Spy or Cop?
Reconsidering the role of the police in counterterrorism intelligence
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Bachelorthesis Political Science
Critical Security Studies: Preemption
Research conducted by: Mirte Versteeg Supervisor: Dr. Stephanie Simon
Januari 2015
Abbreviation List
Abbreviation Dutch English
AIVD
Algemene Inlichtingen-‐ en Veiligheidsdienst
General Intelligence and Security Service
BI Buitenlandse Inlichtingendienst Foreign Intelligence Service BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst Homeland Security Service CI Centrale Inlichtingendienst Central Intelligence Service
CTIVD
Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen-‐ en
Veiligheidsdiensten
Supervisory Committee regarding the Intelligence and Security Services
CVD Central Veiligheidsdiesnt Central Security Service DIR
Districtelijke Inlichtingendienst Rijkspolitie
District Intelligence Service State Police
IDB Inlichtingendienst Buitenland Intelligence Service Abroad KLPD Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten Corps National Police Services MIVD
Militaire Inlichtingen-‐ en Veiligheidsdienst
Military Intelligence and Security Service
OO Openbare Orde Public Order
PID Plaatselijke Inlichtingendienst Local Intelligence Service RID Regionale Inlichtingendienst Regional Intelligence Service RIO Regionale Informatie Organisatie Regional Information Organization WIV
Wet op de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten
Act on the Intelligence and Security Services
Table of content
Abbreviation list 2
Table of content 3
1. Introduction 4
2. Theory 6
3. Data & Methods 13
4. Introduction to the Regional Intelligence Services 15
5. Results 23 6. Conclusion 31 7. References 32 8. Attachments 35
1. Introduction
The separation between police tasks and intelligence tasks has been a point of
discussion since the nightmares of the Gestapo and Stasi. With clandestine operations and executive powers combined in one organization, the bugbear of a police state might become reality. After the experience of the Gestapo, West Germany decided to separate the police from the intelligence service. The Bundesambt für Verfassungsschutz was established, besides the National and Regional Police and this service was only focused on the protection of national security. This separation is known as the Trennungsgebot (Vis, 2012: 8)
This separation has also been executed in the Netherlands. In the 1990’s, the Act on Intelligence and Security Services (Wet op Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten, WIV) passed. In this Act, the competences and task setting of the BVD (Homeland Security Service, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst), the predecessor of the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service, Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst) was
arranged. The WIV also arranged the separation between the police and the intelligence service: employees of the BVD/AIVD do not have the authority to trace a criminal
offence. After the transformation of the WIV in 2002, this article remained the same (Vis, 2012: 8).
Thus, from a legal point of view, the separation between police and intelligence tasks in the Netherlands seems strict. This separation is sometimes seen as a feature or even a guarantee for the existence of a democratic rule of law (Fijnaut, 2004: 15). Nonetheless, there is one service that seems to operate in the shadows of the separation, in the grey area between the police and the AIVD. This is the Regional Intelligence Service
(Regionale Inlichtingendienst, RID), a service that is entitled to perform tasks assigned by the AIVD, but also entitled to perform police tasks. The RID-‐officers are not allowed to perform these tasks at the same time, but the tasks are executed by the same team. This double-‐hatted nature questions the legitimacy of the RID.
In this study, I will look into the reasons why intelligence should be performed on a local level. This question has been answered for countries such as the United States, the
United Kingdom and France, but not yet for the Netherlands. The focus will be on counterterrorism intelligence, because this kind of intelligence has gone through
significant changes in the last 20 years and this influenced intelligence performed by the police. The main question in this thesis is:
To what extend did the RID turn into an intelligence service and to what extend is this transition desirable?
I will first outline the theory I have used to formulate a hypothesis. This will be focused on the localization of intelligence, on a policing strategy called ‘community policing’ and on experiences in different countries. I will also outline the methods and resources I have used for this thesis. Next, I will give an overview of the Dutch intelligence
community and the development it has been through. Subsequently I will compare the RID with the theoretic framework put up by Bayley and Weisburd, as can be found in the theory section. I will end with a conclusion.
