Tone of Dutch newspaper coverage toward right wing populism:
going beyond the Election Day.
Janneke Benschop 10438807 Master’s Thesis
Graduate School of Communication Master’s programme of Communication Science
Jasper van de Pol February 2nd 2018
2 Abstract
This thesis studied the tone toward right wing populism in Dutch media before and after several elections of the past decade. Newspaper articles of quality newspaper De Volkskrant and tabloid newspaper De Telegraaf were studied by performing a content analysis of 427 articles. Articles of the two weeks before and after each election were selected, and the negative tone toward right wing populism, right wing populist parties and party leaders were coded. The results showed a difference in tone between the tabloid and quality newspaper, the latter one showing a lot more negativity toward right wing populism than the first. More importantly, the results denoted the negative tone toward right wing populism to be higher
after elections than before elections. No evidence was found for the influence of the outcome
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades there has been a rise of right wing populism in western
democracies. Right wing populist parties have played a significant role during governmental and presidential elections, as they gained support among the citizens. The rise of right wing populism has been subject of attention in the media, but also the relationship between right wing populists and the media has not gone unnoticed. During the EU referendum in the United Kingdom national newspapers chose sides either supporting ‘Remain’ or endorsing ‘Leave’. When the referendum resulted in the Brexit, the focus was on the role that the British media would have played in the citizens’ decision. Reports of the Loughborough University showed that there was more coverage of ‘Leave’ arguments, and negative framing of
immigration (one of the biggest issues in the referendum campaigns) in the British national newspapers. A similar situation appeared during the 2016 presidential election in the United States. After Donald Trump won the primaries and after he got elected the 45th president of the US, the media also focussed on the role that the media had played in this outcome of the elections. Articles titled such as ‘How the media created the president’ (BBC, November 2016), and ‘The media is to blame for Trump’s success’ (Huffington Post, September 2016) appeared in almost all big news outlets, discussing the amount of attention Trump got and the lack of balanced information during the campaign period.
These examples show that today, there is a lot of interest in the relationship between media coverage and right wing populism. With the rise of right wing populist parties in the western world, how are the Dutch media doing? This thesis will focus on the relationship between Dutch media coverage and right wing populism. It is important to study media coverage, as research has proven that media coverage during campaigns can influence the public’s
evaluation of political parties and leaders (Druckman, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 2000; Takens et al., 2015). This effect is explained by the ‘priming’ theory, which describes how the
2 attention media gives to certain issues and events can change the standard by which the
government, political parties and leaders are evaluated by the public (Iyengar & Simon, 2000).
Over the years, right wing populism has become a subject of political communication research. Studies try to explain the rise of right wing populism by looking at the relationship of right wing populist parties and leaders with the media. There is a focus on explaining the successes of right wing populism, by studying their visibility in the media and the amount of attention they get (Bos et al., 2010; Pas et al., 2013; Wells et al., 2016). What however is lacking in these studies on the relationship between the media and right wing populism are insights in the way in which right wing populism is covered in the news. Although there is a lot of attention for the amount of attention media give to right wing populists, it is not studied what the tone that media attention is. Earlier research has only studied the tone toward
political parties in general (Eberl et al, 2017; Hopmann et al., 2010), other research focusses on the communication style and rhetoric of the right wing populist parties themselves (Bos et al. (2013); Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Research studying the tone of news coverage toward right wing populist parties specifically is lacking. Lengauer et al. (2012) in their paper on the concept of negativity in the news however call for more specific research on the tone, and specifically negativity, toward political actors. The tone of the media toward right wing populism should be studied as it has been proven that the endorsement of journalists,
favouring some parties over others in their media coverage, affects the political preferences of the media outlet’s readers (Kahn & Kenney, 2002). Previous research has proven that the more positive the tone toward a given party is, the more voters are inclined to vote for this party (Eberl et al., 2017; Hopmann et al., 2010). That is why this study will look at negative tone toward right wing populist leaders and parties
3 Another gap in research is that up to now, research focussing on the relationship between the media and right wing populism only study this relationship during the campaigning period, ending at the election date (Bos et al., 2010; Bos et al., 2011; Koopmans & Muis 2009; Pas et al., 2013; Wells et al., 2016). Studying the news coverage of right wing populism after the election could however also be relevant. It is important to study media coverage after the election, to see whether the outcome of the election changes the tone toward the politician. If the tone of news coverage of a media outlet would change after the election, whether it is more or less negative, thiswould mean that they are not consistent in their reporting.
Furthermore, this way it can be tested whether the outcome of an election influences the tone of news coverage toward right wing populists.When, for example, the tone increases in negativity after a victory for a right wing populist party, media could put a negative light on the publics’ democratic decision. Thereforeit is important to study the tone of news coverage toward right wing populism before as well as after an election.
Because of these gaps in literature and the effects that news coverage has on the public, this study will look at negative tone toward right wing populist leaders and parties in Dutch national newspapers. It will study the tone of news coverage toward right wing populism before and after the election days. A distinction will be made between the media coverage of a quality newspaper and a tabloid newspaper because, according to Mazzoleni (2008), these different types of newspapers have a different relationship with right wing populism. This could lead to a difference in tone toward right wing populism.
This study will try to answer the following research question: ‘How do Dutch media report on
populism before and after elections, and how does a victory or defeat by populists affect this
reporting?’.In a content analysis of news coverage of the last decade on the Dutch general elections and the French presidential elections in which a right wing populist party was running are studied, together with the EU referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2016
4 presidential elections of the United States. Two weeks before and after each election will be analysed, to study the tone of newspaper coverage toward right wing populism and to see if there is an effect of the outcome of an election on newspaper coverage. A random sample of articles from both quality newspaper De Volkskrant and tabloid newspaper De Telegraaf will be coded.
