European Union`s engagements with civil society organizations in Ukraine

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Master`s Thesis

European Union`s engagements with Civil

Society Organizations in Ukraine.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Second Reader: Prof Dr Jonathan Zeitlin Author: Tymoteusz Paweł Kraski, 12298255 Date: June 2019

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List of abbreviations

AA- Association Agreement

Commission – European Commission

CSO - Civil society organization

EaP - Eastern Partnership

EaP forum - Eastern Partnership civil society forum

EEAS- European Union External Action Service

EESC - European Economic and Social Committee

ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy

EU - European Union

EU-UA platform - European Union - Ukraine civil society platform

NGO - Non-governmental organization

NPE – Normative power europe

MPE – Market power Europe

PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

UNP – Ukrainian National Platform

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1. Introduction

The topic of this thesis- the EU engagement with the civil society in Ukraine, is of dual importance. Firstly, the EU is of curtail significance for the shaping and transforming of democracy in Ukraine. The Maidan Revolution that has ignited over the EU-related debate, presented high hopes and expectations towards EU among the Ukrainian society. The EU is also heavily engaged in domestic Ukrainian politics, creating government support groups and engaging with the entire range of social actors. As assumed by the liberal democracy

discourse and conceptualizations, civil society organizations are an essential component of well-working democracy. Therefore the shape of the EU engagement on this field is of exceptional importance. Secondly, to see how such engagements are constructed and

executed allows us to have an insight into a dimension of the functioning and identity of the Union itself - which, ultimately, is a goal of the European Union studies.

The puzzle this thesis will address is the axis of possible conflict between discourse and practice of the European Union. On the ontological level - what it claims to be vs. what it is in its engagements with the other actors. An underlying question to be stated here is that it remains to be seen whether such dichotomies are valid at all - or rather than being

dichotomous are those the two sides of the same processes of discursive power presiding over all. Such puzzle will be narrowed down to a very specific case of Ukrainian civil society, as to the allow for the author to argue convincingly on a very broad problem.

As this work will engage with the analysis of discourses, the approach it will follow will focus on their deconstruction. It is important to acknowledge here , that although this work is critical of the union discourses, it does not necessarily constitute a criticism of the Union. Author ties not to take such normative stance, other than a strong conviction of the

importance of understanding of the underpinning discourses, which can only be achieved via their critical deconstruction. Here I will only show what I believe those discourses to be, leaving their evaluation to the reader, but cautioning that conclusions derived from those should not be too far reaching or claimed with too much of a certainty. Fluidity, dynamic character and lack of constancy are traits of all discourses. The practices within them and the reoccurring themes, narratives, can be analyzed, but there is an epistemological limitation to such exercise. Its outcomes will always be, in a way, authors argumentation . I hope

argumentation I shall present here to be logical and scrutinized, but nowhere do I claim it to be sure to be true. With discourses, there always can be alternative explanations.

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2. Ontological approach

To explore the problem presented above, my thesis will be structured around the two following, interconnected main research questions:

RQ1. How does the EU construct itself in its engagements with Civil society actors in Ukraine?

The second of the main research questions, resulting from RQ1. and only answerable after the analysis of RQ1. will be as follows:

RQ2.To what degree does the EU`s implementation of policies corresponds with the said-construct?

To answer those questions, firstly, I will engage with the review of the relevant literature. The approach to analysis adapted here will be inspired by post-modernist school of thought and works of Michel Foucault, and constructed from various applicable conceptualizations of analytic approaches - such as second reading, critical discourse analysis, “What's the

problem represented to be” approach; and others. I will therefore invoke and discuss the

debate on discourses and its practices, othering, construction of identities and the conception of political self. Before moving on to the analysis, I will also shortly discuss the discourse on the Normative Power Europe and its scholarly conceptualizations as I believe those to be a central starting point of EU`s construction of self. I will also introduce my methodology for the interviews that have been conducted for this thesis, although their content will still be analyzed critically within the constructed post-modernist approach. In an attempt to find an answer to the questions defined above, I will further move onto the analysis of the European Union engagements with the Ukrainian civil society organizations, the discourses of such engagements and constructs of the Union in those; analyzing and deconstructing policy documents, reports, papers, websites, statements etc. and the data provided by the interviews.

With the exception of the interviews, this work will not have a structured methodology. That results directly from the epistemology of the adapted approach- post-structuralism and its authors reject the confinements of defining methodology as such. In her 1999 article. The

Study of Discourse in International Relations:: A Critique of Research and Method J.

Milliken writes on the postmodernist rejection of methodological and research design criteria that those “constitute attempts to silence alternative experiences and perspectives”. Further

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6 she argues that the demand of adherence to those academic practices is “understood to render the scholarship complicit with structures of domination, which gain normalcy partly via `sovereign` social scientific projects claiming foundations and setting rules for thinking and research”(Milliken 1999, p.227). Therefore, this work will adapt a post-structuralist

approach, instead of methodology, which will be described above. A certain strategy was deployed, however, for the selection of documents analyzed in this thesis, focusing on the ones relevant rather for the discourse itself then the content of the policies. A total of over 20 documents and four reach interviews has been critically analyzed. The time frame of the analysis stretches between the year 2009 when the Eastern Partnership was introduced and discourses on EU engagement with CSO`s became non-marginal (as I will argue below) and the current day (with the most recent documents dating to the year 2019).

2.1 Civil society defined

In order to answer the questions posed above, I will first define this work`s understanding of the civil society organizations. Such definition is necessary also within the adapted approach, even if it is stained by the limitation of falling under a specific discourse. That is because to study a discourse of European Union`s engagements with the civil society, it is useful to look through the same lenses as the EU. The exercise in construction the concept of civil society is a discursive practice in itself, but a different one and a possible focus of another study. As I will argue later, such separation of discursive practices is an inherently artificial simplification, yet a necessary and justifiable one for the purpose of this study. To argue about the engagements and discursive space between the EU and Ukrainian CSO`s I will therefore assume their coherent (yet not unproblematic) conceptualization, derived from the book Promoting democracy through civil society: How to step up the EU's policy towards

the Eastern neighbourhood published by Kristi Raik in 2006 –

“A democratic political system not only allows, but also encourages its citizens to take active part in public life. It is one of the key features of democracy that people act together in an organized manner in order to formulate and express their interests, values and identities. Civil society, as understood in this study, is the sphere where such organized, ‘bottom-up’ activity takes place. It is by definition independent from the state and the business sector, as indicated by the concept of ‘third sector’, which is often used interchangeably with ‘civil society’.” (Raik 2006). This conceptualization, on one hand, serves as a justification of the choice to focus this study on the CSO organizations dealing with the questions of human, civil and