2. Theory
In this chapter, I will make a theoretic foundation for my findings on the Dutch intelligence community on a local level. First, I will outline the arguments for
counterterrorism on a local level, to find the academic reasons behind this construction. Subsequently, I will show some proponents and opponents of the ‘localization of
intelligence’. Afterwards, I will highlight the work of Bayley and Weisburd, who
conducted a comparative research on four countries regarding the way they organized intelligence on a local level. Bayley and Weisburd came with some factors influencing this localization and summed up advantages and disadvantages for the localization of intelligence. I will use these in my results on the Dutch case. The chapter will be finished by a hypothesis.
The authors and articles I describe in this theoretic framework, are for the greater part originating from the Anglo-‐Saxon nations. This is for two reasons: first, most of the research on intelligence communities stems from these countries. Besides this practical reason, the Dutch police and the Dutch intelligence and security service are highly influenced by especially American institutes and modes of operation. In all the books and articles I have read as orientation on this thesis, the main literature was from a Anglo-‐Saxon origin.
Counterterrorism on a local level
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, with an even more complex approach to prevent it. It is often said to be an international problem, which needs an international approach. The ‘war on terror’, as declared by the Bush administration, is an example of this
international course of action. Other scholars have focused on the national level of preventing terrorism, such as the reform of domestic intelligence. The level that has received the least attention, is the local level (Dahl, 2014: 81/82). In recent years, concerns have increased about homegrown terrorism. Most of the terrorist attacks within the United States are conducted by terrorists who were born in or lived a major part of their lives in the United States. Therefor, frontlines have changed places to cities such as Bridgeport, Denver and Minneapolis, according to Bergen, Hoffman and
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano argued that ‘homeland security is hometown security’ (cited in Dahl, 2014: 82).
Although most of the academic discussions and studies on counterterrorism focus on the international or national level, the local level receives more and more attention. Kettl argues that local governments will always play a central role in counterterrorism, because ‘Any attack is, first and foremost, an attack on a city and a state’ (cited in Dahl, 2014: 82). Besides the fact that attacks happen at a local level, local authorities also have an advantage over national agencies. In most cases, they have more personnel available and they have more knowledge of the territory. They have a closer relationship with the population and reflect the local population (Dahl, 2014: 83). Henry describes the
American law enforcement agencies and how they should deal with the new terrorist-‐ threats, after 9/11. He calls for “greater and more effective threat identification, better
planning for potential terrorist events, and relaxation of organizational boundaries. It also requires more effective, efficient and sophisticated intelligence systems – especially at the state and local levels of law enforcement” (Henry, 2002: 336)
Fighting terrorism consists of many different components. This study will focus on the intelligence component. Sloan describes an observation made by an Israeli counter terrorism advisor, who noted that 90 percent of the terrorists attacks in Israel could be defined as a failure of intelligence (2002: 339). This observation clarifies how vital effective intelligence could be in the prevention of terrorism. This awareness is difficult to create among local police officers, they often see intelligence as clandestine, covert operations and they relate it first and foremost to spying. But intelligence has always been more and this understanding is required in order to use police intelligence in counterterrorism (2002: 339).
Sloan also highlights the major differences between national and local intelligence. National intelligence is more focused on international activities and national security. Its modus operandi is strategic and looking for long term trends in the global environment, while local intelligence is often more tactical and used to prepare agencies to respond to immediate threats. These differences create difficulties in constructing a mutual mode of action to fight terrorism through intelligence and calls for more cooperation between
the different levels, as Sloan argues. Therefore, Sloan calls for more than sharing information of the terrorists’ strategies and goals, but also for the local offices to learn the basic skills of intelligence collection. He calls this ‘the localization of intelligence’ (2002, 342/343).
Bayley and Weisburd conducted research in different countries, comparing the changes law enforcement agencies made to deal with new terrorist threats. They are more prudent in their conclusion than the authors outlined above. The benefits of local intelligence in the war against terror come with some disadvantages. The main point of their arguments is that legitimacy is essential for successful policing: “Using frontline
police as high police can, ironically, jeopardize the very advantages that local policing has in the war on terror” (Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 95)
The legal separation
Local police agencies should be cautious in using intelligence gathering methods, because they could mix high and low policing, concepts often used in academic police research (ibid: 95/96). These concepts are introduced by Brodeur, a Canadian
criminologist, to make a distinction between traditional policing performed by agents in uniform and policing that is closer to the seat of power, which contains intelligence. These concepts used to be separated, but this changed in the Cold War and even more after 9/11. However, this distinction is still relevant for understanding the changes the police and intelligence services went through (Brodeur, 2007).