Theory
In this section of the thesis literature will be discussed, which will lead to some expectations for this study. First, the concept of populism is defined. After that literature on the different relationships with right wing populism of quality newspapers and tabloid newspapers will be discussed, followed by a hypothesis. Second, as there are no earlier studies on the difference in tone toward political parties before and after elections, this theory section will explore some ideas on why the tone toward right wing populism could differ before and after elections. In order to do this, different models of democracy and their implications for journalism will be discussed. After that some ideas on why role perceptions of journalist could differ before and after the elections are explored, which could influence their tone in reporting.
Defining populism
There is no single definition of populism that is used among researchers. Populism can be defined based on their style of communication or on the substance of their beliefs. According to Fennema (2005) populist parties assume that the common man is good, whereas the political elite by nature are dishonest. Taggart (2000) elaborates on this by describing the populist message as hostile toward representative politics and the establishment, while trying
5 to identify with the ordinary people by using the language of the common man. He defines populism as reluctantly political, which is the consequence of their ambivalence toward representative politics (Taggart, 2000). Mudde (2004) however disagrees with defining populism as reluctantly political, claiming populism does not oppose representation but rather opposes being representing by corrupt elite. In his view populism is ‘an ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (p. 543). What seems to be the core of all the different definitions is that the foundation of populism is the distinction
between the common/ordinary ‘pure’ people and the corrupt/dishonest elite.
However, Mudde (2004) and Taggart (2000) do not only define populism as ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’, instead it can also be seen as ‘the people’ versus ‘the others’. The ‘others’ can be the elite, but can be another social group as well. Populism should be understood as trying to exclude an out-group from the ‘pure people’. Populism has a discourse of distancing an in-group of a ‘good and pure’ social group, toward an out-group of a ‘bad and deviant’ social group, mediated by social problems (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). This aspect of populism mostly fits right wing populist parties, which therefore will be the focus of this study. Right wing populism can furthermore be recognized by the appeal to xenophobia (Betz, 1994). According to Betz (1994), right wing populists want to appeal to the common people, trying to create fear toward an ‘out-group’ and anxiety among the public to get support for their beliefs. This study will follow the aspects of Betz’ definition of right wing populism, while studying the tone toward right wing populist parties and leaders in Dutch newspapers.
6 The tone toward populism of quality media and tabloid media
Despite the fact that there are no previous studies on the tone toward right wing populism, a difference in tone toward right wing populism in tabloid newspapers and quality newspaper could be expected. Tabloid news media and quality news media have different approaches in covering populism (Mazzoleni, 2003). First of all, the two kinds of newspapers have different political-orientated readers. Tabloid newspapers readers are attracted to their focus on
infotainment, conflict and anti-elitism and tabloid newspapers are therefore supposed to provide a platform for populist politics (Sparks, 2000). For quality newspapers however it is more likely to have non-populist voters as their readers, with their focus on politics,
economics and society (Sparks, 2000).Secondly, quality news media are more often the mouthpiece of the ruling classes. They are more in favour of the ‘elite’, defending the status-quo and attack anti-establishment forces such as protest groups and populists movements (Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 16). This media tend to combat or downplay protest/populist threats (Mazzoleni, 2008, p. 51), and will therefore be more critical toward populism. Tabloid media on the other hand, tend to have a more commercial approach to journalism. They have a preference of sensational coverage of events and stories that stir the emotions of the public (Mazzoleni, 2008). It can therefore be expected that tabloid newspapers are likely to give non-critical attention to the highly emotional, being a platform for the sensational events staged by right wing populism. This, together with the difference in readership, leads to the expectation of quality newspapers being more critical and negative toward right wing populism than tabloid newspapers.
H1: There is more negativity toward right wing populism in quality newspapers than in tabloid newspapers
7 Tone of news coverage before and after elections
This study will not only add to recent research by looking at the tone toward right wing populism, as it will look further than just media coverage during the campaigning period of elections. Literature on different journalistic role perceptions will lead to some ideas of a difference in tone in news coverage before and after election.
Strömbäck (2005) describes how different conceptions of democracy, can imply different role perceptions for journalists. Strömbäck (2005) describes four different models of democracy and their implications for journalism. The first model is the Procedural democracy, in which free and fair elections are at the centre. Citizens have to respect the democratic procedures such as going out to vote, but do not further have to get involved into politics. Therefore, the job of the journalists is to decide what is important to report. Media do not necessarily have to be of high quality in this model. The second model is the Competitive democracy, which includes competitive elections in which citizens need to gain knowledge to make an informed decision. Journalists need to provide information that citizens can trust. They have to act as watchdogs, reporting on the wrong-doings of representatives and their promises for the future. Than for the Participatory democracy, there is need for political participation of citizens in their public lives. Therefore, journalism needs to let the citizens set the agenda, and mobilize the public’s interest and engagement in politics in their public life. They need to focus on problem solving as well as problems. Lastly, Strömbäck (2005) describes the model of
Deliberative democracy. Here journalists also need to mobilize the interest and engagement of citizens, and act to create inclusive discussions. Citizens need to have discussions
characterized by rationality, impartiality, intellectual honesty and equality, which journalists have to encourage.
8 What is important to notice is that these are ideal models of democracy, in reality democracies have features of different models just as journalists can adhere to the different normative implications and act in different roles (Strömbäck, 2005). Other research has also found that journalists can adhere to different role perceptions (Weaver et al., 2009), which could mean that role perceptions of journalists could differ before and after elections.
