the EU’s Development
Policy in Afghanistan
Modes & Effecteveness of External
Governance Theories
Master Political Science, European Union in A
Global Order
First reader: prof. dr. Jonathan Zeitlin
Second reader: dr. Liza Mügge
Lema Poya
6266290
I have opened close doors of ignorance
I have said farewell to all golden bracelets
Oh compatriot, I am not what I was
I am the woman who has awoken
I have found my path and will never return
Poem by Meena (1956-‐1987), Afghan political activist
and poet
Acknowledgements
First of all I would like to thank everyone who has been involved in some way into this long and difficult project. I tried to combine different interests in this research, and I hoped that it worked out well. The past year has been psychically and
emotionally live changing for me therefore I would especially like to thank Geertje Haverkamp, my study advisor for being so understanding.
Then, I would like to pay my respect to the strong, smart and independent women I have interviewed, in the Netherlands, Belgium, but mostly in Afghanistan. Thank you for the interviews.
Although a woman wrote this thesis, and it is written for women and to women, here I would like to thank two men.
The first man I would like to thank is my supervisor, mr. Zeitlin, in supporting me doing fieldwork in Afghanistan, but mostly for his patience and understanding of my personal situation. This has been a very difficult year for me, and mr. Zeitlin gave me the time, support and understanding I needed.
Ms. Müegge, thank you for reading my thesis as well.
Then, I would like to express my gratitude to my father. He was my driver, advisor and organiser of interviews in Afghanistan. Without him it would have been impossible for me to arrange most of the interviews.
Lema Poya
Table of Contents
Introduction p. 5
1. Theoretical Framework p. 11 1.1 Governance: concept, ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms.
1.2 External modes of governance
1.2.1 Hierarchical governance 1.2.2 Network governance
1.2.3 Experimentalist governance & GXG
1.3 Effectiveness of EU external governance
1.3.1 Measuring effectiveness
1.3.2 Conditions of external governance
1.4 Conclusion based on Theory
2. Methodology p. 24 2.1 Research method
2.1.1 Single Case Study 2.1.2 Process-‐Tracing
2.2 Data
2.3 Conclusion based on Methodology & The research plan
3. Analysis p. 31 3.1 Gender mainstreaming
3.2 Domestic structures explanation
3.2.1 Internal policy and mode of governance Afghanistan
3.2.2 External approach gender mainstreaming EU in Afghanistan & external mode of governance
3.2.3 Conclusion based on domestic explanation 3.2 Effectiveness
Conclusion & Discussion p. 51 References p. 55
Introduction
Research Goal
The European Union (EU) has the ambition to broaden its influence by increasing its international presence. The EU has tried to increase its influence by coordinating external action trough the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the EU has also developed ‘a wide array of external relations which realm from the
traditional field of external trade to democracy promotion and co-‐operation in carious policy areas falling under its legislation competence’ (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 1). It is been argued that the EU has been trying to transfer EU’s rules and policies to third countries and even international organizations. This thesis will examine this transfer of EU’s rules and policies to a third country using the theories of external governance. This serves as the main goal of this research. The study of external governance ‘seeks to capture’ this transformation of EU’s internal rules and policies towards third countries (Lavenex 2004).
Research Question
In this thesis the theories of external modes of governance will be studied and aims to answer the following question: on which mode is EU external governance based and how effective is it?
This question will discuss the development policy of the EU, and will primarily focus on gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is used as a new tool in the EU development policy to improve gender equality in third countries the EU is dealing with (The European Commission, 2007). Lavenx & Schimmelfennig defined certain conditions to measure the effectiveness of EU external policy from a governance perspective (2013). They formulated hypothesis to test on which mode of
governance external governance is based on, it is effective or it this all depends on the domestic conditions of the third country.
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to answer the above question with an addition: on which mode is EU external governance based and how effective is it? Or does the effectiveness depend on the domestic conditions of the third country?