The theoretic separation by Brodeur can also be seen in practice. After the Second World War and the period short after, security services and executive action were separated to prevent the establishment of a secret political police such as the Gestapo or Stasi. The distinction even seems a guarantee for the existence of a
democratic rule of law. Some countries are more strict in the separation than others, we can see two models: the English and the French model. In the English model, the
separation is quite strict and the MI5 does not have any executive powers. West-‐
Germany was a good example, but also the Netherlands belong to this model. The other model is the French model, with the security service falling under the jurisdiction of the police and executing investigative powers. This model can also be seen in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Estonia.
In the Netherlands, the separation was already put in practice with the
establishment of the BVD, the predecessor of the AIVD, and received its legal foundation with the passing of the Act on Intelligence and Security Services, the WIV, in the ‘90s. Officers of the BVD/AIVD do not have the qualification to investigate criminal offences. The discussion on this separation started after the collapse of the Sovjet Union, with countries who value the cooperation between the intelligence services and the police more than the previous separation (Vis, 2012: 7/9).
Discussion on the practice of police intelligence
Local law enforcement agencies performing high policing comes with benefits, but also with disadvantages. Scientists disagree about the separation between high and low policing, as they do about whether local law enforcement should collect intelligence to prevent terrorism. I will show some of the arguments in this paragraph.
Sloan begins by pointing out the need for a more offensive and preemptive approach of terrorism, to act on the root causes of it. Intelligence is central in this approach, because intelligence is the only way to identify terrorists before they start moving. This is also the phase where terrorist are most vulnerable to capture, because they have to get out of the dark. For this purpose, Sloan argues, local law enforcement agencies should be brought into the complete intelligence cycle, from collection to dissemination (Sloan, 2002: 342). Local agencies could also use existing crime watch programs for terrorism and thereby use the public to discover terrorist cells. To cite Sloan: “The same public
awareness that could lead to the discovery of a meth lab could also apply to a bomb factory or a safe house” (ibid. 343).
Sloan does not call for a new separate agency to collect counterterrorism intelligence on a local level, but argues for the use of existing agencies by expanding and improving their intelligence capabilities. It is necessary to improve communication though, away from the traditional hierarchical lines to avoid stove piping (ibid. 344/345)
Henry (2002) illustrates how police and public safety agencies should transform after a major incident such as 9/11, so that the public will keep their trust in law enforcement. The response will also influence the possibility and the effectiveness of future terrorist attacks. After this illustration, Henry points out three categories of changes for the
police. One of them is prevention, in particular through intelligence, which should be more effective in gathering and sharing and be more proactive. According to Henry, its capability should span local, state and federal law enforcement boundaries. However, Henry does not argue for all local police agencies to engage in intelligence collection, because this requires specific resources and particular expertise. Police officers already gather intelligence, but this is from a different kind and for a different purpose than the proactive, preventive intelligence needed to counter terrorism. They need training to recognize the value of intelligence. Once this value is recognized, effective
communication systems should be used to get this information to trained intelligence personnel, for analysis. He also highlights the balance between civil liberties and public safety that must be held. Without judicial supervision, this balance could be in danger and for a nation with the size of the United States, it is not possible to have this
supervision for each small police agency. Therefore, improvements must be made in communication.