Making the different implications of journalists in different democracies of Strömbäck (2005) more specific, Skovsgaard et al. (2013) created four different journalistic roles that journalists can adhere to. In their study they make two distinctions in journalistic roles. Firstly they explain the difference between an active approach to journalism and a passive approach. The passive journalists believe that news emerges by itself, and the journalists are able to report reality without intervention. The active journalists however acknowledge that they are news constructors, news is the product of active intervention by the journalists (Skovsgaard et al., 2013). The passive journalist acts as an observer, while an active journalist acts in the middle of the news production process. The second distinction is made between journalists’ roles in the Representative conception of democracy and in the Participatory conception of
democracy. In the Representative conception of democracy journalists’ main job is to provide citizens with the necessary information to make an informed vote. In the Participatory
conception this is not enough, journalists need to create a public debate and public
engagement and involvement in politics. With these two distinctions Skovsgaard et al. (2013) created the four role perceptions: ‘passive mirror’, ‘watchdog’, ‘public forum’, and ‘public mobilizer’, as shown in Table 1.
9 Table 1.
Four different role perceptions as described by Skovsgaard et al. (2013)
Journalistic approach Conception of democracy
Representative Participatory
Passive journalism Passive mirror Public forum
Active journalism Watchdog Public mobilizer
The journalists as a ‘passive mirror’ is just disseminator of information, he or she believes they can reflect reality by disseminating information as it happens and exclude own their own beliefs from reports (Skovsgaard et al., 2013). As a ‘watchdog’, the journalist is critical toward the powerful and provides an analysis of complex problems. Than as a ‘public forum’, journalists let regular people voice their opinions and try to engage them in public debate (Skovsgaard et al., 2013). Lastly, as a ‘public mobilizer’, the job of journalists is to lead the public toward creating distinct solutions to societal problems. In their study they prove those different role perceptions of journalism lead to different forms of news coverage, and a different relationship with objectivity (Skovsgaard et al., 2013). The discussed roles of journalism are again ideal types of journalism, therefore journalists in reality can work in different role perceptions in different times.
In this study the idea of a different role perception before and after an election is explored. With different role perceptions come different forms of reporting on politics. As journalists can adhere to different role perceptions (Strömbäck, 2005; Weaver et al., 2009), journalists could consciously or unconsciously act in different roles before and after an election. It could
10 be there is more passive journalism before elections by providing the public with balanced information on political parties, and more active journalism after elections by going back to the watchdog role and being more critical and providing judgements. It could also be the other way around, there could be more active journalism during the campaign period trying to involve the citizens in a debate to make a well informed decision and be critical toward the current establishment and promises for the future.This could differ between journalists of the quality newspaper and journalists of the tabloid newspaper, as they have different relationship with right wing populism (Mazzoleni, 2008). As these are just speculations, it is not clear if and how the newspaper coverage before and after elections differs. Therefore, a research question is asked, to get more insights into this concept.
RQ1: To what extent does newspaper coverage on right wing populism differ before and after the election?
This research will not only study the difference in news coverage on toward right wing populism before and after an election, but will also try to find a possible influences on the difference, namely the outcome of an election. It could be that journalists report the right wing populism differently after a win or after a defeat for right wing populism. Again, this is likely to differ for the quality newspaper and the tabloid newspaper, due to their earlier discussed relationships with right wing populism. A quality newspaper could have giving balanced information before an election but be more of a watchdog after the right wing populist party one, where a tabloid newspaper might not make this switch. To research the influence of the outcome of an election on the tone toward right wing populism, a second research question is asked.
RQ2: Does the outcome of the election, a win or defeat for right wing populism, affect the tone in Dutch newspaper coverage toward right wing populism?
11 Method
Content analysis
In order to test the hypothesis and answer the research questions Dutch media content needs to be analysed. Content analysis is therefore a suitable method for this study, as newspaper content itself needs to be studied. The content analysis will have a quantitative approach, coding Dutch newspaper articles covering right wing populism, right wing populist parties and its leaders before and after elections. This study will furthermore be longitudinal, Dutch newspaper coverage of elections in democratic societies of the past decade can be studied by using the online database Lexis Nexis. The results of the content analysis will be analysed using SPSS.
Research units
The articles of two Dutch newspapers will be studied. The decision to study political news in newspapers, instead of on for example television, is made because of the more in-depth news coverage in newspapers and because the public values a newspaper as a reliable source for political information (Kiousis, 2001). The two newspapers that are selected for this study are the De Volkskrant and the De Telegraaf. These newspapers enable this study to compare a quality newspaper, the De Volkskrant, with a tabloid-style newspaper, the De Telegraaf and to test the hypothesis. The selected newspapers are the quality newspaper and tabloid newspaper with the biggest reach in the Netherlands according to research-institute NOM (NOM, 2017).
Sampling procedure
The articles of these newspapers covering elections in western democracies in the past decade, in which a populist party was running, are studied. The selected elections had to fell under the criteria of having a right wing populist party that fit the definitions of Betz (1994)
12 that are followed in this study. Furthermore each selected election needed to have a right wing populist party that played a significant role during the elections. This was the case for the PVV in the Netherlands during the national elections of 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017, and for the Front National in the French presidential elections of 2002, 2012 and 2017. In their national elections these parties have been in the race for ‘victory’ during elections, either for becoming the Dutch biggest party or becoming president of France. Unfortunately, due to time limitations, it was not possible to study all relevant western elections with a right wing populist party, such as the elections in Italy and Austria. The elections of Austria could also not be analysed because of a lack of Dutch news coverage on these elections which could be collected for this research. Two other elections involving right wing populism, who did get a lot of media attention, were the USA 2016 presidential elections and the EU referendum of the United Kingdom. Therefore these elections were also analysed.