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7 political rights, rather than the economical ones (which in Ukraine are plenty - to give an example 5 out of 14 members of the Ukrainian side of the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform are actually coming from business “NGO” organizations1

). On the other hand, it serves, in part, as an explanation of why the EU`s engagement`s with CSO`s are worth and interesting to look at. If the EU truly was to be a normative actor- Manners’s novel kind of power (Manners 2002) - then clearly the true shape of its interactions with a this crucial part of a democratic system would be symptomatic. “The existence of civil society obviously requires a democratic political system that guarantees the civic freedoms of association, opinion and speech. On the other hand, the functioning of democracy requires civic activity, and the quality and strength of democracy are defined, among other things, by the level of civil society ” (ibid.). In other words, well-functioning Civil society sector can be treated as a litmus paper for a well-functioning democracy- there can hardly be one without the other.

2.2 The relevance of the study

The level of dedication to the development of civil society in the third countries, to which the EU is supposedly exporting its norms, will be indeed a level of its commitment to

democracy promotion and therefore- said norms. Perhaps, such focus then may allow even for an ontological insight into the construction of the EU as a foreign actor. What are, or are there, as M. Cebeci (2012, p.578) argues “major inconsistencies in the EU’s policies and the mismatch between the constructed European identity and the policies pursued” or rather does the European Union truly is this normative self, a force for good? Further adding to the importance and validity of this problem, is what seems to be a degree of confusion regarding the answer among the EU`s institutions themselves. As E. Korosteleva writes in her detailed analysis of policies and policy instruments deployed by the EU in the Eastern Partnership and European Neighbourhood countries (Korosteleva 2011; 2016) “the Commission pledges to prioritize `stability, in its relations with the region, and in doing so, the Eu will pursue its

interests which include the promotion of the universal values and the Eu`s own stability`.

Once more, the EU is prepared to face the outside as the extension of its own Self, in the process of externalizing its interests and rules of the established internal order” (Korosteleva 2016, p78.). The interlink made here by the commission between the promotion of European “universal” norms and the pursuit of EU`s interest (resulting de facto in pursue interests

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The website of the Ukrainian side of the EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform (date of access 25.05.2019): http://eu-ua-csp.org.ua/en/eu-ua-csp-members/

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through norms) does not preclude “normativeness” of the EU, but it does put into question its

motivation. Moreover, even if norms and values cannot be easily separated, the outcome of engagements and policies can be assessed. Often that would allow to trace back the true pursuit underneath the rhetoric- which dimension does the outcome serve more - the one of EU`s values or the one of EU`s gains. As (Korosteleva 2011, p.249) indicates “the conceptual gap between ‘inspirational partnership’ and ‘practical actions’ persists and widens.

Paradoxically there is absolutely no articulation of the problem by the Commission and its representatives”. That lack of articulation of the problem gives further weight to this study.

2.3 Post-structuralism inspired analysis

To engage in analyzing the discourse and the (de)construction of self, post-structuralism provides an exceptionally useful approach. In the foreword to Foucault's lecture “The Order of discourse” R. Young (1980, p.48) writes about the approach - “What is analyzed is not simply what was thought or said per se, but all the discursive rules and categories that were a priori, assumed as a constituent part of the discourse and therefore of knowledge.”. Far-reaching and in-depth way of analysis proposed here allows to formulate convincing

arguments about the central puzzle of this research - the EU`s construction of self. As Cebeci (2018, p.4) summarizes “Poststructuralism is about establishing/deconstructing conceptions and representations, and, displacing binaries such as centre-periphery, inside-outside,

superior-inferior, European-non-European, etc. (Derrida 1998, Zehfuss 2009).” This work will be therefore inspired by the post-modernist school of thought and its unique analytical equipment. I will further devise an analytical strategy for the next chapters of this work, consisting of elements derived from different poststructuralist strategies and authors.

2.3.1 Second reading

Second reading approach to analysis of text was forged by a French philosopher J. Derrida based on the premise that, whilst the first (superficial) reading reproduces authorial intention, a second one allows us deconstruct the meaning identified during the first one (Kakoliris 2004). Furthermore, the “Signs do not reflect pre- existing objectivities or meanings. The possibility of any signification is dependent on a silent system of differential references. In this sense, in order for any present element to signify it must refer to another

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9 element, different from itself, that is not present.” (Kakoliris 2004, p.285). Therefore the image that arises, is one of a text as a discursive practice in itself, with all of the implications of it being such. A Text dealing with any given issue area cannot be separated from that area`s discourse, it is its part and a subject to its forces; it both shapes it and is influenced by it. Hence it is possible to identify and study discourses via second reading of the text. To again derive from the conceptualization of the approach done by Cebeci (2018, p.4)

“A second reading thus demonstrates the inconsistencies, tensions, exclusions and silences in the text, and, enables one to see how the text deconstructs itself (Derrida 1998, 1999).”. That is precisely the approach that I will further adapt for conducting analysis - an attempt at deconstructing the outcome of how European Union positions itself in its engagement with (in their genesis) normative CSO actors. Whether its normative image is only a first reading of those, and what will arise from conducting a second one.

2.3.2 The “What's the problem represented to be” approach

Alongside the analytic strategy and approach of critical discourse analysis and second reading, inspired by the postmodernism and discussed above, the design of this thesis will engage with the “What's the problem represented to be” approach (as conceptualized in the article "Making Politics Visible: The WPR Approach.” published in 2016 by Carol Bacchi and Susan Goodwin). This will help to expand the theoretical framework, add another dimension to the focus of my analysis and provide another way of operationalizing the deconstructivist ideas. The short definition of the approach put forward by the authors states (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, p.14) “WPR is an analytic strategy that puts in question the common view that the role of governments is to solve problems that sit outside them, waiting to be “addressed”. Rather, it considers how governmental practices, understood broadly, produce “problems” as particular kinds of problems.”. The strategy derives its conceptual backbone from the work of Foucault (in points similar to those discussed above). Here, again, “(...) phenomena are not singular, fixed, or discrete entities that can be attributed an essence. Instead, they are best viewed as combinations or patterned networks of diverse elements and relations that are coordinated, arranged, combined, or patterned to appear as a convergence.” (ibid.). Therefore the goal of any analysis, in the environment of constant discursive fluidity of meaning, is to capture the practices (or processes) of the creation of discourse. In the context of this approach and of my work (focused, after all, on political interactions) “An

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10 underlying goal is to make the politics involved in these productive practices visible” (ibid.). A central concept for the approach is problematization - as a political act is inevitably directed towards change of reality of a sort, the change implies that something is in need of being changed - therefore is a problem (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, p.16). How that problem is represented (problematized) is a central discursive practice of a government and central question of the approach.

