Democratic Governance By: Isaya Wullings 11023627
Seminar 1
Reviewer: Benno Netelenbos Second reviewer: Robin Pistorius Risk Analysis of Climate Change 7452 words
Friday 18th of January 2019
Risk Analysis of Climate Change
How the Policy-Making Process of Uncertainty can be Analysed in the Case of the Deltaplan on the Adaptation of the Netherlands to Climate Change
Index
Index _________________________________________________________________ p. 2 Introduction ____________________________________________________________ p. 3 The problem of risk and uncertainty _________________________________________ p. 4 Wickedness of climate change _____________________________________________ p. 5 Debate between rational and political risk analysis _____________________________ p. 7
Methods and Case _______________________________________________________ p. 9
Analysis _______________________________________________________________ p. 12 Deltaplan ______________________________________________________________ p. 13 ‘Stress test’ ____________________________________________________________ p. 15 Risk dialogue ___________________________________________________________ p. 17 Conclusion _____________________________________________________________ p. 19 Discussion _____________________________________________________________ p. 20 References ____________________________________________________________ p. 21
Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows us in their report that climate change is a worldwide challenge and affects planet earth in different ways (2012: 40).
Because of the climate change is based on uncertainties on ‘what to expect?’, ‘what are the chances of risks?’ and ‘how bad will the consequences be?’, it is hard to design policies on the problem (ibid.).
Not having a final definition of the problem of climate change makes the problem ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1973: 160). The wickedness of a problem is characterised by several characteristics, among which ‘the unpredictability’ and ‘the uncontrollability’,
because the problems are complex (ibid.). Climate change can be seen as a ‘wicked problem’, is that there is no ultimate definition on what can be understood as climate change (IPCC 2012: 4, 46). The consequences are interdependent on other problems, such as development and human behaviour, which makes it difficult to come up with a simple solution (IPCC 2012: 7-9).
The uncertainty of the problem of climate change inherently leads to rational risk analysis in order to create more security (idem: 4). Because policy makers always try to manage the problem, rational calculations and cost-benefit analyses on climate change are a way to create a feeling of control and security to policy makers and citizens (Stone 2012: 131-133).
Yet, risks are always present in society, and can never be fully eliminated (Beck 1992: 19; IPCC 2012: 4). Therefore, the aim of policy makers to manage the uncertainty can never be completely achieved (Beck 1992: 29-31; Stone 2012: 139). The problem of risks is that risks are based on uncertainties, that make it hard to control the problem (Wynne 1992: 114; Stone 2012: 131-133). Uncertainty makes it hard to define the problem and the expectations, because the chances on risks occurring and on harmful consequences are unknown (Wynne 1992: 114).
It is interesting to see how rational analyses try to control risks and what shortcomings of the rational policy-making process are. This is relevant because it will provide more insight to policy makers on how their policy plans can be improved and more adequately respond to the questions asked by society (Beck 1992: 30). Furthermore, the practical implementation of the criticism on rational decision-making processes provides an insight in the difficulties policymakers experience (Hindmoor 2010: 59; Beck 1992: 5; Stone 2012: 140).
To provide an answer to the central question about the ways policy makers try to implement the criticisms on rational decision-making, the wicked problem of climate change
will first be described by a description of the problem of uncertainty and risk. Then the debate between rational decision-making and political decision-making will be clarified by using the theories of Beck (1992), Wynne (1992), Hindmoor (2010) and Stone (2012). The case of the Deltaplan will be analysed to provide an empirical example to answer the central question, where the practical difficulty of implementing a more political process, because the rational decision-making process forms the basis to political decision-making (Hindmoor 2010: 59; Beck 1992: 5; Stone 2012: 140).
The problem of risk and uncertainty
Climate change is according to the IPCC (2012: ix) seen as a difficult problem, because it entails ‘the combination of severe consequences, rarity, and human as well as physical determinants’. This means that policy makers do not know ‘what to expect?’, ‘the likelihood of the risk occurring?’, for example the chance of floods, and if it does occur, ‘how bad the consequences will be?’, for the natural environment and the liveability for humans (Stone 2012: 131). Climate change is thus a problem that is hard to manage, because it is insecure, coming from uncertainty on two questions: ‘will it happen?’ and ‘how bad can we expect the consequences to be?’ (ibid.).
The problem of risk comes from the uncertainty inherent to climate change, which forms another problem: the problem of uncertainty. A distinction can be made between four types of uncertainty: risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy (Wynne 1992: 114). Wynne defines the first one as simply ‘knowing the odds’, meaning that the chances of different outcomes can be defined and analysed, because the probabilities and the way the system works are known (idem: 114). Uncertainty then can be defined as ‘not knowing the odds, but only the system parameters’ (ibid.). Here, uncertainty can decrease by estimating the probability and its outcomes and include the uncertainties in the analysis (ibid.). Ignorance means that an uncertainty is not recognized, because ‘we don’t know, what we don’t know’ (ibid.). Indeterminacy is a concept used to add intensified scientific knowledge on
environmental risks in the process of uncertainty (idem: 118). However, it should not be a substitute of the precise control of social actors, and therefore Wynne argues that contingent social behaviour should also be explicitly included in the risk analysis (idem: 119).