Dahl (2014) performed a case study on the New York Police Department, which has an extensive intelligence program. He demonstrates that the New York approach, with agressive local intelligence on counterterrorism, leads to increased national and international security. With this demonstration, Dahl challenges the traditional model, which sees intelligence as a primarily national business. Although Dahl seems optimistic, he warns for the concerns for civil liberties, which are the same for local intelligence as they are for national or international intelligence. Dahl describes different examples of violations of civil liberties, brought up by two Pulitzer Price winning Associated Press reporters. There used to be a ‘Demographics Unit’, a team of the NYPD who were
supposed to map ethnic communities, especially focused on Arabic communities. There are more examples that illustrate several controversies in the modus operandi of the NYPD, and in search for the balance between security and civil liberties, the NYPD seems to emphasize security (Dahl, 2014: 91). Considering all the critics and the successes of the NYPD’s local intelligence unit, Dahl concludes with a recommendation to other local law enforcement agencies. He suggests that not all local agencies are able to implement an intelligence unit such as the New York example, mainly because of their size, but that they can use some intelligence collection methods in order to prevent terrorism. Dahl finishes with a metaphor from a former CIA director: he wanted his agency to be
operating on the edge, so close to the boundaries that he wanted “to have chalk on their
shoes, as if he were almost out of bound”. Local law enforcement agencies must decide
how much chalk they want on their shoes (ibid. 93)
Not all scientists are as positive on local intelligence performed by the police as Dahl, Henry and Sloan. Brown (2007) criticizes the local intelligence in the light of community policing. This policing model consists of two elements: “(i) quality relations between law
enforcement and the citizenry and (ii) concerted problem-‐solving efforts among law enforcement officers and local residents which focus on identifying and eliminating the cause of crime in the community” (ibid. 240)
This model of policing gained more acceptance in the 1980s. This changed after 9/11, with the PATRIOT act of 2001 and all security agencies receiving more power for to win the ‘war on terror’. Brown describes a philosophic division between community policing advocates and counterterrorism hawks, which is not only a theoretic debate but also has policy implications. While the changes after 9/11 were movements towards the hawks, Brown calls for a shift to the other side. He argues that community policing would
reduce violations of civil liberties, restore the international status of the US as protectors of human rights and democracy and will enhance homeland security. Aggressive tactics could increase the potential abuse of power, while cooperative relationships with the citizenry discourages officers to use coercion on people who could be helpful with gathering counterterrorist intelligence. Community policing is thereby a better alternative not only for the near future, but also for the long haul.
Lyons uses the same line of argument as Brown. In order to get information on
terrorism from the communities with the most accurate information, it is necessary to have a good relationship. Local law enforcement agencies should treat these
communities with respect and protect their liberties as they do with other citizens, otherwise the community will stay closed. As Lyons outlines: “We simply cannot continue
to govern and police in ways that privilege the social positions of some communities and expect – in an atmosphere charged with ethnic and religious intolerance – the remaining communities to willingly, actively and patriotically assist in their own subordination. At least not if we expect access to the information embedded within these communities”. (Lyons, 2002:538)
Waxman outlines three main challenges on American local police engaging in national security. The first problem is organizational, with the American local police as a decentralized organization. This creates problems in the coordination of intelligence gathering and the different agencies vary enormously in size and capability. The second challenge is about accountability. In the United States system, an elected major often appoints the local police officers. The major can therefore be held accountable for the decisions of the local police. In fighting crime, local measures will affect local crime. This is different for fighting terrorism. Local measures could affect national or even
international security while the costs are for the local community. This could affect the community and could lead to resistance. Waxman also warns for a process the other way around: “it allows the police to apply the legitimizing gloss of national security to
their own pet projects of repression” (2009: 396). He also mentions the broader mandate
of the police, which is wider than the FBI. This could infringe civil liberties. Routine activities by the police penetrate more widely and deeply into communities and this could open doors to abuse of power. The last challenge Waxman notices, is that of community policing. This has already been explained by Brown and Lyons.
Hypothesis
With the recent terrorist threats, in Europe and in the Netherlands, I expect that the Dutch police will react the same as is seen in the United States. Local intelligence will play a larger role. The centralization that is related to the transformation of the Nationale Politie will increase this respond. The concept of community policing is thereby counteracted. The infringement of civil liberties is a serious danger with the police acting as an intelligence service and this danger could grow with this transition.
3. Data & Methods
This study will consist of two research methods: literature research and field research. Because of the secret character of the intelligence community, the collection of
information is difficult. Policy documents will not show the whole story and intelligence or police officers are reserved, because they do not want to tell too much. This makes the collection of data complicated. By combining these two methods, I hope to construct a true and complete as possible image of the Dutch RID and its development.
The literature sources will consist of policy papers by the AIVD and the police and by the Supervisory Committee on Intelligence and Security Service (CTIVD). I will also use previous studies on this subject, especially for the legal foundation and the history of the intelligence community.