The approach is therefore not far from Derrida`s second reading - “(...) it is possible to “work backwards” from a proposal to how a “problem” is represented—to “read off” the problem representation from the proposal or proposed solution (...)” (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, p.17). The difference is, however, it's more situational focus. It applies to a political act, an interaction, rather than the text or a speech act itself (that does not preclude an analysis of the problematization occurring in text, however). As Kakoliris (2004, p.290) writes on Derrida`s approach “Deconstruction can only subvert the meanings of a text that has already been construed determinately.”. I argue that the WPR Approach does not have such a limitation. It is, in a sense, broader - it is possible to imagine a problematization that occurs as a result of a discourses themselves, a representation of a problem coming from preexisting representations of different, interconnected ones. On the other hand, the said approach is also seemingly lees in-depth than the second reading - it does not reflect upon the individual agency or influence of the author of the text and remains on a more general level of the effect on the discourse itself.

Authors of the article suggest engaging with the analysis within the approach by following a set of questions aimed at “working backwards” from policy to problematization. Those are: “- Question 1: What’s the problem (...) represented to be in a specific policy or policies?

 Question 2: What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the “problem”?

 Question 3:How has this representation of the “problem” come about?

 Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the “problem” be conceptualized differently?

 Question 5: What effects are produced by this representation of the “problem”?

 Question 6: How and where has this representation of the “problem” been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?” (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, p.20).

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11 Throughout my analysis, the structure of those questions will be present as those pose a useful tool. However, regarding the hybrid nature of my approach, those will be present non- universally- only wherever I deem this dimension of analysis to be the most relevant for the overall insight into the topic.

2.3.3 Story line and discourse-coalition

There are few more relevant aspects of conducting a discourse analysis worth mentioning here. The concepts of story lines and discourse-coalition as presented by M. Hajer in his 2006 article Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning are useful for the purposes of this study. The story line is a “condensed statement summarising complex narratives, used by people as a `short hand` in the discussions” (Hajer 2006, p.69). Those

lines are in no way static- they are constantly changing and not necessarily coherent as the

sender of the message often prescribes a different meaning to it than the receiver. However, on this level of summary more meaning is interpreted similarly than on the level of complex narratives. And as ”much of the communication is based on interpretative reading, or

thinking along (...) the concept of story line is the key” (ibid.). Building upon this concept, we can identify a discourse coalitions, which are “a groups of actors that (...) shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time” (Hajer 2006, p.70).

Such concept is of grave importance for this research as “a discourse-coalition is not mush connected to a particular person (...), it is related to practices in the context of which actors employ story lines and (re)produce and transform particular discourses” (ibid.). The

reproduction and transformation of discourses via practices (and discourses influencing the practice) is one of the central axis of this study. Such an approach allows for “taking the explanation beyond mere reference to interests, analysing how interests are played out in the context of specific socio-historical discourses and institutional practices” (Hajer 2006, p.71). Therefore I shall later identify the story line of European Union engagements with Ukrainian CSO`s and discourse-coalition within those engagements.

2.4 Methodology for the conducted interviews

Although in accordance with the approach of poststructuralism this thesis does not have a strict methodology, I will here describe the approach I adopted to contacting the interviews.

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12 For the purposes of this thesis five interviews were conducted. Three of them have taken place in person in Kiev, one of them in person in Brussels and one on-line via Skype. The level of anonymity has all been established beforehand. All of the interviews have been audio-recorded for the purposes of the author. The interviews have been semi-structured by the guidelines of Bryman (2012) ‘Interviewing in qualitative research’. The interview guides and questions asked varied in all the interviews as the profile of the respondents and the information needed where different. I do not provide transcripts of the interviews within that study as the respondents requested different level of anonymity, as well as I do not believe all of the acquired information to be of equal significance. I therefore select the information relevant for this study. The interweaving as a method has its limitations but I argue that the data provided by those is useful for my analysis. It will allow me to gather a more in-depth insight into the studied discourses. To test, in a figure of speech, the discourses arising from the text to discourses, their interpretations and perceptions “on the ground”. Regarding the small number of the conducted interviews I do not argue for data saturation (Bryman 2012) or possibility of the generalization of their findings. The purpose for this study of engaging with them is different. They are set out to serve as an indication of how discourse of the engagements between the European Union and Ukrainian civil society organizations unfolds on the least general, lowest level. How it is interpreted by the final receivers of the message- people working for or with those organizations themselves. That will allow to better direct this study and read its findings from the level of text or discourse of the high levels of policy making. It will allow for an insight, however small, into the interaction between the discursive top-down and bottom-up, the dispersion of its power and practices of creation discussed below.

3. Literature Review

In this chapter I shall present the discussion on the concept of discourses and argue for the importance of conducting an analysis of the those in the foreign policy of the European Union. I deem the discourse and conceptualization of the Normative Power Europe to be the most important for the purpose of the study because of the implications of its normative ontological claim. However, before proceeding to its discussion, I will provide background and examples of different other conceptualizations arising from the literature.

