The European Radicalisation Awareness Network:
an assessment of the authority and knowledge produced
through the Network
Caspar Pille (10105611) 24/06/2016, Amsterdam
Thesis project “Master Political Science”: European Security Politics Words: 19.965 (excl. references and appendix)
Thesis supervisor: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede Second reader: Dr. Floris Vermeulen
2 Content 1. Introduction ...3 2. Literature review ...7 2.1 Epistemic communities ...7 2.2 Uncertainty ...9 2.3 External recognition ... 11
2.4 Cohesiveness of expert knowledge ... 12
2.5 Defining radicalization ... 13
2.6 Conceptualizations of radicalization and additional measures ... 15
2.7 Summary and sub questions ... 17
3. Methodology ... 18
3.1 Qualitative approach ... 18
3.2 Strategy of data analysis ... 19
3.3 Method of data analysis ... 25
3.4 Validity and reliability ... 28
4. Uncertainty and external recognition ... 29
4.1 Perspectives of high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN ... 29
4.2 The RAN within strategic EU documents ... 32
4.3 The authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN ... 35
5. Cohesion and content of expert knowledge produced through the RAN ... 37
5.1 Causal beliefs about radicalization ... 37
5.2 Notions of validity regarding preventive and counter measures ... 44
6. The authority and content of knowledge produced through the RAN ... 50
7. Conclusion ... 53
Appendix ... 56
3
1. Introduction
In light of the developments in the Middle East, the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the emergence of European foreign fighters and the increased threat of “home grown” terrorism, the European Commission founded the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2011 (RAN, 2016 I). Its goal is to facilitate transnational cooperation and information exchange between Member States and European institutions (RAN, 2016 I). In 2014 the European Commission published its communication “Strengthen the EU’s response to radicalization and violent extremism (European Commission, 2014)”. This document with recommendations for Member States seemed to reflect the European Commission’s continuing ambition to prioritize the issue of counter-terrorism and radicalization as a transnational tasks/objective. A central role was given to the RAN in providing the basis for knowledge exchange between radicalization experts throughout Europe (European
Commission, 2014).
Since its establishment in 2011 the RAN has held various meetings and published a wide range of approaches and practices to address radicalization (European Commission, 2016 III). The RAN serves as an umbrella network connecting experts involved in preventing radicalization and violent extremism in Europe (European Commission, 2016 II). Within the RAN practitioners from different European countries come together in the 10 thematic RAN working groups1 to exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences on countering radicalization and violent extremism (European Commission, 2016 II). Amongst these practitioners are field experts, social workers, teachers, NGOs, civil society organizations, local authorities, law enforcement and academics (European Commission, 2016 II).
In November 2015 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, the European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos stated to the European Parliament: “Our strongest partner and guarantor for the delivery of effective preventive measures is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (Avramopoulos, 2015)”. His statement confirms the central role the RAN has been given in the area of
1
Communication and Narratives working group (RAN C&N), Education working group (RAN EDU), EXIT working group (RAN EXIT), Youth, Families and Communities working group (RAN YF&C), Local authorities working group (RAN LOCAL), Prison and Probation working group (RAN P&P), Police and law enforcement working group (RAN POL), Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism working group (RAN RVT), Health and Social, Care working group (RAN H&SC) and the Steering Committee (European Commission, 2016 II).
4 radicalization policies. It suggests that the expertise produced through the RAN possesses a degree of authority.
Avramopoulos further claimed that the RAN is able to guarantee the delivery of effective preventive measures. A claim that is problematic in light of the contested nature of counter-radicalization and prevention programs (e.g. Schmid, 2010, Sedqwick, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2013). A recent UN report authored by Ben Emerson2 and issued by the Human Rights Council argued: “many programmes directed at radicalisation are based on a simplistic
understanding of the process (Human Rights Council, 2016:7)”. In addition, Alex P. Schmid argued in 2013, based on an extensive literature review, that the popularity of the concept of radicalization stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. Moreover, regarding current counter-radicalization methods it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive (Schmid, 2013).
In light of the central role of the RAN as a transnational information hub and the problematic nature of expertise in the area of counter-radicalization this research aims to research the RAN in more detail. In doing so, this research aims to assess the authority of expertise produced through the RAN and how it defines and conceptualizes radicalization and counter-radicalization3 measures. The following research question has guided the research:
The first part of this question seeks to assess the authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN. In order to do so, this research understands the RAN as an epistemic community. Literature on epistemic communities provides conceptual tools to analyze
networks of experts in Europe in a variety of issue areas such as the environmental, economic, academic and security domain (Haas, 1992, Thomas, 1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999; Zito, 2001; Davis Cross, 2012).
Understanding the RAN through the lens of the epistemic communities literature enables this research to explain the degree of authority of the expertise produced through the RAN. It uses three conditions, derived from the epistemic communities literature that could
2
The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (Emmerson, 2016).
3
This research uses the term counter-radicalization to describe both counter-radicalization and prevention measures.
“How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness Network and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the network?”
5 explain this authority: uncertainty, external recognition and cohesiveness (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). Haas and Davis-Cross argue that uncertainty amongst policymakers, about how to address certain complex issues, enhances the authority of an epistemic community of, when this is combined with recognized expertise and competence in that particular issue area (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). Furthermore, the more cohesive the expertise of a particular
epistemic community, the greater their influence on policymakers (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011).
In addition, the second part of the question, which aims to assess the content about radicalization produced through the RAN, uses the work of scholars as Sedgwick, Lindekilde and Heath-Kelly and their critical approaches towards contemporary counter-radicalization measures (Sedgwick, 2010; Lindekilde, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). It takes into account their critical assessments of contemporary definitions, conceptualization and approaches related to counter-radicalization policies.
This research aims to be academically relevant by improving our theoretical
understanding of epistemic communities in the European counter-terrorism domain. While empirical studies on epistemic communities have been focusing on networks of experts in Europe in various domains (environmental, economic, academic and security domain) no attempt has been made so far to analyze transnational networks of experts in the domain of radicalization (Haas, 1992, Thomas, 1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999; Zito, 2001; Davis Cross, 2012). This research therefore provides new insights into how a community of
radicalization experts in Europe, in terms of the European Radicalisation Awareness Network, is able to make an authoritative claim on policy-relevant knowledge.
