We are waiting for the moment : the role of class and settlement intentions on the motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the Netherlands

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Universiteit van Amsterdam

“We are waiting for

the moment”

The role of class and settlement intentions on the

motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the

Netherlands.

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Graduate School of Social Sciences MSc Sociology: Migration and Ethnic Studies

July 2015

“We are waiting for the moment.”

The role of class and settlement intentions in the

motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the

Netherlands

Esmée de Jong Student number: 10094806

e.dejong@student.uva.nl Supervisor: Apostolos Andrikopoulos

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates whether settlement intentions of Syrian refugees in the Netherlands are of influence in their integration process. The concepts of class and capital are also taken into account because they seem to play a vital role in the migration experience and the integration process. The main question asked is whether Syrian refugees have the intention to stay in the Netherlands, move on to a third country, or return to their home country, and if this seems of any influence in the way and pace they integrate in the Netherlands. The findings suggest that the settlement intention of Syrian refugees do not necessarily affect their integration process. A difference should be made between settlement intentions and wishes. Even though almost all respondents have the wish to return to Syria, they do not see this happening in the near future, and thus have the intention to stay in the Netherlands long term. This results in the fact that they are very much motivated to integrate. Class is expected to be a vital element. Since the respondents in this study were all what scholars would call “middle-class”, and most are experiencing some form of downward mobility, they might have more motivation to integrate so that they can return to their previous status and prestige. Capital plays a role in the migration experience because it is a huge determinant factor in the process of where and how to seek asylum. Those who have more capital are more likely to travel to farther and more desired places than those who do not.

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Introduction

I met Taim1_{in a nightclub in Istanbul. I was on a study trip and had just formed the idea of writing} my thesis about Syrian refugees. I knew that there were many of them living in Istanbul and the rest of Turkey. I had been willing to talk to a few, to figure out their aspirations and understand the situation they were in. It was, however, a coincidence that I met Taim. He was sitting alone in at a table in the corner, smoking a cigarette. As soon as we started talking it became clear that he was not the upper-class Turkish man I held him for at first sight. With a grin he asked me where I thought he was from. I said I did not have a clue. After a few wrong guesses he revealed he came from Syria, and that he had fled his country because of the war. He had been studying in Syria prior to the uprisings, and had lived a good life. And yet here he was, smoking his hard earned cigarettes in a club in Istanbul, with no one around him to keep him company. If I understood him correctly, I was the first one in a club who came up to him to talk since he had arrived in Istanbul a few months earlier. He told me he has a job as a bartender, but did not want to stay much longer, “because they treat us like dogs in the street”. He wanted to go to Europe, where he could make his dreams come true. Where he believed that life would be easier and people would treat him with respect. And he would do as much as it took to get there, as became clear when he told me later about his plan over WhatsApp:

Taim: I told you I want to come to the Netherlands Me: Yes, you did

Taim: But I did not tell you how Me: No

Taim: Walking. I don’t have any money. So I’m going alone. With two of my friends. From Istanbul to the Netherlands. My friend did it one year ago. But from Istanbul to Germany. He walked for 120 days.

Walking to Germany involves crossing many borders, which is a problem if one does not have legal documents to do so. It is a very long distance that would already be hard for trained walkers with equipment and a solid plan. Not only does Taim consider to walk to cross Europe’s borders, which is illustrative of his despair to leave Turkey and go somewhere ‘better’ - he says that his friend in fact has done so and is now living in Germany. Could it be true that this route full of hardships is actually undertaken? According to the media, more refugees have done so. From Greece to Germany, even from Afghanistan to Paris. Harrowing stories circulate on the news and other media. In October 2014,

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the 22-year old Mouaz Balkhi from Syria, in the media referred to as the wetsuit-man, tried to swim van Calais to Great Britain. He had fled Syria in search for a safer life with better future prospects, and he was aiming for England where his uncle had already been granted asylum. Swimming the Canal is a very risky affair: the man drowned and was found on a Dutch coast a couple of months later (Fjellberg 2015).

What do these stories tell us? As much as both cases are tragic and unique, they are also illustrative of the points I want to make in this thesis. First of all, they show that refugees are desperate to reach countries where they are safe and have a better future. In the hierarchy of destinations that can be reached, England and the Netherlands can be placed high up, due to their relatively high levels of safety, freedom and social security. Such destinations are desired and not easy to get to. Money, connections, chance and luck all play a role in the migration experience. Taim is wound up in Istanbul, not because he wanted to live there, but because he was using it as a channel to get to the Netherlands. The lack of financial resources he has at his disposal is however causing him to stay put – for now. Mouaz Balkhi did have the money to make it as far as Calais, but Europe’s restrictive immigration policy and the canal that separated him from England made it virtually impossible to cross. You can have all the connections and money at your disposal, but that does not buy you a legal status or a safe passage.

A civil war is raging in Syria, which now makes it one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Although most Syrians are internally displaced or seeking refuge in Syria’s surrounding countries, a proportion has been and is coming to Europe. Money and connections are needed to make it all the way to this far away destination. Taim stranded in Istanbul on his way to the

Netherlands. Others have made it all the way. At this moment, most people from Syria applying for asylum in the Netherlands are being granted a residence permit2_{. These refugees form a large, new} immigrant group, which in one way or the other needs to find its place in the Dutch society. Not only do they differ from most existing migrant groups in the Netherlands because of their recent arrival, but also, and especially, because of the reason they left their home country. Most do not come out of voluntary, economic reasons, but because they had no option but to leave their violence-ridden home country. This naturally creates a difference in the way they arrive in the Netherlands, and with what aspirations in terms of goals and dreams. Another factor that lets Syrians stand out to other refugee nationalities in the Netherlands is their relative wealth. Although most of them arrive in the Netherlands with just the clothes on their backs, many had lived a rich and free life in Syria. My respondents worked in oil companies in Saudi Arabia, gave lectures at the university of Damascus, volunteered for international non-governmental organization, or owned businesses and shops.

