movement and behavior in a ‘safe’ virtual environment to ‘control’ and target ‘opponents’ considered to be a ‘threat’ ” (Awan & Blakemore, 2012).

The circulation of opinions became more accessible with the rise of electronic means. The internet can both segregate and bring together communities in a cyberspace (Perry & Olsson, 2009). The internet is socially generated and this is again culturally informed (Castells, 2001). Many users of the internet see it as a lawless space with very little consequences. Comment sections are difficult to regulate since the paradox of freedom of speech is not yet fully regulated by all governments. Moreover, the internet gives the advantage of anonymity (Hlavach & Freivogel, 2011; Perry & Olsson, 2009).

The face to face contact in offline social setting can create social pressure. People tend to not speak their mind in offline communication out of fear for instant backlash against their statements. In online communication people are likely to speak their minds more easily because in the case of online backlash at their comments, ignoring this backlash is as easy as going offline (Curci-Wallis, 2019).

In online communication a highly discussed concept is the online disinhibition effect. The online disinhibition effect is defined as “a lowering of behavioral inhibitions in the online environment” (Joinson, 2007, p. 76; Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012). Curci-Wallis (2019) it is described as a lowering of psychological restraints to conceal emotions and undisclosed needs in online interpersonal behaviours (Joinson, 2007). Many social behaviour in cyberspace is ascribed to the online disinhibition effect. This social behaviour can be positive such as offering help and philanthropy or it can be negative such as online flaming and verbal attacks (Joinson, 2001). Negative portrayals of the online disinhibition effects are not revealed in the actual, offline social world (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012).

A conventional form of toxic online disinhibition is online flaming behaviour (Alonzo & Aiken, 2004). Online flaming behaviour is the practise in online communication of expressing hostile remarks towards others (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012). Online flaming involves multiple linguistic decisions such as profanity, offensive nicknames, threats,

(18)

18

aggression and improper sexual comments (Dyer, Green, Pitts, & Millward, 1995). Online flaming can be boosted and portrayed through many question marks, exclamation points and capital letters (Turnage, 2007).

There are two factors that can influence the occurrence of the online disinhibition effect. First, there is anonymity, the perception of anonymity can generate a sensation of not being accountable for one’s negative acting. This feeling of not being held accountable for one’s actions can boost undertakings of toxic online disinhibition (Christopherson, 2007). Anonymity is intended as unidentifiable instead of nameless. Being unidentifiable involves other Facebook commentators not knowing personal features such as profession and address (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012). Second, online disinhibition can be increased by invisibility. The majority of online communication occurs without visuals. Most online communication is in written form. Online textual communication has the quality of being dependent on others’ level of awareness, perception, acknowledgement and recognition (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012). Hereby social presence is decreased. This can contribute to a process of deindividuation based on communication. Subsequently, occurrences of online disinhibition take place.

3.6. Online Islamophobia

Aside from the multiple definitions of Islamophobia, Awan (2014) advocates for an independent definition of online Islamophobia. Accordingly, the level of attention given to street level Islamophobia should also be given to online Islamophobia for the influence of both forms of Islamophobia is reciprocal. On the one hand, physical Islamophobia has an impact on the online angers towards Muslims online. On the other hand, the expansion of online Islamophobia can cause the normalization of online misconducts and escalate into physical Islamophobia (Allport, 1954; Matamoros-Fernández, 2018).

Muslims more often than not are perceived online as a subordonate group and are routinely attacked online because of their faith (Perry, 2001). The base of online extremist messages is often common racial lineage which is associated with an idea of common values and culture (Kaplan & Bjorgo, 1998). Online Islamophobia has increased ever since the terror attacks on 9/11/2001. In various countries an online atmosphere was constructed which facilitated anti-Muslim sentiments in Facebook comment sections (Amnesty International, 2012). In online communication a group of passive participants condemning other commentators’ Islamophobic statements, namely the bystanders. News outlets play a

(19)

19

considerable roles in the group of Islamophobic bystanders that increases more and more (Taras, 2013).