Stone (2012: 131) defines risks as “the likelihood of something bad happening”, expressed as a percentage of calculated chances. The calculation of risk is highly insecure, because it always remains a guess made by people interpreting the outcomes of the
available data and the most sophisticated statistical methods’, they remain guesses on what will happen, because in practice, there are always other unexpected changes in natural and social factors influencing climate change (IPCC 2012: 37). The problem of risk is then that it is hard to control risks, because risks are based on uncertainties (Stone 2012: 131).
Another problem is that risks can never be completely eliminated (Beck 1992: 19; IPCC 2012: 4). According to Beck (1992: 19) modern society can never be free of risks, because ‘in advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically
accompanied by the social production of risks.’. This means that risks are ‘a systematic way of dealing with the insecurities and hazards induced and introduced by modernization itself’ (ibid.). In this definition it becomes clear that risks are not always matching the scientific predictions, because the social reality affects the risks as well, and can take unexpected turns (idem: 4, 22-24, 154).
To conclude, uncertainties on climate change make it hard to measure the probability of an event occurring, what consequences we can expect and how bad the consequences can be (Stone 2012: 131). The problem of risks is thus that it is based on uncertainties and the problem of uncertainties is that it is hard to control the problem (Wynne 1992: 114; Stone 2012: 131-133). Risk analyses are based on uncertainties about the probability, the
characteristics of the problem and the potential harmful consequences (ibid.). The problem of uncertainty is that it is hard to define the problem and to define the expectations, because the odds are not know, only the parameters can be known to a small extent (Wynne 1992: 114). Everything thus remains a guess on the questions of ‘what is the chance it will actually happen?’ and ‘if it happens, how bad will it be?’ (Stone 2012: 131).
Wickedness of climate change
As mentioned before, uncertainty makes it hard to define the problem of climate change (Wynne 1992: 114; IPCC 2012: 4). For policy makers, it is difficult to design a policy plan on climate change, without a clear definition of what climate change is (IPCC 2012: 4, 46). The IPCC argues that defining the problem of climate change is difficult, because it is hard to identify long-term changes (idem: 46). Although the earth is always changing, the observed data is not matching the natural variability of climate change, which makes the current changes hard to predict (ibid.). The possibility for changes in all aspects of climate will complicate the policy-making process in terms of evaluation, communication, and
management of the resulting risk (idem: 27). The fact that there is no definitive formulation of climate change, is what Rittel and Webber (1973: 160) understand as one of the
characteristics of a ‘wicked problem’. Other than the difficulty of defining wicked problems, there are other characteristics that make some problems, like climate change, wicked (ibid.).
These wicked problems can be understood best as complex problems that ask for multiple different types of actions, as problems with unpredictable consequences and as problems that are hard to control (ibid.). This type of problems arises when policy makers try to make decisions in areas characterized by risk and uncertainty (Head and Alford 2013: 2). Rittel and Webber (1973: 160) argue that there is no final definition of wicked problems, but they offer several characteristics that are helpful to understand when problems become wicked.
Next to not having an ultimate formulation of climate change, another characteristic is that there is no ‘stopping rule’, which means that there is no definitive solution (ibid.). This applies to climate change, because it seems to have region specific trends (IPCC 2012: 8). Region specific trends show a great variability between consequences, because different types of climate change occur in different regions (ibid.).
This second characteristic can be combined with another one, namely that ‘every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem’ (Rittel and Webber 1973: 160). Here, it can be said that climate change is not only a problem of natural changes in the environment, but is also dependent on other problems like socioeconomic development and human behaviour (IPCC 2012: 9). Natural climate change variability refers to the
adjustment of nature to the actual climate and its effects, which can be seen as long term trends of the earth (ibid.). Socioeconomic development has had effects on exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes and human behaviour can both increase or decrease the effects of climate change, depending on the level of awareness, wealth, education, gender, age and other characteristics (idem: 7).
Finally, a fourth characteristic that can be named is that there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, because climate change has big impacts on the liveability of people and animals and vegetation (idem: 237). This makes it difficult for policy makers to estimate the value of the consequences, because there is a big range in the value to estimated damages and losses (idem: 9). Every attempted solution is thus a ‘one-shot operation’ (Rittel and Webber 1973: 160).
Climate change is thus an example of what Rittel and Webber (1973: 161-166) call ‘wicked problems’. Climate change is seen as a wicked problem, because there is no ultimate definition on what can be understood as climate change (IPCC 2012: 4, 46). All consequences are interrelated and are also dependent on other problems such as development and human
behaviour, which makes it difficult to come up with a solution (IPCC 2012: 7-9). Moreover, every solution is a ‘one-shot operation’ and can thus be a risky decision influencing
vegetation, animals and people (idem: 237).
Debate between rational and political risk analysis
Hence, the problem of risk is that it is inherent to a great amount of insecurity, which makes decision-making difficult (IPCC 2012: 69-76; Kuijken 2017: 127; Wynne 1992: 114). However, policy makers try to control risks in order to deal with insecurities, by estimating the probability to decrease uncertainty (Stone 2012: 139-141). Around the twentieth century a shift in policy-making was implemented (idem: 9). The policy-making process shifted from political discussions between elected officials towards a more scientific method by experts and specialists, based on facts and numbers (ibid.).
