How do government characteristics determine the share of academics in Norwegian public inquiry commissions in the period from 1972 to 2018?

Maik Alexander Jordan s2435675

Universiteit Leiden

Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs

M. Sc. Public Administration – Economics & Governance Master Thesis

Capstone: Expertise in Public Policymaking Supervisor: Johan Christensen

T I T L E :

How do government characteristics determine the share of academics in Norwegian public inquiry commissions in the period from 1972 to 2018?

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A quantitative analysis on the use of academic expertise in public policymaking

I.

Content

2.1 POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE ... 10

2.2 DETERMINANTS FOR THE USE OF ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING... 12

2.3 THE LEGITIMATING FUNCTION OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN POLICYMAKING ... 14

2.4 POLICY ADVISORY SYSTEMS & COMMISSION GROUPS ... 16

2.5 SCIENTIZATION &POLITICIZATION AS TRENDS IN POLICY ADVISORY SYSTEMS ... 18

2.6 HYPOTHESES ... 19

3. CONTEXT & RESEARCH DESIGN ... 23

3.1 CASE INTRODUCTION ... 25

3.1.1 INTRODUCTION TO COMMISSION GROUPS IN GENERAL ... 25

3.1.2 NORWEGIAN PUBLIC INQUIRY COMMISSIONS (NOUS) ... 27

3.2 DATA COLLECTION... 28

3.3 MEASURES ... 29

3.3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES ... 29

3.3.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ... 30

3.3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES ... 31

3.4 METHODOLOGY & ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ... 32

3.5 LIMITATIONS ... 33

4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ... 34

4.1 NORWEGIAN COMMISSION GROUPS AND THE COMPOSITION OF MEMBERS... 34

4.2 ACADEMICS IN NORWEGIAN PUBLIC INQUIRY COMMISSION ... 35

4.3 GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION OVER TIME ... 39

4.4 RESULTS ... 42

4.5 DISCUSSION ... 46

5. CONCLUSION ... 49

1. Introduction

How do policymakers find solutions to a policy-problem they are not familiar with? What if this particular problem is shaped by a growing technical uncertainty and a complexity resulting in global concerns because of worldwide interlinkages? Decisionmakers depend on scientific knowledge and expertise to understand the core of such issues and to consider relevant options to solve this policy problem. Expert knowledge helps states and policymakers to prioritize their interests and to propose specific policies (Haas, 1992, p.2). The significant role of scientific and academic expertise has gained increasing attention by the public and by academics themselves as well. Weingart even states that science can be defined as one actor among many in the political systems and is especially crucial in setting the political agenda (1999, p.155). Besides that, academic expertise can be used politically by legitimating policies. In this sense, academic expertise attributes epistemic authority to decisionmakers. Despite this significant impact of experts, the precise definition on expert knowledge is varying across research. As a starting point, this thesis understands expert knowledge as scientific, academic or professional skills, abilities and capabilities. In this context, this thesis is primarily focusing on academic knowledge. More precisely, expert knowledge is usually achieved through the use of some kind of scientific method by people with a higher academic education. Plus, this kind of knowledge is mostly acknowledged by a wider community of experts. Academic knowledge can be defined as theoretical knowledge achieved within academic and scientific disciplines and gained through extensive training (Christensen, 2018, p.293).

This thesis aims at investigating what determines the use of academic knowledge in public policymaking. Under this scope, the analysis focuses under what circumstances governments experience the need to include academic experts. The demand-side of academic policy advice has yet been understudied, as most literature focuses on experts and, thus, the supply-side. By focusing on the demand-side of policy advice, we can derive better insights on what determines the use of academic knowledge in public policymaking. Therefore, this analysis examines how certain government characteristics influence the use of academic experts in the decision-making process. In this sense, the thesis takes the perspective that academic knowledge follows a political function in legitimating policies. Legitimacy can be defined as favorable group judgement of the performance and actions of an institution (Useem, 1976, p.217). The theoretical argument underlying this view ties on the thinking by Boswell. Boswell describes the political use of academic expertise as a quest for achieving stability in the political environment by displaying that decisions have been made on a reasonable and sound basis. The thesis assesses how government characteristics, such as how many seats the government holds,

impact the utilization of academic experts in order to legitimate actions and policies. Under a technocratic scope of policymaking, legitimacy arises from technical expertise. In this context, expertise is a factor to achieve authority (Beetham, 2013, p.284). So far, a wide range of scholars has studied the channels through which academics participate in the policy process. Most literature has focused on the supply-side of policy advice and on the conditions under which academic expertise is used by decisionmakers. This thesis takes a different perspective by examining the other side focusing on the main driver of public policymaking. The government, as the driving force in policymaking demanding policy advice, is the actor under scope in this analysis. To offer a different perspective, this study follows an organizational institutionalist approach by focusing on the legitimating function of knowledge utilization. The thesis assesses quantitively how certain characteristics in the government composition are determining the use of academic knowledge in public commissions and, thus, the use of academic expertise to legitimate decisionmakers’ actions and decisions in public policymaking.

1.1 Research Question

Substantially, this thesis is focusing on the involvement of academic experts within the policymaking process to examine what drives and determines the use of expert knowledge. The thesis will assess under what circumstances academic knowledge and expertise is used by policymakers to legitimate their actions and policies. The quantitative analysis will examine how different government characteristics are driving the need for academic expertise to legitimate the government’s behavior. How differences in the composition of the government are shaping expert influence is yet understudied in current scholarship. By focusing on the demand-side of policy advice and what factors influence the demand, we derive further insights on what determines the utilization of expertise in public policymaking. Therefore, this thesis is directed at what government factors explain the use of academic expertise. More detailed, it is examining how certain factors matter for the appointment of academic experts to commission groups. In this sense, the main factors influencing the appointment of academic experts are government characteristics as the government is setting up the commission and decides on its member structure.

The goal of this thesis is to analyze quantitively how government’s characteristics are determining the use of academic expertise within public-policy making. Thus, this paper poses the research-question:

How do government characteristics determine the share of academics in Norwegian public inquiry commissions in the period from 1972 to 2018?

This question will be addressed with a quantitative analysis based on data on Norwegian commission groups by Hesstvedt (2019). The dataset contains all Norwegian advisory commission from 1972 to 2018, including 1563 commissions in total. To study the share of academics, the dataset provides information on the educational and professional background of commissions’ members. Most commissions have been assigned by the government. However, some commission groups were appointed by the ministry. Combined with this dataset, the study will also use a dataset on parliaments and government by Döring and Manow (2019) to gain information on the influence of the changing composition of the Norwegian government. The, for this research, most substantial part of the data, contains, how the government can be categorized on the left-right-axle in the political dimension, the share of seats the government holds and how many parties are forming in the government. This data will provide insights into how government characteristics have developed over time.