By analyzing the expertise produced through the RAN this research in addition aims to provide new information about contemporary thinking about radicalization and counter-radicalization measures amongst experts at the transnational level. Current research into counter-radicalization approaches has mainly been focusing on (comparisons of) national programs (e.g. Sedgwick, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2013).
The societal relevancy of this research is linked to the role of the RAN as an
information hub for Members States, policymakers, practitioners and EU institutions. Due to this role it is important to critically assess the expert knowledge produced through the RAN. Assessing this expertise is relevant in light of the perceived threat of “home grown” terrorism in Europe and the observation that many counter-radicalization programs over the past years have resulted in potentially counter-productive and stigmatizing practices (e.g. Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013).
6 This research is structured as follows. Firstly, the relevant literature and concepts used to analyze the central research question are discussed. Secondly, important methodological considerations and used strategies of data gathering and analysis are explained. In addition, three analytical chapters discuss the authority and content of the expert knowledge produced through the RAN. Finally, a conclusion is presented including relevant practical and
7
2. Literature review
The central research question, “How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness Network and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the network?”, consists of two central elements. Firstly, it seeks to assess the degree of authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN. Secondly, it aims to assess the particular knowledge about radicalization that is produced through the RAN. Here assessment refers to the attempt not only to analyze, but also critically evaluate the knowledge produced through the RAN. This chapter explains the relevant literature and academic concepts that have been used to examine the central research question.
2.1 Epistemic communities
This research uses literature about epistemic communities in order to understand the RAN. Theoretical work on epistemic communities provides useful concepts to explain the authority of knowledge produced through the RAN (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). The concept of epistemic communities has its origins in the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962). Kuhn developed the notion of a scientific community arguing that members of academic disciplines are sharing certain common beliefs and methodological standards and therefore are bound to each other (Kuhn, 1962). Such a shared paradigm in terms of common norms, values and practices touches upon the idea of epistemic communities as it has later been developed by John Gerard Ruggie, arguing that epistemic communities share a specific construction of social reality in terms of symbols, points of reference, behavioral rules, expectations and intentions (Ruggie, 1975). Ruggie used Foucault’s (1973) notion of episteme in order to explain the type of relationship that emerged from the increased interconnectedness between states in the area of technology, ecology, politics, economics and social environments and the need to represent national interests internationally (Ruggie, 1975). As a result epistemic communities in terms of bureaucratic bodies with technocratic training, similarities in scientific outlook and shared disciplinary paradigms emerged (Ruggie, 1975).
Traditionally the EU has relied greatly on such bureaucratic bodies (Radaelli, 1999). A wide range of working groups, standardization bodies and committees of experts are involved in the policy process (Joerges et al. 1997; Pedler and Schaefer 1996). This practice has been up for debate as it builds on expertise as the basis of authority, which is opposite to democracy relying on legitimate consensus, free elections and participation (Wincott 1998; O’Neill 1999; Radaelli, 1999). Within this context of technocracy in the EU several scholars made attempts to explain the authority and influence of bureaucratic networks of experts in
8 the EU, by using the notion of epistemic communities developed by Peter Haas in 1992
(Haas, 1992; Richardson 1996; Verdun 1999; Zito 2001).
Haas developed the concept of epistemic communities by referring to it as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas, 1992:3). According to this notion, epistemic communities are networks of individuals with shared professional expertise, that must have an authoritative claim on knowledge in order to influence policy (Davis Cross, 2011).
In addition, Haas argues that epistemic communities are characterized by four main characteristics (Haas, 1992). First, a shared set of normative beliefs which provide a value-based value-based rationale for social action of community members (Haas, 1992:3). Second, shared causal beliefs based on their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their policy domain, and thus about the possible policy actions in relation to desired outcomes (Haas, 1992:3). Third, there are shared notions of validity in terms of internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise (Haas, 1992:3). Fourth, a common policy enterprise amongst the members of the community, meaning a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992:3).
In one of the more recent works on epistemic communities, Mia Davis Cross outlines that epistemic communities are not simply issue networks whose members use personal contacts within the community in order to exchange services, information or debate issues (Davis Cross, 2011). She argues that epistemic communities have much more tighter membership (Davis Cross, 2011). She states that epistemic communities are not advocacy networks with idealistic goals for change, but driven by expert knowledge, regardless the question whether or not it serves social or environmental goals (Davis Cross, 2011). It is their authoritative claim on knowledge which determines their influence on policymakers (Davis Cross, 2011).
Approaching the RAN as an epistemic community thus provides a useful starting point, to explain the authority of expert knowledge produced by the RAN. The RAN is a transnational network of radicalization experts and exists of several thematic working groups (European Commission, 2016 II). These working groups have tight membership and
attendance of their meetings is by invitation only (European Commission, 2016 IIII). Since its establishment in 2011 the RAN has held various meetings and published various documents
9 on radicalization (European Commission, 2016 III). The RAN appears to be more than just an issue or advocacy network. Consequently, this research views the RAN as an epistemic community. The next sections discuss the concepts that have been used from the epistemic communities literature in order to analyze the authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN.
2.2 Uncertainty
Several scholars applied the concept of epistemic communities to empirical case studies in the field of environmentalist, economic, scientific and security experts (Haas, 1992 II, Thomas, 1997; Radaelli, 1999, Verdun, 1999; Zito, 2001; Davis Cross, 2011). Davis Cross (2011) argues that these authors all seem to agree that epistemic communities can only exercise authority when some form of uncertainty allows them to do so. Haas (1992) argues that the forms of uncertainty arising around transnational issues tend to stimulate demands for information. In particular, it concerns transnational issues that feature a strong
interdependence between states’ policy choices to addressing the issue (Haas, 1992). Haas illustrates this by referring to studies of uncertainties that were topical when he published his article: uncertainties about strategies to avoid nuclear destruction and the uncertainties about how to respond to the threat to the ozone layer (Haas, 1992). These kinds of uncertainties cannot be addressed unilaterally (Haas, 1992). They are of a transnational nature and interrelate with other processes which results in a demand for scientific and technical expertise (Haas, 1992).