In social media discourses emotional reactions to social and political issues get more attention that reasoned arguments (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). Therefore, Facebook reactions and comments have become a profitable manner of putting anger into motion, becoming a power instrument (Ost, 2004). Conclusions of association of Muslims with certain issues are made by the public without having the proper arguments (Mescoli, 2017a). Often there is a presumed Islamic influence and often Muslims are represented as the scapegoat for unrelated problems (Vercauteren, 2005).

In existing research on online Islamophobia in Belgium, Facebook reactions are often debated. Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández (2018) discussed how Facebook reactions can be an instrument for expressing hatred towards certain groups. Portraying the “other” as inferior or the enemy can become a mean to protect the interest of specific identities over others (Dunn, Klocker & Salabay, 2007). This is what Matamoros-Fernández (2018) called ‘platformed racism’, in which Islamophobia in particular stands in as ‘a form of racism that reinforces cultural privilege (Matamoros-Fernández, 2018).’ In this sense, as Liz Fekete (2004) argues, patterns of racism inform the European Islamophobic mindset. Furthermore, the Islamophobic portrayal of Muslims in the media exacerbates the dissemination of hateful narratives, which regularly occur in the readers’ comments on a certain articles in the media (Mescoli, 2017a).

(20)

20

4. Research design and methods

This research will analyze Facebook comments of Het Laatste Nieuws and De Standaard news articles regarding the Brussels terrorist attacks in 2016. I collected the data from the news outlets Facebook pages. The fitting analysis is Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. Besides the meaning of the comments in question, the semiotic choices made by the commentators will also be examined. I created a custom conceptual model which illustrates the data analysis further.

4.1. Data

The type of data I used in this thesis are written Facebook comments on articles concerning the Brussels terrorist attacks on 16/03/2016 on the Flemish news page on Facebook of Het Laatste Nieuws (“the latest news”) and De Standaard (“ the standard”). The timeframe within which the relevant comments were analysed is one month after the attacks: 22/03/2016-22/04/2016.

Within the field of the Flemish written press a distinction between popular and quality newspapers has been made (Manssens & Walgrave, 1998). On the one hand, De Standaard represents an example of a high quality newspaper (De Bens, 1997; Stouthuysen, 1999). De standaard is known to provide more background information than other Flemish news papers (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010). The readers of high quality newspapers have to put in effort to read the articles. This is known as news with a ‘delayed reward.’ (Jansen, 1987; Stouthuysen, 1999). The division between news and opinion articles are clear for news papers categorized as quality newspapers. The goal of quality news papers is generally to inform their readers, not to entertain them with sensationalized news articles (Stouthuysen, 1999). The articles entail a broad international glance (Heyndrickx, 2014; Manssens & Walgrave, 1998). More political and judicial experts are heard in the articles (Manssens & Walgrave, 1998). The goal audience of a quality newspaper is highly educated and from a higher social class (Santeddu, 2018). A conventional online DS reader is an employed male aged 45 to 54. This typical reader has a university diploma (Beyers, 2004). Because the goal audience differs from a popular newspapers’ goal audience, the content and language use also vary (Santeddu, 2018).

On the other hand, Het Laatste Nieuws can be seen as an example of a more popular Flemish newspaper (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010). HLN is known to be the most popular newspaper in Flanders (Heyndrickx, 2014). Popular newspapers can be defined as newspapers

(21)

21

with ‘immediate rewards’ (Jansen, 1987; Stouthuysen, 1999). The readers do not have to put in much effort to understand and process the news. The topics of popular newspapers’ articles regard mostly sports, regional and sensational news (Jansen, 1987). The division between articles with the goal to inform the audience or entertain the audience are faded (Stouthuysen, 1999). The goal audience of popular news papers concerns all ages and social classes (Persgroep Advertising, 2018). The reports on terrorism are more frequent and easily digestible (Jansen, 1987; Stouthuysen, 1999). The reports in terrorism are shaped by the interest of the audience to increase a sensational, entertaining reputation (Heyndrickx, 2014). Popular news papers are more likely to let victims, witnesses and family take the floor (Heyndrickx, 2014; Manssens & Walgrave, 1998).