To answer the above research question the following sub-‐questions need to be answered first, such as: what are mode of external governance that exist when analysing gender mainstreaming in EUs development policy? Which mode of external governance is effective? Effectiveness will be defined as ‘the extent to which EU rules are effectively transferred to third countries’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 10).
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig formulate three different levels of effectiveness: rule selection, rule adaption and rule application. These different levels of effectiveness could depend on different conditions. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig divide three different conditions. In this thesis the focus will be at the domestic conditions, which states that ‘the mode and effectiveness of external governance is driven by its
compatibility with domestic institutions’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 11). This conclusion is based on the following hypothesis that will be discussed in this thesis (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 12):
1A. The mode of external governance follows the mode of third country domestic governance.
1B. The effectiveness of external governance increases: (a) with the resonance of EU rules;
(b) with the EU compatibility of domestic institutions;
Especially in the case as Afghanistan it could be interesting and relevant to see if the mode of governance and its effectiveness depends on domestic structures.
The scientific relevance of this thesis lies in the answer of the above questions; there has been little research or no research done on rule adoption by third countries of EU rules and policies.
Further more, the use of governance theories will provide a different way of answering the research question because governance theories seek to explain the institutional processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer. The governance perspective takes systems of rules as the point of departure. It addresses ‘the external dimension of internal process of integration and hence adopts a sectoral optic on norms, policies and regulations and their external dimension’. The three modes of external governance described are: hierarchical, network and
experimentalist. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2013) have studied hierarchical and network governance in their research to the effectiveness of modes of external governance in norm adoption by third countries, however they did not include experimentalist governance.
Another reason this thesis is scientific and social relevant is the topic of gender mainstreaming in improving gender equality. Gender mainstreaming is defined as: ‘the integration of a gender perspective into every aspect of EU intervention – preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, legal measures and spending programmes – with a view to achieving equality between women and men' (Article 8 TFEU). The amount of Treaties, and Directives
demonstrates that the theme of gender equality has been of importance in the EU. The EU has tried in the past decades to integrate gender into different policy fields. This process is apparent in EU’s internal policies, its development policy and also through its participation and support for international initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (Carbone & Lister 2005, p. 5).
The basis of gender equality in EUs internal policy lies in the Treaty of Rome. The legislation of equal treatment goes back in the 1970s. These policies were formed to improve gender equality between men and women within the EU. Since then
thirteen directives have been introduced in different areas. The European
violence against women and girls in the EU. Besides the legislation the EU has developed other instruments in order to combat gender inequality more generally: gender mainstreaming and specific measures for the advancement of women (European Union, ‘Report on Gender equality in the EU in 2009’, p. 6).
Gender equality, and gender mainstreaming as the most recent strategy, has not only been one of the main goals within the EU, but recently became one of the goals outside the EU. The EU has evenly moved forward in terms of promoting gender equality. However, it is argued that this progress has been ‘slow and the rhetoric of the EU’s commitment to gender equality often exceeds the substance’ (Carbone & Lister 2005, p. 5). While there has been a huge focus on gender equality in the development policy, there have been problems in funding and implementing new gender policies.
All the reasons mentioned above contribute to the scientific and social relevance of this thesis.
Case Study
Afghanistan as a case is interesting because it is said that ‘despite EUs longstanding commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014, and despite the fact that the EU is one of the major donors of development an humanitarian assistance its influence remains predominantly declaratory and has not translated into real political influence’ (EAIS Event Report, May 2014). This lack of political influence may be because the EU pursues a political-‐civilian approach based on shared norms and values. These shared norms and values also include the EU’s commitment to integrate a gender perspective into its development and foreign policies and to mainstream gender in all policies, programmes and activities (EAIS Event Report, Mat 2014). Thus the main reason for this case selection is that the relationship between the EU and Afghanistan has not been documented before on this subject.