The interviews will have a supporting character, because the little time given for this thesis was not enough to take in-‐depth, structured interviews. Therefore, the quotes I use in the results are more illustrative. Because of the secret character, not all my respondents want their name in this study. Therefore, I use their position. Besides two respondents who are active in the intelligence field, I also have interviewed scientists on this subject.
In order to find an answer to my main question, I will use the article by Bayley and Weisburd as a guideline. With their comparative research on local intelligence in four countries, they have come to six factors influencing the interlocking of intelligence agencies and the police. They have also found seven advantages and four disadvantages to this interlocking. These advantages, disadvantages and factors combine all the
arguments of my literature review and therefore, I will use these as a manual for the analysis of the RID. The advantages, disadvantages and factors can be found in table 1.
Advantages 1. Police has more possibilities to observe than intelligence officers 2. Police has more contact with more civilians
3. Police can identify links between criminality and terrorism 4. Existing partnerships with local business
5. Police can make a first selection of information if intelligence agencies do not have enough capacity
6. Police can be better in undercover operations, due to the reflection of the population
7. It is easier to recruit informants for the police
Disadvantages 1. Due to limited budgets, intelligence work can influence traditional police work
2. Ambitious officers may be more willing to work for an intelligence unit than for a traditional police unit
3. Infringement of civil liberties
4. Community policing might be harmed Factors 1. Local incidents of terrorism
2. The structure of the police organization 3. The size of the police unit
4. Time under threat
5. Intolerance of political dissent
6. Legal mandates and financial encouragement
Table 1: Advantages, Disadvantages and Factors by Bayley and Weisburd, rephrased from: Bayley and Weisburd, 2009: 88-‐ 95
4. Introduction to the Regional Intelligence Services
Before we turn to the analysis of the factors, advantages and disadvantages of local intelligence in the Netherlands, I will first give an overview of the Dutch intelligence community, the development it went through, some problems that occurred earlier and the current transformation of the National Police. This knowledge is necessary to understand the late analysis.
History of the intelligence network in the Netherlands
For an overview of the RIDs, I will first outline a brief history of the RIDs. For this paragraph, I will use an article by Kessels (2010) and a study by Hoogenboom (2009).
The Dutch police have been engaged in intelligence work since the 19th century,
although this was mostly improvised. This changed just after the end of the First World War. The CI (Centrale Inlichtingendienst, Central Intelligence Service) was founded after experiences with intelligence during the War. This service was established to inform the government of revolutionary propaganda or preparations for a revolution. The
municipality police was a major role assigned and the PID (Plaatselijke Inlichtingen
Diensten, Local Intelligence Service) fell directly under the chief commissioner. These
PIDs were established in roughly 45 municipalities in 1919 and were the most important source for the CI. The number of PIDs grew rapidly: eventually there were 150 PIDs. The services in the biggest cities, Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht, were the largest.
The most prominent threat in the 1910’s en 1920’s was the communist revolution. PIDs registered revolutionists, screened newspapers and pamphlets and infiltrated in the communist organizations. Soon new points of focus came up: the unrest in the Dutch Indies en the rise of fascism.
After the Second World War the CI, de facto a part of the military intelligence service, was replaced by two new services: the CVD (Centrale Veiligheidsdienst, Central Security Service) and the BI (Buitenlandse Inlichtingendienst, Foreign Intelligence Service). After some political and personal conflicts, the CVD transformed into the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, National Security Service), reporting to the Minister of Home Affairs. During the Cold War, the focus was again on communism in the
Netherlands and the PIDs were running informants and conducting security research. Besides the PIDs, the State Police (Rijkspolitie, supervising the municipal police) also had their own intelligence service, the DIR (Districtelijke Inlichtingendienst Rijkspolitie). These DIRs had the same tasks as the PIDs, but with a different scope.
In 1993, the new Police Act passed. The municipal police corps were transformed into 25 independent regional police corps, headed by the KLPD (Korps Landelijke Politie
Diensten, Corps National Police Services). Each police corps had their own RID
(Regionale Inlichtingen Dienst, Regional Intelligence Service), the successor of the PID (Van den Vijver & Terpstra, 2007, 362).