1.2 Academic relevance

A wide range of recent studies has focused on the role of academic knowledge in public policymaking (Fischer, 2009; Beetham, 2013; Hirschman & Berman, 2014; Christensen & Holst, 2017; Christensen, 2018; Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019). Scholars agree on the significant role of academic experts in the policy process, both at the national and the international level. With the growing attention to this topic, scholars have pointed out that academic knowledge can be utilized in many ways. In the context of modern policymaking, scholars explain the contribution of experts by referring to concepts describing the role of experts in the political system, which resulted in the creation of terms like evidence-based policy making, ideas, epistemic communities and others. Most of these concepts have in common that they focus more on the experts themselves and less on the role of the demanding side of policy advice in terms of policymaking. In this sense, these theoretical developments

have missed out to clarify what determines the use of academic knowledge in public policymaking. Hence, this thesis focuses on the demand side of policy advice by examining what drives the government’s demand to use academic knowledge. This focus might also explain what function academic expertise fulfills.

1.3 Societal relevance

The use of academic knowledge in public policymaking is highly relevant for the society as it requires a trade-off between certain aspects arising from the involvement of academic experts. On the one hand, to include experts aims at improving policies by providing a solid and sound base. On the other hand, it means that power is shifted towards unelected individuals. In this sense, the involvement of experts has an anti-democratic character. Various scholars are focusing on the paradoxes and risks arising from the use of expert knowledge in policymaking. More precisely, Weingart focuses on the nature of policy expertise and emphasizes a paradox arising from the liaison of scientific expertise and policymaking. This paradox refers to the omnipresent role of scientific expertise in the policy process. To be more precise, it relates to the primary concerns about the illegitimate impact of scientific expertise have dissolved completely (Weingart, 1999, p.152). In this sense, Weingart particularly questions the accountability of experts by underlining the initial fears that expertise might undermine the democratic mandate. The core argument of these concerns is that scientific experts would use their knowledge also in their own interest, for example to anticipate funds for future research in their particular field. In this sense, scientific expertise is categorized as a threat to representative democracy (Weingart, 1999, p.154). This threat is also relevant for the case of commission groups as various scholars point out a trade-off between democratic and efficient policymaking. In technocratic societies, science serves as rational ground for decisionmakers by improving policies’ efficiency and performance. Nevertheless, involving non-elected experts in policymaking does not follow strictly the guidelines of democracy. To portray the risk of including experts in public policymaking, Fischer draws the development of expert knowledge from being praised to being viewed critically (2009, p.18). In this sense, some scholars are questioning the legitimacy of commission groups because of democratic concerns. Vibert describes it as the ‘rise of the unelected’ by pointing out to an increasing number of unelected bodies with power in public policymaking. Commissions can be considered as such an unelected body influencing the policy process (2009, p.18). Beetham even states that science

works in an anti-democratic direction by appointing the power of policymaking to the experts (2013, p.73). In contrast to that, other studies emphasize that the increasing reliance on academics might lead to rational and sound policymaking (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.824). Under this view, expert knowledge fulfills a problem-solving function (Boswell, 2008, p.471). Therefore, assigning commission groups requires to weigh democratic concerns with efficiency arguments.

Due to the paradox and risks arising from the utilization of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to further study the use of academic expertise in policymaking and to understand what determines this utilization. By examining the influence of government characteristics, this analysis studies whether the role of academic expertise follows an instrumental or rather and legitimating and symbolic motive.

1.4 Structure

This thesis particularly focuses on knowledge being used by policymakers to legitimate their actions and policies. The reasons behind this thinking will be outlined in the second chapter. This chapter also gives an overview of the current state of literature on the use of academic knowledge in policymaking as well as on policy advisory systems and commission groups. The goal of this research is to examine how the reliance on academic knowledge is determined by government’s characteristics. Thus, the thesis underlies the following structure to address these issues by studying the use of academic expertise within public policymaking. In the beginning, topic of the thesis was introduced by presenting the state of literature and previous research. In the context of a comprehensive elaboration of the aims and objectives of the study, the research question has been stated. Following this, the second chapter covers the role of (academic) expertise within policymaking. This part will explain the main ideas behind such terms as scientization and politicization. This section includes the theoretical framework underlying this thesis. To build up a solid base for the quantitative analysis, theories from different bodies of scholarship that describe the role of knowledge utilized in policymaking as well as studies that theoretically analyze the role and behavior of the government, are synthesized. Based on the theories, this part will also derive the hypotheses to be tested in the qualitative analysis. As the centerpiece of this thesis, the following two chapters contain the research design and the quantitative analysis. The chapter starts with an introduction to the case followed by presenting the datasets. To further elaborate the topic, this section displays

descriptive statistics to explain the composition of the dataset and the changing role of academic as well as the development of government characteristics. Moreover, this chapter also further explains the dataset, data collection and the methodology. As the next step, the quantitative analysis tests the hypotheses. This chapter involves the regressions and presents the results. Concluding, this section interprets the results and connects them to the current state of research The last part of the thesis summarizes the results by referring to the hypotheses, limitations and further pathways for future research. By using this structure, the thesis will give insights on what determines the appointment of academic as commission members and chairpersons and what drives the use of academic knowledge within the policy-process.

2. Theoretical Discussion

In highly complex societies and interlinked economies, policymakers depend on expert knowledge to tackle policy problems. Various scholars have contributed on how expertise is institutionalized and included in policymaking by referring to the benefits and risks. This chapter provides a broad overview of essential concepts and terms that describe the role of expert knowledge in the policy process. Furthermore, this section presents the theoretical framework describing the legitimating function of academic expertise. Taking this into consideration and introducing commission groups and policy advisory systems in general, this chapter derives the hypotheses.

2.1 Political functions of knowledge

In public policymaking, expert knowledge can fulfil different functions. In this context, the way how research knowledge is being applied and included in politics is a very diffuse and diverse process as it is depending on the intention of the use. The use of knowledge emerged from research can have significantly different intentions as Carol H. Weiss stated. Weiss differentiates between the use of research as gained knowledge being applied in general or knowledge being applied in order to solve a specific problem. Moreover, research can be utilized to be added to an interactive policy process or it can be used only if the political side using it is in line with the research’s findings. Plus, research can be used without relating to its substantive findings by just underlining that research is being done or it can act in a way of

enlightenment by informing the public. Finally, knowledge can also be used within politics as research is often responding to an emerging policy interest in the context of an interaction between politics and social sciences (Weiss, 1979, p.427ff).

