MORAL OBLIGATION OR CULTURAL HERITAGE?
A
CASE STUDY ON WHY THEE
UROPEAN POWERS WERE DIVIDED DURING THEL
IBYA CRISIS OF2011.
WEELDEN, GERT VAN
LEIDEN UNIVERSITYMoral obligation or cultural heritage?
A case study on why the European powers were divided during the Libya crisis of 2011.
Thesis for MA History, Political Culture and National Identities
A thesis submitted to the Department of History, Leiden University, in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
Leiden, The Netherlands
24 April 2020
Gert van Weelden (s0935093)
Word Count: 27510
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. B. Schoenmaker
Second reader: Dr. T.W. Brocades Zaalberg
ABSTRACT: In 2011 Libya is torn apart by civil unrest in the form of an uprising against the
Gadhafi regime. The European powers are divided over the course they have to take. A unified
European response is also hindered by the different mandates the European governments
have regarding the use of force. This thesis seeks to find the reasons why the European states
diverged over a case in which they had a common interest in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’.
For this explanation, this thesis will focus on the political- and strategic cultures of France,
United Kingdom and Germany and the way they influence the parliamentary debates.
KEY WORDS: France, Gadhafi, Germany, Libya, Operation Unified Protector, Parliamentary
Control, Parliamentary Debates, Political Culture, Responsibility to Protect, Security Council,
Strategic Culture, United Kingdom
Table of contents
Introduction... 1
Research question ... 1
Structure ... 4
Background... 6
The European powers and the Maghreb ... 6
European Neighbourhood Policy ... 7
Operation Unified Protector ... 8
Theoretical Framework ... 11
Responsibility to Protect and UNSC Resolution 1973 ... 11
Political and strategic culture ... 12
Methodology ... 16
Chapter 1: La République Française ... 18
France – La Grande Nation ... 18
Assemblée Nationale and the Forces armées françaises... 22
Crisis in Libya, France must act! ... 23
Parliament: language or influence? ... 23
Government: Let’s go!... 26
Chapter 2: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ... 27
Capital of the free world ... 27
House of Commons and the British armed forces ... 32
Crisis in Libya, Britain is needed once more ... 33
Parliament: questioning not demanding ... 34
Government: the world cannot stand by! ... 36
Chapter 3: Bundesrepublik Deutschland ... 39
Germany – A nation of pride and shame ... 39
Bundestag und Bundeswehr ... 44
Crisis in Libya, the fine line between protection and aggression ... 45
Parliament: scepticism and restraint ... 46
Government: divided? ... 47
Discussion and conclusion... 50
Responsibility to protect ... 50
Cultured debates or debated culture? ... 51
Democratic force or chosen autocracy? ... 54
Bibliography ... 57
Literature ... 57
Newspapers ... 61
Parliamentary records ... 62
Introduction
In 2011 violence and bloodshed ravaged northern Africa. The ‘Arab Spring’ was in full swing, leaving many countries shaken to their core. Governments were overthrown, dictators fell, thousands lost their lives and many more lost their homes. These events made the entire world turn their attention to the area. Many debates were fuelled by the Arab Spring, not in the least in Europe. Especially the events in Libya caused major worries and differing opinions on how ‘the West’ should react. Growing concerns for the situation of Benghazi in February 2011 were a catalyst for these debates. The increasing danger for civilians and the growing oppressive behaviour by Gadhafi made many call for action. The idea that the world should protect all humans, even those in other countries, started to gain traction. These thoughts were captured in the principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).
Although the Western powers would lead a humanitarian intervention grounded in the principle of R2P, namely Operation Unified Protector (OUP), they were far from unified during these events. This operation was not Europe’s finest hour. It revealed some structural problems that impeded a unified European action. First, in the military sphere Europe’s armies were not equipped to deal with an intervention. They had to rely heavily on the United States of America (USA) for both material capabilities, such as precision-guided missiles and aerial refuelling capabilities, as well as for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance.1 Second, and perhaps most glaringly, Europe lacked an internal political consensus. While
France and Britain were the main proponents of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that resulted in a humanitarian intervention, Germany2 abstained from voting. This split the European
Union into a pro- and contra-interventionist camp and resulted in a lack of a unified European response to the crisis in Libya.
Research question
The Libya case was not the first time that the EU members disagreed on key foreign policy issues. There had been political disputes in the cases of Iraq, Kosovo, the Middle East peace process, and others. However, it would be paramount for the EU to develop a shared foreign policy if it wanted to remain relevant on the world stage. Therefore, it would be important to gain a better understanding of the reasons why the major EU member states diverged on these topics. Based on research by Balossi-Restelli3
1 B. Barry, ‘Libya’s lessons’, Global Politics and Strategy 53:5 (2011), 5-14.; R.M. Gates, The Security and Defense
Agenda (Future of NATO), speech delivered in Brussels on 10 June (2011),
<http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581> accessed 30-05-2018.; I.H. Daalder and J.G. Stavridis, ‘NATO’s Victory in Libya The Right Way to Run an Intervention’, Foreign Affairs 91:2 (2012), 2-7, 6.; E. Hallams, B. Schreer, ‘Towards a ‘post-American’ alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya’, International
Affairs 88:2 (2012), 313-327, 323.
2 For the years 2011 to 2012 Germany had been elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.
3 L.M. Balossi-Restelli, ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy in a State of Flux? The Case of Libya in 2011’,
an interesting argument could be made to take a closer look at the different domestic situations in the member states in order to gain a better understanding of their European policy. Their domestic struggles and institutions needed to be examined; not every state had the same institutions. Foreign policy was regulated quite differently in each of the member states. It differed per country which person or institution was responsible for the army, who decided whether military action would be taken or not. In Germany the Bundestag needed to give its permission for any military action, while in France the
President was the commander in chief. In Britain a more hybrid form existed, where the Cabinet held the formal decision power, but increasingly involved the House of Commons. This divide in political structure could very well be a contributing factor to the way the member states reacted to crises such as the Libya case. All this leads to the following research question:
“Why did France, the United Kingdom, and Germany diverge in the area of military action in the case of Libya?”
