The paradox of a non-emotive lexicon
A critical metaphor analysis of the EU’s adherence to a non-emotive lexicon in its security and counter-terrorism discourse
(MC Escher 1960)
By Liza Kamstra
Student Number: 11228695
June 2017
Master Thesis ‘Political Science: International Relations’ Research Project: European Security Politics
Supervisor: Dr. R. Bellanova Second Reader: Dr. R.M. Sanchez Salgado
2
Ascending and Descending
Yes, yes, we climb up and up, we imagine we are ascending; every step is about 10 inches high, terribly tiring – and where does it all get us? Nowhere (Escher 1960).
The illustration on the cover page of this thesis is a lithograph created in 1960 by the Dutch Maurits Cornelis Escher called Klimmen en Dalen (Ascending and Descending). It is one of the most famous images of Escher’s “impossible objects” collection. It shows human figures trudging forever upwards and eternally downwards respectively on an impossible four-sided eternal staircase (Poole 2015). Escher’s impossible staircase can be perceived as a visual metaphor for the paradox of the non-emotive lexical framework studied. An in-depth explanation of this is provided in sub-section 4.6 of this thesis.
3
Abstract
In 2005, a non-emotive lexicon was introduced in the preventative pillar of The European
Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, to prevent an unintended stigmatisation resulting from an
ill-considered choice of words, which can result in negative psycho-social effects and may contribute to the process of radicalization. Whilst this lexical guideline has largely been taken for granted since its implementation 12 years ago, and in consideration of the increasing apparentness of global terrorism in Europe today, this thesis analyses in how far the EU has accurately adhered to its own lexical guidelines.
Hence, this thesis has studied to what extent the EU has adhered to this non-emotive lexicon by means of a critical metaphor analysis and has done so through the lens of both social constructionism and securitization theory. In studying this adherence, it has examined whether this lexical guideline is securitization or simply a securitizing move.
The analysis of this thesis has demonstrated that the EU has used a range of metaphors in its documents and speeches on terrorism and counter-terrorism and much incoherence has shown to exist in terms of the implementation of these lexical guidelines. The EU has failed to adhere to the non-emotive lexical guidelines, and has consequently been unsuccessful in securitizing this lexicon. Furthermore, the non-emotive lexicon has shown to be self-contradictory in nature. An emotive lexicon has been used in the documents that define and explain how the non-emotive lexicon must be implemented. This has been referred to as the paradox of the non-emotive lexicon.
4 List of abbreviations CDA CFSP CMA CMT CTS EAS EU IR MCS MIP UNAOC US
Critical Discourse Analysis
Common Foreign and Security Policy Critical Metaphor Analysis
Conceptual Metaphor Theory Counter-Terrorism Strategy European Agenda on Security European Union
International Relations
Media Communication Strategy/Strategies Metaphor Identification Procedure
United Nations Alliance of Civilizations United States
5 Table of contents List of abbreviations ... 4 Table of contents ... 5 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 7 2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 11
2.1 Social constructionism as an alternative to social constructivism ... 12
2.2 Social constructionism explained ... 13
2.3 The role of lexicon through a constructionist lens ... 14
2.4 Securitization theory within a social constructionist framework ... 15
2.5 Units of analysis within securitization theory ... 17
2.6 Acknowledging the limitation of the theoretical framework ... 19
2.7 Concluding remarks ... 20
3.0 NON-EMOTIVE LEXICON ... 21
3.1 Introducing the EU’s non-emotive lexical framework ... 21
3.2 Terrorism and radicalisation defined and explained ... 22
3.3 Overview of the non-emotive lexical framework ... 23
4.0 RESEARCH DESIGN ... 24
4.1 Methodology ... 24
4.2 Introducing metaphor analysis ... 25
4.3 Critical metaphor analysis as a methodological approach ... 26
4.4 The operationalisation of critical metaphor analysis ... 28
4.5 Metaphor themes ... 29
4.6 The paradox of non-emotive lexicon and metaphor ... 30
4.7 Data collection ... 32
4.7 EU action plans, strategies and agendas ... 33
4.8 Speeches and statements ... 33
5.0 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ... 35
5.1 Theme 1: What is terrorism? ... 35
5.1.1 Terrorism is crime... 36 5.1.2 Terrorism is religious ... 37 5.1.3 Terrorism is evil ... 39 5.1.4 Terrorism is ideological ... 41 5.1.5 Terrorism is war ... 43 5.1.6 Terrorism is foreign ... 46 5.1.7 Conclusion of findings ... 47
5.2 Theme 2: Root-causes of terrorism ... 49
5.2.1 The handbook ... 49
6
5.2.3 Commission President speeches ... 51
5.2.3 Conclusion of findings ... 52
5.3 Theme 3: The values and norms of the EU... 53
5.3.1 The container metaphor ... 54
5.3.2 Contrasting civilisations ... 58
5.3.3 Conclusion of findings ... 60
6.0 CONCLUSION ... 61
7
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Metaphors are a powerful tool that can limit what we notice, highlight what we see and provide the inferential structure with which we reason (Lakoff 1991, p.481). Although many of us may not consciously realise it, the conceptual system in which we live and the way we reason, experience and undertake everyday interactions is often influenced by metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p.3). A metaphor can be defined as “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (p.5). Not only are metaphors used on a daily, small-scale, individual level, the institutional discourses produced and published by large organisations, such as the European Union, are equally involved with metaphorisation (Drulak 2006). The ways in which the EU brings across key messages to its own officials as well as European citizens is an issue that has received increasing attention, specifically in the field of counter-terrorism (Council of the European Union 2005).
The relationship between the use of metaphors and emotions has been studied by many scholars (Davitz & Mattis 1964; Drulak 2006; Fainsilber & Ortony 1987; Lubart & Getz 1997; Gross 1983; Emanatian 1995; Mio 1997) and they have shown that metaphors create an ambiguousness that allows them to stir emotions. Hence, an emotive word-use for the discussion of issues relating to security and counter-terrorism may result in misunderstandings that can lead to an unintended stigmatisation and negative psycho-social effects (Council of the European Union 2007). For this purpose, the EU has presented a non-emotive lexical framework in its 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS).