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13 3.1 Conceptualizing EU as a foreign actor

European Union is an entity of a debated “nature” and same is very true within the discussion over what it is or how it acts as a global actor. While conceptualizing EU`s as a foreign power, authors usually take an ontological stance on what the EU is (sometimes implicit) , and proceed to argue how it acts predetermined by, or in the context of said “nature”. Before presenting few examples of such concepts alternative to the Normative

Power adapted in this work, one important argument of a general nature is to be made. Such

conceptualizations usually seem to take a stance on the issue of whether the EU follows norms or interests in its foreign policy – answer to that question will be in line with the ontological assumption of the concept as for what the EU is. I would like to note here, following T. Diez (2013, p.201) that “The judgement on this issue (of treating an issue as a norm or as an interest) will always be essentially a political one, and depend on the analyst’s normative views, however honorable they may be”. That is to say, that the line between the norm and an interest is a blurry one to say the least and that the choice will ultimately come down to the authors ontological assumption ant the discourses followed by such work. The realization that follows is that what is considered to be a norm or an interest in such work is a discourse on its own, and similarly to any other discourse those are not separate but entangled and co-dependent - “norms and economic interests form one whole: norms shape interests; interests shape norms.” (Diez 2013; page 201).

With this caveat in mind, I will now describe few influential alternative conceptualizations of Europe as a foreign actor, before proceeding to more in-depth discussion on NPE concept. Firstly, the framework of Market power Europe introduced in 2012 by C. Damro in the article of the same title, is somewhat a polar competitor to the normative power. It argues that because of an empirical observation that “the EU is, at its core, a market it may be best to conceive of the EU as a market power Europe (MPE).” (Damro 2012, p.683). The ontological assumption here, presented as a mere and obvious observation, is somewhat justified by relinquishing the claim on its exclusiveness – “It is worth clarifying at the outset that

conceptualizing the EU as MPE is not intended to portray it as an exclusively neo-liberal and capitalist actor.” (Damro 2012, p.683) and further clarification that “Because the EU is an international actor with competing internal agendas, MPE does not begin with an attempt to

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14 elaborate or explain the sum of the EU’s official external relations.” (Damro 2012, p.697). Therefore, MPE focuses and highlights a certain dimension of what EU is and how it acts rather than claiming to explain its nature. It does claim, however, this dimension to be dominant and “often and readily recognized by other actors” (Damro 2012, p.697) – more so then the less relevant dimension of norms. The way that EU acts is by using “its market and regulatory strengths to externalize internal policies. Central to this argument is an assertion that the EU’s identity provides an important basis for its power” (Damro 2012, p.684). Here from the perspective of the post-structuralist analysis I must partially agree, however noting that the EU`s identity is not a constant of any sort but rather a discursive practice. Damro later proceeds to does acknowledge the importance of the NPE contribution into showing the linkage between identity and pursued policy, but he does believe the dominant dimension of this identity to be somewhat different – “At a base level, the European single market

represents the EU’s material existence and the most salient aspect of its presence in the international system (Allen and Smith 1990). Comparative economic figures reveal the importance of the EU’s market as a characteristic of its identity” (Damro 2012, p.686). I do argue that the acknowledgment of a lack of wholesome identity of the EU is a step in the right direction. However the discussion on which dimension within this identity is dominant, from the perspective of economic figures, is futile from the standpoint of the study of

discourses, with the identity being inevitably a fluid outcome of interactions between those. Such debate is therefore a perpetuation of one of the one particular discourse (on EU as a market).

Secondly, the concept of Europe as an Empire introduced by J. Zielonka in his article

Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?’ published in 2006 presents an interesting

attempt at more empirical and descriptive conceptualization. It focuses rather on how it acts question then what the EU is. The axis of the concept is the asymmetry in EU`s external relations - how ”EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination” ( Zielonka 2006, p471). Europe, to synthesize, “looks and acts like an empire” but it is not one in a sense of historical empires- it is not a state. Little here is argued on the ontology of the Union explicitly – the implicit claim results from the described ambition of the Union to project its power. Therore it must have agency and some sort of identity which makes it follow imperial logic of action, the theory leaves a room, however, for such identity to be discursively constructed. More accurate descrtiption of the conceptualization would be then perhaps Imperial power rather than Europe as an

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15 Empire. This power is much differentiated and not constant nor universal, it differs

“depending on its (EU`s) self-confidence and how it is received externally” ( Zielonka 2006, p484). It is a dimension of Union`s logic of action in its foreign policy. It acknowledges different dimensions to EU`s foreign power – normative, market or any other relevant one. What it puts onto question, however, are the motivations and stresses out the possibility of underlying imperial ambitions. It also holds it ground within the interest-norms dilemma - “conceptualization of the EU as an empire of sorts captures the synchronicity and

interconnectedness of interest-based and normative behavior toward its near abroad” ( Del Sarto 2016 217). The limitations of the concept come, however, when “the Union’s power is limited and its norms are not shared, it has problems implementing its policy agenda, let alone practicing imperial politics.” (Zielonka 2006 482). I therefore argue that this concept introduces a few important developments into the debate – firstly, the lack of the strong stance as for the ontological nature of the EU; secondly, the explicit acknowledgment of its limited application. I argue that what Zielonka perceives to be a favorable condition for the mechanisms he describes to occur, is a high saliency of the EU`s normative discourses which I will analyze below, in the country with which the EU engages.

Last of the alternative conceptualizations of Europe as a foreign power I believe is important to mention here is the concept of Ethical Power Europe as introduced by L. Aggestam in her article Introduction: Ethical Power Europe? published in 2008. The important contribution here is that it somewhat engages in a debate with the normative discourses of the EU, although taking a discursive stance of its own. According to article the EU`s external role “is articulated in a discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a ‘power for good’ and a ‘peacebuilder’ in the world.” and although contrary to parts of the NPE discourse “The acquisition of a military capability has gone hand in hand with an emphasis on the EU as a ‘force for good’, thereby justifying these new power capabilities in European foreign policy.” (Aggestam 2008, p.1). Aggestam further argues that the “notion of ‘ethical power Europe’ is not seen as a statement of empirical reality, but rather as a concept that opens up new lines of critical reflection.” (Aggestam 2008, p.2). It is therefore not an explanatory theory but rather a critical approach – when the EU acts, or aspires to act, normatively, it inherently engages in ethical decisions regarding its policy. That`s how the military power can be introduced in a coherent manner into the NPE discourse – a situation is possible in which a failure to act is unethical. It therefore argues against the civilian and normative power “idea of the declining utility of military power in an increasingly

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16 domesticated world of international relations” (Aggestam 2008, p.3) – such decline, even if present as a trend, will not always be a case. It also engages with the claim of the

universality of the European values which are “in fact widely contested, and in some parts of the world seen as little more than an imposition of western values” (Aggestam 2008, p.6). The author acknowledges “a criticism frequently levelled at a foreign policy articulated in ethical terms is that of inconsistency, hypocrisy and double standards.” (Aggestam 2008, p.10). The important realization in the approach, however, being its original contribution, is that “on a deeper level, however, real ethical dilemmas are involved as to what kind

of foreign policy behavior is appropriate” (ibid.).

