Introduction
1-5
Chapter 1 - War Memorials: Complex Memory Shaping Tools
6-17
Chapter 2 - Post-World War II Memory Directions
18-29
in Germany and Japan
Chapter 3 -
The Neue Wache: Revealing Three Centuries
30-43
of German War Memories
Chapter 4 - Yasukuni Shrine: Defining Japanese War Memories
44-59
between Religion and Nationalism
Conclusion
60-64
Images
65-76
Introduction
‘To be sure only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past. Which is to say, only for a
redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments’ Walter Benjamin.
This thesis is an interdisciplinary study of German and Japanese war memorials which involves the scrutiny of two case studies, the Neue Wache in Berlin and Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. These two national monuments were erected in the nineteenth century and have been reconfigured throughout three centuries to commemorate German and Japanese war dead, albeit in different ways, subject to the cultural and political tendencies of the respective countries.
The aim of this thesis is to consider war memorials through the lens of heritage and memory theory and from a multidisciplinary perspective. The objective is to establish if war memorials have a role in shaping collective memories of past wars and in the creation of national and international heritage discourses around past conflicts. My argument is that whilst war memorials are used to convey a specific image of war by the nation state, the message that they transmit is constantly mutating and influenced by the memorial’s own agency and that of the individuals that interact with it.
I have chosen to focus on war dead memorials in Germany and Japan, paying particular attention to memorials that commemorate WWII dead, and to use these two countries’ national memorials dedicated to the war dead as case studies. In Germany and Japan, the process of memorialisation and heritagisation of war has been extremely tortuous. This is a result of Germany and Japan’s history since their establishment as nation states, and throughout the first half of the twentieth century, which has been characterised by aggressive and expansionist behaviour. These policies culminated in WWII and ended when these nations lost the conflict. Therefore, in Germany and Japan it has been harder to integrate war dead memorials with the official image of the nation’s past and present that these countries want to project within their national discourse. The consequences of Germany and Japan’s past behaviour on an international level has also
influenced the way in which the commemoration of their war dead is perceived by other countries, particularly those that were directly affected by the two nations expansionist aims. As a consequence of these two aspects, commemorating the war dead in Germany and Japan is a complex exercise, often subject to criticism and controversy both within and outside their respective national borders.
In order to research war memorials and to establish the ways in which they convey certain messages, and how these messages are received, I will use a mix of methodologies. I maintain that it is only possible to fully consider the interactions between the different agents that create meaning around a war dead memorial, when it is scrutinised from different analytical perspectives. I will use heritage and memory theory as the framework within which I implement four different types of analytical work on the case studies. To coherently evaluate the case studies, I will use visual analysis, site analysis, critical text analysis and participatory observation. Using my findings, I will try to demonstrate that art and architecture, geographical location and written texts, all contribute to create a narrative for each of the case studies. I will also provide the reasons as to why this narrative is constantly changing and being perceived differently in relation to the memorial and the visitor’s agency. Ultimately, the point that I want to stress is that it is necessary to constantly monitor the ways in which war memorials are contextualised and perceived, because the message that they communicate to the public is not fixed. Conversely, their messages can be adapted by different agents. Furthermore, this exercise of critical observation seems quite relevant in the current times of a resurgence of nationalism and far right policies around the world.
This thesis is structured in four chapters. Chapter one will be dedicated to the theoretical framework of the thesis. I will outline the elements that characterise war memorials as a specific category of heritage sites. Consequently, I will provide an overview of the main theoretical strands on the topic of the memorialisation of war, but also of dark and dissonant heritage, and of the affective properties of heritage sites and architecture. I will also take into account the role that architectural features and location play in the existence of a war memorial. Laying out the main theoretical stances on memorialisation and war memorials is necessary to contextualise the controversial nature of war memorials in Germany and Japan, particularly those dedicated to, or
encompassing the casualties of WWII. In this chapter, I will also explain in more detail how I carried out my research using a mixed methodology, and what my aims and concerns as a researcher are. This should clarify the ways in which I collected new material to advance my argument.
Chapter two will focus in a more detailed way on how Germany and Japan have approached the representation of a problematic period of their recent past. Firstly, I will consider the path that led these two countries to war and the relationship between the two countries during that time. Secondly, I will discuss the ways that Germany has dealt with its role in WWII in the last seventy years, and what the main problems and causes of controversy linked with coming to terms with this past actually are. Consequently, I will provide a brief analysis of a group of national war dead memorials that were built in Berlin in the last twenty years. These memorials are under the patronage of the Federal Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, and are dedicated to specific categories of war dead, reflecting current German narratives on WWII. Afterwards, I will discuss Japan's approach to the memories of war and how it deals with a contested period of its national history. This will be followed by a brief analysis of the Hiroshima Peace Park and the Nagasaki Peace Park; two national war dead memorials that commemorate the victims of the two atomic bombs that U.S forces dropped respectively on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These sites memorialise what is arguably the most traumatic event in Japan’s war history, and they exemplify a certain approach to the commemoration of the war dead in post-WWII Japan. The scrutiny of these other selected memorials will be necessary in order to contextualise my case studies within the types of national memorial sites that can be found in Germany and Japan in relation to the war. I will also consider the different perspectives and messages that these sites offer to visitors. Moreover, this comparison will be important in order to understand the multiple issues that can arise with memorials dedicated to the war dead in two countries whose actions have been seen by other nations as the primary cause of most of the deaths that are being commemorated.
The next two chapters will be dedicated to the two war memorials that I have selected as case studies. One is the Neue Wache in Berlin, and the other is Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Both sites have national and international relevance, and have been war dead memorials for an extended
timespan, going back much further than WWII, as well as being outstanding example of German and Japanese architectural styles respectively. In addition to this, these sites have been reconfigured to encompass WWII dead, and this has been a cause of considerable controversy. These case studies also differ from each other in some characterising elements. The Neue Wache is a secular monument albeit with a quasi-sacral purpose, as its temple-like architecture and the presence of the war dead entombed there suggests. Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine and therefore a religious institution. However, at Yasukuni the separation between the secular and the religious is quite blurred given its political involvement, and its pre-war establishment as a State Shinto shrine. The differences between the two sites also include geographical, political, and cultural differences. This has led me to make the choice to not compare the two war memorials with each other, but to analyse them separately whilst using the same methodological approach. In this way, I can use them as examples in order to argue that different countries attempt to shape their nations’ collective memory of war in different ways, and I will explore why this is important in reinforcing their national narratives.