2_{http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2007172-syrische-vluchtelingen-zullen-in-nederland-blijven.html, last visited}

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Whatever their previous situation in Syria, they start in the Netherlands just as any other refugee: in an allocated house, with a monthly allowance provided by their new municipality. The Dutch government expects them to integrate. On the governments’ website about civic integration, the following is being said:

Once you have settled in the Netherlands, you are required to integrate. That means you will have to do an integration exam. Once you have done that, you can participate in the Dutch society more easy. You can than attend education and will have a better opportunity to find work. […] Learning the language is one of the sections of the compulsory integration. (own translation)3 Next to what the government expects newcomers to do in this regard, popular attitudes tend to treat integration not so much as an option but as something all people have to do, albeit as a one-way process (Castles et al 2002: 113). The path leading to integration is one that cannot be neglected. Refugees and other migrants need to learn the local language, learn about the local culture, get to know local people, and work or educate themselves. The lack of agency in these discourses is striking. Integration is treated as something that is imposed from above, rather than something that newcomers can actively choose to do or actively reject. Who says those people are here to stay? What if all they want is to go back to their home country or move on to another? Are they still motivated to get integrated in their host society if they are planning to leave the country in the (near) future?

How do these two factors – Syrians’ aspirations for the future, and the States’ expectation of integration – fit together? In migration literature, the link between refugees’ settlement intentions and integration has not been sufficiently examined. Although migrants are the key actors in integration research, “their motivations and dreams are commonly overlooked, and their voices silenced” (Pratsinakis 2005: 195). Of course, there is a large body of literature that treats the separate subjects extensively. However, this thesis will combine research on aspirations and settlement intention with that on integration. Refugees are mainly treated as having no option but to integrate. But what is their own say in this? Do they want to integrate? And what aspirations did they have before coming to the Netherlands? How did these aspirations develop over time? How do they see their stay in the country? Do they feel like they are here just temporary, albeit withholding them from full participation? Or are they very motivated to make something out of this experience? With the look on the future, are they waiting to return to Syria? These sub questions eventually lead me to pose the following main research question:

3_{http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/nieuw-in-nederland/inburgering-en-integratie-van-nieuwkomers}_,

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How do Syrian refugees’ settlement intentions in the Netherlands affect their motivation to integrate?

For this study I have asked seven Syrian refugees to tell me about their pre-migration situation, their flight to the Netherlands, their settlement experiences and their aspirations for the future. The aim of this thesis is to sketch a qualitative description of the people I have interviewed, and to see whether their settlement intentions and aspirations for the future have any impact on how they integrate in Dutch society. Qualitative methods are particularly suited to investigate this topic, “since integration is individualized, contested and contextual [and therefore needs] methodologies which allow the voices of respondents to be heard in an unadulterated form” (Robinson 1998). Life of people is complex and dynamic, and is best to be researched in their own context and environment, at their own pace. Understanding their experiences and different perspectives gives us a more complete picture of the situation they are in and the context in which they talk about topics such as settlement intention and integration. I have interviewed each respondent once, in their own house or in a café nearby. Some interviews were held in Dutch, others in English, and two of my

respondents spoke Arabic while a third person was translating it. The interviews were open-ended and I have communicated with my respondents in an informal way, not at least to be able to get to know them better. A good relationship between researcher and informant is crucial for trust, and for a clear understanding and interpreting of the gathered data. In the end, this had led me to describe a minor yet very important part of the refugee world, with all its complexities yet all its beauty.

Outline

The layout of this thesis is divided in three major parts. First, a description of the context of the subject is given: the Syrian crisis, the refugee problem that sparked it, and the Dutch legal framework in regard to refugees and asylum seekers. Second, a consideration of the theories concerning class, settlement intention and integration is presented. In the final part the findings and theories will come together. To be able to fully grasp the specific personal situations of the Syrian refugees I have interviewed, the first empirical chapters will include more than the necessary

information to answer the main research question. I include both the living conditions in Syria before the war and their flight stories. This enables us to see the full picture and gives us a better

understanding of the Syrian crisis and the backgrounds with which these refugees arrive in the Netherlands. This chapter has therefore been divided in situations in time instead of empirical and theoretical topics. Firstly, the pre-migration situation will be discussed. How were my respondents living? What was their education and what work did they pursue? What was their family situation?

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After this we will look at the migration experience. What motivation did they have to leave Syria? How did they do it? This will lead us to the last, and for this thesis most important time period: their settlement in the Netherlands. In this chapter it will all come together, since both their integration and aspirations will be discussed.

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1. Context

1.1 The Syrian crisis

In March 2011 some fifteen school children between the age of the nine and fifteen were arrested for painting anti-government graffiti on a wall in the small southern city of Daraa, Syria. Security forces4_{took them to Damascus, and the children were not seen for fourteen days. According to the} media they were severely punished, and their mistreatment caused the community to take the streets and protest against the government led by Bashar Al-Assad. Security forces tried to disperse the demonstrators by shooting into the crowd and the use of other sorts of violence. As a reaction to this, a greater resentment grew and even more people took the streets. This provincial uprising, together with a nation-wide discontent over the government and its violent treatment of the children and the protesters in Daraa, soon spread to other cities in the country. It turned out that Daraa was ‘the spark that lit the Syrian flame’ (Sterling 2012).

Discontent in Syria had been present for decades, ever since the presidents’ predecessor and father came into power. People mainly wanted to have more freedom, and less of a division of society along sectarian lines (McHugo 2015). When Bashar Al-Assad came into power in 2000 the people of Syria expressed optimism about this young president who had big plans to modernize the country (Hinnebusch 2012: 95). He seemed to be criticizing the regime, and had plans for free and open debate. However, these plans did not work out, and a large part of the society claimed that the government was an “authoritarian and totalitarian regime”. What went wrong on the level of politics is summarized by Hinnebusch (2012: 112):

Bashar Al-Assad’s authoritarian upgrading, intended to address shortcomings [of Hafez Al-Assad], was itself fatally flawed. […] In Syria after 2000 the overconcentration of power and patronage in the ruling clan debilitated the clientelist networks that connected the regime to society. The spread of electronic media allowed political mobilization to take place as the party’s incorporative capacity weakened and in the absence of an alternative integration of youth into jobs that would give them a stake in the status quo.

Although people wanted a modernized country, they did not want a civil war (McHugo 2015). But that is exactly what evolved. While the government used force to stop the protesters, even more took the streets. Rebel brigades started to form, and soon the protests and violence turned the crisis into a civil war. The fighting reached Damascus and Aleppo, the two major cities, in 2012. The total chaos has caused even more parties, such as the Islamic State and other jihadists groups, to involve

4

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in the conflict, making it an even more complex and dangerous war.

