An Analysis of Status Considerations as a Mechanism to Induce Green
Consumption Behavior
Lennart Breeschoten (11053194)
University of Amsterdam
Date: 22
ndof June, 2020
Supervisor: Samuel Franssens
1 Statement of Originality
This document is written by Student Lennart Christiaan Epeüs Breeschoten who
declares to take full responsibility for the contents of this document.
I declare that the text and the work presented in this document are original and that
no sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been used
in creating it.
The Faculty of Economics and Business is responsible solely for the supervision of
completion of the work, not for the contents.
2
Table of content
Abstract
p. 3
1. Introduction
p. 4-5
2. Theoretical Framework
p. 5-12
2.1 Status
p. 5-7
2.2 Conspicuous Consumption and Costly Signaling
p. 7-8
2.3 Green Consumption and Status Attainment
p. 8-9
2.4 Current research on Status and Green Consumption
p. 9-12
3. Method
p. 12-14
3.1 Main Effect
p. 13-14
3.2 Moderation by Need for Status
p. 14
4. Results
p. 14-17
4.1 Discussion
p. 16-17
5. General Discussion
p. 17-19
6. Limitations & Directions for Future Research
p. 19
3 Abstract
Through consumption in public settings, consumers can send strategic costly signals to others. In the case of green consumption, this signal is twofold: 1) that a person is a prosocial individual that cares about the environment and 2) that the individual has enough resources to be able to pay for green products. Both pro-sociality and having resources are known to be positively associated with an individuals’ status. So, this would imply that people who buy and use green products in public settings will be awarded higher status by their peers and buying green products in public settings could then be seen as a viable strategy to attain higher status. This research analyzed if status motives can indeed be leveraged to induce green consumption behavior. The outcome of the experiment in this paper shows promising (but statistically insignificant) evidence that status motives are indeed a good predictor of green consumption behavior. Furthermore, there were implications that an individuals’ personal need for status moderates this relationship such that individuals with higher need for status are more likely to consume green in public settings, but not in private settings.
4 1. Introduction
Even though the current Corona crisis provides nature with a welcome breather, humans and the environment are on a collision course. Since 1880, and especially the last few decades, global temperatures have increased with 1.1 degrees Celsius, sea-levels are rising with 3.3 millimeters per year, and ice caps are decreasing in size by about 13% per decade (American Meteorological Society, 2019). Consequences of climate change such as wildfires, floods, and loss of biodiversity are already widespread and will become more common and severe with the passing of time, resulting in a vicious circle of further degradation of our natural environment (WMO, 2020). This downward spiral of our environment will prove to be catastrophic for all life on our planet.
With these developments comes the need for solutions to slow or reverse
environmental degradation. Technological innovations to reduce emissions such as renewable energy sources, circular products and more energy efficient machines are becoming more common in business models as a response. However, mainly due to the current human consumption patterns, most of the energy and consumer products production still largely depend on the use of fossil fuels. As there are no technologies available yet that can
significantly and economically reverse carbon emissions, culture must be shifted away from the use of fossil fuels towards renewable alternatives. Shifting consumer choices is thus key in fighting climate change (Stern, 2000). Not surprisingly, environmentalists and policy makers are thinking of ways to change consumption patterns into more green-minded ways. Historically, an environmental concern perspective would imply that people engage in pro-environmental behavior because they intrinsically care about the environment(Bamberg, 2003; Fransson & Gärling, 1999). Motivating green behavior from this perspective would involve better informing people about the state of the world which then leads to
pro-environmental behavior through intrinsic motivation. A rational economic perspective on the other hand, would indicate that motivating people to engage in pro-environmental behavior must be done by activating economic reasons, making it for instance cheaper or easier for individuals to buy green products (van Vugt et al., 1996). These two perspectives can indeed both promote pro-environmental behavior. More recent evidence suggests, however, that psychological and socially-oriented motives can be even more powerful mechanisms to spur conservation behavior (Van Vugt, 2009).
