Cultures of tolerance

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UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN

Cultures of tolerance

An analysis of the discourse on refugees, asylum

seekers and immigrants in Dutch and British

election manifestos

8/10/2018

G.J.M. van Duijn – 1029800 - g.j.m.van.duijn@gmail.com

Supervisor: Dr. A. Afonso a.afonso@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

Second reader: M.J.A. van der Heijden MSc MA m.j.a.van.der.heijden@fgga.leidenuniv.nl

Public Administration, Economics and Governance

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Introduction

Over the last few decades political contestation in Western Europe has increasingly focused on issues around refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants (RASIM). Anti-immigration parties argue that popular worries about immigration have long been ignored and issues surrounding immigration have actively been depoliticized. Today, these worries are actively articulated by commercial news media and political parties across the left-right spectrum. In the United Kingdom as well as the Netherlands these processes are represented by the denunciation of what were widely regarded as successful models of multiculturalism, to significant increases in the political salience of RASIM issues, and to the rise of successful anti-immigration parties.

In the light of these events mainstream political parties faced tough strategic choices on how to position themselves around these issues. Popular concern about immigration and integration, and the electoral threat posed by anti-immigration parties mean that mainstream parties have had to reposition themselves strongly on RASIM issues. Relatively little is known about the way in which mainstream parties have discursively responded to these challenges and why they have done so. This research project is concerned with the assertion by some that we are facing a ‘lethal mainstreaming’ of previously taboo frames on immigration and integration (Kallis 2013: 221). These old taboos include the problematization of the cultural difference of RASIM groups (Brubaker 2001: 532) and the subsequent representation of these groups as economic (Ibid: 230) and/or security (Buonfino 2004; Innes 2010) threats. Additionally, some argue that this mainstreaming is (in part) caused by the electoral success of anti-immigration parties (van Heerden et al. 2013; Kallis 2013). The goal of this project is to assess whether such a mainstreaming has taken place and to assess whether the notion of electoral threat is useful in accounting for any variation in the propensity to adopt anti-immigration framing, and the type of framing, by mainstream political parties.

This research takes the election manifestos of the British Labour party, the Conservative party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Dutch Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), Volkspartij

voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) as its

cases. Its scope ranges from 1972 (founding of the British National Front) to 2017 in Britain and from 1980 (founding of the Centrum Partij) to 2017 in the Netherlands. Theories of the dynamics of party competition, namely spatial theory, issue ownership and electoral threat, have been used to hypothesize that right-wing parties under high levels of electoral threat are the most likely to adopt

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4 the anti-immigration rhetoric of their competitors. Conversely, left-wing parties under lower levels of electoral threat are expected to be the least likely to do so.

In order to get a general understanding of the discourse on immigration, various discourse studies of media representations of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants (RASIM) have been reviewed. Additionally, attention has been given to the nature of racist and anti-immigrant discourse generally as well as the nature of the discourse employed by anti-immigration parties in the UK and the Netherlands specifically. These findings and any relevant categories found inductively together make up the structure of the codebook used in the analysis.

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Previous work/ relevance

Even as immigration/integration has become increasingly important as a subject for political contestation, still relatively little is known about the strategic choices political parties make with the use of their discourse. Much more common are studies that have investigated how immigration/integration is framed in the national media (see: van Dijk: 1983; van Praag & Adriaansen 2011 for the Dutch case and: Baker & McEnery 2005; Greenslade 2005; Gabrielatos & Baker 2008 for the British case). Only a handful of studies have looked at the framing strategies of political parties. Examples from the Dutch case are the studies by Roggebrand and Vliegenthart (2007) and Van Heerden et al. (2013). The only study (to my knowledge) that analysed the framing of British political parties is the cross-national study performed by Helbling (2014).

Furthermore, these studies have produced conflicting results. While the Dutch studies found that Islam was increasingly seen as a threat after 9/11 (Roggebrand & Vliegenthart 2007), and that parties across the board have adopted a discourse of cultural integration (as opposed to socio-economic integration) (Van Heerden et al 2013), the cross-national study by Helbling found that the most commonly used frames are rather positive, focussing on notions of fairness, equality and human rights (2014: 37). This might be caused by the fact that these studies have used different types of documents as their corpus.

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Theoretical framework

This research project is interested in how mainstream political parties react to the rising salience of RASIM issues and the success of anti-immigration parties. It aims to uncover the way in which political parties think about immigration, and if and how these views have changed over time.

The aim of the following paragraphs is to first provide an overview of the types of frames that are expected to be found in the data. It will first provide an overview of the turn to cultural arguments in anti-immigrant discourse. Then attention will be given to the other types of framing that may be present in the manifestos. The section thereafter discusses the types of framing expected from each type of political party, based on theories of spatial competition, ideological consistency and issue ownership.

Framing, securitization and culturalization

This paragraph will briefly discuss the notion of framing in general, before moving to the types of framing found in previous studies on media and party discourse. These previous studies have inspired the structure of the code book that was used to code the arguments used by political parties in their manifestos.

This contribution necessarily starts with the argument that the use of language is critical in the way in which social reality is perceived and (re)constructed. In this sense, knowledge of this social reality is not a neutral representation of an objective world but is constructed through language determined by interests (Chilton 2004: 42). This research aims to analyse the kinds of frames on immigration used by political parties. Frames can be thought of as conceptualisations of certain situation types and their expression in language (Ibid: 51). Frames define problems, diagnose the causes of these problems, make moral judgments on these causes and then prescribe a certain solution to the defined problem. In doing so, frames highlight specific aspects of reality while obscuring others (Entman 1993: 55). Framing is a selective way in which actors define a problem and simultaneously provide certain answers. The frames employed by political parties are important because parties do not just reflect voter opinion but help to structure it as well (Thomassen 2005 in: Bale 2008: 453). Analysing the use of frames by political parties will inform us of how political parties see social reality, and how these interpretations have changed over time.

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7 In the introduction the breakdown of multicultural modes of immigrant integration was referenced. The goal of this contribution is not to lament the denunciation of what was regarded as multiculturalism. Its rejection is quite rightly based on its failure to combat issues of segregation, unemployment, poverty, school drop-out and criminality in ethnic communities (Joppke 2004: 243). Similarly, the breaking of taboos related to issues of race, religion and culture to some extent is valuable in facilitating honest debate on these issues (Cantle 2001: 18). Positive too, is the hypothetical re-emphasis of the universal liberal characteristics of citizenship as a bridge building tool in contemporary civic integration policies. This contribution is instead interested in the problems that arise when ‘tropes of liberalism’ are used to problematize the cultural identity of minority groups to legitimate their exclusion (Gibson 2017: 1). This has become a defining characteristic of anti-immigrant discourse (Halikiopoulou, Mock & Vasilopoulou 2012). Its strategy involves arguing that the host society is defined by these civic values of tolerance, and that these are threatened by the inflow of immigrants who lack these values (Ibid; Mudde 2007b: 78-79).