The goal of this research was to increase our understanding of the power structures in Europe and the way they shaped European foreign policy. The focus was on the three largest member states of the EU at the time: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Through a comparison of these three states a better understanding of the European continent could be reached. This understanding would be critical in building towards a more unified foreign policy. The situation in Libya of 2011 was chosen because it was the first operation that was built on the principle of R2P, but still managed to divide Europe – one of R2Ps main proponents. Examining the divergence over a topic which the European countries seemingly agreed over would help gain more insight in what influences there were on the political decision-making process. To find these influences I focussed on the responses of France, the United Kingdom and Germany, chosen for multiple reasons: First, they were the three big Western European countries. Second, all three of these countries were members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2011 when the Libya crisis arose; France and the UK were both permanent members and Germany entered the first year of its term on the UNSC. Portugal was the only other Western European state that was a member of the UNSC at that time. Third, these three countries covered most of the continuum of stances that were held regarding the military intervention in Libya. France and the UK were strong proponents of the intervention from early on, while Germany was on the opposite side and did not partake in the military operations. Both France and the UK had their own military operations in Libya before the merging into the NATO operation ‘Unified Protector’. Fourth, these three countries were the largest and most significant actors in the European Union foreign policy, and without their agreement the policy of the EU would not be coherent. Therefore, a focus on these three countries would help to better understand the EU foreign policy. And lastly, the political structures of these three countries covered a broad continuum regarding the question who controls the foreign policies. By analysing these three countries and their political debates I would be able to form a generalizable picture on parliamentary debates concerning military intervention and the
factors that influenced them. The Libyan civil war was a revealing case for these three countries. As Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk demonstrated, the positions of the three countries on the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) were highlighted during this time and it showcased the extent of
disagreement between their governments. The fact that the European powers had a relative agreement on the principle of R2P, with the EU being one of the main proponents, made the principle a good focus for this research. Because of this the European powers had a similar interest in the Libya case, which makes the question on why they diverged even more interesting.
In order to explain the differences in key policy issues, researchers had looked into the history and the contemporary developments in member states and the European institutions. The principle of R2P and the diverging stances by European nations helped researchers to identify underlying differences. Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk4 discussed the European past and the differences between the member
states, and how these differences contributed to the division on their interpretation of the principle of R2P and subsequently the humanitarian intervention in Libya. Their research found that common ground for R2P required long term multilateral norm-building. In other words: while all countries agreed R2P was important, they were not on the same page of how it should materialise. While Germany put its focus on military restraint and the prevention of civilian crises, France and the UK viewed R2P through their pre-existing traditions of mission civilisatrice and humanitarian intervention. Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk saw these different starting points in the interpretation of the concept, together with different historical lessons learned by the different countries as the root cause for the European divide. Other researchers dove less into the historical background of the member states, but instead sought to find explanations in the mass media and public opinion. Bucher, Engel, Harfensteller and Dijkstra5 demonstrated that each
member state had a different focus in the public debates. While Germany had a more diverse debate where alternating options were discussed, France and the UK had more straightforward debates. As a result, the decision-making process was more erratic in Germany. Another difference is the focus of the debates in the public discourse. In Germany there was a comprehensive discussion on the core issues, such as the legitimacy of an intervention. In the UK, however, the debate was more introspective in nature, with a reflection on past relations with Libya and the region, as well as a scrutinization of the recent budget cuts. In France the debates were mostly a call for action, without any regards for the question whether or not France should partake in an intervention. These different focal points obstructed a mutual understanding of the goals for any military action.
While both the historical lessons and the public debates revealed divergence between the member states, they formed only part of the puzzle. France, the UK and Germany also had very different political
4 Brockmeier, S., G. Kurtz and Julian Junk, ‘Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to
protect’, Conflict, Security & Development 14:4 (2014), 429-460.
5 Bucher, J., L. Engel, S. Harfensteller and H. Dijkstra, ‘Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian
structures, therefore the Libya case should also be reviewed through the lens of the policy frameworks. Over the course of history each country had developed its own so called ‘political culture’. This culture defined the boundaries of institutions, but also the unwritten rules on how the institutions and actors should interact.6 The course of action taken by a specific country was influenced by its political culture.
For a good understanding of the reasons why France, the UK and Germany diverged over Libya these cultures should be examined.
When these ideas of political culture were applied to the military aspects of society and the decision-making process, one steps into the realm of ‘strategic culture’. Gray, one of the founders of this theory, stated that countries had a strategic culture that influenced actors beyond the pure facts. This culture was made up of shared beliefs and practices that were central to their view on the international order.7 When
countries had very different, or even opposing, strategic cultures they would take vastly different actions when presented with similar cases. Because the strategic culture nested itself firmly within the policy process it would be vital for the EU to develop a shared strategic culture and political identity. Without these shared values unified action would remain improbable. Since strategic culture looked more into the external factors that influence actors it would also be important to seek explanations in a domestic level approach. This approach argued that a closer look at the different domestic situations is necessary in order to understand their foreign policies. Balossi-Restelli8 analysed the Libya crisis and the implications
on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. She highlighted the limitations of the ‘strategic culture approach’ when observing and explaining the lack of a unified European response and argued that the ‘domestic level approach’ had a greater explanatory power.9 In this thesis I aimed to
marry the two ideas and use strategic culture as a lens for a domestic approach of the three countries and their actions during the Libya crisis.
Structure
Some background cases will be presented, which were necessary for the Libya case and the actors to be properly understood. First an examination of the past relations the European powers had with the Maghreb (the region Libya is part of). Second a short introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which helped understanding the multilateral relationship the Europeans powers had with the region. Lastly an examination of Operation Unified Protector – the UN mission that intervened in Libya. All these will help set the right stage to understand the influences surrounding the decision-making process regarding military action.
6 R. Eatwell, ‘The importance of the political culture approach’ in: R. Eatwell, European Political Cultures
(London 1997), 1-11.
7 C.S. Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example", International Security, 6:2 (1981), 21-47, 23. 8 L.M. Balossi-Restelli, ‘The Common Security and Defence Policy’.
With the background knowledge in place the theoretical framework in which this research was embedded will be presented. Responsibility to Protect is part of the theoretical framework of this research. Together with the ideas of Political and Strategic culture it formed the lens through which the three countries were analysed. The principle of R2P highlighted how France, the UK and Germany viewed military action and what boundaries they had or had not drawn up surrounding its use. R2P will gave a frame to examine the political and strategic cultures. The theory of political culture focussed this research into the domestic sphere of the countries and helped understand their internal forces, both instituted and not. Whereas the theory of strategic culture gave a focus on the foreign policy and military aspects of the endeavours surrounding the Libya crisis. The theoretical framework will go more in depth about these theories and how they were applied within this research.