The regions conflict has now reached the point of a complete war-zone. Rebel fighters, government forces and jihadists groups have all taken up their weapons and are fighting each other on a daily basis, ensuring the death toll to rise every single day. Human rights violations have been identified at both sides of the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons has also been confirmed. In March 2015 it was estimated that about 220,000 people have died in the conflict so far. Another 4 million people have fled the country. It is said to be “one of the largest refugee exoduses in history” (Rodgers et al 2015).

1.1.1 Construction of reality

Although the above is a relatively neutral description of the Syrian crisis, it is important to mention that it is based on media reports, which are not always as neutral as they could be. The construction of reality in the media can and is biased towards certain specific interest groups. Although it is too broad a topic to describe how the Syrian crisis is framed by the media (for more information, De Wit (2014) has written her master thesis on it), it has to be mentioned, especially because my

respondents have informed be about this issue as well. Yvette for instance told me the following: I am sick and tired of how Western media portray the Syrian conflict. They say Al-Assad is a

terrorist, and the Syrian ‘freedom fighters’ are doing a good job defending our country. Well, for me it sometimes feels like the other way around. We cannot see it as black and white as the Western media is making us believe it is. That is why I stopped watching Dutch and English TV. From now on I only watch the Arabic news channels.

- Yvette

Interestingly, almost all of my other respondents were firmly against the Assad regime. Mahdi, a man raised in a political active family in Syria, explains the situation after he got out of jail for the last time:

All of a sudden there was a war, all those parties fighting against each other. The regime caused this situation. What Assad does against his people is horrific. He uses all sorts of weapons. He killed more than 250 thousand people, in different ways. Just because we have an opinion, because we are trying to make our country a better place. But he is a dictator and thinks differently. He only cares about himself and his family.

- Mahdi

It is not in the scope of this paper, or any other paper for that matter, to come to the conclusion of who is right and who is wrong. Nor is it my intention to make this a political thesis, going deeper into the political opinions of my respondents (although most of them were very involved in the conflict

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and wanted to talk about the political situation in much detail). However, it is important to note that the description of the Syrian conflict can be put in different lights, depending on who is talking about it.

1.2 Syrian refugees in Europe

By the end of 2014, Syrians have become the largest refuge seeking group according to UNHCR statistics. More than 3,8 million Syrians have fled to neighboring countries, and over 6,5 million are internally displaced. Although the largest proportion of them is still living within Syrian borders, or has fled to surrounding countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, five per cent of the total number of Syrians who have fled their country has applied for asylum in Europe. As can be seen in the chart below, the largest proportion of Syrian refugees has turned to Germany and Sweden. In the Netherlands a total number of 9,475 Syrians have asked for asylum in the year 2014. As for now, the Netherlands counts 13,744 inhabitants of Syrian origin, of which 4,279 have been born in the Netherlands.5

Source: UNHCR6

The proportion of Syrians living in Europe, and especially in the Netherlands, is very small compared to the total number of Syrian refugees worldwide. This discrepancy can partly be explained by the role class plays in international migration. According to Van Hear, class determines how far, spatially, people can travel to ask for asylum. In the “hierarchy of destinations that can be reached” (Van Hear 2004: 3) by refugees, the Netherlands, due to its ‘fair’ asylum policy, welfare and relatively mild environment, holds a favorable position. The fact that Syrians living in the Netherlands made it all the way through Europe is already a sign that they have got the knowledge and the means to do so, which could be a result of being from a higher class. This is important to mention, because it could mean that refugees coming to the Netherlands, and Syrian refugees in particular, can be from a higher class than for instance Turkish and Moroccan labor migrants who have arrived during the

5_{http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/landen-van-herkomst/syri%C3%AB}_{, last visited 03-06-2015} 6

_{http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#}

_{, last visited 14}th_{June 2015}

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1960’s-70’s. Research has for instance shown that newer ethnic groups in the Netherlands are generally better educated than groups with longer emigration traditions (Van Liempt 2007: 92-93). Having accumulated more social, economic or cultural capital could mean that it is easier to adopt the host language and better understand the procedures for finding good quality housing and a job. It could thus mean that (Syrian) refugees have a better chance and are more likely to integrate in the host society than other migrant groups. In chapter 2, paragraph 3 a more detailed overview will be provided about how class is interlinked with migration.

1.2.1 Dublin Regulation

The Dublin Regulation is a European law, which holds Member States responsible for the

examination of an asylum claim in Europe. Members States are the 28 European Union countries together with four countries that are associated to the regulation (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). In practice this means that Member States in which the asylum seeker first lodges his/her application will be held responsible for the examination. Comparing fingerprints enables countries to determine which country should be held responsible. Critique on this regulation mostly comes out of concern about the refugee crises in the ports of entry, such as Greece and Italy, who will have to deal with the largest proportions of refugees. Also, refugee themselves are deported back to the first EU country they entered, which usually have worse welfare conditions. Some Syrians and other refugees who enter Europe via Greece and Italy therefore try to get around the fingerprint registration in those countries, and move on to other European countries with more opportunities (Grant and Domokos 2011).

1.2.2 Refugee Resettlement Program

Every year, those countries that are affiliated with the UNHCR Resettlement Program invite a number of refugees to settle in their country. Most of those who get invited have already fled their home country and are living in refugee camps or cities in neighboring countries. The Netherlands invites about 500 refugees each year. Once a year representatives from COA, IND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will visit selected countries on selection missions to assess whether refugees come into consideration for the program. Interviews will be held to see if a person is eligible for the Dutch asylum procedure, and whether refugees are likely to integrate and whether their expectations are realistic. Once invited, refugees will be offered an ‘exploratory cultural course’ of a week, which prepares them for their arrival in the Netherlands and gives them a basic understanding of the Dutch

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1.3 Dutch legal framework

Arriving in the Netherlands without a visa, non-European immigrants have the right to ask for asylum. Because Syria is the main citizenship that applies for asylum in the Netherlands, the IND prioritizes applications from Syrian nationals. This means that they will go through a short regular procedure and in most cases will be granted a residence permit after 4 days (AIDA 37)8_{. Although there are} currently no statistical data available on Syrian refugees’ recognition rates, according to Eurostat 2,705 Syrian have lodged an application in 2013 (AIDA 38). No cases are known in which a Syrian national has been sent back to the home country.

In the Asylum Procedure flow chart provided by AIDA9_{, it can be seen that a distinction is} made between two types of entering the country: either by land or by plane. Because for most Syrians it is impossible to get a visa, the large proportion of those coming to the Netherlands will enter by land. This means they will be sent to an asylum center in Ter Apel, the location where they will start their asylum procedure.