Chapter three is the first to be dedicated specifically to the case studies. In this chapter, I will analyse the Neue Wache in Berlin. This monument has a long history as it was originally built in the nineteenth century as a guard station, and only became a war dead memorial after WWI; a role it has maintained up to the present day. An unusual fact about this monument is that it has been selected to be a national war dead memorial throughout the decades by all of the various political forces that came to power in Germany since its inception. This seems to be due to its location and to its neoclassical shape, which immediately brings to mind Germany’s Romantic Golden Age. In order to discuss the role of this monument in the memorialisation of WWII in Germany, and its importance for the heritagisation of WWII’s history in the country, I will analyse it in different ways; carrying out visual and site analysis, as well as critical text analysis and participatory observation.
The last chapter is the case study of Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. This Shinto shrine is a place to commemorate Japan’s war dead, who have been enshrined here from the 19th century until after WWII. The shrine has given rise to controversies on multiple occasions; for instance when men considered to be Class A war criminals were enshrined there in 1979. Yasukuni can be
considered as a symbol of the complex relationship between the practices of Shinto and the country’s politics, but also, not unlike the Neue Wache, as an example of how the geographical and aesthetic properties of a building can consolidate its role as a site of memory. To investigate Yasukuni Shrine, I will use the same methodological approach that I have used to analyse the Neue Wache, which is comprised of a mix of visual and site analysis, critical text analysis, and participatory observation.
I will conclude this thesis by bringing together the main arguments and findings that I have discussed throughout it, in order to highlight what has surfaced from my research. This will be important in establishing what I have learnt from the scrutiny of the memorialisation of the war past in Germany and Japan, and through the analysis of my case studies.
Chapter One - War Memorials: Complex Memory Shaping Tools
Theoretical Framework
This thesis wants to explore the role of war memorials in shaping collective memory of war by investigating two national memorials that also commemorate the casualties of WWII in Germany and Japan. I have chosen these memorials because the role that these two countries have had in this conflict still has a great impact on the way in which these nations build their respective national identities. Moreover, the patterns of acceptance and denial of these countries and their citizens’ role in the conflict, as well as the ways in which they have dealt with the resulting sentiments of guilt and shame, have an important function in how they are perceived by other countries and in their international relationships with them. These circumstances and the memorials that resulted from them have long been scrutinised from a heritage and memory perspective. Nonetheless, as heritage is constantly reviewed to fit the present, there is still a need to reevaluate Germany’s and Japan’s approach to this pivotal moment of their recent past. Clearly, the events of WWII have also been analysed under the lens of history, but what is relevant for this thesis is the way in which they have been ‘repackaged’ over time through the lens of heritage.
Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, 6), offer a clear explanation of the difference between history and heritage by stating that: ‘History is what a historian regards as worth recording and heritage is what contemporary society chooses to inherit and to pass on.’ The authors continue their argument by saying that in heritage studies the current and potential future uses of the past are at the centre of attention, and that the main focus is on the interpretation of a product, such as a site or an exhibition, that is consumed (ibid.). This point is important for this thesis because the fact that heritage can be repackaged means that the message contained in war memorials can be reshaped to suit different political trends. Therefore, it is necessary to always maintain a critical approach to war memorials to be able to recognise how collective memory of past conflicts is being shaped in the present.
War dead memorials are places where private citizens as well as institutions mourn and remember the war dead. The twentieth century has seen a change in the manner in which war and the war dead are memorialised in relation to the new developments in warfare that have characterised the modern age. As argued by Capdevila and Voldman (2006), the technological advances that have led to mechanised warfare have not only had the consequence of increasing the number of dead and wounded on the battlefield, but also amongst civilians. This meant that the ways in which the war dead were commemorated had to be adapted to include these new casualties of war, deal with the greater number of people to commemorate, and ultimately celebrate their death as necessary for the perseverance of the nation. The other main change in the way that the war dead have been commemorated is also partially connected to the practices of modern warfare, and has to do with the centrality of victimhood in war discourse. Since the 1920s, heroism in the depiction of the war dead was increasingly substituted with victimism, and the violence suffered, particularly by civilians, became the focus of war memorialisation (ibid., 16).
This way of representing war and its casualties, and the focus on commemorating the victims of mass killings and genocides and their suffering, has become increasingly prominent after WWII, and it has consequently influenced war memorials. The traditional methods used to mourn the war dead had to be adapted to be able to encompass the sheer numbers of civilians who had to be commemorated, alongside regular soldiers. This meant that public ceremonies in which private citizens and institutions could both commemorate the dead, became a central part of war remembrance, and a way to honour the dead’s often unwilling, sacrifice. Thus, the war dead memorial became the place where public mourning and private mourning could meet in order to reinforce the memories of the dead and to highlight that their death was not in vain, but for the sake of the nation (Capdevila and Voldman, 2006, 126-127).
Layering commemorative events and war memorials with historical traditions also provides a way to contextualise the dead’s sacrifice as being part of the wider history of the nation. This is important to consolidate what Jan Assmann (1995) defined as cultural memory, which constitutes a community’s collective memory of a past they do not have direct links with. Cultural memory is to be seen in opposition to communicative memory, which is produced by a group in connection to events that they have lived through which are destined to disappear with
them. In the case of the war dead; these two types of collective memory can often overlap- as there could be a real memory connection with the dead commemorated, but also the cultural memory of the war dead as part of the nation’s historical narrative. This is perhaps clearer in memorials such as the Neue Wache and Yasukuni Shrine, both of which commemorate the WWII dead, as well as victims of conflicts of whom there is no longer a direct memory within the community.
War memorials thus, could be considered as a specific category of heritage sites- created with the ultimate scope of presenting war as having been an intrinsic element of society throughout history, and thus commemorating its victims over time. In order to do this, as argued by Beckstead et al. (2011, 195) :
Narratives and stories of the past are thus objectified and embodied in physical artifacts and commemorative practices; they present possible ways of acting in the present and immediate future. It is through the objectification of memory in memorials, monuments and other material objects that social and individual memory meet.