Standing on a firm foundation, the case in the three different countries could be examined. Each country will have its dedicated chapter in which political and strategic cultures and the parliamentary control over military missions will be discussed. This will help in the examination of the parliamentary debates. After the review of the countries there will be a short discussion on what the findings of the research mean regarding the used theories. To conclude the research question will be answered based in the findings of this thesis.
Background
In this section some background into the topic at hand is provided. There were three important aspects to consider. First were the histories of the case countries with the region, their perceived influence over the region and their ongoing interests. Second was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as this was Europe’s leading policy concerning their multilateral relations with the border regions of the European Union. This was important to consider because these policies could be reflected by the domestic attitude of the three countries towards the region. Third was the humanitarian intervention itself: Operation Unified Protector, as it is the entire catalyst of events.
The European powers and the Maghreb
Before the examination of responses by the three countries it was important to reflect on their historical relation with Libya and its surrounding geographical area. Every European state had a different
relationship with the Maghreb. The Maghreb is a major region in North Africa and consists mainly of the countries Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.
From a geographical point of view, France was by far the closest to the Maghreb region with Germany coming in second and the UK in third, unless one takes Gibraltar into consideration. While France was merely separated from the Maghreb by the Mediterranean Sea, this did not necessarily mean that unrest in the Maghreb was felt the most in France. During the refugee crisis in the 2010s many European countries offered to relocate refugees that entered through Italy and Greece. The numbers showed that Germany had relocated more refugees than France. In 2016 Germany hosted 669.482 refugees, more than double the amount France hosted (304.546).10
In France the influence of its colonial past was visible, which also reflected in its relationship with the African continent. Africa, more than any other continent, had experienced the export of the ideals of the French revolution through non-intellectual means. While the empire lies in the past, France still
maintained its influence over its former colonies. Their sense of cultural superiority, even today, still lowered the threshold for interfering abroad in the name of universal principles. Because of this it was not surprising that there was little opposition to an intervention in Libya among the representatives in the National Assembly. Their support for the opposition forces was not obvious beforehand, however. When the Arab Spring started December 2010 in Tunisia, a former French colony with strong political and economic ties to France, Paris supported the regime and not the insurgents. President Sarkozy opted to continue the policies of “stability” and economic cooperation instead of support for the opposition and their ideals.11
10 European Council on Foreign Relations, Migration through the Mediterranean: Mapping the EU response,
<http://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration> accessed 30-05-2018.
While the United Kingdom also had colonies all over Africa, they did not have any large colonies in the Maghreb region itself. They did however hold control over Egypt and large parts of the Middle East, making the British Empire a neighbour to the Maghreb. In the 20th century the UK’s relationship with the
Maghreb was mostly through the European Union. British politicians stressed that one of the most important dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was about security in Europe. All in all, it was difficult to distinguish the British foreign policy in relation to the Maghreb, but it appeared to be mostly on a rhetorical level.12
Germany started interfering with the African continent during the “scramble for Africa” beginning in the 1880s. The Germans did not settle in the Maghreb, but instead established German West Africa (Togo and Cameroon), German South West Africa (Namibia), and German East Africa (Rwanda and Burundi). After the German defeat in the First World War it lost all of these colonies.13 In its external policy in the
first decades of the 20th century Germany appeared supportive of the Islamic world, for example during
the Moroccan crisis in 1905 and during the First World War, when Germany allied with the Ottoman Empire.14 However, these instances were more motivated as an opposition to France than a close
relationship with the region. In the second half of the 20th century German relations with the region was
mostly through investments by large German companies active in the region, with little to no other political presence apart from the European Union.15
The foreign policies of the three European powers regarding the Maghreb differed greatly. France played a dominant role here. Meanwhile the UK was more active on a rhetorical level, with less practical input. Germany was mostly politically passive in this region, although there had been some controversies between France and Germany which led to some political interference in the region. The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood policy tried to improve the European relations with the Maghreb, but they had been quite unsuccessful up until now.16 The European non-interference in Algeria
and the way they dealt with the Arab Spring in general stained the relationship of Europe and the region.
European Neighbourhood Policy
The ENP was an instrument of the EU which sought to tie the countries to the east and south of the European territory to the Union. The ENP had been promoted by the EU since the mid-1990s17 and only
focused on the states close to the European mainland, the overseas territories and their neighbours were
12 P. Seeberg, ‘European Security and the “Clash of Civilizations”: Differences in the policies of France, Germany
and the UK towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ in: W. Zank, Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations?:
Overlapping Integration and Identities (2009), 147-166, 158.
13 J.S. Olson ed., The Peoples of Africa: An Ethnohistorical Dictionary (1996), 196.
14 R.A. Hill ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol IX: Africa for the
Africans, 1921 – 1922 (1995), 257.
15 Seeberg, Clash of Civilizations, 152. 16 Ibidem.
17 J. Bucher, L. Engel, S. Harfensteller and H. Dijkstra, ‘Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian
out of scope. The EU offered financial assistance to these countries, so long as they abided the conditions set out by the EU. These conditions entailed government, economic and/or human rights reform in a country. Usually this process started with an action plan on which both parties agreed. In exchange the country might be offered tariff-free access to European markets and financial or technical assistance.18
This policy aimed to strengthen Europe and its position on the geopolitical stage. While Europe tried to enlarge its influence through political means they were unable to provide military effort in this region. This became clear throughout the Libya crisis where Britain and France took control of the NATO
offensive, but there was no unified or central role for the European Union. In the end any European action was not based on their ENP, but on the principle of R2P. Although the principle of R2P had been pushed by the EU and its member states for several years, the Libya crisis revealed once again that the
interpretation and perceived consequences of this doctrine differed per member state.
Operation Unified Protector
With the adoption of the UNSC resolution the foundation was laid for stronger actions against the Gadhafi regime. On 19 March, just two days after the adoption, French aircraft started their attack and struck armoured vehicles just outside Benghazi, in order to alleviate the increasing pressure of the Gadhafi regime on the city. These first attacks were seen as premature, because that same day the Western leaders met in Paris to discuss the military options for the situation in Libya.19 That same night the first
actions were taken under Operation Odyssey Dawn by the US Navy and under Operation Ellamy by the UK’s Royal Navy, which saw the launch of multiple cruise missiles at more than 20 targets throughout Libya followed by bombing runs.20 These strikes were aimed at targets that were seen as a threat to either
the coalitions pilots or as a threat to the people of Libya.21 They crippled the Libyan air defences and
opened the way for more strikes against Gadhafi’s forces outside Benghazi.22 Although this all seemed
coordinated and fluid to the public, in reality confusion about the chain of command, control over the mission and the support of the NATO countries was prevalent.
