Mass Atrocities in Darfur
in Spite of the
Responsibility to Protect
The Response of the United Nations
to the Conflict in Darfur
Marcel Köhler
29-11-2016
Thesis supervisor: Dr. K. Anderson
Second reader: Dr. Bas von Benda-Beckmann
Master thesis History: Holocaust and Genocide Studies
“We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda.”
- Kofi Annan (1998)
“I believe that, if we are to take human rights seriously, we must embrace the concept of ‘the responsibility to protect,’ as a basis for collective action to prevent and stop instances of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This is not meant as a way to bypass sovereignty, since each State remains, first and foremost, responsible for protecting its citizens. But when national authorities are unwilling or unable to do so, the international community, through the Security Council, should be able to act, and must be ready to do so.”
- Veira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia and Envoy of the Secretary-General for the World Summit (2005)
“Genocide is the responsibility of the entire world.”
Abstract
The concept of the Responsibility to Protect was forged when the United Nations was going through a series of major changes in its policy. In this thesis, the central question is how the Responsibility to Protect influenced the United Nations’ response to the conflict in Darfur. This subject was researched using a variety of United Nations sources such as United Nations resolutions, United Nations Secretary-General reports, and United Nations meeting reports, as well as other primary sources such as African Union and Non-Governmental Organization reports, and secondary sources. Although the United Nations was created in order to prevent a world war in the future and to ensure that mass atrocities such as the Holocaust would “never again” be part of this world, the end of the Cold War demonstrated this has not yet come to pass. The concept of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was born after the end of the Cold War as a way to prevent these atrocities in the future and to replace the old idea of humanitarian intervention. The concept had to overcome many difficulties and opponents before it was accepted at the United Nations. The conflict in Darfur was one of the first places where this new United Nations concept was tested. The interaction between the United Nations Security Council, the African Union, and the United Nations Secretary-General made it clear that although the Responsibility to Protect influenced the United Nations in numerous ways, it did not affect the UN substantially enough to reach a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict.
Table of Contents
Abstract ... iii
Maps ... vi
Map 1. Map of Sudan ... vi
Map 2. Desertification of Africa ... vii
Preface and Acknowledgements ... viii
List of Abbreviations ... ix
Introduction ... 1
The History of the Darfur conflict ... 3
Methodology and Structure ... 4
Chapter 1. The Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect ... 9
1.1 Introduction ... 9
1.2 History of the Responsibility to Protect ... 10
1.3 The Differences Between Humanitarian Intervention and RtoP ... 14
1.4 Opposition to RtoP... 18
1.5 The Responsibility to Protect as a Case for Darfur ... 24
1.6 Conclusion ... 26
Chapter 2. The African Union, RtoP, and the United Nations ... 28
2.1 Introduction ... 28
2.2 The Evolution of RtoP in the African Union and its Influence as a Regional Body on the United Nations ... 29
2.3 The African Union ‘Ezulwini Consensus’ on the United Nations Policy Changes ... 33
2.4 The Conflict in Kenya After the 2007 Elections in Relation to Darfur and RtoP ... 37
Chapter 3. The Responsibility to Protect and the United Nations
Secretary-General ... 42
3.1 Introduction ... 42
3.2 Kofi Annan and RtoP ... 43
3.3 Ban Ki-moon and RtoP ... 48
3.4 Conclusion ... 53
Chapter 4. The Responsibility to Protect and the United Nations
Security Council ... 55
4.1 Introduction ... 55
4.2 The Political Will to Intervene and UNSC Resolutions on Darfur... 55
4.3 The Use of Veto by the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council ... 62
4.4 The use of the ICC for RtoP ... 68
4.5 Conclusion ... 72
Conclusion ... 74
Appendices ... 78
Appendix 1. Paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome Document ... 78
Appendix 2. ICISS Report, Articles 6.1-6.23, The Question of Authority ... 79
Appendix 3. ICISS Report, Articles 6.28 - 6.40, When the Security Council fails to Act ... 85
Appendix 4. ICISS Report, The Responsibility to Protect, Principles for Military Intervention ... 88
Appendix 5. Article 2 of the UN Charter... 90
Appendix 6. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union... 91
Bibliography ... 92
Secondary sources... 92 Primary sources... 99 UN sources ... 99 Non-UN sources ... 103 Websites ... 105Maps
Map 1. Map of Sudan
Blue is the whole Darfur region, green are the borders of South-Sudan.
Source: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/image/Darfur1.jpg, last accessed on
Map 2. Desertification of Africa
Source: http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/use/?cid=nrcs142p2_054025, last
Preface and Acknowledgements
I chose this subject, because I believe the Responsibility to Protect has a dynamic past and could have a bright future. Through my research I explored the factors and elements that make up this doctrine. I believe the conflict in Darfur is a very complex crisis that provides many angles of research in the field of mass atrocities and genocide, especially in adjunction with the Responsibility to Protect and the United Nations.
This thesis is a completion to the master Holocaust and Genocide studies, at the University of Amsterdam. The master program focuses almost entirely on genocides, but looks at every aspect of it, such as transnational justice. It also deals to a lesser extent with crimes against humanity and war crimes. Since November 2014 I have been conducting research on the topic of the Responsibility to Protect, Darfur and the relationship of these two with the UN. In this time I went through a whole range of sources to fully grasp my subject and come to a satisfying answer to my research question.
The establishment of this research has not always been easy, and I would like to briefly share a word of thanks for those that helped and supported me during my research. I would like to thank all the professors of the master program, Dr. Nanci Adler, Dr. Kjell Anderson, Dr. Karel Berkhoff, Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate, and Dr. Uğur Ümit Üngör for their support, guidance and aid during my masters. I would especially like to thank again my supervisor from the University of Amsterdam and the NIOD, Kjell Anderson for his supervision and guidance while doing this research. Even though I had some though times and difficulties, he kept believing I would manage to finish it and make a good final product. I would also like to thank my girlfriend, Anastasiia Myronenko, for her constant support, understanding and motivation to help me arrive at the best thesis possible. She has also been a great help with editing and proofreading this master thesis. Without her this thesis would not even be half as good as it is. My parents receive my gratitude too, as they have always encouraged me during both this research and my life in general to continue to improve and not to give up when times are though. If it was not for their support this thesis would never have been created. Lastly, I want to thank Rijnyr van Putten and Katrina Cooper for editing and proofreading this master thesis.