In the 1960s a scientific and mathematical approach to security was developed, called ‘risk analysis’ (idem: 131). This scientific method of policy-making is what we now think, belongs to the theory of ‘rational choice’ (idem: 9). The rational choice theory is an approach where the economic principles are applied to political decision-making (Hindmoor 2010: 42). It assumes that people rationally think about the costs and benefits and put their own interest first (ibid.). Rationally weighing the costs and benefits can be seen in policy-making on uncertainty as well, because how risk, potential harms and tolerance of uncertainty is the basis of all security issues (Stone 2012: 140). Risk analysis is a method to calculate the expected value of a danger by scientifically and mathematically estimate the likelihood of risk
occurring and the possible damages it will bring (Stone 2012: 131, 141). To scientific policy makers, insecurity can be calculated rationally to maximize security and minimize harms (idem: 133). This way, they provide a feeling of security, since risk analysts reduce bad events to measurable outcomes (ibid.). Although policy makers acknowledge that it is impossible to have absolute security about the risk and that a society can never be risk free, they still see risk as an objective measure of insecurity, which can be calculated rationally (idem: 133, 139). This presumes that two catastrophes with the same expected value, are seen as equally important, which means that people care about both catastrophes equally (idem: 142).
Yet, in practice people respond to two risks differently, based on feelings (Stone 2012: 142). Stone (2012: 11) criticizes the rational model of risk analysis by saying that policy makers ignore what she considers as two powerful parts of decision-making, namely the emotional feelings and moral intuitions (ibid.). She thus offers a critical approach to the
‘rationality project’ (idem: 9-11). She argues that the rational model of decision-making is too objective, because it ignores the essence of policy-making: ‘the struggle over ideas’ (idem: 13; Hindmoor 2010: 54-55). According to Stone, the starting point of decision-making should not be an economic view on society, based on the idea to use cost-benefit analysis and
mathematical calculations to calculate insecurities and estimate risks (idem: 12, 139), but rather an idea of a political community, where people exchange ideas, perspectives and ideals (idem: 13).
She uses the same critical approach to discuss risk analysis, by saying that the calculation of risks can be based on ‘the best available data and the most sophisticated statistical methods, but they are still guesses’, and thus the estimation of risks can never be completely bias free (idem: 141). This means that for example the amount global warming can be calculated, and there can be a final estimation of a specific amount of temperature rise, but if that will turn out to be true in practice, will never be known for sure (IPCC 2012: 112). Global warming can be very precisely calculated, but there is already proof that the
calculations of the 20th century on the current era have overestimated the warming of the warm extremes and underestimated the warming of the cold extremes (ibid.). The bias lies then in the interpretation of the final answer, namely, if it is considered as something to worry about, or if it seems to little to actually take action (Stone 2012: 141). However, if the
calculations are already a guess, then the interpretation can thus lead to overreaction or no reaction at all on the expected change (idem: 139). Additionally, Hindmoor (2010: 51-53) argues that the assumptions are wrong, and that people (e.g. policy makers) do not always know the consequences of their actions and mistakes can be made.
Dealing with the problems Stone sees in the rationality project, she suggests a more deliberative model, with political discussions between groups, along with interactions of scientific inputs to the policy-making process, along (Stone 2012: 29-30). She suggests to involve groups of people, because people always belong to groups and decisions are in her vision always collective in the polis (idem: 29-30).
Beck, however, defines risks as a creation of the modern society, in which risks are part of an underlying process that changes the social structure of societies (Beck 1992: 4, 22-24, 154). He thus does not draw the attention to individual feelings, like Stone, but he tries to say that risks are caused by the modernization of the society, which is created by the political process and risks are therefore ‘politically reflexive’ (ibid.). What becomes clear in his theory, is that science and society do not match each others questions (idem: 30). Science does not offer adequate answers to the anxiety on risk in society, and society raises questions that are
not answered by technical research (ibid.). He concludes that risks are part of an underlying process that changes the social structure of societies (idem: 4, 22-24, 154). He argues that the risk analysis method that has become the norm, is focussing exclusively on scientific
knowledge, and is thus neglecting a big part of society (idem: 5). He suggests a reflexive learning process, in which different dialogues between different theories of knowledge and subcultural forms of discourses would have developed a broader idea of risks (ibid.). This idea matches what is now called ‘joint-fact finding’, in which science is used more effectively to design environmental policies in order to try to control natural resources (Karl et al. 2007: 23). Joint-fact finding is a method that can be used to balance science and politics on three levels: national, regional and local (ibid.). Here, the political dialogues are not seen as
substitutes of scientific calculations, but as additions to help match science and society better (ibid.). This then offers a solution to the problem that Beck points out, namely that technology does not offer adequate answers to the questions of society and does not decrease anxiety of society (Beck 1992: 30).