The rapid escalation of ground attacks and the lack of a coalition lead command structure concerned many of the NATO partners. The UNSC Resolution authorized the use of force as a means to protect the Libyan civilians, but most of the NATO partners were not comfortable with the aggressive strike missions and would rather support a no-fly zone and arms embargo. NATO was split in two over the issue. France
18 Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Mededeling van de commissie Europees Nabuurschapsbeleid
Strategiedocument (2004).
19 C.F. Anrig, ‘Allied Air Power over Libya: A Preliminary Assessment’, Air & Space Power Journal 25:4 (2011),
89-109, 91.
20 C.D.F. Baltrusaitis and M.E. Duckenfield, ‘Operation Unified Protector: Triumph or Warning Sign?’, Baltic
Security and Defence Review 14:2 (2012), 21-47, 29.
21 M. Townsend, ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn Commences to End Gaddafi Onslaught on Benghazi’, The Guardian
(19-03-2011), < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/19/operation-odyssey-dawn-tomahawks-libya> accessed 22-04-2017.
was pushing for a European command of the operation. Sarkozy stated that the European actors should take “ownership” of the operation.23 However, the reaction of the Arab nations to a NATO mission were a
concern to members such as Turkey. President Abdullah Gül unilaterally declared that “Turkey could never
condone the pointing of weapons at Libyan targets.”24 Germany kept opposing a NATO handover as well,
because it feared that the evolving intervention was more aggressive than the Resolution supported.25
While NATO command kept pushing for action, the arguments became so heated that during a discussion with the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen both the Turkish and the German ambassador stormed out mid-debate.26
For the first ten days after the instalment of the UNSC Resolution the military actions had the political commitment of a loose coalition. France and the United Kingdom fully supported the combat operations, the USA was only partially committed, and Germany obstructed any political consensus and showed no willingness to involve militarily. It was only after significant political efforts that NATO was able to take over the operation and create a clear command structure.27 Before the command takeover by NATO the
coordination was very confusing. There were separate ongoing missions with parallel command structures. Coordination needed to go through the respective national staffs and required coordination between each contributing nation command elements in order to ensure unity of effort.28 This lack of
unity and agreement on a suitable command arrangement within NATO was met with increasing frustration by the contributing nations. Norway even refused to employ its six F-16s unless they came under NATO command and control, although they later agreed with operating under US command.29
Within these first weeks it was the US command that provided a certain amount of unity to the operation. Even though from the get-go president Obama made it clear that he expected NATO to pick up the operational lead. When he approved the American support of the operation, he reiterated that it would be limited to “days not weeks”.30 He repeated this sentiment in his speech on Libya on 28 March 2011:
“[We will] focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and transfer responsibility to our
23 Defence Dateline Group, Libya Phase II - Operations Ellamy and Odyssey Dawn Make Way for NATO,
< http://www.defenceiq.com/air-forces-and-military-aircraft/articles/libya-phaseii-operations-ellamy-and-odyssey-dawn/> accessed 22-04-2017.
24 Defence Dateline Group, Libya Phase II.
25 J. Gertler, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress (2011),
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf> accessed 30-05-2018, 15.
26 Defence Dateline Group, Libya Phase II.
27 Hallams and Schreer, Towards a post-American Alliance?, 323.
28 Joint Publication 3-16, Multilateral Operations II-7 (2007), < https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-16.pdf>
accessed 30-05-2018. & Baltrusaitis and Duckenfield, Operation Unified Protector?, 29.
29 Gertler, Operation Odyssey, 16.
30 Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Shift by Clinton Helped Push Obama to Take a Harder Line,” The New
York Times (18-03-2011), <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19policy.html> accessed 22-07-2017.
allies and partners.”31 The USA moved to a mostly supporting role in order to minimize the risk and cost
for the American military and taxpayers. This approach of Obama was a turn in the American policy towards NATO, with the USA now seeking more commitment from the European nations.32
After an internal breakthrough NATO took command of the air operations over Libya on 24 March. The US, Britain, France and Turkey agreed to put the offensive under NATO command. This offensive
consisted of three parts: (1) A no-fly zone, (2) an arms embargo, (3) targeted air strikes. Three days later, on 27 March, NATO announced to expand the scope of the mission to include the protection of civilians and civilian areas through air strikes on ground forces. This meant they implemented all possible military aspects as allowed under UNSC Resolution 1973. This expansion of the mission was by far its most controversial aspect.33
31 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya (28-03-2011),
< https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya> accessed 22-07-2017.
32 Hallams and Schreer, Towards a post-American Alliance?, 321. 33 Baltrusaitis and Duckenfield, Operation Unified Protector, 32.
Theoretical Framework
In this chapter an overview is provided of the principle R2P and its relation to UNSC Resolution 1973, and of the theories of political and strategic culture. These were used to create a methodology to research the main question of the thesis. In the methodology section I went a bit more in depth in how these theories helped to understand our actors and in what way this framework provided the necessary insights. In the discussion at the end of this thesis I come back to this framework to demonstrate how this research fitted within the scholarly debates and what it contributed to these.
Responsibility to Protect and UNSC Resolution 1973
UNSC resolution 1973 was proposed by France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom as their vision on how the international community should deal with the situation in Libya. It was adopted by the Security Council on 17 March 2011.34 This resolution was threefold in its approach:
• First it demanded “an immediate ceasefire” by all parties
• Second, it authorized the international community to “take all necessary measures […], while excluding a foreign occupation force”
• Third, it established a no-fly zone above Libya and reaffirmed the imposed arms embargo and the freezing of all foreign assets of the Gadhafi regime
One of the main arguments was that the international community had a responsibility to protect citizens against aggression from their own governments. This resolution was the first to be based on the principle of R2P. With its adoption by the United Nations a legal basis was created for the events to come. The primary idea behind R2P was that the world (with the UN as its legal body) should protect civilians against any military aggression; when a country itself would be incapable of protecting its citizens – or even worse, were the aggressor – other countries could step in to safeguard the people. Or as Thakur said: “At its core, R2P is a duty by all those in zones of safety to care for those trapped in zones of
danger.”35 While this concept might sound simple, its interpretation and implementation differed greatly.
Even within the European Union, the only major power of the twenty-first century who unambiguously supported this concept, the idea on how to implement the concept diverged.36 There never was a truly
consensual position on R2P in the EU. Different parliamentary cultures and backgrounds concerning foreign policy resulted in different interpretations between and within the member states. At its best the
34 NATO, Resolution 1973 (2011),
<http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf> accessed 22-07-2017.
