The implementation of energy transition policies on the ground : a comparative study on Germany and the Netherlands

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY

TRANSITION POLICIES ON THE GROUND

A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON GERMANY AND THE

NETHERLANDS

Lucas Sitanala 10276718

Supervisor: dr. Sebastian Krapohl Second reader: dr. Darshan Vigneswaran

23 June, 2017

Master Political Science: International Relations

Research Project: The Political Economy of Energy

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Abstract

There is a puzzling difference with respect to energy transition policies between Germany and the Netherlands. In this regard, Germany is considered as a worldwide pioneer due to the challenging ambitions the country has set for itself. The Netherlands, on the contrary, belongs to the countries that perform badly. The issue of energy transition is endlessly discussed among scholars. However, studies from an institutional point of view appear to be rare. For this reason, the purpose of this thesis is to determine the influence of the political institutions on the policy-adoption process. In doing this, the thesis focusses especially on the Green party in both countries, considering the fact that these are most concerned with energy transition policies. The analysis primarily relies on two theories: one is the political opportunity structure, and the other one is the veto players theory. Data for this study were gathered by desktop-research and thus, these are primarily derived from primary and secondary literature such as books, articles and policy documents. The results of a thorough process-tracing analysis tend to prove that the political institutions indeed contribute to the variance in energy transition policies. The German federal structure and, surprisingly, the voting threshold, appeared to be in the advantage of the German Green party in gaining political power. Besides, the thesis proved that it is harder for the Dutch Green party to become a veto player than it is for its German sister party. As a result, the Dutch Greens have not been able to force a policy change as significant as the German Greens have accomplished. For now, this thesis is just a modest contribution to the existing corpus of points of view on the role of political institutions on policy-adoption. There is much more scholarship needed here in the future. The explanatory power is limited since, for example, this thesis did neither specifically address the influence of social pressure nor that of the private sector. Further research is necessary to cover the issue more accurately.

Keywords: energy transition policy, Germany, The Netherlands, policy-adoption, political

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List of Abbreviations

AfD Alternative for Germany CDA Christian Democratic Appeal CDU Christian Democratic Union

CPN Communist Party of the Netherlands

D66 Democrats 66

EC European Commission

EEG Renewable Energy Law

EU European Union

EVP Evangelical People’s Party

FDP Free Democratic Party

GDP Gross domestic product GPV Reformed Political League IEA International Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIMBY Not in my backyard

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPM4 Fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan PPR Political Party of Radicals

PSP Pacifist Socialist Party

PvdA Labour Party

PV Photovoltaics

PVV Freedom Party

RPF Reformed Political Federation SDP Social Democratic Party of Germany SGP Reformed Political Party

SP Socialist Party

StrEG Feed-in Tariff

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List of tables and figures

Table 1 - Percentage of potential vote for ecologist parties in 1986 24 Table 2 - The House of Representatives party configuration (1980 – present) 28

Table 3 - Institutional veto player configuration 38

Table 4 - Coalition parties in German majoritarian governments (1980-present) 40 Table 5 - Coalition partners in Dutch majoritarian governments (1980-present) 42

Figure 1 - The three stages of policy-adoption 11

Figure 2 - The causal mechanism 18

Figure 3 - Difference between percentage post-materialist and percentage materialist 23 Figure 4 - Party positions of German political parties with respect to environmental policy 46 Figure 5 - Party positions of German political parties with respect to environmental policy 48 Figure 6 - The support of the German people for further growth of renewables in 2015 49

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1.Introduction

It is increasingly accepted among the political leaders of the European Union (EU) that energy transition can be considered as one of the most important challenges of the 21st century (Armaroli & Balzani, 2009). This broad consensus of the European leadership is primarily based on two predominant reasons. First, the world is facing the consequences of the exploitation of fossil fuels. It is scientifically shown that greenhouse gas emissions are related to global warming and air pollution (Armaroli & Balzani, 2009). Global warming will have profound consequences on life on earth, for example due to increasing extreme weather events (Man et al., 2017). Second, it is of crucial importance for European countries to become less dependent on other states for their energy. The EU imports more than half of the energy it consumes from Russia and countries in the Middle East (IEA, 2016). It is expected that these countries will face an increasing demand in the future due to upcoming developing countries. From this perspective, taking into consideration that these proven fossil fuel reserves are gradually decreasing, it is a necessity for European countries to increase its self-sufficiency with the aim to secure the energy supply.

For these predominant reasons, the European Commission (EU) has adopted several measures in order to stimulate the transition towards renewable energy. One of the most promising examples is the legally binding objective to which all member states have committed themselves. This objective obligates each member state to improve the position of renewable energy and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (Jäger-Waldau et al., 2011). Consequently, European governments are diligently seeking to implement the right policies to meet their energy targets by 2020 (Oteman, 2014). The extent to which member states succeed in their transition varies considerably. Remarkable is the difference of success between Germany and the Netherlands. The progress of these closely allied and neighboring countries is quite different, with Germany as front runner and the Netherlands as backbencher.

Germany has set itself huge challenges in its energy policy, by moving away from fossil fuels and abandoning nuclear energy simultaneously. However Germany is not unique in striving for a low-carbon energy system, it is globally considered as a pioneer with respect to energy transition. The country is unique due to the ambitious package of goals that it has assigned itself to, which is also known as the Energiewende. The Energiewende consists of the goal to, in comparison with 1990, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020, to decrease primary energy consumption by 50% by 2050, increase the share of renewables in energy

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consumption by 2050% and to increase the share of gross electricity production to 80% by 2050 (Buchan, 2012). These targets were set by the German federal government and they even exceed the binding EU targets that the country will meet smoothly.

On the contrary, the Netherlands is a country that is struggling to meet their 2020 targets. The government is not as active as the German government in light of energy transition policies, much initiatives are left to the private sector. In Dutch politics, energy transition is still too often seen as a ‘leftist hobby’ (Köper, 2012). Consequently, the Dutch energy mix is for the most part dominated by fossil fuels. From all member of the International Energy Agency (IEA), there are just three countries that perform worse and have a higher share of fossil fuels in their energy mix. Additionally, in a European context, only Luxemburg and Malta have a lower share of renewable energy than the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2017).