Not only the police community, but also the intelligence community changed after the Cold War. The IDB (Inlichtingen Dienst Buitenland, Intelligence Service Abroad, successor of the BI) was discontinued in 1994, after internal problems. This called for a transformation of the WIV 1987 (Wet op Inlichtingen-‐ en Veiligheidsdiensten, Intelligence and Security Services Act). In 2002, a new WIV passed the Lower House and this
transformed the BVD into the AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen-‐ en Veiligheidsdienst, General Intelligence and Security Service), combining homeland and foreign intelligence and security tasks. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the following ‘war on terror’ doubled the size of the AIVD and changed its nature (Engelen, 2010: 67-‐70).
Organizational structure before 2013
In January 1990 a committee was assigned to realize a new cooperation structure
between the police and the BVD. The report of June 1991 advised a structure in the form of a project organization, called ‘Hermandad’. Investments were made in ICT and a policy was written for the cooperation between the police and the BVD. Priorities were secured in agreements and communications had to go via shorter lines. In the same period, the police system went through some changes. The State Police was replaced by the KLPD and 25 regional police corps were established. These corps differed
significantly from each other. The base structure was the same, as outlined in figure 1, but the interpretation of the divisions differed, depending on specific problems in the regions. The corps were always in development and debates were held over the degree of (de)centralization and (de)specialization. (Van der Vijver & Molenkamp, 1999: 198/199).
In each intelligence division, there is a Regional Information Organization (RIO). The RIDs, the successors of the PIDs, are a part of this service. The organizational chart of the Amsterdam corps can be found in figure 2.
Figure 1: Organization chart of a regional police corps, 1993 -‐2013
Figure 2: Organization chart of Regional Information Organization of Amsterdam, 2011
Besides the differences of organizational character, there are also differences in staff size, the ratio between the tasks, the task and job descriptions and the way of
communicating with the AIVD and other divisions of the police (Hoogenboom, 2009: 30).
Tasks and legal foundation
After the PIDs changed into the RIDs in 1993, their tasks remained the same: performing intelligence work on a local scope. This task is divided into two different areas: The WIV-‐ task and the OO-‐task.
The OO-‐task is aimed at public order (Openbare Orde in Dutch) and officers performing this task are gaining information on behalf of the major. The major is responsible for the maintenance of the public order en therefore in need of a profound information position (Local Government Act, Gemeentewet, article 172). The major is accountable to the city council (Local Government Act, article 180) and is supported by the police, acting under his authority (Police Act, Politiewet, 1993, article 12). Under Article 2 of the Police Act 1993, the police is responsible for the actual enforcement of the law and order. The maintenance of the public order and the information collection for this purpose are based on this article.
Clandestine collection of information by the RID takes place if this is not possible in a regular way, for example in case of a serious threat, a structural problem, secrecy or a plausible chance for outrages. The information for the OO-‐task concerns movements and activities of groups of individuals and the potential implications for the public order. The character of this task suits within the RID, because the necessary expertise and experience are present (Kessels, 2010: 102/103) .
Competences are not included in the acts mentioned before; therefore the Handbook Information Collection Public Order (Handleiding Informatie Inwinning
Openbare Orde) was created in 2000. The compentencies described in the Handbook
are: the use of open sources, informants and observation. Although the entire police performs the collection of public order information, the RID is the only unit who can collect this information in a clandestine way, using source protection
The maintenance of public order is separated from criminal prosecution. The major is responsible for the maintenance of public order, while the public prosecutor is responsible for the maintenance of the criminal law. Although this is formally strictly separated, they are not independent from each other. When a RID, performing their OO-‐ task, has found indications for the disturbance of the public order, they are expected to inform the public prosecutor and the major. If this indication contains evidence for a criminal case, the head of the RID has the possibility to record this information in a statement and provide this one time for the purpose of detection. The information collected for OO-‐purposes is recorded in another register than information collected for WIV-‐purposes. (Kessels, 2010: 103).