Studies on the securitization of RASIM discourse offer an interesting view on the mechanisms behind this desire for a dominant monoculture. The main point of these works is that the interplay between media, public opinion and politics in conjunction with increasing levels of migration and focus events related to terrorism has led to immigration being primarily interpreted as a security issue (Buonfino 2004: 24). Migration and terrorist attacks have generated severe anxieties in the hearts and minds of European citizens. This has led to pressure on governments, exacerbated by the media, to address the fear of the public of being overrun by foreigners. This fear, according to security scholars, is a fear for the loss of societal security. Societal security entails the continuity of the essential character of society in the face of possible threats (Buzan 1999: 37; Waever 1993: 23). The nature of these essential characteristics and the danger of these possible threats are often the subject of framing strategies. It often entails the alienation of an out-group and the solidification of the in-group identity (Innes 2010: 459). The main implication of this securitization is that while it aims to placate anxieties caused by migration (Huysmans 2006), it actually helps to provoke and recreate these anxieties as well (Buonfino 2004: 48) by underlining and establishing differences between imagined in- and out-groups.

A common argument is that this societal insecurity is at least in part caused by the politically correct policies of multiculturalism. This attack on multiculturalism is dubbed by Prins as new realism (2002).

New realism argues that it was the dominance of multicultural discourse and its social taboos that

prevented the discussion of issues of race, culture and religion. New realist discourse argues that multicultural policies have only increased the government dependency of minorities, and that they

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8 have allowed minorities to retreat into their own groups as opposed to integrating into the native society (Prins 2002: 368). This isolation is then seen as an unwillingness or incapability of minorities to adapt to the host society. This is in turn viewed as a threat to the essential characteristics of society. This is especially true when it concerns Muslim minorities (Ibid: 367). Instead of facilitating cultural difference and dependency, the argument runs, the goal should be to make absolutely clear to minorities that liberal principles are the non-negotiable leitkultur in the country.

Similar to the argument of Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulou, some works on the nature and evolution of racist ideas argue that the emphasis on cultural incompatibility is a convenient way in which anti-immigrant parties (hitherto considered political pariahs) may position themselves as legitimate political actors. Racist movements from earlier days focussed on ideas of racial purity, otherness and superiority. They voiced these ideas with a variety of examples and conceptions of racial otherness (Back 2002). In the past decades however there has been a move away from biological essentialism toward cultural racism (Wetherell & Potter 1992: 128). Here, a certain group is given its lesser status by way of culture instead of biology (Meintel 1997: 222). It aims to define a difference between the values and nature of different cultural groups. These different values are often seen as an explanation for an out-group’s (purported) low-status, un-assimilability, poverty or criminal behaviour. While for the in-group the idea of cultural homogeneity serves as a source of group pride and nostalgia. These ideas are often accompanied by the sense of a threat to national/native/indigenous culture and the need to protect it (Ibid: 224).

This movement away from biological arguments toward cultural arguments is performed to avoid the identity of prejudice (Wetherell & Potter 1992: 211). Instead, actors aim to formulate their arguments on objective criteria. They focus on liberal values of tolerance and reason to justify exclusion (Gibson & Booth 2017: 1). Pitcher speaks of a hegemony of anti-racist discourse in this regard. He argues that as the demands of anti-racism have become incorporated into the state and civil society, any statement dealing with race has to be channelled through a discourse that is, or appears to be, anti-racist (Pitcher 2006: 537). Similarly, Augoustinos and Every note that common rhetorical strategies of anti-immigration actors include: the denial of racism, the construction of negative portrayals that minimize the relevance of race (and instead use other grounds, such as culture, for criticism) and that they draw on liberal values to argue for illiberal policies (2007).

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9 A similar development is noted by Rogers Brubaker in his work questioning the return of assimilation policies in France, Germany and the US (2001). Brubaker notes a return from what he calls differentialist thought to ideas of assimilation. Differentialism here is loosely analogous to the notion of multiculturalism used in this contribution. It places value on group identities and a certain right to be different (Brubaker 2001: 535-536). Brubaker argues that in the case of France it was Le Pen that used these ideas of differentialism to legitimate his agenda. The idea that the ‘real’ French also had the right to preserve their identity from unwanted external influences would be the foundation where their assimilationist policy proposals were built on (Ibid: 536).

Ideas related to universal enlightenment values and differentialist preferences to the native culture are thus often conflated in anti-immigrant arguments. That is, often the universal liberal values of enlightenment are paradoxically seen as being an exclusive feature of western culture. This allows anti-immigration actors to frame the cultural otherness of RASIM groups as problematic, while simultaneously being able to position themselves as defenders of a tolerant and free society. It also enables the new realist critique of framing the defence of any cultural difference as harmful and naïve. Harmful traditional practices or ideas sadly do find expression within some communities. These practices can and should be condemned. However, the simplistic way in which culture is equated with illiberal and harmful practices and ideas is counterproductive and polarizing. It reinforces a dichotomy between the native ‘us’ versus the alien ‘them’ (Roggeband & Verloo 2007: 286). Slootman and Duyvendak note for example that feelings of belonging are strongly related to identity ascription by others (2015: 157). The characterization of (especially Muslim) minorities as un-emancipated, illiberal and un-western is thus likely to hamper the identification of being Dutch or British by minorities (Ibid). Indeed, one may wonder whether the emphasis on cultural integration is borne out of frustration of multiculturalist policies or rather out of cultural diversity or, “lived

multiculturalism per se” (Lentin 2014: 1279).

Stigmatizing, polarizing and harmful ideas about cultural differences are thus increasingly expressed through the disavowing of racism and an emphasis on liberal values. This makes these arguments more difficult to address. An additional complicating factor is the new realist critique of permissive multiculturalism. Any potential argument calling for the recognition of different cultures may now be labelled as irking to political correctness, and the dangerous fragmentation of the ‘native’ society allegedly caused by the legitimation of cultural diversity.