1.1 Thesis objectives

Germany and the Netherlands are closely allied and neighboring countries that are similar in many respects. The GDP of both countries is comparable, they are both export-orientated economies (IMF, 2016) and their performance on the Human Development Index is about equal (Lijphart, 2012). Against this background, it is puzzling that these countries differ substantially in light of such an important issue. For this reason, this thesis aims to explore what factors influence the differences in policy-adoption between the countries. To do so, this thesis chooses to analyze the countries from an institutional approach.

Thus, this thesis will analyze the political institutions of Germany and the Netherlands in order to explain the difference in energy transition policy-adoption between the countries. The objective of this thesis is to explore whether or not institutional characteristics are of influence in explaining the variance. The main research question is as follows:

‘(How) do the political institutions in Germany and the Netherlands contribute to the

difference in energy transition policies between the countries?’

1.2 Academic relevance

The issue of energy transition is widely discussed among scholars all over the world. The two countries that are central in this thesis have been subjected to academic attention many times too. On the one hand, many scholars have stressed the pioneering German Energiewende and its challenges, opportunities and shortcomings (Buchan, 2012). On the other hand, the

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Netherlands is a country that has been studied for the opposite reason. Scholars have tried to find answers on the laborious transition of the country.

Most of these studies were single-case studies that tried to derive lessons that can be learned from pioneers and those lagging behind. However, it is sometimes easier to reveal certain characteristics and processes by comparing one unit of analysis with another. Germany and the Netherlands are comparable units with different outcomes and, therefore, an institutional approach could offer surprising insights when using a ‘most similar system’ design (Teune & Przeworski, 1970).

In his astonishing study, Lijphart (2012) has compared democratic states and the consequences of different institutional characteristics. However, the relationship between energy transition policies and democratic institutions has remained undiscussed. Besides, as consensus-based democracies, Germany and the Netherlands belong to the same category with respect to Lijphart’s distinction of democratic systems. This way, this study could contribute in a broadening and a more in-depth way to the extensive study of Lijphart.

1.3 Social relevance

Each generation is confronted with challenges and opportunities. The threat of global warming can be considered as the greatest global challenge for the people of the 21st century (Armaroli & Balzani, 2007). Based on extensive studies, it can be argued that global warming will have disastrous effects that affect the lives of future generations disastrously (Morris & Pent, 2016).

Recent research has presented evidence that extreme weather events are positively related to global warming. Man et al. (2017) have shown that the number of extreme weather events has increased since the rise of carbon emissions that are caused by human activity. For this reason, it is likely to assume that extreme weather events such as heat waves, drought and floods will take place more often in the forthcoming years (Mann et al., 2017). Additionally, extreme weather events will indirectly cause food insecurity and large migration flows too (Werz & Hoffman, 2015). It is even stated that global warming can restrain the progression towards a world without hunger (Wheeler & von Braun, 2013).

In battling these existing threats, a transition towards sustainable energy is of unmistakable importance. There are bilateral and multilateral agreements that should stimulate national governments to work as hard as they can on the transition. However, there are also unilateral

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initiatives with the aim to decarbonize society. Here, the difference between Germany and the Netherlands becomes clear, which is striking from a social point of view as well. More than two-third of both the German and Dutch population considers climate change as one of the biggest threats of our century (Eurobarometer, 2015). In this regard, it is of importance to know why the Netherlands is not leading by example despite the overwhelming societal support. After all, the consequences of global warming will be experienced by the people.

1.4 Thesis outline

In order to answer the main research question, the following issues are to be addressed in this thesis. With the aim to place this thesis into context, chapter 2 provides the reader with a literature review. It serves as an academic introduction in order to present an overview of the existing literature, and to expose the literature gap that this thesis attempts to fill. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the theories and concepts that are the foundation for the analysis of this thesis. In Chapter 4, the methodological decisions are addressed. Chapter 5 will sketch the social context that will be used as starting point for the analysis. In chapter 6 and 7, the thesis will discuss the influence of the political institutions in both countries. Chapter 8 will analyze the influence of political institutions on specific energy transition policies. As final part of this thesis, chapter 9 provides the reader with a conclusion and discussion.

2. Literature review

This section presents a brief overview of the key contributions to the field of policy- adoption and energy transition policy. The aim is to show that there are theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature. Eventually, this research attempts to deliver a modest contribution to fill these theoretical and empirical lacunae.

2.1 Policy-adoption theory and energy transition policy

Policy-adoption studies are an important method of study in political science research. Political scientists have been using a policy-adoption or policy diffusion framework for many years already, especially in the United States. Policy-adoption theorists try to explain policy-adoption as a function of political and economic characteristics (Matisoff, 2008). In doing so, policy-adoption studies have delivered fruitful contributions to many societal puzzles (Karch, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). However, despite its central role in the field of political science, policy-adoption theories have rarely addressed the issue of energy transition policy. The articles that do combine policy-adoption and energy transition are focused on the

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situation in the United States (Matisoff, 2008; Krause, 2011), which can be explained by its popularity in that country.

There is burgeoning literature that stresses energy transition policies, despite the fact that these studies are not conducted from a policy-adoption framework. However, just as the policy-adoption theory, many studies analyze energy transition policies from political and economic characteristics. Knill et al. (2010) have investigated to which extent political parties influence environmental policy outcomes. They show in a sophisticated study that party politics and environmental politics are correlated. The inclusion of Green parties in government is positively correlated to environmental policies. Additionally, the extent to which other parties have addressed environmental concerns in their party manifesto’s plays an important role as well. In other words, it is more likely that environmental policies take place when parties have addressed environmentalism in their party manifesto’s and during campaigning. Furthermore, the evidence has shown that the existence of an environmental ministry influences the number of adopted policies positively.