35 R. Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers”, The Washington Quarterly 36:2 (2013),
61-76, 65.
36 D. Göler, ‘Die Europäische Union in der Libyenkrise: Die „responsibility to protect“ als Herausforderung für
countries within Europe shared what Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk coin the “norm-building approach”37,
where R2P is seen as to be promoted through referencing the concept in speeches, statements and resolutions, but nothing more actionable.
Political and strategic culture
During Unified Protector the major European powers clashed over the amount of involvement needed from NATO and the EU. While they all had their respective arguments, the prevalent culture might have been a very influential aspect that shaped the behaviour of the actors. This idea that foreign policy actors were shaped by their countries history and culture was addressed by multiple scholars with the concept of Political Culture. Research to the underpinning values of politics could be traced back all the way to the classical times with Aristotle and Plato in ancient Greece. However, it was not until the 1950s when the term ‘political culture’ was coined by Gabriel Almond, an American political scientist, who argued that every political system is infused with particular orientation patterns in regard to political action.38
In the 1960s he and Sidney Verba published a pioneering research of political cultures, The Civic Culture. In this work they examined five states through opinion polls and build a theory that a stable democracy required certain attitudes, based on a balance of ‘subject’ and ‘participant’ cultures, and a high level of system support and trust.39 They found their fair share of followers who would employ the term, although
methods varied. Besides the methodology, the countries studied also became more varied. Especially the Communist systems were popular subjects, they tried to offer insights into why communist systems arose and their success and failure in the creation of the new communist man. Political culture became a tool of social science to look deeper than the formal politics; increasingly the term was borrowed for other fields as well, especially by historians and journalists. Through this borrowing the term often became little more than a synonym for national stereotypes.40
The concept of political culture was and is not without its opponents and critics. One much heard criticism was that the concept was often left undefined and even those who tried to define it had diverging
emphasis, where some saw the term apply to the values of the individual, while others such as Gaffney and Kolinsky41, applied the concept to institutions and groups. The other criticisms on the concept of
political culture broadly fell into three categories:
First, there were hidden assumptions in the concept. Critics pointed out that Almond and Verba were mainly displaying their view that the already existing Anglo-American democratic system was superior.
37 S. Brockmeier, G. Kurtz and Julian Junk, ‘Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to
protect’, Conflict, Security & Development 14:4 (2014), 429-460, 430.
38 G. Almond, ‘Comparing Political Systems’, The Journal of Politics 18 (1956), 396. 39 G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (1963), 402-470.
40 R. Eatwell, ‘The importance of the political culture approach’ in: R. Eatwell, European Political Cultures
(1997), 10-14.
There also seemed to be an assumption that all systems should develop along a relatively homogenous path towards something akin the capitalist economic system and liberal democratic polity.42 In part
because of these assumptions, Almond and Verba, and most of their followers, were not interested in sub-cultures, implicitly seeing them as ‘un-modern’. They also ignored the fact that other forms of democracy also seemed stable, such as the ones based on ‘elite accommodation’ in ‘pillared’ societies such as Belgium and the Netherlands.43
Second, the methodologies used to establish the concept of Political Culture were not always as solid as they should be. Especially the use of the opinion poll to research such complicated matter was under scrutiny. The fact that the results from these polls were transnationally compared raised its questions. Translating words and concepts to other languages was difficult to say the least, not even taking into account the fact that the cultural weight of some concepts differed greatly per country. For example, since the Nazi era the term ‘racist’ carried much more weight in Germany than in France. This would inevitably have its impact on the answers given by the respondents of opinion polls. As such the political culture approach tried as much as possible to be quantitative but was still very qualitative in nature. The fact that scholars, such as Almond and Verba, never made it clear what balance of factors made up their ‘civic culture’ did not help either. Thus, the main difficulty of the political culture approach seemed to be in the operationalisation of its central concepts.44
The third attack was in line with the assumptions made by Almond and Verba. The implied causality and primacy were under fire, with many arguing that it was also vital to ask how attitudes were formed in the first place, and to emphasise the relative powerlessness of individuals. Those who applied a political culture approach often had troubles explaining the causal process by which changes happened. Continuity might be better explained by the power of socialisation and tradition. In addition, the relationship
between civic culture and a stable democratic government was not clear-cut. Almond and Verb claimed that a stable democratic government flowed from civic culture, but it could very well be argued that civic culture was a product of an extended period of stable and good government. This possible reversal in the causality was for many a reason to not seek explanatory power in the political culture concept.45
While these were all valid criticisms, they did not mean that the concept of political culture in itself was no longer useful. Some arguments on this were brought forward by Inglehart, who argued that (1) people’s responses to their situations were shaped by subjective viewpoints, which varied from culture to culture; and (2) these variations reflected differences in experience, and the things learned in the past
42 L.W. Pye, ‘Identity and Political culture’ in: L. Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development
(1971), 101-134, 103.
43 A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (1975), 194.
44 R. Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture (1974), 253. 45 Eatwell, The importance of the political culture approach, 11.
impacted the things learned later on.46 According to him, culture did not and could not change overnight.
The differences observed between cultures reflected paths travelled throughout the generations. To better uncover this one should not dismiss political culture because of the eclectic approach of its operationalisation, but instead systemisation would be needed.
Eatwell made a case that adopting three perspectives, a micro, macro and meso, would help in understanding the behaviour of political players. At the micro level one looked at the motivation and choices made by individuals. According to Eatwell these motivations were three-dimensional:
individualist-economic, group-oriented, and idealistic. He argued that for a better understanding of the latter two it was helpful to also look at the two areas beyond the micro. The meso was about the social organisations and structures to which individuals belong, or that provided them with knowledge and norms. Examples were family, community groups, party and religious groups – not necessarily politically oriented groups. It also dealt with local socio-economic situation of the individual. This approach had a look at the way these groups and factors influenced the individual behaviour. The macro dealt with the widest level or organisation, with which the individual had social contact. This usually was the national level. It was at this level that factors like state, national identity and specific institutions, such as electoral systems, were influencing behaviour. The broader socio-economic situation, how well of the community and nation is, were at play here. Eatwell argued that throughout examining the meso and macro perspectives it was important to keep in mind how they influenced behaviour of individuals. Instead of making generalisations about national traditions, one must explain how these influence the actor. Mapping the three layers would not be enough, the relationship between these three levels were key. With this threefold approach one gained important explanatory power for political actions.47
While the criticisms on the concept of political culture were valid, there were still arguments to use it in research. This was further enhanced when foreign policy and its military aspects came in to play. In those scenarios a closely related theory should be considered as well, namely strategic culture. While having many similarities with political culture it had been mostly debated as a separate idea. The concept of strategic culture arose during the Cold War when the two world powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, opposed each other, both militarily and culturally. During this time period International Relations scholars such as J. Snyder48 and C. Gray49 started to suggest that culture influenced strategic
behaviour. Snyder argued that strategic culture explained why certain attitudes and behaviours were seen as valid by the communist powers, while being seen as wrong or peculiar by an American observer. He implied that the behaviour of the individual was influenced by cultural factors and thus the behaviour of