The articles were collected using LexisNexis database. They were found by using the
following search terms: Right wing populism AND/OR the populist party involved AND/OR the last name of the populist party leader and/or the election. For every election the right wing populist party and its leader was identified and added to the search terms. The decision to include the party leader in the search term was made in order to include the tone toward a specific political actor in the content analysis. The party leader, in contrast to other politicians, is the political actor that often gets and attracts the most attention of the media. Furthermore, right wing populist parties tend to have a big focus on their party leader. According to Taggart (2000) one of the three aspects of the populist style is the emphasis on the party leader.
Some examples of searches done where, first for the Dutch general elections; ‘rechts populisme en/of PVV en/of Wilders en/of Tweede Kamerverkiezingen’, second for the French presidential elections: ‘rechts populisme en/of Front National en/of Le Pen en/of Franse presidentsverkiezingen’, and third for the United States 2016 presidential elections:
13 ‘rechts populisme en/of Republikeinen en/of Trump en/of Amerikaanse
presidentsverkiezingen’. At least one of these terms needed to be present in the title or first paragraph of the article, for the article to be selected. A list of all elections with the right wing populist’s party and party leader involved is provided in the Codebook (Appendix 1).
A period of two weeks before and after each selected western election/referendum was studied. For each election a stratified random sample was taken from the articles. Every stratum consisted of two weeks, from which 12 articles will randomly were selected. This will be done for every two weeks before and after all elections, for both papers. When there are less than X articles on an election in a stratum, all articles will be studied. The total number of articles will be 10 elections X 2 strata X 2 newspapers X 12 articles = 480 articles (N = 480).
Unfortunately, for the second round of the French presidential elections of 2002 the two weeks after the second round could not be analysed. There were no articles covering this subject, due to the murder of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn a day after the second round of the French elections. Therefore, understandably all news media covered this subject, and let other foreign political news aside.
Observed variables
To test the reliability of the content analysis, the intercoderreliability was calculated for some of the independent variables and the dependent variables measuring tone. First, the two coders did not come to same judgements of the variables while coding the articles using the
codebook. After this first try, some questions where altered and examples for the questions where added to the codebook. After these alterations, Krippendorfs’ Alpha was calculated and all variables used for analysis where above 0.80, which showed a reliable codebook.
14
Dependent variables
Both dependent variables of this study are based on Lengauer et al. (2012), who created coding instructions for negativity in political news based on previous research. This first dependent variable is ‘Negativity’, which measures whether an article has a negative, tone toward right wing parties and/or leaders. Indicators of negative tone are based on Lengauer et al. (2012). The negative tone was measured coding six different items for each articles (0 = No, 1 = Yes). Examples of questions of two items are:
Is one of the subjects of the article a failure, fiasco and/or scandal of the right wing populist party(leader)?
Is the right wing populist party(leader) receives critique and/or is attacked in the article?
After a factor analysis it became clear that five items, the ones about criticism, mistrust, misbehaviour, contempt and incompetence together measured the amount of negativity in the coded articles. These items scored over .40 in the factor analyses and had an Eigenvalue of 2.3, the item ‘failures’ only scored .09 and was there for left out of the scale. The items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .71), and were computed into the new variable Negativity (= criticism + mistrust + misbehaviour + contempt + incompetence). This variable was used in further analyses.
Other dependent variables where not fit for analyses. 1
1
A second dependent variable is ‘Pessimism’, which measures the pessimistic outlook on right wing populism in the articles. The indicators of pessimism are also based on Lengauer et al. (2012). To measure the pessimism in each article, four different items were coded. One of the four questions was: Does the article cover negative prospects and/or in regard to the right wing populist party(leader)? After a factor analysis it became clear that the first item on negative prospects and the last item on potential treats together as a factor had a Eigenwaarde of 1,5. Unfortunately the reliability analysis of the scale showed an unreliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .43). Therefore the variable ‘Pessimism’ was not used in further analyses.Lastly, there we items coded to measure the positive tone and optimistic outlook toward right wing populist. This however was almost
15
Independent variables
There are several independent variables in this study. First of all, the length of the article, the page number of the article and the date (DD/MM/YYYY) of the article were coded. Second the source of the article was coded, both newspapers are given a specific code, 1 = De
Volkskrant, 2 = De Telegraaf.
It was also coded whether the article was published in the two weeks before or on the election (Period = 0) or in the two weeks after the election (Period = 1). This was clear for the Dutch general elections, the US presidential elections and the EU referendum, but not for the French presidential elections. These elections are decided in two rounds, after the first round the public has to vote again on the two most popular candidates. However, the two weeks after the first election round are the same two weeks as the ones before the election second round. In the analysis these weeks are coded as Period = 1, because the articles are after the right wing populists party had a victory. In order to answer the second research question on a victory/defeat for right wing populism, these articles need to be analysed as articles after the election.
Furthermore, all articles were given a specific code. With these codes, a new variable could be created that determined what article belonged to which election creating the variable ‘Elections’. Each election was given an individual code (NL2006 = 1, NL2010 = 2, NL2012 = 3, NL2017 = 4, US = 5, Brexit = 6, Fr2002 = 7, FR2012 = 8, FR 2017-1= 9, FR2017-2 = 10).
Lastly, a new variable ‘Win/Lose’ was created to determine whether the election outcome was a victory or defeat for the right wing populist party. In case of a defeat, Win/Lose was coded
never found in the articles. Therefore, these items were not able to measure Positivity and Optimism, and where let out of the analyses.