Moreover, instrumental theories are dominating the literature on knowledge use. Overall, instrumental theories built on rational theories on organizations. To be more detailed, one distinct approach has evolved to explain the instrumental function of knowledge by referring to Max Weber. Within this approach, expert knowledge helps organizations to deliver their goals by enhancing the quality of output. This concept builds upon the Weberian theory, by emphasizing that knowledge contributes to achieving rational organizational targets (Boswell, 2009, p.30). Thus, knowledge assists to define and prioritize different policy options and ensures that the decisions fulfil organizational goals (Boswell, 2009, p.31).

Contrary to the instrumental function, knowledge can be also used in a symbolic way (Boswell, 2009, p.61). In the context of the political function, Boswell distinguishes between knowledge as legitimizing and as substantiating. Theories on the symbolic function draw upon neo-institutionalist theories, which assume that organizations are mainly concerned to secure legitimacy. Under this scope, organizations need to secure legitimacy from their members and from the environment (Boswell, 2009, p.65). In practice, both theories are difficult to disentangle. The substantiating function describes the process of attaching scientific authority into policy proposals. In this sense, involving experts can be identified as a strategy to confirm policy preferences. This might be the case, if the debate involves technocratic aspects rather than interests or values (Boswell, 2009, p.62). The aim of including knowledge in a substantiating function is to garner support for a preferred decision of action (Boswell, 2009, p.73).

Organizations are motivated to use knowledge in a symbolic legitimizing way when they act in an unstable organizational field. Plus, they might also feel the need to symbolize expertise under a technocratic scope of policymaking. Whereas, substantiating aims to garner support for policy preferences, the legitimizing function of knowledge aims to demonstrates that the organization is able to “mobilize resources to produce and apply knowledge” (Boswell, 2009, p.73). These differences in the rational show the distinction between the substantiating and legitimizing function of knowledge. As the legitimating function of expert knowledge is the central element of the theoretical framework underlying this thesis, this concept will be discussed more deeply in this chapter.

2.2 Determinants for the use of academic knowledge in public policymaking

In the field of political science, the use of expertise has been frequently studied in the last few years. To begin with, this thesis introduces different approaches examining the motives behind the use of academic expertise and in what ways this knowledge can be used in public policymaking. This study focuses on the legitimating function of expert knowledge. Beetham describes that science serves as an external source of legitimacy and authority. Nevertheless, it has an anti-democratic character, by shifting the power of decision-making away from elected politicians to experts. Still, the belief in the authority of science justifies technical decision excluding normative or political alternatives (Beetham, 2013, p.73). As a solid base for this thesis, the theoretical framework is built upon an organizational institutionalist approach based on ideas by Di Maggio and Powell in its core. The key idea is that organizations and institutions are deeply concerned about securing and maintaining legitimacy (Boswell, 2008, p.473; Di Maggio & Powell, 1991, p.19). In contrast to rational choice theories, the primary goal is not to maximize performance or power, but to secure external legitimacy in their environment (Boswell, 2008, p.473). Taking this perspective, the primary incentive to involve academic expertise in policymaking is its legitimizing function. As discussed in the introduction, there are various perspectives on the intention of the use of academic expertise within public policymaking. This paper follows the concept that knowledge is used by decision-makers to fulfil a legitimating function for their actions and policy proposals. This section examines theories on the political functions of expert knowledge in policymaking. Furthermore, this chapter outlines the role of policy advisory systems and trends explaining how the role of academic knowledge in policymaking is changing. Additionally, this section also addresses theoretical approaches on what determines the government to seek for legitimacy. Building up on this, in its final part this chapter derives the hypotheses and outlines limitations of the study. In the context of expertise in public policymaking, the concept of evidence-based policymaking describes a process resulting from the pressure on decision-makers to improve efficiency and effectiveness within the policy process. To increase the performance of policies, evidence resulting from expertise or research shall help policymakers to decide for the right policy option. Head illustrates that this process has been initiated in the 1970s and that it has enjoyed renewed intensity in the late 1990s. This trend has been strengthened by international authorities such as the EU (Head, 2015, p.472; Innvær, 2009, p.1). The UK has been one of the first countries to adopt an evidence-based policy approach. In 1999, the UK has implemented this approach is its strategy as an integral element (Strassheim & Kettunen, 2014, p.261).

Norway followed this path soon as the government declared that it wished to follow the evidence-based approach to policymaking (Innvær, 2009, p.2). Such a claim for evidence-based policymaking can be also identified as a call for the use of scientific methodologies. Usually, the term evidence in these matters relates to some kind of findings resulting from formal or scientific investigation. Other scholars highlight that there is a wide range for what defines evidence. In this sense, evidence is not only achievable through scientific methodologies. Instead, evidence might be also “found in the experiences of an agency administrator, the claims of those affected by a decision, or the judgment of expert panels” (Jennings & Hall, 2012, p.246). Whereas, Strassheim and Kettunen understand expertise and evidence as embedded in structures such as authority relations and cultural contexts. They also underline that policy-relevant findings are resulting from an intensive and complex battle for political and epistemic authority (Strassheim & Kettunen, 2014, p.260). In this respect, evidence plays a key factor in finding priorities and formulating policies in order to solve policy-problems. Recent studies have shown that decisionmakers depend their use of scientific evidence on three aspects. More precisely, scientific evidence needs to be conducted by high quality research, it needs to involve data on effectiveness, and it has to contain conclusions with clear recommendations (Innvær, 2009, p.2). The role of evidence is especially crucial in technocratic environments, where policies should ground on a reasonable and sound base. Accordingly, research and academics are a source of institutional authority and power. Technocratic decisionmakers legitimate their actions through research results (Parkinson, 2003, p.189). Hence, the concept of evidence-based policymaking is relevant for the research questions as it focuses on evidence arising from academic research. By proving a reliable base for better policies, evidence and, thus, the use of research can fulfill a legitimating function. Evidence-based policymaking acts to improve the legitimacy of decision-makers and to gain civic trust in policymakers (Head, 2015, p.472). Nevertheless, evidence-based policymaking is mostly used in a more instrumental way.