Therefore the second goal of this thesis is to provide an up-‐to-‐date overview of gender mainstreaming in the development policy of the EU and Afghanistan. Reading guide
This thesis is divided three different main parts: theory, methods and analysis. First, three modes of external governance will be described in the theoretical framework. Here two set of question will be answered: what is the study of
governance? And what are the external modes of governance? The three modes of external governance described are: hierarchical, network and experimentalist. Hierarchical governance takes place in a formalized relationship of domination and subordination and is based on the production of collectively binding prescriptions and proscriptions. On the contrary to hierarchical governance, network governance provides a network form of governance defines a horizontal relationship of equally, interdependent, but autonomous, actors either public and/or private sector.
Experimentalist governance is defined as ‘a recursive process of provisional goal-‐ setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative
approaches to advancing them in different contexts’ (Sabel & Zeilin in Levi-‐Faur 2012, p. 169). In the theoretical part I will also define effectiveness, and discuss the domestic condition.
In the second part, the methodology, I will describe the methods used in this
research to answer the answer the research question. I will use qualitative research method. Qualitative research can be defined as a research method that puts ‘an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured [if measured at all] in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency’ (Norman & Lincoln 2000). In this part I will also reflect and argue the use of case study analysis and process tracing. In the end I will provide a research plan to organize the analytical part of the thesis.
In the last part of the thesis I will answer the main questions of this thesis: on which mode is EU external governance based and how effective is it?
The analysis will be divided in three parts. First, I will briefly describe the concept of gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming has become a central theme in
The second part, deals with domestic structure condition. Here I will focus on the hypothesis defined by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, and divide this section in two parts. The first section describes and analyses the main policy document relating to gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan, namely the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The second section focuses on the EUs external policy, and analyses the Gender Action Plan (GAP).
The last part deals with the following question: Is the effectiveness of a certain mode of governance dependent on the country the EU is dealing with? This question will be answered by testing the second part of the domestic structures hypothesis formed by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, and their definition of effectiveness.
The last part of this thesis provides a summary of the main findings, and answers the research question.
1.
Theoretical framework
From the governance perspective the point of reference are ‘institutional processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 4). This makes the external modes of governance suitable in studying the transfer of rule expansion to third countries in EUs development policy. Therefore, in this research I will use the theories of external modes of governance as a tool to analyse the
empirical data I have been collecting.
The theoretical part is divided in three sections. The first section will introduce the concept of Governance. The second will focus on the external modes of governance. Here three modes of external governance will be discussed: hierarchical, network and experimental. The last section will deal with effectiveness of these different modes of external governance, and the measurement of this effectiveness on different levels.
1.1 Governance: concept, ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms
Governance as a concept has been defined and conceptualized in different manners. A more general definition of governance has been ‘innovative practices of networks or horizontal forms of interaction, in which actors, political and non political, arrive at mutually acceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with each other’ (Wiener & Diez, 2009, p. 99).
Lavenex & Schimmelfenning give a definition of governance that comes close to the above definition. They argue that governance can be referred as ‘to provide common goods or establishing public order as a result of the intersections between various categories of actors and the coordination of their behaviour’ (Lavenex &
Schimmelfenning 2008, p. 1).
It is founded on ‘a system of rule(s), shaping and coordination the behaviour of actors’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning 2008, p. 1). Kohler-‐Koch defines governance as a process of policy-‐making: ‘governance is about the ways and means in which the divergent preferences of citizens are translated into effective policy choices, about how the plurality of societal interest are transformed into unitary action and the
compliance of social actors is achieved’ (Kohler-‐Koch 1999, p. 14).
Héritier, on the other hand, defines governance as ‘a mode of political steering’ (2002, p. 185). Political steering refers by the characterisation of steering instruments, such as command and control, incentive and supply, information, deliberation and persuasion, as well as forms of social influence and control, engaged by public actors to achieve specific policy goals (Héritier 1987). The difference between governance and governing is that the second states ‘to strategic actions of the state or public authorities in order to intervene in the economic and societal sphere’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning 2008, p. 1)
Governance has two scopes. On one side, it mentions a process, including various modes of coordination; on the other side, it refers to fundamental regulatory structure, pointing the actors involved in the process and this to an institutional setting underlying and shaping its various forms.