46 R. Inglehart, Culture Shift (1990), 19.
47 Eatwell, The importance of the political culture approach, 9.
48 J. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (1977), 4.
nations as well.50 K. Booth argued in his work that “strategic culture referred to a nation’s traditions,
values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.”51 While Kupchan
defined the concept as “images that shaped how the nation as a collective entity defined its well-being and conceived of its security.”52 In general, strategic culture could be defined as “the set of beliefs,
assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it.”53 Gray also build on this
definition when he described strategic culture as the context that shaped strategic behaviour, other than the forces by which strategic behaviour was influenced (political, geography, balance of power, and structure of international system).54 Berger bridged the gap between the concept of political culture and
strategic culture with what he defined as political military culture. He applied the concept of political culture to the foreign and security polity and derived a sub-concept “that influenced how members of a given society viewed national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations.”55
In this thesis I argued that political and strategic culture are intertwined. The strategic culture of a country was first and foremost determined by its own culture consisting of historic, political, structural,
technologic, defence organizational and geographic factors.56 All choices, strategic thinking, and strategy
making were shaped by their context.57 Both political and strategic cultures were first and foremost
thinking frames of the people in a country. While political culture dealt with the entire political nature of a country, I saw strategic culture as a subset hereof, namely there where it applied to national security, the use of force and the military as an institution. Like with most culture it was found in the entire population, but it became the most influential in policy makers. Once a strategic culture was established it became the default thinking pattern. As such it became difficult for policy makers to see foreign policy in other ways, it could sometimes even lead to a somewhat dogmatic following of the cultural ideas. In this way strategic culture influenced foreign and military policy. Therefore, a shared strategic culture and political identity seemed to be key for a successful strategy and foreign policy. While strategic culture was mainly formed within a state, one should remain cautious to seek all explanations internally, as changing threat
50 Snyder, Soviet Strategic Culture, 5.
51 K. Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in: C. Jacobsen ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (1990),
121.
52 C.A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, (1994), 22.
53 A. Biava, M. Drent, & G.P. Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An Analytical
Framework.”, JCMS: journal of common market studies, 49:6 (2011), 1227-1248, 1228.
54 C.S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back”, Review of International
Studies, 25:1 (1999), 46-69.
55 T. Berger, The Culture of National Security, (1996), 325-326.
56 J.S. Lantis and D. Howlett, “Strategic Culture” in: J. Baylis, J.J. Wirtz, & C.S. Gray ed. Strategy in the
Contemporary World, (2011), 84-101, 86-87.
perceptions also influenced the strategic norms and values of actors. When actors perceived a rising amount of threats, their norms concerning protective and strategic measures against these threats deepened.58
Methodology
Researching political and strategic culture was not without its challenges, since one of the main problems with the concepts had been the lack of a unified operationalisation. In this endeavour I found that the inflexibility of culture – political, strategic, or otherwise – helped. Strategic culture, especially in the West, had penetrated and influenced bureaucracies and institutions, such as parliament and government. In certain cases, such as Germany, it was even institutionalized. Since it also permeated the rest of society, political leaders in democracies were bound to follow the established paths in order to maintain public support. Although certain factors could modify the strategic culture, leaders were traditionally less keen on doing so and many political leaders tended to remove options from the agenda that did not fit in the countries culture. This meant that political and institutional constraints were put on the policy-making process by strategic culture. Even when new policies were initiated that differed from the existing culture, there was likely a reaction from the public, such as demonstrations and political confrontations. With this in mind I could focus on the political institutions and arenas in my case studies.
In this research I examined the three aforementioned European states and assessed them on an individual basis, with France first, the United Kingdom second and Germany third. In the conclusion of this thesis the comparison between the states was made explicit where necessary. For every state I examined:
• Their political and strategic culture, with a focus on the post-World War II era • The parliamentary control over military missions before the Libya crisis • The debates in the parliaments about the Libya crisis
These first two points provided a frame of reference to examine the parliamentary debates. After these had been discussed, a sub-conclusion has helped in the review of the debates. The examination of the parliamentary debates gave insight in the parliamentary structures and how they influenced policy. The outline of the political and strategic culture, and the parliamentary control over military missions helped in providing the insight on what I needed to focus and where I saw the underlying structures shining through. With the examination of the debates I paid special attention to the following points:
• What was the primary focus of the debates?
o Did this reflect any parliamentary control over the use of military force? o Did I see political or strategic cultural elements in this?
58 C. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the
• What was the role of the government within these debates? And what did this say about their influence on the use of military assets?
With the answers to these questions and linking them to the broader framework of the country I could examine how these debates followed the trend of their respective political and strategic culture. In the main conclusion I evaluated my findings and compared the three countries with each other. Here I was able to answer my main research question and also reflected upon whether the research of parliamentary debates was the best tool to examine the political and strategic culture and the underlying power
structures of the western (European) democracies.
For the examination of the political and strategic culture, and the parliamentary control over military missions, I mostly relied on existing literature. During the discussion on the parliamentary I dove into the primary source material. The largest part of this source material were the minutes of the parliamentary debates themselves. The strength of these sources was that they were a close representation of the actual discussions, which meant I could get a mostly unfiltered view on the subject. Although Members of Parliament usually had the right to make some alterations to the minutes before they were published, this was mostly meant for a further explanation of the provided arguments. Because of this the reliability of these sources was very high. The other part of the primary sources were newspaper articles. These articles gave more social context to the political debates and gave interpretations of the events that might differ from the interpretations by the members of parliament. Newspaper articles were usually more coloured in their opinions and agenda. Therefore, it was necessary to not take everything said at face value. Their agenda could give a specific interpretation of the events that might not be the entire story or truth. However, I believed that these sources could help in gaining a better insight in the political
machinery of the member states and the parliamentary impact on military missions. The weakest point of this approach would be the fact that it relied on the assumption that a parliamentary debate reflected to some degree the amount of control parliament had over a certain issue. Because parliament was the democratic institution where matters of importance were discussed and their time was limited, it was safe to assume that they would not discuss anything for which they saw no benefit in discussing. Nevertheless, it was important to keep the limits of this assumption in mind when drawing conclusions.