In contrast to that, academic knowledge and expertise can also be utilized to legitimate policy decisions. In this sense, policymakers make use of academic expertise in a strategic way. By legitimating policies knowledge takes the role of a source of authority as Christensen concludes (2018, p.293). For instance, recent studies have shown how economic knowledge is used to enhance legitimacy. This is due to two main dynamics. On the one hand, economic knowledge is vital for securing prosperity and growth, which makes economic knowledge crucial for decision-makers. One the other hand, and more importantly for the issue of this thesis, including economic knowledge in policymaking displays a rational and reasonable ground for finding policy solutions (Christensen, 2018, p.293). Thus, it takes a legitimating function for

decision-makers. Both dynamics show the different considerations driving the instrumental and legitimating use of expertise in policymaking. Various studies agree upon that economics is the most influential social science in policymaking (Hirschmann & Berman, 2014, p.779; Christensen, 2018, p.293). Therefore, economic knowledge also underlies also the dual dynamics of expert knowledge in policymaking.

Recent studies have demonstrated that the reliance on academic economists in decision making has increased. In the Norwegian context, policymaking has orientated towards economic research, which can be “interpreted as a scientization of policy advice in the economic field” (Christensen, 2018, p.306).

2.3 The legitimating function of expert knowledge in policymaking

This thesis underlies an organizational institutionalist approach, established by Di Maggio and Powell and elaborated by Boswell to explain the political functions of expert knowledge within public policymaking.

Boswell outlines that the policymakers’ demand for expert knowledge arises from the assumption that it helps the organization to deliver its goals. In this sense, Boswell is referring to the traditional Weberian account based on rational choice theories. This follows an instrumental function of expert knowledge as decisions reflect solid and reasonable base. Besides that, expert knowledge can also fulfil a different function. Policymakers can legitimize their actions through the use of expert knowledge as it symbols that their behavior is in line with rational rules, supporting their authority and decisions (Boswell, 2008, p.471). This can be related to governments specifically as she states, that “governments are heavily reliant on expert knowledge to legitimize their authority and justify their actions” (2009, p.250). The liaison between expertise and the government is complex as knowledge helps decisionmakers to react to a wide range of conflicting requirements. The requirements arise from various actors such as the bureaucracy, party politics, organized private interests and the media. Because of the variety of different origins of the conflicting requirements, distinct types of knowledge are needed by the government. The applied knowledge either supports decisions, rationalizes decisions or legitimizes structures. In this sense, Boswell characterizes knowledge as a “symbolic resource for underpinning the risky decisions of politicians” by reinforcing authority (2009, p.251).

Boswell refers her thinking also to organizations in general and under what circumstances they might experience a demand for legitimating knowledge. In this context, an organization can strengthen its legitimacy as knowledge can award organizations with epistemic authority (Boswell, 2008, p.472). Taking this perspective, Boswell offers a different approach compared to other studies, which can be connect to rational choice accounts. These studies assume that organizations are mainly concerned about maximizing power.

In contrast to that, Boswell follows the thinking of Di Maggio and Powell by referring to an organizational institutionalist approach. This view assumes that agencies and organizations follow the fundamental goal of securing legitimacy by fulfilling societal expectations about reasonable structures, actions or output (Boswell, 2008, p.473, Di Maggio & Powell, 1991, p.19). Instead of fulfilling an instrumental function, expert knowledge acts in a symbolic way to demonstrate authority and expertise. This thinking is based on the assumption that organizations need to secure external legitimacy in their environment. The environment contains of elements such as the political system. To secure legitimacy, organizations aim to reduce uncertainty. According to Powell and Di Maggio organizations address this issue by establishing organizational practices and routines (1991, p.19). Hence, information is being politicized when used to legitimize policy decisions. This kind of utilization does also involve the distortion or the selective use of knowledge (Weibel, 2008, p.620). The concept of politicization will be discussed in more depth in the following section.

Under this scope, it is important to be aware that knowledge can be utilized legitimizing in many different steps of the policy cycle. Expert knowledge is not only assisting in formulating solutions to a problem. Moreover, knowledge can be the prospective source that creates a problem (pre-decision). But policymakers need knowledge after the decision as well as policies exist for some time (post-decision) and decisionmakers must react to a changing environment (Majone, 1989, p.33).

In the context of knowledge being utilized for legitimizing reasons, Boswell distinguished between two ideal types of organizations. First, so called action organization are building up their legitimacy on their output or the impact of societal interventions. Second, political organizations that derive their legitimacy from advocating certain norms and values in its structures and by reacting to issues that have been framed as demanding political responses (Boswell, 1991, p.474).

Resulting from this distinction, Boswell is assuming that political organization are more likely to use expert knowledge in a legitimizing way, whereas action organization might use expert knowledge instrumentally. Furthermore, the legitimizing function depends on two factors. The

first factor describes the degree of controversy of the policy. If the organization is facing an opposition to the proposed policy, it may be seeking for additional support to attach creditability to its proposal. The second feature highlights the mode of settlement for finding compromises between rival claims. This mode can be either a technocratic or a democratic one. A technocratic mode of settlement describes a policy area, where scientific evidence is classified as legitimate criteria for advocating preferences. In this mode, an organization is likely to adopt knowledge to confirm its preferences in instances. Whereas, a democratic mode describes a policy area, where popular support is the decisive force. Under these circumstances, policy conflicts arise from different values and interests. Therefore, competing knowledge cannot be considered as driving for conflicts (Boswell, 2008, p.474).

2.4 Policy advisory systems & commission groups

The institutionalization of the involvement experts and their knowledge as policy advice in policymaking is multifaceted and diverse. This thesis will focus on academic expertise being institutionalized within the context of policy advisory systems. In these regards, the concept concentrates on actors and organizations supplying policymakers with policy advice. The policy advice mainly contains of an analysis of a particular problem or the formulation of solutions. The suppliers of such advice are highly diverse. Policy advice can be given by think tanks, consultancies, government research agencies, commission groups or others (Christensen, 2018, p.295). Craft and Halligan differentiate between policy advisory systems along two dimensions. The first dimension considers the degree of government control that the policy advisory systems possess, either high or low. The second dimension focuses on the policy advisor’s location within the political system, either inside or outside the government (Craft & Halligan, 2017, p.49).

Within the scientific discourse, a wide range of literature has focused on the role of commission groups in the policy advisory system. Commission groups represent only one method on how to include expertise in public policymaking. Therefore, commission groups are just a small element within the policy advisory system. Recent studies have shown that commission groups can have a noteworthy influence on the policy process and debates (Christensen, 2018, p.297). Academics and experts as political advisors in public policymaking can be considered as an international phenomenon. Several studies have found that a wide range of political advisors are important suppliers of policy advice in a broad number of countries (Craft & Howlett, 2013,

p.191). Nevertheless, the extent to which policy advisors are part of the political system and the institutionalization in which advisors act, is varying across countries. There are many different ways the government can include experts as advisors in policymaking. Such other ways to include academic expertise in policymaking involves the citation of academic literature in policy proposals or state-funded research projects. Furthermore, a broad of range of literature is focusing how the two trends externalization (or scientization) and politicization have changed policy advisory systems. The next section discusses these trends in more depth.