Additionally, I chose the two newspapers in question for their distinct publishing houses. In Flanders only four publishing houses dominate the news industry. Het Laatste Nieuws is published by ‘de Persgroep’ (‘The Press Group’), while De Standaard is published by ‘Mediahuis’ (‘Media House’). The difference between HLN as a popular newspaper and DS as a quality newspaper can be explained because of their distinct publishing houses (Heyndrickx, 2014).

A third reason for selecting Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN) and De Standaard (DS) for this thesis has to do with the Belgian communities. The three Belgian communities have three associated languages. Both newspapers are in Flemish. Solely the comments from news articles concerning the research question will be selected for further analysis. The comments were published as reactions to the news articles regarding the terrorist attacks in the airport of Zaventem and the metro-station of Maelbeek. The timeframe in which the comments will be analysed is 22/03/2016 until 22/04/2016. Therefore the findings will only be able to describe the results concerning this period and these two newspapers.

Both HLN and DS have a code of conduct on their Facebook pages. From these code of conducts I selected the regulations relevant to online Islamophobia. DS declares the following: “While you are here, you can share your opinion with others, which is very valuable to the debate. Please avoid the following affairs: personal attacks, racist or discriminatory comments, encouragement of self-injury or death, trolling and commenting with a false profile. If you do not pay attention to these matters and we notice this, we will remove your reaction. If you violate these agreements several times, you will be removed from this page. That is waste of your and our time, but necessary to keep the debate decent.”

(22)

22

HLN presents the following code of conduct: “HLN keeps you informed on this Facebook page about what is happening at home and abroad. We think it is important that everyone can give his or her opinion, but we want it to remain pleasant for everyone. This is why there are a number of guidelines that we urge everyone to adhere to. Respect: opinions are free, but keep in mind that not everyone necessarily agrees with your opinion. Keep your reactions substantive and well-founded and also express your opinion with respect for the other person. Expressions of racism, discrimination, sexism or negationism cannot be accepted. Nor are reactions that offend, taunt, discriminate, bully, threaten or unnecessarily hurt others.”

4.2. Data collection

Using the method of data collection for this thesis I gathered and organized the comments on news articles from the two newspapers on their Facebook page. As a first step, I scanned all titles of news articles within the timeframe for both newspapers. The used search terms were the Flemish words for attack, terrorist, bomb, Zaventem, Maalbeek and terrorist attack. Additionally, the articles including any of the suspects of the attacks were incorporated into the data collection. The suspects within the timeframe were Najim Laacharoui, Ibrahim El Bakraoui, Khalid El Bakraoui, Salah Abdeslam, Mohamed Abrini and Osama Krayem. If a news article title is relevant to the research, it was preserved for further analysis.

As a second step, I gathered the relevant articles and their comments. Each preserved article and its comments were given a code. For example: the first relevant article from the HLN Facebook page got the code: “HLN1.” All preserved articles were evaluated for a second time. Resulting in some articles not being included for further analysis. The main exclusion criteria hereby was the titles including the names of suspects. Since a few of the suspects were also suspects in the Paris attacks a few months prior. However this research is not regarding the Paris attacks.

In total 73 articles were included from the HLN Facebook page. This resulted in 21 575 comments on those articles in question. From the DS Facebook page, 92 articles were included for further analysis. The amount of comments on these articles is 6841. The sum including all analyzed comments is 28 416. The comments are collected per article in a document. In appendix 2 and appendix 3 an overview can be found regarding the articles, amount of comments per article and translated titles.

(23)

23

However, many comments are not concerning the titles or Islamophobia. Yet I made additional notes about less relevant comments because they can give more insight in the context of other more relevant comments. This data collection method has multiple advantages, namely, the amount of data is large and accessible. The main challenge when using this data collection method is that it is time consuming.

4.3. Data analysis

The research questions will be explored deductively except for one. The definition for online Islamophobia will be formed inductively. The level of analysis this thesis will focus on will be the Islamophobic Facebook comments on Flemish online news articles about Islam after the Brussels’ bombing in 2016. Thus, the people that wrote these comments had to be able to understand Flemish and the articles. Furthermore, they had to have access to the articles and their online Facebook commenting sections. The commenters will be anonymized since the research does not focus on who commented, instead on what was commented.