The agenda-setting perspective is another political approach from which energy transition policies can be identified. By the 1990s, global warming has secured its spot on the international political agenda. Accordingly, many nations have committed themselves to targets under the 1997 Kyoto protocol. However, there is still room for improvement left in order to decarbonize societies. Pralle (2009) argues that the reason that national governments do not take more profound measures is that they are afraid to suffer political damage. Nevertheless, climate change is a long-term problem that requires tough short-term solutions. Pralle (2009) claims that an agenda-setting perspective can help to keep the issue of climate change high on the political agenda, and can therefore contribute to the implementation of new policies. Pralle (2009) mentions that the scientific knowledge and the raising public concerns should be emphasized. Furthermore, the key problem indicators should be reported in non-technical and user-friendly terms.

From an economic point of view, it has been argued that fossil fuels have provided astonishing possibilities upon which the economic growth of many westerns societies has been built. In other words, economic progress often brings along environmental challenges. It is safe to argue that wealth and power in industrialized countries is primarily dependent on the use of fossil fuels (Amineh & Houweling, 2007). Knill and Tosun (2009) have found evidence that fighting the environmental challenge and economic integration are positively

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related. This research is based on the EU and demonstrates a strong correlation between trade dependence, foreign direct investments, export to industrial states and membership of the EU. However, the research does not include differences within the EU.

2.2 Literature gap

It is sound and clear that energy transition policies are subjected to many scholarly studies. However, it has become clear in this chapter that energy transition policies are rarely analyzed from a policy-adoption approach. Scholars that have combined this approach with the issue of energy transition policy, specified their research on the United States. Furthermore, most of these studies included a single-case study design or, in other cases, tried to explain the role of intergovernmental organizations such as the EU.

This thesis will take a different tack than the scholars that are discussed in the above. It attempts to modestly fill this literature gap by setting up a cross-national study of energy transition policy adoption, from an institutional approach. In doing this, the thesis considers policy-adoption as a process that can be divided into three stages, as is pictured in figure 1. The first two stages of the process will be analyzed in both countries in order to explain the difference between the countries in the final stage. In analyzing these stages, this thesis focusses its investigation on the role of the Green party in both countries. It is assumed in this thesis that these parties are most concerned with energy transition policies and that their role in the policy-adoption process influences the final policy stage significantly. As first of the two Green parties, the German Green part has been founded in 1980. For this reason, the timeframe of the analysis will be limited to the period from 1980 until today.

Figure 1: The three stages of policy-adoption

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter elaborates on the theories that will be used in this thesis. In assessing the effects of political institutions, the thesis primarily relies on two theories: the political opportunity

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structure and the veto players theory. For the understanding of these theories, the thesis will address the institutional approach first. Thereafter, the theories are stressed and the thesis will derive a hypothesis from both. The political opportunity structure will be used for the analysis of the input stage and the veto players theory will be utilized for the analysis of the political system stage.

3.1 Institutional approach

This thesis attempts to answer the research question from an institutional approach. It chooses for an institutional point of view because it covers many aspects of social and political life. Political actors affect many aspects of live, but they do not operate in circumstances of their own making. Instead, they balance in an institutional configuration that offers them possibilities and in which they encounter constraints (König et al., 2010). Rhodes et al. (2006: xiii) have formulated the importance of institutions accurately: ‘Institutions may be

seen as architecture and as rules that determine opportunities and incentives for behavior, inclusion and exclusion of potential players, and structuring the relative ease or difficulty of inducing change, and the mechanisms through which change may be facilitated or denied’.

3.2 Political opportunity structure

The political opportunity structure theory constitutes what is considered as the hard core of the political process framework. The basic idea of the framework is that it provides insight into the independent structural conditions that, to some extent, determine the possibility for success of political parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). Researchers that are concerned with the political opportunity structure basically have distinguished ‘open’ and ‘closed’ structures, that is, structures that allow political actors to easily access the political system or structures in which access to the political system is more difficult. In a sense, the institutional structure of a political system determines how many political actors are engaged in the policy process and can influence policy outcomes (Jeffery & Sturm, 2014).

The structures of political systems are made up of the formal political institutions. For this reason, the design of these political institutions is crucial for the degree of openness of such a political system (Kriesi, 2004). Different factors are important in order to determine whether a political system should be considered as open or closed. For example, for the analysis of the political opportunity structure, this thesis stresses that the opportunity of political actors to entry a political system is not only influenced by political institutions, but also by standardized social structures. Or, as accurately described by Marks and McAdam (1996: 25):

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‘One can certainly think of ways in which cultural factors or processes create opportunities

for movement activity’. When public opinion in a political system is changing, it is likely that

this provides a ‘window of opportunity’ for political actors that respond to these social changes accurately. Chapter 5 sketches the social context before the thesis continues with structural institutional characteristics in chapter 6.

One important institutional characteristic of the political opportunity structure is the electoral system. According to Kriesi (2004), proportional electoral systems are more accessible for emerging parties than plurality or disproportional systems. Additionally, there are considerably different voting thresholds in countries. To a certain extent, the political configuration of a country is determined by the voting threshold. Consequently, it is likely that a variance in voting threshold can partly explain the difference in political practices in countries. Thus, voting thresholds can have consequences for the openness of a political system.

Furthermore, the openness of a political system is dependent on the degree of centralization (Marks & McAdam, 1996). There is broad consensus among scholars that it is likely that decentralized political systems are more open for political actors than unitary political systems. The argument is that there are more options to access decentralized states due to the multiplication of state actors. In purely centralized states, there is only one way to significantly influence policy-making which makes it harder for a political actor to enter (Kriesi, 2004).

From this starting point, this thesis aims to compare the openness of the German and Dutch political institutions, especially with respect to the Green party in both countries. Against this theoretical background of the political opportunity structure, there are some important differences that need to be stressed.

As will be addressed in the analysis more elaborately, the two countries differ considerably in their electoral structure. Germany has a mixed-ballot structure which is partly disproportional (Shikano & Herrmann, 2009). On the contrary, The Dutch electoral system is considered as one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world (IPP, 2008). Additionally, the German voting threshold is 5%, while the Dutch threshold is just 0,67%.