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A classification of frames

The main goal of this contribution is to uncover whether, when and how mainstream political parties have incorporated ideas of cultural difference in their manifestos. There are, of course, much more ways in which RASIM groups may be represented. In order to gain a general understanding of the types of frames that may be it is useful to review studies on immigration/integration discourse in media. Some of these studies only distinguish between positive and negative depictions of migrants (van Dijk 1983; Muijsers 1998). Many other distinguish between almost innumerable amounts of different discourse types (Buonfino 2004: 24). Examples are references to the illegitimacy of economically motivated migration, to physical, cultural or economic threats, to criminality, and the size of the migrant influx itself (i.e. flood, tsunami, wave) (e.g. Horsti 2003, 2007; Gabrielatos & Baker 2008; Haynes, Devereux & Breen 2004; Lakoff & Ferguson 2006; Matthews & Brown 2011). In order to place and order the findings of these studies, the more broad and general categorization of frames by Helbling (2014) will be used. Following Habermas (1993), Helbling distinguishes between three general types of frames. These are: identity-related, moral-universal and utilitarian frames (Helbling 2014: 24).

Source: Helbling 2013, p.25

Nationalist identity frames

In parallel to the cultural arguments described above, identity based frames are those that deal with the supposed key characteristics of a society. More specifically, nationalist identity frames may refer to the threat of the loss these characteristics due to the immigration of the culturally incompatible ‘other’. Various media studies as well more theoretical works on the nature of citizenship and the evolution of racism describe a positive trend in the popularity of such nationalist ideas. For example, a discourse study by Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopoulou has shown that the most successful

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anti-11 immigration parties tend to use arguments that refer to civic values (2012). At first this may seem counterintuitive. Civic values such as tolerance, equality under the law and an emphasis on human rights can easily be related to ideas of cosmopolitanism, which run counter to anti-immigration ideology (Halikiopoulou, Mock & Vasilopoulou 2012: 3). However, an effective strategy of anti-immigration parties is to argue that the host society is defined by these civic values of tolerance, and that these are threatened by the inflow of immigrants who lack these values (Ibid; Mudde 2007b: 78-79). In this way a preference or need for a Western liberal leitkultur is expressed.

Multicultural identity frames

As noted above, identity frames deal with the supposed key characteristics of society. In multicultural discourse these key characteristics are an inclusive conception of national identity and mutual tolerance between societal groups. They emphasize the need to increase domestic support for diversity in the host-society in order for the immigrants to be able to integrate fully. As such, they view intolerance as a danger to social cohesion. Successful integration is seen as equal participation in fields such as the labour market, education and politics. Any policies aimed at reducing inequalities in these fields would have to respect diversity (Roggebrand & Vliegenthart 2007: 530). Multiculturalism thus deems integration or participation of migrants possible without them having to relinquish their cultural identities.

Moral-universal frames

The second general category is moral-universal framing. A review of the literature on the framing strategies of media actors has not resulted in an overview of how moral universal arguments tend to be structured. Studies on immigration discourse tend to focus on the ways in which immigration and immigrants themselves are negatively represented. These negative depictions are often presented as a deviation from a traditional, rights based approach. In the context of securitization Innes mentions the irony of the fact that the most vulnerable people (asylum seekers) are increasingly represented as a threat. A threat that takes precedence over considerations of individual human rights (2010: 456). Similarly, Huysmans and Buonfino show that policy propositions aimed at mitigating migration based security risks (in the UK) are followed by parliamentary discussions on whether these policies undermine the core principles of liberal democracy (2008: 785).

A study by Helbling however, does show that moral-universal arguments are the most often used arguments in media discussions on immigration. In his work, moral-universal arguments refer to general moral principles that are (argued to be) claimable by everyone on an equal basis (Helbling 2014: 24). Examples would include human, civil and political rights such as the right to not be

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12 discriminated against, the right to seek refuge from danger and the right to participate in decision making.

Economic benefit and threat framing

One of the most pervasive of ways to frame immigration is to equate it to an economic threat (Innes 2010: 460-469). In this context economic resources are seen as being zero-sum divided, which means that when immigrants enter the country more people will have to compete over the same amount of resources (Kallis 2013: 230). By allowing more immigrants to enter the country, resources such as jobs, housing and healthcare are argued to be put under pressure (Haynes, Devereux & Breen 2004: 11; Rydgren 2008: 754). These arguments not only refer to the perceived practical difficulties caused by migration but also to the legitimacy of the motivation for migration itself. Immigrants are often depicted as being motivated economically, wanting to take advantage of the welfare state (Innes 2010: 460-469). The perception is thus, that of immigrants being a financial burden for receiving benefits, and an economic threat because they compete for jobs with existing citizens (Gabrielatos & Baker 2008: 21).

Gleeson (2015: 9) mentions that market-based arguments are also appealing for countering negative depictions of migrants. Here, migrants may be represented as hard working individuals destined for self-sufficiency (Ibid: 10). Similarly, political parties may refer to the benefits immigration has already brought or the need to attract new immigrants. In doing so they may make a distinction between so called high and low skilled migrants.

Security frames

Security frames present immigration and its purported consequences as security problems. These types of frames link immigration to rises in criminality and terrorist threats (Haynes, Devereux & Breen 2004: 11; Kallis 2013: 230; Matthews & Brown 2011: 807). As mentioned above, this link is often established through the creation of a homogenized image of immigrants with shared negative characteristics (Innes 2010: 456). Here, the connection to identity has to be noted. It is often the ideas about the culture or religious beliefs of immigrants that are believed to be the drivers of criminal behaviour (Matthews & Brown 2011: 807). Similar to economic threat framing, security frames have been shown to be among the most pervasive ways in which issues of immigration are presented in news media (Buonfino 2004: 24; Haynes, Devereux & Breen 2004: 11). Furthermore, a study by Rydgren has shown that it is an effective strategy for radical right parties to mobilize support (2008: 737). We may thus expect manifestos to refer to immigration as a security concern. This may occur through direct references to the culturally inspired criminal tendencies of migrants or

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13 through more general references to their overrepresentation in criminal statistics. Political parties may also refer to the destabilizing nature of immigration itself, or to fraudulence in the immigration and asylum systems.

Pragmatic frames

Lastly, the pragmatic category contains references to legal and efficiency arguments. Actors may use such arguments in order to avoid taking a clear ideological stance (Helbling 2014: 24-25). As we will see, relatively common are general references to the immigration, asylum or integration systems and policies as being out of control, vulnerable to fraud or overly permissive. Instead of making any ideological claims about RASIM, a party may simply argue for stricter immigration policies due to the system being out of control at present.