The selected data will be analysed through discourse analysis. A relationship between different texts is central in discourse analysis. In this thesis I paid attention to the relation between the articles and their online comments. Discourse analysis has the aim to research social relations and draw conclusions which may set off social change (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002). The correspondence of information about underlying mental states and behaviour is not the only function of language. Instead language brings about the social world and social relations (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002). Discourses too add to the development of the structures of meaning and knowledge, social relations and social identities (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002).

4.3.1. Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis

Within the discourse analysis field, I utilized Fairclough’s outlook on critical discourse analysis (CDA). Discourse, according to Fairclough (1992), is not a one way street, but rather, constitutive and constituted. All instances of language use are a communicative occurrence entailing three dimensions, namely text, discursive practice and social practice (Fairclough, 1992). The first dimension is text. Text includes visual imagery, writing and speech. The analysis of a text pays attention to the linguistic aspects like vocabulary, grammar, syntax and sentence coherence. For the analysis of a text Fairclough (1992) suggests multiple instruments. For instance, grammar, wording, metaphors and interactional control.

(24)

24

The second dimension is the discursive practice. A discursive practice concerns the consumption and production of texts. “Analysis of discursive practice focuses on how authors of texts draw on already existing discourses and genres to create a text, and on how receivers of texts also apply available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the texts (Fairclough, 1992).”

The third and final dimension is the social practice. Social practice involves the larger social practice of which text and discursive practice belong to. Discursive practice mediated in the exchange between text and social practice. For the analysis of social practices social and cultural theory as a non-discursive aspect are essential (Fairclough, 1992).

The data analysis consists of two components which will be utilized simultaneously. The first component is the content of the comments concerning the research questions. Pieces of comments will be coded with previously created labels within a labelling list. Furthermore, other labels can be created inductively during the coding process. The additional labels are labels that depict Muslims in an unfavorable way through other reappearing declarations, patterns, thoughts and stereotypes.

The second component of the data analysis pays more attention to the linguistics. To do so four possible semiotic decisions made by commentators will be analyzed. Most of these semiotic decisions are understood as representational strategies (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Representational strategies are semiotic decisions that can used to depict others in pleasant or unpleasant way. Machin and Mayr (2012) state that up until this day a neutral manner to depict another person does not occur. All decisions made to depict a person will accentuate particular features of identity. Which are themselves related to specific sorts of discourses. Commentators on Facebook can use representational strategies to accentuate features of Muslim identities (Curci-Wallis, 2019). Drawing attention to specific features of others’ Muslim identities can lead to possibly false associations regarding that identity (Machin & Mayr, 2012).

The semiotic decisions that I used to analyze the Facebook comments in question are the following:

● Specification-genericization

This semiotic decision considers whether a person depicted is described as a generic kind or as a specific individual (Machin & Mayr, 2012). For example: the description of a man as a

(25)

25

specific individual acting in the world gives a different impression than that man being described as a Muslims man acting in the world.

● Nomination-functionalization

This semiotic decision evaluates whether a person is described considering their nomination or considering their function. Deciding to represent another person in terms of their function reduces them to their role (Machin & Mayr, 2012). For example: the connotation associated with the statement “Tom wants to install a new bike parking in his village” is very different from “The major wants to install a new bike parking in his village.”

● Aggregation

This semiotic decision assess when persons are talked about as if they are quantifiable or statistics. Machin and Mayr (2012) provide the example of “Many thousands of immigrants are arriving in city X.” Aggregation can imply that it is supported by scientific evidence when in fact it is not (Van Dijck, 1991).

● Us versus them division

This semiotic decision analyzes pronouns like “us” opposite to the others or “them.” This indicates an own group with “our” ideas opposite to a collective “other” with other ideas (Machin & Mayr, 2012). The us versus them division introduces the thought of otherness. However, “we” is an ambiguous word choice since it is hardly ever clear who “we” are (Fairclough, 2002).