More concretely, in order for epistemic communities to have an authoritative claim on knowledge at a transnational level, decision makers must be faced with uncertainty
surrounding an issue which is located in the domain of expertise of the particular epistemic community (Davis Cross, 2011). Such uncertainty could be related to a loss of previous held beliefs regarding an issue, the new nature of an issue, or the complex nature of an issue (Haas, 1992; Radaelli, 1999).
Several authors have problematized this authority of experts and uncertainty (e.g. Bigo, 2002; Antoniades, 2003; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). First of all, as Andreas Antoniades argues, expertise is embedded in social constructs and not necessarily about whether knowledge is correct (Antoniades, 2003). Expert knowledge produced through epistemic communities is part of a system of intersubjective assumptions and definitions, which has been produced and reproduced through social interaction, representing a particular
10 social construction of reality (Antoniades, 2003). Both expert knowledge and the conditions of uncertainty, to which epistemic communities respond, should therefore be understood as part of a broader social construction of reality.
Didier Bigo and others makes a similar claim with regard to the influence of security experts in Europe (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Bigo argues that the perceived importance of security in Western societies is the product of the construction of a continuum of threats and unease (Bigo, 2002). Ulrich Beck famously referred to this as the “risk society”, a society in which increased technological developments have enlarged risks by making society more complex and empowering those who want to pose a threat (Beck, 1992).
According to Bigo, this context of risk and unease is constructed through the social interaction between various security experts (Bigo, 2002). Bigo argues that these experts share a “sense of the game” or common habitus, which means that these professionals believe act and react in a similar fashion even if they are always in competition (Bigo, 2002:75). In doing so, they create a common notion of security threats and how to address them.
In addition, security experts would become influential in transnational European networks, in light of the complex nature of threats and uncertainty amongst policymakers about how to address them (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). In this sense, security experts gain authority over “nonprofessionals or amateurs” based on their professional knowledge about how to address these complex threats (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). According to Bigo, this authority is enhanced by the often very technical nature of their expertise, making their assessments only accessible for a limited few (Bigo, 2002).
Returning to the notion of uncertainty outlined by Haas, related to a loss of previous held beliefs, the new nature or complexity surrounding particular policy domain, Bigo would argue that it are especially those issues, that are perceived as very technical or complex and potential security threats, that enable experts to exercise authority (Bigo, 2002).
In the area of radicalization various academia have acknowledged uncertainty regarding the complex nature of radicalization (e.g. Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). While the concept of radicalization has been used frequently in the past years its nature is still very much contested, as well as proposed approaches to prevent or counter it (Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013) (see paragraph 2.4 for a more detailed discussion). A recent UN report of Ben Emerson4 (2016) issued by the Human Rights Council, further confirmed this lack of definite
4
The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (Emmerson, 2016).
11 knowledge/certainty about radicalization (Human Rights Council, 2016). The report states that many governmental programs directed at radicalization lack valid statistical data and are rather based on a simplistic understanding of the process as a “fixed trajectory to violent extremism with identifiable markers along the way” (Human Rights Council, 2016:7).
In addition, Schuurman and Eijkman (2013:3) from the International Centre of Counter Terrorism in 2013 emphasize the lack of sufficient empirical testing and the overreliance on secondary sources when it comes to research on terrorism, its “root causes” and how it can best be countered. There appears to be a degree of consensus within academia, bodies as the UN Human Rights Council and terrorism think tanks regarding radicalization as complex issue and that is surrounded by uncertainties.
Parallel to this notion of uncertainty, policymakers show a tendency to make the issue of radicalization governable (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Radicals or potential radicals are perceived as security risks that require governmental action (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). De Goede and Simon argue that European counter-radicalization efforts aim at the anticipation of threat and early intervention into individual trajectories of potential radicals (De Goede and Simon, 2013). In addition, it seems that this anticipation of threat is motivated by what Aradau and Van Munster describe as “precautionary risk” (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007:91). The notion that the threat of radicalization, as it could materialize into violence, is potentially catastrophic and thus needs to be governed, even when the used approaches and practices are contested (Aradau and van Munster 2007; De Goede, 2008).
The instigation of the establishment of the RAN by the European Commission in 2011 for the purpose of providing approaches and practices to address radicalization, seems to be in line with this tendency amongst policymakers to make the issue of radicalization governable (European Commission, 2014).
Returning to the notion that the authority of expert knowledge is related to uncertainty surrounding a particular policy domain, the complex and potentially threatening nature of radicalization is expected to enhance the authority of the expert knowledge produced through the RAN. In chapter 4 this uncertainty in relation to the role of the RAN is empirically analyzed.
2.3 External recognition
The previous paragraph has explained the relation between uncertainty surrounding the particular domain or issue area and the authority of expertise. Next to this condition of
12 uncertainty the epistemic communities literature argues that the authority of expert knowledge is based on external recognition of this knowledge (Haas, 1992). As Haas argues, networks of professionals need to possess “recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain” in order to have authority (Haas, 1992:3). This external recognition could be formal when the network of professionals is institutionalized by national administrations or international secretariats (Haas, 1992). In case of the RAN this formal institutional position seems evident since the network is part of the Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission (European Commission, 2016 I).
In addition to this institutional position, external recognition manifests itself in the role attributed by high level politicians and bureaucrats to the particular network and its expertise. Considering that expert knowledge in the area of radicalization is embedded in social
constructs, as previously discussed, authority is not related to objective validity but to social recognition (Antoniades, 2003). In order to research the authority of expert knowledge produced through the RAN it is therefore important to include perspectives of EU high level politicians and bureaucrats as part of the analysis of external recognition (see chapter 4).
2.4 Cohesiveness of expert knowledge
Next to the elements of uncertainty and external recognition, the epistemic communities literature argues that internal cohesiveness of the knowledge produced through the epistemic community is an important factor in explaining its authority (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). According to Davis Cross cohesiveness reflects the ability of an epistemic community to reach consensus on particular issues and therefore significantly affects the degree to which epistemic communities can pursue and impact decision makers of that consensus (Davis Cross, 2011).
As argued earlier epistemic communities are characterized by shared normative beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992; Davis Cross, 2011). In the case of the RAN a common policy enterprise is evident since the experts working within the network have a formalized policy aim (i.a. providing expertise for policymakers) financed by the European Commission (European Commission, 2016 I). In addition, this research deviates from Haas and Davis Cross regarding the separation of the elements of shared normative beliefs and shared notions of validity. In the area of radicalization validity in terms of perspectives on what works and what does not
13 work is socially constructed and lacks statistical prove and therefore to a great extent relies on normative beliefs (Schmid, 2010, Sedgwick, 2010; Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013).