Reacting to anti-immigration party success

Over the last decade the structure of political competition has changed from being centred around the role of the state in the economy (i.e. progressive and redistributive vs. conservative and market-oriented) to culturally rooted issues related to the rights of immigrants and Islam (De Vries et al. 2013: 223). A popular explanation of this transformation is that it is caused by pressures that have arisen through globalisation. Globalisation pressures have led some citizens to feel their societal position threatened (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922). As a result cultural issues have become increasingly important in electoral behaviour (van Praag & Adriaansen 2010: 203). A study by De Vries et al. of the Dutch electorate shows that anti-immigrant sentiments have become increasingly important in voters’ left-right self-placement, while the opposite is true for economic attitudes (2013: 225). Furthermore, political parties that position themselves clearly on this cultural dimension stand to gain electorally (Kriesi et al. 2006; van den Brug & van Spanje 2009).

Both in the Netherlands and Britain, mainstream political parties have lost considerable amounts of votes to anti-immigration parties in recent parliamentary elections. A study by Bale et al. (2010) distinguishes between three ideal-typical ways in which mainstream parties may respond to this sort of competition: to hold one’s own position, to adopt the position of the competitor or to decrease the salience of an issue (Ibid: 413).

A party may attempt to decrease the salience of an issue by choosing to de-emphasize it. Anti-immigration parties or indeed any ‘niche’ party are able to successfully compete with mainstream

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14 parties by politicizing novel issues (Meguid 2005: 4). The strategy to de-emphasize aims to exclude, or at least not validate, the inclusion of such issues in the debate (Ibid: 28). When voters are convinced that the primary issue a new party prioritises is not relevant, they are not likely to vote for that party. A similar idea is that anti-immigration parties are often initially branded as pariahs due to their nationalist, ethno centrist or racial ideas (Downs 2001: 24). Mainstream parties may ignore these parties in order to starve them from legitimacy (Ibid: 26). However, several scholars note that in reality it is unlikely that any one party is able to successfully deemphasize an issue once it becomes salient. This is due to the fact that the saliency of an issue also depends on elements such as media attention, public opinion and topical events. That means that as the saliency of an issue increases, parties are less likely to be able to de-emphasize an issue. As a result the strategies of holding one’s own position and of adoption become more attractive as salience increases (Akkerman 2012: 55; Bale et al. 2010: 413).

The strategy of parties holding their own position is based on the notion that parties are constrained by factors such as the need to be ideologically consistent (Ibid: 413; Akkerman 2012: 55) and their general understanding of the social world (Helbling 2014: 26). Parties do react to changing social and electoral conditions, but they do so slowly. Bale et al. mention that parties function as brands and organizations, which are resistant to change (2010: 413). Parties also have a strategic incentive to be ideologically consistent. It is this consistency that binds voters to the ‘brand’ of the party (Akkerman 2012: 55). This strategy entails an adversarial approach while engaging with anti-immigration parties, arguing for tolerance and multiculturalism (Bale 2010: 413).

Conversely, the strategy of adopting the policy of a competitor is based on Downs’ spatial model of competition. In this model political parties are seen as rational vote-maximizing actors who compete on a single dimension (e.g. left-right). Voters are in turn believed to give their vote to whichever party is closest to their own position on that dimension (Downs 1957: 27). The resulting strategic incentive for political parties is to adopt policies that resonate with the largest amount of voters. This means that when a competitor presents an electoral threat, mainstream parties may try to adopt the position of this competitor in order to win back lost voters (Akkerman 2012: 55; Bale 2003: 78; Downs 2001: 27, 38).

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Issue ownership

In order to hypothesize which types of parties are most and least likely to adopt anti-immigration rhetoric a review of the concept of issue ownership proves useful. The idea of issue ownership is somewhat related to the notion of ideological consistency discussed above. Theories of issue ownership argue that parties compete by selectively emphasizing specific issues, rather than competing by adopting positions on the same issues on a exogenous agenda (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2009: 5). The idea behind this is that parties benefit more from the emphasis of one issue than the other because some parties are seen as more competent on certain issues than others, granting them an advantage on those issues. This means that rather than formulating responses to issues on an exogenously determined agenda, parties have an incentive to try to influence which issues are salient.

Centre-right parties are typically dominant of on issues taxation, law and order, and immigration. Conversely, left-wing parties are perceived as competent on issues such as healthcare, redistribution and social rights (Alonso & da Fonseca 2011: 3; Bale et al. 2010: 410; Bale 2008: 319; Dennison & Goodwin 2015: 179; Thränhardt 1995: 327). It is important to note that these emphases are not just electoral strategies, but that they also reflect genuine interest and priority that a party attaches to an issue. Right-wing parties are truly preoccupied with taxation, law and order and security. As ethnic minorities are indeed overrepresented in the criminal justice system and welfare schemes (though in part due to discriminatory practices (Joppke 2007: 5-6)), and terror threats are common across Western Europe (Bale 2008: 319), a tough stance on immigration seems all too compatible with the centre-right’s ideological position. Conversely, left-wing ideology tends to be based on social egalitarianism and universal solidarity (Alonso & da Fonseca 2011: 3). The left’s general commitment to tolerance and international solidarity means that left-wing parties are likely to try to hold onto their sympathetic views or to de-emphasize immigration and integration issues. However, even left-wing parties may feel the need to resort to the adoption of anti-immigration discourse in the face of electoral loss.

Indeed, empirical studies show that the issue emphasis of political parties during elections shows considerable overlap. Political parties focus on issues that they prefer, but also on those that are beneficial to their competitors (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2007). Green-Pedersen and Mortensen offer a theoretical account of why this occurs (2010). They argue that besides the individual motivations of a party to ignore or emphasize an issue, parties must also respond to what is called the party system

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16 agenda and the issues on that agenda. The system agenda is a result of debate between political actors. These actors are expected to debate important issues with each other and not to ignore them. By addressing these issues a party is able to voice a certain perspective on an issue, and to respond to the actions of competing parties. Failing to do so entails the risk that other parties may simply emphasize a certain issue, with the silent party unable to voice their perspective. For our purposes then the expectation is that all parties are increasingly pressured to address the issue of immigration as it rises in salience.

The choice of parties to emphasize certain issues is thus based on two considerations. The first deals with party characteristics such as ideology and issue ownership. That is, the issues that a specific party would want to focus on individually. The second consideration deals with the party system agenda. At any given time several issues will be salient and parties will have to respond to these issues (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2009: 9). While both left- and right-wing have had to deal with the rise in salience of immigration issues, we have established that right-wing parties benefit more from their emphasis due to their ownership of and commitment to such issues. The commitment of left-wing parties to notions of social egalitarianism, solidarity and tolerance makes any strategic shift towards adoption of anti-immigration rhetoric difficult compared to their right-wing competitors.