Several promising ways of stimulating pro-environmental behavior through
5 leverage cognitive biases and social influence (Cinner, 2018). An example is that the
likelihood of picking a green option of a product increases when this option is presented as the default option, as opposed to being the upgrade (Abadie & Gay, 2006; Johnson et al., 1994.). Other proven ways to influence behavior include picking the right messenger to deliver a pro-environmental message, priming, and framing green incentives as a loss (Dolan et al., 2012).
New research indicates that evoking status motives in green consumption can make consumers more likely to buy sustainable products (Griskevicius et al., 2010). Several
experiments indicated that by priming status considerations in respondents, these respondents were more likely to pick green options over more luxurious non-sustainable products
(Griskevicius et al., 2010). In these experiments, respondents first read a story in which the experiment group received a story that primed status motives. As a result of the priming story, respondents were more inclined to pick the green options. This is indeed early evidence of status mechanisms as a way towards green consumption. In real-world contexts, however, consumers will probably not read an essay before buying products, so further experiments are needed to develop interventions that can actually be applied in the real world. Aside from the beforementioned article there is not much evidence linking status motives to green
consumption.
As environmental conservation is one of the key challenges currently faced by the world (if not the key challenge), more ways to promote conservation activity are always welcome. If status motives can indeed promote sustainable behavior, leveraging these
motives can help environmentalists and policy makers create new strategies to induce desired behavior that can be applied by business and government. The aim of this research is to do just that. To expand the scope of the literature on this topic and explore the link between status motives, conspicuous consumption, and green behavior. Specifically: Can status motives be leveraged to increase the likelihood of green consumption?
2. Theoretical Framework 2.1 Status
There is agreement among scholars that status can be explained as the respect, admiration, and voluntary deference individuals are afforded by others (Anderson et al., 2015). Voluntary deference means that people award greater status to a higher status individual by acting in voluntary compliance to that person’s wishes, desires and suggestions. Some consequences of this voluntary compliance involve more rights, greater access to scarce resources, release
6 from certain obligations, and the general elevation to a higher social level for the higher status individual (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Kemper & Collins, 1990). This also includes greater access to romantic partners, which one could argue to fall under greater access to scarce resources (Griskevicius et al., 2007).
This respect, admiration, and voluntary deference is awarded to those that are perceived to have instrumental social value: the perceived ability that an individual’s characteristics or skills can help others in their goal attainment (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). Important here is that an individual is perceived to have instrumental social value, this does not necessarily mean that one indeed has useful qualities. An individual could for example by having much confidence in his or her actions be perceived as skilled or helpful, while in reality this person may be incompetent and overconfident.
So, status can be achieved by having what is called instrumental social value. An example of instrumental social value is when an individual has valuable skills, such as being a good problem-solver, that could help the group. By having those skills, the individual can do things for the group as well as transfer these skills to others, thereby helping them develop their capabilities. As a result, that individual is held in higher regard by group members as s/he contributes to the group’s goal attainment. Learning new skills that can benefit the group can therefore prove a fruitful way to increase one’s status. An important addition here is that only having skills that could help the group is insufficient for it to translate to higher status, the skilled individual must also appear willing to use those skills to the benefit of others (Blau, 1964; Ridgeway, 1982). This signals the second mechanism to gain more status: by behaving in other-oriented ways and thereby showing the willingness to self-sacrifice to the benefit of peers. Evidence indeed seems to point in the direction that status-directed behavior often involves giving and self-sacrificial behavior (Anderson et al., 2015). Experimental social dilemma games, for instance, showed that individuals who contribute more to a group subsequently attain higher status within that group (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009). Participants also seemed aware of this mechanism and took advantage of this: they gave more to the group when their contributions were public as opposed to private. Other research showed that those who scored high on self-monitoring (and thus had a stronger desire for status) were also more likely to be helpful and generous to others (Flynn et al., 2006). This again led to them being awarded higher status by peers.