16 0, in case of a win Win/Lose was coded 1. The US 2016 presidential elections and the EU referendum in the United Kingdom where both coded as a win for right wing populism (Win/Lose = 1), as Donald Trump became the president of the United States and the British citizens’ voted in favour of leaving the European Union. The first round of the French
presidential elections of 2002 and 2017 where both coded as a win, as the candidate for Front National made it to the second round (Win/Lose = 1), the second round of 2017 was however lost by Marine Le Pen and therefore coded as a defeat (Win/Lose = 0). Front National did not make past the first round of the 2012 presidential elections of France, and was code as a defeat (Win/Lose = 0). For Dutch general elections of 2006 and 2012 where both coded as a defeat for the PVV, as they did not get a lot of seats (Win/Lose = 0). It was chosen to see the 2010 Dutch general elections as a victory for the PVV, as they got more seats than ever before, they became one of the biggest parties and made it into government (Win/Lose = 1). During the 2017 elections the PVV did not become the biggest party and no other parties wanted to cooperate with the PVV. However, the media did describe the outcome as a victory for the PVV because they still became the second biggest party. That is why the analysis to see the influence of the outcome of the election will be done twice, to see if there are different results when the Dutch elections of 2017 are coded as a win or a defeat for right wing
populism. Two separated variables of Win/Lose will be created, Win/Lose1 in which the 2017 general elections are coded as a win for the PVV, and Win/Lose2 in which the elections are coded as a defeat. All the other elections are coded as explained above in both of the
variables.
Analytical strategy
Not for all elections, twelve articles before and after each election where available on LexisNexis. After making the irrelevant articles missing in the analysis, the total amount of
17 analysed articles came to 427 (N = 427). Than the new variables Negativity, Elections,
Negativity, Win/Lose1 and Win/Lose2 were computed.
To answer the hypothesis and the two research questions,the amount of negativity toward right wing populism will be measured before and after the elections, and for each of the elections separately. To test the hypothesis and the first research question, several independent t-tests are performed to compare the amount of negativity in both the
newspapers, and before and after each election. The results for each election separately will be shown in two parts. The news covering the Dutch national elections will be discussed together from the other elections, as they are easier to compare with each other. Lastly, two regression analyses will be performed, to see whether the outcome of the election influences the tone of newspapers coverage and whether this is moderated by the source of the article (the quality newspaper or the tabloid newspaper).
Results
Quality and tabloid newspapers
Hypothesis 1 was: There is more negativity toward right wing populism in quality newspapers
than in tabloid newspapers. To test this expectation an independent samples t-test was done to
analyse the tone in the De Volkskrant and the De Telegraaf. As expected the amount of negativity was significantly higher in the De Volkskrant (M = 0,66, SD = 1,12) than in the De
Telegraaf (M= 0,15, SD= 0,53), t =(165,36) = 6,00, p = 0,000, 95%CI[0,34, 0,68]. Hence, the
hypothesis is supported; the newspaper coverage of the quality newspaper the De Volkskrant contains over four times more negative coverage than the tabloid newspaper the De Telegraaf.
18 It should be noted that the tabloid newspaper, to a small extent, also has a negative tone toward right wing populism in their coverage as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 4.
Tone before and after the election
The first research question of this study was: To what extent does newspaper coverage on
right wing populism differ before and after the election?
First for the quality newspaper, again an independent t-test was performed on all the studied elections together. The results denoted that there is more negativity toward right wing populism after the elections (M = 0,77, SD = 1,17) than before the elections (M = 0,54, SD = 1,05). This is a significant result t(9,82) = -2,08, p = 0,032, 95% CI [0,08, 0,53]. This result shows that the tone of the newspaper coverage significantly differs before and after the
studied elections.
The same result appears for the overall amount of negativity toward right wing populism in news coverage of the tabloid newspaper, the means are higher after the elections (M = 0,18, SD = 0,62) than before the elections (M = 0,11, SD = 0,37). Again this result is significant t(64,72) = -1,07, p = 0,031, 95% CI [0,07, 0,22].
Dutch elections
Figure 1 shows the amount negativity toward right wing populism before and after in the quality newspaper, covering the Dutch national elections in 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017. The means of negativity before and after the elections did not differ significantly for any election separately, which could be due to the amount of articles coded for each election being too small. Not for every election individually the amount of negativity toward right wing populism is higher before than after the elections, for example for the election in 2006 the negativity was higher before (M = 0,45, SD = 1,04) than after (M = 0,42, SD = 0,97).What
19 also becomes clear is that the total amount of negativity is different for each of the elections. The total means of negativity in the news covering the 2017 Dutch national elections (M = 0,95, SD = 1,24) is a lot higher than in the 2012 Dutch national elections (M = 0,26, SD = 0,69). Additionally the negativity in news coverage of the 2010 elections was higher in 2010 than in 2012, which shows that there is not a trend of increase of negativity over time. Rather, it differs per election.
Figure 1. Means of negativity toward right wing populism in the quality newspaper
before/after Dutch elections
Figure 2 shows the results for the tabloid newspaper De Telegraaf. It shows that there was no negativity at all – in none of the articles analysed - toward right wing populism during the Dutch national elections in 2006. In 2012 there was only negativity before the election (M = 0,27, SD = 0,64), and in 2017 only after the election (M = 0,33, SD = 0,77). The figure denotes that news coverage in De Telegraaf is not often negative but more neutral, or slightly positive, toward right wing populism.