3.2 Normative Power Europe and The concept of discourse

As this work shall be focused on the deconstruction of the foreign policy discourse and practices of engagement of the European Union with the Ukrainian CSOs, I argue that the that the best starting point of engaging with the literature is the concept of Normative Power Europe and the debate that arose around it. Coined in 2002 by Ian Manners, it derives from the earlier concepts of Civilian power (Manners 2002) and is generally focused on the power of norms and values (European, or as Manners implicitly argues- universal). Manners (2002, p.240) defines it as a “a power that is able to shape conceptions of the normal”. This kind of ideational power is inevitably and deeply connected to the concept of discourses and the processes governing them, as the “conceptions of normal”, values and ideas can only be created via acts of speech and their interpretations. I shall later argue, in the analytical chapters of this study, that the concept of the NPE holds a special significance for the discourse of the European Union`s foreign policy, as it is - in parts- implicitly embraced by the Union itself or deployed as a legitimizing discursive practice. To provide an example of such (in this case explicit) embrace, the back-then President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso (2010) stated in his article on the Europe's rising global role written for the Guardian “More than that, it is often said that the EU's comparative advantage lies in its normative power or the power of its values. I think this is right. In the post-crisis world, when people are looking for new ways to ensure their well-being, peace, prosperity, the European experience has a great deal to offer the world.”

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17 Manners (2002, p.240) claims that “the EU’s normative difference comes from its

historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution”. He later continuous to argue that the “The constitution of the EU as a political entity has largely occurred as an elite-driven, treaty based, legal order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity.” (Manners 2002. p.241). Therefore the main argument Manners is making is, in fact, an ontological one. He does not stop on his claim of the EU`s normativeness in its relations with the world nor on identifying the

mechanisms of such power, but rather goes a step further, claiming that the Union “not only is constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics.” (Manners 2002, p252). Precisely that claim - of the ontological normative exceptionality of the EU and its direct projection onto the

conceptualization of the EU as a foreign actor, is what I find the most puzzling and relevant for the purpose of this analysis. As Diez (2006, p.626) notices “From a discourse analytical point of view, the most interesting question about normative power therefore is not whether Europe is a normative power or not, but how it is constructed as one; paraphrasing Stefano Guzzini, what the use of the term ‘normative power’ does.”. It, indeed, does quite a few things, discussion of which will follow in the next parts of this literature review.

Lastly, I would like to notice that the self-embrace of the normative power by the EU has its limitations and is evolving. In a change from the previous commission narrative, Frederica Mogherini - the current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated in the foreword to the document Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger

Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy published

in 2016 that “the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand.” (Mogherini 2016, p.4). Therefore I do not argue that NPE concept is in any way official position of the EU institutions. It is, however, still embraced in parts and implicitly present in their discursive practices.

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18 3.3 Discursive practices

As I argued before for the concept of normative power being an important part of the European Union discourse and the discourse about the European Union, I shall elaborate now for this concept being first and foremost a discursive practice.

Firstly, in my post-modernism inspired analysis the Foucauldian concept of discourse plays a central role. Applying the Foucault's theory of discourse to the literature on the EU's foreign engagements allows for a better insight into its critical review.

Discourses, according to Foucault are not a “ mere intersection of things and words ” (Foucault 1972, p.49) nor a “ a play of the pre-existing significations” (Foucault 1981, p. 67). Therefore the meaning of the word, sentence, message, a conversation or a political document is never predetermined or universal. It is always a subject of interpretation for the recipients - in no way constant nor necessarily shared. It is always a subject both, to a intended

signification given by the sender, and external one assigned by the context and circumstance. In the interplay between those two a new collective space emerges - discourses “irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech.” (Foucault 1972, p.49). Therefore “A task that consists of not - of no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.” (ibid.). Exactly such discursive practices form the representations of the European Union as a Normative Power. However, one of the main principles governing the discourses is their fluidity, the only constant being the evolution of significations and creation of new constructs. “We must not resolve discourse into a play of the pre-existing significations; (...) we must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them” (Foucault 1981, p. 67) - such violence/practice is done at all times, hindering Manners` argument of the NPE being a reflection of the

ontological nature of the EU. Not taking a stance on whether Manners was right with regards

to what the Union is in its core, I argue that it might be wrong, or at very least not sufficient, to derive a meaning and identify discursive practice based on the supposed identity of the signifier. As one of the main rules for deconstructing a discourse, Foucault (1981, p. 67) writes “the fourth rule is that of exteriority: we must not go from discourse towards the interior, hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought or a signification supposed to be manifested in it”. The hidden nucleus will not, therefore give any pre-existing signification to

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19 the engagement of the European with the outside world. To be more precise, the signification it may give- the link between what the Union is and what the Union does for which Manners firmly argues - is one of many significations, valid in itself if and only as long as it is at the moment constructed as such, via discursive practices of a European Union. Manners here himself, amongst with other scholars advocating for the conceptualization of the EU as a normative power, is perpetuating and constructing such discourse.

This argument is strongly made by M. Cebeci in her 2012 article European Foreign

Policy Research Reconsidered: Constructing an ‘Ideal Power Europe`. She argues that the

EU research together with Union`s political discourse creates an ideal power Europe

meta-narrative via discourses on “the rhetoric of the EU as a post-sovereign/postmodern polity,

the EU-as-a model discourse and the NPE discourse” (Cebeci 2012, p.564).

Her conceptualization of the construction of the ideal power Europe provides a great insight into how the ontological arguments - of Union being a novel, different, normative and implicitly better kind of polity, are used in themselves as a legitimizing discursive practice. The important observation, central to this thesis is that “These discourses continue portraying the EU as an ‘ideal power’ in world affairs, even if EU practice does not always match such a portrayal”(Cebeci 2012, p.566). Two important and deeply interlinked discursive practices come into play at this point: firstly, the practice of othering - deeply embedded in the European Union`s discourse of exceptionality; and secondly the practice of self-identity construction - being a search for what exactly this exceptionality is presented to be.