List of Abbreviations
ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AU African Union
ACT Accountability, Coherence and Transparency AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DPA Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU European Union
HLP High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty IDP Internally Displaced Person
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
KNDR Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OAU Organization of African Unity PSC Peace and Security Council
P5 Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council SLA/M Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAMID United Nations Mission in Darfur UNAMIS United Nations Mission Sudan
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council UNMIS United Nations Missions in Sudan UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary-General USA United States of America
Introduction
Thirteen years ago, in February 2003, a conflict broke out in the Darfur region of Sudan, resulting in the loss of in excess of 300,000 lives (the most recent UN estimate from 2008) and forcing millions to flee their homes, becoming refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).1 The conflict in Darfur is still ongoing and, although there has been a decline in violence since the outbreak of the conflict, it does not seem that an end will come soon. It has often been called the worst humanitarian disaster of our time.2 Its disruption of the already fragile ‘health care’ system made it difficult and hazardous for people to return to their homes.3 This conflict did, however, not start from nowhere; a long history of events led to the current conflict. It is a very complex phenomenon involving many actors, some of whom sought a lasting solution, but so far without real success. The United Nations (UN), United States of America (USA), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU) were bystanders when the conflict in Darfur broke out. Samantha Power argued that in the USA, the will to help was nonexistent, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) prioritized the invasion of Iraq. The UN’s initial response was faltering, although this changed as the conflict went on. It can be examined - especially after more than a decade of fighting in Darfur and even longer in the whole of Sudan - what the results of UN humanitarian help in Darfur have been to date. At the same time it can be researched whether there have been any significant changes in the UN’s response to conflict, especially in relation to the 2005 UN agreement on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP). Many have been positive about its development. British historian Sir Martin Gilbert described RtoP as “the most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in 360 years”4
, while international law professor Anne Orford said that RtoP “represents one of the most significant normative shifts in
1 The UN estimate of April 2008 is the most recent,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html and
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/fact_sheet.pdf, last accessed on 21-10-2016. Eric Reeves, however, provided a more recent estimate and has put the total number of killed Darfuris at 600,000,
http://sudanreeves.org/2016/03/18/reckoning-the-costs-how-many-have-died-during-khartoums-genocidal-counter-insurgency-in-darfur-what-has-been-left-in-the-wake-of-this-campaign, last accessed on 21-10-2016.
2
See http://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict,
http://www.pg.com/pghsi/safewater/pdf/PG_AmeriCares_Newsletter_072404.pdf,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article2161, and http://africanarguments.org/2009/12/14/the-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis/, all last accessed on 25-11-2016.
3
International medical corps UK, Darfur, a decade of crisis, http://www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/darfur-a-decade-of-crisis/?gclid=CPmT8v-7p8ICFUsJwwodwLkAMQ, last accessed on 15-09-2016.
4 Ramesh Thakur, “The Development and Evolution of R2P as International Policy”, Global Policy, Volume 6.3
international relations since the creation of the UN in 1945.”5
Ramesh Thakur6 and Thomas Weiss7 have argued that “no idea has moved faster in the international normative arena than the ‘responsibility to protect’.”8
My research question is therefore:
- How did the Responsibility to Protect influence the United Nations’ response to the conflict in Darfur?
Research sub-questions
To answer this question I focus on the development of RtoP and three elements that impact its implementation at the UN in relation to Darfur, each with its own sub-question in its own chapter:
- How did the Responsibility to Protect develop from 2000 to 2016?
- How did United Nations conflict resolution and United Nations peace missions in Africa change between 2000 and 2016, especially regarding the founding of the African Union and the new concept of Responsibility to Protect?
- How did the two United Nations Secretaries-General (UNSG) use the Responsibility to Protect to respond to the conflict in Darfur?
- How has the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) dealt with the conflict in Darfur to date?
To answer these questions this research is primarily focused on the political side of the conflict and leaves the atrocities out. In order to understand the context of this thesis, it is important to start with an overview of the history that led to the current conflict in Darfur.
5 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge 2011) 41.
6 A commissioner and co-author of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
report.
7 Historian and the research director of the ICISS.
8 Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss, “R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?”, Global Responsibility to Protect 1.1
The History of the Darfur conflict
During the “scramble for Africa”9
, roughly between 1880 and 1914 (when the First World War broke out), the British colonized Sudan. Although Sudan became a condominium of the United Kingdom (UK) and Egypt in 1899, the structure of this condominium ensured that it was Britain who had full control over Sudan. This construction led directly to many of the current problems in Sudan. British rule of Sudan resulted (as with many other colonized countries from that era) in a Sudanese ‘leadership’ loyal to the British colonial office, therefore turning against the people of Sudan, and rendering the nation a source of cheap resources for the British. The local profit went mostly to the Egyptian-Arabic elite and not to the general population, already living in poverty.10 The many conflicts in Sudan arose mainly from the possession of and trade in oil, and the lack of food, water and land. The oil trade is still in the hands of a small Arabic elite and the profits used for affairs such as funding Al Qaeda, and not for education, infrastructure and the security of the more impoverished. This had been thoroughly described at the start of the 21st century in a publication of the Sudanese rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), ‘The Black Book,
Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan’.11 Alongside this marginalization of certain people and areas, including Darfur and its people, Sudan faces increasing desertification, making it steadily more difficult to survive.12 This is why most people in Sudan remain poor and incapable of realizing their full potential.13 Although these environmental factors increased the struggle for survival in Darfur, they did not cause the conflict there. This is important to note, as blaming the environment may lead to ignoring the perpetrators responsible for these environmental problems, the Sudanese government.14
Sudan has also always been home to a wide variety of religions and races, which has led to a very complex societal structure. It is on the border between predominantly Islamic northern
9 “The Scramble for Africa (or theRace for Africa) was the proliferation of conflicting European claims to African
territory during the New Imperialism period, between the 1880s and the start of World War I,”
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Scramble_for_Africa, last accessed on 24-11-2016.