Aside from the fact that higher status people are awarded higher respect, admiration, and voluntary deference from others, status considerations can have more long-term
7 well-being such that higher status people have higher subjective well-being than their lower-status peers (Anderson et al., 2012). A study showed that when lower-status of individuals within groups changed, their subjective well-being changed accordingly. Second, status affects individuals’ self-esteem, where higher status people thus have higher self-esteem. Finally, status can even impact general health (Goodman et al., 2001). Research using a community ladder as a measure where individuals place themselves on this ladder according to their perceived status rank has consistently found that lower status is related to higher levels of mental and physical illness. Low-status individuals are more likely to suffer from depression, chronic anxiety, stress, and even cardiovascular diseases.
With status having such widespread consequences to individuals, it is not surprising that the pursuit of status can be seen as a fundamental human motive, as opposed to merely a want or preference (Anderson et al., 2015). Individuals therefore engage in a range of goal-directed behavior in order to manage impressions and increase their status. If these status considerations can be leveraged to induce green consumption, status could be of importance on the road towards a more sustainable world.
2.2 Conspicuous Consumption and Costly Signaling
One way in which people try to influence their status, and the mechanism this paper focuses on, is through conspicuous consumption (Griskevicius et al., 2007; Han et al., 2010).
Conspicuous consumption is the act of spending money on goods to gain status and impress others. For instance, Americans spend more than $130 billion a year on SUVs (often just to commute to work alone) and spend far more than that on large mansions, dinners, yachts, jewelry and other conspicuous purchases (Griskevicius et al., 2007).
At first glance, spending money so inefficiently may seem counterintuitive, but such purchases contain strategic costly signals. Through consumption, individuals have the ability to send communicative signals about themselves to others, as explained by costly signaling theory (Grafen, 1990; Zahavi, 1975). In the case of luxurious consumption, individuals can signal that they have enough resources to buy (expensive) products. If one buys a yacht, for example, this signals that the individual has sufficient resources to buy and maintain the boat. These, of course, are the extreme examples. Status signaling through consumption is known to also exist in regular more low-key consumption. For instance, a series of experiments had participants wear a polo shirt that had either a logo associated with a high-status brand, or just a regular polo. Participants wearing the higher status brand polo received greater compliance from others when asking for assistance and received more money when asking for donations
8 (Dubois et al., 2012). The same authors conducted an experiment to test product size as a signal of status. The experiment produced 9 scenarios where a consumer would buy a coffee, pizza, or smoothie; for each option there would be a small, medium, and large choice.
Participants were then presented with one of the 9 scenarios and asked to rank the consumers on status based on the product they were consuming. Perceived status of the consumer in the scenarios was shown to increase as a function of the size of the chosen food option such that large option consumers were awarded higher status by respondents. So even products that have no inherent status connotations, such as a pizza, may be viewed as status signaling opportunities when their large size becomes salient.
An important moderator here is the role of social visibility. As mentioned in the experiment about social dilemma games in the previous paragraph, participants gave more to peers in public settings as opposed to private settings (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009). In private settings, such as shopping for groceries online, consumers are unable to send status signals to others, leading to very different consumption patterns (Richins, 1994; Wang, 2006). For instance, another experiment testing consumption of smoothies or pizzas was conducted (Dubois et al., 2012). The control condition participants were told that they were ordering a pizza or smoothie at home (privately), whereas in the experimental condition, participants would do so at a local restaurant (publicly). In the private setting, there were no significant differences between ordered food sizes, whereas in the public condition
consumers were more likely to pick larger options. So, in public settings consumers are able to send status signals to others leading to different consumption patterns than in private settings.
2.3 Green Consumption and Status Attainment
Environmentally friendly consumption can be seen as consumption activities that have a less negative or more positive effect on the environment than substitutable activities (Pieters, 1991). Often, these products are of lower quality and are more expensive than their non-green counterparts. Still, consumers actively seek out such products and invest more money and time to buy them. An example of this is the success of the Toyota Prius in the United States. The Prius is a car with less attributes and of much higher price than competitors in its class, but with lower emissions. The success of the Prius seems to indicate that consumers are willing to pay more for products which provide lower quality and comfort, for the sake of the environment. A New York Times survey, however, displayed that ‘caring about the
9 ability to make a statement about themselves to others was the most important incentive for consumers to buy such a car: ‘to show the world that its owner cares’ (Griskevicius et al., 2010).