In this way, the war dead memorial becomes the physical link between the past, the present and the future, and the place where collective memories can be shaped. A place where the warfare history of a nation can be presented and contextualised for the public, and where suggestions about life and death, but also identity can be encoded (Beckstead et al., 2011, 196). The importance of war dead memorials then is not only linked to the messages that they contain, but also to their physical presence and appearance. Their materiality is necessary to reach the public and shape their memory. Consequently, it could be argued that these memorials have their own agency in creating memories by attracting human participation through visits and other commemorative rituals. Furthermore, the materiality of war memorials means that they not only include certain messages, but also help to spread them regardless of the group to which visitors belong. This is because material artefacts like war dead memorials are extremely important in producing feelings and thoughts regarding complex concepts, such as sufferance and death (ibid., 197-8).
As the physical expression of past conflicts, war dead memorials could also be considered as
are used to anchor memories in a time when collective memory of the past is slipping away. According to Nora, the erosion of memory is due to the ever faster pace of modern times, in which true collective memory is lost and replaced with monuments to memory. This view of memorialisation as a way to counteract the loss of memory in modern societies could easily be applied to the war dead memorials. In this case, the reorganised memories of the war are used to create both a historical consciousness of the past, and an emotional response to it in an otherwise inattentive and busy public. This is because, as also argued by Nora (ibid., 15-16), the reordering of memory through lieux de memoire implies a shift from an historical and social perspective, to a psychological and individualistic one. This results in the subjective interpretation of the message transmitted by these places, where memory ceases to be a spontaneous collective exercise, but instead becomes an individual duty. In his essay Nora (ibid.,19) advances another important point, he argues that for a place to be a lieux de memoire, there has to be a will to remember. Consequently, with the will being changeable through time, the existence of such places is intrinsically linked to their ‘capacity for metamorphosis’ and their ability to endlessly recycle their meaning to adapt it to all sorts of unexpected changes.
The mutating nature of sites of memory has also been highlighted by Jay Winter’s (1999, 20-1) writings on the topic of war remembrance and war memorials. He has defined war memories and memorials in general as having a ‘shelf-life’, depending on how memories are effectively rehearsed and kept alive through different strategies. This implies that memories are influenced by their social context, and the interactions and the material conditions of those that are remembering (ibid.) This is because collective memory can be defined as the individual memory ‘fashioned by the social bonds of that individual’s life’, but also as a ‘matrix of interwoven memories’ created by the intermixing of individual memories (ibid. 25-28). According to Winter it is necessary to combine these two definitions to gain an understanding of how memories of conflict are developed and maintained over time by those who he aptly calls ‘homo agens’. These agents include the state and civil society, which combine to influence individuals by attracting them towards their own representation of war memories. In order to do this, they use objects and monuments such as war memorials to facilitate the collective ritual remembrance of war, and thus extend the ‘shelf life’ of these memories (ibid. 29-30). This reveals the importance of war memorials as initiators of ‘spatial memory’, meaning that they can activate collective
memories through the rituals and symbols connected to them, initiating an exchange between the living and those being remembered (ibid., 38).
Whilst, as discussed above agents such as the state or groups within civil society can, and do, have a key role in shaping collective memory; it is also true that people that visit a heritage site such as a war dead memorial have their own agency, and in a way perform with it. According to Crouch (2015, 186), heritage sites affect visitors in many ways depending on an individual’s experiences and ‘heritage participates, as we participate, in cultural and geographical feeling and meaning’. This conveys that the meaning of a site can also change according to how visitors experience it through time. For instance, seeing a site again after having seen other similar sites, or after a significant event that has affected our life, can change our perspective on it. It is important to highlight this element in my thesis, because through my analysis of the case studies I will not only try to demonstrate that war memorials contain specific political and cultural messages, which can be passed on to the visitors. I will in fact, also maintain that individual agency plays an important part in the way in which the message of war memorials is received by individual visitors. This I would aver is due to what Michel de Certeau called ‘practices of everyday life’. These are those actions and behaviours that people adopt within the rules and obligations of the society in which they live. De Certeau (1984, 21) considered how not only discourse, but also objects such as those found in a museum, are marked by their uses, and he goes on to express how these uses:
[...] signify the operations whose objects they have been, operations which are relative to situations and which can be thought of as the conjectural modalizations of statements of practices; more generally, they thus indicate a social historicity in which systems of representations or processes of fabrication no longer appear only as a normative framework but also as tools manipulated by users.
This line of thought could also be applied to war dead memorials, because the monument, the text, and the artefacts, which are found in connection with them can be interpreted differently by various visitors. Therefore, it could be argued that the meaning of a war memorial can also be reinterpreted independently of the message that was embedded into it by the state and its institutions. According to De Certeau (1984, 28-29) the re-use of places are part of the tactics that people use to deal with the impositions of society. In the case of war dead memorials these
tactics could include for instance, using the space within the premises of the memorial, not as a place for sombre remembrance, but as a backdrop for pictures. Furthermore, visiting the memorial could serve not to commemorate the war dead, but to appreciate the place’s aesthetic beauty, or artistic value. Incidentally, as I will highlight in chapter three and four of this thesis, both ‘uses’ can be observed at the Neue Wache, and at Yasukuni Shrine.
Consequently, it could be argued that there is constant interaction between the war memorial as a physical object, the message encoded into it by the institutions, and the the people visiting it. The relationship between memory sites and the public has been recognised by various scholars, but it is still being researched and applied to case studies (Drozdzewski et al., 2016). The main point that has been advanced is that individual memory is constantly in construction and is influenced both by human and non-human agents (ibid., 14-15). The human body is seen as an active agent of memory, meaning that memories are not only created by what one sees, reads, and thinks, but also by what the body experiences. In addition to this, there is also the agency of the places of memory that anchor memories to a physical locus, which becomes an arena for memory making (ibid.,16-18). Therefore, I would aver that heritage sites such as war memorials contain the potential to galvanise memory through their physical features, the official messages that they are entrusted to convey by the institutions, and the individual visitors’ own personal agency. This also implies that the meaning of war memorials is constantly shifting and that- as Crouch (2015, 188) writes :
Matters of culture, of individual and shared relational participations in heritage, have the potential of affect upon, and being affected by, heritage, and heritage emerges from this as diverse, multiple, and open to mutual, complex and contradicting affects in the complexity of our feelings.