4.3.2. Hall’s encoding and decoding

Following Stuart Hall (1991) and contrary to dominant views, audiences to news articles are not passive subjects. News outlets produces messages. Relying upon their socio-economic and political background and personal experiences audiences make sense of these messages. The reactions on news outlets’ messages leave a footprint on the internet. Hall’s (1991) theory of communication has four steps. The first step is production. Here the message is created by using the society’s values and beliefs. During production the message is encoded. The second step is the circulation. At this step the way of presenting the message is decided and executed. The third step is usage or consumption. The audiences who received the messages decode the message. Because of diverse backgrounds of the audience, the encoding will also be diverse.

(26)

26

The fourth and last step is the reproduction. This step entails the responses after the previous steps.

4.4. Conceptual model

A research design is supposed to be custom-made for the particular qualities of that research (Jorgensen & Philips, 2002). Therefore, I created a custom-made conceptual model which illustrates the analytical framework below.

(27)

27

5. Results

In this section, I present the results of the data analysis, describing them in different categories. First of all, I explain the dominant narratives of how Muslims are described. Second, I describe the recognized dominant narratives. Next, I discuss the commentators’ semiotic decisions, to them explain differences between HLN and DS comments. And lastly, I describe the process of decoding and encoding. The findings will be complemented with direct quotes of the (anonymized) commentators on the Facebook pages of Het Laatste Nieuws and De Standaard, The quotes are translations from Flemish into English in order to prevent retrospective identification of the commentators.

5.1. Dominant narratives in descriptions Muslims

The dominant narratives when describing Muslims in this research design amounted to 1110 reactions in total. On HLN’s Facebook page there were 890 reactions that conform with dominant narratives. On DS’ Facebook page, only 220 reactions fit within this category.

5.1.1. Islamic practices need to be secularized to be accepted in Western societies

The first dominant narrative to stand out concerns secularization. While in HLN, there were 150 comments concerning secularization, for DS there were only a total 39 comments. Throughout all of the comments express the desire to ban all religion. Not to the same degree but still a significant amount of times the desire to ban Islam specifically was articulated. The most common motivation for these desires was the idea of atheism. Commentator A. declares: “Don’t pray for Belgium. We’re an atheist country and aim to keep it that way.” Multiple commentators quote Karl Marx when commenting “Religion is the opium of the people.” A statement taking this even further is: “Religion the most common mental illness.”

However religion is acknowledged to be a bearer of hope in difficult times by a minority of the commentators. The emphasis of the comments’ desire to ban all religions, lies on the lack of scientific evidence for religion. Religion is viewed as outdated and medieval. Further commenting on this topic, commentator B addresses the Belgian government: “As a government, just stop subsidizing religions.”Allah or God is mentioned as an imaginary friend on multiple occasions. Two commentators ironically state to being a “pastafarian” or believing in “the holy jar of chocolate spread.” Commentator C even suggests to “put the Quran under

(28)

28

the category of fairytale books.” Islam is described to be used as an excuse to kill. Islam is said to equate to terror, violence and misery.

5.1.2. Veiling is incompatible with Western values and local rules

For HLN, there were 26 comments and for DS 22 comments concerning headscarves. The statement “the headscarf is incompatible with Western values and local rules” is frequently mentioned. It is the most prevailing comment on this topic. This opinion is explained through the idea that headscarves insinuate that the person wearing a headscarf has not adapted very well to society. Additionally the non-headscarf wearing community has been thought if as already tolerant enough towards other concerns.

A second commonly expressed opinion is that wearing a headscarf is a form of female oppression. Many commentators share the idea that Muslim women only wear headscarves because of social pressure from other Muslims. Headscarves are referred to by the derogatory term: “kopvodden” or “animal head rags.” The Dutch language makes a difference between human heads and animal heads. The term “kop” or “animal head” creates the term to be even more racialy derogatory.

Thirdly, many commentators do not explicitly specify that headscarves are thought to be incompatible with Western values and local rules. Though these same commentators nevertheless have the opinion that headscarves are inappropriate in the Belgian society. These commentators express fear of non-Muslim women being forced to wear headscarves in the future. An example of such comment is provided by commentator D.: “I don’t plan on wearing a headscarf.” Lastly a few commentators claim to think headscarves are a form of provocation and a political statement, rather than related to only religion. Commentator E. discloses the following idea: “ I am also disgusted by those headscarves, it shocks me again and again and I think it is merely provocation.”