So, here consumers try to signal not one’s socioeconomic status such as with luxurious consumption, but that they are caring individuals. This is known as competitive altruism, where individuals compete for status by trying to seem relatively more altruistic or caring than others (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Hawkes et al., 1993; Roberts, 1998). Competitive altruism was already happening in hunter gatherer societies (Hawkes et al., 1993, 1993), and recent examples include the large donations or sponsorships by modern tycoons such as Bill Gates. But competitive altruism, and green consumption, present theoretical anomalies. Self-sacrifice, such as giving donations, is costly and depletes an individuals’ resources to the benefit of others. An explanation for such behavior again comes from costly signaling theory as engaging in altruism or green consumption can also be seen as communicative signaling (Bird & Smith, 2005). In this case the signal is twofold: to display pro-sociality as well as the
ability to incur the costs to do so. So, the individual not only displays that s/he is prosocial
and caring, but also that s/he has the time, resources, and energy to be able to give away those resources. From a costly signaling perspective, acts of public self-sacrifice are thus status related because they demonstrate both one’s willingness and one’s ability to bear the costs of self-sacrifice for public welfare.
As those who self-sacrifice and engage in pro-social behavior are awarded with higher status costly signaling points at the fact that individuals, such as Prius owners, engage in costly prosocial behavior, such as green consumption, primarily when they want to
increase their status. Buying green products enables a person to signal that one is both willing to benefit others (through sustainability) and deplete his or her resources to do so. Therefore, providing consumers with the possibility to show their pro-sociality to others through
conspicuous consumption could prove a helpful mechanism to promote conservation behavior (Griskevicius et al., 2010).
2.4 Current research on Status and Green Consumption
Not much research has been conducted that tests the link between status and green
consumption (Griskevicius et al., 2007). Current research mainly focuses on status motives and the differences in consequent purchase decisions between more luxurious non-green products or less luxurious sustainable products that benefit society (Griskevicius et al., 2010). An example would be a consumer that is going to buy a car: s/he can either choose to buy a
10 more luxurious but less fuel-efficient car, or s/he can choose to buy a less luxurious but equally expensive green option. Traditionally one would expect the person to choose the more luxurious option, one that both has greater comfort and can signal greater wealth (Godoy et al., 2007; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Such previous evidence, however, does not consider the possibility that people can signal status with a green product as well, by
displaying pro-sociality instead of wealth. When one buys the luxury car, for instance, this may signal to others that one cares more about his own comfort than the state of the
environment, which may be viewed as antisocial. Therefore, costly signaling theory predicts that status motives would lead people to want to signal pro-sociality and self-sacrifice and thus pick the green option.