In order to determine the level of cohesiveness of expert knowledge produced through the RAN this research thus looks at two elements: 1) shared causal beliefs and 2) shared (normative) notions of validity. Shared causal beliefs in the domain of radicalization refer to notions about a perceived process of radicalization. Claims about what causes an individual to become a violent radical or terrorist. In turn, shared notions of validity refer to consensus about preferred approaches and practices.
2.5 Defining radicalization
Expert knowledge in the area of radicalization is contested. Alex P. Schmid argues that radicalization, de-radicalization and counter-radicalization are widely used concepts despite a complete lack of clarity about what these concepts mean (Schmid, 2013). He further states that the popularity of the concept of radicalization stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism (Schmid, 2013). Moreover, Schmid argues that regarding the current de-radicalization and counter-radicalization methods it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive (Schmid, 2013).
Before 9/11 the term radicalization was relatively unknown to the wider public, it was rarely used in the media and only occasionally by academia (Sedgwick, 2010). The use of the concept experienced a boost after 2001 and became even more prominent in 2005 in the wake of the rise of “home-grown” terrorism in Western Europe and the London bombings
(Sedgwick, 2010). Since then many Western governments have used the concept of radicalization and established “counter-radicalization” programs (Sedgwick, 2010).
According to Mark Sedgwick “radicalization” nowadays is the standard term to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010:479). Over the past years various authors have pointed at the contested nature of radicalization and the problem that the concept is understood and used in a variety of different ways (e.g Mandel, 2009; Sedgwick, 2010; Githens-Mazer, 2009; Kühle and Lindekilde, 2010; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Sedgwick argues that most researchers who use the terms “radical” or “radicalization”, do not define these terms but assume that their meaning is understood (Sedgwick, 2010:483). Few attempts have been made to further develop radicalization as an analytical concept.
Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley developed a definition which separates radical from activism. They define activism as readiness to engage in legal and non-violent
14 political action and radicalism as readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). They argue that activism is widespread and radicalism is rare (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). Important regarding this definition, is that they make a conceptual distinction between non-violent radicalization and violent radicalization. This distinction often lacks in governmental definitions of radicalization, as will be explained briefly.
Official definitions of radicalization agree and differ on several aspects. Sedgwick has illustrated this by looking at definitions used in the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark since these countries represent a range of current official thinking (Sedgwick, 2010). The definitions in these countries show similarities in that they assume that: 1) a terrorist is presumed to be a radical, but not every radical is a terrorist, 2) “radical” and “extremist” are interchangeable terms, and 3) they include a reference of the radical as a threat (Sedgwick, 2010:483).
These official definitions differ, however, on how they conceptualize the relationship between radicalism and violence (Sedgwick, 2010). In the US a Congressional Bill defines radicalization as related to violence by “promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence” (The Senate of the United States, 2007:2).
However, it is unclear whether someone is a radical when he promotes a violent belief system, while not being engaged in violent activities himself. The British definition of the Home Office too describes a link in terms of radicalization “as the move towards active support for violent extremism” (Youth Justice Board, 2012:6). Again the definition is vague regarding the question whether active support for violent extremism, means that the radical also needs to be engaged in violent activities himself. The lack of clarity about this separation between non-violent and non-violent radicalization within governmental definition, as will be explained in paragraph 2.6, result in approaches the framing of individuals or groups of individuals as both “at risk” and “risky”.
The Dutch and Danish definitions of radicalization are more clear about their focus on violent and non-violent radicalization (Sedgwick, 2010). The Dutch AIVD refers to
“radicalisation with the potential to result in terrorist violence” and “the active pursuit of and/or support for far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to the continuity of the democratic legal order (aim), possibly by using undemocratic methods (means)” (AIVD, 2010:10). The Danish definition refers to radicalization as being “socialized into accepting the radical ideology, hostile imagery and a division into “us” and “them” and,
15 possibly, into accepting the use of violent and undemocratic means” (Danish Government, 2009:8).
The Dutch and the Danish definitions in addition to the definitions used by the US and UK, conceptualize radicalization as the possible use of nondemocratic means which not necessarily means violence. According to Sedgwick this blurs the element of threat related to the concept of radicalization (Sedgwick, 2010). He argues that when something that leads to violence is certainly a threat, the question is whether something that does not lead to directly, or not at all to violence, can be a threat (Sedgwick, 2010).
It seems thus the official definitions of radicalization create a basis for governmental programs to focus at both non-violent and violent radicals.
2.6 Conceptualizations of radicalization and additional measures
Policy documents often present radicalization as a linear process to terrorism (Lindekilde, 2012). Heath-Kelly and others argue that this notion of a linear process serves to make radicalisation accessible for problem solving approaches (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Lindekilde described this commonly perceived linear scenario in the following terms:
“Adolescents, in particular of immigrant descent, who are socially isolated, identity seeking and politically aggrieved, may experience a ‘cognitive opening’ (a concrete event in the realm of politics, social life, private life, etc.) which renders the individual in search for alternative life styles, ideological outlooks, etc. This situation may be exploited by ‘radical entrepreneurs’ who seek out such vulnerable youngsters and recruit them to radical groups. Once inside radical milieus, newcomers come under heavy peer pressures and radicalize further due to group dynamics of socialisation and cultivation. Taking on an identity as, e.g., radical Islamist avant-garde, individuals radicalise to the degree where they are ready to put actions behind their radical views. A process of ‘hardening’ takes place (Lindekilde, 2012:337)”.