5.1.3. Islamic belonging is a prior identity marker

This component of dominant Islamophobic narratives gives an impression of confusion. The distinction between being non-white, being foreign and being Muslim is often mixed up. From time to time Islamic belonging was confused with being foreign. For example, some commentators assumed that all Moroccans are Muslim.

(29)

29

Apart from foreign belonging as a prior identity maker, Muslim belonging as a prior identity maker was only mentioned a few times. A handful of Muslim scholars, journalists and politicians were discredited in the comments for being Muslim. Dyab Abou Jahjah was discredited in the comments. Abou Jahjah is a Belgian- Lebanese author and was an columnist for DS at the time of the Brussels attacks. Dyab Abou Jahjah is presented negatively in the comments mainly for being Muslim. Thereafter, Meyrem Almaci, a Turkish Muslim president of the Flemish environmental political party, was also discredited in the comments. It is emphasized that she is a foreigner with insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language. For example: “Significant doesn’t mean almost ‘all of them.’ However it is used by people who don’t know the nuance of the Dutch language like opinion makers and politicians like Abou Jahjah and Meyrem Almaci.” Regarding Almaci, she is additionally discredited for being a “foreigner” leading a political party in the Flemish government.

Other than Muslims in the public eye, other commentators are being discredited after stating they identify as Muslim. For example, a comment from commentator who stated she identified as Muslim was discredited with a simple: “Shut up, you are a Muslim whore.”

5.1.4. Islam threatens Belgian traditions

The amount of comments regarding Islam threatening Belgian traditions on HLN articles is 112 while on DS articles there are only 22. The main standpoint on Islam threatening Belgian traditions is that Muslims do not integrate very well into Belgian society. Muslims put very little to no effort into adapting their ways to Belgian society. Muslims and integration do not go together. Some commentators like commentator I imply that Muslims try to impose their values onto the Belgian non-Muslim population and Islamize Western society. Commentator I narrates the following: “I came to the conclusion that when Muslims, who insist on multiculturalism and freedom of religion, when they become the majority, will want to replace multiculturalism with a monoculture, namely their Islam.” One of the commentators is the alleged ex- president of PEGIDA, and organization of Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West.

An additional remark that is regularly disclosed is the need to defend “our” values in response to Muslims imposing theirs on the non-Muslim community . Commentator F demonstrated this point of view by stating “it is true that we defend our particularity too little with regard to the demands of the Muslim community… We must show our own cultural norms

(30)

30

and values just as they (want to)do so and certainly not allow ourselves to be cornered.” One of the values ‘we’ should defend to a greater extent is the separation of church and state.

Other commentators suggest that Muslims do not comply to Belgian laws and instead only comply to Sharia law. Commentator G provides an example. “The Muslim population is concentrated in “their” neighborhoods (ghettos) and a statistically large part does not attempt to integrate and assimilate, but retains the character of life in their original country, their religion, their customs, laws, clothing, cultural customs and language. In a number of Western European countries, the laws of Sharia apply in entire neighborhoods in major cities, while the police and local authorities are afraid to enter.”

5.1.5. Brussels is turning into a Muslim city

There were 245 comments for HLN and 29 comments for DS concerning Brussels as a upcoming Muslim city. The majority of comments on this topic concern Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, a submunicipality of the Brussels Capital Region. Many of the comments are critiquing Molenbeek as a result of the terrorist of the Paris attack hiding in Molenbeek before committing a second attack in Zaventem airport and Maelbeek metro station. Commentators have made the assumption that because the terrorists were able to hide in Molenbeek, Muslim residents on Molenbeek must have helped them. Further down in the results section, these assumptions will be explained. Many commentators have come up with derogatory nicknames associated with Islam for Molenbeek: Mollahbeek, Molenbeek-istan, Mosque-beek, Molen-shit, Blown-up-beek.” Throughout many reactions on various articles, commentators refer to “cleaning up Molenbeek.” This is a reference to a statement politician Jan Jambon, former minister of security and home affairs at the time of the statement, and current prime minister of Flanders. With the statement he expresses the desire to “separate the chaff from the wheat” or to remove and separate the radicalized terrorists from the Muslim community in Molenbeek. The statement was made following the arrest of two terrorists responsible for the Paris attack. Molenbeek is also known as the “terrorist municipality.” In reference to Muslims, Brussels is introduced as a “hotbed” and “breeding pond.” Commentator J describes Brussels as “Muslims and more Muslims.” In addition to Molenbeek, Brussels was also described through derogatory nicknames associated with Islam: “The new Lebanon, IslamBrussels, Brussel-okko”.