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 NL2006 NL2010 NL2012 NL2017 Before After
20
Figure 2. Means of negativity toward right wing populism in the tabloid newspaper
before/after Dutch elections
Other elections
Figure 3 shows the amount of negativity before and after the other studied elections in the De
Volkskrant. For all elections the amount of negativity toward right wing populism is higher
after than before the elections, except for the French presidential elections of 2002 where it was higher before (M = 0,42, SD =1,00) than after (M = 0,33, SD = 0,78). The highest amount of negativity was toward Marine Le Pen of Front National after losing the second round of French presidential elections (M = 1,50, SD = 1,45).
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 0,25 0,3 0,35 NL2006 NL2010 NL2012 NL2017 Before After
21
Figure 3. Means of negativity toward right wing populism in the quality newspaper
before/after other elections
Figure 4 shows that in the tabloid newspaper all other studied elections the means of negativity were higher after each election than before each election. The highest amount of negativity was after the EU Referendum in the United Kingdom (M = 0,50, SD = 1,17).
Figure 4. Means of negativity toward right wing populism in the tabloid newspaper
before/after other elections
Outcome of the election
Lastly, to be able to answer the second research question: Does the outcome of the election, a
win or defeat for right wing populism, affect the tone in Dutch newspaper coverage toward
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6
USA2016 Brexit Fr2002 Fr2012 Fr20171e Fr20172e
Before After 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6
USA2016 Brexit Fr2002 Fr2012 Fr20171e Fr20172e
Before After
22
right wing populism?, a linear regression analysis was performed. First the analysis was
performed with independent variable Win/Lose1 and after that the same analysis was done with independent variable Win/Lose2. In both the analyses the type of newspaper (Source) is added as a moderator. First, Win/Lose1 turned out to not have a statistic significant effect on the amount of negativity after elections (b* = 0,04, t = 0,65, p = 0,517), as is shown in Table 2. Also for Win/Lose2 no significant effect was found (b* = -0,02, t = -0,26, p = 0,792), as shown in Table 3. This means that the outcome of the election does not affect the tone toward right wing populism in Dutch newspaper coverage.
Table 2.
Regression results with the outcome (Win/Lose1) of the election predicting the amount of
negativity with the source of the article as a moderator
Variable B SE B Beta T Constant 1.27 .21 5.96 Win/Lose1 .08 .13 .04 .65 Source -.55 .13 -.27 -.4.30** F 9.04 R2 0.079 * p = < .05, ** p = <.01
23 Table 3.
Regression results with the outcome (Win/Lose2) of the election predicting the amount of
negativity with the source of the article as a moderator
Variable B SE B Beta T Constant 1.34 .21 6.10 Win/Lose2 -.03 .13 -.02 -.26 Source -.55 .13 -.27 -4.30** F 9.31 R2 0.074 * p = < .05, ** p = <.01 Conclusion
The goal of this study wasto answer the following research question: ‘How do Dutch media report on populism before and after elections, and how does a victory or defeat by populists affect this reporting?’ What can be concluded on the basis of the results is that Dutch media report differently about right wing populism before and after elections, the tone negative tone toward right wing populism is higher after than before elections. This was true for both the De
Volkskrant and the De Telegraaf. What however was not found was evidence for the outcome
of the elections to affect the tone of the reporting after elections. The study furthermore tested the expectation of the difference in tone toward right wing populism in quality newspapers and tabloid newspapers. The results showed that there was a lot more negativity toward right wing populism in the quality newspaper the De Volkskrant than in the tabloid newspaper De
24
Telegraaf. The last result is in line with existing literature on the relationship between
different kinds of media with right wing populism. Quality newspapers are more often critical toward populist-style politics, where tabloid news media are more attracted to this style of communication (Mazzoleni, 2008).
A possible explanation for not finding evidence for the influence of the outcome of the election on the tone toward right wing populism could be that is not the outcome of the election that affects the tone, but whether the outcome was the same as the expectation of the outcome by the newspaper. Furthermore, the earlier discussed different journalistic roles (Skovsgaard et al, 2013) may cause journalists to follow different guidelines during the campaign time than after an election. Journalists could have a more passive, neutral approach of providing information during campaign periods, but go back to the more critical, watch-dog approach after the elections. In future research, in-depth interviews could be held with political journalists, confronting them with the found results of this research. They could be questioned about their role perceptions and whether they (consciously) act in a different role during the campaign time than after an election.
The change in tone before and after elections should not go unnoticed. Effects of tone toward political parties should also be studied after the elections. This study found that there is more negativity after elections than before. If there is a lot of negativity toward right wing populism after they ‘won’ the election, journalist can be shining a negative light on a democratic
decision. It is important that further research in done to see what the impact is of such negative tone. Research on the effect of the tone of news coverage on the public during campaign time has been done (Eberl et al. 2017; Hopmann et al., 2010), but it is important that future research will study the effects of the tone of news coverage after elections also.
25 Future research, in order to make more precise conclusions, could also study the tone toward other parties and party leaders before and after elections. In this study, the negative tone of news coverage was only coded when it was directed at a right wing populist leader, party or right wing populism in general. It can be measured whether there is negative tone specifically toward right wing populism or toward political leaders in general, and whether the increase in negativity after elections also appears toward other political parties.
This research has some limitations. First of all, due to time limitations the amount of articles that were coded for each newspaper, before and after each election, was too low to get significant results for each individual election. Additionally only one newspaper was studied representing quality newspapers, and only one newspaper representing the tabloid
newspapers. It can be questioned whether these two newspapers are representative enough to make conclusions about quality and tabloid newspapers in general. The choice to only study to newspapers was made due to time limitations of this study. By only studying two
newspapers, more articles could be coded for each of the newspapers which enabled this study to do interesting analyses.