When looking at the process scope of governance, there are several categories or modes of governance that can be differentiated. There is a variety on the way to categorize modes of governance. This differs to the number of categories; to the defining criteria, referring to either the process or the structural dimension of
governance or to both and, in some cases, to the actor constellation or the procedure being used (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning 2008, p.2).
The European modes of governance do not occur by design of single actors but are the outcome of the process of policymaking, developing through interactions between several institutional actors at the European level, between the European and national government levels and the actors representing them, and between public and non-‐state actors.
In the literature there is a distinction made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of governance. In the new form of governance a shift takes from a focus on the boundaries of national territories to a multilevel and transnational level; from centralised authority to decentralized form; from hierarchical to a more
reflexive. The old form of governance did not have the same way of decision-‐making that was so non-‐hierarchical (Bartolini 2011, p. 15).
The difference between these two is that the old term of governance did not point ‘to the discovery, elaboration of and experimentation with forms of co-‐production that indicate modalities of actors’ (Bartolini 2011, p. 14). New forms of governance try to change the current by ‘persuasion, monitoring and mutual learning, rather than by hierarchy, fiat or sanction’.
Furthermore, new forms of governance tend to create a very different situation, such as the inclusion ‘greater tolerance of diversity, less use of binding norms, and greater participation of actors other than those that are responsible for the
traditional Community method and whose role is stipulated in the treaties’ (de Búrca 2008, p. 1).
Börzel conceptualizes the new modes of governance as the narrow view on governance. This narrow view on governance ‘focuses on the non-‐hierarchical coordination between public and private actors, on the one hand, and among private actors only, on other, in the setting and implementation of collectively binding norms and rules for the provision of public goods and services’ (2005).
In the next section the external modes of governance will be discussed. Hierarchical mode of governance can be seen as an ‘old’ form of governance, while network and experimentalist governance can be seen as a ‘new’ form of governance.
1.2 External modes of governance: hierarchical, network and experimentalist
The concept of external governance consists of the extension of internal rules and policies beyond formal membership. It is the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 791). This expansion can refer to the regulatory or organisational boundaries of the EU towards the territory of non-‐ member countries. The regulatory boundary dimension ‘covers the amount of issues addressed by an agreement, the legal obligations arising from it and the modalities
through which compliance is monitored’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2008, p. 1). The organisational boundary refers ‘to the stake third countries posses with respect to the shaping and implementation of decisions and the participation in agencies or programmes’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2008, p. 1). The point of view from a governance perspective is ‘not the (often implicit) unified state actor model of traditional foreign policy studies but institutional processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 792). This means a shift in the unit of observation; takes systems of rules as its points of departure. According to some, the external governance framework offers ‘the prospect of capturing the way in which the EU has come to support democratic reform through extending the reach of EU rules and legislation’ (Youngs 2009, p. 796).
EU external governance varies across countries, regions, and also policy fields. It addresses the external dimension of the internal process of integration and hence adopts a sectoral optic on norms, policies and regulations and their external
dimension.
The external modes of governance can be more hierarchical, that could involve third countries to adapt already established and legally binding acquis to new
governance. Or it can be more a horizontal forms of network governance and communication in which rule extension progress in a more participatory way (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 796). The areas where network governance is active are governed by ‘horizontal, participatory and process-‐oriented modes of policy-‐making’ (Lavenex 2008, p. 796).
1.2.1 Hierarchical governance
Hierarchical governance has been discussed in literature as ‘simplistic, old-‐ fashioned and ineffective’, however it is still used as a starting point for emerging models and organizations, such as the EU (Zielonka 2007). Therefore hierarchical governance will be described as a concept in this thesis.