The Counter-Terrorism Strategy was introduced to provide a unified framework to combat global terrorism, making Europe safer, whilst respecting human rights and allowing the Union’s citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice (Council of the European Union 2005, p.6). This strategy consists of four main pillars to prevent, protect, pursue and respond to global terrorism. Within the preventative pillar, the development of a non-emotive lexicon was introduced for the discussion of issues related to counter-terrorism and radicalisation, which is the focus of this thesis. This lexicon must ensure that the EU’s policies do not exacerbate any division that may result in negative externalities (p.8). Following the introduction of this lexicon in the CTS, its precise meaning and intentions were further clarified in the Media Communication Strategies1 (MCS) of 2006 and 2007 and these two strategies
1 The Media Communication Strategies will be referred to as both ‘MCS’ and ‘handbook’ interchangeably
8
combined, comprise the ‘handbook’ of the non-emotive lexicon that will be studied in this thesis. This handbook defines the purpose of this non-emotive lexicon as:
Unintended stigmatisation resulting from an ill-considered choice of words may have serious negative psycho-social effects […] This is not a matter of empty political correctness, but stems from an astute awareness of the EU’s interests in the fight against radicalisation (Council of the European Union 2007, p.16).
The handbook provides a clear overview of what is to be considered ‘emotive’ and ‘non-emotive’ lexicon. For example, a non-emotive lexicon is one that “is not confined to one belief system or political persuasion […] and rejects any attempt to identify one religion or civilization with terrorism” (Council of the European Union 2006, p.7). Moreover, the non-emotive lexical framework stresses that terrorism is not an ideology (p.33) and “the EU avoids any terms that could imply a direct causal link between, for example, socio-economic conditions (which are often cited as ‘root-causes’) and terrorist acts” (p.28). Interestingly, the new 2015 European Agenda on Security (EAS) discusses the tackling and prevention of terrorism and radicalisation as:
Terrorism in Europe feeds on extremist ideologies. EU action against terrorism therefore needs to address the root-causes of extremism through preventative measures. Throughout the EU, the link between radicalisation and extremist violence is becoming ever clearer (European Commission 2015, p.14).
This quote states that terrorism is ideological, which is, according to the lexical framework, ‘emotive’ lexicon. Also, it discusses the ‘root-causes’ of extremism, which is a term that the non-emotive lexical framework clearly prohibits. The EAS has therefore used an emotive lexicon.
This thesis has analysed the lexical framework introduced above with the use of critical metaphor analysis (CMA). Overall, CMA largely analyses how a target domain is mapped onto a source domain, allowing the target domain to be viewed in light of the source domain (Spencer 2012, p.396). For example, in the metaphor terrorism is ideological, the target domain, terrorism, is mapped onto the source domain, ideological. Furthermore, CMA has shown to be an excellent method to analyse the paradoxical nature of the non-emotive lexicon. A paradox in this context refers to the emotive lexicon that has been implemented in the handbook of the non-emotive lexicon, to define and describe the non-emotive lexical framework. Whilst the EU portrays itself as an entity that promotes the use of a non-emotive
9
lexicon to prevent any misunderstandings in the communication of EU policies on security, it has used an emotive lexicon to clarify its non-emotive intentions (Council of the European Union 2007). This indicates the self-contradictory nature of the non-emotive lexicon and the counter-intuitiveness of this lexicon will therefore be examined in this thesis.
A combination of social constructionism and securitization theory2 has been
implemented to study the adherence of the EU to this lexical framework. Hence, this thesis has based its analysis on the social constructionist assumption that the EU is an authoritative discursive entity. Social constructionists argue that knowledge is constructed within communities of ‘meaning-making’, and this ‘meaning’ has been constructed through the interaction of social groups (Young & Collin 2004). This thesis refers to the EU as an ‘authoritative discursive site’ and this therefore suggests that the EU is a community that has constructed and utilised a certain lexicon specific to that community and has the authority to implement such a lexicon (Jackson 2007). Moreover, the securitizing nature of this lexicon has been studied, by analysing the adherence of the EU to this lexical framework. Neal (2009) has indicated that, for an issue to become securitized, it does not necessarily need to be accepted by a public audience. This audience may equally consist of bureaucrats, experts and political professionals (p.337). Within this study, the audience therefore refers to the bureaucrats, experts and political professionals of the EU.
The preventative pillar of the CTS previously introduced has become increasingly relevant and the Europol TE-SAT report of 2016 indicates that the overall threat to the security of the EU has increased in recent years and remains on an upward trajectory (p.6). The report outlines that the EU has experienced a significant rise in the number of incidents caused by terrorist attacks (p.5). Due to this growing threat, the Council has stressed the importance of the reinforcement of efforts both at national and EU level and has referred to terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist financing as the main threats to the internal security of the Union. Monar (2007) has further claimed that, whilst Europol’s TE-SAT reports frequently use emotive lexicon such as ‘Islamist extremism’, the EU’s CTS consistently uses very neutral language (p.297). Monar is not the only scholar that has recognised the EU as a promoter of neutral, non-emotive, lexicon. Jackson (2007) equally argues that the EU’s discourse in relation to terrorism is considerably more neutral than that of the US. However, whilst counter-terrorism discourse in the US is a topic that has received a large amount of scholarly attention
2 Although this thesis has adopted a British spelling, ‘securitization theory’ and ‘securitize’ are predominantly
written in American spelling in the existing academic literature and will therefore be written in American spelling in this thesis.
10
(Jackson 2007; Winkler 2006; Jackson 2005; Collins & Glover 2002; Murphy 2003; Silberstein 2002; Croft 2006), overall, the study of the EU’s counter-terrorism discourse has not been as prominent.
Those studies that have focused on counter-terrorism discourse in the EU have mainly studied media discourses (Spencer 2012; Lule 2004; Hülsse & Spencer 2008). This research has largely been done on a member state level, comparing media outlets between countries or within one country. Furthermore, other studies (Bakker 2015; Ranstrop 2009; Coolsaet 2008) have focused on the comprehensiveness, implementation and consistency of EU policies on counter terrorism, concentrating mainly on the causes of radicalisation and recruitment in the EU. This thesis does not set out to analyse the causes of counter-terrorism in the EU, however, it focuses purely on the lexical framework that has been implemented and used to discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism. Although previous scholars have applied discourse analysis to the EU’s counter-terrorism policies, the focus on the non-emotive lexicon implemented by the EU in 2005 has largely been overlooked. Moreover, most of the literature considered above focuses on rather old discourses on counter-terrorism. Since the EAS of 2015 has only recently been established, the literature on this newly introduced strategy is scarce.
Thus, although a vast amount of literature has analysed counter-terrorism discourse in the EU in general, there appears to be a lack of explicit focus on this non-emotive lexical framework as introduced by the EU in 2005. To this end, this thesis will focus on the following research question: To what extent has the EU, as an authoritative discursive site, adhered to the non-emotive lexical guidelines introduced in the European Union’s 2005 Counter-Terrorism
Strategy? To provide a comprehensive answer to this research question, it has been divided
into three sub-questions, including:
1. What kind of lexicon has the EU used to explain the non-emotive lexical framework in the Media Communication Strategies of 2006 and 2007?