Despite these limitations, this study still provides some new insights that can be used in further political communications research. It shows differences between quality and tabloid media in their relationship with right wing populism. More importantly, it gives evidence for the difference in news coverage before and after elections, in both newspapers.
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30 Appendix 1. Codeboek
A: Algemeen A1: Codeur
Om de intercodeurbetrouwbaarheid te kunnen meten zullen twee codeurs dit codeboek testen. Iedere codeur krijgt een eigen code.
0 = Janneke 1 = Linde
LEES DE TITEL EN DE EERSTE ALINEA VAN HET ARTIKEL A2: Filter voor selectie
Het artikel wordt alleen geselecteerd wanneer minstens één van de zoektermen aanwezig is in de titel of de eerste alinea.
Voldoet het artikel aan bovenstaande eis? 0 = Nee
1 = Ja
Wanneer ‘Nee’ wordt ingevuld, hoeft er niet verder gecodeerd te worden. Wanneer ‘Ja’ wordt ingevuld, ga verder met A3.
A3: Bron van het artikel
Omdat er artikelen uit twee verschillende Nederlandse kranten gecodeerd worden, krijgen beide kranten hun eigen code.
Uit welke krant is het artikel afkomstig? 1. De Volkskrant
2. De Telegraaf A4: Artikel
Aan elk artikel dat wordt gecodeerd wordt een specifieke code toegekend. Uit deze code blijkt uit welke krant het artikel komt, en welk nummer het heeft. Er wordt rekening gehouden met een maximum van 1000 artikelen per krant. Wanneer het artikel uit de Volkskrant komt wordt een er een 1 voor het artikelnummer gezet, wanneer het uit de Telegraaf afkomstig is een 2. Voorbeeld: Je codeert het vijfde artikel uit de Volkskrant, de specifieke code voor dit artikel wordt dan: 10005. Of je codeert het 142ste artikel uit de Telegraaf, de code wordt dan: 20142. Code artikel: …..
31 A5: Datum van het artikel
Codeer de datum van het artikel, in de volgorde dag-maand-jaar. Datum: (DD, MM, JJJJ)
A6: Lengte van het artikel
Codeer het aantal woorden van het artikel zoals aangegeven in Lexis Nexis. Wanneer dit niet aangeven staat codeer ‘niet bekend’.
Aantal woorden: …
A7: Pagina van het artikel
Op welke pagina in de krant staat het artikel? Codeer de plaats van het artikel zoals aangegeven in Lexis Nexis. Wanneer dit niet aangeven staat codeer ‘niet bekend’. Paginanummer: …
A8: Soort artikel
Codeer welke vorm het artikel heeft.
Welk soort bericht is het meest van toepassing op het artikel? 1. Nieuwsbericht
2. Verkiezingsrubriek 3. Column
4. Opinie
5. Redactioneel commentaar 6. Interview met politicus 7. Interview met derden 8. Debat 9. Ingezonden brieven 10. Voetnoot 11. Magazine 12. Recensie 13. Debat 14. Advertentie? 15. Overig, namelijk.. LEES HET HELE ARTIKEL B1: Rechts populistische partij
Codeer de naam van de rechts populistische partij die genoemd wordt in dit artikel. Zie bijgevoegde lijst. Wanneer er geen partijnaam wordt genoemd, codeer dan ‘niet genoemd’. Partij: …
32 B2: Rechts populistische partijleider
Codeer de voor- en achternaam van de populistische partijleider. Zie bijgevoegde lijst. Wanneer er geen partijleider wordt genoemd, codeer dan ‘niet genoemd’.
Partijleider: … … B3: Artikel periode
Valt het artikel voor of na de verkiezingsdatum? Zie bijgevoegde lijst. Wanneer het artikel is gepubliceerd op de verkiezingsdag zelf, codeer dan ‘Voor’.
0 = Voor 1 = Na
C. Toon tegenover rechts populistische actoren
Geeft het artikel een positieve/bevestigende of negatieve/kritische indruk van de rechts populistische partij en/of de rechts populistische partijleider? De positieve en negatieve toon worden aan de hand van meerdere items gemeten.
Positieve toon tegenover rechts populistische actoren
Indicators van een positieve toon tegenover een politieke actor: omschrijving van triomf, succes, prestaties, vertrouwen, lof, complimenten, bekwaamheid, waardering,
overeenstemming en positieve eigenschappen. C1: Succes van rechts populisme
Is één van de onderwerpen van het artikel de triomf, succes en/of de prestaties van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Níet; succes als in winnen verkiezingen. Gaat om andere prestaties of successen zoals Winnen debat…
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C2: Waardering voor rechts populisme
Is er sprake van lof, complimenten en/of waardering vanuit de auteur van het artikel voor de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld: complimenten voor prestaties, manier van aanpak of waardering voor partijleider als persoon.
33 0 = Nee
1 = Ja
C3: Bekwaamheid van rechts populisme
Wordt er gesproken over de bekwaamheid en/of positieve eigenschappen van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld: worden de positieve politieke competenties besproken, of persoonlijke eigenschappen die zorgen voor het beeld van een goede, bekwame leider?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C4: Vertrouwen in rechts populisme
Is er sprake van vertrouwen van de auteur in de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld, wordt er gesproken over de betrouwbaarheid van de partij(leider), zijn/haar geschikte competenties of goede bedoelingen voor het publiek.