Furthermore, Germany is a federal state in which the distribution of power is geographically defined. This means that there are different levels of government and each of these levels

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have the authority to make final decisions about certain issues. The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state, which means that the country is a unitary state in the core and governmental power is not divided into different organs of government. However, the central government has recognized, subsidized and delegated power to private associations in the semipublic sector, for example in the field of health care and education (Lijphart, 2012). It is theorized that the federalist structure of the German political system provides emerging parties the opportunity to gain political influence, by participating on the level of the constituent state. This way, such emerging parties are able to effectively demonstrate their qualities at the state level and to gain national publicity (Müller Rommel, 1998). In the Netherlands, access to lower levels of government provides political actors not with the authority to influence policy significantly. Policy fields such as energy transition are the full responsibility of the national government.

In light of the above, this thesis hypothesizes that the German political system is more admissible than the Dutch system is. This might be surprising, since the electoral system of the Netherlands looks more open at first sight. However, the aim of this thesis is to investigate what explains the difference in energy transition policies in these countries. For this purpose, it is not only interested in how easily accessible political systems are, but more specifically how easily these new political actors can acquire political power. In this regard, the low voting threshold in the Netherlands is considered adverse: the thesis assumes that it is more difficult to gain political parties in a political system with many parties. The fact that Germany is a federal state with multiple levels of power and there is no such political structure in the Netherlands supports the claim that the German system is more admissible. Thus, the hypothesis can be described as follows:

H1: The German political system is more admissible for a new party such as the Green Party to gain political influence than the Dutch political system is

3.3 Veto players theory

The veto players theory is a prominent theory in the field of comparative politics, which is introduced in the iconic works of George Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2000, 2002). The theory is useful in comparing the effects of political institutions on public policies. The veto players theory has been developed from the perspective that comparisons across countries are complex due to the multidimensionality of different institutional configurations. This theory

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The veto players theory helps to reveal policy-adoption processes by focusing on the institutional effects of a political system. Tsebelis argues that each political system has its specific ‘configuration of veto players’. Veto players are defined as ‘individual or collective

actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo’ (Tsebelis, 2002: 36).

Tsebelis distinguishes two types of veto players, which are the institutional and partisan veto players. Institutional veto players are constitutionally defined, such as unicameral or bicameral legislatures or parliamentary systems. It is evident that the more institutional veto players there are in a political system, the more institutional avenues should be defeated in order to adopt policy. Inside the institutional configuration, partisan veto players have generated power by the political game. Partisan veto players are intrinsically related to party politics. Tsebelis argues that studying these partisan veto players gives a more accurate insight in the division of power in a political system. Imagine, for instance, that the German Lower House of Representatives is controlled by a single cohesive party. Not this legislative house as institutional veto player, but this majority party is the real (partisan) veto player in this specific situation (Madden, 2014).

Tsebelis has established that there is a causal relationship between the number and cohesion of veto players and policy outcomes. On the one hand, when the number of veto players in a system is increasing, or when the veto players are separated by substantial ideological differences, the set of outcomes that can change a status quo (the winset of the status quo is small) is affected negatively. On the other hand, when there are not many veto players or when the veto players are ideologically more cohesive, the winset of the status quo is bigger. Tsebelis has shown that with a small winset of the status quo, there will be policy stability due to the fact that only incremental polies will be implemented. When the winset of the status quo is big, it is likely that significant policy changes can be implemented which leaves room for policy change (Tsebelis, 2002).

Additionally, veto players are also strongly related to governmental agenda setting capacities. The presence of many veto players is negatively related to the governmental capacity to control the agenda in parliamentary systems. In other words: the more veto players, the smaller the winset for a government to implement significant policies. In this respect, a lack of agenda setting power leads to weak governments in comparison to parliaments. Additionally, the significance of agenda setting declines with an increasing number of veto players since the possibility to chance the status quo reduces similarly (Tsebelis, 2002).

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For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on significant policy changes. Yet, energy transition policies are changing society structurally. It moves power from the large economic sector that is based on fossil fuels, towards the sustainable sector which is continuously developing. In this regard, in analyzing the veto players configuration in both countries, the number of veto players and the distance among them is from vital importance. It is expected in this thesis that there will be more political parties in the Dutch political system due to the low voting threshold. Accordingly, with the aim to gain political power, some parties will move to the extremes with the goal to distinguish themselves (Lijphart, 2012). As a result, the ideological differences are increasing which makes the winset to change the status quo smaller (Lijphart, 2012). Besides, the thesis predicts that the number of political parties will be lower in Germany, as a result of the 5% voting threshold. As Lijphart argues (2012), it is expected in a system with few parties that they will move to the political center. Consequently, these parties are more cohesive which leaves enough room for significant policy change. From this perspective, the following hypothesis has been developed:

H2: There is a smaller winset to change the status quo in the Netherlands than in Germany because of the expected higher number of political parties and a larger distance that

separates them

4. Research methods

In order to answer the research question effectively, it is important to stress some methodological decisions. This aim of this chapter is to justify the methodological decisions that are made in this thesis as good as possible.

4.1 Comparative case study

Research designs can be distinguished by the type of causal inference a study is attempting to make. The aim of this thesis is to explain how the political institutions in Germany and the Netherlands have influenced the difference in energy transition policies. For this reason, a comparative case study approach suits this thesis best. A case study is defined as ‘the

intensive study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases’

(Gerring, 2007: 96). A case study design allows this thesis to study a causal mechanism and locate the factors lying between a structural cause and the supposed effects, which helps to see the independent and dependent variable interact. Additionally, social phenomena are better understood in a comparative context, since this way, the researcher is in in a better

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position to reveal the specific circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold (Bryman, 2008).