Stone argues that emotional feelings and moral intuitions are ignored in the rationality project, where risks are scientifically calculated (Stone 2012: 11). Stone and Beck both
acknowledge that rational calculations of risks are not bias free and should not be the standard method to risk analysis (Beck 1992: 155-156; Stone 2012: 141). Therefore, it seems that policy makers can only be rational to some extent, and cannot always know the consequences of their actions, which is crucial in the rational risk analysis (Hindmoor 2010: 51-55). The interpretation of risks thus forms an important part in the risk analysis, and is thus not
objective (ibid.; Stone 2012: 11). Beck however argues that rational risk analysis ignore a big part of society, because it is too scientific and therefore does not offer adequate answers to the insecurity and anxiety of society (Beck 1992: 5).
Methods and Case
As said, a rational calculation of risk is not sufficient to design policies, since science always remains a guess, even if the scientific research is done well (Stone 2012: 141). A wicked problem as climate change and more specifically sea level rise is dependent on many natural factors and human actions, and thus can never be controlled (IPCC 2012: 4). However, policy makers do always feel the need to control and to design good policies to deal with wicked problems (ibid.). Therefore, scientific calculations on the amount of sea level rise are done to know the chances of extreme sea level rise and what percentage of risk can be expected (Kuijken 2017: 129-130).
To analyse the critics on rational decision-making, the risk analysis of the Deltaplan 2018 will be used to illustrate the difficulties of meeting these critics in practice (idem: 8). The case suits the purpose of my research, because it is an example where both rational, as well as political mechanisms are used to analyse the risk of climate change (Kuijken 2017: 123-130). The goal of the case is to adapt the Delta works in a way that protects the
Netherlands from flooding, along the lines of seven ambitions (ibid.). Since climate change is a wicked problem, it is difficult for policy makers to adapt the Netherlands to the risk of flooding (ibid.). Therefore, the case can be used to illustrate the practical difficulty of
adaptation, because it uses both the rational analysis of risk, as well as the political analysis of risk (idem: 128-130).
In the Netherlands, the problem of climate change has been acknowledged and so several actions has been taken (Commission of Infrastructure, Environment and
Environmental Planning 2011). For example, the Dutch government appointed a Delta commissioner in 2010, who has an independent position from the executive power and a legally embedded position with responsibility for the expenses and the policy process (Twist et al. 2013: 8). Additionally, he is responsible for the Delta commission, appointed by the government in 2007 to answer practical questions such as ‘how can the Netherlands be protected against flooding?’ (Rijksoverheid.nl). Since 60% of the Netherlands is below sea level, this question formed the basis for the Deltaplan, that has been implemented in 2012 to prevent the Netherlands from flooding (Commission of Infrastructure, Environment and Environmental Planning 2011).
Furthermore, a so-called ‘Signal group’ is providing new scientific insights on a regular basis (Kuijken 2017: 9). The ‘Signal group’ consists of specialists and experts from, among others, the government, the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), the independent research institute on the Delta and Wageningen University (idem: 18).
Finally, an international collaboration is meant to improve adaptive strategies and share knowledge to try to keep track of possible domino-effects caused by external factors or other countries (IPCC 2012: 7-9, 237). In 2017, the UN Environment, Japan and the
Netherlands took the initiative to create an international knowledge network called the ‘Global Center of Excellence for Adaptation’ (Kuijken 2017: 44). This network is meant to develop and share knowledge on effective methods to adapt to climate change, focused specifically on participative actions and on the administrative organisation (ibid).
In this research, we will focus on two of the seven ambitions, because those are the steps in which the rational and political mechanisms occur most clearly. The first ambition is
providing an overview of the vulnerabilities (ibid.). This is done by scientific calculations, that are made through the so-called ‘stress test’ (idem: 128-129). The ‘stress test’ is a
standardized test, in which the vulnerability of extreme weather is measured (idem: 128). The ‘stress test’ (see figure 1) is a standardized process made by the central government in
collaboration with water authorities, counties, experts and providers of current types of ‘stress tests’ (idem: 128-129). The ‘stress test’ is includes several possible future scenarios, like the chances of extreme rainfall and heat and will be adapted to new calculations or analysis on climate change (ibid.). The idea is that the results of the first ‘stress tests’ will be public before 2020 and will be included in a risk diagram by January 2021 (idem: 129, 133).
The ‘stress test’ is thus a rational measurement of risks, in which the focus lies on showing the vulnerabilities of climate extremes (idem: 128-129). After calculating the chances of climate change occurring and having an impact on the risky and vulnerable areas, the expected chances will be rationally analysed to maximize security and minimizing harms (ibid.; Stone 2012: 131, 141).
Figure 1: process of the ‘stress test’
Even though risks will always occur, and the Netherlands can never be free of risks, adapting the Delta works will help to protect our country (Kuijken 2017: 127). This however requires commitment from everyone to decrease risks (ibid.). With everyone, the Delta commission means businesses, social organizations and society (ibid.). Additionally, intensive cooperation between citizens, businesses and governments and between local, regional and national levels, is necessary to adapt specific parts of society, like the water system, dikes or Delta works (ibid.). Therefore, in addition to the rational calculations of risks, a risk dialogue has been introduced in the Delta policy plan (idem: 129). The risk dialogue is the second ambition of the Deltaplan (see figure 2), to discuss with all stakeholders the results of the ‘stress tests’ and to discuss possible strategies that can be used to deal with the possible risks of climate change (ibid.). The purpose is to include all relevant partners with an interest in the water board, like housing corporations, network operators, farmers and nature conservators (ibid.). The
development standardized stresstest 2017 implementation standardized stresstest 2018 overview of all vulnerabilities 2019 periodical repetition 2020-2050
dialogues are done on all levels, and thus a broad range of stakeholders is included in the process (ibid.). The risk dialogues are meant to create more awareness and discuss the vulnerability of the Delta works (ibid.).