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C5: Overeenstemming met rechts populisme
Wordt er gesproken over overeenstemming van de auteur met de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C6: Verbetering van rechts populisme
Is één van de onderwerpen van het artikel de verbetering van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
34 Wanneer van toepassing. (Datum na verkiezingsdag)
Is er sprake van blijdschap om de winst of teleurstelling om het verliest van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
Negatieve toon tegenover rechts populistische politieke actoren
Indicators van een negatieve toon tegenover een politieke actor: omschrijving van fiasco, crisis, afwijzing, minachting, kritiek, aanvallen, schandaal, beschuldigen van wangedrag, beschuldigen van incompetentie, wantrouwen of negatieve eigenschappen.
C8: Mislukking van rechts populisme
Wordt er gesproken over mislukking, fiasco en/of schandaal van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld: persoonlijke schandalen en/of betrokkenheid bij politieke schandalen. Het uitlichten van gemaakte fouten of tegenslagen van de partij(leider)
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C9: Kritiek op rechts populisme
Is er sprake van het aanvallen van en/of kritiek op de rechts populistische partij(leider)? Bijvoorbeeld kritiek op persoonlijke eigenschappen van de rechts populistische partijleider of het afkraken of in twijfel trekken van het verleden, de aanpak of standpunten van de partij. 0 = Nee
1 = Ja
C10: Onbekwaamheid van rechts populisme
Is er sprake van een beschuldiging van onbekwaamheid en/of negatieve eigenschappen van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld: uitspraken over het niet geschikt zijn voor het (minister) presidentschap of het opstellen van een duidelijke politieke agenda. Of het niet kunnen waarmaken van gemaakte beloftes.
35 0 = Nee
1 = Ja
C11: Wantrouwen in rechts populisme
Is er sprake van wantrouwen in de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
Bijvoorbeeld: wordt er getwijfeld aan de oprechtheid/eerlijkheid van de partij(leider). Worden er dubieuze gebeurtenissen omschreven waardoor het vertrouwen in de partij(leider) in twijfel getrokken zou moeten worden.
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C12: Wangedrag van rechts populisme
Is er sprake van beschuldiging van wangedrag van de rechts populistische partij(leider)? Bijvoorbeeld: artikel gaat over het provoceren of misleiden van de samenleving door de partij(leider), respectloos gedrag/taalgebruik of misbruik maken van anderen voor eigen belang door de partij(leider).
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C13: Minachting tegenover rechts populisme
Is sprake van minachting en/of frustratie tegenover de rechts populistische partij(leider)? Bijvoorbeeld: frustratie over beloftes die gemaakt worden, maar niet na gekomen kunnen worden. Minachting tegenover de standpunten of aanpak van de rechtspopulisten. Of taalgebruik waaruit blijkt dat de samenleving er beter uit zou zien zonder rechts populisme. Wordt de rechts populistische partij vergeleken met fascisme uit de geschiedenis, zoals Nazi Duitsland.
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
C14: Reactie op verkiezingsuitslag
Wanneer van toepassing. (Datum na verkiezingsdag)
Is er sprake van opluchting om het verlies of blijdschap om het verlies van de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
36 D. Houding tegenover rechtspopulisme
Heeft het artikel een pessimistische of optimistische houding tegenover rechtspopulisme? Optimistische houding tegenover rechtspopulisme
Indicators van optimisme tegenover rechtspopulisme: geeft een indruk van positieve
ontwikkelingen die realistisch en/of mogelijk zijn. Omschrijving van positieve vooruitzichten en scenario’s, hoopvolle standpunten, potentiële voordelen of veelbelovende verwachtingen. D1: Positieve vooruitzichten
Wordt er gesproken over positieve vooruitzichten en/of scenario’s met betrekking tot rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
D2: Hoopvolle standpunten
Is er sprake van hoopvolle standpunten met betrekking tot rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
D3: Potentiële voordelen
Wordt er gesproken van potentiele voordelen van rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
D4: Veelbelovende verwachtingen
Wordt er gesproken over veelbelovende verwachtingen van rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
37 Indicators van pessimisme tegenover rechtspopulisme: geeft een indruk van negatieve
ontwikkelingen die realistisch en/of mogelijk zijn. Omschrijving van negatieve vooruitzichten en scenario’s, kritieke ontwikkelingen, negatieve verwachtingen of potentiële dreigingen. D5: Negatieve vooruitzichten
Wordt er gesproken over negatieve vooruitzichten en/of scenario’s met betrekking tot rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja D6:
Wordt er gesproken over kritieke ontwikkelingen van rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja D7
Wordt er gesproken over negatieve verwachtingen van rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
D8
Wordt er gesproken over potentiële dreigingen van rechts populisme/de rechts populistische partij(leider)?
0 = Nee 1 = Ja
38 Lijst met verkiezingen + partij + partijleider
Nederlandse Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 15 maart 2017 – PVV – Geert Wilders Nederlandse Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 12 september 2012 – PVV – Geert Wilders Nederlandse Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 9 juni 2010 – PVV – Geert Wilders
Nederlandse Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 22 november 2006 – PVV – Geert Wilders
Franse presidentsverkiezingen 23 april 2017– Front National – Marine Le Pen (eerste ronde) Franse presidentsverkiezingen 7 mei 2017– Front National – Marine Le Pen (tweede ronde) Franse presidentsverkiezingen 22 april 2012 – Front National – Marine Le Pen (eerste ronde) Franse presidentsverkiezingen 21 april 2002 – Front National – Jean-Marie Le Pen (eerste ronde)
Amerikaanse presidentsverkiezingen 12 november 2016 – Republikeinen - Donald Trump Brexit referendum 23 juni 2016 – Vote Leave – Boris Johnson