2. Has the EU adhered to a non-emotive lexicon in the new 2015 European Agenda on
Security?
3. In how far has the non-emotive lexical framework influenced the lexicon that has been utilised by the EU Commission Presidents since the implementation of the non-emotive lexical framework?
These sub-questions focus mainly on what this non-emotive lexicon is and how it should and has been applied. Therefore, understanding why this lexicon has been adopted by the EU is not
11
the aim of this research. Spencer (2012) has indicated that it is difficult to claim that metaphors shape or ‘cause’ politics, as they are only one of a range of devices that play a role in the discursive construction of reality. Furthermore, the underlying intentions of metaphor usage are equally difficult to grasp (p.399). For this reason, this thesis purely focuses on the what and the how, instead of the why.
To answer this research question, this thesis is structured as follows. First, the theoretical assumptions guiding this research will be discussed. Both social constructionism and securitization theory will be introduced and their overlapping and complementing characteristics are clarified. Moreover, the link between social constructionism, securitization theory and metaphor analysis is examined and discussed. Once the topic has been placed within the theoretical framework, the key concept, non-emotive lexicon, is introduced and defined with precision. An overview of the main non-emotive lexical guidelines will be provided and the handbook of the non-emotive lexicon is discussed. Next, critical metaphor analysis is explained and the way it has been operationalised within this thesis is examined. Furthermore, the key documents and speeches that have been analysed will be listed and justified. Nine metaphor sub-themes have been identified to guide the analysis of these documents. These nine sub-themes have been grouped into three overarching metaphor themes. These include: (1) What is terrorism; (2) Root-causes of terrorism; (3) The values and norms of the EU. The analysis section of this thesis has therefore equally been divided into these three overarching themes. The conclusion will refer to interesting topics for future research that, unfortunately, were beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis examines the adherence of the EU to a non-emotive lexicon through the application of a critical metaphor analysis. The methodological approach applied in this thesis has incentivised the choice of theory that has been used. The theoretical framework consists of two complementing theories. Whilst social constructionism is used as the overarching theoretical framework (Bruffee 1986), it is complemented by securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998). This thesis does not intend to merge these two theories together. Instead, it situates itself in this wider theoretical approach to further develop a more specific theoretical framework. It therefore uses these two theories in combination, to understand and explain how a non-emotive lexicon has been introduced and adhered to in and by the EU. This thesis recognises the EU’s non-emotive lexicon as a social construct and, by examining whether this socially constructed
12
lexicon has been adhered to, the securitizing nature of this lexicon will be confirmed or disproved. The following section introduces both social constructionism and securitization theory and outlines why these two theories complement each other. Furthermore, it discusses the units of analysis that will be examined in this thesis as well as the social constructionist and securitizing nature of the non-emotive lexicon.
2.1 Social constructionism as an alternative to social constructivism
Prior to explaining the social constructionist framework that has been implemented in this thesis, it is important to note that social constructivism is a more prominent theory in international relations (IR) (Checkel 1998). Wendt (1992) is one of the key scholars that has developed a social constructivist argument in IR. He predominantly argues counter to the neorealist claims introduced by Waltz (1979), that self-help and power politics do not follow logically from anarchy and that, if we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to social process and interaction rather than a fixed structure (p.395). Thus, the social structures that exist in our society are a result of social interaction. Furthermore, Adler (2013) has indicated that constructivism has gone through several notable changes since Wendt, which has affected its location on the map of IR theory today (p.112). One of these changes includes that constructivism has been developing in parallel directions with other theories, and there has been a growing attempt to build bridges between approaches, showing that analytical eclecticism has been taking root in IR theory (ibid).
Moreover, Young and Collin (2004) have argued that constructivism, constructionism and constructive have been employed so idiosyncratically and inconsistently, that they have been used as terms that can be discussed interchangeably (p.375). Although there is a bridge between social constructivism and social constructionism, these two theories differ in a range of aspects and must be discussed with utmost discretion. Social constructivism, which is the more common theory in IR, mainly differs from social constructionism by having a more individualistic nature (ibid). Whilst constructivism proposes that each individual mentally constructs the world of experiences through cognitive processes, constructionists argue that knowledge is sustained by social processes and strongly relies on social action (pp.375-376). This thesis criticises social constructivism similarly to Young and Collin (2004) by claiming that the theory relies too heavily on individually sovereign processes of cognitive construction to understand social interaction (p.376). Instead, social constructionists argue that knowledge and truth originate within communities of meaning-making, and that knowledge is the product of our social practices and interactions between social groups (pp.376-378). Social
13
constructionism is a more suitable theory for this study, precisely due to this community focus. This thesis analyses how a non-emotive lexicon has been introduced and adhered to in and by the EU as a community actor and basis its analysis on the assumption that the EU is an authoritative discursive entity. By studying the EU as a whole, rather than separate entities, and therefore arguing that the understanding of language in the EU has been community generated, the social constructionist understanding of social learning is a more suitable framework for this thesis (ibid). Furthermore, whilst social constructivism has been more prominent in IR, social constructionism has a long history in the field of linguistics (Thorpe & Holt 2004). Since this thesis predominantly focuses on language, this theory is more applicable to the methodology that has been implemented.
2.2 Social constructionism explained
The concepts and practices associated with social constructionism have a long history in disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and linguistics. The key overlapping tenet of social constructionism in all fields is that knowledge of the world, as well as our understanding of human beings, is a product of human thought rather than grounded in an observable and external reality (Thorpe & Holt 2004, p.222). This concept is not new, as it is grounded in thought that was sparked around fifty years ago by Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Bruffee 1986, p.774). Kuhn understands scientific knowledge as: “Intrinsically
the common property of a group or else nothing at all” (Kuhn 1970, p.201). Building on Kuhn’s foundation of social constructionism, Bruffee (1986) explains that a social constructionist position in all disciplines assumes that:
Entities we normally call reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on are constructs generated by communities of like-minded peers. Social construction understands reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves and so on as community-generated and community-maintained linguistic entities – or, more broadly speaking, symbolic entities (p.774).
Social constructionists therefore challenge the traditional ‘realist’ assumptions that the existence of the ‘self’ can be described similarly to an object and claim that the constitutive role of language in our everyday lives is of vital importance (Crossley 2003, p.288).