Residence permits granted to refugees in the Netherlands are valid for five years. Under certain circumstances, the Dutch government can withdraw this permit. If the permit is not withdrawn after those five years, the holder has the opportunity to obtain an indefinite permit. After being granted a residence permit, asylum seekers qualify for housing. Although they can suggest where they want to live, usually they do not choose their residency themselves. All municipalities are obligated to take in refugees. The number depends on the number of people living within that municipality.

Some refugees have lost family members in their flight. They can apply for family reunion, which enables them to bring their family members to the Netherlands. There are however strict rules for this program, and not all family members are allowed to take part in family reunion by invitation. For instance, refugees who have come to the Netherlands need to apply for family reunion within three months after being granted a residence permit (Vluchtelingenwerk).

7_{https://www.coa.nl/en/asylum-seekers/resettlement}_{, last visited 13}th_{June 2015}

8_{http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands/treatment-specific-nationalities}_{, last visited}

3rd_{June 2015} 9_{See Appendix III}

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2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the hypothesis that settlement intentions of refugees can have an influence on their motivation to integrate and feelings of belonging in the host country. I differentiate between a three terms that are very close together, and in fact are

sometimes interchangeable in scientific literature. For one, motivation refers to the actual reason behind leaving the home country and coming to the host country. Aspirations can be thought of as a much wider concept and includes both dreams and future plans of refugees, which is related to their motivation to integrate. Settlement intention is coming from the idea that some migrants want to permanently settle in their host country, want to move on to another country, or want to return to their home country. Next to that, class is taken into account in this chapter because it proves to be an important facet of the migration experience of refugees, especially those making it as far as the Netherlands or other parts of Northern and Western Europe.

2.1 Settlement intention

Research shows that in countries such as the Netherlands, between 20 to 50 per cent of immigrants eventually move back to their home country (De Vroome and Tubergen 2014). De Vroome and Tubergen (2014) conducted a survey research among refugee groups in the Netherlands and asked to what extent the socio-cultural and economic position of migrants and refugees in the home country affected their intention to permanently settle in the Netherlands. They found that, contrary to their expectations, refugees were generally not more likely to have a wish to permanently settle than other immigrants. Furthermore, De Vroome and Tubergen conclude by saying that “(a lack of) economic opportunities and political stability in the country of origin can have a strong impact on the intention to stay in the host country” (2014: 21). Applying this to the situation of Syrian refugees, it is expected that, since the very weak political stability and low economic opportunities in Syria at the moment, Syrian refugees could have a relatively high intention to permanently settle in the Netherlands. What is more, multiple scholars show that socio-cultural integration in the Dutch society triggers their intention to stay (De Vroome and Tubergen 2014; Reagan and Olsen 2000). Of course, this is a two way process. Integration triggers the will to permanently settle, and the decision to stay and invest in ones future in the host country further triggers integration. De Vroome and Tubergen show that this is especially the case when we talk of cultural integration, social ties to native Dutch and Dutch language skills.

2.2 Aspirations

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migration research. Most of the literature on this subject is describing the aspirations of economic migrants, and thus does not take into account the difference between voluntarily and involuntary migration. Of course, refugees have different motivations to migrate. But do they also have different aspirations for the future?

Pratsinakis describes the aspirations and strategies of Albanian migrants in the Greek city of Thessaloniki, in which he defines aspirations as the “immigrants’ wishes and goals” (2005: 195). He points out that the goals of States not necessarily correspond to the goals the migrants set for themselves, and, even more problematizing, that migrants’ goals are rarely taken into account in policy. Prastinakis specifically focuses on economic, voluntary migration, which he sees “as an instrumental behavior, as a strategy towards the materialization of aspirations”. His findings could therefore be very different for refugees. However, he does pose a very important concept: that of specific time-space conditions. He investigates whether and how migrants’ aspirations are being defined and redefined through passing time and through specific circumstances, events and personal experiences; their life course changes.

One scholar who does take into account the aspirations of refugees specifically is Delgado-Gantain (1994). She investigates the integration of Russian refugee families through education, and finds that the main goal of Russian parents is their children to be “successful Americans”. In addition, however, those parents also want to stick to their Russian background and make sure that their children were brought up with “the language, religion, and important customs from their Russian heritage” (1994: 146). Although this article is very useful, we should be aware of the fact that it is written over 20 years ago, and is very much biased towards the United States. This could be a problem since the integration debate in the United States is different from that of Europe. Also, America is from the outset an immigrant country, a fact that shapes the way people think of America as the ‘promised land’ and the corresponding ‘American dream’. Furthermore, I find that the focus of Delgado-Gantain is on how people want to “become American” instead of whether they want to integrate. Thus, there is no question asked about what their plans for the future are in terms of returning to their home country or whatsoever; rather, Russians refugees are expected to integrate into society, and the only question asked is how they want to do that.

Aspiration is a very broad term and is not easily defined. Where Pratsinakis speaks about ‘wishes and goals’, it is still unclear what kind of wishes or goals we speak of. You could think of economic goals, social goals, educational goals, settlement or return wishes, goals for yourself, for your children, goals in terms of specific targets, or more broadly in regard to the type of lifestyle you want to live. Aspirations can thus be thought of in many different ways. In this thesis the term will

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mainly be used in reference to settlement intention, but can also refer to other related goals and dreams. I will leave it up to my respondents to define the term more specifically.

2.3 Class

“Patterns and impacts of migration are shaped by the resources migrants can mobilize, and those resources are largely determined of course by socio-economic backgrounds” (Van Hear 2006: 2). Elaborating his arguments, Van Hear uses the notions of class used by Bourdieu, who distinguishes between different forms of capital such as economic, social, symbolic, cultural, and political capital. Each of these forms can be accumulated, transferred, and converted into each other (Van Hear 2014: 104). This is important in migration, since “navigating the migration regime to particular

destinations will require different amounts, forms and combinations of capital.” (Van Hear 2006: 6) In the hierarchy of destinations that migrants can reach, the economic and network based resources that they can call upon play a big role. Some countries are more desired than others due to their welfare, prosperity, freedom and other related factors. Comparing those factors in the Dutch setting to those of other countries (European countries and countries closer to Syria), it can be said that the Netherlands is a relatively high desired country. But these desired environments come with

migrations polices that become more strict, and so “the main factors which determine the ability to reach them have increasingly become cost and connections” (Van Hear 2014: 111). Since Syrians have little possibilities to enter Europe legally, and thus are in large numbers forced to make use of smugglers and agents that channel them through irregular routes, it is assumed that those who do make it to the more desirable destinations are better resourced. We can thus expect that most Syrians who have made it all the way to the Netherlands have better access to or have accumulated more economic and network based resources, which could be connected to their class. I do not want to imply that only the rich make it to the Netherlands, since one form of capital (such as social capital) can be converted into other sorts of capital (such as economic) and can thus serve as a facilitator to reaching a desirable destination. Neither does it suggest that all Syrians living in the Netherlands are of a higher class, not least because some Syrians have been invited through a resettlement program for which no particular economic capital is required. But class and capital are expected to be important factors in the migration experience of Syrian refugees living in the

Netherlands.