10 Robert O. Collins, “Disaster in Darfur: historical overview”, in Samual Totten and Eric Markusen, Genocide in
Darfur, investigating the atrocities in the Sudan (New York 2006) 4.
11
‘The Black Book, Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan, published in two parts in May 2000 and August 2002, described the imbalance of power and wealth in Sudan. The first page of the Black Book, Part I, states its thesis: “This publication unveils the level of injustice practised by successive governments, secular and theocratic, democratic or autocratic, since the independence of the country in 1956 to this date.”
12
See Map 2. Desertification of Africa.
13 Collins, Disaster in Darfur 9.
14 Mansour Khalid, “Darfur, a Problem within a Wider Problem”, in Carina E. Ray and Salah M Hassan, Darfur and
Africa and the south, which is mainly Christian or adheres to animistic religions. Because of this, Sudan’s population is divided along the same lines: until 2011, when Sudan had split up in Sudan and South-Sudan, 70 percent of it was Muslim, while 25 percent followed traditional religions, and 5 percent was Christian. These religious groups are also, internally, not homogeneous, consisting of many different tribes, which in turn form some larger groups. One of these is the Sudanese Arabs, further subdivided into those from the Arabic peninsula and those from northern Sudan. The first of these two groups feel superior to the second group and by extension superior to all the people living in Sudan. They call the black people in the country15 slaves and generally disrespect and discriminate this group in many ways, such as refusing them possibilities for jobs and justifiying the rape and killing of this ethnic group.16 During Nimeiry’s rule, many people from the Arabic countries came to Sudan to work as, for example, traders in the ports. They used racism toward black Sudanese to take their jobs away and make money themselves, further undermining the already precarious position of the black people in Sudan.17 These ethnic divisions, lack of resources, and the increasing number of people spawned the current conflict in Darfur which broke out in 2003 and expanded into a regional conflict. So, although it is often presented as a simple clash between some rival 'clans', it is in reality “a complex situation in which geography, history, politics, and cultural proclivities all play a part.”18
Methodology and Structure
Part of the research is focused on the existing secondary literature to get a good grasp of the existing information on the topic, while keeping in mind the differences between early accounts and later ones. Much has been published on RtoP, which has led to some clear historiographical debates. There is ample consensus among most historians and some journalists, who write about RtoP from the point of view that the UN is a useful organization, but is in need of some substantial changes. What these changes should be, however, is heavily debated and often connected to how the UN incorporated the ideas of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), best shown at the World Summit in 2005. Simultaneously, both the academic literature and public debate is on the questions what RtoP actually is and if it really
15
Mostly the Christians and the followers of Animistic religions, as well as a few Muslim groups.
16 Collins, Disaster in Darfur 9.
17 Roel van der Veen, Afrika van de Koude Oorlog naar de 21e eeuw (Volendam 2002) 411. 18 Khalid, “Darfur, a Problem” 41.
adds or changes something, or if it is just another name for the former humanitarian intervention. These historiographical debates are therefore also regarding which country deals best with RtoP and how RtoP should be considered in the light of earlier types of intervention for (alleged) humanitarian purposes. The ethical issues of humanitarian intervention, with the debate about realism (representing the interests of great powers) versus liberalism (legal and moral principles) are also present in many RtoP discussions. Realists are cynical about humanitarian intervention, and now also RtoP, on the basis of its potential, perhaps unavoidable, abuse by the main powers. Liberals cherish the belief that humanitarian intervention and RtoP will address the great powers’ unwillingness to aid those suffering helplessly at the hands of oppressive regimes.19
Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur were co-chair and member, respectively, of the ICISS on the RtoP, while Thomas Weiss was the research director of the ICISS. Thomas Weiss has been an active contributor on RtoP. One of the things he believes is that the most vital points of RtoP were removed from the ICISS report at the World Summit in 2005, which damaged its future at the UN. Evans disagrees with this and believes that the World Summit Outcome Document “does not vary from core R2P principles in any way.”20
He wrote a thorough research on the development and the uses of RtoP in The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity
Crimes Once and For All.21
Historian Alex Bellamy wrote about RtoP in two books dedicated to the subject,
Responsibility to Protect, the Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities22, and his latest book, The Responsibility to Protect, a Defense.23 He also wrote about the implementation of RtoP in various articles, including “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur”24
, together with Paul Williams. He wondered whether, “in order to secure consensus [on RtoP], the concepts advocates have abandoned many of its central tenets.”25
Bellamy discussed in his book, Responsibility to
Protect, the Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, the debate whether RtoP is a concept, principle
or a norm.26 He also believes that even though the World Summit Outcome Document was more
19 Misha Seay, Realism, Liberalism and Humanitarian Intervention, is there a Middle Ground? (London 2007) 1. 20 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington D.C.
2008) 47.
21
Ibidem.
22 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, the Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge 2009). 23 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, a Defense (Oxford 2015).
24 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur”, Security Dialogue,
36.1 (2005) 27-47.