In practice, different countries can be considered broadly as examples for one of the mentioned models. The Westminster-Model is focused on the executive power, which results in an advisory system dominated by the public service. By contrast, the United States is shaped by federalism and fragmentation, which leads to an advisory system relying on a wide scope of actors (Halligan, 1995, p.142). Most literature has focused on the Westminster-model and policy advisory systems in anglophone countries.

Halligan emphasizes that the shape of the policy advisory system is influenced by the political system as well. In an administrative state, the policy advice mostly arises from public servants leading to a quasi-monopoly in advising decision-makers. In contrast to that, the advice system could also be dominated by politicians, when there is a requirement for political appointments in the state. The third option describes an open government system in which the advisory system provides access to external interests resulting in a wide range of highly diverse contributions (Halligan, 1995, p.141).

In addition, Craft and Howlett differentiate between policy advisors in terms of their location within the policy advice system by referring to the thinking established by Halligan. The variable of location can take three different states affecting the advisory system structure and actor influence. First, the policy advice supplier can be located in the public service. These kinds of advisors take forms such as central agency advisers or strategy policy unit. The second set of locations describes policy advisors internal to the government such as temporary policy units like commission groups. This also includes ministers’ offices. The third set focuses on external actors such as NGOs or federal international organizations (Craft & Howlett, 2013, p.189). This set consists of a wide variety of actors advising policymakers. External organizations like lobbyists, community groups, workers unions and other private interest groups have established as advisors in the age of privatization (Halligan, 1995, p.153). Decisionmakers can also demand external advice by setting up public consultation as a form of direct democracy, which is a common practice conducted by the EU.

The route academic research takes can also take a turn through an intermediary actor to find its way into policies. This set of actors is classified by various studies as knowledge brokers. Such brokers can take diverse forms as specialized research staff inside governments or as temporary counterparts participating in commissions and task forces. In this sense, intermediaries translate research results into appropriate forms of expertise by matching supply and demand of policy advice. It has been found that these brokers play a key role in formulating processes and thus, playing a major function in advisory systems (Craft & Howlett, 2013, p.188). The concept of commission groups will be discussed more detailed in the next chapter.

2.5 Scientization & Politicization as trends in policy advisory systems

A central scope of various studies is to examine how policy advisory systems are changing. Resulting of this, a wide range of literature has identified two predominant trends in explaining developments in this field. These trends are also illustrating certain benefits and risks of involving academic expertise within the policy process. In the context of explaining the role of academic experts as advisors to political actors, scientization and politicization can be understood as trends that characterize the changing role of academic experts and their advisory role in public policymaking.

Scientization refers to the increasing reliance of decision-makers on academic experts and their knowledge for policy advise. In this sense, academic actors become a source for arguments supporting or not supporting certain policy actions (Christensen, 2018, p.295). Moreover, the growing dependence on academic expertise attributes scientific knowledge as a source of authority or legitimacy. Thus, this development is also linked to evidence-based policymaking. An example of this trend is the growing use and establishment of expert organizations like courts, regulatory authorities, central banks and other financial organizations (Christensen, 2018, p.293). More specifically, this trend can be understood as a form of externalization, but it differentiates academic experts from other external actors functioning as advisors. Externalization derives from the demand by elected decisionmakers to achieve greater political control and receptivity. This also follows the goal to mitigate the monopoly and the dependency of the public service as the main supplier of policy advice (Craft & Howlett, 2013, p.190; Van den Berg, 2017, p.65). Moreover, it is also related to governments seeking to reduce staff in order to cut down administrative costs.

Politicization describes a second dynamic within the concept of policy advisory systems. This trend outlines the increasing use of partisan political advisors and larger political steering of the policy formulation process (Christensen, 2018, p.295). In more detail, politicization illustrates the growing number of policy advice linked to partisan-ideological and value-based factors rather than objective or technical concerns. In this sense, political advice ranges from personal attitudes and experiences and interest group opinions and beliefs to clear partisan electoral advice (Craft & Howlett, 2013, p.191). Furthermore, politicization of policy advice can be also described through the political involvement in senior public service staffing or procedural steering (Van den Berg, 2017, p.65). The administrative politicization describes the development of the civil service drifting away from professional and impartial civil service Both trends also describe the political versus technical advice dichotomy (Craft & Howlett, 2017, p.496). Strassheim emphasizes a specific type of politicization, especially relevant for this case, which he classifies as silent politicization. Silent politicization describes the involvement of experts, lobbyists and other stakeholders in policymaking. In this sense, problematic issues are addressed by these actors in back rooms or closed shops (Strassheim, 2017, p.511). By this shift, academic evidence can be controlled. Thus, science and politics negotiate “the terms and boundaries of expertise without public interference” (Strassheim, 2017, p.512). This is also applicable to the concept of commission groups, as government officials choose which individuals to appoint as commission members, and thus, are able to control which academic experts are involved in the commission groups and the decision-making process. Hence, the decisionmakers can steer the political process by legitimating their actions and decisions based on evidence originating from selected academic expertise.

2.6 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework presented in this chapter, this section derives the hypotheses to be tested empirically on a quantitative dataset on Norwegian commission groups. In general, government and policymakers expect their decisions and actions either to be rewarded or depreciated by their environment. Therefore, expert knowledge acts as a source of legitimating and authority. The analysis focuses on the role of the government in the public policymaking in the Norwegian context. In the case of Norway, the government is the driving force in evolving proposals and public policies in the political system. In this role, the government is concerned about maintaining its position by legitimizing its actions and

decisions. By appointing academic experts as members of commission groups, the government utilizes academic knowledge in symbolic way. The involvement of academic experts signalizes authority and competence in the environment to other actors and audiences. Through the belief in science to solve problems, academic expertise displays policy progress and provides a solid base for better policies (Boswell, 2008, p.472). In the next step, this section derives what could drive the need for legitimacy and deduces the hypotheses.

As this thesis is focusing on the use of expert knowledge depending on government characteristics, this section is discussing various theoretical concepts to further shed light on such characteristics. Hence, this discussion involves distinct theories on how certain government characteristics might influence its demand for legitimacy. In the next step, this part introduces the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework. The structure of the thesis and the quantitative analysis orientate along the following three hypotheses.