Furthermore, social constructionists view the social world as humanly produced in on-going activity of routines, yet it becomes experienced as being objective, in that it affects our lives on an on-going basis. Thus, jointly constructed understandings of the world through
14
routinisation and habitualisation form the basis for shared assumptions about reality (Cunliffe 2008). This has equally occurred in the EU’s non-emotive lexical framework, with a range of metaphorisation becoming habitualised and routinised. For example, the linkage of migration to security has become so habitualised, that we often fail to recognise the stigmatising and psycho-social effects this linkage may have on migrants, even without the presence of intentional stigmatisation (Huysmans 2000). For instance, this nexus can also be retraced in the EAS of 2015, which has indicated that:
This Agenda has to be seen in conjunction with the forthcoming European Agenda on Migration, which will address issues directly relevant to security, such as smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, social cohesion and border management (p.4).
Within this quote, the target domain, migration, is directly mapped onto the source domain,
security, resulting in the metaphorisation of migration. Migration is mapped not only as a
security matter, but as an issue of high priority that is directly relevant to security. Although the non-emotive lexicon states that: “Internally, the EU seeks the active support of all citizens, of whatever social, cultural or religious background, in the fight against terrorism” (Council of the European Union 2006, p.7), the linkage of security to migration, perhaps unintentionally, marginalises a large section of society.
2.3 The role of lexicon through a constructionist lens
Social constructionism provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of discourse and therefore links well to the methodological framework of CMA. Potter et al. (1993) have claimed that language derives its significance in human affairs from the way in which it functions within patterns of relations and have called discourse analysis largely constructionist in nature. Moreover, Guo (2013) has shown that, when we see the world through a particular metaphor, it can form the basis of our action. He states that:
When metaphors begin to be accepted by more and more people, individual cognition will turn into social cognition. Accordingly, the perspective provided by the metaphors would become the subconscious, which people can hardly feel, let alone challenge (p.477).
Guo (2013) claims that, once a new metaphor comes into being in our conceptual system, our perception of the world and behaviour subsequently changes. As soon as a certain lexicon has become accepted within a certain community, it vests itself into our subconscious, and we fail to acknowledge its influence. Furthermore, he states that dominant groups may take advantage
15
of their social power and make their metaphors the prevailing ones. Therefore, the acceptance of these metaphors results in the approval of the construction of power and result in the loss of our ability to acknowledge the use of certain metaphors as well as the securitization of these metaphors (Guo 2013, p.477). Acceptance is an integral part of critical metaphor analysis as well as securitization theory, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
The subconscious nature of metaphors becomes specifically important when applying CMA to the EU’s counter-terrorism discourse. This is largely because the EU’s discourse on terrorism is much subtler than that of the US. For example, Jackson (2007) outlines how the US employs more explicit and unambiguous words when discussing terrorism. The US refers to terrorism as ‘acts of war’ or ‘evil’ (p.238). On the contrary, the EU adopts a more metaphorical word-use when discussing terrorism. Phrases such as ‘the struggle against terrorism’ or ‘the fight against terrorism’ are used, rather than defining terrorism as a war (Council of the European Union 2006). However, although the EU does not implicitly define terrorism as an act of war, it adopts several metaphors that indirectly have the same meaning. For example, the EU has used phrases such as:
Even though Europe is proud to be a soft power of global importance, we must not be naïve. Soft power is not enough in our increasingly dangerous world (Juncker 2016b).
Hard power is often characterised as involving military action, and the EU is therefore indirectly referring to an act of war. It is these less explicit expressions that CMA sheds light on, and social constructionism and securitization theory provide a comprehensive framework to study the acceptance of these ambiguities.
2.4 Securitization theory within a social constructionist framework
Whilst securitization theory in IR is more commonly discussed in relation to social constructivism, securitization theory nevertheless fits well into the social constructionist framework explained above. Columba Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010) stress that securitization begins by ‘saying security’, indicating an explicit constructionist component to securitization. Securitization theory defines security as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998, p.24). Securitization theory thus extensively focuses on the
construction of threats, rather than the real existence of a threat. Therefore, although it does
not deny the real existence of a certain threat, it focuses on the dramatisation of these threats. Issues may become security issues by means of their social construction, presentation and
16
acceptance as such, rather than their real threatening qualities (Columba Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, p.78).
Furthermore, securitization theory shares the community focus of social constructionism. Columba Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010) state that securitization involves “constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (p.78). Therefore, they focus on a collective understanding and response. Moreover, Buzan et al. (1998) argue that:
The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”) […] In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as security, and agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (p.26).
The labelling of issues as a security threat indicates the social constructionist nature of securitization. The task is thus to understand the process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered, and collectively responded to, as a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, p.26). By studying the construction of a non-emotive lexicon of the EU, it is precisely this process of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be threatening, and what lexicon is stigmatising, that will be examined.
Moreover, for securitization to be successful, a securitizing actor must be in a position of authority. This actor must have enough social and political capital to mobilise an audience and legitimise a security move (Columba Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, p.79). This authority is often placed in the hands of ‘security experts’ who are assumed to have the knowledge and capacity to make legitimate decisions (ibid). This is directly related to the non-emotive lexical framework, in which the Commission and Council have been given authority to draft and decide upon the guidelines (Council of the European Union 2006).
A vital component of securitization theory, is the acceptance of a securitized issue by a relevant audience. The importance of acceptance is likewise found in the theory of social constructionism, as constructionists stress that a community must accept a certain construct as their objective reality. Watson (2012) has indicated that audience acceptance remains rather unclear within securitization theory. He has introduced acceptance as “avoiding the escalation
17
of public opposition” (Watson 2012, p.284). On the other hand, the OED3 defines acceptance
as: “The action or fact of willingly receiving something offered or given, assenting to a proposal or a state of affairs, or of agreeing to undertake a task or take up a role” and in this thesis, acceptance is therefore studied in the form of adherence to the non-emotive lexicon.
Within the non-emotive lexical framework of the EU, an audience can be examined on two different levels. First, the audience can consist of the EU’s interlocutors and officials that are supposed to adhere to this lexicon. Second, the audience can consist of the European citizens who read the reports and listen to the speeches of these officials. This thesis will focus on the former, since it is examining the adherence to the lexicon. Neal (2009) has indicated that there is no methodological prescription that states that the audience must be a public audience. This audience may therefore also consist of bureaucrats, experts and political professionals (p.337). Thus, by examining whether the EU’s experts and political professionals have adhered to the non-emotive lexicon introduced in 2005, the securitizing nature of this non-emotive lexicon can be determined.
Watson (2012) has argued that, while an audience is empowered in that it must accept a certain construct for it to become securitized, it is nevertheless embedded in power structures in which they have limited knowledge and hold a less privileged position than the implementing actors (p.286). However, since the audience in this context is the EU itself, the implementing actors and the audience hold a similar power structure.