Based on this narrative preventive measures to stop radicalization processes from gaining momentum, become central to counter-terrorism approaches (Lindekilde, 2012). In addition, measures to prevent radicalization and potential violence, focus at careful monitoring of adolescents deemed to be at risk of radicalization as well as early intervention in worrisome cases (Lindekilde, 2012). In terms of practical policy measures this means effort towards increased surveillance, engagement with Muslim communities, counter-narratives against
16 extremist propaganda, community cohesion programs, individually focused mentoring
programs, role model campaigns and anti-discrimination measures (Lindekilde, 2012:338). Conceptualizing radicalization as a linear process to terrorism includes notions of vulnerability. The described measures imply that some individuals or groups of individuals are more at risk of becoming radicals than others (Lindekilde, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Consequently, problems concerning the integration and socio-economic development of Muslim communities in Western Europe are identified as risk factors creating vulnerable individuals prone to contagious ideas responsible for violence (Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet, and Ragazzi, 2014). Based on her analysis of counter-terrorism programs in the UK, Heath-Kelly argues that this has led to governmental framing of Muslim neighborhoods of significant density as risky sites of possible contagion (Heath-Kelly, 2013).
The centrality of risk and vulnerability within recent notions of radicalization and the assumption of a linear process, presents Muslim communities as both “at risk” and “risky” (Heath-Kelly, 2013:397). According to Heath-Kelly these notions are problematic and cannot be sustained because there is no certainty over whether and when a holder of radical views shifts to being a violent radical or terrorist (Heath-Kelly, 2013). This uncertainty implies that being at risk of becoming risky, means that individuals who are deemed vulnerable to develop a propensity of dangerousness, according to Heath-Kelly are “always already rendered as dangerous” (Heath-Kelly, 2013:408). Heath-Kelly and others argue that interventions aimed at preventing radicalization therefore inevitable result in the blurring of vulnerability into presumed riskiness and thus the blending of Muslim communities with notions of being suspicious and dangerous (Omand, 2010; Nickels, Thomas, Hickman and Silvestri, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013). Thus, the lack of conceptual distinction between individuals at risk or risky individuals results in counter-radicalization programs that problematize entire
communities rather than at the exceptional few that engage in violent extremism (Lindekilde, 2012).
Furthermore, preventive policies often identify broader socio-economic and
integrations issues as risk factors (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). By making social issues part of counter-terrorism strategies, minority or Muslim communities suffering from these social problems are indirectly being presented at prone to violent radicalism (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). This again could have stigmatizing effects with possible counter-productive effects (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Bartlett, Birdwell and King argue that “whole of government” approaches of prevention work, risk isolating Muslim communities
17 and stigmatizing social policy without proof that certain approaches prevent radicalization to violent extremism (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010:133). They argue that Muslim
communities in the West often face economic and social difficulties, pool life chances, poor education and professional attainment and suffer from challenges relating to integration and social cohesion (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Therefore, securitizing what are in essence social or economic issues can be “divisive and unhelpful” (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010:3). Addressing these issues is part of the domain of social policy and should not be brought into the realm of counter-radicalization measures (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010).
2.7 Summary and sub questions
Epistemic communities are networks of individuals with shared professional expertise and an authoritative claim on knowledge in a particular domain. The authority of their knowledge is related to a context of uncertainty surrounding the particular issue area, external recognition and cohesiveness of their knowledge. Assessing the RAN through these concepts leads to the following sub-questions:
To what extent do high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents describe the RAN as a way to respond to uncertainty in the area of preventing and countering radicalization?
To what extent do high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents describe the expertise of the RAN as important for counter-terrorism efforts in Europe?
To what extent contain the documents and expert opinions produced through the RAN shared causal beliefs about radicalization and notions of validity regarding preventive and counter measures?
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3. Methodology
The central question, “How can we assess the European Radicalisation Awareness Network and the authority and content of expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the network?”, contains roughly two parts. The first part assesses the authority of expert
knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN and the second part assesses the particular content about radicalization produced through the RAN. However, it has to be mentioned that these parts are not completely separate. The particular content produced through the RAN gives important information about the cohesiveness of expertise in the network and therefore about the authority of its expert knowledge. This chapter elaborates on the research design that has been used to conduct these assessments. The chapter explains the qualitative approach, as well as considerations regarding the strategy of data gathering and the methods of data analysis. The chapter ends with a short discussion of important validity and reliability issues.
3.1 Qualitative approach
In order to answer the central research question this research uses a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach is “characteristically exploratory, fluid and flexible, data-driven and context sensitive” (Mason, 2002:24). According to Mason, a qualitative approach means rejecting the idea of a research design as a single document with the entire advance blueprint for a particular research (Mason, 2002). This research follows this line of thinking about qualitative research, since it enables for in-depth analysis of the perceptions towards the RAN and expert knowledge produced through the RAN, partly based on predetermined concepts but also with an inductive nature aimed at identifying new unexpected insights.
A qualitative approach furthermore enables this research to explore the RAN by using a variety of data sources in an in-depth fashion (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Applying a
qualitative approach has consequences for the strategy of data gathering and data analysis. In short, regarding the strategy of data gathering a qualitative approach implies that sources are selected based on their ability to provide in-depth information regarding the particular research problem. In the case of this research the assessment of authority and content
produced through the RAN. They are not selected based on quantitative availability and their potential to identify correlations or even causal relationships. Furthermore, with regard to the strategy of data analysis, the qualitative nature of this research makes it possible to apply an interpretivist approach concentrating on the meaning and perspectives surrounding knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN (Punch, 2013).
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3.2 Strategy of data analysis
This research has used a variety of data sources to analyze both the authority and the content produced through the RAN. This strategy of triangulation, meaning that more than one type of data source is used, enhances the reliability of the research findings (Bryman, 2008). The different sources have been used to analyze the authority and expert knowledge produced through the RAN by focusing on 1) uncertainty, 2) external recognition and 3) the content about radicalization.
As discussed in the literature review, uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge amongst policymakers about how to address certain issues in light of their complex nature. External recognition refers to the notion that epistemic communities need to possess recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain in order to have authority. The elements of uncertainty and external recognition are closely connected in the sense that they both require information about perspectives towards the RAN from high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents. The cohesiveness of the RAN in terms of the presence of shared causal beliefs about radicalization and shared notions of validity about preventive and counter measures, is in turn closely related to a critical assessment of its content, since both these research aims require an in-depth analysis of expert views and documents about radicalization produced through the RAN.
Statements of high-level politicians and bureaucrats about the RAN
The degree to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization and the importance attributed to the RAN regarding European counter-radicalization measures is analyzed by focusing on: 1) statements of high level politicians and bureaucrats in the European Parliament and 2) strategic documents about radicalization and terrorism.