H1: Right-wing parties are more likely to adopt elements of anti-immigration rhetoric than their left-wing counterparts.

The electoral system and electoral threat

The degree to which political parties choose to adopt anti-immigration rhetoric may also be related to the extent to which a competing anti-immigration party constitutes an electoral threat. In his study on the effects of anti-immigration party success Van Spanje (2010) shows that the success of anti-immigration parties drives other parties to adopt harsher immigration policy positions, with opposition parties being more vulnerable than parties in government (2010; see also Jackman & Volpert 1996: 503). Similar to Bale et al’s argument above, van Spanje explains this phenomenon with Downs’ economic theory of political action. This theory assumes that political parties are rational actors who compete with each other for votes. Downs argues that parties will change their policy positions in order to attract more voters (1957: 137). Van Spanje goes on to reason that when political competitors do well, other parties may expect many voters to be in favour of the policy positions of those successful parties (2010: 566). When immigration is regarded as an important

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17 topic, parties are expected to change their policy positions in accordance to the performance of anti-immigration parties (Ibid). Similarly, we may then also expect that mainstream parties adopt elements of anti-immigrant rhetoric in an attempt to win over votes.

Although anti-immigration parties have seen successes in both the Netherlands and Britain, the potential for electoral threat by incumbent parties differs greatly between the two countries. This is due to the differences between the electoral systems in place in the two countries. The dominant context within which party competition takes place is that of the electoral laws and regulations in place in a country. These shape the opportunities and constraints that political parties face prior, during and after electoral campaigns. Specifically, we are interested in whether the electoral system presents a permissive or an inhospitable structure for new and small political parties. In her book Radical Right, Pippa Norris holds that the process of winning elected office can be seen to consist of three distinct stages: the nomination stage, the campaign stage and the election stage. First, during the nomination stage regulations on party registration and the way in which parties nominate candidates on the ballot are relevant. Second, during the campaigning stage regulations on resources such as subsidies or access to public broadcasting apply. Finally, the election stage mainly revolves around electoral thresholds and district size (Norris 2005: 84-85).

In terms of the nomination stage there is little difference between the UK and the Netherlands. Both countries require new parties to pay a registration fee and to follow certain standards with regards to the internal organization of the party and to its financial responsibilities. After that, additional fees are required for each candidate that will stand for election. One difference is the Dutch requirement of a relatively small amount (~600) of signatories in order for a party to be able to partake in the elections. With regards to regulations governing party funding and media access, the cases of the UK and NL do not differ substantially. In both countries party finances are regulated, parties receive public funds and have access to free public broadcasting. However, there are some differences. In the UK, political parties receive indirect public subsidies while in the Netherlands parties do not. More importantly, the basis for allocating public broadcasting time differs between the UK and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the basis is the percentage of parliamentary seats in the current legislature. The UK system is somewhat more egalitarian in this regard: allocation of public broadcasting time is based on the total number of candidates running in the election (ibid: 97). Even so, these factors prove to be poor predictors of anti-immigrant support within a country. Norris’ analysis provides no support for the thesis that more egalitarian systems with regards to public funding and media access benefits small incumbent parties. Formal regulations may not reflect the actual practice, or may not be effectively enforced. Another consideration is the extent to which

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anti-18 immigrant/ new parties are able to raise funds or get publicity on their own. The populist/aggressive style of anti-immigrant parties often earns them considerable publicity. It is possible that this outweighs any effect of a small amount of free public broadcasting (Ibid: 102).

Significant differences emerge when looking at the election stage. The majoritarian system of the UK and the proportional representation system of the NL differ substantially. In the prior the country is divided into constituencies. Those who run for office compete over the highest amount of votes in a certain constituency. In the end only a single winner will be able to represent that constituency. Note that this implies that one can win a constituency with less than 50 percent of the vote. The most dramatic example of this is the election result of the Belfast South district in the 2015 general election. Here, the winning MP managed to win the constituency with only 24.5% of the vote (BCC 2015). Conversely, in a Proportional Representation (PR) system such as the Netherlands, a certain percentage of support for a party will result into roughly the same percentage of won seats. The Netherlands employs a particularly low voting threshold of 0.67 percent of the total amount of votes.

The two different systems give rise to diverging dynamics of electoral competition. This can be illustrated by what is called Duverger’s law. This law holds that systems such as the British majoritarian system have a tendency to move toward party dualism, and that proportional systems tend to facilitate a multitude of parties. This difference is crucial in understanding the opportunity structures that political parties face in both systems. Generally, proportional systems offer greater opportunities for new parties to enter the election and give greater incentive for voters to support new parties (Arzheimer & Carter 2006: 423). In (the Dutch) proportional system(s) representatives need not gain the most votes in a district in order to be elected, they only need enough votes to pass a voting threshold. This also increases the likelihood with which new parties are able to attract voters. Voters are more likely to vote for new parties (or smaller parties in general) when their vote still counts even when their electee gains less votes than his or her competitors. Conversely in majoritarian systems new or small political parties have much less chance to gain representation (Ibid). This may dissuade new actors to enter the political race and voters to vote for these actors: one risks ‘wasting’ ones vote (Golder 2003: 455; Jackman & Volpert 1996: 506).

Mainstream political parties in the Dutch proportional electoral system therefore suffer from higher degrees of electoral threat from anti-immigrant parties than mainstream parties in the British majoritarian system. This is supported by the fact that anti-immigration parties in Britain have historically received a lower percentage of the vote than similar parties in the Netherlands. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) did receive a significant 12.6 percent share of the vote in

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19 the 2015 UK general election. However, due to the nature of the British electoral system, UKIP only got one MP into parliament. Under a proportional system UKIP would have received 12.6 percent of the total of 629 seats, and would manage to get 82 MP’s into parliament. The British majoritarian electoral system thus seems to dampen the threat that is exerted by any entrepreneurial party. This is important because survey data of politicians shows that perceived seat insecurity is strongly, significantly and negatively associated with strategies of disengagement (Downs 2001: 31). When parties and politicians are under threat of losing seats to anti-immigration parties, they have greater incentives to co-opt anti-immigration themes (Ibid). The expectation then, is that mainstream parties in the Netherlands are more likely to adopt anti-immigration rhetoric than their counterparts in the UK.