This restates once more that heritage and memory are fluid, constantly in construction, and influenced by a multiplicity of factors. In doing so, it highlights why there is a need to consistently review academic research on heritage sites and theories. This is because it is necessary to consider heritage sites as always in the making, and always different from before; the shifts in personal, public, and institutional perception of a site and of the past should always be taken into account.
War memorials are heritage sites that are erected in order to try to construct memories surrounding the negative events of a country’s history, and this makes the process of the establishment, and the changing of narratives within the place, often controversial. This is because it is deemed to be desirable to present national heritage as a linear narrative, which highlights the uniqueness of a nation and its people as far back in time as possible. However, some events in the history of any nation are bound not to fit within this narrative and give rise to dissonant heritage (Tunbridge and Ashworth,1996). When it comes to dealing with the heritage of war, the presence of dissonance is inevitable, and when the war is so recent and of such a large scale as WWII, dissonance becomes even stronger. In the case of Germany and Japan, both countries had to deal with the fact that crimes were committed within the context of war, whilst at the same time, their people also suffered as a consequence of policies that eventually resulted in the war being lost. Tunbridge and Ashworth (ibid., 95-113) highlight how in the specific case of war certain events can easily be interpreted differently by the various parties involved, which often results in controversy. This becomes apparent in the way in which sites of war atrocities can be hard to present to the public. These encompass war dead memorials that aim to commemorate the war dead, but also have to deal with the fact that the line between victims and perpetrators is often quite easily blurred.
As I will explain in more detail in the following chapters of this thesis, the dissonance described by Tunbridge and Ashworth can be observed in the WWII memorials in Germany and Japan, which are often the subject of controversy, both inside and outside their respective national borders. In connection to this, it is important to consider that heritage and memory can actually break the boundaries of the nation state. This is because some memories, and certain heritage sites can be meaningful outside the nations in which they have developed. Therefore, I would argue that in order to fully investigate war memorials in Germany and Japan, it is important to consider them from a transnational perspective, but without seeing them as being in competition with each other. This is an important element of transnational memory theory that has been forwarded by Rothberg, who has argued that competitive memories of victimhood can prevent countries from developing an effective transnational approach to the study of memory (Craps and Rothberg, 2011, 518).
Ultimately, the analysis of the memorialisation and heritagisation of a sensitive subject- in this case of a war that was lost, cannot be treated without considering morality. This is because the actions of the people involved in the war are scrutinised repeatedly in order to find justification for what has been done; and also because of the moral lessons that such places usually aim to convey (WIlliams, 2007). Bauman examines this topic in depth; considering how morality has been conceived in modern and post-modern times (1993, 38-61). He argues that in modern times the concept of morality was internationalised, while at the same time being shaped by the nation state. This meant that people were made to feel like they had to follow their nation’s moral stance, which was always truly universally right. In post-modern times the nation state has partly delegated this moralising role to a plurality of ‘communities’ divided by gender, race, and religion within the nation itself, whilst still aiming to convey the nation’s moral stance as a universal value. In the same way as before this has the consequence of delegating moral choice to the group to which one belongs to. What Bauman (ibid.,61) instead suggests is that morality is personal to the individual subject, who decides whether to abide to certain moral stances expressed by society:
We are not moral thanks to society (we are only ethical or law-abiding thanks to it); we live in society, we are society, thanks to being moral. At the heart of society is the loneliness of the moral person. Before society, its lawmakers and its philosophers come down to spelling out its ethical principles, there are beings who have been moral without the constraint (or is it luxury?) of codified goodness.
This point of Bauman’s argument is especially important for this thesis, as it reasserts once more the fact that one nation’s stance on what is right or wrong cannot became paradigm for another nation. At the same time it repositions morality as an intrinsic, but personal choice within society that can transcend the ethical rules imposed by a nation. By considering the events that are memorialised in Germany and Japan from this point of view, it is possible to consider the two countries’ differing approaches to war memories, without falling into a nationalistic or essentialist pattern.
Methodological Framework
According to Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, 14-5), heritage sites are encoded with messages that visitors have to decode. The process of decoding is usually hard as the encoders are often distant from the decoders, especially if these are tourists. Furthermore, the messages that are sent to local visitors and to tourists could differ altogether, and this could contribute to generating controversy around a site. This is also true for war dead memorials which, as I have explained throughout the theoretical framework of this thesis, are a specific category of heritage sites. Being neither German, nor Japanese, I have approached these memorials with a tourist’s gaze, albeit that of one who might have developed a more in-depth knowledge about these memorials than the average foreign visitor. This meant that when I visited the sites I asked myself such questions as: What is the message that foreign visitors gather from these memorials? Is it the same as that decoded by local visitors? What is the lesson about war and nation that these sites aim to convey and why? I tried to answer these questions through the use of a mixed methodological approach in order to gather data in different ways, so as to formulate a well-rounded study on war memorials. This will be also be useful to help understand why war memorials should be studied as an indicator of a country’s approach to the heritagisation of war past, and to the shaping of people’s collective memory of war.
In order to approach the topic of this thesis in an appropriate way, it is necessary to use different methodologies. The two sites that I have selected as case studies; as well as the other sites that I will discuss, are characterised by a complexity given to them by what they commemorate, by their visual rendering, and by the way people interact with them. This is why I have decided to use visual analysis, site analysis, participatory observation, and critical text analysis, to scrutinise each of them. Each of these methods will be combined together using different theories in order to corroborate my direct observations in the field.
Visual analysis will be used to look at the sites from an art historical point of view. This means that I will consider the monuments in a formal way, but also in relation to the art historical tradition of their countries. In the case of the Neue Wache in Berlin, I will pay attention to the artists and architects that have contributed to the site throughout its existence, and consider how their work has contributed to convey certain messages. I will consider Yasukuni Shrine in light of a Japanese artistic and architectural tradition, using visual analysis to consider the relationship
between the shrine and the Shinto tradition. I will also focus my visual analysis on the statues that decorate these two monuments using Laura Mulvey’s 1975 essay on the topic of male and female gaze, so as to consider how these statues might be perceived by visitors.