A first piece of evidence that tests the expectation that status motives influence green consumption tests this by priming status motives in respondents with a story (Griskevicius et al., 2010). They found that by activating status motives through the priming story, the
likelihood that respondents picked less luxurious green products over more luxurious non-green products increased. Another experiment indicated that this mechanism only held true when the consumption was public as opposed to private (online). So, in line with costly signaling theory people only forgo luxury for sustainable products when this behavior is observable and could influence one’s reputation. Finally, status motives increased desire for green products only when those green products were more expensive than their non-green counterparts. A reason for this could be that by buying the cheaper and more efficient green product one can only signal pro-sociality, but not wealth through pro-environmental acts (Griskevicius et al., 2007). So, it seems important that to induce green consumption behavior the ability to signal both pro-sociality and wealth must be salient. Another experiment
showed that there are important differences between other-benefit and self-benefit appeals for green consumption, dependent on public or private settings (Green & Peloza, 2014). Self-benefit appeals are those that focus on the Self-benefits of a product or service for the consumer, such as saving costs. Other-benefit appeals are those that focus on benefits received by others, or more broadly, society. Participants of an experiment were asked to rank
advertisements containing self-benefit or other-benefit messages. Respondents in the public conditions were told they had to discuss their answers in a group talk afterwards, whereas in the private condition participants were told everything was confidential. In the public condition, participants reported more positive purchase intentions in response to the other-benefit appeal as opposed to the other-benefit appeal. In the private condition, however, self-benefit appeals resulted in more positive purchase intentions. These effects were mediated by
11 impression management concerns (similar to status considerations) in the public condition, not surprising as the potential for consumer responses to offer social value is diminished in private settings. Another experiment conducted by the same authors asked participants to review advertisements for 5 large detergent brands. For the public condition, this was done at a table in a mall. For the private condition in a special area that was away from other
participants and the experimenter. In both conditions, the consumers were given the detergent displayed in the advertisement they picked. Again, consumers were more likely to pick the brand associated with the other-benefit appeal (69%) in the public setting, and the brand with the self-benefit appeal (67%) in the private setting.
This paper will analyze if status considerations affect green consumption and add to the literature on the topic. Derived on the beforementioned paragraphs, the expectation is that status considerations affect green consumption. Specifically:
H1: Evoking status motives in consumers increases the likelihood of green consumption
As mentioned in the previous experiment, the relation between appeals and status was altered by impression management concerns, similar to status considerations. Another experiment tested such a mechanism for the consumption of hors d’oevres (Dubois et al., 2012). Here, participants completed four items on a 7-point scale with higher numbers indicating greater desire for status. Participants that ranked higher on need for status, and low in power, were found to pick larger options of the hors d’oevres to try to attain higher status. Those with higher need for status are thus more likely to engage in status-related consumption behavior. Therefore, the expectation is that the effect of status considerations on green consumption in public settings is moderated by an individuals’ need for status.
H2: The effects of status motives on green consumption are moderated by need for status
12
Figure 1: The effect of status motives on green consumption behavior, moderated by individuals' personal need for status
In this paper these hypotheses are tested in an experiment that tests willingness-to-pay for carbon offsets. In both conditions, participants are offered a free Dopper bottle that is widely available and that has no apparent status connotations. In the experimental condition,
however, participants are offered an exclusive Dopper bottle with a special logo of a
sustainability organization, that they are told to receive instead of the regular version if they buy the carbon offset. If they do not buy the offset, they just receive the regular bottle. So, with an exclusive bottle, participants can show that they bought the carbon offset and exhibit both their pro-sociality and their ability to incur costs. The translated expectation of the main effect (H1) is therefore that due to this status signaling possibility, participants will be willing to pay a higher price for a carbon offset in the experimental condition than in the control condition. In addition, participants in both groups are asked a series of follow-up questions that assess individuals’ personal need for status. The expectation for the moderation effect (H2) is then that higher need for status individuals will be willing to pay a higher price for the carbon offset in the experimental condition than those with lower need for status, but not in the control condition.
3. Method
One hundred and ten participants (64 males; Mage = 32.45, SDage = 11.01) participated in the experiment. The sample was taken from the friend and family circle of the author and was sent in group chats of work, school, friends and family to get an as varied as possible sample.