2.5 Units of analysis within securitization theory
To study securitization, three units involved in security analysis must be examined, including: (1) Referent objects; (2) Securitizing actors and; (3) Functional actors.
Referent objects are things that are portrayed as being existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan et al. 1998, p.36). In this study, the referent objects are the basic values on which the EU is founded. These values are not only portrayed as being threatened by terrorism, more importantly, they are threatened if terrorism is spoken of in an ‘emotive’ way. All member states adhere to the basic principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Council of the European Union 2006). These basic values have created a distinction between those actors that adhere to them
3 The Online Oxford English Dictionary (OED) has been used, because it is widely regarded as the accepted
authority on the English language. It is an unsurpassed guide to the meaning, history, and pronunciation of 600,000 words – past and present – from across the English-speaking world. Information has been retrieved May and June, 2017, from: http://www.oed.com. Any quotes and definitions used from the Online Oxford Dictionary will therefore be referenced as ‘OED’ in this thesis.
18
and those that have a different world view. This has created an ‘us’, that is potentially threatened, and a ‘them’ that is potentially threatening. This division will be discussed in more detail further on in this thesis and has been be referred to as the container metaphor in chapter 5.3.1. The container metaphor is a type of ontological metaphor in which some concepts are represented as having an inside and outside (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, pp.29–30). Throughout the documents that will be studied in this thesis, the values of the EU are characterised as having an inside and outside, thus representing a container. The inside of this container, referring to those that share the same values and norms, are portrayed as being more superior than the outside of the container. For example, in his speech at the ECSA World Conference, Barroso has indicated that:
Europe cannot be an island of peace in a sea of instability. We have to take our responsibility in an interdependent world […] the EU thus serves as an anchor of stability in its neighbourhood and far beyond (Barroso 2004, pp.2-3).
The EU thus intends to protect these ‘inside’ values (the referent object) by implementing efficient counter-terrorist strategies, in which the non-emotive lexicon has become an integral component.
The second unit of analysis, the securitizing actors, refers to the actors involved in declaring the referent object as existentially threatened (Buzan et al. 1998, p.36). In this study, the securitizing actor is the EU as a whole. The EU is viewed as a unitary actor and as an authoritative discursive entity. This may be seen as a limitation of this thesis, because a European political identity is still largely interpreted differently through different national contexts and it could be argued that Europe should not be treated as a single policy (Neal 2009). Applying securitization theory to the EU rather than to states is more challenging, as it is difficult to define who represents the ‘EU’. Moreover, Neal (2009) has indicated that security moves cannot be considered equal to securitizing moves in national political contexts, as these involve a wide range of reports and analysis in the media and provoke a large public debate (p.336). However, Jackson (2007) has indicated that the EU’s discourse, including written and spoken texts from official EU bodies and office-holders, can be accepted as portraying the collectively agreed perception of the EU as an organisation as a whole (p.236). Although the securitizing actor is the EU as an organisation as a whole, this thesis mainly focuses on discourses produced by the officials of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union and considers these discourses as speaking for the EU as an organisation as a
19
whole. When applying securitization theory to the EU, it can be difficult to identify the key securitizing speakers of the EU’s complex institutional framework (ibid). However, the MCS of 2006 (Council of the European Union 2006) has indicated that it is the task of both the Council and the Commission to develop a common lexicon and these two institutions are thus the key actors involved in the formation of a non-emotive lexicon.
Lastly, the third unit of analysis is the functional actors. The functional actors are those that affect the dynamics of a sector without being the referent object or the securitizing actor (Balzacq 2005). Buzan et al. (1998) give the example of a polluting company, which can be a central actor in the environmental sector without being the referent object or the securitizing actor (p.36). In this thesis, the functional actor is slightly more difficult to explain and takes a different turn. Although Buzan et al. (1998) indicate that the functional actors are not the same as the securitizing actor, in this thesis, they are. Since the audience of this securitizing move is also the EU, the functional actors in this study refer to the EU as an audience of its own securitizing move. This is rather uncommon in the application of securitization theory, as the functional actors are generally always distinct from the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, p.36). Furthermore, in many studies that apply securitization theory, the audience of a securitizing move is a public audience. However, Neal (2009) has argued that there is no methodological prescription which says the audience must be public, and can equally consist of bureaucrats, experts and political professionals (p.337). This thesis therefore argues for a slightly different theoretical perspective on the functional actors of securitization.
2.6 Acknowledging the limitation of the theoretical framework
Securitization theory has inevitably received a range of criticism. The first criticism relates to ‘societal security’, which was developed by the Copenhagen School, referring to “the ability of society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Columba Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010, p.85). This has been criticised by scholars who argue that identities are fluid and change over time (ibid). Buzan et al. (1998) have opposed this argument by claiming that they do not treat identities as objective and given, but that identities, once mobilised, are something that people perceive to belong to. By combining social constructionism with securitization theory as the theoretical framework for this thesis, it argues similarly to Buzan et al. by stating that identities are not objectively given, yet socially constructed and open to re-construction and change. Furthermore, Wilkinson (2007) has defined securitization theory as the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ (p.7). This refers to the tendency of the non-traditional approaches to security, specifically that of the Copenhagen
20
school, to assume that the European westernised model should define what the international system is for all times and places. The Euro-American model of the state and political culture is often portrayed to be valid globally (ibid). Critics have therefore called securitization theory a westernised Euro-American model. This criticism is also apparent in the metaphor analysis discussed in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) book, which has been used extensively in this thesis, in which they discuss metaphors in a particular culture, yet fail to clarify which culture they are referring to. For instance, they state: “The argument is war metaphor is one that we live by in this culture” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p.4). They take for granted that it ‘this culture’ is not evident. However, since this thesis solely studies the role of the EU in counter-terrorism discourse, this criticism has been overcome.
Additionally, one of the criticisms of studies that implement securitization theory is their profound focus on written discourse (Hansen 2011). Hansen (2011) argues that there is a growing sense within Security Studies, as well as in IR more broadly, that images need to receive further theoretical and empirical attention (p.51). He further states that, since constructivists have indicated the significance of emotions for international politics, the study of image is vital, due to their ability to evoke emotions (Hansen 2011, p.53). This thesis argues that securitization studies not only lack the focus on images, but also falls short in incorporating metaphors into its analysis. Balzacq (2010) indicates that securitization is an “articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor” (p.3). He therefore demonstrates the importance of metaphors in the study of securitization. Fischhendler (2015) equally shows that the literature on securitization highlights the use of linguistic tools, including metaphors, framing and narratives, to portray urgency (p.4). These scholars therefore indicate the importance of metaphors in the study of securitization theory. However, there seems to be a lack of CMA in the study of securitization, and the link between the two is rather absent in much of the literature. This thesis thus adds to the existing literature on securitization theory by incorporating metaphors.