Generally, internal and external validity can be distinguished, where the former means internal to the units of analysis under study and the latter is about the broader unstudied population (Gerrring, 2007). Case study research usually has strong internal validity, since it intends to offer a broad and in-depth explanation of specific cases. Besides, it is often easier to find causal mechanisms in a small number of cases. On the contrary, case studies struggle with representativeness due to their focus on specific circumstances, which is at the expense of the external validity. Against this backdrop, it means that in this thesis the internal validity will be higher than the external validity, as the question of energy transition policies specifically applies to Germany and the Netherlands. However, the findings can raise questions about the influence of political institutions in other countries, which should be investigated in further research.

4.2 Most similar system design

The Most Similar System Design is based on the idea that systems that show many similarities are optimal subjects of study, since many experimental variables are minimized (Teune & Przeworski, 1970). In other words, the factors that are common to both countries are irrelevant in explaining the phenomenon that is under study, while the variables that differentiate the systems can be considered as explaining variables.

Case selection

Germany and the Netherlands are countries that are quite similar to each other. As neighboring and closely allied countries, they show many political and economic similarities. Both countries are founders and active members of the EU and they both participate in NATO and many other multilateral political organizations. Economically, they are well-developed countries with a comparable GDP and export-orientated economies. However, there are differences between the countries that should be taken into consideration. For instance, Germany and the Netherlands are not comparable in size. Germany is about eight times bigger than the Netherlands. Additionally, Germany is a more important player in the field of international relations than the Netherlands.

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Independent and dependent variabl

In this thesis, the political institutions are the independent variables. The political institutions in both countries are given, while the implemented energy transition policies are to be explained, which means that they are the dependent variables. This thesis will compare the political institutions of both countries on two theories. For the input analysis, the political opportunity structure will be used. For the political system analysis, the thesis relies on the veto players theory. Obviously, there is a starting point from which the thesis starts to analyze the political development of the Green party. In this regard, chapter 5 provides the reader with a sketch of the social context. Figure 2 pictures the causal mechanism that is under investigation visually.

Figure 2: The causal mechanism

4.3 Process tracing

In analyzing the different energy transition policies, this thesis will make use of the process-tracing method. The aim of process process-tracing is to bring theory closer to practical reality, in order to make scholarship more relevant for policy-making and to increase the reliability of scientific findings (Checkel, 2005). Process tracing is of vital importance for a sophisticated understanding of the underlying processes of social phenomena. This method attempts to

Social context

Political opportunity structure

Veto players theory

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reveal the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Process- tracing stimulates one to trace a process theoretically informed and specific. Between the independent and dependent variables, there is the theoretical approach from which the process will be explored. In other words, the theoretical foundation functions as the ‘given situation’ from which the process will be carefully addressed (Checkel, 2008).

4.4 Data collection

This thesis will obtain its data by desk-research. For the data collection, it primarily relies on the analysis of primary and secondary literature. It will use data from a variety of sources such as books, journals, policy documents and institutions in order to strengthen the validity of the research. Additionally, it will aim to use data as recent as possible in order to accurately describe the subject of this thesis.

Publicly accessible reports from the German government, the Dutch government, the EU, the IEA, World Bank and the IMF will be used for this study. Furthermore, articles in the following peer-reviewed journals are to be used for the purpose of this thesis: Elsevier, Energy Policy, Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, Energy Research & Social Science, Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, Energy and Technical Forecasting & Social Change. Other qualitative sources that can be used are official policy documents, official government statements and think tank articles.

5. Social context

In comparing the input stage and the political system stage in both countries, this thesis is predominantly focused on the role of the Green party. In order to avoid any ambiguity, it is useful to explain the concept of a political party. A political party is an organization in which candidates are appointed at general election to a political system’s representative assembly. This simple definition distinguishes political parties on a single criterion from any other form of organization. The fundamental characteristic is though, that political parties present candidates at general elections (Hug, 2001). Additionally, it is often stressed in literature that, in many cases, emerging Green parties find their origins in environmental movements (Kitschelt, 1988; Poguntke, 1993; Müller-Rommel, 1993). In the remainder of this chapter, the social contexts in which the German and Dutch Green parties are founded are addressed. After this, these social contexts will be compared.

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5.1 The development of the Green party in Germany

The rise of the German Green party should be seen along the lines of the broader societal context of the 1970s and 1980s. During the turbulent years of the 1970s, important questions such as the shock of globalization, the changing nature of democracy and social values have been raised. These fundamental questions are today considered as pivotal stones of the ‘post-industrial vision’. Amongst others, ‘post-‘post-industrial’ movements such as the women’s movement, the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement have voiced their positions in the public debate. Especially the anti-nuclear movement enjoyed considerable support among the German people, due to the role that the country has played in the devastating events earlier in the 20th century. Despite the heterogeneity of these social movements, they shared a bitter disenchantment with respect to the political establishment and ‘politics as usual’. It can be argued that there was a broad common aversion to the ruling political structures (Milder & Jarausch, 2015).

The rethinking of political means has created space outside the boundaries of the political establishment in which Green politics was able to develop. This development of Green politics was not just an inclusion of several single-issue movements. There was a shared set of political values about the quality of a meaningful life and its relationship to politics. There was consensus among these movements that cultural issues such as self-expression and gender equality should be prioritized on the political agenda. Besides, they rejected the profound influence of liberalization and markets on all aspects of social life. It has been theorized that the liberalization has harmed the environment and has reduced the value of human lives to economic standards (Milder & Jarausch, 2015).

This opportunity structure for a political voice, that goes beyond the traditional ideas and categories, is supported by empirical evidence of Abramson and Inglehart (2009). In an extensive study, these scholars attempt to estimate the impact of the replacement on value change. Their research has shown that a replacement of values has led to a move towards postmaterialism. The evidence shows that during the 1970s and 1980s, the number of postmaterialists in Germany was continuously increasing. According to Schmid (1987), this attitudinal switch can be explained by an emerging social class, which could be characterized by the rise of service-based, tertiary and white-collar occupations. More important, the sectors were growing at the expense of manufacturing and agrarian jobs.