3.4 European identity in face of others

As Diez (2005, p 633) claims “the discourse on ‘normative power Europe’ is an important practice of European identity construction”. To construct an identity means inherently to differentiate it from the other identities. The exceptionality of EU`s particular practice of identity construction is the emphasis on normative distinctiveness of the Union, especially with regards towards its modus operandi. For a claim of such normative difference of the European Union to be made, it is not sufficient to identify what the Union is, but also what it is different from. This practice of dual identity construction leads, in the case of the EU, to an underlying claim of the Union`s superiority. Assuming the NPE discourse that the Union is indeed based on norms, freedoms, values and human rights and pursues such because of its

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20 ontological basis, it also is presented to be a new different kind of actor. Different from what and different how? - other actors not anchored in those universal values. In the case of the EU, as Cebeci (2018) argues, the process of othering presents us with two kinds of those different actors- other modern day nation states on one hand and past, violent selves of the EU member states on the other. “The EU is represented as the ideal, superior, desirable —as representing peace—vis-à-vis the conflictual/modern/uncivilized others. On the other hand,

[there is - author's note] the EU’s representation as a peaceful regional integration project”

(Cebeci 2018, p.7) - from both of those representations the EU derives the justification for the legitimacy of its normative power. It is simply an entity that has evolved further than anyone else and “ because of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its constitutional configuration, has a normatively different basis for its relations with the world.” (Manners 2002, p 252). To, again, point out that this kind of discourse is not alien to the European Institutions themselves, Cebeci (2012, p.570) brings an example of the former Commission president J. Barroso “arguing that ‘by showing the successful functioning of a peaceful Union, based on democracy and respect for human rights, Europe is leading by example’, Barroso stated: European institutions are substantially more mature than what we see at the global level.”. The implications of such a discursive representation of the Union are many, amongst them that the legitimacy derived from such normative representation of being a

force for good, can be misused to pursue non-normative agenda. “The EU’s security interests

are also pursued through the rhetoric that the Union aims to project its model to other regions. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a case in point. In the European Security Strategy is it stated: ‘It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed.’” (Cebeci 2012, p.572) - the good governance here derives directly from the EU's normative standpoint and its interlinkage with the category of interests associated with a rather more traditional (at least non-exceptional) modus operandi of political calculation. It is one of the many examples of the problems in identification European Union`s claim of

normative difference in all of the policies it pursues. More such examples will be discussed

later in this work.

3.5 Problematic self

Amongst other implications of the said discursive representation of the Union, there is one primary to others. To argue that the EU as engaging in self-identity construction practices, it

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21 is to argue that the EU as a polity has some sort of self. As Epstein (2011, p.341) argues “That the state has a self may remain forever impossible to demonstrate. However, one trait states can be seen to share with individuals, even on a very basic level of empirical

observation, is that they talk. This ‘talking’ is central both to what they do and who they are — to the dynamics of identity. States, like individuals, position themselves in relation to other states by adopting certain discourses and not others.” . When faced with the talking of the European Union, however, we hear a multiplicity of voices, perhaps far greater than we would coming from a nation state. Who is the Union that talks and engages in discursive practices? The governments of the member states? The European institutions? - the discursive positions can vary even amongst the latter. To give an example after Korosteleva (2011, p249.) the “EU policy making towards eastern Europe reveals a number of critical

discrepancies in EU official discourse and actions, primarily associated with the ambiguous interpretation of policy goals and the contradictory utilization of available means by a multi-actor EU”. This is, perhaps, a part of the explanation of why the discourse on the normative power (and not necessarily the practice) is central to the European identity construction - it is amongst few embraced by next to all the voices. Therefore the Union does not necessarily has a self- what is does have is a “particular subject-position carved out by the discourse”

(Epstein 2011, p344) and a certain agency regarding this position and resulting from it. However, with acknowledging that treating the European Union as possessing self is a simplification with limiting implications, it is justifiable for the purposes of this study. The proxy self of the Union is a product of multiplicity of the discursive practices deployed by various actors to construct the European identity and although this identity is embraced and interpreted differently, the self remains at the very least a discursive reference point. The

othering on the normative level therefore becomes crucial as it allows for this proxy to

become more distinguishable (as Korosteleva (2016, p.78) writes “In order to survive and more importantly, sustain itself, it requires, as in the world of nature, the recognition of the

Other vis-à-vis the Self, which would enable the Self to treat the outside in its own right and

distinction, and not as a simple extension of the Self.”)

Here the issue is further problematized by the blurriness of distinction between the other and self on the level of interactions between the EU and countries of ENP in the process which I will call a half-way othering. I shall come back to the arguments about such process, but to do so it is first necessary to discuss one particular characteristic of the power of discourse - its dispersion.

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22 3.6 Dispersion of discursive power

According to Epstein (2011, p.344) “ In taking on the ‘I/we’ of that discourse, actors’ identities are produced in a very specific way. In doing so, they are establishing themselves as the subjects of particular discourses”. Therefore, although to a degree the invocation, participation in a discourse is a choice of an actor and the discourse can be (asymmetrically) influenced by the actors, by being a part of the discourses they become their “subjects”. As discourses are dynamic, subject to constant re-interpretation, there is no such thing as a total power over discourse or absolute agency within it. They are by nature limiting. Because of that characteristic (Foucault 1978, p.100-101) argues “Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.”. I therefore argue that the power of discourse is by nature dispersed and not assignable to any single actor. More specifically, on the level of NPE discourse, Diez (2006, p.633) argues “(...)the power of the ‘normative power Europe’ discourse is not unidirectional, but

multifaceted, and cannot be easily controlled. It empowers EU actors, but it also empowers other actors to remind EU politicians of their words.”. Hence, firstly, on the level of bilateral interaction between two actors, the “mutual understanding is not achieved through a one-way process. In each interaction, the messenger thus loses ownership over the message. The reaction of the other in turn feeds back to the originator of the message, who is influenced by the discursive exchange.” (Krasnodębska 2018, p.353). Secondly, the effects of the discourse - whom will it empower or who will it be used by - are beyond the control of the sender of the original message. This can be exploited by the actors with agency - “Actors in the target country have their own agendas and might pick up, reinvent and strategically employ

narratives to fit their goals.”(Krasnodębska 2018, p.354) ; or on an example of how “pro-EU elites in Ukraine can be said to have reinterpreted the message promoted by the EU through public diplomacy on the basis of their own values, experiences and interests.” (ibid. p.347). But perhaps more importantly the dispersion of a discursive power can cause it to have a “live of its own” of a sort - most clear example of that is perhaps the role of the European Union`s normative discourse in the empowerment of the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. As

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23 Krasnodębska (2018, p 347.) notices “As an official of the EU Delegation to Ukraine

remarked, ‘no one in Brussels would have imagined that the association agreement would become a symbol of a revolution’”. Such unintended consequence is a clear example of the Union not having control over the discourse on its being a normative power, especially in the case in which such discourse was indeed “sold”- embraced by other actors.