Chapter 1: La République Française
France, the United Kingdom and Germany had different experiences with the (European) past. These experiences had influenced their political and strategic cultures enormously. In this chapter I
demonstrated how France was influenced by this past in “France – La Grande Nation”. I examined how the French political culture formed. The idea of what it meant to be ‘French’ differed per region and community. Each group had their own collective memory and sense of the past. The line between myth and history was more often than not opaque in these group cultures. Also, the region had its impact on these groups. As Braudel stated: “Geography is as important as is history”. 59 However, this did not
invalidate the ties of the French with France. La Grande Révolution tied region and state together. Although it was one of the great societal dividers, it laid a foundation of revolutionary tradition for century to come. The idea that the Republic was the embodiment of this revolution was further cemented by the success of the (in particular the Third) Republic.60 Having the Revolution at the core of the French
state also provided legitimacy to the idea that sometimes violence was the key to a greater good and a better society. With that, a seed was planted for a willingness to use military force in domestic and foreign policy matters.
In “Assemblée Nationale and the Forces Armées françaises” the parliamentary control over military missions were analysed. Here I demonstrated that there was a division between theory and practice. Where parliament had a formal control over acts of war, the Head of State was able to control more and more the military actions, which did not formally fall under the declaration of war.
After these two analyses it was time to look at the parliamentary debates in “Crisis in Libya, France must act!”. Here I showed the debates in France were influenced by their culture and the amount of
parliamentary control parliament had in “Parliament: language or influence?”. I also looked at the attitude of the French government in this theatre in “Government: Let’s go!”. Based on the information gathered in this chapter, I would be able to argue why France acted the way it did in the Libya crisis. This will be done in the main conclusion where I also compare these with the reasons of and actions by the United Kingdom and Germany.
France – La Grande Nation
In the last centuries France’s political culture formed both in unity and in conflict. Conflict in particular had been a strong factor. One could not discuss French culture, political, societal or other, without the French Revolution. While the French Revolution was a major shift in France’s politics, two aspects were carried over from before these turbulent times: (1) The state as a promoter of national interest and unity, and (2) the pursuit of grandeur and territorial expansion. The first was embedded in a cult of bureaucracy
59 F. Braudel, The Identity of France, vol 1., History and Environment (1988), 38. 60 R. Tombs, France 1814-1914 (1996), 453.
dedicated to the public good. This so-called etatisme (statism) had served as a counterweight to the fragmentation of the political landscape. It could perform this function, because it was accepted by all political tendencies. This resulted in the representation of the state as the true nation of France, which endured all regime changes. The political right took pride in the tradition of the monarchy, which was in a sense responsible for the birth of the French state, on the opposite side the political left saw the state as a continuation of the revolutionary tradition. Weber suggested that this ideological divide is owed to the need of arguments between the different political parties in a situation where both sides tried to increase the central power of the state.61The second continuity was shown in the exportation of the revolutionary
principles and the right of man. While the revolutionaries rejected the idea of conquest, they did see it as their obligation to export their ideas and ideals. The feelings for French grandeur remained even when Napoleon rose to power, who kept supporting the idea of the nation-state after his crowning to emperor. The concept of the nation-state, and the nationalistic feelings, would redraw the map of Europe
considerably.62 Although the French domination of Europe would end with Waterloo in 1815, feelings of
French grandeur would linger in France’s national identity.
The French revolution not only removed the ancien regime, it also meant a more fundamental shift in political engagement. The storming of the Bastille in 1789 and the subsequent revolution marked the entry of the masses in the political arena. While popular uprisings were not uncommon before, this time it not only prevented a counter-revolution, but it also forced the revolutionary governments to take up more radical positions. It raised the question of popular violence and whether violence was the only way of the masses to engage in political processes. More than once France was reminded that popular opinions could be accompanied by violent outbursts. The revolts in 1830, 1848 and 1871 showcased that the revolutionary tradition was one full of insurrections.63
The late nineteenth century was crucial in Europe’s historical processes, also in France. Hobsbawm and Ranger called this period crucial for ‘the invention of tradition’.64 The European states became aware of
the need to establish some form of legitimacy in an age of mass politics. Many new methods of
manufacturing loyalty to the state and heightening a sense of social solidarity and political identity were used throughout Europe. The heart of the French endeavour was the attempt to create a new ‘civic religion’. In this ‘civic religion’ republicanism was the spiritual principle necessary for national unity.65
Educating the children became a top priority and new state-run institutions were founded. Republican propaganda and patriotism were the core values of this education and the new generations were taught that the Revolution was the single greatest event in French history and no other outcome than the
61 E. Weber, My France: Politics, Culture, Myth (1991), 40-56.
62 J.F. McMillan, ‘France’ in: R. Eatwell ed., European Political Cultures (1997), 69-87. 63 McMillan, France, 73.
64 E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914’ in: E. J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The
Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge 1983), 263-308, 267-268.
establishment of the Republic would have been logical.66 During this period all means were used to unify
the French people. Internally focussed there were festivals, monuments and the institution of the national anthem. Externally political opponents were demonized and an aggressive campaign against the Catholic Church was started. Catholicism stood for fanaticism and the counter-revolution and it was deemed completely incompatible with true, republican, patriotism during this period.67 Despite all these efforts
the Republic was not able to create a single and undivided France. The Catholics and Jews were alienated from the created image of France and created their own views on the French culture. At the same time the far-right began to rise at the start of the 20th century.68 It was this divided nation that met Nazi
Germany on the battlefield and was defeated by them in 1940. This led to the establishment of Vichy and the Nazi Occupation. This catastrophe revealed the cracks in France’s unity and simultaneously bolstered the far-right movement. In Vichy anti-Semitic laws were passed and the regime collaborated with the Nazi’s Final Solution, bringing 76,000 Jews to the death camps. 1940-1944 were dark years and they continued to cast their shadow on French politics long after their Liberation in 1944.69
The Second World War was a great shock for France. While the memory of the First World War was one of national solidarity and a great, albeit costly, victory. The Second World War was a deep scar torn in the French nation. The divide went straight through the country between those who opposed the occupiers and those who collaborated. The post-war purging looked a lot like a civil war with 10,000 executions.70
Within this turbulence General De Gaulle and his provisional government tried to rebuild the national unity around the Republic and sought to minimize the communist influence in France. They quickly began to downplay the role of the Vichy regime, glorify the myth of La France Résistante (the resisting France) and project the image of a nation united in their desire to defeat the oppressor. For De Gaulle a rebuilding of the republic did not equal a return to the old institutions with their quarrels and weaknesses. Escaping this legacy, however, proved harder than he initially thought. After a long political track, the new
constitution for the Fourth Republic was finally adopted in November 1946, but it still bore a striking resemblance to the Third Republic. Once again France preferred to give supreme authority to the elected National Assembly, rather than a presidential figure, which De Gaulle would have preferred. The Vichy experience and the (almost) two years under De Gaulle dictatorship had reinforced the nation’s fear for an authoritarian rule.71
Despite De Gaulle’s efforts, the Fourth Republic would be short-lived. Plagued by the same problems of ministerial instability that had handicapped the Third Republic, it never succeeded in creating a
consensual political culture. And so, in 1958, a bit more than a decade after the instalment of the Fourth