There is another dimension in which class is important. Upward and downward mobility of refugees who have settled in the receiving country relate to the concept as well. People of higher class are usually better equipped to travel to more desired countries. However, arriving in these countries, those refugees can experience downward mobility, mostly because their educational qualifications and previous work experience can be devalued (Rutten and Verstappen 2013), and

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because (of that) they cannot find a job with the same prestige as they are used to (Gans 2009). Since many Syrian refugees are of “middle class”, or at least not the poorest of the poor, it is interesting to see whether they experience any kind of downward (or upward) mobility.

Although I use the word class in the analysis of the accumulation and interchangeability of different forms of capital, I want to highlight the fact that class is much more complex and dynamic than referred to in this thesis. As for many main concepts in sociology or migration studies in particular, class is a very broad concept of which a fixed definition is not agreed upon. I have made the consideration to not include a thorough description of the debate on class. Rather, I use class as a general analytical concept which may refer to different sorts of social classification, but in this thesis is mainly related to economic or financial capital (money) and social capital, and the refugees’ socio-economic background in Syria.

2.4 Integration

The integration discourse is a complex one, which includes multiple perspectives on how people integrate into society. In this thesis I differentiate between integration aspirations and actual integration. Because Syrian refugees have been living in the Netherlands for such a short period of time, and many of them have not yet reached their own and the State’s goal regarding integration, it is only relevant to research their motivation to become integrated. Of course, in order to do that, we first need to make clear what it is exactly that is meant by integration in theory.

Definition

Integration is a complex term, which, because of its broadness, cannot be easily defined. “Meanings vary from country to country, change over time, and depend on the interests, values and

perspectives of the people concerned”(Castles et al 2002: 112). In research concerned with integration it eventually comes down to one question: what happens to immigrants and refugees once they arrive in the host country? Most scientific literature on the subject acknowledges that integration is a two-way process, in which both the newcomers and the host society are required to adapt to each other (Castles et al 2002).

Looking at the integration of refugee in particular, there seems to be a lack of consistency as well. Terms such as social inclusion, settlement or re-settlement have been used instead of

integration. According to Castles and colleagues, “such terms are considered more adequate to explain a complex of mutual adjustment of newcomers and the established community of the receiving society.” (2002: 123) Even though no generally accepted definition of refugee integration is in place, Kuhlman has, although it should be taken as an ideal rarely achieved in reality (Castles et al 2002), developed a definition that can serve as a model to assess the two-way process of integration:

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‘If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible with their values; if they attain a standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements (standard of living is taken here as meaning not only income from economic activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public utilities, health services, and education); if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and adjust psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated.’ (Kuhlman 1991: 7)

Destination

Another main question is: integration into what? (Castles et al 2002). What is it that

newcomers are heading to? Do they integrate into the whole society, or just a minor part of it such as an existing local minority or a particular neighborhood? Especially in the public debate, integration often has a normative connotation to it. With other words, “the implication that newcomers should change their values and behavior to ‘fit in’ with the existing society” (Castles et al 2002: 114).

In the United States, a debate between different terms and thus destinations has been going on. Zhou (1997) gives an overview of this debate. Assimilationists believe that

immigrants eventually shed off their culture and become fully incorporated into the new society. As a reaction to this, multiculturalists claim that immigrants stick to the norms and values of their own culture, but do participate fully in the new society. Different ethnicities and cultures in this way form one integrated society. Structuralists on the other hand, tend to focus less on culture and more on social strata. “From this perspective, immigrants and ethnic minorities are constrained by the ethnic hierarchy that systematically limits their access to social resources” (Zhou 1997: 983). Finally, segmented assimilationists believe that divergent destinies can be obtained from distinct patterns of adaptation.

The latter theory is an interesting and popular one, because it acknowledges the fact the difference between upward and downward mobility, and takes into account community-based and personal characteristics that play a role in the integration process. Portes and Zhou, the founders of the segmented assimilation theory, note that “instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation” (1993: 82). They differentiate between “growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class”, a path leading into “the

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opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass”, and a third which “associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity”. They value the fact that integration is dependent on multiple variables such as individual and family characteristics, and the socio-economic and political context in which immigrants arrive. Of importance for this thesis is the notion of divergent destinies. It is generally acknowledged that different groups and persons integration in different ways. Ideally, refugees “maintain their own identity, yet become part of the host society to the extent that host population and refugees can live together in an acceptable way.” (Kuhlman 1994: 56)

Having discussed the possible outcomes of integration, it is important to note that in most literature nowadays, integration is not treated as a destination. Rather, it is seen as a multidimensional, two-way process. It is multidimensional because it covers different dimensions such as socio-economic or structural ones. Also, integration is coming from two ways: from the society itself, which should be willing to facilitate integration and should have a general acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction, and from the immigrants

themselves, who have to take their own responsibilities to adapt to the lifestyle of the host community (Bakker et al 2014: 432). Furthermore, integration is seen as a process which starts at the moment one enters the host country, rather than as a destination which can be reached. Elaborating on this understanding of integration, the next section will name the dimensions, or indicators, of integration.

Indicators

What are the indicators of integration? Just as the definition of the term integration is not easily specified, so is it hard to define the indicators of integration. Different models and frameworks have been developed to assess integration. Since we have determined that integration must be seen as a process rather than a destination, it must be said that it is very hard to adopt an operational

definition of the concept. How does one measure or describe integration when there are no fixed outcomes possible? How to determine indicators of ‘successful integration’ when the term

‘successful integration’ is in itself vague and contestable? There are many political, social, economic and institutional factors that influence the process of integration, of which some will be appear in the empirical chapters of this thesis. What is needed, however, is a “coherent conceptual structure for considering, from a normative perspective, what constitutes the key components of integration” (Ager and Strang 2008: 167).