To begin with, the first hypothesis considers the political ideology the government follows. The most obvious government characteristic describes the general political position, whether it is a right- or a left-wing government. Hallerberg and Wehner conclude that left parties experience credibility problems in government (2018, p.1). In this sense, left-wing governments have a higher need to gain legitimacy in order to signalize authority and competence. They further dive into this issue as they state that left parties represent labor power compared to right ones representing capital. Nevertheless, no matter what political ideology is underlying the government, there is still a need to attain credibility with the markets. To signal expertise towards the markets, left-wing government might be more likely to involve economists in policymaking (Hallerberg & Wehner, 2018, p.4).

We can conclude, that this is relevant for the case, because academic economic knowledge plays also a vital role in policymaking in the Norwegian context as Christensen identifies a growing reliance on economic experts in economics policies, which he classifies as a “scientization of policy advice” (2018, p.306). Therefore, we expect economic knowledge as a crucial source for legitimization. As especially left governments are experiencing a lack of credibility in terms of economic policies, they might have a higher demand to include experts to signalize competence and authority. As conducted in the previous part of this section, economic knowledge is the most influential social science in policymaking. Furthermore, referring to Hallerberg and Wehner, left-wing governments experience a lack of credibility when it comes to economic policymaking. To signalize expertise in these regards, they might be more in the need to involve academic experts in policymaking to signalize authority and competence to the markets. Governments are in the need to achieve this credibility with the

capital market, to ensure financing and reassuring of investors (Hallerberg & Wehner, 2018, p.4). By consulting experts, governments are legitimizing their authority and justifying their decisions. Synthesizing these conclusions, this thesis assumes that especially left-wing governments have a higher demand in appointing academic experts to commission groups to symbolize competence and authority through the utilization of expert knowledge.

Therefore, hypothesis 1 is formulated as:

H1) Left-wing governments are more likely to appoint academic experts as commission group members than right-wing/center governments.

The second hypothesis considers the decision-making power of the government. Another characteristic influencing the need for legitimacy, might be the government’s share of seats. In this sense, governments with a small majority can be considered as unstable as their endurance is depending on a small share of votes. This is even more crucial for minority governments. Minority government are in the need to receive support from other parties in the parliament to achieve a majority of votes for their policies. In this sense, they have a higher demand for legitimacy to defend their policy proposals and to win allies from other parties. Because of that, government with a small share of seats might be more likely to include academic experts in order to enhance their credibility. To signalize competence and authority, government use academic expertise to win other parties’ votes. In this sense, academic knowledge also fulfils a comprising function.

Accordingly, the second hypothesis is derived as:

H2) Minority governments are more likely to appoint academics as members than governments holding a majority in parliament.

The third hypothesis draws upon the theoretical framework underlying the second hypothesis. Under this scope, governments with a small share of votes can be considered as an unstable organization. Boswell states that instability and uncertainty about its survival are increasing the need for legitimacy. Operating under these conditions, an organization is more likely to seek legitimacy (Boswell, 2008, p.473). In this context, these organizations are more likely to utilize expert knowledge to legitimize their actions with the goal to symbolize authority in their

environment. Following Boswell’s thinking presented in this section, we expect governments with a small share of votes to be more likely appoint academic members as commission group experts as they have a higher demand for legitimacy. Boswell identifies an organization seeking for legitimizing knowledge as an unstable political organization (Boswell, 2008, p.475). This can be applied to governments with a small share of seats as their survival is depending on a small share of votes. Governments receive pressure from a variety of actors, such as the opposition, the own bureaucracy, party politics, organized lobby groups and the mass media. To respond to these pressures, governments are legitimizing their actions and decisions by relying on expert knowledge. The main dynamics in this concept are uncertainty and instability. To address uncertainties, governments try to increase their stability by referring to academic experts as members of commission groups.

Therefore, hypothesis 3 is formulated as:

H3) The smaller the share of seats of a government, the more likely the government utilizes academic expertise than single-party governments.

The fourth hypothesis ties on the theoretical base described for H2 and H3, which states that unstable organization might experience a lack of credibility and are in the need to gain legitimacy for their policy decisions. This can be also related to the number of parties forming the government. With the number of parties, the instability increases as the potential for conflicts is growing as well. The pressures arising from party politics are growing with a higher number of parties forming the government coalition. Multi-party governments are more vulnerable to pressures arising from conflicts within the government parties and, thus, have a higher need to legitimize their actions, compared to single-party-governments.

Plus, the more parties a government consists of, the more it is in the need to find consensus. Various conflicts around finding consensus, increase the level of instability. Academic knowledge facilitates compromises. Compromises are essential to the survival of a multi-party governments, which underlines the role of academic knowledge in these constellations. In technocratic environments, expertise acts a source of authority by referring to a certain kind of evidence. Thus, the evidence promotes compromise by agreeing to technocratic normative beliefs and referring to scientific methodologies. Nevertheless, we have to be aware that conflicts shaped by values or interest cannot be solved by knowledge alone. Instead, public preference might enable argumentation. Whereas, in technocratic environments conflicts

evolve around various knowledge claims, technocratic modes of justification succeed Under these circumstances, expert knowledge helps to find compromise by justifying decisions. This dispute-solving role is especially crucial under risky policy areas and policy areas, which involve technical aspects of socio-economic steering (Boswell, 2009, p.79).

Concluding, the fourth hypothesis is derived as:

H4) Multi-party governments are more likely to appoint academics than single-party government.

All these hypotheses are building up on the thinking that the government utilizes commission groups to control the policy process. In this sense, certain characteristics are influencing the government’s need for legitimacy. The government responds to this by appointing academic experts as members of commission groups to signalize competence and authority to the political environment. This attributed epistemic authority allows the government to stabilize and control its role within the environment. In the following section, the conceptual model stating this framework will be discussed in more depth. This model visualizes the thinking underlying the hypotheses.

3. Context & Research Design

This paper analyses the role of academic knowledge as policy advice legitimating policies through a quantitative analysis of Norwegian public inquiry commissions Norges Offentlige Utredninger (NOUs). The analysis is based on a dataset compromising all NOUs in the period of 1972 to 2018 by Hesstvedt. The dataset contains variables on the commission, such as the appointment date, variables on the members like their background and variables stating the characteristics of the commission’s academic members, such as the academic discipline. This data will be synthesized with the dataset by Döring and Manow on parliaments and governments, which gives us information on the government composition, including variables on the government’s left/right-position, the share of seats and the number of parties building the government. This chapter introduces the case by explaining the concept of commissions in general in the first place. Following, the next part refers this concept in more depth to the case of Norway. The following section outlines the data collection, the variables under the scope of

this analysis and the methodology. Concluding, this chapter emphasizes the limitations of this study.