Hierarchical governance takes place in a formalized relationship of domination and subordination and is based on the production of collectively binding prescriptions
and proscriptions. In the modern state, this function is exerted through legislation. Legislation is the definition of authorative, enforceable rules whose violation may be monitored and sanctioned (Youngs 2009). This type of governance can only function with ‘clear, fixed and relatively hard borderlines’ (Zielonka 2007, p. 191).
The EU is the supranational institution engaged in the production of strongly
legalized supranational law, which can be enforced and sanctioned by the European Court of Justice (Youngs 2009). Both the institutionalization of domination and the authority of rules go along with the implicit acquiescence of the ruled (Youngs 2009). The hierarchical method could be, for instance, be associated with the traditional ‘Community method’ of policy-‐making; which means that decision-‐ making is based on a qualified majority, and the narrow qualities of EC law (Youngs 2009).
In relation to EUs external relations, the term hierarchy needs further qualification because, formally, non-‐members keep full sovereignty regarding the Union.
However, there are certain forms of external governance that look like a hierarchical system and can therefore undermine parts of third countries autonomy over their legislation. These forms of external governance include ‘the existence of precise rules, formal procedures, monitoring and sanctioning associated with hierarchy’, which are also necessary are also necessary conditions for the effective exercise of conditionality (Youngs 2009, p. 797).
Thus, the characteristics of hierarchical governance are: there is a central authority that has the ultimate power; this central authority exerts its function via legislation; in situation of incompliance with legislation monitoring and sanctions will be the result. Although there is a central authority, this does not mean that
decentralization is not likely within hierarchical model. Hierarchical governance could exist in ‘a considerable degree of decentralization and delegation’ (Zielonka 2007, p.191). However, the organization has to be in clear lines of control and responsibility.
In contrast to hierarchy, a network form of governance defines a horizontal relationship of equally, interdependent, but autonomous, actors either public and/or private sector. This relationship takes ‘place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework’ (cited in Torfing 2012, p. 101).
The equality in the relationship means in institutional terms that actors have equal rights and that no party can bind the other party to a certain degree without the latter’s consent (Youngs 2009).
Furthermore, networks ‘produce less constraining instruments that are based on mutual agreement and often prescribe procedural modes of interaction rather than final policy solutions (Youngs 2009, p. 798). Youngs describes that in some of the literature networks are referred as negotiation systems (2009, p. 798). In contrast to hierarchical governance, in times of conflicts of interest the solution is not found in applying law and jurisdiction but via negotiating and voluntary agreement on grounds of bargaining or arguing. The focus is more on the process rather than output (Youngs, 2009, p. 794).
In case of the EU, the policy-‐making process is without legislation and rather takes place in a more ‘decentralized, sectorally specialized governance institutions such as agencies, committees or policy networks’ (Youngs 2009, p. 799). These networks may include private actors or international organizations.
1.2.3 Experimentalist Governance Architecture & GXG
The EU has been developing in different policy areas a new form of governance, namely experimentalist governance (Sabel & Zeitlin 2008, p. 272). De Búrca,
Keohane and Sabel argue that experimentalist governance appears ‘issues for which governments cannot formulate and enforce comprehensive sets of rules, but which do not involve fundamental disagreements or high politics, and in which civil society is active’ (2013 p. 15).
Experimentalist governance is defined as ‘a recursive process of provisional goal-‐ setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative
2012, p. 169).
The experimentalist governance architecture is also referred as ‘directly
deliberative polyarchy (DDP)’. The use of argument to remove settled practices and hereby redefine interest makes it deliberate. This means that the original
preferences of actors can be transformed through discussion. The use of specific experience of actors’ diverse reactions to present problems to develop different possibilities to consider makes it ‘directly deliberate’. The system in which local units learn from one and other and set goals for each other makes it ‘polyarchic’ (Sabel & Zeitlin 2010, p. 9).