2.7 Concluding remarks
Overall, social constructionism and securitization theory combined provide a comprehensive framework to study the adherence of the EU to a non-emotive lexicon. Not only do both theories stress the importance of language in the construction of security threats, they also highlight the significance of the acceptance of this language, which is precisely what this thesis aims to study and explain. Furthermore, both theories justify the use of CMA, as they confirm
21
the ambiguity of language and social interaction. The next section of this thesis will introduce the non-emotive lexical guidelines that will be analysed in chapter five.
3.0 NON-EMOTIVE LEXICON
3.1 Introducing the EU’s non-emotive lexical framework
The EU’s CTS was first introduced in 2005 to prevent, protect, pursue and respond to global terrorism. Within this strategy, a non-emotive lexicon was introduced as part of the preventative pillar, in the strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights and making Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice (Council of the European Union 2005). Whilst this non-emotive lexicon was introduced in the CTS, it was not until the 2006 and 2007 Media Communication
Strategies, that the lexicon was clearly defined and characterised. The non-emotive lexicon is
part of the task to promote voices of moderation over those of extremism for the discussion of relevant issues relating to the strategy to combat radicalisation and recruitment (Council of the European Union 2006, p.4). It therefore refers to any security issues related to both counter-terrorism and radicalisation in the EU. In general terms, this non-emotive lexicon can be defined as:
A common understanding of the possible connotations of a number of frequently used terms to reduce misunderstandings and facilitate more effective communication […] Misunderstandings may arise because certain words evoke different meanings and concepts among different people. Unintended stigmatisation resulting from an ill-considered choice of words may have serious negative psycho-social effects and thus contribute to the process of radicalisation (Council of the European Union 2007, p.16).
These frequently used terms are listed in section 3.3 of this chapter, in which the framework for the use of a non-emotive lexicon is explained.
Throughout both the 2006 and 2007 MCS, the non-emotive lexicon is presented as a framework for the entire EU, including all security discourses related to counter-terrorism and radicalisation. However, the action plan tasks the Council, in close consultation with the Commission, to draw up and develop the common lexicon (Council of the European Union 2006, p.1). These two institutions are therefore predominantly expected to adhere to this lexical framework and are the key securitizing and functional actors.
22
Overall, the revised MCS of 2007 summarises the non-emotive lexicon, outlining three main objectives. First, the lexicon must enhance the quality and accuracy of relevant discussions in institutions of the Union by enhancing knowledge, awareness and sensitivity among its users. Second, it must provide contextual and background information about the ways in which some commonly used terms may be understood by the EU’s interlocutors. Third, the lexicon must support the communication of the Union’s counter-terrorism policy in a more effective way by encouraging unanimity of language (p.17).
3.2 Terrorism and radicalisation defined and explained
Although the non-emotive lexicon has been implemented to guide all objectives that are directly or indirectly related to counter-terrorism (Council of the European Union 2006), most of the non-emotive lexical guidelines focus specifically on the use of the term terrorism and radicalisation and it is therefore important to outline how the EU defines these terms. In the revised MCS of 2007, the EU defines terrorism as:
Criminal acts (such as attacks upon a person’s life or physical integrity, kidnapping or hostage-taking, causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a public place or private property, seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of transport etc.) carried out with the aim of 1) seriously intimidating a population, 2) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any acts, or 3) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation (p.33).
The EU therefore views terrorism largely as a criminal act and discussing terrorism as a criminal act is thus not considered to be emotive lexicon. Moreover, radicalisation is a concept highlighted in the handbook that is mainly discussed in the context of terrorism. Bakker and de Graaf (2010) argue that all terrorists are radical but not all radicals are terrorists and that a clear distincion must be made between the two (p.5). This thesis acknowledges Bakker and de Graaf’s argument and equally does not claim that all radicals are terrorists. However, in the handbook, the EU discusses radicalisation mainly in light of terrorism, as it claims that radicalisation refers to a process whereby an individual may develop views that can lead to terrorism. The EU defines radicalisation as:
In the context of the fight against terrorism, its main usage refers to a process whereby an individual develops views which may lead him to support, and in extreme circumstances commit terrorist acts in order to further a ‘cause’ […] The EU and its Member States have
23
developed policies to tackle radicalization because the process could lead to terrorist behaviour in the future (Council of the European Union 2007, p.25).
Since the non-emotive lexicon aims to prevent any stigmatisation that can contribute to the process of radicalisation, and as a result terrorism, an emotive lexicon used in relation to radicalisation can be equally stigmatising as an emotive lexicon used in relation to terrorism. Thus, when the EU uses emotive language in relation to radicalisation by for example claiming that radicalisation is ideological, although this thesis does not claim that radicalisation is terrorism, it nevertheless argues that this is equally emotive as stating that terrorism is ideological. It is therefore not using radicalisation and terrorism as interchangeable terms, however, since the EU states that radicalisation is often used in relation to terrorism, this thesis nevertheless analyses those metaphors referring to radicalisation in the context of terrorism.
3.3 Overview of the non-emotive lexical framework
To provide a comprehensive overview, the table below has been made to summarise the key arguments put forward by the non-emotive lexicon in the MCS of 2006 and 2007. Overall, the non-emotive lexical framework states that:
Non-emotive lexicon Emotive lexicon
❖ Terrorism is a crime.
❖ Terrorism must not be identified with one religion or civilisation. ❖ Terrorism is not confined to one
belief system or political persuasion. ❖ Terrorism is not ideological.
❖ Terrorism is not evil. ❖ Terrorism is not war.
❖ Radicalisation denotes a process whereby a person or a group is radicalised or becomes radical, it is
not the same as radicalism, which
denotes the doctrines of practices aiming at fundamental changes in society.
−
❖ Terrorism can be identified with one religion or civilisation.
❖ Terrorism is confined to one belief system or political persuasion. ❖ Terrorism is ideological. ❖ Terrorism is evil.
❖ Terrorism is war.
❖ Radicalisation denotes a process whereby a person or a group is radicalised or becomes radical, it is the same as radicalism, which denotes the doctrines of practices aiming at fundamental changes in society.
24 ❖ Representatives of the EU dealing
with third countries must not use the term root-causes.
❖ Terrorism affects all, it is a global problem, and is not only foreign.
❖ The EU seeks the active support for
all citizens and provides security without differing between social,
cultural or religious backgrounds. ❖ The EU is determined to develop an
open, diverse and tolerant society with equal opportunities for all citizens.