(31)

31 5.1.6. A process of radicalization of Muslims is underway in Belgium

For this dominant narrative I encounter for HLN 141 reactions and for DS 43 reactions. Various commentators express a scare of radicalization and extremism. Commentator K stated the following: “… You do not understand that radicalism is simply part of Islam.” The commentators understand radicalization as invisible and hidden in public. Commentator L clarifies this perspective as follows: “We cannot see with the naked eye who is an extremist and who is not.” This perspective goes on by statements suggesting that Muslims can very much distinguish radicalized Muslims in their community with the naked eye. Therefore multiple commentators have the opinion that Muslims should take responsibility for radicalization. Muslims should resolve the problem of radicalization within their community.

The majority of the comments regarding radicalization concern speculations and theories about its causes. The causal theories of radicalization differ quite strongly between the comments on HLN or DS articles.

The commentators of HLN articles came up with four plausible causal theories. The first cause is ascribed to the lousy integration of Muslims in Belgian society. The second possible cause could be the ‘bad imams’ who proclaim messages of radicalization and recruit young Muslims for ISIS. Thirdly, Muslims are thought to radicalize in prison. Finally, the radicalization is also ascribed to Muslims’ disadvantaged situations, discrimination, unemployment and consequently frustration. Overall the commentators mention their theories rather swiftly. Additionally, they do not go into detail as off to why they consider these factors to be plausible causes for Muslim radicalization. 2

A few examples from the HLN comments: “For every terrorist that is arrested, ten additional youths radicalize”, “Large parts of the Muslim community refuse to integrate and even seem to distance themselves from the (native) Flemings. Perhaps this is not directly responsible for the attacks, but it does promote radicalization.”

(32)

32

The commentators of DS articles came up with six possible causes for Muslim radicalization. Firstly, a commentator suspects radicalization to be caused through online recruitment. The second possible cause is ascribed to disadvantaged neighborhoods with frustrated residents. The third potential cause is a continuation of the second cause. These frustrated residents of these disadvantaged neighborhoods are, according to the commentators, often migrants and Muslims who cannot identify with the Belgian identity, which causes even more frustration. The Muslims in question are thought to struggle with the complex reality of dislocation from social, cultural and moral religious contexts. Additionally multiple commentators suggest radicalization is generated by the Muslim upbringing and culture. The last two possible causes have to do with politics. The commentators believe radicalization was facilitated by the government’s excessively negligent policy regarding radicalization. Lastly, numerous commentators insist that radicalization is provoked by the European interference in the Middle East and European bombings in Syria. 3

These last two plausible causes were mentioned countless times by both HLN and DS commentators. The Belgian government as the culprit of the Brussels attacks or as incapable to make good decisions after the Brussels attacks was mentioned 1403 times. This is an exceptional amount of comments about one cause for one dominant narrative considering the total amount of comments regarding all dominant narratives about Islam is 1110.

Aside from causes of radicalization the HLN and DS comments conform on two standpoints. First off there is an understanding that the majority of radicalized Muslims are young or adolescents. The second conformation is illustrated by a statement by commentator M: ”A moderate Islam does not exist at all, it is an invention (hope) of the West.”

5.1.7. Islam is (and Muslims are) a problem for Western societies

Islam being a problem for Western societies is not as prevalent as a dominant Islamophobic narrative in the comment sections. In the comments on HLN articles it only appears as a

3_{A few examples from the DS comments: “By bombing places over there and then leaving a} snake pit behind … that does contribute to radicalization here”, “There are other socio-economic causes that facilitate radicalization more easily. Period.”