WIV-‐task
Besides the OO-‐task, the RIDs perform the WIV-‐task. This refers to the WIV 2002. Officers carrying out this task are called ‘article 60 officers’, referring to the article 60 of the WIV 2002. In this article it is stated that the police, and therefore the RID, can
perform assignments directed by the AIVD, regarding policy matters as well as
implementation issues. They are entitled to execute all the activities of the AIVD, from running informants to observing local movements and individuals, although they are not entitled to execute this independently. RIDs always need an assignment from the AIVD to conduct special competences (CTIVD report 16: 10). At the same time, RIDs are responsible for the transmission of information considering facts and events that might affect the mission of the AIVD, without a direct order. There is contact on an almost daily basis between the RIDs and the AIVD, especially on an operational level. The RIDs are said to be the ‘eyes and ears’ of the AIVD (Kessels, 2010: 101/102).
In article 9 WIV 2002 it is determined that the ‘article 60 officers’ performing the WIV-‐task, do not have any detection competence and the separation of the processed data for the two different purposes is determined in article 14 WIV 2002. This work is performed under the authority of the Minister of Homeland Affairs and not under the authority of the major. Each year, the activities of the RID are determined in a
‘Inlichtingen Behoefte Plan’, the Intelligence Requirement Plan. Every RID, 25 in total before 2013, drafts their own plan in dialogue with the AIVD.
Another tool to share information, especially information regarding
established in 2004, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid and contains the AIVD, MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), KLPD, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Public Prosecutor’s department. The CT-‐Infobox is designed to
streamline the exchange of terrorism-‐related information. It is a so-‐called ‘closed box system’, in which the AIVD can supplement and compare its own information with other information, for example reports by the RIDs (Kessels, 2010: 101).
Double-‐hatted nature
Although the separation between the two tasks seems quite strict, with different laws under which the tasks are conducted and separate registers for the storing of information, practice shows otherwise. CTIVD report 16 (2007), a report by the supervisory committee on the intelligence and security services, concluded that some research areas, such as radicalization and left-‐ and right extremism, belong to the WIV-‐ task while they can also be significant for the maintenance of the public order, for example in the case of demonstrations. Hoogenboom interviewed a head of a RID, who stated that ideally there would be two sources in one group of interest: one for the WIV-‐ task and one for the OO-‐task. This situation is completely theoretical, because
sometimes it is hard to have even one source. (2009: 25). Overlap seems inevitable in practice, but as long as it is clear to all the parties under which task information is collected, this should not cause big problems.
According to Kessels, the problem is mainly seen by outsiders, who see ethical and governmental obstacles. To unite an AIVD-‐officer and a police-‐officer in one person is seen as difficult to control and this evokes associations with the Gestapo. Although these problems are known by the parties involved, the RIDs, AIVD and CTIVD approach it more pragmatical: the situation is not ideal, but it is functional. Besides, there are also advantages to this doubled-‐hatted nature: the different networks reinforce each other and local knowledge is very useful. The RIDs have learned how to deal with it: officers know under which law they operate when approaching a potential informant and the head of the RID keeps tight control on this subject (Kessels, 2010: 104/105).
Transferring information from the RID to the AIVD might cause problems in the light of the double-‐hatted nature. When the RID has a source for the OO-‐task and this source gives information concerning national security, the RID is obliged to hand the source over to the AIVD, who is by then in control of this source. The RID cannot contact
this source independently, which might cause a certain restraint (Hoogenboom, 2009: 66)
The double hats can also cause a problem in the light of loyalty. RID-‐officers are employed by the police, but can operate under the authority of the AIVD. There is also a difference in culture: it is said that AIVD-‐officers can act disdainful towards RID-‐officers, which could harm the cooperation (ibid.: 47/48).
Transformations Nationale Politie
With the passing of the new Police Act in 2012, the route to the new National Police was opened. The first step of the transformation was made in January 2013, with the
establishment of the National Police, replacing the KLPD (Korps Landelijke Politie
Diensten). The 25 regional corps are reorganized in 10 regional units and some
specialized units are grouped under the National Unit. With this transformation, the formerly very different corps are more identical and this shows a more centralized direction. You can find the organization chart in Attachment 1.