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Green parties are usually divided into two into predominant categories of party types. On the one hand, there are purist Green parties that are specifically defined by their ecological identity. Purist Green parties do not want to be associated with postmaterial values or a leftish school of thought. These parties often combine their environmental position with a conservationist worldview. On the other hand, there are rainbow-type Green parties that include postmaterial values in their manifesto’s. These rainbow-type Green parties are more common than purist Green parties and can be identified as left-wing. Several studies have shown that environmental and postmaterial thoughts are more likely to occur in left-wing than in right-wing party manifesto’s (Neumayer, 2004). Because of the diversity of progressive values and social movements within the party, the German Green party can be seen as the politicization of the postmaterialist value in the German political arena (Kaelberer, 1998).

The Lower House of Representatives consisted, until the entry of the Green party, most of the time of three parties: the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP). As the two major parties in a three-party system, the CDU and SDP operate in the political middle in order to convince the centrist voter. Lijphart argued that if two major parties compete for the centrist voter, it is likely that these parties forget to emphasize meaningful differences between the parties (Lijphart, 2012). Due to the absence of a political party on the left-wing of the spectrum, the SDP has been able to operate as a catch-all party from the center to the left, without facing any significant competition (Kaelberer, 1998).

Because of the political structure in the Lower House of Representatives, there was sufficient room on the left-wing of the then three-party system to voice Green politics and to emphasize the importance of sustainable energy for a rainbow-type Green party. In addressing such postmaterial issues, the Green party appealed upon many dissatisfied SDP voters. For these voters, the Green party provided an alternative for the old-fashioned left-wing ideology of the SDP. In doing so, the Green party revealed the heterogeneity among SDP voters. Traditional SDP voter did not share these postmaterial values. As a consequence, the party was not able to move towards postmaterialism, so that the Green party could present itself as the only advocate of postmaterialism (Kaelberer, 1998).

In 1980, the Green party was officially founded. In its first party manifesto for the federal parliamentary elections, the party argued that Germany, as an industrial society, was in an

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ecological and economic crisis. In the light of energy transition policies, their most striking position was their proposal to phase-out nuclear energy. Against the background of the scenario sketched above, it can be argued that there was a window of opportunity during the 1970s and 1980s and that the leadership of the emerging Green party has efficiently taken advantage of it.

5.2 The development of the Green party in the Netherlands

The Dutch Green party was founded in 1990, ten years after the foundation of the German Green party. Unlike the German Green party, which has been founded without the intervention of the existing political establishment, the Dutch Green party emerged as a fusion of several political parties that already participated in the Lower House of Representatives. It was a fusion of four small parties, which where the following ones: the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), the Pacifist-Socialist Party (PSP), the Evangelical People’s Party (EVP) and the Political Radical Party (PPR) (Keith, 2010). Due to their decreasing political importance, they decided to work together with sustainability and postmaterial values as the most important party positions.

The wave of social movements that prioritized postmaterial values such as environmentalism, was also present in the Netherlands during the late 1970s. However, this environmental emphasis was not new for the Dutch people, that originally have a special relationship with nature. This can be explained by the fact that a substantial part of the country is below sea level. This has led to a profound awareness of the Dutch people that the nature should be respected, taking into consideration that a rising sea level could bring huge security risks for a considerable part of the Dutch population (Hug, 2001).

The rise of social movements such as the peace movement, the woman movement and the environmental movement are quite interwoven. Research has shown that these movements demonstrate substantial overlap. These overlapping parties have resulted in the foundation of a Green party in many countries in the late 1970s and the beginning of the eighties, among which Germany (Rüdig, 1990). However, this was not the case in the Netherlands This is remarkable since the Netherlands displayed a high attraction for postmaterial values. As is pictured in figure 3, the Netherlands has even led the list of European countries with respect to postmaterial values for a substantial number of years.

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23 Figure 3: Difference between percentage post-materialist and percentage materialist

Source: Inglehart & Andeweg 1993: 348

In 1990, there was finally a Green party that entered the Lower House of Representatives. While the German Greens were pragmatic from the beginning and prepared to get dirty hands by making compromises (Jungjohann, 2017) the Dutch Greens were initially not willing to conform themselves to the prevailing political standards. During the early 1990s, the Green party had incorporated the ambivalence of its founders towards the attractiveness of national government. This belief cherished the stance that governmental discipline and responsibility is in conflict with the idea to radically reform society. Many leading members of the party had more experience with extra-parliamentary protest than carrying political responsibility. Consequently, joining a government coalition was not likely and even rarely discussed within the party (Keith, 2010).

The disappointing result at the parliamentary elections of 1994 was a turning point for the Green party. From that moment on, the party was not only against initiatives of the political establishment, but it was also prepared to offer substantiated policy alternatives. The adhesion to the more constructive attitude of the Green party was reflected in the successes they have experienced in the elections during the years that followed (Keith, 2010).

Due to the electoral success in 1998, the idea of governing was taken more seriously within the party. The expansion of municipal politicians helped the Greens to knock radicals out of the party. From 1990 to 1998, after two municipal elections, the representatives of the Green party in municipal governments increased from 16 to 62. It helped to convince the group of

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former activists that governmental responsibility could make a difference, which led to more respect for the moderate pragmatism of the new vision. Furthermore, it learned the established parties that the Green party was an effective party and that it could be a responsible coalition partner in the future (Keith, 2010). However the party got close several times since then, it has not participated in the Dutch national government coalition yet.

5.3 The social context compared

Postmaterial values that are represented by new social movements have been on the rise in European countries in the 1970s. On the one hand, these social movements have led to the foundation of Green parties in many countries at the beginning of the 1980s. For example, the German Green party has been founded in 1980, the Belgium Green Party in 1982 and the British sister party in 1984 (Richardson & Rootes, 2006). On the other hand, it took until 1990 before the Dutch Green party was founded. Additionally, the German Green have already participated in the federal government twice, while the Dutch Greens have not participated in national government even once.