Figure 2: process of the risk dialogue
The case is thus an example of a policy programme in which both rational and political risk analyses are used (Kuijken 2017: 127-130). It seems as if they are aware of the shortcomings of the rational risk analysis, and therefore added the risk dialogue to create a more political analysis of risks. The question is then if the risk dialogue is actually meeting the critics and if it is thus a good example of reflexive science. Therefore, in this research I will try to show that the case may seem like an empirical example of self-reflective science, but that in
practice the addition of the risk dialogue is not meeting the critics on rational instruments, like the ‘stress test’. By this, I am showing that the critics on the rational calculations are clear, but that it is hard to actually implement political instruments, because rational cost-benefit
analysis has become the basis to decision-making in the past decennia (Hindmoor 2010: 59; Beck 1992: 5; Stone 2012: 140). The question that arises from the difficulty experienced during the implementation of the criticism on rational risk analysis as discussed above, is formulated as: “In which ways can the criticisms on rational risk analysis be incorporated on a regular basis by policy makers?”
Analysis
First a short general analysis will be done on the case. Important questions here are ‘who is included?’, ‘If risks and uncertainties are acknowledged?’, ‘what is their strategy to act upon climate change?’. Second, the first strategy, a rational calculation of the so-called ‘stress test’ will be analysed. Central in this analysis is how the ‘stress test’ can be seen as a rational analysis of risk. Here, the critical perspective of Beck (1992) and Stone (2012) will be used to answer this question. Third, the second strategy will be analysed, where the focus is on the risk dialogue. The main point here will be how the risk dialogue can be seen as a more political analysis of risk and if it then meets the suggestions of a more deliberative political
leading provinces create a strategy 2017
new provinces create a strategy
2018
region specific dialogues are done and
strategies are set 2019-2020
model (Stone 2012: 29-30) and the political process of joint-fact finding (Beck 1992: 5; Karl et al. 2007: 23).
Deltaplan
The Deltaplan is a policy plan on what they call “a framework for country covering governance”, an overview of instruments and agreements on shared knowledge (Kuijken 2017: 29). Every year, an updated policy plan will be presented by the Delta commissioner, in which he will explain the actions and decisions taken (ibid.).
The Delta commissioner is the head of the Delta commission, that consists out of people with different expertise and specializations, working on a policy plan to the adaptation of the Delta works (Twist et al. 2013: 15-16). They are working together to find possibilities and sorting out strategies and solutions to prevent possible disaster due to climate change (ibid.). Their first strategy was based on estimating potential crises, and therefore the
adaptation process was not seen as urgent (ibid.). Nevertheless, new insights and researches of the KNMI shows an increasing chance of sea level rise and rainfall, which makes action taking more urgent (Kuijken 2017: 9). The Signal group, of which KNMI is a part, is thus an important research partner for the Deltaplan, because they analyse whether or not the
Deltaplan is still on track (idem: 9). Based on regular research on the external developments of climate change, they have seen that climate change is developing faster than first expected (ibid.). Therefore, there is a high level of insecurity, because external developments could affect the speed of sea level rise (ibid.).
Even though the Signal group is keeping a close eye on the developments of climate change, the development of climate change in the Netherlands is highly insecure (idem: 112). It is dependent on worldwide developments such as global warming, which could lead to a domino effect: melting of permafrost areas, changes of ocean streams and changes in rainfall (ibid.). The insecurity and the dependence are acknowledged by policy makers, and therefore the Deltaplan is adaptively designed (idem: 8, 112). Through regular adaptations, the
Netherlands can respond adequately to changing insights and developments of the worldwide climate change (ibid.). The Deltaplan is thus open to changes and new insights to look ahead and keep track of the process in close collaboration with international knowledge
organisations and Dutch organisations and research groups (idem: 9, 44).
Policy makers are aware of the uncertainties, which can be assumed from the following paraphrase in which they state that risks can never be fully eliminated, and therefore it is important to take action to minimize the harms (idem: 127). A certain amount
of risk is accepted, but their aim remains to maximize the possibility to prevent the Netherlands from any risks and to minimize the harms if risks would occur (ibid.).