Site analysis will be focused on the monuments, but also on their surroundings. I will consider the area in which the memorials are located, and what their relationship is with the other monuments and buildings surrounding them. What are the lessons that these memorials aim to impart to the visitors, and how are they reflected in the composition of the sites? Have they changed throughout time? This is what I want to scrutinise through my site analysis. For instance, while carrying out the analysis of the Neue Wache, I will focus my attention on the role that this structure has in the landscape, and how it influences it, and how it is in turn influenced by the landscape, and by the people that visit the memorials. In order to do this, I will draw on recent theories by scholars such as Jacobs and Merriman (2011) about ‘practicing architecture’, which focuses on an analysis of how architecture might interact with the space surrounding it, which comprises human and non-human agents. Whilst in analysing Yasukuni Shrine, and more specifically the war museum within its premises, I will use Moser’s text on the educational value of exhibitions in order to question whether the way in which exhibitions are structured can lead visitors to certain conclusions. In addition to this, I will also take into account Williams’ (2007) theories on the function of objects within war memorials, and on the way that they are used to convey certain emotions, and to teach certain lessons.
As already mentioned, considering the way in which people interact with a heritage site is an important aspect to take into account when studying these type of sites. This is why I will use participatory observation as part of my methodology. This method of observing people’s behaviour, has been long used in anthropological research; as explained by Cappelletto (2009) and there are various ways to approach it. The researcher can be fully ‘participant’; by observing a group from within over a long time span, or it can be ‘passive’; wherein the researcher observes a group from a liminal position. This approach dictates that the researcher does not join a group, but takes notes of people’s behaviour on a particular occasion. I have decided to use this variation of the method as it works best when observing a great number of people in a performative context like visiting a memorial (ibid.). It also helps when the observation can only be carried out over a short period of time. With this kind of observation it will be possible to
consider how people behave right before, during, and right after visiting the memorial. Moreover, it will be possible to establish how long people spend at the memorial, and how they interact with the space and with other people, all without disrupting their experience. By gathering data about visitors I aim to consider what factors influence the ways in which they understand the site and relate to it.
The last type of methodology that I will use is critical text analysis. When it comes to heritage, it is important to remember that certain messages are also sent and received through a variety of texts. It is necessary to scrutinise these texts in order to highlight these messages. Critical text analysis implies the recognition of a social problem through the analysis of what is written about it. In this case, the discourse created by the text is seen as generating a certain knowledge, whilst at the same time legitimising it (Waterton et al., 2006, 343). I will use this methodology to analyse certain texts that provide information within the memorials, but also comments that have been written on the memorials by visitors on TripAdvisor. This online source will be useful to understand if the comments associated with these sites online reflect the behaviours of the visitors that I have observed during fieldwork.
I will use this mix of methodologies to analyse both my case studies, but considering the many differences that exist between them, I do not aim to carry out my research in the exact same manner, nor do I expect to achieve the same results from their scrutiny. In concluding this chapter about the theoretical framework and methodology of this thesis, I believe that I ought to spend few words on my positionality as a researcher. Palmer (2010) considered this aspect while writing about her ethnographic research on tourism in England, through which she highlighted the fact that the researcher’s own cultural background has an influence on their research. Nonetheless, she argued that this can be counterbalanced by the rigorous use of theory, and methodology, in order to contextualise the research findings within the field of studies in which they have been produced. As a researcher, I had to consider how my positionality as a Western European woman. who is neither German, nor Japanese, and who does not understand either of the countries languages; would influence my work. Whilst this clearly limited my ability to use certain sources, and to a certain extent to communicate; it has also had the effect of allowing me the ability to analyse these war dead memorials, from a complete outsider’s perspective, without preconceptions on either site. The fact that I had never visited these monuments before, also
allowed me to approach them in an unbiased way. Furthemore, having as case studies, two sites which have the same function, but are articulated in completely different ways, gave me the opportunity to showcase the ways in which a theoretical framework of heritage and memory studies, can be moulded to encompass different cultures.
Chapter Two - Post-World War II Memory Directions in Germany and Japan
Germany and Japan on the path to war
For different reasons, Germany and Japan had arrived late to the table of modernisation. This could have been one of the motives behind their anxiety to catch up with countries such as Britain, France, Soviet Russia, and the United States, in order to be reassessed as main players in the world order, rather than being overwhelmed by these other nations. Their intentions might have been similar, but the paths that brought Germany and Japan to become expansionist powers, and to create the premises for a war that was going to involve most of the world, were quite different. Neither included the perspective of an alliance between the two countries. (Gerwarth, 2015, 22-3). Nonetheless, at the end of the 1930s, the two countries formally became allies due to a series of pacts, which were also signed by Italy, whose expansionist aims, and internal politics had not varied much from those of Germany and Japan. The so called ‘Anti-Comintern Pact’ was ratified in 1937, and consisted mainly of a mutual agreement that neither country would help the Soviet Union, if it were to attack one of the signatories’ countries. This was the first sign that an agreement could indeed form amongst these expansionist and militaristic powers (ibid.). These countries had auspicated to reclaim their place in the international order through war, but they could not sustain each other sufficiently to achieve their aim. This is believed to be due to the immense geographical and cultural differences between Germany and Japan, as well as to the fundamentally opportunistic nature of their alliance (ibid., 39-40). Nonetheless, Germany and Japan have their demise in common, only surrendering after they had fought long past the point at which they had any hope of winning the war, with both countries suffering an incredible loss of both civilians and members of the military forces.
The ties between Germany and Japan did not survive the war; as the two countries sought to move past their experiences in different ways, influenced by their cultural tradition, and geopolitical positioning. Both nations were occupied by American forces after the war, and the strategy to reintegrate the two nations in the post war economy, and have them as buffers in order to keep communist countries at bay, was decided well before the end of the war (Dobbins
et al., 2008, 16-7). The intention was to have a local government through which the U.S could control the two countries. Denazification in Germany meant that many of the people in charge at any level were substituted while in Japan the political class, as well as the Emperor, were not removed from power in an attempt to avoid a transition to chaos. Thus, recreating an independent government that could rule democratically, was a faster and much smoother process in Japan, than it was in Germany. However, this also meant that the transition to democracy was carried out less thoroughly in Japan along with the process of reconciliation with neighbouring countries, and that of a recognition of historical responsibility (ibid., 34). Clearly, there was a degree of interference by the Allies; especially by the U.S, in the two countries’ policies in the post-war period. This was aimed at ensuring their economical redevelopment and their reintroduction to the international stage as Western allies in the Cold War. This is important to highlight, as it has influenced greatly the memory patterns and national narratives of both Germany, and Japan (Schmidt, 2016).