To further demonstrate the theoretical framework underlying this thesis, Fig. 1shows the conceptual model, which illustrates the theories the analysis is grounded on and the focus of the quantitative analysis. The government characteristics influence the government’s demand for legitimacy. In this sense, the characteristics impact the instability and insecurity of the government. The government responds to this by utilizing academic experts to legitimate their actions and decisions. From this perspective, academic knowledge is used in a symbolic way by appointing academics as members or chairpersons of commission groups.

Fig. 1: Conceptual model illustrating the theoretical framework underlying and the theoretical thinking followed

in this thesis (own depiction).

Referring to the conceptual model, the quantitative analysis will test empirically the relationship between the government characteristics and the utilization of academic knowledge. Accordingly, the analysis and the dataset underlying this thesis does not allow us to observe the demand for legitimacy. This research approach will give us insights on what determines the use of academic knowledge in public policymaking and how these characteristics are influencing the appointing of academic experts as commission members or commission chairpersons.

Government characteristics Left/right Share of seats Minority/ Majority Number of parties Demand for legitimacy Utilization of academic knowledge

3.1 Case Introduction

The presented theoretical framework will be applied in the empirical context of commission groups in Norway in the period of 1972 to 2018. Norway has been shaped by a tradition of neo-corporatism based on negotiations with various actors involved in the policy process (Arter, 2008, p.157). In the Scandinavian context, the government administration usually is the main driving force in the development of public policies (Christensen, 2018, p.296). The Nordic countries can be categorized as neo-corporatist in policymaking with contributions by assorted interest groups. However, the Nordic countries can also be classified as technocratic with a strong focus on identifying rational solutions to policy problems (Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2018, p.87). As mentioned before, Norway also follows the wish to adopt the evidence-based approach in public policymaking. The government is taking different techniques to achieve this goal. One feature targeting this goal are the Norwegian public inquiry commissions NOUs. Following, this section will introduce the concept of commission groups in general. This introduction includes a broader overview of the literature on commission groups and the basic functioning of such advisory bodies. To elaborate the case in more depth, the next part explains the role of commission groups in the context of Norwegian policymaking.

3.1.1 Introduction to commission groups in general

A wide scope of studies focused especially on the role of commission groups in the policy process and policy advisory systems (Rowe & McAllister, 2006; Inwood & Johns, 2016; Christensen & Holst, 2017; Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019). Public inquiry commissions represent a common tool to address specific policy problems. In general, commission groups are usually set up by the government, consist of experts and address a certain public and political matter (Rowe and McAllister, 2006, p.99). In the sense of corporatism, commission groups play a vital role by including a wide range of experts into policymaking. Under the scope of technocratic policymaking, commission groups and their increasing number of academics are one method to provide a solid base for rational conclusions.

Commission groups involve a wide range of members to supply advice in the policy process. Their members can be classified in groups as representatives of academics, interest groups, the civil and public service, the private sector or judges and lawyers, politicians and others (Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2018, p.90). As a trend, the number of academic experts participating in commission groups is growing. Especially academics from the field of economics have been

increasingly appointed as commission members (Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2018, p.88). In terms of the member structure, Rowe and McAllister refer to another feature of commission groups by outlining that commissions can also be used control the policy process. Therefore, the government may exclude others from the discussion to achieve the desired conclusion (2006, p.111). Another function of assigning a commission group could be to gain time and delay the policymaking process after a crucial event (Blum & Brans, 2017, p.346).

In general, the commission group acts as an advisory body to the government by developing policy ideas. In their work, commission groups “synthesize existing knowledge” with the target to present their findings and recommendations in a submitted report (Christensen, 2018, p.297). This report summarizes the group’s policy advice and usually adds into the initial phases of the policymaking process, before concrete proposals are raised by the government. As mentioned before, this means that commission groups can have a significant impact on policymaking as they contribute by formulating policy solutions.

These kinds of advisory bodies have been predominantly studied in the Westminster context, for example the role of commissions in the policymaking process in the UK (Rowe & McAllister, 2006, p.99). In the Westminster setting, the number of commission groups has been decreased over time. Craft and Halligan conclude that this results from a preference for managerialist alternatives (2017, p.54). Nevertheless, commissions still play a vital role in policymaking, for example in the Canadian context (Inwood & Johns, 2016, p.400). Plus, the institutionalization of commissions themselves has changed as well. Royal commission have been predominantly present in the advisory system but have been replaced with less formal commissions or committees. Besides that, Halligan has also observed a trend of externalization in the advisory system. However, the main idea is still to include a wide range of participants in the policy process (Rowe & McAllister, 2006, p.100). Inwood and Johns conclude similar findings on the Canadian counterpart, as they attribute Canadian commissions of inquiry with an important role in public policymaking (2016, p.400).

Besides the anglophone countries, commission groups represent a key element in policymaking in the Nordic countries as well. Several studies have focused on commission groups in the Nordic context (Arter, 2008, Innvær, 2009; Christiansen et al., 2010; Christensen & Holst, 2017; Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019). The commissions contribute in formulating public policies. Recent studies have shown that academics represent a huge fraction of commission members in Denmark and Norway (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.821).

This finding appears to be comprehensible considering that the Nordic countries are shaped by corporatist interest representation under the scope of technocratic policymaking (Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019, p.84).

3.1.2 Norwegian public inquiry commissions (NOUs)

Under the corporatist view, the Norwegian model of commission system can be understood as the institutionalization of participation of various interest groups in policymaking. Taking this perspective, commission act as arenas where governments and organized interests exchange resources. The Norwegian public inquiry commissions Norges Offentlige Utredninger (NOUs) can be classified in two groups, policy-preparing and law-drafting commissions (Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019, p.89).

From a state-centered perspective, commissions “have been seen essentially as an extension of the public administration” (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.823). This perspective is related to the fact that the government plays the central role in appointing commissions, deciding on their members and composition and giving guidelines for the basic modus operandi. Christiansen et al. conclude that the government’s perspective on the use of commission groups has changed as well. They argue that the appointment of commissions groups as advisor has changed from an institutional norm to a strategic choice (2009, p.36). This can be interpreted as an increasing politicization of commissions (Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.823).