Ager and Strang (2008) have proposed a framework to analyze the integration of refugees in particular. They suggest four domains to be included: markers and means which are indicative of

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integration success (employment, housing, education and health); social connection that drives integration (social bridges, social bonds and social links); facilitators for integration (language and cultural knowledge, safety and stability); and the foundation that must be present for integration (rights and citizenship). This framework can be a useful tool and base for investigating the

integration of refugees in the Netherlands. Facilitators are a very important aspect of integration, because it eradicates or at least reduces the barriers that stand between being integrated and being not integrated. Especially language skills are of utmost importance, since it makes it possible for refugees to communicate with members of the host society, both professionals as well as

community members. In this way language serves as a kind of gate-keeper, and can “link the micro and the macro levels of discussion and become relevant at social, cultural and economic levels in migrants’ lives” (Trifu 2014: 49). Research has furthermore shown that material translated into the languages of refugees, especially in health care, are crucial in the early stages of settlement (Ager and Strang 2008: 182). Here again we see the two-sided dimension of integration at work. In addition, social ties provide the connection between rights and citizenship on the one hand and indicators of integration success such as housing and employment on the other. That is; one can have the right to work legally, but often needs contacts to actually find a job. This goes for both native ties as well as (co-)ethnic ties. These ties can furthermore prove to be an important resource for social mobility. Social networks in general enables people to make us of their human and financial capital (Burt 1992). For migrants in particular this can be of high importance, even if the relationships they hold are mainly co-ethnic or interethnic. Finally, living in an integrated community can strengthen feelings of ‘belonging’, which involves “links with family, committed friendships and a sense of respect and shared values” (Ager and Strang 2008: 178).

Furthermore, the concepts of employment and education provide refugees with the opportunity to strengthen the other domains of integration, and at the same time are indicators of this very integration. For instance, having a job can be a sign that a person is “well integrated” in the host society, and can also be a way to practice the language and gain more insight in the culture. Having a job furthermore proves to be an opportunity to set up social bridges and bonds, and has an impact on refugees’ self-esteem (Phillimore 2011: 586). For many refugees, employment and education are thus very important factors in what they would like to achieve.

Because both the ability to speak the language and the connection and relationships one has with natives and/or (co-)ethnics are key in participating in the host society, and are influential factors in the integration discourse, these are the two main concepts I will be focusing on when doing research among Syrian refugees in the Netherlands. Because I believe the ‘markers and means’ of Ager and Strang are also very important refugees’ goals and indicators of their integration, I will

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include both education and employment in my analysis of the integration of Syrian refugees. It is true that this leaves one more crucial domain untreated: rights and citizenship, which are part of the foundation of integration. Most refugees from Syria receive a residence permit within a short period of time, which gives them the opportunity to utilize legal and welfare benefits and equity in access to services and entitlement. Rights and citizenship are by no means less important for them than for other immigrant groups or refugee nationalities, but in this thesis I do not differentiate between those who do and those who do not hold residence permits or other legal documents. Because the description of this foundation needs a thorough understanding of the policy and ideas of nation and nationhood in the Netherlands, I believe it is beyond the scope of this research to include the domain of rights and citizenship.

Figure: A Conceptual Framework Defining Core Domains of Integration.

Although the framework introduced by Ager and Strang is a very useful conceptual tool to use in integration research and will the base of the integration research in this thesis, it may seem like a normative and over simplistic reproduction of very complex theory. What we need to keep in mind is that integration is not a destination but a process. It is a process that starts from the moment

refugees arrive in the host country, and is shaped by their intentions and aspirations. Elaborating on this understanding of integration, Ager and Strangs framework will be used as an analytical tool and as a guidance to understand the integration process of Syrian refugees in the Netherlands. Although

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it comes with some flaws, the simplified structure of Ager this framework can serve as a bridge between theory and local practice, as it illuminates “key local processes through accessible use of core theoretical insights” (Ager and Strang 2010: 591).

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4. Life before the conflict

In this chapter I will introduce my respondents and will provide some background information about their living conditions in Syria. The information is solely derived from the interviews, and will be mainly described in their own words. The interviews have taken place either at their homes, in cafés or over WhatsApp. What stood out in every meeting was the hospitality and kindness of my

respondents. Every single one of them was very open and were able to express their feelings and emotion in a detailed manner, no matter in what language the conversation took place or whether an interpreter was helping us. Two of the interviews took place in cities far away from where I live, and when my parents dropped me off they were not allowed to leave until they had a cup of coffee and two pieces of cake. This is illustrative of their immense hospitality. The relaxed environment made me and my respondents feel at ease, and the information I got out of them could therefore not have been more rich and accurate. A short introduction of all of them will now follow.

Taim

Taim, the Syrian man of 24 who was already introduced in the introduction of this thesis, and who is ‘trapped’ in Istanbul, just finished studying economy at the University of Aleppo when the uprisings began. He has two brothers. His father was an agricultural engineer, his mother did not work. His father’s salary was enough to support the family, but Taim himself also worked at a clothes store. He says that he had a beautiful life before the war, until the situation got worse:

My friends started to leave one after one. Europe, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries. The city was almost empty. No jobs, no money. Everybody was unhappy. My dad’s company left my dad without money. And I started to think that I had to leave Syria. […] So my old dream started to grow. To live in Europe, because they have freedom and dignity. So I told my family. They accepted that. Turkey was my goal at the beginning. After that I am gonna save some money and go to Europe.

Right now Taim is still living in Istanbul, waiting and hoping to get to Europe, preferably the Netherlands. I met him during a study trip to Istanbul and told me his story without hesitation. He spoke English very well, and expressed his feeling of frustration (towards Turkey’s immigration policies and treatment of Syrians) and feelings of hope and despair very well. We continued talking over WhatsApp after I had left Turkey. Currently he is still saving money, and he is hoping to leave Istanbul after summer 2015.

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Shevan had studied Arabic at an institute and English literature at the University of Damascus. His father was an engineer at an oil company, and they owned a beautiful house. Shevan comes from a mixed background: his mother is Christian, and his father is from a Christian Armenian background but converted to Islam, and his grandmother is Jewish. As he explains:

This is difficult, especially now in Syria, because nobody loves someone like me. Gay, Christian, Muslim, Jewish. Both ISIS and Assad hate me.