25 Alex J. Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humaniterian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit”,
Ethics and International Affairs 20.2 (2006) 143–169, there 145-146.
restrictive than the ICISS report, it still provides “a mandate for a wide range of institutional reforms and international activites”27
which will help toward the goal of reducing mass atrocities. Journalists Eric Reeves has a website dedicated to the atrocities in Sudan, sudanreeves.org, and he is working almost full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst. In this way he adds critical articles to different debates on RtoP, Darfur and the reactions of the international community. As writer for the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof tries to raise awareness of the atrocities in Darfur among the general public. In addition to these historians and journalists, there are those who were either less critical of the UN or had some good ideas for change and became part of the UN system, including Edward C. Luck, Jennifer Welsh, and Samantha Power. Although Jennifer Welsh welcomes the RtoP, she “questions the suggestion made by many proponents of RtoP that under the new umbrella term, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been eliminated from its scope.”28
She argues that on closer inspection and when not looking too closely at the too-narrow definition of humanitarian intervention, this is incorrect. Alongside these historians and journalists, there are many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) fully focused on the advancement of RtoP, such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, who have published important articles on this topic to further the debates. They believe that the UN has been neglecting the promises on RtoP it has made since the World Summit meeting in 2005.
There is also a group of scholars who are staunchly against RtoP and everything it stands for. They see it as another tool of Western powers to increase their influence in the world. Critics of the RtoP and interventionism argued that international humanitarian action is a form of imperialism cloaked in humanitarianism. Noam Chomsky, Philip Cunliffe, Mahmood Mamdani, David Chandler and Jean Bricmont belong to this group and the works of these fierce RtoP critics will be accessed when necessary. They feel that criticism towards RtoP has often been ignored or dismissed as incorrect in order to protect this new UN doctrine, so as to not give it the same negative image as humanitarian intervention. This group of scholars believed that for a long time, critical scholarly work on RtoP has been absent. To change this, they published the book Critical
27 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 67.
28 Julia Hoffman and André Nollkaemper, “Introduction”, in Julia Hoffman and André Nollkaemper, Responsibility
Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating Theory and Practice.29 To conclude, most of the historiographical debates discussed here are woven into the analysis of the key questions of this research.
Although there are many books and articles written by these and other authors about the conflict in Darfur and RtoP, this research is not focused entirely on secondary sources; many, varied primary sources are used as well. Different types of UN documentation, such as UNSC resolutions, reports, meetings, internal and external correspondence between states and UN bodies, websites, and the Mandate of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide are key for my research. The report from the ICISS, which first featured the RtoP principle, will likewise be employed. Furthermore, an analysis of AU reports, resolutions (including its Constitutive Act), meetings and correspondence is crucial for an understanding of the UN and its relation with regional bodies, as this is the biggest regional actor in Africa and directly influenced the approach of the UN towards RtoP and the conflict in Darfur. The International Criminal Court (ICC) reports, especially the arrest warrants of Omar al-Bashir, are also worth examining. The different NGOs involved in the conflict have published influential reports and letters to the UNSC which will likewise come into play. In short, there is a strong focus on the primary sources whenever possible, as, in my opinion, they have not been studied enough to date. Those writers who have used primary sources have usually worked with only one type, such as UN reports, ICC reports or NGO reports - rarely all. The three specific angles used in the second through fourth chapters are also a new approach to this topic. This research could, therefore, lead to new findings.
This introduction provided a brief historical overview leading up to the conflict in Darfur, as well as an outline of my methodological approach. In the first chapter the use of the RtoP since it was first mentioned in 2001 by the ICISS until the end of 2016 will be analysed. The differences between humanitarian intervention and RtoP, the international opposition at the UN to the RtoP and why examining Darfur as a case for the development of the RtoP at the UN is useful will likewise be researched in this chapter. In the second chapter the UN’s relationship with regional bodies will be analysed, particularly in relation to the AU and RtoP, followed by an examination of the use of RtoP with the crisis in Kenya after the elections in 2007-8, including a comparison of this crisis with the international response to the Darfur conflict. The third chapter
29 Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating Theory and Practice
deals with the two UNSGs who held this position during the conflict in Darfur, combined with an analysis of their reports and the effects that they had on the RtoP. In the last chapter the focus is exclusively on the UNSC and their power to make the RtoP either work or fail, including the use of veto by the five permanent members and the referral of Sudanese politicians, including president Omar al-Bashir, to the ICC.
Chapter 1. The Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect
1.1 IntroductionThe Twentieth Century has seen a great number of mass atrocities, so one of the main tasks of the UN became “to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.”30
During the Cold War this was very problematic, and afterwards, driven by the humanitarian crises of the 1990’s, the UN sought the best new method of conducting conflict resolution. To this aim, UNSG Kofi Annan asked “for a new global consensus on the legitimacy of international action to save civilians from mass atrocities.”31
And as Thakur argued: “For a new global norm like R2P to regulate international behaviour, it must first be translated into national and international policy.”32
Since Annan’s request much has happened to create a new doctrine for humanitarian intervention. In September, 2005, the
Responsibility to Protect Protocol with its three main pillars of prevention, reaction and
rebuilding was approved by the UN via the World Summit Outcome Document33 as a new protocol to globally respond to humanitarian crises and protect populations at risk of the four major mass atrocities. It can be seen as a real new start in forming a united political responsibility toward genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In this protocol, it is agreed that it is the duty of every state to provide safety for its inhabitants. If a state is unable or unwilling to do this, then it is the duty of the international community to provide help.34
30
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml, last accessed on 24-06-2016.
31 Kofi Annan, We the peoples, the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century (2000) Paragraphs 48-50,
page 8.
32 Thakur, “The Development and Evolution of R2P” 190. 33
According to the World Summit meeting in September, 2005, there are three pillars which make up RtoP. Firstly, “Each individual state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from Genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.” This often shortened to ‘the Responsibility to prevent”, addressing root causes of internal conflict. The ICISS considered this the most important obligation. Second, “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means […] to help protect populations from [these atrocities]”, and in this way encourage and/or assist individual states which don't fulfill their primary responsibilities. This is seen as ‘the Responsibility to React’: responding to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures which could include sanctions, prosecutions, or military intervention. Thirdly, the signatory countries “are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council [...] should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations” from these atrocities. This is seen as ‘the Responsibility to Rebuild’: providing full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation.