Working together with the Signal group, local, regional and national governments and other parties, the Delta commission tries to adapt the strategy of ‘Weten, Willen, Werken’ (see figure 3) (idem: 117). The first one, weten, is about knowing the challenges of climate
change, by analysing the consequences of climate change on different aspects of an area until 2050, potentially until 2100 (ibid.). The second one, willen, is concretising the goals in order to improve the Delta works and other water resisting technologies (ibid.). The last one,
werken, is then to come up with a policy plan to set goals and strategies (ibid.). In the past
years, different measurements have already been done to ‘know the challenges and vulnerabilities’ (ibid.). The results differ per theme and region, but form the basis for the Deltaplan (ibid.). The strategy of ‘Weten, Willen, Werken’ is divided in seven ambitions (idem: 128):
1. providing an overview of the vulnerabilities;
2. having a conversation on risks and climate change and coming up with a strategy; 3. setting up the agenda on action taking;
4. using possible developments as additional chances to the adaptation process; 5. stimulating and facilitating;
6. regulating and protecting; 7. acting in case of disasters.
‘Stress test’
The ‘stress test’ is a mechanism used to meet the first goal to provide an overview of the vulnerabilities (Kuijken 2017: 128-129). It is repeated periodically to present a broad overview of the measures that have been implemented (ibid.). According to the Delta Commission, more insight in the consequences of extreme weather forms the basis for the
Deltaplan Ruimtelijke Adaptatie (ibid.).
There are four characteristics of the ‘stress test’ to measure weather extremes, in particular to the vulnerability of water, heat stress, drought and floods (idem: 129). Other characteristics of the ‘stress test’ are the specific attention to vital and vulnerable functions, such as subsidence or changing groundwater level, the attention to other developments increasing the vulnerability of these functions and the fact that it covers both urban and rural areas (ibid.).
The ‘stress test’ is a standardized method to provide a first overview of the
vulnerabilities in the specific area based on important questions that should be answered in the ‘stress test’ (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie 2018: 5). Several future scenarios are outlined to show the chances on extreme rainfall and extremely high temperatures (Kuijken 2017: The ‘stress test’ thus measures the amount of ‘stress’, in other words the amount of water that one specific Delta project is able to receive and process (idem: 123-125).
To measure the amount of ‘stress’, all four vulnerabilities are analysed by answering three to four questions (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie 2018: 8, 14, 18, 24). Examples of these questions are: ‘What does climate change mean for the amount of rainfall?’, ‘Where are the risks for buildings as a consequence of water nuisance?’, ‘What is the influence of heath on ground level water?’, What is the direct effect of drought on the ground level standard?’, ‘What are the chances of flooding for a specific area?’ and ‘What are the chances of death after floods?’ (idem: 8, 14, 18, 24). The ‘stress test’ is thus a rational instrument focussing on facts and chances (ibid.).
The standardized method is according to the Delta commission beneficial because every party can use previous experiences and strategies used to show the vulnerabilities (Kuijken 2017: 129). Next, it is easier to exchange experiences with other regions (ibid.). More importantly, a countrywide picture is drawn to show the vulnerabilities and risks (ibid.). However, no disadvantages to the standardization are mentioned. Although there are several standard questions central to ‘stress tests’, it remains unclear what the standardization means (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie 2018: 4). First, the ‘stress test’ does not set qualitative standards, so there is no final ‘pass or fail’ (ibid.). Based on the outcomes, there are no
follow-up steps set (ibid.). So, there is room left for interpretation on what amount of risk we should accept. Lastly, they do not offer a future scenario in 2050, but only offer a first overview of the current vulnerabilities (ibid.).
Although the test is standardized, there is room for regional and local problems and needs (Kuijken 2017: 129). Furthermore, there is room for personal interpretations, because no final ‘pass or fail’ is set (Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie 2018: 4). The outcomes of the ‘stress test’ are thus subject to the individual choices of policy makers (Stone 2012: 189-190). This could lead to differences between the different water authorities dependent on what they have determined in their individual meetings, based on what ideas the executives of the water authority have to look at the harms and risks (Stone 2012: 9-13, 141). An intermediate evaluation of the Deltaplan has shown these differences, namely that methods, interpretations and depth of the problem differ between the regions (ibid.). The policy plan does not offer any responsibility to try to solve this variety, which seems problematic, because it means that some regions accept more risks than others. However, the evaluation shows that the ‘stress test’ is according to the policy makers, successful, because the different regions have created more awareness of the problems and have got a concrete overview of the threats and chances relevant to their region (Kuijken 2017: 123).
Furthermore, the uncertainties in society are huge, which means that the chances of risks can only be approximately known with rational cost-benefit analysis (Wynne 1992: 119). Uncertainties are always present in society, and rational calculations remain the basis to provide the feeling of security to people to some extent (Stone 2012: 133, 141). To provide a feeling of security solutions and policy plans are designed to control and decrease the risks (idem: 141). However, they do offer a feeling of control and security (idem: 133, 141). Rational analysis and estimates may not reduce risks to a simple number, but they are still a way to manage the problem to some extent and are used to limit the chances that risks occur (IPCC 2012: 74; Stone 2012: 141).
The ‘stress test’ is thus a rational measurement of risks, in which the focus lies on showing the vulnerabilities of climate extremes (Kuijken 2017: 128-129). After calculating the chances of climate change occurring and having an impact on the risky and vulnerable areas, the expected chances will be rationally analysed to maximize security and minimizing harms (ibid.; Stone 2012: 131, 141).