H2: Due to the higher levels of electoral threat, mainstream parties in the Netherlands are more likely to adopt anti-immigration rhetoric than their counterparts in the UK.

This leads us to the following distinction between parties in their expected propensity to adopt anti-immigration rhetoric. Labour, due to its need to be ideologically consistent and the relatively low levels of electoral threat in the British electoral system, is the least likely to adopt harmful/racist/anti-immigration discourse. Conversely, the VVD is the most likely to do so due to the relatively high levels of electoral threat in the Dutch system and due to its ownership and preoccupation of immigration issues. The PvdA and conservatives take intermediary positions.

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Data and coding method

Electronic versions of the manifestos of the leading social democratic and liberal/ centre-right parties were collected from the Comparative Manifesto Project’s database1, the University of Groningen’s online political party documents archive2, Richard Kimbe’s website ‘political science resources’3 and from the parties’ own websites. The twelve most recent manifestos of the Labour party, the Conservative party, the VVD and the PvdA were coded. This means that the British manifestos range from October 1970 to 2017 and the Dutch manifestos range from 1981 to 2017. Additionally, all the available manifestos of the LPF, the PVV and UKIP were analysed. The LPF’s manifesto range from 2002 to 2006, the PVV’s manifestos from 2006 to 2017 and UKIP’s manifestos from 1997 to 2017. UKIP’s 1992 manifesto was sadly excluded because of its unavailability online or elsewhere.

Such a large scope was taken in order to be able to review the way in which issues of immigration have been represented by political parties over time. Both the UK and the Netherlands are known as countries espousing multicultural citizenship models. That is, they grant minority groups and immigrants a range of cultural rights (Helbling 2014: 28). As such they provide the perfect cases to analyse whether there has been indeed a mainstreaming of anti-immigration discourse. The same goes with regards to the choice of election manifestos as primary documents. Critics are quick to say that election manifestos are only read by the people who analyse them. However, manifestos are carefully constructed documents aimed at offering solutions to salient issues in a way that is convincing to voters. An additional benefit of using manifestos is their close relation to electoral competition: they are written for the purpose of winning elections. As such we may expect manifestos to reflect a party’s stances and framing on issues during a time of heightened competition over votes and issue ownership.

The Comparative Manifesto Project is perhaps the most well-known project in the field of manifesto analysis. It covers over a thousand political parties from 1945 to the present, with thousands of manifestos already having been coded. While the dataset does contain some relevant variables related to the policy stances of political parties it sadly does not cover the use of frames. The manifestos have therefore been coded to identify the use of frames. The coding process was done manually by a single human coder in order to maximize validity, as a human reader is better equipped than algorithms derive the meaning from texts (Dolezal et al. 2012: 6).

1 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ 2_{http://dnpp.ub.rug.nl} 3 http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man.html

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21 During the coding process it became apparent that there are considerable differences in the way Dutch and British manifestos tend to be written. Where the Dutch manifestos often contain a narrative that cross-cuts various different policy fields, the British manifestos tend to only deal with issues in their subsequent paragraph or chapter. This may be a confounding factor. As we will see, the Dutch manifestos contain considerably more references to immigration and integration issues. This was expected based on differences in the permissiveness of the electoral systems in question. It is important to note however, that the nature of election manifestos in the Netherlands and Britain may also be of importance.

The total 61 manifestos were coded with the help of the program Atlas.ti. Atlast.ti is a tool for qualitative data analysis, but allows for the assignment of codes to quasi-sentences and easy data transfer into excel spreadsheets. These quasi-sentences are the coding units in this analysis. Each quasi-sentence is a single expression of a political idea or issue (Budge et al. 2001: 217 as referenced by Dolezal et al. 2012: 7). The strategy followed in determining the structure of the codes was both deductive and inductive. Initially, a basic structure was created on the basis of the types of representations identified in the section on media discourses on immigration and integration. This basic structure was then improved upon during the coding process. This means that categories were added, removed or changed to better capture the discourse found in the manifestos. This process led to a code structure consisting of seven parent categories. These are: nationalist identity, multicultural identity, moral universal, economic threat, economic benefit, security and pragmatic arguments. Each of these parent categories encompass a small variety of arguments. I have attempted to make my coding decisions as transparent and traceable as possible by including an appendix which details what type of arguments the child categories consist of. Additionally, the datasets with all primary documents, codes and their assigned quasi-sentences are available to the assessors.

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Analysis

This paragraph contains the analysis of the framing and arguments used by the Dutch and British mainstream parties and their anti-immigrant colleagues. First the nature of anti-immigrant discourse in the UK and the Netherlands will be analysed. The section thereafter will look at the types of arguments used by the mainstream parties.

Anti-immigration parties in the United Kingdom

This section aims to shed some light on the development of anti-immigrant discourse in the UK. First, some ideas and policies of the National Front (NF) and the British National Party (BNP) are discussed. As the electorally most successful anti-immigrant party in Britain, most attention will be given to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP’s election manifestos for the General Elections of 1997 through 2017 have been analysed in the same vein as manifestos of the mainstream parties in the Netherlands and the UK.

British racist and populist extreme-right movements have a long term history rooted in the fascist movements and ideology of the interwar period. They have been a feature of political debates about race and immigration from the 1960s onward (Solomos 2011: 121). During the 1960s and 70s it was mainly the NF that achieved some success in voicing racist and xenophobic opinions in debates about race and immigration (Ibid: 123). However, it failed to achieve any significant electoral results. The NF was founded out of different neo-fascist groups (Copsey 2007: 65), most notably the BNP. As such it espoused views in favour of racial purity and racial difference. The NF viewed immigration and population mixing as threats to the survival of British identity and culture. Here themes of the immigrant or non-white as the alien, stranger and even subhuman were common (Solomos 2011: 126). The NF represented the whole of minority communities as a threat to the unity of British society, while positioning itself as the voice of a silent white majority (Ibid: 128).

The NF fractured after the first Thatcher government due to internal strife and the marginalization of its message (Ibid: 125). During the 1980s and 1990s the BNP became the most successful extreme-right party after the collapse of the NF. However, the party only achieved minor local successes throughout this period. During the last two decades the BNP has attempted to rebrand itself as an electable party by stripping its links with neo-Nazi extremism (Copsey 2007: 67). This can be seen as an example of the movement from biological to cultural arguments. In the case of the BNP however this transition only applied to the surface, while it remained fascist at heart (Edwards 2012: 246). Publicly the party started to emphasize its critique of multiculturalism, arguing that it aims to

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23 wipe out indigenous cultures through the homogenization of different peoples. In doing so it even reversed the accusation of racism toward Muslims by portraying itself as a victim (Edwards 2012: 252; Atton 2006: 573). In this regard the BNP claims that it is not racist, but that it is a defender of ethnic and cultural diversity (Ibid: 73-74). Following from this the party argues against integration schemes. Instead, the BNP favours an immigration stop as well as the expulsion of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants when possible, or cultural and biological separation otherwise (Ibid: 75).