3.7 Half-way othering

The result of both, the said dispersion and expression of self via othering is the

phenomena of half-way othering. Because of the EU`s representation as a model/ peace/ ideal power(s) and its self-convinced exceptionality, on one hand actors sometimes also embrace such discourses. They adapt the language values of the EU as their own, at least within the engagements with the Union. On the other hand, from the EU perspective, such other party is seen by the EU as an extension of itself of a sort, although not equal and somewhat inferior - not complete, as in a distorting mirror. As an empirical example of such a case I present the case of EU`s engagements with Georgia under ENP as described by L. Delcour (2013, p.353) - “Georgian officials view the reinforcement of control over migration as a strategy to meet EU concerns while also enabling the country to safeguard its core norms and values. (...) While the previous government questioned the EU’s regulatory approach to policy change, EU norms are now clearly seen as a template for domestic reform.”. Therefore regardless of its own normative stance, over time the European conceptualization of those was adopted. Delcour (2013, p.354) further elaborates “This is because EU instruments are based on the premise that the acquis would automatically lead to modernization, regardless of Eastern neighbors’ policy preferences (Delcour and Wolczuk 2013). The issues identified as crucial by the EU and the conditions it sets under the EaP shape the policy process in partner countries notwithstanding their own reform policy priorities ”.

The half-way othering implies asymmetry and fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of the other actor. According to Korosteleva (2016, p.78) “ (...) the EU is prepared to face the outside as the extension of its own Self, in the process of externalizing its interests and rules of the established internal order.” The underlying argument made by Korosteleva in her article (in which she proposes for “bringing “the political” back to the eastern region” already in the title) is that the treatment of others as an extension of self depoliticizes the engagement, making it a technocratic exercise of external governance. In an earlier article about the

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24 conceptually premised on the process of ‘othering’ – construction of ‘self’ through ‘the other’ – is included to make the EU’s approach to its neighbours more effective and sustainable. ”. Elsewhere in the same article she notices that “While lacking the anchoring definition of partnership, the EU appears to increasingly be privatizing the elements of ‘joint ownership’ and ‘shared values’, thus ascribing ‘the other’ a role of compliant ‘norm-taker’ rather than a ‘negotiator’ or ‘owner’, as initially conceived” (ibid. p.246). I argue that this is a direct result of such incomplete othering - it is the treatment of others as if they were the extension of self that allows for the lack of acknowledgment of their normative agency. Korosteleva further adds that “Being seen as ‘different’ is perhaps ‘preferable to the other three in that it reduces the possibility to legitimize harmful interference with the other’. In external governance the process of ‘othering’ is circumvented: it is either removed entirely from EU external actions by simply concentrating on the promotion of the EU as an attractive model, or it is limited to treating ‘the other’ as a threat or inferior, thus securitizing EU relations with outsiders.”(ibid. p.251). However, the occurrence of such securitization does not result simply from treating other as a threat or inferior. It is precisely the extension of self practice that allows for securitization within the NPE discourse in the foreign policy towards the neighbourhood. To elaborate, in the first step “The EU aims to spread these norms to third countries through institutional arrangements, such as association agreements, and through the use of

conditionality. In other words, the EU rewards actors that comply with its norms through closer political and economic ties” (Krasnodębska 2018, p.350). Next, as EU`s norms are partially adopted within the discourse of engagement with the Union by those countries, they become a part of the universal European values discourse and therefore are not entirely other to the EU. Their inferiority, or at the very least asymmetry of the relationship, is often not a result of othering but rather failure of thereof. They are only othered half-way, and seen as a lesser, not fully developed versions of self. The implication of that is lack of full

acknowledgment of their agency and subjectivity. Metaphorically speaking, EU in such a discourse assumes a role of a gardener only tending to their growth. To put is in the policy terms, “The EU portrayed its role in the expected evolutionary transformation not as an intervention, but rather as a facilitation of a ‘natural’ process of democratization and liberalization. ” (Krasnodębska 2018, p.358)

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25 3.8 Critique and limitations of the approach

Approach adopted by this study, naturally and like any other, has its limitations. Part of those result from ontological and epistemological assumptions of the postmodernism, the other from imperfections of arguments derived from scholarly work (inherent to any) invoked for the conceptualization of the approach. I will therefore briefly discuss the first and engage with the critique of the latter.

Resulting from the nature of the discourses as conceptualized above, limitations arise as to the nature of possible argumentation. Firstly, the time resilience of such arguments is rather low. As discourses are fluid and dynamic, what shall be deconstructed here can change at any given time. Secondly, the separation and study of one particular discourse is rather artificial, as they are inherently interconnected and co-dependent. It is a justifiable simplification as for nature of such work would not allow to study all of the discursive space. It does imply, however, that there is a possibility of arguments made here being omissive of some important discursive practices due to the focus on NPE and normative discourses.

Moreover, an epistemological limitation arises from the discursive bias of this study, as in any given text. As Cebeci (2012 p.566 writes) ”By claiming that the EU actually has a foreign policy and analyzing it, the EFP researchers also, inevitably, engage in an identity construction exercise. “. That argument, however, is a double-edged sword, and I shall state here what Cebeci omits. Even deconstructivism and poststructuralist approach, aiming at decoding the underlying discursive powers are not free from those. As I pointed out earlier, all text is a discursive practice and by it a certain knowledge is reproduces. As for my work, the poststructuralist discourse weights heavy over the conceptualized approach, and although I shall consciously try not to, the certain unconscious bias of the discourse (or even identity

construction exercise of poststructuralist research) cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, a certain simplification strains over this work, assuming the agency over analyzed discursive practices. As in parts discussed above, some of those legitimizing practices (heavily criticized by, for example, (Cebeci 2018)) are not necessarily deployed by an actor. They might occur by the default from the discursive intersection of many

interpretations of the message – a discursive net force. Therefore it is simplifying to assume, for example, a coherent discursive agenda of the European Union. Bearing that in mind this

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26 study will, however, continue on doing so to allow for identification of EU`s practices within the discourse. The justification is provided by the argument that there are observable

outcomes of those practices, hence its study, even if simplified, is valid.