34 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 2005 World
1.2 History of the Responsibility to Protect
The RtoP initiative was developed against a backdrop of humanitarian crises such as Somalia Rwanda and Srebrenica. The crisis in Somalia and its failures, including the Somalia Affair35, showed what can happen when states intervene. Thomas Weiss argued shortly after the end of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II36, that the failures in Somalia resulted in what is called the ‘Somalia Syndrome’: “Multilateral interventions to thwart starvation, genocide, the forced movement of peoples, and massive violations of fundamental rights are no longer politically or operationally feasible”.37 Weiss simultaneously argued that we should not take Somalia out of context or draw upon the wrong lessons leading to isolationism or eschewing necessary humanitarian intervention. The international community acted otherwise, and paralyzed their willingness to respond to new crises, such as Rwanda and Srebrenica. The USA started to rethink its foreign policy and overall the fear of another Somalia Affair crippled the options for intervention. Around the same time, the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica showed what happens when UN troops are not allowed to intervene as a direct result from the Somalia Syndrome.
To this day, there are still new crimes against humanity and war crimes taking place globally, such as the use of child soldiers and mass civilian casualties of war. It is, however,very difficult for the UN to solve these conflicts, or to provide aid in an effective way. This is partly due to the sovereignty of states, which may not be violated. To counter this, there have been talks for decades to find a solution. This resulted, in 1999, in the basis of a plan, primarily to prevent or decrease genocides such as Rwanda and Srebrenica. Canada38, an active contributor of UN peace operations, created a commission to develop this plan further and find a solution, which brought out a report in 2001 called the Responsibility to Protect report, which explained the UN’s
35 The Somalia Affair in 1993 was a broadly published military scandal with 9 Canadian peacekeepers accused of
crimes, later dubbed ‘Canada's national shame’. See for more on this topic: Donna Winslow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “The Parliamentary Inquiry into the Canadian Peace Mission in Somalia.
36 As stated on the UN website: “UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action including
enforcement measures, to establisch throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2.htm, last accessed on 25-11-2016.
37 Thomas Weiss, “Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome - "Operation Rekindle Hope"?” Global Governance Vol. 1.2
(1995) 171-187, there 171, 173, 179.
38 Canada was one of the countries that sent UN personnel to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) before the genocide and was also part of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other missions.
dilemma: respecting sovereignty of each country, but realizing that this sovereignty is in jeopardy when a humanitarian crisis occurs.39
From the end of the Second World War until now, the new world order has been building, with a strong emphasis on sovereign states sharing a common legal basis which does not depend upon the specific wealth and power of a nation.40 As Neil Middleton and Phil O'keefe argued: “Sovereignty is not just a protection for the state against coercion by other states; it is also the means of locating responsibility for the protection of people and property and for the exercise of governance in a territory within each state.”41 With conflicts such as the one in Darfur, the need to have a good working system for humanitarian help, which the RtoP should be, became an important item on the UN’s agenda. Unfortunately for many countries and the UNSC, it is very difficult to launch operations on their own which require military action.
Multilateralism is therefore a must for any kind of intervention, since it is associated with neutrality and impartiality, and is seen as a way to reduce the chance of states acting on pure self-interest rather than humanitarian motives when they intervene. According to former UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld42, independence, impartiality, and neutral civil service were important factors for this collective legitimation to be effective, and he believed international civil servants should be able to act “without subservience to a particular national or ideological attitude.”43
John Ruggie, political scientist and former senior official in the UN44, suggests that “multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”45
One of the most critical observations on the multilateralism of the UNSC is that the permanent members of the UNSC are the same as seventy years ago, even though the international distribution of power has changed tremendously.
39 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility To Protect: Report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa 2001).
40 See Appendix 5. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, specifically article 2.1: “The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”
41 Middleton, Neil and Phil O'keefe, “Politics, History & Problems of Humanitarian Assistance in Sudan”, Review of
African Political Economy, 109 (2006) 543-559, there 548.
42 The UNSG who created UN peacekeeping.
43 Dag Hammarskjöld, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,” in Wilder Foote, The Servant of Peace,
A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld (London 1962) 346.
44
From 1997 to 2001 he was the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning and from 2005 till 2007 he was UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.
45 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992)
To see these changes in the distribution of power, it is important to not only look at the Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) and other highly influential states, but to look at other nations as well, as they too can produce changes. Some middle-power countries have used their status as non-permanent members of the UNSC to embrace more objective possibilities for conflict resolution, such as Canada. It responded to Kofi Annan’s request by creating the ICISS, with its report on RtoP. As one of the nations which played a crucial role in the mission in Rwanda, as well as in Somalia, it saw first-hand that things had to change if this kind of UN mission was to be be successful. Canada decided to take a leadership role in conceptualising RtoP. According to Bellamy, in the first few years after the ICISS report was released, “Canada stood ‘almost alone’ in trying to persuade states to commit to R2P”.46
Two draft resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2002, the first one to commit the Assembly to discuss RtoP and the second one to obligate the UNSG to set up a debate on RtoP, were blocked by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)47 and defeated by the Assembly. In 2005, Canada sent a letter to the UNSC President encouraging action on Darfur and promoting the norm of RtoP, and in December of that year Canada made a statement to the UNSC with the same purpose, backed by multiple nations.48 Marc Gionet argued that “The RtoP leadership initiative is a prime example of the strength and pull a middle power [such as Canada] can have in shaping discourse and normative developments regarding international law and policy.”49
The basis of the RtoP concept was thus laid down by the report of the ICISS.50 It was created “to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations.”51
The ICISS tried to incorporate as many different viewpoints as possible from different international actors in various regions, both political and non-political, which made a
46 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 70. 47
The Non-Aligned Movement is a group of states that are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. As of 2012, the movement has 120 members and 17 observers. See for a full list of member states:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140208210716/http://nam.gov.ir/Portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=27f3f bb6-8a39-444e-b557-6c74aae7f75f, last accessed on 28-11-2016.