To summarize, the ‘stress test’ does not offer an adequate answer, because it only shows us how much ‘stress’ the Delta works can handle (Kuijken 2017: 123-125). No
the test are offered. Furthermore, there are differences between the regional analyses of ‘stress’, which shows us that the ‘stress test’ is not sufficient to deal with uncertainties, because the test offers only rational answers to the uncertainty of climate change (idem: 128-129).
Risk dialogue
The risk dialogue is the second ambition of the Deltaplan, to meet the goal of discussing risks and creating a strategy (Kuijken 2017: 128). The outcomes of the ‘stress test’ provide the starting point of the risk dialogue (idem: 129). The aim of the policy plan is to adapt the Netherlands preventively to the possible risks of flooding (idem: 29). To decrease the chances on the risk occurring, businesses, social organizations, government and society should
cooperate and be committed to the adaptation (idem: 127). The risk dialogue is thus created to have a broad dialogue between government and society on how to prepare for calamities, and how to cooperate during a possible disastrous event (idem: 133). We could assume that the policy makers have been critical towards a rational ‘stress test’, because they have added the risk dialogue in the process of adaptation (idem: 127-129).
Before the publishing of this Deltaplan, a few regional risk dialogues had already taken place (idem: 139-140). Some of these dialogues were administrative meetings between executives of municipalities, provinces and water authorities, and some were dialogues between representatives of businesses, stakeholder organizations, sector organizations, knowledge institutes and social organizations (idem: 139). However, the aim of the dialogue was to create a dialogue between government, society and other organizations, groups or businesses (idem: 127). The participants of the different dialogues show already a first
problem, namely that they have not discussed risks together, but in separated meetings (idem: 139).
In the administrative meetings, three general outcomes can be highlighted: first, the adaptation of the Netherlands is local or regional and requires everyone’s attention (ibid.). Second, adaptation is connected to other social tasks, such as the transition to sustainable energy (ibid.). Third, the adaptation includes four different themes, which makes it hard to create a uniform policy plan (ibid.). This is because vulnerability of water, heat stress, drought and floods all have different urgencies, tasks, and their areas are owned by different private or public institutions (ibid.).
The general outcome of the social dialogues between among others investors,
main points: creating awareness and a sense of urgency remain important and should be central (ibid.). The first contours of the agenda on heath have been set (ibid.). There is a growing demand to experiment and to coherent rules and regulations of different governments (ibid.). There is a possibility to connect chances of adaptation to other adaptations such as energy transitions, housing constructions and recreation (ibid.).
Creating awareness thus seems crucial in the social dialogues (ibid.). The OECD agrees with the importance of awareness and thinks that raising awareness will also help stimulate people to help pay for the management of water risks and will change people’s behaviour to become more conscious to climate change and the environment (OECD 2014: 68). Furthermore it is meant to make people aware on the failure of current policy plans to meet the standards of flood defences (idem: 69).
The dialogues are not standardized, but will use the experience of lead regions (idem: 129). This means that the dialogues are open for additional comments, ideas, interpretations and expertise of citizens, interest groups and businesses (ibid.). The agreements resulting from the national dialogues will be used in regional, area-specific dialogues to be discussed in more details (idem: 130). Municipalities, water authorities and provinces can decide for every area which additional actions they will take to reduce vulnerability, how to help citizens and enterprises in their actions and what harms will still be acceptable (ibid.).
However, what is discussed in the risk dialogue are the outcomes of the ‘stress test’, and the follow-up steps that can be taken (Kuijken 2017: 129-130). What do people
understand as ‘risks’ and what people find acceptable in terms of risk is thus not discussed, and therefore the risk dialogue does not meet the requirements that Stone and the IPCC set to the policy-making process. This becomes even clearer once we take a look at one of the lead provinces in the process of adaptation, the southern Netherlands region (Pröpper and van Oort 2017). Most of the participants in this risk dialogue are executives of the water authority, the municipality, the province and the central government, with only 20% of social organisations (idem: 1).
This shows us that the participants all have an interest in the matter, and that the goal to raise more awareness among citizens thus was not achieved, since all of the participants are already aware of climate change and the changing sea level (ibid.). Furthermore, the
discussions were separated between executives and social groups, and thus no exchange of ideas or joint-fact finding took place (ibid.). It can thus be seen as a first attempt to a more deliberative process of decision-making, by aiming to include more people to the policy-making process (ibid.). Nevertheless, coming back to the process of the risk dialogue (see
figure 3), we could see that it is not meeting the critical perspective of Stone on rational decision-making, except that the process and a follow-up action taking plan is discussed publically (Pröpper and van Oort 2017: 9).
Conclusion
The case thus aims to include a rational and a more political model of risk analysis, because the policy makers saw the necessity of commitment from all stakeholders, organizations, knowledge institutes, governments and citizens (Kuijken 2017: 127). Next to the ‘stress test’, to provide an overview of the regional vulnerabilities by answering standardized questions, the risk dialogue has been introduced to create more awareness and commitment from citizens (idem: 128-130). The goal of the dialogues was to create a dialogue between all relevant partners to increase awareness and to discuss how to deal with vulnerabilities (idem: 129).