❖ Representatives of the EU dealing with third countries can use the term root-causes.
❖ Terrorism does not affect all, it is
not a global problem, and is mainly
foreign.
❖ The EU seeks the active support for
its own citizens, by providing
security by differing between social, cultural or religious backgrounds. ❖ The EU is not determined to develop
an open, diverse and tolerant society with equal opportunities for all citizens.
(Council of the European Union 2006, Council of the European Union 2007)
The non-emotive lexical guidelines on the left of the table are retrieved from of the MCS of 2006 and 2007. Since the opposite of the non-emotive lexical guidelines on the left comprises an emotive lexicon, the guidelines in the row on the right have been formulated to complete and create a clear overview. This lexical framework, in combination with the metaphor themes that are introduced in chapter four of this thesis, are the guiding structure to analyse and answer both the research question and sub-questions. The next section explains how CMA has been implemented to analyse this non-emotive lexicon.
4.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 4.1 Methodology
This thesis applies a critical metaphor analysis (CMA) to examine the adherence to a non-emotive lexicon by the EU in counter-terrorism and security activity. Metaphor analysis has become more popular amongst IR scholars (Milliken 1996; Chilton 1996; Chilton & Lakoff 1999; Campbell 1998; Spencer 2012) and it has been applied to a range of topics, including European integration, immigration and security policy (Spencer 2012, p.394). However, metaphor analysis in the field of counter-terrorism has predominantly been applied to US discourses rather than those produced by the EU (Bhatia 2009; Kruglanski et al. 2008; Shimko 2004; Jackson 2007). These studies have largely focused on the way the US has used a range
25
of metaphors, such as war on terror, and the psychological perspective of the use of metaphors in the framing of counter-terrorism in the US (Jackson 2007). On the contrary, those articles that have applied metaphor analysis to the EU focus almost entirely on media discourse, rather than the discourses produced by the EU itself (Hülsse & Spencer 2008; Spencer 2012).
CMA consists of a combination of both critical discourse analysis (CDA) and conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Guo 2013). Critical metaphor theory is mainly concerned with intuition and focuses on the conceptual structures from which language naturally arises. CMA therefore primarily focuses on the cognitive dimensions of metaphor, stressing that it concerns both language and knowledge (Hart 2008). Instead of focusing on intuition, critical discourse analysis is contrarily more involved in examining the choice of discourse (ibid).
4.2 Introducing metaphor analysis
We can distinguish between two ways of understanding metaphors: a rhetorical understanding and a cognitive understanding. The former understands metaphors as purely rhetorical tools that replace one word with another and focuses on ways to make speech sound nice(r). This type of metaphor is mainly used in literature. On the contrary, cognitive linguistics goes beyond this simplified understanding by arguing that metaphors are more than just words (Spencer 2012, pp.395–396). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have indicated that metaphors structure how we perceive, how we think and what we do. They explain this by providing a simple example:
Argument is war (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p.4). This metaphor is reflected in our everyday
language and structures an everyday activity. Although we may not consciously notice it, this metaphor is used in almost every argument. Examples include (p.4):
Your claims are indefensible
He attacked every weak point in my argument His criticisms were right on target
I demolished his argument
I’ve never won an argument with him
This indicates that metaphors are often implicit. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), we not only talk about arguments in terms of war, but we can actually win or lose an argument. Lakoff and Johnson claim that this is one of the many metaphors that “we live by” in this culture; the war metaphor structures the actions we perform in arguing (ibid). They however do not clarify which culture they are referring to.
Within cognitive linguistics itself, we can further distinguish between two types of metaphor analysis, including the agent-focused approach and the critical approach. The
26
former is very similar to critical discourse analysis as it examines hidden agendas and intentions of agents. The latter has been put forward by Charteris-Black (2004), who has argued that “metaphors are potentially powerful weapons as they can influence the way we perceive a certain social reality. Metaphors have the potential to influence human beliefs, attitudes and consequently actions.” (p.29). By focusing on the construction of a social reality, this critical understanding of metaphors fits well into the social constructionist framework. It portrays metaphors as having the power to shape and structure the interpretation of a certain social reality.
4.3 Critical metaphor analysis as a methodological approach
The methodology that will be used in this thesis has flourished from the critical approach introduced in section 4.2. Although CDA and CMT are usually considered as two separate methodological approaches, a number of scholars (Guo 2013; O’ Halloran 2003; Koller 2004; Hart 2010; Chilton 2005) have argued that these two approaches combined provide a more extensive methodology and this combination has flourished into CMA. Most scholars that study security discourses implement a critical discourse analysis method, however, CDA faces criticism for its lack of attention to the cognitive aspects of communication (Guo 2013). Guo (2013) argues that a choice of metaphor is governed both by individual as well as social resources. The former comprises mainly cognition, emotion and pragmatic and linguistic knowledge whilst the latter refers to an ideological outlook, as well as historical and cultural knowledge (p.476). Therefore, a combination of pragmatism and cognition produces a better methodology. This methodological approach has not previously been applied to the study of emotive lexicon in the EU’s security policies and provides a unique perspective.
Although CMT provides a better explanation of metaphor comprehension and its experiential basis, it fails to answer the question why certain metaphors are preferred over others (Guo 2013, p.476). This thesis does not intend to explain why the EU uses metaphors in their policy documents and reports and their ulterior motives, nor is it claiming that these metaphors are the driving factor to combat counter-terrorism. However, CMA does provide a better framework to understand why and how often certain metaphors have been chosen in a
certain context.
CMA provides an appropriate method for this study, because, whilst the EU portrays itself as an entity that abstains from an emotive lexicon in counter-terrorism discourse, this thesis analyses whether it nevertheless, with the use of metaphors, triggers emotions amongst its citizens that create a similar result as an emotive lexicon. In this thesis, this has been referred
27
to as the paradox of the non-emotive lexicon, which will be discussed in more detail in section 4.6. Metaphors can influence the way we understand and interpret a certain social reality. Since the focus of this study does not lie on why a certain lexicon is used by the EU, an approach based purely on critical discourse analysis is an inefficient approach. Although the US explicitly uses an emotive vocabulary when discussing terrorism, such as ‘criminal acts’ and ‘acts of war’, the EU’s word-use is much more obscure (Jackson 2007). Therefore, the study of counter-terrorism discourse in the EU requires a deeper analysis, hence the examination of metaphorical language.
In their book, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have indicated that:
Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experiences coherent. In this sense, metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies ( p.156).