Statements made in the European Parliament are relevant for analyzing the authority of the RAN since they are directed at EU policymakers and the wider EU public (European Parliament, 2016 I). Furthermore, the European Parliament is the body where high level politicians (members of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe) and bureaucrats (members of the European Commission) have the opportunity to make statements (European Parliament, 2016 I). Important information about the perspectives of high level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN and what role they attribute to the expertise of the RAN
regarding the policy domain of radicalization can therefore be found in EP debates. These statements therefore provide information about both the degree to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization and the perspectives of politicians and bureaucrats on the importance of the RAN addressing radicalization issues.
20 The analyzed statements have been selected based on two criteria: 1) they need to mention the “Radicalisation Awareness Network” or “RAN”, and 2) they were presented during EP plenary debates in the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till now (May 2016). In the period from 2011 till May 2016 nine debates with the topics of terrorism or radicalization were held (see appendix). Within these debates seven statements of six different debates have been selected based on references to “RAN” or “Radicalisation Awareness Network”:
Statement of Cecilia Malmström (Member of the Commission) during the European Parliament Plenary: “European Union’s internal security strategy”, 21 May 2012 (Malmström, 2012);
Statement of Viviane Reding (Vice-President of the Commission) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Marketing and use of explosives precursors”, 19 November 2012 (Reding, 2012);
Statement of Siôn Simon (Member of Parliament) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Oral explanations of vote about Anti-terrorism measures”, 11 February 2015 (Simon, 2015);
Statement of Theresa Griffin (Member of Parliament) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Oral explanations of vote about Anti-terrorism measures”, 11 February 2015 (Griffin, 2015)’
Statement of Dimitris Avramopoulos (Member of the Commission) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations”, 24 November 2015 (Avramopoulos, 2015).
Statement of Elżbieta Bieńkowska (Member of the Commission) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Protection of victims of terrorism”, 14 December 2015
(Bieńkowska, 2015).
Statement of Bert Koenders (President-in-Office of the Council) during the European Parliament Plenary: “Increased terrorism threat”, 21 January 2016 (Koenders, 2016).
European strategic documents about the RAN
Next to the statements of politicians and bureaucrats this research has selected strategic documents that contain information about the EU approach to radicalization. These
21 described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization and the importance that has been given to the RAN in addressing radicalization issues. These documents have been selected based the following criteria: 1) they need to mention the “Radicalisation Awareness Network” or “RAN”, and 2) they were published in the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till now (May 2016).
Based on these criteria three strategic documents have been selected. First, the European Commission’s 12 page long Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU”s Response” published in January 2014 (European Commission, 2014). Second, the European Commission’s 21 page long Communication on “The European Agenda on Security” published in April 2015 (European Commission, 2015). These two communications of the Commission were both directed to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions and entail recommendations for EU and Member State
policymakers in the area of radicalization (European Commission, 2014; European Commission, 2015).
The third document that has been selected is the 15 page long “Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” published in may 2014 by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2014). This third strategic document is relevant for identifying the degree to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty and the institutional position of the RAN since it entails not only recommendations but actual agreed upon strategies (Council of Europe, 2014).
Expert perspectives and documents produced through the RAN
Next to the earlier described data about external perspectives towards the RAN, this research focuses on perspectives about radicalization within the RAN. The aim is to identify the particular content and cohesiveness of knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN. In order to identify the level of cohesiveness and assess the content, different data sources have been used: 1) expert interview data, 2) media interview data (both textual and video), 3) documents published by the RAN about radicalization.
The different data sources have been selected based on the following criteria: 1) they need to provide information about how experts in the RAN conceptualize radicalization and additional approaches to prevent and counter radicalization, 2) they need to be published in the period of 2011 (establishment of the RAN) till now (May 2016). In the case of expert
22 interviews the second criteria is slightly different in the sense that the interview data needs to provide information about the RAN in the period from 2011 till now.
Based on these criteria this research conducted two expert interviews. Regarding these expert interviews, this research has used semi-structured interviews as a method of data gathering. This means that a list of predetermined questions in terms of an interview guide has been used, as well as that the interviewee has been given the opportunity to elaborate broadly on the questions and come up with new insights (Bryman, 2008). A semi-structured interview further allows questions to not be asked exactly in the way outlined in the interview guide (Bryman, 2008). It further gives the researcher the opportunity to ask questions not included in the interview guide, based on the things said by the interviewees (Bryman, 2008). The flexible nature of semi-structured interviews is important for this research since it potentially leads to unexpected elements/aspects of the RAN (see appendix for interview guide).
The experts have been selected based on one important criteria: they have participated in the RAN as part of the secretariat, as a working group leader, or as a member of one of the RAN working groups. Based on this criteria several experts have been found through desktop research and through the website of the RAN (European Commission, 2016 I). From the twelve experts that have been contacted eventually two were willing to give an interview (see appendix for interviews transcripts):
The former chair of the INT/EXT Working Group, involved with setting up the RAN in 2011. The expert has a think-tank/academic background in the field of radicalization and terrorism.
Current member of the RAN working for the EXIT Working Group, the RVT Working Group (Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism Working Group), and the RAN centre of excellence. The expert has a social/youth care back ground. Using expert interviews as a data source has implication for the validity and reliability of the research findings. Since the researcher is very much the research instrument himself it is inevitably that his subjective perspectives influence the way the interviews are conducted (Bryman, 2008). This risk of steering the answers of the interviewee into a particular direction has been minimized by using open phrased interview questions (Bryman, 2008).
In addition to the expert interview data, this research has used media interview data. It is important to mention that the term media interview here does not suggest that the
interviews have been conducted by media or news broadcasting agencies. The interviews have been conducted by a consultancy organization, think tanks and the magazine of a security
23 cooperation organization. The term media interview is used to describe interviews that have been conducted for the purpose of being published for the public.
The media interviews have been selected based on similar criteria as the expert interviews: the particular interviewed expert needs to have participated in the RAN as part of the secretariat, as a working group leader, or as a member of one of the RAN working groups. Furthermore, the media interviews need to contain information about the expert his ideas about radicalization or approaches to address radicalization. Desktop research based on these criteria has resulted in the selection of the four media interviews (see appendix for transcripts of video interviews):
Interview with Omar Ramadan the current head of the RAN, (video, 4:53 minutes), conducted by ICF Mostra5 (consultancy and communications) and published at 21 August 2015 (Ramadan, 2015);
Interview with Jessika Soors the current chair of the LOCAL Working Group (video, 5:33 minutes), conducted by ICF Mostra and published at 21 August 2015 (Soors, 2015).