However, the risk dialogue does not include both governments and social groups together in a meeting (idem: 139-140; Pröpper and van Oort 2017: 1). This means that there is no real discussion between experts and citizens, but only separated meetings of experts and citizens (ibid.). Furthermore, creating awareness does not lead to a real discussion on the political process of policy-making, but is mainly a presentation on the findings of the ‘stress test’.
Although the aim of the risk dialogue is to include more political deliberation, it is mainly focused on the outcomes of the ‘stress test’ and raising awareness, instead of joint-fact finding and discussions on ideas (Kuijken 2017: 129-130; Stone 2012: 13). Because rational analyses have become the norm in the political thinking of policy-making, it is difficult to implement alternative ways of decision-making (Hindmoor 2010: 59; Beck 1992: 5; Stone 2012: 140). This is what Beck (Beck 1992: 4) has acknowledged as well, by saying that “reflexivity is excluded from the social and political interactions between experts and social groups over modern risks, because of the systematic assumption of realism in science.”
What can be learned from this case is then that the implementation of more political processes, such as joint-fact finding and deliberative discussions, are difficult to implement in practice. The difficulty lies then in changing the norm of political thinking (ibid.). To change the way people think is a difficult and long-term process, in which people should first become aware of the problem of their norm, then to be aware of the possible alternatives, and then to adapt another way of thinking (ibid.). This requires self-reflexivity, which is often excluded from the interactions between groups (ibid.).
Answering the central question “in which ways can the criticisms on rational risk analysis be incorporated on a regular basis by policy makers?”, it could be said that the incorporation of more political risk analysis is difficult in practice, because it requires more than just the implementation of political instruments to the policy-making process (ibid.). The norms should change first, which is a difficult process, because cost-benefit analysis are strongly embedded in the political thinking (Hindmoor 2010: 59; Beck 1992: 5; Stone 2012: 140).
Discussion
Reflecting on the process of this research, a few things could have been improved. First, there might have been an easier case to answer the central questions. This is mainly due to the fact that the rational ‘stress tests’ and the risk dialogues are both not finalized, and thus only a few of those could have been analysed. A better analysis and overview of the shortcomings of the risk dialogue could have been made, once all the dialogues had been held. However, the leading provinces have set the framework on how to use ‘stress tests’ and risk dialogues, and thus it could be assumed that the following regions would follow their lead.
Second, it was not entirely clear that the risk dialogue was indeed an instrument to meet the critics on rational risk analysis. This could be assumed, because they added the goal of discussing risks and strategies, which shows that they have been aware of the advantages of a more deliberative policy-making model. However, it should remain clear that the Delta commission couldn’t be seen as self-reflecting, because no specific argument is made on the addition of the risk dialogue as a way to meet critical perspectives on rational decision-making.
References
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London – Newbury Park – New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
Commission of Infrastructure, Environment and Environmental Planning (2011). Deltawet
waterveiligheid en zoetwatervoorziening. Den Haag: Eerste Kamer.
Head, B.W. and Alford, J. (2013). "Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management", Administration & Society, XX (X): 1-29.
Hindmoor, A. (2010). “Rational Choice”. In: Marsh, D. en G. Stoker (eds), Theory and
Methods in Political Science, 42-59. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan
IPCC (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge (UK) – New York: Cambridge University Press.
Karl, H. A., Susskind, L. E. and Wallace, K. H. (2007). “A Dialogue, Not a Diatribe:
Effective Integration of Science and Policy through Joint Fact Finding”, Environment:
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 49 (1): 20-34.
Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie (2018). “Handreiking gestandaardiseerde stresstest light”, https://ruimtelijkeadaptatie.nl/stresstest/handreiking/. Accessed on 28th of December 2018.
Kuijken, W. J. (2017). Deltaprogramma 2018: Doorwerken aan een duurzame en veilige
delta. Den Haag: Rijkscommissaris Deltaprogramma
OECD (2014). Water Governance in the Netherlands: Fit for the Future? Paris: OECD Publishing.
Pröpper, I. and Oort, L. van (2017). “Regiotafel Deltaplan Ruimtelijke Adaptatie – Noord-Brabant: verslag en sfeerimpressie”. Partners + Pröpper, 28th of February 2017. Rittel, H.J.W. and Webber, M. M. (1973). “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”,
Policy Sciences, 4 (2): 155-169.
Rijksoverheid.nl (year unknown). “Achtergrond Deltaprogramma”,
https://www.deltacommissaris.nl/deltaprogramma/achtergrond-deltaprogramma. Accessed on 30th of December 2018.
RIVM (2016). Nationaal Veiligheidsprofiel 2016: een all hazard overzicht van potentiële
rampen en dreigingen die onze samenleving kunnen ontwrichten. Bilthoven: RIVM.
Stone, D. (2012). The Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making. London – New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Twist, M. van, Schulz, M., Steen, M. van der, and Ferket, J. (2013). De deltacommissaris:
Een kroniek van de instelling van een regeringscommissaris voor de Nederlandse delta. Den Haag: Nederlandse School voor Openbaar Bestuur.
Wynne, B. (1992). “Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving science and policy in the preventive paradigm”, Global Environmental Change, 2 (2): 111-127.