This transformation also means a change for the intelligence division. The Collection Department and Regional Information Service are part of the Regional Information Organization (see figure 3 & 4). Each Regional Unit has its own Regional Information Organization, thus there are 10 Regional Information Organizations. What is most conspicuous, is that the two tasks of the former RID, the OO-‐task and the WIV-‐task, are now separated in two different teams: the Public Order Intelligence (Openbare Orde
Inlichtingen or OOI), grouped under the Collection Department and performing the OO-‐
task; and the Regional Information Service WIV (Regionale Informatie Dienst WIV or RID-‐
WIV), performing the WIV-‐task which has its own department in the new situation.
Figure 3: Organization chart of the Collection Department (Afdeling Inwinningen) (Nationale Politie, 2012: 159). Percentages are the part of the total amount of FTE’s working in this department.
Figure 4: Organization chart of the Regional Intelligence Service – WIV (Regionale
Inlichtingendienst – WIV) (Nationale Politie, 2012: 160) Percentages are the part of the
total amount of FTE’s working in this department.
5. Results
In this chapter, I will compare the factors, advantages and disadvantages, as outlined by Bayley and Weisburd, with the Dutch case
Factors
According to Bayley and Weisburd, there are six factors that affect the way local police engages in counterterrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009: 89 – 91). For each of the factors, the Dutch situation will be described.
1. Local incidents of terrorism
Visible response by law enforcement agencies is required after an incident of terrorism. Research has shown that the level of high policing is higher in
countries with experience in terrorism. For the Dutch case, this can also be said, although terrorist attacks abroad influenced legislation likewise. A major
incident in the recent history is the murder on Dutch populist politician Pim Fortuyn, by animal activist Volkert van der Graaf in 2002. Together with the murder on Theo van Gogh, a director and author, in 2004 by Mohammed Bouyeri, this changed the social debate. After the attacks in New York in 2001 and the attacks in London and Madrid, the AIVD and the RIDs with it, went through some changes. The focus is more on Islamic terrorism, investments have been made in automation and exchange of information, for example the establishment of the Counterterrorism Infobox in 2004 (Kessels, 2010: 100/101). The Netherlands also participated in the ‘war on terror’, declared by George W. Bush after 9/11. This meant a duplication of the work force of the AIVD (Engelen, 2010: 69). Not only the AIVD, but also the RID faced a doubling of the staff and thereby an obligation to perform (Hoogenboom, 2011: 27).
2. The structure of police organization
According to Bayley & Weisburd, the more centralized the police is organized, the more likely it is that counterterrorism will be a task of the local police. The
reason is that they are closer to the national government and thereby more involved in national security. The Dutch police has become more centralized,
from 150 PIDs in the 1920s to 10 RIDs in 2015 and with one supervising authority, the National Police. The centralized structure of the Dutch police shows that local intelligence on counterterrorism is likely to be undertaken.
3. The size of the police unit
To specialize a unit in counterterrorism intelligence, a police unit needs a large scale. With the reforms in 2013/2014 with the National Police, most of the RIDs have grown because the former regional corps are merged. The growth of the units makes place for more specialization. Before this transition, the RIDs had grown already, because of the imminent terrorist threat (CTIVD report 16, 1).
4. Time under threat
Bayley & Weisburd show that governments make amendments after the
experience of terror. Therefore, countries that have faced terrorism for a longer period, will go further in their countermeasures. Especially the attacks from 9/11 and the killing of Theo van Gogh have influenced Dutch legislation. With the ongoing threat of jihadist fighters and returning jihadists, the threat is still
noticeable. This calls for more action and this will influence the scope of the RIDs.
5. Intolerance of political dissent
This factor is fairly complex, according to Bayley & Weisburd. They say that if a country is not tolerant on dissent, high policing is more accepted. Dissent is viewed as a threat in these countries, and therefore high policing is needed to fight this threat. In the Netherlands, one of the countries were civil liberties and the freedom of speech are respected, this factor does not play an important role.
6. Legal mandates and financial encouragement
Engagement in counterterrorism intelligence is only possible when there is a legal foundation and financial possibilities. These requirements are met when the national government sees the need to do so. The threats of new attacks influence this. In the Netherlands, legislation makes it possible to conduct intelligence research by the police, under the Act on Intelligence and Security Service (WIV
![Qualitative, quantitative, and data mining methods for analyzing log data to characterize students' learning strategies and behaviors [discussant]]()