Germany, the unmasterable past and how to come to terms with it
By the end of WWII Germany was a country in ruins. Its cities had been thoroughly bombed by the Allies, and its people had suffered the many hardships of war; including hunger, homelessness, and sexual abuse. There was no certainty with regard to what the future of the country would be, but many Germans hoped for the development of a democratic, socialist and neutral nation. However, this was not to happen, as the Allies had decided to divide the country into zones of influence. On one side there would be zones controlled by the U.S, Britain, and France, with the other zone to be controlled by the USSR (Fulbrook, 2015, 112). This decision, in conjunction with the start of the Cold War, led to the development of two states: democratic West Germany in the areas occupied by the three Western capitalist powers, and Communist East Germany in the zone under the control of Soviet Russia. This division started in 1949 with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in the West, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East, which lasted until 1990. This separation had a deep influence on the way in which German identity and memory has evolved (ibid., 114-5). In the GDR, there was an attempt to legitimise the new state by looking back at Germany’s long multistate history, and by focusing attention on iconic historical figures such as Frederick II and Luther. A form of
denazification took place, aiming to remove key administrative figures, or to ensure their ‘conversion’ to the communist cause. Generally, Nazism was presented as a capitalist oppressing force, from which German citizens had been liberated by Soviet Russia. This approach reinforced the narrative of Germans as victims, and hindered East Germany citizens’ ability to fully review their role within Nazism, and also to deal with it appropriately (ibid., 244-47).
Conversely, the apparently thoroughly denazified Federal Republic of Germany- after the period immediately following the end of the war; in which people did not want to be confronted with the war and its crimes, embarked in a total reassessment of Germany’s role in the conflict. This was originally initiated by the youth movements in 1967 and became a fundamental aspect of West German nation building. At a time when the country was still divided, West Germans started to uncover the crimes of their ‘fathers’ and to work their way through the guilt and shame derived from this operation. This eventually led to the full recognition of the Holocaust first and foremost, but also to the ‘rediscovery’ of the narrative of German civilians as victims; especially after the reunification with East Germany (Hein, 2010, 149-150). According to Hampton and Peifer (2007, 378-85), this was due to a change in Germany’s memory culture, which was enhanced by the reunification that had changed the focus of collective memories. This is a result of the fact that after the war, West Germany had focused on memories of the country, and its newly formed allegiance with the U.S; memories on which a new national identity based on pacifist and democratic values, could be built. Conversely, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the memories of Germany as a Central European country were rekindled and aided by the new option of travelling to the East (ibid.). What is important, is that these memories have also led to the resurfacing of narratives linked to German victimhood, in connection to the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe after the end of the war.
Germany’s proximity with the countries that it had attacked during the war, especially France, also played a role in the country’s approach to the heritage of its recent past. This is because it was important to admit the mistakes made by Nazi Germany in order to rekindle positive relationships, which would pave the way to the establishment of common economic objectives in Europe. This process was also facilitated by the fact that France was involved in deciding the post-war destiny of Germany (Chirot, 2015, 65). Furthermore, as coherently argued by Chirot, it
is also important to mention that the admission of guilt by Germany has been positive for the country, whilst at the same time being useful for all the other European countries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, which had collaborated with Nazi Germany. This transfer of responsibility occurred in these countries, because it was easier to suppress internal guilt and shame by ‘othering’ these feelings as being the sole concern of Germany, particularly regarding their complacency with the Holocaust (ibid., 55-60).
Taking into account what has emerged earlier in this chapter, it appears that Germany has gone through a complex process to deal with its past, and to recognise the suffering that Nazi policies had caused, both before and during the war. Nonetheless, it is still important to stress that whilst Germany seems to have overcome its past through its contrition and the admission of guilt, victimhood has also played an important role in the repositioning of the German ‘everyman’ as a victim of the circumstances (Moeller, 1996). In addition to this, there seems to be another problematic aspect to the heritagisation and memorialisation of Germany’s WWII past. This aspect may be problematic, due to that fact that the official German heritage discourse might reiterate the perceived position of superiority of German culture by advancing the message that Germany and its people have been able, unlike others, to ‘master the past’. This aspect is largely debated amongst scholars, who have highlighted how Germany’s relationship with its Nazi past is still far from being solved (Muller, 2015; Langenbacher, 2010). Furthermore, this debate gains more significance in the light of the recent resurgence of Neonazism, especially in East Germany, and with the growing influence of far right parties in recent German elections.
Twenty first century war memorials in Berlin and the tension between inclusiveness and the categorisation of victims
The changes in memory narratives over the years has influenced the way in which war memorials have been developed in Germany. This means that some memorials, such as the Neue Wache, have been reconfigured over time to respond to these changes, but also that new memorials have been created for the same reason. I will discuss in detail the Neue Wache in chapter three of this thesis, but for now I will consider other memorials that are relevant to this argument. This will also allow me to contextualise the Neue Wache within the German
memoryscape. I have decided to scrutinise four memorials in Berlin that are linked with each other, but are each dedicated to a specific category of war dead. These memorials are: the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma of Europe Murdered under the National Socialist Regime, the Memorial to the Homosexuals Persecuted under Nazism, the Memorial for the Victims of National Socialist ‘Euthanasia’ Killings.1 These four memorials are all located quite close to each other; near the Brandenburg Gate and they have all been established between 2005 and 2014.
The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, was the first to be built after the institution of the Federal Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, which then also supervised the creation of the other three memorials. This memorial is the more prominent of the four, and includes an information centre that highlights the main events that are connected to the persecution of Jewish people across Europe. The memorial itself is known as the Field of Stelae and was designed by the American architect Peter Eisenman. More than 2.700 stone slabs are distributed over 19.000 square meters of paved ground. The slabs are all the same width, but they vary in height and inclination creating a wave like effect. Eisenman, the architect who designed the memorial, intended it as a critique to ‘all closed systems of a close order’ such as Nazism, that are characterised by a hyper rationality which is actually a sign that they have lost touch with human reasoning.