66 McMillan, France, 74.
67 R.C. Cobb, The People’s Armies, (New Haven 1987), 442–479.
68 P. Birnbaum, ‘La France aux Français’. Histoire des haines nationalistes (Paris 1993), 213.
69 H. Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome. History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge 1991), 382. 70 McMillan, France, 79.
Republic, it was replaced by the Fifth. De Gaulle rose to power once again and formed the new republic, this time with a powerful president at its centre. This power of the head of state was laid down in the new constitution and reinforced with direct presidential elections, established in 1962. At the same time the new constitution preserved essential elements of the republican traditions, such as the need for a prime minister and a government to command a majority in the National Assembly.72 While many thought that
this constitution would disappear when De Gaulle would exit the stage, it became gradually more
accepted and is still in place today. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century France became a neo-liberal democracy governed by the centre instead of the left or right. This was also seen by the Mitterand presidency (1981-1995) which began with high hopes for a genuinely socialist agenda, but instead established a balance between left and right in parliament.73
During the Fifth Republic France also consolidated her strategic culture. The traditions of politics of empire and grandeur remained, but two significant elements were added: their special relationship with Germany – mainly in the framework of European institutions – and feelings of anti-Americanism. For their relationship with Germany it was striking that they found a way of reconciliation, after decades of
tensions between the two states. It was during this time also that the deterioration of France’s
international position became apparent. Especially their exclusion from the Yalta Conference (February 1945) was striking in this regard. This in part fuelled France’s ambition to shape Europe into the ‘Third Force’. However, instead of using this drive to focus on strong European integration France opted to preserve its independent nature. This was not entirely surprising since France’s national identity remained interwoven with the idea of national greatness, which at times shone through in their relations with the other European nations74. In order to promote the grandeur of France and preserve global peace France
wanted to play the role of a “broker, arbiter, and critic of international relations” speaking “not just for herself but for Europe and for the emerging nations of the Third World”.75 However, this nationalism
isolated France from her European partners and wasted resources on military obligations of an
independent strategy. This was one of the contributing factors to the failing of an early political European integration.76 This French nationalism also weakened their attempts to unify the third world into a
common block.77 In the late 80s and early 90s France took a stronger role on the European stage and
brokered the deal of deeper European integration and monetary union in exchange for the reunification of Germany. During this period, they also pushed for security and military cooperation between the EU members. With the advent of the Iraq war France took a leading role in Europe in voicing the opinion that
72 Ibidem.
73 R. Gildea, France Since 1945 (Oxford 1996), 222.
74 R. Tiersky, ‘France in the New Europe’, Foreign Affairs 71:2 (1992), 131-147.
75 E. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur, (Ithaca and
London 1974), 46.
76 W.I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The turbulent history of a divided continent 1945-2002, (London
2003), 230.
military action – without UN authorization – should not take place. According to Moisi, Chirac was expected to “appear as the courageous leader of a coalition against the new hyperpower”. France was speaking on behalf of the vast majority of the European public opinion, and its popularity had never ranked higher in the Third world.78 With this France presented a vision that Europe – with France at her
helm – could be a force on its own besides the superpowers of the United States of America and Russia. This vision for Europe was also shown by Macron who claimed in his speech on the Brexit crisis that Europe was too weak and too slow and should become stronger.79
Concluding after 1958 France seemed to escape from the cycle of permanent crises, upheavals and revolutions, which shaped its political culture for centuries. French ‘exceptionalism’, derived from the ideals of the revolutionary tradition, appeared to dwindle after the Second World War. In the Fifth Republic, the French created a democratic regime in which there could be alternation of power at the level of both the presidency and parliament.80 They developed their institutions along the way, starting at
the end of the war under military rule by De Gaulle, France sought to prevent any form of authoritarian rule by starting with a republic were power lay with parliament, but this republic was flawed at its core, riddled with issues and instability. After De Gaulle rose to power again, he was able forge it into one where a powerful president could take the lead. In this period France also saw great opportunities for further European integration if France were to be one of the steering forces.
Assemblée Nationale and the Forces Armées françaises
While the French Constitution laid the responsibility for war with parliament (“A declaration of war shall be authorised by Parliament”, Article 35), the Head of State became more influential after De Gaulle forged the Fifth Republic, including in this area. Since military actions, which were not always formally declared war, were not explicitly mentioned, the President found some leeway to execute these without consenting parliament. This resulted in a situation where the government had the opportunity to decide whether parliamentary authorisation was required for a military action.81 Although this opportunity was
not always used, the government took more and more autonomous decisions on foreign policy regarding the use of military assets. In January 1991 President Mitterand asked the National Assembly for a vote on Frances involvement in the military campaign of the Gulf War, but in April 1999 Prime Minister Jospin refused a vote on the Kosovo crisis and French participation in the KFOR mission.82 In 2003 president
Chirac was one of the greatest critics of the Iraq mission. He gave no form of support for the mission and
78 D. Moisi, ‘France pays a price; Burned bridges’, The International Herald Tribune (18 April 2003). 79 Editorial, ‘The Guardian view on Macron’s Europe speech: a bold vision’, The Guardian (26-09-2017),
< https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/26/the-guardian-view-on-macrons-europe-speech-a-bold-vision> accessed 13-10-2017.
80 McMillan, France, 80.
81 O. Rozenberg, “French Parliamentary Participation in Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Anemic National
Performance and European Potential” in: J. Mittag, The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Options for the
European Convention (2003), 125-136, 126.