To determine the nature of UKIP’s discourse regarding RASIM groups an analysis of its manifestos have been performed. The results are presented in graph 1.1. below. The data shows the percentage share of a specific category of the total arguments coded as pertaining to RASIM groups.

It becomes immediately apparent that UKIP message has been relatively consistent since 2005. Since the 2005 elections nationalist identity and security arguments seem to have been established as the foundation of its discourse on RASIM issues. Prior to 2005 its discourse was a varied mix of the pro immigrant multicultural, moral universal and economic benefit arguments and the anti-immigrant nationalist, economic threat and security arguments. To gain a better understanding of the nature of UKIP’s nationalist and security arguments, it is useful to go over the specific types of arguments within these broader categories.

,000% 20,000% 40,000% 60,000% 80,000% 100,000% 120,000% 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017

Graph 1.1: UKIP RASIM arguments

Identity, nationalist Identity, multicultural Moral universal Economic threat Economic benefit Security Pragmatic

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24 From 1997 to 2005, UKIP’s nationalist arguments seem to have been based on ideas of sovereignty. To be more precise, its anti-immigrant arguments typically called for leaving the European Union in order to take back control over Britain’s borders. An example quotation from UKIP’s 1997 manifesto:

“The UK as a prosperous country will always attract immigrants, and must therefore limit their numbers. The EU’s policy, however, is to apply immigration rules which are common to all member

states and to scrap internal borders, a policy will not work satisfactorily so long as its southern member states remain easy entry points for illegal access to all EU countries. The UKIP wishes the UK

to keep its own independent rules on immigration and political asylum.”4

From 2010 onwards, UKIP starts to include arguments based on the cultural otherness of immigrants. Take note of the following excerpts as examples.

“UKIP believes in civic nationalism, which is open and inclusive to anyone who wishes

to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious background. We reject the ‘blood and soil’ ethnic nationalism of extremist parties. UKIP opposes multiculturalism and political correctness,

and promotes uniculturalism, aiming to create a single British culture embracing all races and religions.”5

“Integration is as important as immigration. In Britain, we do not believe in treating women

or gay people as second-class citizens, and we hold to a fundamental belief in democracy and free speech.”6

Especially the call for cultural integration and a longing for British culture to be dominant are central here. Multiculturalism is explicitly rejected and a desire for the promotion of a single British culture is expressed. Multiculturalism is perceived as dangerous because it fails to integrate those RASIM groups who are argued to be culturally inclined to have negative views towards gays, women, democracy and free speech. The emphasis on the openness and inclusiveness of this unifying British culture is interesting, as the cultural other is excluded without negotiation due to his supposed illiberal tendencies.

4

The United Kingdom Independence Party. 1997. UKIP manifesto 1997. [online] Available at:

http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/ukip97.htm [11-6-2018], p.22.

5_{The United Kingdom Independence Party. 2010. Empowering the people. [online] Available at:}

http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge10/man/parties/UKIPManifesto2010.pdf [11-6-2018], p.13.

6

The United Kingdom Independence Party. 2017. Britain Together. [online] Available at:

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/3944/attachments/original/1495695469/UKIP_Manife sto_June2017opt.pdf?1495695469 [11-6-2018], p.34.

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25 UKIP’s security arguments consist of references to fraud in the immigration and asylum systems as well as references to terror threats and culturally motivated crime. Arguments dealing with fraud include policy proposals to ‘tackle’ sham marriages7 and those which call for the expulsion of those who have acquired British citizenship through fraud or deception.8 Most notably however, is the rise of references to terror threats and culturally motivated crime in the 2017 manifesto. Here too a connection is made between the political correctness of multiculturalism and the danger posed by the un-emancipated, illiberal nature of the cultural other. This constitutes the new realist discourse described earlier. UKIP positions its competitors as too politically correct to effectively deal with RASIM issues, while it frames itself as an actor that dares to speak plainly about these issues.

Take for example the following quotations:

“Multiculturalism has prevented criticism of certain religious beliefs and cultural practices, even those the overwhelming majority of British people would consider repugnant, and which

threaten rights and equalities established in Britain for decades.”9

“Every woman, indeed anyone who believes in women’s rights, should be outraged by the appalling

practices occurring on a daily basis in minority communities across Britain.”10

With regards to economic threat arguments, UKIP tends to argue around issues of employment competition, the undercutting of wages, and the social security uptake of immigrants. As a response, UKIP calls for a welfare chauvinistic approach. Note for example:

“UKIP is not ashamed to say it: we should be offering jobs first to our own unemployed, rather than inviting cheap labour from overseas to do the jobs British people are perfectly able to do.”11 “We have an over-stretches NHS and a high benefits bill, partly because of the pressure from

immigration. To combat this, all new migrants to Britain will have to make tax and national insurance contributions for five consecutive years before they will become eligible to claim UK

benefits, (…).”12

7

The United Kingdom Independence Party. 2015. Believe in Britain. [online] Available at:

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/1103/attachments/original/1429295050/UKIPManifes to2015.pdf?1429295050 [11-6-2018], p.10.

8

The United Kingdom Independence Party. 2017. Britain Together. [online] Available at:

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/3944/attachments/original/1495695469/UKIP_Manife sto_June2017opt.pdf?1495695469 [11-6-2018], p.33. 9 Ibid: 35. 10 Ibid: 36. 11_{Ibid: 14.} 12 Ibid: 13.