48
Marc Alexander C. Gionet, “Canada's Role in the Conceptual Impetus of the Responsibility to Protect and Current Contributions”, in Julia Hoffman and André Nollkaemper, Responsibility to Protect, from Principle to
Practice (Amsterdam 2012) 61-70, there 66.
49 Ibidem 61. 50
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, 82-83. See also Thomas G Weiss,
Humanitarian Intervention: War and Conflict in the Modern World (Cambridge 2007).
more detailed and elaborate report possible, especially in comparison with one from the UN. To achieve this, they held twelve regional round-table talks in capitals on all continents52 and some national consultations over the course of the first seven months of 2001. These meetings revealed the attitudes held by the different regions toward intervention, as well as the measures constituting legitimate intervention. As Noële Crossley argued, “The roundtables were meant to give an input to the work of the commission, but actually provided platforms for advocacy relating to the broad set of ideas the commission had been created to refine and represent.”53
All regions agreed with the ICISS that the UNSC should be the primary source of authority to authorize an intervention. In Cairo, New Delhi and Beijing, it was even argued that it should be the only authority, while at the round-table talk in Washington DC there were strong objections to this idea. This demonstrated the split between the West and the rest of the world on how the UN should deal with authorizing UN interventions. Another interesting suggestion was to incorporate the IMF and World bank into conflict resolution. An important concern in some of the non-western round-table talks, most directly voiced on the 10th of March in Maputo, was about military intervention and more specifically “the practical implications of intervention, and an exit-strategy that would leave a state on a path towards political stability and economic development, addressing the root causes of a conflict rather than just its symptoms.”54
Distancing the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which focuses mostly on prevention and also incorporates post-conflict peacebuilding and sees military intervention as a last resort, from the more military-intervention-focused concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ was one of the things the commission hoped to achieve, and luckily this was agreed upon at all of the round-table talks.
The most important individual round-table talk was the one in Washington, D.C. on the 2nd of May, 2001. This is, in part, because of the pressure the USA faces when it comes to policing the world and promoting global peace. The most clearly stated opinion was that “the US could not be expected to do everything.”55
The attendees were afraid that the expectations about the USA, and the response of the USA to the mass atrocities mentioned by the ICISS, could not be met “everywhere, in every particular case.”56
It was argued that the current double standards
52 The roundtable talks were in: Beijing, Cairo, Geneva, London, Maputo, New Delhi, New York, Ottawa, Paris, St
Petersburg, Santiago and Washington DC.
53 Noële Crossley, Humanitarian Intervention: From Le Droit d'Ingérence to the Responsibility to Protect (London
2015) 61.
54 Ibidem 63.
55 ICISS, “The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background”, 366-369. 56 Crossley, Humanitarian Intervention 63.
and selectivity for intervention would remain an unavoidable reality in the future. As mentioned before, American scepticism of the UNSC and its power, which would only increase if it became the sole authority for legitimizing interventions, was very evident at this round-table talk. It is, therefore, not surprising that the USA objected to RtoP during the preparations for the World Summit in 2005.57 All in all, the round-tables showed that achieving consensus about the different views on the principle would be very challenging, and the commission would have to “make choices about which perspective on intervention to promote.”58
Thus, even though the commissioners claim there was “a complete consensus in each of the issue areas”59
, the ICISS report can be seen as quarrelsome by definition. It is thus not remarkable that the version of the RtoP concept which was unanimously endorsed at the World Summit in 2005 was very different from the idea elaborated in the ICISS report, and is therefore often referred to as “RtoP-lite”.60
1.3 The Differences Between Humanitarian Intervention and RtoP
During the Cold War, most members of the UN saw humanitarian intervention as problematic and part of a political plan to increase the sphere of influence of either of the two main superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Especially after the mid-1960’s, the new post-colonial members of the UN influenced the decisions for intervention to prevent any type of new colonialism, and in general most members condemned military interventions. According to Adam Roberts, the records of the UNSC are not a good source of information regarding the ways in which states looked at humanitarian intervention during this period. If specific issues were discussed, and many were not, the draft resolutions were usually vetoed by either the USSR or the USA, and even when they did agree that there were threats to international peace and security, such as in regard to Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977), it was not seen as an acute emergency and therefore military intervention was not authorized. The UNGA is thus a better source for ascertaining the views of the UN during the Cold War. The UNGA emphasized the principle of sovereignty in many resolutions, but also made it clear that the general
57 Crossley, Humanitarian Intervention 63-4. 58
Ibidem 65.
59 Ibidem.
60 Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit,
populations of states in crisis should be helped.61 An example of this dates from the end of the Cold War, when, after the Armenian earthquake of 1988, UNGA resolution 43/13162 displayed both “the importance of humanitarian assistance for the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations … [and] also the sovereignty of affected states and their primary role in the initiation, organization, co-ordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance within their respective territories.”63
This situation changed with the fall of the Soviet Union; the P5 now could and, indeed, had to work together in the UNSC to ensure worldwide peace and security, and thus extending humanitarian aid became easier. As Roberts mentions, “there was a greater willingness to view internal conflicts as potential threats to international stability, and therefore a matter for Security Council action.”64 Simultaneously however, many of the other UN member states were still nervous about the decisions of the UNSC and what these could mean for their own internal affairs.65 In the ICISS’s report, published in 2001, it was noted that giving the UNSC an absolute monopoly regarding the authorization of interventions was not acceptable and did nothing to help protect human populations, and discussed what needed to be done if the UNSC failed to act.66
As a result of these changes in the UN and the new possibilities for intervention, the ICISS came up with a new term, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and discarded the old term ‘humanitarian intervention’ due to the way the word had been used in the past.67
The commission felt that a new term would help to reshape interpretations of “the real issues involved in the sovereignty–intervention debate.”68 There are some considerable differences with the former notion of humanitarian intervention and the new concept of RtoP, which can be narrowed down
61 Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention”, in Jennifer M. Welsch, Humanitarian
Intervention and International Relations (Oxford 2004) 71-97, there 78-80.