In the Norwegian context, either the government or the ministry sets up a temporary committee, which has to produce a report answering decisive policy questions and proposing policy solutions. A commission usually works for a year. The NOU-reports are the government policy documents that refer most to research results (Innvær, 2009, p.2). This underlines the relevance of academic expertise within the commission groups. The commissions and their reports play a vital role in the Norwegian policy advisory system with an average of around 30 commissions assigned in the period 1967-2013. This vital role takes usually place in the early stages of the policymaking process (Christensen, 2018, p.297). This fundamental contribution by ad hoc commission in the Nordic countries has been considered by studies as a key factor of the Nordic model of government (Arter, 2008, p.166; Christensen & Holst, 2017, p.822). Nevertheless, the number of commissions has declined over time, from 85 in 1972 to 27 in 2015 for example. Arter concludes that this development corresponds with a narrower remit for commission groups and a stronger focus on more technical issues. Considering this, academic knowledge might be even more required as it is especially crucial when addressing complex and technical

questions. Supporting this assumption, Christensen and Hesstvedt found that the participation of academics in commissions has increased permanently over the last 40 years (2019, p.95). Furthermore, the reduction in the number of commissions has resulted in a change in the way interest groups are operating to impact the policy process as they are having less opportunities to participate in commission groups. Some studies classify this change as a shift from corporatism towards lobbyism (Arter, 2008, p.162).

3.2 Data collection

The analysis of the NOUs is based on the dataset on the Norwegian Public Inquiry Commissions by Hesstvedt (2019). Overall, the dataset contains 1563 commissions. For the purpose of this study, we focus only on temporary commissions in the period from 1972 to 2018 to fully understand what determines the knowledge utilization on ad hoc commission dealing with current pressing issues. Therefore, permanent commissions will not be considered in the analysis. Thus, the analysis is based on 1239 commissions. The dataset includes variables on the member’s background, such as their professional background. This forms the unit of analysis as the quantitative chapter focuses on the commission members’ and chairpersons’ affiliation to examine the utilization of academic expertise. Furthermore, it gives us insights how the commissions have been structured in terms of their personnel. The analysis will only focus on temporary commissions to investigate the effect on the utilization of academic expertise, which is especially important on concrete and contemporary policy issues. Therefore, the term commission in this thesis refers always to temporary commissions.

Considering the focus of this thesis, the dataset provides information on the academic and disciplinary background of the members. All these variables are defined at the time of the commission’s appointment. The dataset does also differentiate between members and chairpersons. Chairs have the basic task to overlook and organize the work of the commission. Furthermore, the chairman takes a representative role by securing the integrity and correctness of the commission. This representative role is further underlined as Norwegian commissions are usually just known by the name of its chairman (Christensen, 2018, p.297). In this sense, appointing an academic as the chairman might be an even stronger expression of the symbolic and legitimizing use of academic expertise. Therefore, this thesis will also focus on both members’ and chairpersons’ academic background. Out of the 1239 commissions, some did not have a chairperson. Therefore, regarding the analysis level of chairpersons, the dataset covers

1212 relevant commissions submitted between 1972 and 2018. The quantitative analysis examines both members and chairpersons with two separate regressions.

This dataset will be matched with the dataset on parliaments and governments by Döring and Manow (2019). They merged data from Castles and Mair (1983), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver (2006) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2010). The quantitative analysis uses this dataset on parliaments and governments. Through the combination of this dataset and the dataset from Hesstvedt, we are able to analyze the impact of certain government characteristics. The dataset by Döring and Manow contains information on the government parties’ left/right-value, the share of seats and the number of parties forming the government.

3.3 Measures

What determines the use of academic expertise in commission groups? To further study what determinants are influencing the legitimating use of academic expertise this thesis focuses on the impact of government characteristics. The goal of the analysis is to examine the relationship between government characteristics and the utilization of academic expertise.

The quantitative analysis will be conducted by regressions combining the data on commission groups in Norway and the data on the government composition. The dependent variable is the share of academics in commission groups, which provides an appropriate measure of the utilization of academic expertise. To be more detailed, the analysis will focus on two classifications of members of commission groups: the members and chairpersons. The latter might be an even stronger indicator for the symbolic use of academic knowledge as the chairpersons take a representative role as outlined earlier in this thesis. This section explains the variables under consideration, what kind of variables are underlying and how the variables are measured. To begin with, the dependent variables will be introduced, followed by the independent variables. In the final step, the control variables will be outlined.

3.3.2 Dependent variables

The dependent variables in the analysis are two measure of the reliance on academic knowledge. To be more detailed, the quantitative analysis focuses on two levels of commission members. Thus, the dependent variables represent two measures on the utilization of academic expertise in public policymaking. The first measure examines the commission members, whereas the second measure studies the chairpersons. The level of members will be measured

by the share of academics. The share of academics states the percentage of commission members with academic affiliation. This scalar variable is measured on the total number of academics and the total number of members. By focusing on the share of academics instead of the total number of academics, we exclude effects due to a change in the total number of members. Such effect could emerge due to the reduced total number of commissions. Whereas, in the 1970s the government has appointed 415 commissions, only 123 commissions have been appointed from 2010 to 2018.

The second part of the analysis focuses on the dependent variable describing the chairperson’s background. The level of chairpersons is measured by a binary dummy variable. This variable takes the value 0, if the commission does not have a chairperson with an academic affiliation. The value 1 indicates that the chairperson does have an academic affiliation. Some commission do not have a chairperson. Due to this, the population relevant for this analysis is smaller compared to the population studying the share of academic on the member level. Both variables are based on the dataset by Hesstvedt. In this sense, an academic is defined as a person employed in an academic position at an independent research institution. An academic position means that the person holds a PhD and is currently employed in a research position like professors, associate professors, etc.. An independent research institution is defined as non-partisan and non-governmental institutions funded for researching. Excluded from this definition are administrative staff at academic institutions and chairs of academic institutions that do not hold a PhD and do not have an academic vita (Hesstvedt, 2019, p.21).

3.3.3 Independent variables

The independent variables measure the composition of the government are focus on different characteristics. The first independent variable GovLeft/Right describes where the government can be located on the left/right-axle. This scalar variable is measured on a scale from 0 to 10 and is calculated by each party’s value. The left/right-value is measured on a scale from 0, most left, to 10, most right. This basic value is multiplied by the number of seats each government party holds. The coefficient is measured by a government party’s basic left/right-value and the number of seats the party possesses. This value is measured by adding all parties’ value, which is then divided by the overall number of seats the government holds.

For example, in the period from October 1972 to September 1973 the center party Sp (Senterpartiet), the liberal party V (Venstre) and the Christian democratic party KrF (Kristelig Folkeparti) formed the government. The Sp held 21 seats with a basic left/right-value of 4,7,