This difference in political activity is puzzling because the postmaterial values are also shared in the Netherlands. Besides, as pictured in table 1, 43% of the Dutch voters might vote for a Green party in 1986. However it is slightly under the European average, it should offer a political party enough support to work with. In Germany, where the level of postmaterialists is similar, there is a considerably higher percentage of potential voters.

Table 1: Percentage of potential vote for ecologist parties in 1986

Countries Potential vote

Ireland 57 France 56 Germany 55 Luxembourg 53 Italy 52 Belgium 49 Netherlands 43 Northern Ireland 36 Denmark 36 Britan 21 Greece 27 European Community 47 Source: Hug 2001: 24

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Despite the fact that the social contexts in Germany and the Netherlands are relatively similar, the countries demonstrate striking differences. The German Green party has been founded ten years earlier, while there are considerable more potential Green voters in Germany too. This could indicate that politico-institutional mechanisms have influence on the degree of success of the Green parties. Chapter 6 and 7 will analyze this potential causal relation.

6. Analysis of the political opportunity structure

The aim of this chapter is to answer H1 properly. In doing so, the section is divided into three paragraphs. The first two paragraphs will address different parts of the political opportunity structure that could have influenced the Green parties and, consequently, energy transition policies. The parts that are to be addressed are: the voting structure and the state structure. Germany and the Netherlands will be compared in the third paragraph.

6.1 The voting structure

Important independent variables for comparing political opportunity structures are the voting rules for the parliamentary elections. An important independent variable is the variance in electoral systems. Basically, there are two predominant categories in this respect: plurality and proportionality. The former consists of a ‘winner takes it all’ ideology, while the latter is concerned with a proportional division of the number of seats (Lijphart, 2012). The voting threshold is another relevant independent variable. It is a constitutionally required percentage of the national vote that a party has to gain to qualify for seats in the legislature (Norris, 2004). This chapter will compare Germany and the Netherlands on these independent variables and stresses the consequences for the Green parties.

Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the first political systems that has implemented a mixed electoral system for parliamentary elections (Shikano & Herrmann, 2009). The mixed electoral system is related to the ballot structure. The share of national vote determines the number of party seats in the Lower House of Representatives. After the division of the percentage of party seats, successful constituent candidates take precedence among party representatives (Pappi & Thurner, 2002). Thus, the German system can be considered as compensatory and not as a parallel or segmented system, such as in Russia or Japan (Nohlen, 2000). In practice, the mixed ballot structure means that a voter has not just one, but two

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votes. The German people can vote for a party list and for a constituent candidate. The interesting part is that these two choices are not necessarily from the same party. To be more specific, the German voting system for the Lower House of Representatives allows a form of ticket splitting (Pappi & Thurner, 2002).

As almost every other political system that is based on proportional representation (PR), Germany employs a legal voting threshold. Parties should obtain at least 5% of national votes during the parliamentary elections in order to enter the Lower House of Representatives (Pappi & Thurner, 2002). In the context of the data presented by Norris (2004), it becomes clear that the German voting threshold is considerably high in comparison to other states.

In first instance, it is likely to assume that it is hard for the Green party to pass such a threshold and to find its place in a political arena, that is dominated by primarily two parties from 1945 until today, which are the CDU and SDP. Nevertheless, there is an informal ruling structure in German politics which contains that parties declare informal pre-electoral coalitions during parliamentary election years. This means that closely allied parties announce that they intend to form a government if they gain a parliamentary majority. Such pre-electoral coalition agreements are of significant importance because they can affect the government composition and, consequently, federal policies. It is not strange that such pre-electoral coalitions occur in Germany, since Golder (2005) has shown that it is more likely that pre-electoral coalitions are formed in disproportional systems than in proportional ones. The argument here is that political systems that benefit larger parties, make it attractive for these parties to forge alliances. The number of seats is the most important variable for governmental participation, joining an electoral coalition increases this chance for smaller parties to be of importance (Laver, 1998).

Usually, the FDP commits itself in advance to the CDU, while the Green party is allied to the SDP. The tendency of pre-electoral coalitions stimulates voters of the SDP and CDU, as biggest parties, to deviate from their first preference in situations where it is unsure whether or not its potential coalition partner will pass the 5% voting threshold. For example, if the Green party is not able to meet the threshold during a parliamentary election, it is likely that the opposing pre-electoral coalition will take office. In 2002, prior to the parliamentary elections, the SDP and the Green party announced that they were planning to form a government together. Consequently, many original SDP voters cast their first vote for an SDP candidate in their district and their second vote for the Green party list (Golder, 2005), which

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is the so-called ticket-splitting (Shikano et al., 2009). The SDP and the Green party succeeded in their plan during these elections. The Green party gained enough votes to entry the Lower House of Representatives and consequently, they formed a federal government coalition with the SDP.

On the one hand, the high voting threshold seems disadvantageous for a small party such as the German Green party. It is challenging for them to pass this threshold. Since the first entrance of the party in 1983 in the Lower House of Representatives, they failed to meet the threshold once, during the first parliamentary elections since German unification in 1990. However, because of the fact that the Green parties in the East and the West merged after these elections, the unified party was able to pass the threshold. It appeared that the eastern Greens had gained enough votes.

It is argued by many German political scientists that the leadership of the Kohl government could be considered as a period of stagnation in terms of energy transition policies (Jacobs, 2012). It seems likely to assume that the Green party, when in parliament, would have taken the initiative to fight for energy transition policies in the Lower House of Representatives. Despite this assumed detriment, on the other hand, this thesis concludes that the threshold brings along more benefits. Due to the political structure and threshold, German parties announce pre-electoral coalitions. In doing so, the Green party not only gains votes of SDP voters, it also forces the SDP towards Green politics. In doing this, it creates a better political opportunity structure for the implementation of energy transition policies.

The Netherlands

According to many political scientists, the Dutch political system is one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. This is due to the fact that there is just one single constituent in the country, which is the country itself. For this reason, the proportionality of the Lower House of Representatives is approaching the optimal situation (IPP, 2008).