62 UN General Assembly resolution 43/131, Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar
emergency situations, A/RES/43/131 (8 December 1988), available from undocs.org/A/RES/43/131. See also the virtually identical terms of UN General Assembly resolution 45/100, Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations, A/RES/45/100, (14 December 1990), available from undocs.org/A/RES/45/100.
63
Ibidem.
64 Roberts, “The United Nations” 80-1. 65 Ibidem.
66 See Appendix 3. ICISS report Articles 6.28 - 6.40 (53-55): When the Security Council fails to Act. 67
ICISS Article 1.40: “The very strong opposition expressed by humanitarian agencies, humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers towards any militarization of the word “humanitarian”: whatever the motives of those engaging in the intervention, it is anathema for the humanitarian relief and assistance sector to have this word appropriated to describe any kind of military action. The Commission has also been responsive to the suggestion in some political quarters that use in this context of an inherently approving word like “humanitarian” tends to prejudge the very question in issue – that is, whether the intervention is in fact defensible.”
to five substantial contrasts. Firstly, humanitarian intervention is mainly focused on the military aspect of solving a conflict, when the conflict is already in full swing, as opposed to RtoP, which declares military intervention to be a last resort, to be enacted only when all non-coercive measures have failed and when authorized by the UNSC. Simon Adams of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect argued that “since the 1990’s there has been a tendency to conflate any military action in support of humanitarian ends with military invasion for material gain.”69 RtoP extends intervention beyond purely military action and encompasses a whole continuum of obligations, summarized in its three pillars. According to Roberts, humanitarian intervention can be summed up as “military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”70
This is in contrast with RtoP, which focuses on other ways to find a satisfactory solution for a conflict, holding that prevention and rebuilding are inherently linked to reacting. RtoP is first and foremost a preventative measure that focuses on humanitarian needs and stresses state responsibilities.
Secondly, humanitarian intervention, as already mentioned above and seen before the use of RtoP, often violated article 2 of the UN Charter, which outlines the territorial integrity of every sovereign state.71 RtoP, on the other hand, is firmly embedded in international law, especially those laws relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. RtoP avoids this via its canon that military intervention must either be authorized by the state in question or by the UNSC.72 However, since the UNSC is often divided, and intervention by the P5 is also often not accepted by all parties in a conflict (since each has its own agenda and political plans regarding intervention, such as in the case of Russia's conflict with Georgia), it often comes down to readiness of the middle power countries to act. This also means that the P5 have less to fear from RtoP, but it could also render RtoP less effective.73
69 Simon Adams, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
occasional Paper Series, No. 3 (2012) 11.
70 Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights,” International Affairs, Vol. 69.3
(1993) 429-449, there 429.
71 See Appendix 4, Article 2 of the UN Charter, especially article 2.4: “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
72
Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the UNSC the sole authority to authorize military intervention globally.
73 Edward C. Luck, “Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect”, in Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies and
Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law (Leiden 2011). See also Appendix 3. ICISS report Articles 6.28 - 6.40 (53-55): When the Security Council Fails to Act.
Thirdly, regional organizations also play a vital role in the RtoP concept, and this can be seen as another difference with ‘traditional’ humanitarian intervention, especially when it comes to conflict prevention and conflict resolution, since they help to fill the gap between states and global organizations. They assist in the implementation of the policies drafted by international institutions, which helps to enact the multilateral plans of the UN. In the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, it is even mentioned that states should work “in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate.”74
The ICISS report went so far as to discuss the possibility of providing an alternative option for authorization of intervention, should the UNSC be in a deadlock, to regional or sub-regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, “subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council,”75 leaving a UNSC mandate out of the picture. Regionalism in the form of regional organizations also helps prevent massive dominance of power, and originated as a reaction to the inequalities left in the post-colonial international system. Regionalism in the RtoP principle is therefore not a way to defy the powerful states or change the system completely, but is used to extract local expertise from regional organizations in order to better comprehend the situation and the context of a conflict, both politically and ethnically. Regional actors will also most often act in a way which lies closer to the regional organizations’ policies than to those of the major international powers.76
Fourthly, RtoP puts the responsibility on individual states, while humanitarian intervention focused on a “right to intervene” in order to decrease the suffering of humans in need. As Ramesh Thakur argued on the difference between humanitarian intervention and RtoP: “[In short] ‘humanitarian intervention’ approaches the topic explicitly from the Western interveners' perspective and isolates and privileges ‘intervention.’ RtoP is victim-centred and surrounds intervention with prevention before and rebuilding afterwards.”77
While humanitarian intervention doesn't see the sovereignty of states as absolute, the RtoP doctrine takes it a step further by shifting away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims, by focusing not on the right of states to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk. This approach introduced a new way of weighing the essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of ‘control’ and emphasizing ‘responsibility’ to one's own citizens and the wider
74 See Appendix 1. Paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome Document, there Article 139. 75 ICISS report page XIII.
76
Crossley, Humanitarian Intervention 28-9.