Then, there are two scope conditions for the emergence of experimentalist
governance to occur. The first one is strategic uncertainty, which means that actors have to learn what their goals should be, and while learning about these goals they have to decide on how to achieve these goals. The second condition is a ‘multi-‐polar’ or ‘polyarchic distribution of power’. This means that ‘no single actor has the
capacity to impose her own preferred solution without taking into account the views of the others’ (Sabel & Zeitlin 2010, p. 9). The views and opinions made by lower entities can influence the decisions formed at superior level. The lower entities can be private as well as public actors at different levels: supranational, national and subnational (Börzel 2012, p. 379).
De Búrca, Keohane & Sabel discuss Global Experimentalist Governance (GXG), ‘an institutionalized process of participatory and multi-‐level collective problem-‐solving, where the problems and the means of addressing them are framed in an open-‐ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in the light of locally generated knowledge’ (de Búrca, Keohane & Sabel 2014, p. 1).
The five key elements of the ideal-‐type of GXG are:
1) initial reflection and discussion among stakeholders with a broadly shared perception of a common problem, resulting in 2) the articulation of a framework understanding with open-‐ended goals. 3) Implementation of these broadly framed goals is then left to “lower-‐level” or contextually situated actors with knowledge of local conditions and considerable discretion to adapt the framework norms to these
different contexts. 4) Continuous feedback must be provided from local contexts, allowing for reporting and monitoring across a range of contexts, with outcomes subject to peer review. Finally, 5) goals and practices should be periodically and routinely re-‐evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in light of the results of the peer review, and the shared purposes (de Búrca, Keohane & Sabel 2014, p. 2). This is the main difference between experimentalism and network governance; in experimentalist governance there are consequences in contempt soft-‐law,
‘operating in the shadow of a penalty default’. This can be done by ‘substantially reducing the parties’ control over their fate through the imposition of an alternative less attractive regime or outcome that none of them favours’ (de Búrca, Keohane & Sabel 2014, p. 3).
These functions can be performed in single or in combination with one another. For example, a formal peer review exercise, can perform a number of distinct functions, such as ‘assessing the comparative effectiveness of different national and
subnational implementation approaches, opening up opportunities for civil society actors to hold governments accountable at national and EU levels, identifying areas where new forms of national or transnational capacity building are required, and/or contributing to the redefinition of common policy objectives’ (2010, p. 3).
Zeitlin argues that experimentalist governance seems well suited to transnational domains. In the transnational domain there is ‘no overarching sovereign with authority to set common goals eve in theory, and where the diversity of local conditions and practices makes adoption an enforcement of uniform fixed rules even less feasible than in domestic settings’ (2013, p.1).
The table below summarizes the three different modes of external governance based on the table used by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2013, p. 10). The main difference is the addition of experimentalist mode of governance.
Actor constellation Institutionalization Mechanisms of rule expansion Hierarchy Vertical: domination
and subordination
Tight, formal Harmonization
Network Horizontal: formal equality of partners
Medium-‐tight, formal and informal
Co-‐ordination
Experimentalist Horizontal: informal equality of partners, including low level actors
Medium-‐tight, formal and informal
Co-‐operation
1.3 Effectiveness of EU External Governance
1.3.1 Measuring Effectiveness
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig tried to formulate factors that could determine the effectiveness of EUs external governance (2013). They defined effectiveness as ‘the extent to which EU rules are effectively transferred to third countries’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 10). Effectiveness could be measured at three levels:
1) Rule selection measures ‘whether and to what extent EU rules constitute the normative reference point of EU-‐third-‐country relations. Do third countries accept EU rules as the focus of their negotiations and agreements? Or do they accept joint rules that reflect EU rules embedded in international norms or jointly negotiated rules? Alternatively, the EU and its negotiating partners may select rules that do not conform to the EU acquis and that are set by other international organizations, other countries, or purely domestic rules’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 11);
2) To assess rule adoption, the question raised is if ‘EU rules selected for international negotiations and agreements are then also transposed into third country’s domestic legislation’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 11). The indicator of rule adoption is ‘by the ratification of agreements with
the EU or the adoption of laws and other legal documents that incorporate EU and joint rules’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 11).