Interview with Magnus Ranstorp current member of the editorial board of the RAN and involved with setting up the RAN (video, 2:47 minutes), conducted by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs6 and published at 19 April 2016 (Ranstorp, 2016);
Interview with member Rob Out current member of Working Group RAN Police and law enforcement (POL) (5 pages), conducted by Security Community7 and published in February 2015 (Out, 2015).
The media interviews with experts are different types of data sources than expert interviews conducted by the researcher himself. As argued earlier, media interviews are meant to be published, which might make the interviewee reluctant with making certain statements. Moreover, the people who have conduct the media interviews were not restricted by rules of academic interviewing. This is also the case with regard to the editors of the described videos and magazine text. Thus, both the interviewer and the editors could have influenced the
5
“ICF Mostra is part of ICF International, a global provider of consulting, communication and technology services to governments and commercial clients with more than seventy offices around the world” (Mostra, 2016).
6
“CIDOB is an independent and plural think tank based in Barcelona, dedicated to the study, research and analysis of international affairs.”(CIBOD, 2016).
7
Security Community is the magazine of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) (OSCE, 2016).
24 content of the interview. However, regardless these limitations the use of media interviews in addition to expert interviews and document produced through the RAN, provides valuable information about the perceptions towards radicalization of experts within the RAN, since they indicate how these experts aim to present their narrative regarding radicalization.
In addition to the expert en media interview data, this research has used documents published by the RAN on its website to analyze the content about radicalization produced through the RAN. Since the RAN has published many documents about approaches and practices to address radicalization, this research aimed at 1) recently published documents in 2016, and 2) a variety in the selection of documents, which means that the goal has been to select documents from a variety of RAN working groups. Following these criteria the following document about radicalization and approaches to address radicalization have been selected8:
“RAN Collection Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent
Extremism: approaches and Practices (258 pages)”, recently updated in 2016, (RAN, 2016 I);
“RAN Issue paper: The Root Causes of Violent Extremism” (5 pages), published in January 2016” (RAN, 2016 II);
“EX POST PAPER: Identifying and treating lone actors” (10 pages), published in January 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group health and social care (H&SC) in Zagreb (RAN H&SC, 2016);
“EX POST PAPER: How to create local networks?” (8 pages), published in February 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Local authorities (LOCAL) in Rotterdam (RAN LOCAL, 2016);
“EX POST PAPER: Empowering and supporting teachers” (6 pages), published in February 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Education (EDU) in Gothenborg (RAN EDU, 2016);
“EX POST PAPER: Methodological minimum requirements exit
interventions” (8 pages), published in March 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Exit in London (RAN EXIT, 2016);
8
25 “EX POST PAPER9
: Successful and effective engaging with communities” (9 pages), published in April 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Police and law enforcement (POL) in Oslo (RAN POL, 2016);
“EX POST PAPER: Religion Matters” (7 pages), published in April 2016 after the meeting of the RAN working group Youth, Families and Communities (YF&C) in Madrid (RAN YF&C, 2016).
3.3 Method of data analysis
This research has used a qualitative content analysis in order to research the earlier described data sources. A qualitative content analysis is a systematic method that can be used to analyze both the content of textual as well as video sources (Mayring, 2000). This method provides a technique to systematically categorize data in order to make sense of it (Huberman and Miles, 1994). This research made use of theoretically determined concepts and themes to analyze the authority and content of expert knowledge produced through the RAN. These concepts and themes are analyzed in a qualitative way. The general strategy has been to analyze the different data sources on certain words, sentences and paragraphs representing indicators of uncertainty and external recognition and particular definition and conceptualizations of radicalization.
Table 1 (next page) shows how the different concepts have been derived from the literature discussed in chapter 2. It furthermore outlines the particular indicators that been used to research the different concepts related to the research question. The indicators have been used to close read the various data sources and to interpret the findings.
9 RAN ex-post papers published after RAN activities and Working Group meetings highlighting lessons learned, insights and follow-up initiatives (European Commission, 2016 III):
26 Table 1 “Operationalization”
Concept “Uncertainty”
Description Uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge about how the address certain issues in light of their complex nature (Haas, 1992; Radaelli, 1999; Davis-Cross, 2011). In the security domain this uncertainty is particularly related the complex and therefore uncertain nature of security threats (Bigo, 2002). Uncertainty surrounding a particular issue area furthermore enhances the authority of epistemic communities and their expert
knowledge about how to address these threats.
Indicators The extent to which the RAN is described as responding to uncertainty about radicalization:
High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy of the RAN to the complex nature of radicalization;
High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy of the RAN to a knowledge deficit in the area of radicalization;
High level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents link the relevancy of the RAN to the complex nature of threats caused by radicalization.
Concept “External recognition”
Description External recognition refers to the notion that epistemic communities need to possess “recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain” in order to have authority (Haas, 1992:3).
Indicators The degree of external recognition of the RAN:
The expertise of the RAN is described by high level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents as important for policies and strategies in area of counter radicalization and prevention
Concept “Cohesiveness of expert knowledge”
Description Cohesiveness of expert knowledge refers: 1) shared causal beliefs and 2) shared (normative) notions of validity (Haas, 1992; Davis-Cross, 2011). Shared causal beliefs in the domain of radicalization then refer to shared conceptualizations of the causes of radicalization. Shared notions of validity refer to consensus about preferred approaches and practices to counter radicalization. The authority of expert knowledge produced by an epistemic community is related to the cohesiveness of their knowledge (Haas, 1992; Davis-Cross, 2011).
Indicators The extent to which the RAN consists of shared causal beliefs about radicalization and shared notions of validity about preventive and counter measures
27 conceptualizations about radicalization
Documents and expert opinions produced through the RAN contain similar claims about preferred approaches to prevent and counter radicalization Concept “Radicalization”
Description Expert knowledge about the concept of radicalization is analyzed by looking at the following aspects:
- Defining radicalization. This refers to the question whether the used definitions make a distinction between radicals and extremists, include a reference of the radical as a threat, and separate violent and non-violent radicalization, or target both (Sedgwick, 2010).