The second memorial to be built, was that dedicated to the Sinti and Roma, designed by Dani Karavan. This memorial is a well located at ground level and is filled with water in a clearing in Tiergarten. At the centre of the well, there is retractable stone on which a fresh flower is placed every day. On the memorial’s website, the architect states that this memorial was intended as ‘a site of inner sadness, a site for feeling pain, for remembering and not letting the annihilation of the Sinti and Roma by the National Socialist regime fall into oblivion’. Before the entrance to the memorial, there is a series of panels explaining the history of the Roma and Sinti deportations.
The third memorial to be built was dedicated to the homosexuals who were persecuted during Nazism, and was designed by duo of artists Michael Elmgreen and Ingar Dragset. This
1 All the following info on these memorials are available on the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe website: https://www.stiftung-denkmal.de (Accessed on 10-01-2019)
memorial is in the same park as the Sinti and Roma memorial and is opposite to the memorial to the Jews. The monument is a grey cube of concrete, not dissimilar from the stelae of the Holocaust memorial across the road, but it has an opening through which a short video of people kissing can be watched. The video is not always the same, in line with the artists’ idea that a monument should be treated like a living organism subject to change.
The fourth memorial’s intent is to commemorate the victims of the Nazi euthanasia programs. It is located at 4, Tiergartenstrasse on the grounds on which the mass killing of patients from clinics, and care homes was carried out. The monument was planned by architect Ursula Wilms, and landscape architects Nikolaus Koliusis and Heinz W. Hallmann. It consists of a 24 metre long concrete base sloping towards the middle, on which a blue glass wall is mounted, beside it there is an open air exhibition about the topic memorialised.
What is most interesting about these memorials is the debate that they have been subjected to since their inception. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe has been planned since the early-nineties, and it can be seen as part of the efforts that have been made in the newly united Germany to consolidate and unify certain memories of the war. The completion of a memorial specifically dedicated to Jewish victims; created with the approval of the Bundestag, and meant to have national relevance, raised the debate on whether there existed a hierarchy of victimhood. It was argued that perhaps this memorial would promote just such an hierarchy. According to the president of the Federal Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Uwe Neumarker (2012), this debate ended after the opening of the memorial, because it was well received by visitors. However, others have maintained that the reason why this debate might have subsequently quietened down, is connected to the opening of three more memorials dedicated to other victims of Nazism nearby (Zimmermann, 2007).
These different arguments reflect the relevance in Germany of the narrative of victimhood, which characterises the modern memorialisation of the war dead, but also highlights how this narrative can lead to controversy concerning which victims should be commemorated, and indeed how to do so. In connection to this, I would add that the fact that the Federal Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe was behind the erection of the other memorials, makes them appear like an afterthought intended to dim down these debates. This train of thought directly emerges from an observance of various elements which differentiate the
memorials. One such example being the visual and physical prominence of the Holocaust memorial, in contrast to the other memorials, which is also the only one complete with a fully equipped information centre. In addition to this, the website that provides information on all of the memorials is actually the website of the Murdered Jews memorial. On this website, there is much more space dedicated to the Murdered Jews Memorial, than there is to any of the others. The architectonic characteristics of the other memorials are also in line with the Holocaust memorial, with similar materials and shapes being used. It seems significant that these spatial, physical, and written elements, do not seem to put victims on the same level, but instead they are separated in virtue of the different reasons for which they were persecuted. Therefore, these memorials can be seen as characteristic of the German memorialisation of the war and its Nazi past, in how they communicate an admission of guilt, but also of how there is a fine line between inclusiveness and separation. Considering Nora’s theory behind the creation of lieux de
memoire, it would be interesting to monitor whether this trend will continue, perhaps with the
creation of more ad hoc memorials in the future.
Japan and the long road to reconciliation with the past
Whilst Germany has often been praised for the way in which it has fully recognised the crimes that were committed during the Nazi regime, the same cannot be said about Japan. Japan, as an island, is removed from its neighbouring Asian countries, which it had occupied during the worldwide conflict. In addition to this, it was not until a long time after the war had ended that China and South Korea- the main Asian countries that had been affected by Japan’s militaristic and expansionist aims, started to demand Japan’s recognition of its role in the war. They did so by insisting that Japan’s WWII crimes, which were committed to the detriment of the people of the occupied countries be recognised and apologised for. Interestingly, these demands have not prevented these countries from maintaining economic links with Japan (Chirot, 2015, 65). Similarly to Germany, in Japan in the late sixties, students were behind the first attempts to bring forward a full recognition of Japan’s role in the war. However, their demands were not embraced by the government, and they did not became part of the official national discourse
pertaining to the war (Hein., 2010, 149-150). Some of Japan’s leaders have tried in the past to issue apologies for the wrongs committed during the war, but this has neither been consistent, nor straightforward. In 1995 the Japanese National Diet passed a resolution commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII entitled: ‘Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History’ (Mukae, 1996, 1111-12). This document did not actually consist of a fully-fledged apology, but it recognised the role of Japan as a colonialist power, and it condemned the war. Interestingly, the resolution was not popular with the parliament, which found it too apologetic, whilst concurrently being criticised internationally for not being apologetic enough (ibid.).
In the last twenty years, the official policies of the government have still been a cause for debate. The main issue that is discussed is the need for Japan to fully recognise events such as the Nanjing massacre, and the coercion of women from occupied countries into prostitution (Hein, 2010, 151-3). It is interesting to note, that even if there are grassroots attempts to raise public awareness on these matters, the official position of the government does not follow them. These controversies, which also include the visits of Japanese state representatives to Yasukuni Shrine, and the acceptance of the Tokyo Trials, are collectively known as the ‘history problem’ (Saito, 2017, 2-4). The history problem also affects the way in which WWII, and the expansionist wars that Japan carried out in East Asia in the years before it, are portrayed to the Japanese people through official channels such as school textbooks. In these outlets, these wars are justified as Japan’s reaction to the colonisation of East Asia by Western powers. Furthermore, Japan is portrayed as the force that liberated Asia from the yoke of the West, and consequently was punished for this by the West; through military retaliation, and unfair punishments, such as the conviction of army exponents in the Tokyo Trials and occupation (ibid.).