(33)

33

dominant narrative 12 times while in DS comments it is apparent four times. The main concern regarding Islam is the standpoint that the Western culture and Islamic culture are too different and thereby it is impossible to coexist in the Belgian society. This standpoint originates in the idea that Muslims residing in Belgium do not make much effort to adjust their norms, values and ways of doing things to the Western norms and values. Three commentators wrote that Islam does not fit into Western societies because Muslims have anti-Western values, such as homophobia, a totalitarian ideology and the urge to conquer. One commentator reacted with the following statement: “Muslims have anti-Western values, they are all scum→ big problem!” Some commentators even state that Muslims in Western countries do not assimilate to the Western way of life. This commentator implies that assimilation instead of integration is the goal for the Belgian society. Various times commentators made the same remarks: “This is Western Europe and for all those who can not accept our norms and values, you may leave. Bye Bye.”

Other commentators make their opinion clear that they, as non-Muslims do not want to adjust their ways of life anymore to Islam. Some commentators disclosed that Muslims have implemented Sharia law instead of the national laws in major European cities. According to them this has escalated to the point where the local authorities do not dare to enter these burrows. Adding onto this opinion, others state that Muslims want everything in Western societies to be organized according to their religion. These commentators specify that the separation of church and state and democracy are Western values that Muslims are not familiar with.

A different argument as to why Muslims should adjust to a Western way of life is that when Westerners go to Islamic countries they would also have to adjust to Islamic values. The commentators with this opinion attach much value to mutual respect. The Western mindset, norms and values that Muslims allegedly disrespect, were not specified.

5.1.8. Islam is an easy object of derision

In the comments on HLN articles, Islam was the object of derision 113 times in total, while in the comments on DS articles, a total of 29 times. The majority of jokes made by commentators are about the promised 72 virgins when Muslims arrive in paradise. A recurring joke suggests that “there will be no 72 virgins but a 72 year old virgin instead.” Additional variations on this joke are made using virgin men leading to homosexual activity or 72 goats. A second element

(34)

34

of Islam that is made fun of is eating halal. The majority of jokes are about Salah Abdeslam, one of the men responsible for the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks. Salah is regularly referred to as “salami”, a type of pork sausage. Salah is also referred to as “salaad or lettuce” since his name is pronounced similarly to the Flemish dialect word for lettuce. Besides nicknames for Salah Abdeslam, multiple commentators referred to IS as “Idiot State” instead of Islamic state.

In addition to these categorized jokes, all sorts of other jokes regarding Islam appeared in the comments. The proclamation often made before a Muslim terrorist attack “Allahu Akbar” is replaced with “Allah snack bar” since snack bars are regularly run by Muslims. Another example is “Islam-mieteke.” Islamiet is the Flemish word for Muslim person. However the word “Islamieteke” is a pun meaning “Islam-sissy.” A final illustration of a Muslim joke present in the comments is the following:

- Person A: Possible attack?

- Person B: No, a Muslim farted

5.1.9. Islamic religion legitimates extreme forms of women oppression

Regarding the oppression of Muslim women, HLN counts 51 comments and DS counts 19 comments. Returning to the dominant narrative regarding headscarves, this topic is most mentioned as a means used by Muslims to oppress women. Commentator P announced this standpoint while adding a peculiar opinion about Muslim women: “I am disgusted by all those rags here is our progressive society and I am disgusted by all the women who let themselves be oppressed.” In the comments there seems to be an overall consensus about the lack of equality between Muslim men and women. Some commentators realize that there also is no perfect equality between men and women in non-Muslim societies. However, these commentators state that non-Muslim societies are still a lot more progressive in trying to achieve that equality than Muslims. The comments on the DS articles give more of a general explanation of oppression, while the comments on the HLN articles provide specific illustrations of female oppression in Islam. Various instances are listed as types of of the oppresion of Muslim women, which are: honor killings, female child marriages, arranged marriages, domestic violence, women are not allowed to have their own opinion… For example, commentator Q reacted with:

Online Islamophobia after the Brussels attacks on March 22nd 2016: a critical discourse analysis of Facebook comments on news articles