As in nearly all states with a proportional system, there is a voting threshold in the Netherlands. However, in contrast to Germany, the voting threshold in the Netherlands is not a legal standard that a party must meet, but it is determined by dividing the number of votes by the number of seats. De facto, this means that the Dutch voting threshold is 0,67% (Norris, 2004). Obviously, this has consequences for the political opportunity structure. It is likely to assume that the lower the voting threshold is, the easier it is for parties to entry the Lower

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House of Representatives. The number of parties that participate in the German and Dutch political arena should reflect this difference in voting threshold between the countries. Table 2 pictures the division of seats between different parties in the Lower House in both countries.

Table 2: The House of Representatives party configuration (1980 – present)

Germany The Netherlands

Year of election Number of elected parties

Year of election Number of elected parties 1980 3 1981 10 1983 4 1982 12 1987 4 1986 9 1990 5 1989 9 1994 5 1994 12 1998 5 1998 9 2002 4 2002 10 2005 5 2003 9 2009 5 2006 10 2013 4 2010 10 - - 2012 11 Average 4,4 Average 11,8

Source: Website Duitsland Instituut 2017; Website Kiesraad 2017

There is indeed a remarkable difference in the number of parties that are involved in the lower houses of both countries. Averagely, there are 7,4 more parties involved in the legislative process in the Netherlands than in Germany. It is likely to assume that the higher voting threshold in Germany explains that there is a significantly lower number of parties participating in the Lower House of Representatives than there is in the Dutch political system.

Additionally, as a political system with a proportional voting procedure, there is no pre-election coalition process in the Netherlands (Golder, 2005). Consequently, closely allied parties battle each other in order to gain as much votes as possible. This appears to be much harder for the Dutch Green party than for its German sister-party due to the fact that there are

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considerably more ideological opponents in the Netherlands. Klingemann (2015) has investigated to which side of the political spectrum the average of party positions deviates. It appeared that the average of the total number of parties deviates to the left-wing of the political spectrum to a comparable extent. This is an important finding since left-wing parties are closely associated with energy transition policies, more than right-wing parties are. There are more left-wing parties in the Netherlands than there are in Germany, due to the fragmentized party system. For this reason, it can be argued that Dutch voters that are left-orientated can choose between several parties that hold a position that includes environmental policies. To illustrate this argument, it is useful to have a closer look on the parliamentary elections that both countries face in 2017. This year, the Dutch voter had the choice between seven parties with regard to Green energy policies that had a realistic change to entry the legislature: the Green party, Democrats 66 (D66), ChristenUnie, 50PLUS, DENK, the Labour party (PvdA) and the Socialist party (SP) (Groen Kieskompas, 2017). In Germany, there are only three parties with ‘Green characteristics’ in their party manifesto’s that have a serious chance to meet the voting threshold: the Green party, the SDP and the Left party.

Furthermore, it is argued that established parties in political systems with low voting thresholds are very alert. These parties try to pay attention to emerging issues in society, in order to avoid that new parties can entry the Lower House of Representatives by prioritizing these emerging issues. This can explain the fact that it took until 1990 before there finally was a Green party. As Inglehart and Andeweg (1993: 358) argue: ‘The emergence of 'New

Politics' parties has been a signal to the established parties that they need to take the changes in Dutch political culture seriously, and they have tried to take the wind out of the sails of D66, PPR, PSP, and EVP by adopting their key policies’. It is stressed here that Green

politics has been addressed by the predecessors of the Green party and D66, but due to the low voting threshold, the established parties have tried to obstruct their agenda’s in order to avoid a rise in serious opponents.

6.2 The state structure

Another important independent variable to investigate the political opportunity structure for the Green party is institutional constellation of the political system. As addressed in the theoretical framework, it is theorized that the constellation of a political system influences the ability of parties to participate in legislation. This paragraph will analyze the German and Dutch political system.

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As a federal state, there are 16 constituent states in Germany with an overarching federal government. These constituent states have their own governments and parliaments and enjoy a high degree of independency. The aim of his profound decentralization was to avoid the re-emergence of a centralized super state (de Vries, 2000). There are many fields in which these constituent government have the right to operate independently. However, these policies must be in accordance with the laws that are determined on a federal level.

From its entrance in 1983 until today, the Green party has always been a minor party in the Lower House of Representatives. Formally speaking, the Green party is barely alive at the federal level considering its continuous battle to pass the 5% threshold. However, despite its involvement in federal politics, the Greens are very active at the level of the constituent state. Below the federal level, the Green party is represented in 11 of the 16 constituent governments today (Jungjohann, 2017). In Baden-Württemberg, there is now even a coalition that is led by the Green party (Morris & Pent, 2016).

Against this background, the German federal structure has provided the Green party the opportunity to influence policy-adoption in two ways. First, by taking part of a governmental coalition at the state level. This way, the Greens are able to be part of the policy-making process. Today, the Greens have governmental responsibility with ten environmental ministries, five agricultural ministries and three that are concerned with transport. This illustrates the party profile as defender of the Energiewende and environmental protection. In Baden-Württemberg, the Greens are in charge of all the ministries that overlap with the

Energiewende. Consequently, there are profound policies adopted in order to move towards a

sustainable energy system (Jungjohann, 2017). As one of the economic strongest states of the country, it is has facilitated the installation of huge wind turbines in forests and on hillsides, that have to fulfil strict ecological criteria as well. Investing in wind is a bold initiative, since the state is an inland region, and it is unlikely that the measure was adopted in any other party constellation (Morris & Pent, 2016). Additionally, it also needs to be stressed that the success of the Green on the constituent state level is also the result of its pragmatic attitude. In contrast to many other Green parties, the German Greens were willing to get dirty hands and to compromise with right-wing parties (Jungjohann, 2017).

The second way to influence policy-adoption is influencing the federal government by means of constituent state governments. For example, there is a Ministerial Conference on the

The implementation of energy transition policies on the ground : a comparative study on Germany and the Netherlands