Shevan is a very sensitive and spiritual young man. I met him at a discussion night about the Syrian crisis organized by Amnesty, where he stood in front of the audience as one of the speakers. Both during this night and during our conversation together, he very much opened up to his audience and told the most personal and traumatic events in great detail. He was not afraid of crying – he did so during the interview – and talking about his feelings. He said it would help him to overcome his great trauma.

Shevan was living with his boyfriend in Damascus and was very active in the (gay) activist community. He volunteered at a radio station where he made a funny yet skeptical program about the Syrian regime. He also worked together with father Frans van der Lugt10_{in order to promote} democracy. He loved to travel. His dream was to be a translator or to be a presenter at a radio station. His situation changed dramatically when the conflict in Syria started. He explained that gay people are victims of both sides of the conflict. It was not long before Shevan and his boyfriend were arrested and were accused of being terrorist. When they got out of jail by means of a bribe they had to leave the country quickly.

Mahdi

I got in contact with Mahdi via Facebook. Because he does not speak Dutch or English very well he brought Yamen11_{, a good Syrian friend of him, to help translate. Mahdi is from Deir-Ezzor, and} worked for an international French oil company in Syria. He had a good life and a good income. He

10_{The Dutch Jesuit priest Frans van der Lugt had been living in Homs for over forty years and was very popular}

in the Syrian community. According to a Syrian refugee living in London, “every Christian in Homs knew Frans. He was very close to our people.” (De Zwaan 2014 II) On the 7th of April 2014 Frans van der Lugt was shot dead in the monastery he lived in. Although the motives still unclear, it is assumed that he was shot by a member of the Al-Nusrafront, a ramification of Al-Qaeda (De Zwaan 2014 I).

11_{Yamen is meanwhile the brother of Ahmed, and has been translating both the interviews with Mahdi and}

Ahmed for me. Yamen is not officially considered as refugee. He has been living in the Netherlands for a longer period of time to study medicine. He however considers himself as a victim of the Syrian conflict.

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was raised in a politically active family, and he himself started protesting against the government from the very outset of the uprisings.

The revolution started in 2011. People got out to demonstrate. I joined them. I dreamed of a better life and more freedom, and wanted to get rid of the old dictator family. We all thought that we were going to change the future, to build a better life. A democracy. Freedom for all, which we have been missing for forty years because of the Assad family. […] We wanted to demonstrate without weapons. We do not believe in weapons and fighting, but in demonstrating and freedom of speech.

Because he was an activist, Mahdi was arrested for three times, the third time for 1,5 year. He was severely punished in jail. When he started talking about his experiences in jail, he asked me whether I have read the interview he held with de Volkskrant (one of the bigger newspapers in the

Netherlands). I said I did not, and he promised me to send me the link. The article contains graphic content of his scars of the torture he went through, and reading his description of his period in prison makes me extra humble and respectful to the smiling and gentle person with whom I spoke in a café in Leiden. It makes it also very clear why he could not stay in Syria any longer. After he got out of prison, Mahdi still wanted to be of service to those Syrian in need. He helped children who could not go to school, people who lost their homes and their families. But when IS came to Syria he was warned: if you will continue to help those people, we will hurt you and your family. That was the moment he made de decision to leave the country.

Yana

Yana is the only woman I spoke to. She is about the same age as Mahdi, and the two met at a conference about Syrian literature in Leiden. Mahdi introduced her to me. She struck me as a very warm, positive and intelligent woman. As for all of my respondents, she was able to talk about her experiences and emotions very openly. I could see that sometimes she was struggling, especially when talking about her parents she had to leave behind in Syria. As she explains:

I am not a Muslim, but Druze. It is a small religion in the south of Syria. They’ve got very strict rules. They don’t want their girls to marry men from other religions. Ahmed [husband] is Sunni. So when I married him, they did not want to see me anymore. I haven’t been in contact with my mother and brother and the rest of the community for fourteen years, only with my father and sister. […] We didn’t have much contact. My father sometimes came to my house in secret, about twice a year. My sister came once a year. They had to visit without my mother knowing. My father died one month ago. I am in a lot of pain because I haven’t seen him for such a long time. When he was ill I couldn’t visit him. This hurts me a lot.

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Yana lived with her husband and three children in Muadamiyet al-Sham, a village about 8 kilometers from Damascus. She is a writer and holds a PhD in Arabic literature. She also lectured at the

University of Damascus. She said she has a great problem with the current government of Syria. Because she wrote about the corruption in Syrian universities, she got into trouble with the University of Damascus who tried to withhold her from getting her PhD. During the same time she and her family started to get into trouble because of the war. Muadamiyet al-Sham was encircled and besieged by pro-government forces and there was a lack of food and water supplies. In chapter 5.1 Yana’s story will continue.

Jamal

Jamal is from Damascus. I met him through my supervisor and went to visit him in his house in Brielle. He was very welcoming and proud of the house he was living in, with all its plants and his cats. In Syria he lived with his mother, sister and grandparents. He said he had a great life there. He got his diploma in Public Relations at the London College in Damascus. His mother had studied in Cairo, and his father worked as a car mechanic. His parents got divorced when he was ten years old, and they both remarried. Jamal has been very active in fighting for human- and gay-rights, especially in Saudi Arabia and Dubai. Although he did not explicitly say it, it became clear that he was not against Syria’s regime. The problems he got into, and thus the reasons why he left, were mainly because Saudi Arabia did not approve his civic activism in their country.

Khaled

During an evening about Syrian refugees organized by the Amsterdam Medical Centre and Nacht van de Vluchteling12_{Khaled came to talk about his experiences in Syria in front of the audience. Later we} met again, in his house in Apeldoorn where he now lives with his wife and three children. He is originally from Homs, but lived with his family in Damascus. He was working as a tailor and was doing very well until the problems in Syria started. When the city of Homs got destroyed, he and a friend tried to help the people as best as they could:

I started with my family in the beginning. But there were too many people coming, they ran away from home. They didn’t have anything to survive. They didn’t have money, they didn’t know anybody outside Homs or Daraa. So they were living on the streets and sleeping in the gardens. We saw these people and this is not good. We tried to help these people. Most of them were women and children, because the men stayed or had died already.