Lastly, this study will select for the analysis texts and documents which are deemed relevant for the identification of the normative discourses identified above. Such strategy may (yet does not have to) lead to an over-blown image of its significance. I do caution the reader, however, not to treat the arguments made in this work as absolute in nature, universally applicable to all the spectrum of the European Union`s discursive space. I do not aspire to construct any grand theory of the Union. My arguments and analysis aim to allow for merely a glimpse (yet a convincing one) into an in-depth understanding of how normative dimension of the European Union functions.

4. Discourse of EU- Ukraine engagements in the existing literature

Before this work can progress to its own study of the EU-Ukrainian CSO`s, it is important to discuss the pre-existing literature on the similar discourses (namely on Union's foreign policy towards the neighbourhood countries) - or rather to identify the image of EU`s practice that arises from those. As a starting point and recurring theme of those, M. Cebeci (2012, p.573) argues that within EU`s neighbourhood “the Union’s partners were only allowed to determine the pace and degree of their relationship with the Union but not its content”. That view, deriving in Cebeci`s analysis from the empirics, would also be

consistent with the earlier theoretical discussion of the conceptualization of Union`s othering processes. Therefore here, again, the asymmetry of the engagements is plain to see.

4.1 The EU`s pursue of a positive image

The EU`s efforts in public diplomacy and engagement with non-state actors are an important factor. Public diplomacy “is understood as an ‘international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with foreign publics’. Through engagement with an international audience, the public diplomacy actor —typically a state government —tries to communicate a positive image of itself,” (Krasnodębska 2018, p.349). The positive image of itself in case of the European Union is of crucial importance as it is a

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27 facilitating factor for the embrace of the EU`s normative discourse by the third parties. The need for such engagements, however, does not result merely from a political calculation, but rather is also an effect of those discourses themselves and their claim on universality. As Cebeci (2018, p.9) writes “The EU’s attempts to engage with civil society actors; deal with the root causes of conflicts (such as social injustices); and pay more attention to the locals are, all, deemed as factors marking its “ideal” traits”. Therefore, efforts towards

communicating positive image and engagements with non-state actors both constitute and are

a result of discursive practice. S. Pardo (2015, p.61) in an article analyzing EU's policy towards Israel claims that its outcomes “suggest that NPE is primarily a discursive practice whose aim is only ostensibly to affect Israeli policy. Instead, the quintessential function of NPE should be understood as inward-oriented and linked with what discursive practices are often associated with: the construction of identity.” Whilst I disagree with the judgement presented here as the discursive practice would only have a potential to ostensibly affect policy of another actor, the argument for inward-orientation of NPE discourse provides an interesting perspective to look at the neighbourhood, half -way othered countries. If it is then the case that the NPE is indeed mostly focused internally, on identity construction, it still does not imply that the effects and influence of the created discourse can be limited to the inside. Firstly because, even if NPE`s aim is internal (identity construction) it does not mean that it pursues it internally - quite the opposite, majority of the practices of those discourses take place in the space of Union`s interaction`s with the outside world. Secondly, because as I have argued before, the identity that is constructed has validity and influence on actors

outside the union (treating some actors is particular discursive situations as an extension of self).

How, then, does the EU pursue its positive image and adoption of its norms? First and the most prevalent mechanism is the linkage of the discourses on European norms to the

prospects of economic prosperity - “the EU communicates a narrative that links the EU’s ‘goods’, such as economic prosperity, to its values, as in democracy, for example to

incentivize democratic reforms in neighbourhood countries. (...) the EU rewards actors that comply with its norms through closer political and economic ties ” (Krasnodębska 2018, p.350). The economical dimension of the EU is focused on economic freedoms and liberal paradigm in the economy, what can be problematic in itself if it fails to take into account pre-existing local conditions. As M. Natorski (2014, p.3) writes “The excess of economic

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28 and a lawless state.”. Here we have an example of how deployment of the mechanism

described above (linkage of economic freedoms to political ones), has a potential of hindering Union`s normative agenda.

In a case when the government of the “recipient” country does not engage nor embrace EU`s normative discourse, a different strategy and set of practices is deployed. “It was clear that President Yanukovych was not highly committed to the EU, as he was not following up on the EU’s demands(...)” - M. Krasnodębska (2018, p.358) writes on the case of Ukraine - “The EU Delegation in Ukraine therefore relied on NGOs and journalists as ‘value

entrepreneurs’ to promote the benefits of the signed (Association Agreement - authors note) (...), believing it would inspire evolutionary change within Ukraine, in which the public and civil society would play a critical role.” Therefore EU actively pursues proliferation of its values (in the case of AA, one might argue that interlinked with economic interests), even if the on the level of government the other party is against it. That, again, reinforces the implication of EU`s belief in universality of its discourse and shows how the Union legitimizes its practices through it.

4.2 Literature on the evolution of EU`s approach towards CSOs

The image of the European Union’s attitude towards CSO`s and evolution of its approach that arises from the literature seems to be rather consistent, but historically not equal in the level of interest. On background of the liberal democracy`s approach towards CSO`s N. Pérez-Solórzano (2016, p.13) writes that the “enthusiasm for civil society (…) amongst governments and international organizations can be explained by three interrelated phenomena, namely, the perceived failure of traditional forms of political representation, such as political parties; the demise of communism; and the need to democratize international organizations (…) The European Union echoes this enthusiasm for civil society in its

enlargement policy”. The reason for the EU to be interested in the development of the CSO`s behind its borders seems to be overarching with the whole logic of action behind its

engagements with neighboring countries. As S. Costea (2011, p.260) writhes on the reasoning behind the lunch of European Neighbourhood Policy “One of the major

geostrategic priorities of the European Union (EU) is to create ‘a ring of friends’ outside its borders, a ring of friends that is to respect the European values, and also to organize a

European Union`s engagements with civil society organizations in Ukraine

Master`s Thesis