- Conceptualizing radicalization and additional measures. This refers to the question whether the used conceptualizations describe radicalization as a linear process, are centered around risk and vulnerability, and aim at broad preventive policies (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010:13; Lindekilde, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013).
Indicators The particular expert knowledge about radicalization produced through the RAN:
Defining radicalization
o A distinction is made between radicals and extremists
o The used definitions include a reference of the radical as a threat o Both violent and non-violent radicalization is targeted without making a
conceptual distinction
Conceptualizing radicalization
o Radicalization is described as a linear process
o Vulnerability to radicalization is described as potentially leading to violent extremism or terrorism
o The used conceptualization of radicalization refers to individuals or groups of individuals “at risk” of becoming terrorists
Conceptualizing radicalization measures
o The approach proposes interventions targeted at those individuals deemed vulnerable to extremist ideas
o The approach aims at vulnerable communities in terms of prevention
o The approach aims at broader social issues as making communities vulnerable (risk factors) to violent radicalization
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3.4 Validity and reliability
It is important to reflect on validity and reliability issues related to this research. Validity refers to extent to which a study is observing, identifying and measuring what it seeks to investigate (Mason, 2002; Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). Any qualitative interpretivist strategy needs to be aware of potential overreliance on subjective judgments of the researcher. Validity in this sense can be enhanced by a clear operationalization of concepts (Mason, 2002). This research has aimed at doing so by providing a clear overview (see Table 1) of how certain indicators were derived from discussed concepts in literature.
In addition, external validity is another kind of validity to that needs to be addressed. External validity refers to extent to which it is possible to make some sort of wider claim based on research finding (Mason, 2002). Regarding external validity this research has aimed at analytical generalization referring to the attempt to draw conclusions from studied data to theory rather than some sort of statistical generalization regarding a population (Yin, 1994). This research has aimed to provide insights into theories about epistemic communities and the authority of expert knowledge, in addition to providing in-depth knowledge about the RAN. However, it has to be mentioned that also the analytical generalizability of this research is restricted due to the exclusive focus on the RAN.
Next to validity, it is important to take issues regarding reliability into account. Reliability refers to the accuracy of research methods and techniques (Mason, 2002). It questions whether the research provides similar findings when replicated by subsequent researchers (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). This research has aimed to enhance its reliability again by using clear indicators that foster opportunities for replication (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, as argued earlier triangulation of data sources has been used to create broad basis of various kind of sources in order to enhance the reliability of research findings (Bryman, 2008).
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4. Uncertainty and external recognition
This chapter analyzes how high-level politicians, bureaucrats and strategic documents view the relationship between uncertainty and the expertise of the RAN. It furthermore analyzes the degree to which the RAN as externally recognized expertise in the area of counter
radicalization and prevention. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the perspectives of high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN are analyzed by using the concepts of uncertainty and external recognition. Secondly, strategic documents are analyzed, again by using the concepts of uncertainty and external recognition. At the end of the chapter the findings of these two analysis are combined and discussed.
4.1 Perspectives of high-level politicians and bureaucrats towards the RAN
The RAN has been referred to by a variety of actors: high-level bureaucrats of the
Commission, Members of European Parliament, and the President in office of the Council. In May 2012 Cecilia Malmström (European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs) during a debate about the evaluation of the European internal security strategy of 2010 mentioned the five objectives of the strategy: “…fighting and preventing serious and
organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime, management of our external borders, and building resilience to natural and man-made disasters (Malmström, 2012)”. Regarding each of these objectives she referred to important policy achievements:
“We have achieved quite a lot since the first publication: for instance, the report on confiscation of goods, the establishment of the radicalisation awareness network, the proposal on EU PNR, and the proposal to establish a cyber centre (Malmström, 2012)”.
By referring to the RAN as one of the main achievements in the area of fighting and preventing terrorism, the RAN is given importance within the European internal security strategy. Malmström further argued:
“we will hold a conference gathering our experience and building on one year of the establishment of the radicalisation awareness network, with some ideas and policies presented from that network (Malmström, 2012)”.
With this quote Malmström seems to recognize the knowledge of the RAN as important for the creation of ideas and policies regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Europe. However, she appears to make no attempt to connect relevancy of the expertise of the RAN to uncertainty
30 regarding radicalization in terms of its complex nature and lack of knowledge amongst
policymakers about how to address it.
In November 2012 Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Commission, took the opportunity in a debate about the marketing and use of explosives precursors to mention that:
“… the Commission will continue to work in other areas, too, to help reduce the threat from terrorism […] that is the work of the Radicalisation Awareness Network, which exchanges best practices between those who work on the ground with people at risk of being drawn into violent extremism (Reding, 2012)”
Reding seems to take the opportunity to emphasize the importance of best practices provided by the RAN, even if the initial debate topic is about a different kind of counter-terrorism efforts. She further seems to link the expertise of the RAN to reducing the threat of terrorism, but does not refer to the uncertain nature of these threats.
In addition, in February 2015 the European Parliament adopted a resolution about anti-terrorism measures (European Parliament, 2015). This resolution contains a paragraph about the RAN, and the role of the network in combating the “root causes of terrorism and
radicalization leading to violent extremism” (European Parliament, 2015). The resolution called on the Commission to strengthening the RAN and referred to the role of the RAN in setting up de-radicalization structures and processes (European Parliament, 2015). This resolution, that was passed though the Council and the Parliament, thus seems to present the RAN as important regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Europe. It suggests that the expertise of the RAN is able to provide approaches to create de-radicalization structures and processes. This assumes a degree of certainty or understanding of the process of radicalization and how to counter amongst experts within the RAN.
Furthermore, during the “Oral explanations of vote about anti-terrorism measures”, Theresa Griffin and Siôn Simon both Members of the European Parliament for the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, emphasized the RAN when explaining their vote. They argued for the “full use of existing measures such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)” to tackle terrorism and radicalization (Griffin, 2015; Simon, 2015).
In November 2015 in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris during a debate about the “Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations” Dimitris Avramopoulos (European Commissioner for Migration and Home