13 Participants were only told that the survey would take about three minutes to fill in.
3.1 Main Effect
Respondents were assigned to either a control or an experimental condition in a between-subjects experiment. First, respondents in both conditions read the same story which asked them to imagine that they would be buying a laptop online. The laptop would cost them €400,- and because of a marketing action they would receive a free, white, Dopper bottle. The standard white Dopper bottle is a product that many consumers in the Netherlands already own, those are often gifted to employees, among others. As this is such a widely available product, it is unlikely that it can be used to signal status to others. In addition, respondents could add a carbon offset to remove any negative environmental effects of the laptop they were buying. A carbon offset is an extra fee you pay on your purchase which is then invested in, for instance, projects that aim to reduce carbon emissions. So, the price of an offset depends on an estimation of the emissions that a certain product accounts for, and the needed investments in carbon-reducing projects to compensate for those emissions. In the control condition, participants were asked what they would be willing to pay for such an offset after reading the laptop and Dopper story above, measured on a scale of €0-20. In the experimental condition, participants were told that if they would buy an offset, they would receive an exclusive Dopper bottle, instead of the regular white one, with the logo of a prominent sustainability organization. In the control condition, the exclusive Dopper bottle was not mentioned and purchase of the carbon offset did not come with any extra rewards. The bottle was explained to be available only to those that donate to sustainable charities or buy green products above certain price thresholds. So, with this version of the bottle
consumers can signal to others that they either forewent resources in order to buy green products or donated to sustainability charities. This would enable them, by using the bottle, to signal to others that they care about the environment and paid the price to do so. Afterwards, experimental condition respondents were also asked what they would be willing to pay for the offset measured on the same scale of €0-20.
Relevant here is that consumers can use the exclusive bottle, but don’t have to. Consumption of the carbon offset is still private, and consumers can choose to make this public, and signal pro-sociality and ability to incur costs, by eventually using the bottle on a regular basis. This design was chosen to isolate the effect of status motivation from other behavioral theories such as social and cultural norming. Due to social and cultural norming, for instance, individuals engage in behavior based on the expectations or rules in a group or
14 society (Dolan et al., 2012). Here, consumers can take their cues from what others do and use their perceptions of what is expected of them as a framework for behavior. In public settings this could mean that consumers choose green options because this is observable to others, and they want to conform to what they perceive others think is appropriate consumption behavior. The consideration here is then not one of self-enhancement, but more of compliance to
others’ perceived expectations. So, a consumer could then pick a green product because they think that others believe they must do so, but not to attain status. By conducting the
experiment in a private setting, and only providing the possibility to make their green choice public if they eventually start using the bottle, the status motivation is isolated from
normative behavioral theories.
As explained earlier, the expectation is that if consumers have the possibility to signal status, that is when they will receive the exclusive bottle, they will be more likely to consume green. So, for this study specifically the expectation is that willingness-to-pay for the carbon offset in the experimental condition will be higher than in the control condition due to the status signaling possibility.
3.2 Moderation by Need for Status
After reporting their willingness-to-pay, the participants were asked a series of follow-up questions. These questions aimed to analyze whether the effect of offering an exclusive bottle, instead of a regular bottle, on willingness-to-pay (WTP) is higher for high need for status individuals than for low need for status individuals. Four status-related questions are asked as derived from Dubois et al. (2012): I have a desire to increase my position in the social hierarchy; I want to raise my relative position to others; Getting to climb the social ladder is a priority for me; I would like to be viewed as being of higher standing than others. These items are measured on a 7-point scale with higher numbers indicating higher desire for status.
As explained in the theoretical framework, the expectation is that higher need for status will lead to more status-related green purchasing behavior. So, the expectation is that higher need for status leads to higher willingness-to-pay for the carbon offset in the
experimental condition, but not in the control condition.
4. Results
Ten of the one hundred and ten respondents did not indicate a willingness-to-pay in either one of the two conditions they were assigned to. As both effects tested in this study test
15 hypotheses with willingness-to-pay as the dependent variable, these 10 respondents were deleted from the dataset.
As expected, participants in the experiment condition (M = 9.87, SD = 6.12) were on average willing to spend more on the carbon offset than in the control condition (M = 8.98,
SD = 6.83). The null hypothesis of equal variances was not rejected (p = 0.25), so a t-test
with equal variances assumed could be conducted. The independent samples t-test proved insignificant (t (98) = -.683, p = .496), so there were no statistically significant differences between the control and experiment group means. The hypothesis that willingness-to-pay would be higher in the experimental condition is therefore rejected.