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26 While most anti-immigration parties have stayed on the political fringes of British electoral democracy, UKIP has achieved staggering electoral successes in the last decade. This is especially the case after the second election of Nigel Farage as its leader in 2010. This is also where the party started to adapt its strategy of Euroscepticism to include populist anti-elitism as well as calls for restrictions to immigration (Ford & Goodwin 2014: 282). This combination of Euroscepticism, populism and anti-immigration views proved to be a winning combination (Tournier-Sol 2015; Dennison & Goodwin 2015: 178; Ford & Goodwin 2014: 282). In the general election of 2015 UKIP gathered 12.6% of the total vote, becoming the most successful third party since the rise of Labour. UKIP aims to portray itself as inclusive but simultaneously opposed to multiculturalism. Additionally, racist outbursts by UKIP party officials are common (Tournier-Sol 2015: 146). In general however UKIP avoids negative characterizations of outgroups, relying on subtle tacit distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Gibson & Booth 2017: 2). UKIP was founded as a populist party (Ibid: 149). As such it presents mainstream parties as interchangeable elitists with little connection to the real world. UKIP presents itself as a party of the common man with common sense policies (Ibid: 150; Kelsey 2016: 971). Related to this is the assertion that mainstream parties have deliberately ignored or downplayed immigration issues, while UKIP dares to speak about these issues honestly. In doing so the party often links immigration with a fragmentation of British identity, a dangerous rise in illiberal views and practices towards women and homosexuals.

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27

Anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands

This section will review the development of anti-immigrant discourse in the Netherlands. First, some ideas and policies of the Centre Movement are discussed. Then, more attention will be given to the manifestos of the LPF and the PVV.

Similar to the British case the earliest example of Dutch anti-immigrant politics can be traced back to fascism. The Nederlandse Volks-Unie (NVU) is an ethnic nationalist party that has the goal of founding a one party Dutch state following the NSDAP-model. The party was founded in 1971. Since its founding it has failed to achieve representation at both the local and national level. However, it did give rise to the Centrumpartij (CP) which split off from the NVU in 1980. The CP in turn gave rise to the Centrumdemocraten (CD) which split off from the CP in 1984 after an internal dispute. After this dispute the CP continued as CP’86. Despite the break off, the ideologies of the CD and CP/CP’86 closely resemble each other (De Witte & Scheepers 1996: 649). Both parties shared strong ethno-nationalist ideas, were in favour of traditional values and were profoundly anti-immigrant. To illustrate, the Centrum movement (CP’86) argued for the ‘internal homogenization’ of the Netherlands with the goal the expulsion of all who did not belong (Ibid). In the same vein, it sported the slogan Eigen volk eerst (Native people first). In general the idea of racial integration was rejected with arguments that it would lead to the degeneration of the own race (Ibid). Furthermore, the movement claimed to stand up for the interests of the autochtonous Dutch, and that these interests were largely being ignored by mainstream parties. They were in favour of restrictive immigration policies as to not be overrun by ‘hordes’ of allochtonous. The movement was also fiercely anti-establishment, and campaigned on the need for tough law and order policies (Ibid: 649). The CP had one seat in parliament from 1982 to 1986, The CD was represented in the 1989-1994 parliament with a single seat and in the 1994-1998 parliament three seats.

The CP and CD only achieved marginal electoral successes during their time. Anti-immigration ideas only started to become significantly popular when Pim Fortuyn announced he was running for the parliamentary elections of 2002 (Pedersen 2011: 39). Fortuyn joined the new populist party Leefbaar Nederland (LN) and quickly became its leader in a few months later. After a controversial interview with Fortuyn in the national paper De Volkskrant in February 2002, LN removed Fortuyn as their leader (Ibid). In the interview, Fortuyn had called Islam a backward culture and stated that no more asylum seekers should be granted residence permits (Pedersen 2011: 39). Because LN had removed Fortuyn as their leader Fortuyn founded his own party, the LPF. Just nine days before the parliamentary elections of 2002 Fortuyn was assassinated by an environmental activist. After the

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28 elections it became apparent that a large part of the LN electorate had voted for the LPF, resulting in a historical gain of 26 seats for the LPF. The LPF became part of the government, but without its leader the party was slowly dissolving and the coalition fell after only a few months due to internal vicissitudes. While the LPF did gain eight seats in the next parliamentary elections in 2003 it did not enter into government.

To determine the types of arguments the LPF used regarding RASIM groups an analysis of its manifestos has been performed. The results are shown in graph 2.1. below. Again, the results represent the share of a category of the total arguments coded as dealing with RASIM issues.

The results show that the LPF has been very consistent in its anti-immigration argument in its short existence. Similar to UKIP’s distribution of arguments, the LPF bases its anti-immigrant rhetoric on nationalist identity, economic threat and security arguments. A closer examination of these categories is therefore warranted.

,000% 20,000% 40,000% 60,000% 80,000% 100,000% 120,000% 2002 2003 2006

Graphs 2.1. LPF RASIM arguments

Identity, nationalist Identity, multicultural Moral universal Economic threat Economic benefit Security Pragmatic

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29 The LPF’s framing of cultural difference is similar to that of UKIP. The LPF’s nationalist notions are built upon the idea that the culture of the out-group is incompatible with that of the liberal Netherlands, and that cultural integration is thus needed. To illustrate, note the following excerpts from the LPF manifestos:

“Large groups in society experience a lag in their socio-cultural position. Often times these groups originate from countries that do not share the Christian-humanistic developments that Europe has

experienced for centuries.”13

“Identity is similar to what a fish feels when it is in water. It is not aware of being in water.

Only when the water becomes polluted does it become aware of what the problem is. Only when there is a threat from the outside do you realise what you really are: A Dutch citizen.”14

One can note that it is indeed the cultural distinctness of RASIM groups that is problematized. Most striking is the perception of diverse identities as ‘pollution’ and an existential threat to the ‘Dutch citizen’. Interestingly, the alleged Christian-humanistic nature of Dutch society is perceived as an end station of a linear model of socio-cultural development. Countries and peoples who have not experienced these Christian-humanistic developments are framed as lagging behind. This lag in socio-cultural development is seen as fostering opposition to the foundations of liberal democracy, such as the separation of church and state, and ‘our’ liberties.15 Indeed, a section of the 2006 manifesto deals with the question whether one should respect other people’s cultures. Why should one have respect for a culture that legitimates honour killings, that subordinates women and that deprives pubescent girls their education?16

13_{Lijst Pim Fortuyn. 2002. Zakelijk met een hart. [online] Available at:}

http://pubnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/root/verkiezingsprogramma/TK/lpf2002/ [11-6-2018], p.5.

14

Lijst 5 Fortuyn. 2006. ‘Dit is niet het land wat ik voor mijn kinderen wil achterlaten’. [online] Available at:

15

Lijst Pim Fortuyn. 2002. Zakelijk met een hart. [online] Available at:

16_{Lijst 5 Fortuyn. 2006. ‘Dit is niet het land wat ik voor mijn kinderen wil achterlaten’. [online] Available at:}

Cultures of tolerance