The lack of a full acceptance of Japan’s role as perpetrator of war crimes is complemented and reinforced by the narrative of victimhood. This narrative is built on the fact that the country was not only extensively bombed by the Allies, but was also the first country ever to be hit by an atomic bomb. In early August 1945, when the war in Europe had already ended with the demise of Nazi Germany, the U.S president Truman decided to end the conflict in East Asia, and to accelerate Japan’s surrender by authorising the dropping of two atomic bombs over the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hein, 2010, 153-4). This has created the premises for what it is known as ‘dual victimization’, meaning that Japanese people have felt themselves both the victims of Japan’s war militarism and of the Allied forces. Throughout the years, this has hindered the discussion about responsibility and has resulted in a form of ‘negative pacifism’, which implies that although people are fundamentally against war, there is a sentiment that military defence is still necessary, but that this cannot be freely expressed (ibid.). This is further exacerbated by article 9 of Japan’s constitution, written under the U.S occupation of the country. This article states that Japan renounces using war as a means to settle international disputes, and also renounces the right to an army. In the past decades, many attempts have been made by different governments to change this article of the constitution, and to resume Japan’s role as a military force (Mukae, 1996).
Therefore the official Japanese discourse on WWII portrays Japanese people as victims of the war actions of the Allies, without contextualising those actions within the framework of Japanese aggression against other countries. Consequently, pacifism is recognised as a positive value, but because of the sufferance that Japanese people endured, and not because of the sufferance that Japan subjected the people they attacked to (Hein, 2010, 154). Bringing together these elements, it is possible to state that the two main issues that concern the memorialisation and heritagisation of Japan’s WWII past are linked together. The first is the result of the failure to fully recognise certain crimes that were carried out mostly against other Asian countries during the war. The second issue has to do with the with the portrayal of the Japanese people as ultimately being the victims of the war, and of the Allied bombing and warfare, which culminated with the controversial decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan.
Victimisation and the lesson of war at the peace memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Victimisation, as it was revealed earlier in this chapter, is considered to be a pivotal element of the Japanese approach to the memorialisation of its WWII past. The strength of this narrative is deeply connected with the reality of the trauma and devastation, which was consequent to the explosion of the two atomic bombs. Since the end of the war, there was a concerted effort to
keep the memory of what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive through the creation of peace memorials, in order to commemorate the victims of the atomic bombs. Therefore, I believe that it is important to briefly consider the ways in which these memorials fit into Japanese heritagisation and memorialisation of its WWII past. For this reason I will provide a brief analysis of the memorials that have been established in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This short analysis will be also important in creating a frame of reference through which to contextualise the memorialisation at Yasukuni Shrine, which will be scrutinised in chapter four of this thesis.
On the 6th of August 1945 the city of Hiroshima was the first place in the world to be hit by an atomic bomb. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was developed in the area where the bomb was dropped, which used to be a busy commercial downtown part of the city, and was completely destroyed by the detonation.2 The memorial that was completed in the mid-fifties was designed by architect Kenzo Tange, and it includes various monuments such as; the A-Bomb Dome, the Children Peace Monument, the Atomic A-Bomb Victim Cenotaph. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Hiroshima International Congress Hall, and the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims, which are also located in the perimeter of the park. The museum is an important part of the peace park and it focuses mostly on the day of the attack and on its aftermath, restating the view of Japanese people as the victims of the war, whilst providing little context as to what events led to the deployment of the atomic bomb. This is exemplified by the fact that little space is dedicated to the role of Hiroshima as a military city, both before and during the war, and only towards the end of the exhibition (Lee, 2018). The museum’s outlook, and the lesson that it aims to convey, is clear even without visiting the museum, by accessing their website; starting from the homepage which states:
A single atomic bomb indiscriminately killed tens of thousands of people, profoundly disrupting and altering the lives of the survivors. Through belongings left by the victims, A-bombed artefacts, testimonies of A-bomb survivors and related materials, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum conveys to the world the horrors and inhumane nature of nuclear weapons and spreads the message of ‘No More Hiroshimas’.
2 All the following info are available on the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park website: http://hpmmuseum.jp (Accessed 10-01-2019)
Taking this into account it also seems that the message conveyed at Hiroshima Peace Park is not to abolish war, but the use of nuclear weapons.
The peace park in Nagasaki, the city that was hit by the atomic bomb three days later, on the 9th of August 1945, is similar to that in Hiroshima.3 This park was also established in the fifties, and it includes a variety of monuments, a museum, and a memorial hall. Similarly to Hiroshima, the park is located in the area near the epicentre of the nuclear blast, and it includes the remains of old buildings that have become monuments, as well as newly erected commemorative sites. The museum also offers a similar narrative to its counterpart in Hiroshima, displaying objects that belonged to the victims, or that have been altered by the blast. Here too, the terrorising consequences of nuclear weapons are explained in great detail, unlike the causes that led to their use. In Nagasaki too the aim is to commemorate the victims, but also to promote a world free of nuclear weapons.
Having briefly, and by no means exhaustively, considered the main elements of Hiroshima Peace Park and Nagasaki Peace Park, it seems that these memorials, and the museum connected to them, try to teach a specific lesson. Scholar Debbie Lisle (2006) has argued that war museums use objects and displays in order to convey awe and terror to its visitors, and that they exhibit artefacts that showcase the sufferance that people endured during the war in a way that appeals to the voyeuristic tendencies of visitors. These strategies, she believes, are used to convey specific lessons of war. I would aver that in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; by focusing specifically on the nuclear bomb events, the lesson that is transmitted to the visitors and to the public at large is that nuclear weapons are terrible and should never be used again. The transmission of this message is aided by what Clark (2013) calls the ‘metonymic’ function of objects, meaning that these memorial objects, but also the monuments are used to represent and signify the victims; creating connections with the visitor. However, this lesson of war is somewhat incomplete as it highlights that nuclear weapons are wrong, but fails to convey the message that war itself is wrong and should not be pursued. This lesson thereby risks reinforcing Japan’s war narratives. It is quite clear that the establishment of these peace parks was important to overcome the trauma of the bomb, and it is understandable that people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki want to promote the
3
All the following info are available on the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Park website: https://nagasakipeace.jp (Accessed 10-01-2019)
message of pacifism. Nonetheless, these memorials cannot be seen as being separate from Japan’s official attitude to the memorialisation of its WWII past. Instead, these memorials display those elements of victimisation already discussed, and they also display a lack of recognition for Japan’s responsibilities regarding WWII, which have been recognised as characteristic of Japanese memory culture.