To see if need for status moderated the relationship between willingness-to-pay and status motives, participants answered 4 questions about need for status. Reliability analysis (to see if all questions represented the construct of need for status) produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .887, so there was excellent internal consistency. As a result, all questions were kept, and the averages were transformed into a composite index variable for each of the
participants. Moderation analysis with WTP as the dependent variable, condition as
independent variable, and need for status as the interaction variable showed promising results as indicated at the top of the next page in figure 2.
16
Figure 2: Moderation effect of need for status on willingness-to-pay in the control and experimental conditions
As shown in the graph, willingness-to-pay in the experiment condition increases as
individuals’ need for status increases. Conversely, willingness-to-pay in the control condition decreased as individuals’ need for status increased. These results are promising, however not statistically insignificant (t (96) = 1.65, p = .10). So, the results as indicated in the graph are in line with the hypothesis that need for status moderates the relationship between status and willingness-to-pay, but, due to the statistical insignificance, this hypothesis is not proven as of yet. The complete results of both analyses are displayed in the Appendix.
4.1 Discussion
For the main effect, there were no significant differences between the experiment and control condition means. The mean for the experiment group was higher, as expected, but the p-value was not significant enough for that to translate to any meaningful conclusions. A possible explanation for this is the size of the sample taken. 100 legitimate responses were taken for the analysis, and the spread of willingness-to-pay ranged from €0-20. As a result, the spread
17 of the answers was relatively high, within such a small sample, and the variance within willingness-to-pay was subsequently high in both groups. With the small sample size of this experiment it is difficult to come to a result with such a wide ranged outcome variable. A better construct would perhaps have been to give participants, for example, four choices: €1-5, €6-10, €11-1€1-5, and €16-20 and recode those as 1-4. As a result, the spread within the answers would have been smaller, possibly leading to different results. Another perhaps better construct would have been to present the same story to both groups and asking if they would be willing to pay more for the carbon offset if they would receive the exclusive bottle instead of the white one.
Also, the choice of the Dopper bottle as a tool to signal pro-sociality could have been a reason for the lack of effect. Perhaps the exclusive Dopper bottle was not perceived to have strong status signaling attributes and as a result there were no differences between the groups. The white Dopper bottle could also already be linked to sustainability, as this prevents
holders from buying throw-away water bottles. So perhaps, using the standard white Dopper bottle could already be viewed as a way of signaling care about the environment without the extra logo on the side. Also, an analysis beforehand about Dopper bottles in a different sample could have been conducted. For instance, participants could be asked to rank the Dopper bottles based on status connotations to analyze first if the product is useful for measuring status motives which would make the subsequent analysis more reliable. The interaction with need for status included provided implications that need for status moderates the relationship between status motives and willingness-to-pay. When need for status became higher, experimental condition participants exhibited higher willingness-to-pay. For control condition participants, the amount they were willing to pay decreased when need for status increased. Again, due to the small sample size, these outcomes were
statistically insignificant. 5. General Discussion
This aim of this paper was to see if status motives could be leveraged to induce green consumption behavior. Relatively recent evidence showed that psychological and socially-oriented motives can be more powerful mechanisms to spur conservation behavior than motives of economic or environmental concern (Van Vugt, 2009). Status-seeking can be seen as such a socially-oriented motive and some research provided early evidence that status-related concerns can spur consumers to engage in green consumption (Green & Peloza, 2014; Griskevicius et al., 2010). The aim of this paper was to analyze if this relationship indeed
18 exists and to add to the literature on this topic.
To investigate the link between status and green consumption behavior, this paper turned to costly signaling theory and research on competitive altruism which suggest links between altruistic acts and status (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006). Costly signaling theory explains it such that people engage in pro-environmental consumption behavior to send communicative signals about themselves to others: that one cares about the environment and has the ability to incur the costs to buy green products. So, in addition to showing that a person is prosocial instead of proself, altruism can simultaneously signal that one has enough energy, time, and money to be able to give away those resources (Griskevicius et al., 2010). Because pro-sociality and resources are associated with a person’s status within a group, the main prediction was that, by activating status motives, individuals would be more likely to engage in pro-environmental consumption in public settings. Furthermore, individuals’ personal need for status has been shown to predict status-related consumption behavior, where those higher in need for status will be more likely to make status-related purchases (Dubois et al., 2012; Green & Peloza, 2014). The second prediction thus was that the effect of status motives on green consumption behavior is moderated by need for status, where higher need for status individuals would be more likely to consume green in public settings than their lower need for status peers, but not in private settings.