77 Ramesh Thakur, Operationalising the “responsibility to protect”,
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/2008/02/operationalising-%E2%80%9Cresponsibility-protect%E2%80%9D, last accessed on 14-10-2016.
international community. Humanitarian intervention automatically focused on the use of military force, by a state or a group of states, against another state, without its consent. As such, it overlooked the broad range of preventive, negotiated, and other non-coercive measures central to RtoP.Thus, to the extent that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is predicated on the basis of the “right to intervene,” it assumes that it can proceed without the need to secure appropriate authorization under international law.78
Lastly, while humanitarian interventions have been justified in the past by the prevention of all kinds of human rights abuses, the RtoP focuses on only the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The first three crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute, which established the ICC. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”79
As Adams argued: “The remit of humanitarian intervention, which aims at preventing large scale suffering, is thus far broader than that of RtoP, which focuses upon the prevention of the four mass atrocity crimes.”80
These five distinctions between the new RtoP doctrine and old-style humanitarian intervention clearly demonstrated what is wrong with humanitarian intervention and how the RtoP tries to change this.
1.4 Opposition to RtoP
In the first few years after the ICISS report, however, the future of the RtoP concept was very uncertain and the expectation was that RtoP would never be adopted in a UN resolution or declaration. The P5 governments were all sceptical of RtoP, each with its own reasons and to varying degrees. The USA did not want there to be any specific criteria for decision-making regarding intervention, not wanting to constrain itself in its use of force. China and Russia insisted that the UNSC must be the place where questions about the use of force should be discussed, and in their eyes, it was already adequately equipped to handle humanitarian crises, They therefore saw RtoP as a concept which could undermine the UN Charter. The UK and
78
Adams, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” 11.
79 The Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 (1992), May 27,
1994 (S/1994/674) Paragraph 130, page 33.
France were mostly concerned that “agreement on criteria would not necessarily deliver the political will and consensus required for effective responses to humanitarian crises.”81
The UN member states outside the UNSC were also heavily divided, with the NAM rejecting the concept. As Bellamy stated: “India, a leading member of the NAM, argued that the council was already sufficiently empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and observed that the failure to act in the past was caused by a lack of political will, not of authority.”82 Debate about RtoP increased even further in intensity when the USA started the invasion of Iraq in 2003, claimed that they did so on humanitarian grounds, thereby associating RtoP with this unpopular invasion. Gareth Evans mentioned that there was no real humanitarian justification for the invasion of Iraq, and that it “almost choked at what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying intervention on the basis of the principle of 'responsibility to protect'.”83
Another important period of opposition to RtoP came before and during the UN World Summit in September, 2005. When negotiations for this summit started there were several states, again with India as one of the most important, which held the view that “R2P was an intervener's charter, designed to legitimize Western interference in the domestic affairs of developing countries.”84
It took months to reach consensus on many of the topics at the World Summit, including RtoP. The general consensus attained at the start of August, about a month before the summit, was, however, attacked by America's new UN ambassador, John Bolton, who wanted to redraft hundreds of paragraphs, including the RtoP paragraphs. He called RtoP “a moveable feast of an idea that was the High Minded cause du jour”85 and this led to an even further reduced
version of RtoP when compared to the principle laid out in the ICISS report, and also renewed strong opposition to the principle. China, still positive about the concept in June, changed its view at the World Summit itself, where Chinese president Hu Jintao “defended a traditional understanding of the UN Charter,”86
and this led to Russia also arguing against RtoP. Bellamy mentions some of the smaller nations which also rejected the idea at the World Summit, arguing: “Algeria stated that the concept of R2P was incompatible with international law, while Egypt disputed both the assertion that international society had a responsibility to protect civilians
81 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 67-8. 82 Ibidem 68.
83 Gareth Evans, “When is it right to fight?” Survival, 46.3 (2004) 59-82, there 59. 84
Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 84.
85 John Bolton, Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New York 2007)
207.
(arguing that there was no shared responsibility beyond a state's responsibility to its citizens) and the notion that the protection of civilians should trump sovereignty.”87
The Group of 77, of which India is a member too, was also reluctant to commit to the RtoP, though insiders reported that so long as they believed there to be movement on development they were happy to find compromises on other issues, including RtoP. Not long before the draft of the outcome-document was to be finalized, India once more showed some opposition, “challenging its legal status and moral foundations.”88
In the end, this opposition did not change the document, and RtoP was endorsed under articles 138, 139 and 140 of the World Summit Outcome Document89 and had the full “support [to] the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.”90
China, Russia, Algeria, Brazil and the Philippines all resisted RtoP shortly after the World Summit, arguing that states had committed to discuss RtoP further only at the World Summit itself, not afterward.91 Gareth Evans called this resistance a form of “buyer’s remorse.”92 China argued that “there are still differing understandings and interpretations of this concept … the Security Council should therefore refrain from invoking the concept of the responsibility to protect [and] should respect and support the GA in continuing to discuss the concept in order to reach broad consensus.”93
As a result of this, there were only three references to RtoP in the UN resolutions during the first four years after the 2005 World Summit94, while there were many more instances wherein the concept could have been mentioned, including resolutions about serious atrocities committed in Darfur. Especially in the UNGA, a few member states, including Brazil, Cuba, Algeria and the Philippines, continued to strongly oppose RtoP and everything it stands for.
87 Ifikhar Ali, “Annan's reform plans criticized by other developing countries”, The Nation, 8 April 2005. 88
Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 84.
89 See Appendix 1, Paragraphs 138-140 of the World Summit Outcome Document, for the full text of these articles. 90 Ibidem.
91 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 84. 92
See http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2008/the-responsibility-to-protect-an-idea-whose-time-has-come-and-gone.aspx, last accessed on 16-06-2016, and
http://www.innercitypress.com/r2p1evans091708.html, last accessed on 16-06-2016.
93 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/R2P%20Government%20statements%20Asia%20Pacific%202005-2007.pdf, last
accessed on 24-05-2016.
94 These are: UN General Assembly, The Responsibility to Protect, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 7
October 2009, A/RES/63/308, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ad6d1fd2.html, last accessed on 28-11-2016, UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1674 (2006), On Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, 28 April 2006, S/RES/1674 (2006), available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4459bed60.html, last accessed on 28-11-2016, and UN Security Council,
Resolution 1706 (2006), Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 31 August 2006, S/RES/1706 (2006),