3) Rule application answers the question ‘whether and to what extent EU or joint rules are not only incorporated into domestic legislation but also acted upon in political and administrative practice’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 11), because rule adoption does not automatically lead to rule application.
1.3.2 Conditions of External Governance
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig discuss three different conditions in which several modes of governance could be more or less effective (2013, p. 11). The different levels of effectiveness, as discussed in the above section, could depend on these diverse conditions. By discussing these conditions that differ from an institutionalist perspective, to power-‐based or domestic explanations of external governance, they seek to eliminate variation. To answer the question if hierarchical mode of
governance is more effective than network governance, can be answered if we can eliminate other explanation, such as if the effectiveness depends on the issue-‐area or country the EU is dealing with (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013).
The first condition is the institutionalist perspective. Lavenex & Schimmelfennig argue that the existing EU institutions generally form the existing EU institutions. The institutions ‘provide the template for the externalization of EU polices, rules, and modes of governance and condition their effectiveness’ (2013, p. 12). The mode of external governance that could be based on hierarchy, network, or
experimentalist, reflects on the internal structures of policy-‐making within a policy field. In this case, the mode of external governance will be based on the internal mode of governance within gender equality in the development policy.
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig argue that there are diverse reasons why the EU external mode of governance turns itself towards internal modes of governance. Sociological institutionalism and rationalist-‐institutionalism explain this differently. For instance, according to sociological institutionalism: ‘existing institutions may
either serve as a template in a highly uncertain policy context or they may be imbued with high legitimacy’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 12). The rationalist-‐institutionalist perspective, EU institutions are more or less forced to externalize their insitutionalist structures. Thus, institutionalist explanations require that ‘the mode and effectiveness of EU external governance depend on the quality of existing EU institutions’ (Lavenex & Schummelfennig 2013, p. 12). Here the mode and effectiveness of EU external governance depends on the quality of existing EU institutions. The more precise, binding and enforceable EU rules are, the more likely they will be selected.
The second condition, that is the power-‐based explanation suggests that ‘external governance is determined by the EU’s power and its interdependence with regard to third countries as well as competing ‘governance providers’ in its neighbourhood and at the global level – mainly the US and Russia but also international
organizations such as the UN or the Bretton Woods organisations’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 13). Power and interdependence are the driving force behind effectiveness of external governance. The selection for co-‐operation, adoption and application of the EU rules depends on the ‘bargaining power’ of the EU. The EU has, for example, the highest bargaining power in the accession process with a candidate country. EUs power is weaker outside the setting of enlargement, and there is a great variation across countries and policies. The power-‐based explanation states that the effectiveness also varies across countries and policies. Thus, power-‐based explanations suggest that ‘the mode and effectiveness of EU external governance vary with international structures of power and
interdependence between the EU and third countries’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 14).
The third, and the last explanation, links the modes and effectiveness of external governance internal structures of third countries. This approach ‘assumes an affinity or compatibility between the institutional structures of domestic politics and of international governance’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 14). The claim
here is that the EU rules are more likely ‘to be selected, adopted and applied if they resonate well with domestic rules, traditions, and practices’ (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 14).
Thus, the domestic structure explanation sees the driving force behind the mode and effectiveness of external governance by its consistence with domestic
institutions. For hierarchical mode of governance this could mean ‘functioning rule of law systems as well as strong administrative and implementation capacity’, in turn for network governance ‘presupposes decentralized and sectorally
differentiated state structures with access for experts and stakeholders’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2013, p. 15). This leads to the following hypothesis:
1A. The mode of external governance follows the mode of third country domestic governance.