To test those predictions, an experiment was conducted testing willingness-to-pay for a carbon offset where consumers would receive either a regular or exclusive Dopper bottle. The expectation was that those who would receive an exclusive Dopper bottle when buying the offset would be willing to pay more for that offset than those who would just receive the standard white model. In line with these predictions, willingness-to-pay for the carbon offset was higher in the experimental condition than in the control condition. This indicates that because participants could status signal with an exclusive Dopper bottle, they were willing to pay more for the offset. Due to the small size of the sample, however, these differences between the condition’s WTP’s were not statistically significant. To see if need for status moderated the relation between status motives and willingness-to-pay participants in both groups were asked a series of follow-up questions, which measured participants’ individual need for status. Moderation analysis showed promising results as willingness-to-pay for the carbon offset in the experimental condition increased as need for status increased. In the control condition, willingness-to-pay for the offset decreased when need for status increased. These results imply that when those with higher need for status are presented with a status signaling opportunity, such as the exclusive Dopper bottle, they are more likely to buy
19 prosocial green products. Conversely, if this status signaling opportunity does not exist, high need for status consumers are less likely to consume green. Again, due to the small size of the sample, these results were slightly insignificant.
So, in line with costly signaling theory, participants that could signal pro-sociality and wealth with the exclusive Dopper bottle were willing to pay more for the carbon offset. These effects were altered by individuals’ personal need for status.
6. Limitations & Directions for Future Research
In the experiment in this paper, participants did not incur real costs. They were only told to imagine that they were going to buy a carbon offset, but, did not do so for real. Although behavior itself was not measured, behavioral intention was measured, which, compared to attitudes, have been shown to be relatively strongly related to behavior (Fishbein, 1975; Petty, 1996). Likewise, there was a large spread between the WTP’s that participants entered, which also seems to indicate that participants answered realistically. After all, why not say that one is highly pro-social and enter the highest possible amount if it does not cost anything to do so. Also, Li and colleagues (Li et al., 2002; Li & Kenrick, 2006) have found that men and women respond in different ways when their budgets differ, suggesting that people are able to make educated calculations about purchase intentions.
Furthermore, this paper only examined Dopper bottles, which might be viewed as having small status signaling possibilities in and of itself. This in combination with a relatively small sample size in combination with the measured construct of WTP may have been an explanation for the lack of results. Further research could first analyze if a certain product can be viewed as having status signaling connotations and consequently see if this leads to different results.
Finally, in this paper, and the other papers on this topic, purchase intentions are measured. Although purchase intentions were just explained as a good indication of real behavior, experiments involving real behavior are needed. Status as a mechanism to promote green behavior can be very important to spur conservation behavior, therefore experiments involving real costs must be constructed. The outcomes of such experiments can then be picked up by policy makers and businesses and be translated into programs to promote sustainable consumption in real-life.
20 7. Conclusion
Through green consumption, consumers are able to send communicative signals about themselves to others: that they care and that they have resources, both of which increase status. So, to act altruistic in this case is to act in one’s self-interest. We as a people have come at a crossroads to maintain the state of the world, and time is running out fast. The promising results in this paper point at a new mechanism that can help overcome this challenge: leveraging status motives to create more sustainable consumption patterns.
Applying these implications to real-life settings will prove to be the new, and very important, challenge within this topic. The outcomes of this paper provide much value in pointing at the importance to create ways to make green consumption behavior visual, so consumers can show others that they are making sustainable choices. Consumers are then incentivized not only by care about the environment, but also by care about themselves.
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25 Appendix
Experiments
26
Experimental Condition
27 Complete Results
Main Effect
28