As mentioned above, Lakoff and Johnson explain this quote with the example of the war metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p.156). They indicate that the war metaphor generates the perception of an ‘enemy’ and a ‘threat to national security’. This threat required setting targets, reorganising priorities and outlining a new strategy. This war metaphor thus highlights certain realties, whilst it leaves others undisclosed. This not only creates a certain view of reality, but it also legitimises a policy change. The acceptance of this metaphor provides grounds for a certain action (p.156). This links directly to securitization theory, since this theory claims that, for a threat to become securitized, it must be accepted by society. Furthermore, it also relates to social constructionism, as it focuses on the social construction of reality to create community-maintained linguistic entities.
Furthermore, Spencer (2012) has shown that the central idea of metaphorisation is that metaphors map a source domain and a target domain, allowing the target domain to be viewed in a new light (p.396). The difference between the source domain and the target domain can be explained using the same metaphorical example as the previous paragraph. By claiming that
terrorism is war, we are mapping the target domain, terrorism, onto the source domain, war.
Target Domain Source Domain (Terrorism) is mapped onto (war)
28
Terrorism is now associated as something that is warlike, and we understand terrorism through interpreting it as an act of war. The source domain may therefore be viewed as a metaphor to discuss the target domain. Thus, instead of claiming ‘this is an act of terrorism’, it has now been changed to ‘this is an act of war’, with war being a metaphor for terrorism.
4.4 The operationalisation of critical metaphor analysis
The choice of CMA as the methodological approach for this thesis inevitably creates limitations. Since one of the main criticisms of CMA is its subjectivity, a group of researchers (Group 2007) have developed a tool called Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) to minimise this subjectivity. MIP is a complex procedure that involves a large number of analysists to check the reliability of metaphorical interpretation (Group 2007). It is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis to adopt the entire MIP procedure. Nevertheless, an extensive share of the MIP procedure has been implemented in this thesis to minimise the subjectivity of metaphor interpretation. MIP consists of four basic steps, which are outlined in the table below.
(Group 2007) These four steps have been incorporated into the methodological framework of this thesis. Several tables will be provided in chapter five to show how MIP has been used in the analysis. Not all tables have been included, because this disrupts the flow of the analysis chapter and results in repetitiveness. By placing these metaphors into a particular context and by examining the role that this discourse has played in understanding security and counter-terrorism in the EU, this methodological framework provides the ideal balance between cognition and pragmatism in CMA. Metaphors will therefore be identified with the use of both target and source domains as well as MIP.
Step 1 Read the entire text/policy document/speech that you wish to analyse to understand and establish its general meaning.
Step 2 Determine the lexical units in the text-discourse (this can be a single word, a part of a word or a chain of words) that are relevant to your study.
Step 3 A For each lexical unit in the text that you have chosen to analyse, establish its meaning in context, that is, how it applies to an entity, relation or attribute in the situation evoked by the text.
B For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context.
C If the lexical unit has a more basic current-contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it.
29
4.5 Metaphor themes
To efficiently adopt a CMA approach and to organise the findings and conclusions, nine metaphor sub-themes have been identified to code and examine the documents consistently. These metaphor sub-themes include:
Theme 1: Theme 2: Theme 3: Theme 4: Theme 5: Theme 6: Theme 7: Theme 8: Theme 9: Terrorism is Crime Terrorism is Religious Terrorism is Evil Terrorism is Ideological Terrorism is War Terrorism is Foreign Root-Causes Container Metaphor Contrasting Civilisations
The table above provides an overview of the metaphor sub-themes that have been analysed in this thesis, however, a detailed explanation of what they entail is provided in chapter five. These metaphor themes were not developed prior to analysis. Instead, they were identified during the first MIP step, which refers to reading the entire document or speech and understanding and establishing its general meaning (Group 2007). Thus, these themes were identified in an inductive manner. During MIP step 1, the documents that are analysed in this thesis were coded with the use of the Atlas.ti software. The most reoccurring codes were chosen as metaphor sub-themes. With the chosen metaphor sub-themes, the documents were coded again, and the findings of this are provided in chapter five.
The metaphor sub-themes outlined in the table are not only present in the documents that have been analysed, they also directly link to, and overlap with, the non-emotive lexical framework that has been previously introduced. The non-emotive lexicon supports several of these themes; however, it rejects the use of and support for most the themes listed above. These nine sub-themes have been grouped together into three overarching themes to structure the analysis. These three themes include: (1) What is terrorism; (2) Root-causes of terrorism (3) Values and norms of the European Union. Chapter five has therefore been divided into these three main themes and will provide an in-depth explanation and examination of these metaphor themes.
30
4.6 The paradox of non-emotive lexicon and metaphor
Through studying the non-emotive lexical framework of the EU, this thesis analyses whether its implementation is paradoxical in nature. This paradox refers to the emotive lexicon that has been used by the EU to describe and characterise the non-emotive lexical framework. In both the MCS of 2006, as well as the revised document of 2007, an emotive lexicon is present, whilst these two documents are the key reference points for understanding the non-emotive lexical framework. For example, the MCS of 2006 explains that a non-emotive lexicon includes the rejection of any attempt to identify one religion or civilisation with terrorism (p.7). However, three lines further, the document states:
Whilst terrorists kill indiscriminately, the current wave of terrorism has made more victims in Muslim countries than elsewhere (p.7).
Although within this quote, and within the entire document, the EU does not claim that Muslim countries are the source of terrorism, Islam is nevertheless the only religion mentioned in the document (three times to be exact). Therefore, this document does, indirectly, associate one type of religion with terrorism. This is only one example of the many self-contradictory statements that will be analysed and discussed in chapter five. The implementation of this non-emotive lexicon can thus be viewed as a paradox, since an non-emotive lexicon has been used to define a non-emotive lexicon.
The existence of this paradox raises several questions, the first of which is what the relationship between emotions and metaphors is and whether there is even such a thing as metaphors without emotions or emotions without metaphors. The relationship between metaphors and emotions has been studied by several scholars (Davitz & Mattis 1964; Drulak 2006; Fainsilber & Ortony 1987; Lubart & Getz 1997; Gross 1983; Emanatian 1995; Mio 1997). Fainsilber and Ortony (1987) present empirical proof that there are certain things whose descriptions appear to invoke more use of metaphorical language than others (p.240). They study the vividness hypothesis introduced by Ortony (1975), which suggests that metaphors may help to capture the vividness of phenomenal experience and metaphors may paint a richer picture of our subjective experience than may be expressed by literal language (p.241). Fainsibler and Ortony (1987) link this to emotions, and indicate that the existing literature on the linguistic expression of emotions suggests a relatively high incidence of figurative language use (ibid).