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With more and more people fleeing to Damascus, Khaled got busier taking care of them. So they started organizing the help in a more profound way. After a few months the government found out about them, and destroyed his house and put him in jail. He got out through a bribe, and started volunteering again. But after a while it got too dangerous for him, and he decided to leave Syria. Ahmed

Thirty-seven year old Ahmed has only recently arrived. He came to the Netherlands just three months ago and is still living in an asylum center waiting for a house and family reunion with his wife and children. I got to know him through Yamen, who is his younger brother. He worked as an Arabic language teacher at a high school in Deir-Ezzor, and also helped in the pharmacy owned by his sister. He lived together with his wife, two children and his mother. His wife worked as a teacher as well. They lived a happy life and never thought of moving outside of Syria. They owned their own apartment, but this got destroyed during the early years of fighting. Ahmed joined the

anti-government demonstrations in 2012 and often used the pharmacy to organize the demonstrations and stock materials such as banners. The fighting in Deir-Ezzor got very intense. Ahmed lost his job, was living in danger constantly. After he got arrested and assaulted by the IS several times, he decided it was time to leave Syria.

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5. The migration experience

As read in the previous chapter, most of my respondents were educated, “middle-class” people, living a relatively rich and good life before the uprisings in 2011. The outbreak of the conflict however changed a lot. Obviously all have left the country at one point, mainly due to the fact that the conflict got so severe that they could no longer guarantee their own and their children’s safety. How did they come to the decision of leaving their home country? What factors played a role in the destination reached? These questions will be answered in this chapter.

5.1 From Syria to the Netherlands

My respondents did not just cross one border to flee the dangerous situation – they crossed many. It shows that they were not satisfied with staying in the Middle Eastern region. They believed that the Netherlands would give them a better opportunity for a safe and fulfilling life. They believed that they would be safer, have more freedom and have more and better economic opportunities than if they would have stayed in Lebanon, Egypt or Turkey. The Netherlands is thus a more desired

destination. To be able to reach the Netherlands a lot of money is needed. Not only does it cost a lot to pay smugglers and agents to get you to desired destinations in Europe, there is also always the risk of losing your money on the way, through bribes, robbing or just bad luck.

In the theoretical chapter about class, Van Hear (2006: 3) was introduced, who suggests that “there is a hierarchy of destinations that can be reached by migrants and asylum seekers, according to the resources – financial and network-based – that they can call upon.” This would mean that those who reach a more desired destination such as the Netherlands would have probably had more resources to get there. That is true for most of my respondents. It does not mean that reaching the Netherlands was easy for them because they come from a higher class. Many of them had lost a great portion of their money during the war. Some of them had owned houses, which were destroyed by the fighting. Others were robbed. Since economic capital is the most important prerequisite for mobility (Van Hear 2006: 6), it made it more difficult for most of my respondents to move. However, coming from an environment in which more people were well-off, and having jobs at universities, family businesses and other places where they were surrounded with relatively more wealthy people, most of my respondents had more easy access to network-based resources, which could then be converted into financial resources.

This can be demonstrated by the story of Yana. She and her husband both worked at

universities in Syria. They saved a lot of money to buy a house, and were living a good and rich life in a town near Damascus.

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In Muadamiyet al-Sham there was a lot of protests against Assad. […] As a result, the army had surrounded and besieged the city. Five days and six nights we were surrounded. We didn’t have any water, food or medicine. The army was shooting people on the street. My husband and I were on the ground. All the windows got broken, and also the water tank. They came and went, came and went. It started in 2011 and continued until 2012. My husband, my children and I saw everything. On the third of July 2013 we left, because we didn’t have anything to eat or drink anymore. We went to the house of my husband’s friend in another city. We stayed there for a week. When we got back we saw that our house was destroyed by a rocket bomb. The house was totally ruined. We had a library with 3000 books, they were all burned. Our house was our own, we didn’t rent it. So the house we worked for so hard was completely gone. […] Everything was gone: our house, our car, our jobs. The soldiers tried to get us into jail. That’s why we fled. First we went to Deir-Ezzor. But there were Islamic jihadists, and they didn’t like us there. So I went to Turkey. It wasn’t hard to cross the border. Someone drove me in a car, and after that I had to walk for 200 meters. On the other side of the border there was family where I could stay. Then I went to Izmir by car, where I met a smuggler. So I came here, but I didn’t know about Europe. […] I had friends in Sweden, and I tried to go there. But the smuggler brought me here (to the Netherlands). He said: I cannot bring you to Sweden, it is too far. We came to the Netherlands in a truck. I was sitting in the back of the truck with another woman and her nine year old child. We sat in a very small corner with many things surrounding us. I hear that these days many more people are being stuffed in trucks. So I was lucky. It took us four days and five nights. We arrived in a place near Ter Apel. I got out of the truck and was left in a street. I waited. I told a random passenger that I came from Syria, in English. The man said: you have to go to the police or to Vluchtelingenwerk. He brought me to Ter Apel in his car. It was August first, 2013. […] I didn’t know anyone in the Netherlands. But my husband knew a student from Damascus who was living in Zoetermeer. So I got in touch via Facebook. And now I live in a place near him and have a lot of contact with his family.

- Yana

Yana’s example is illustrative of some points I want to make. First, it is clear that although she lost her house, her car and most of her property, she was still able to gather enough money to travel all the way to the Netherlands. At first she used her social capital (her husbands’ friend) to travel outside her city and stay somewhere safe. Then, once arrived in the Netherlands, she used her social capital again (her husbands’ student) to get in get in touch with someone with the same nationality in a foreign country where she did not know anyone. But her story also shows us something else. Yana wanted to go to Sweden because she had a friend living there. Even though she wanted to go there, the smuggler did not agree with her, because he thought it was too far. It is illustrative of the limits class plays in the migration experience. You can have the financial and social capital to go

We are waiting for the moment : the role of class and settlement intentions on the motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the Netherlands

“We are waiting for

the moment”

The role of class and settlement intentions on the

motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the

Netherlands.

“We are waiting for the moment.”

The role of class and settlement intentions in the

motivation for integration of Syrian refugees in the

Netherlands

Table of Contents

Introduction

Outline

1. Context

1.1 The Syrian crisis

1.2 Syrian refugees in Europe

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#

1.3 Dutch legal framework

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Settlement intention

2.2 Aspirations

2.3 Class

2.4 Integration

4. Life before the conflict

5. The migration experience

5.1 From Syria to the Netherlands

_{http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#}