1B. The effectiveness of external governance increases: (c) with the resonance of EU rules;
(d) with the EU compatibility of domestic institutions;
(e) as the number of adversely affected veto players decreases.
In this thesis I will analyse the domestic structure condition only, because of the case selection. In a case like Afghanistan, as mentioned in the introduction, it is the most valid to demonstrate the effect of domestic structures on the modes of
governance. Further more, the institutional explanation is the most relevant when the research is related to EU enlargement whereas it is important to include internal policy in the study. This thesis will not deal with EU enlargement therefore the first explanation is of less importance. Then the power-‐based explanation is difficult, or rather impossible to measure when it comes to gender equality in the development policy.
The domestic structures explanation is in this research the most relevant to study because internal policies and the domestic situation influence the effectiveness of
certain mode of governance in relation to gender equality policy (Pollack & Hafner-‐ Burton 2000).
1.4 Conclusion based on theory
The first part introduced broadly the concept of Governance. In the second external modes of governance were introduced. The three modes of external governance were described: hierarchical mode of governance, network governance and
experimentalist governance. The different aspects of these theories will be analysed in order to measure the effectiveness and existence of the mode of governance in the development policy of the EU related to gender equality. The methodological part will provide the tools to answer the research question. The formulated
hypothesis will serve as a guide in answering the research question in the analytical part.
2.
Methodology
The research method in this thesis will be a combination of the inductive and the deductive manner. Whereas inductive research emphasis on the development of theories after analysing the research data, deductive research instead uses analysis to test theories. In the combined form, theoretical issues are used as a background for empirical analysis.
The choice for qualitative research is based on the research question: which mode is EU external governance based and how effective is it? Or does the effectiveness depend on the domestic conditions of the third country?
The methodological part of this thesis will be divided in three parts: first, the research method used will be outlined, second part the data gathered and used. In the third, and the last part, I will outline the research framework.
2.1 Research method
In this thesis I will use qualitative research method. Qualitative research can be defined as a research method that puts ‘an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured [if measured at all] in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency’ (Norman & Lincoln 2000). In contrast, quantitative research underlines ‘the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables, not processes’ (Norman & Lincoln 2000).
2.1.1 Single Case study: Afghanistan
A way of doing qualitative research is by conducting a case study. According to Yin (2003) a case study research can be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you
believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (cited in Baxter and Jack 2008, p. 545).
Landman defines a case study as: ‘A case study is an empirical inquiry in which a focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within its real-‐life context and boundaries between phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident’ (2008, p. 127). The different types of case study, which could serve as purposes for research, might be: explanatory, exploratory and descriptive. This research is a combination of these three purposes. Explanatory research deals with ‘the discovery and reporting of relationships among different aspects of the phenomenon under study’ (Babbie 2009, p. 365). Exploratory research ‘attempts to develop an initial, rough
understanding of some phenomenon’ (Babbie 2009, p. 365). Descriptive research can serve as goal ‘the precise measurement and reporting of the characteristics of some population or phenomenon under study’ (Babbie 2009, p. 365).
In this research the choice for using a case study approach relates to one of the advantages of a case study that is its usefulness in testing hypothesis and developing theories (Babbie 2009).
Furthermore, single-‐country studies are ‘thus not plucked from thin air, but are specifically chosen for the merit in contributing to larger sets of questions in the field’ (Babbie 2009, p. 19). In this research the case study country is Afghanistan. As mentioned in the introduction, Afghanistan in relation to the EU, and to the topic of this thesis, gender equality, is an interesting case study, because of mainly three reasons:
1) The relationship between the EU and Afghanistan:
The country is ‘a regional cockpit, affecting the security of its neighbors and being used in turn as a venue for proxy wars’ (Burke 2014). The instability in Afghanistan has its effects on the amounts of refugees in the EU: the more the country is instable, the more refugees seek for asylum in the EU.
