Achieving our humanity : Dutch immigration policies and the limits of liberal justice : to what extent are Dutch immigration rules limited, in theory and practice, with regard to humaneness?

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Achieving our humanity:

Dutch immigration policies and the limits of

liberal justice

To what extent are Dutch immigration rules limited, in theory and practice, with regard to humaneness?

Simone Teunissen (10362940)

Master Thesis Political Science, track Political Theory University of Amsterdam

Date: October 2018

Supervisor: dr. M.O. Eze

Second reader: dr. P.A. Raekstad

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Introduction

"[T]he ideal of moral intervention beyond national borders" became an important subject after the Second World War, explains Michael Ignatieff (2001, p. 293). From then on, “[h]uman rights”, secured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have "given bystanders and witnesses a stake in abuse and oppression both within and beyond their borders, and this has called forth an advocacy revolution", he writes (idem, p. 291). As this Declaration imposes “structural barriers to what states can do in the name of ‘their’ people” ever since, Christian Joppke explains, immigration policies of "post-war Western states" evolved and the signification of the word exclusion changed because “the mark of the liberal state … [became] to break [the] … nationalist-cum-racist windows and to institutionalize a modicum of shared humanity” (2005, pp. 48-49). In addition, since 1951, the Refugee Convention, affirmed by 145 nations, legally protects the specific group of immigrants that is referred to as 'refugees' (UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, n.d.).

However, in contrast to what might be assumed from conventions or treaties that are made in order to protect humaneness in current immigration rules, Stephan Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller explain, "[f]ortress Europe" has restricted immigration rules in several ways since the end of the 20th century (2014, p. 226). Some of these changes include: restricted access to refugee status, "restrictive interpretations of the 1951 UN Refugee convention", temporary refugee status for more people instead of the granting of permanent refugee status and policies that require people to obtain visas preceding departure (ibid.). A contrastive tendency to further restrict immigration is selective access based on skills. Castles et al. explain that, increasingly, class is a significant factor in regulating immigration (idem, p. 238). They write, Western states "compete to attract the highly skilled through privileged rules on entry and residence, while manual workers and refugees often experience exclusion and discrimination" (idem, pp. 6-7). Since more strict and selective immigration rules seem to become the new normal, it is relevant to study the implications they have for immigrants. As entry rules are increasingly being tightened, people start to rely more on their migration network – the so-called "migration industry" – and the even more risky services of human smugglers (idem, pp. 235-236), when they are motivated to migrate anyway. Immigrants have to be creative in finding new ways to try to manage their migration. Arriving in the promising cities of Europe, Michael Onyebuchi Eze writes, after travelling "often through treacherous routes", an immigrant "learns how to skirt the laws of exclusion and even help others like him to achieve similar goals" (2017, pp. 12-13). As I will discuss, one important attempt by migrants to bypass immigration rules could be to lie about identity.

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In the Netherlands, Gloria Wekker explains, the phenomenon of lying to obtain a residence

permit received attention in 2006, when Rita Verdonk, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration:

repeatedly told Ayaan Hirsi Ali, ... member of parliament for the same party and a former

refugee from Somalia, that since she had lied about her exact name and her date of birth in

order to obtain Dutch citizenship, the minister was now forced to revoke it (Wekker, 2016, p.

10).

According to Wekker, this “event was shocking and deeply unsettling”, as it reminded the Dutch of the Second World War, because of the similarities of Verdonk’s demand with “the _{Befehl ist Befehl} ethos of the war years”, which implied that “rules exist to be obeyed” (ibid.). Today, lying by migrants is still considered a problem by the Dutch government. As will be discussed, immigration procedures place a great deal of emphasis on "credibility", and thus whether or not people speak the truth (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b).

Based on Bourdieu's concept of social capital, Eze explains that nationality can be understood as a characteristic which influences how people's social status is perceived. With that, he observes that in the context of South Africa migrants 'perform' being from another nationality than they actually are as a means to get "credits" as a human being (2011, p. 306). This idea of 'identity performance' (Eze's term) will be further applied in this thesis to analyse what happens when immigrants are confronted with Dutch immigration rules.

In this thesis, I will analyze the two tendencies in immigration policies described above – those of increased restrictions for asylum seekers and selective policies for other migrants – and their effects with regard to the humaneness of immigration rules. This case study will mainly focus on the phenomenon of lying about identity, which, I will argue, turns up in the Netherlands as a result of strict immigration rules. Therefore, the following research question is developed:

To what extent are Dutch immigration rules limited, in theory and practice, with regard to humaneness?

As I think the term humaneness does not require a lot of clarification, I will only briefly explain how I understand the term in this research question. In the Oxford English Dictionary, the noun ‘humaneness’ is defined as: "[t]he quality, state, or condition of being humane" (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). The adjective 'humane', is, in addition, defined as: "characterized by sympathy with and consideration for others; feeling or showing compassion towards humans or animals; benevolent,

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be: "characterized by sympathy with and consideration for others" (ibid.). Secondly, following the definition of the noun 'humaneness': it is a 'state of being'. Connected with an egalitarian political philosophical outlook, the idea of equality would in this case mean that humaneness, as a state of being, should apply to every human being, since all human beings are equally human. In order to be able to take the aspect of equality properly into account in this study, the starting position Rawls uses for his studies on 'liberal justice', which says that that everyone should be understood as an 'equal moral person' (Rawls, 1971, p. 19), can be of help. Humaneness with regard to immigration rules should therefore be understood to mean that anyone confronted by these rules should be approached by them as an equal human being and treated in a way that is characterised by sympathy and consideration.

In chapter one, the relationship between Dutch immigration rules and the theoretical liberal tradition is examined. The most well-known and influential theory on ‘liberal justice’ is John Rawls’s

A Theory of Justice (Mills, 2015, p. 14). As Rawls' philosophy on justice has been so influential on

Western political philosophy and his theoretical foundation in which people are understood as equal moral beings has led to the questioning of immigration restrictions, it will be used as the starting point for my theoretical framework to analyze how Dutch immigration rules can be understood. Rawls's theory is summarily discussed, followed by an overview of several critiques on that theory, particularly related to its foundation: the original position. Subsequently, critiques specifically relevant to immigration rules are considered, leading finally to an explanation of the link between Dutch immigration rules and Rawls's ideas on justice. I will show that these rules align with Rawls's theory, because it implies restrictive immigration policies on the country level. Chapter two will include an overview of the Dutch immigration rules and procedures. The specific distinction between ‘regular’ migrants and asylum seekers will be explained, followed by the differences in the procedures involved in their immigration. Next, in chapter three, I will look at the effect of these rules and procedures in practice. Several criticisms are made. People are categorized and expected to abide by that categorization, while a comparison with Kantian ethics shows that what the law expects from migrants is in fact an inhumane expectation. Secondly, this problem of insensitivity to context will be expanded upon, mainly regarding the simplified procedure. Subsequently, these critiques will come together through the lens of game theory. In chapter four I propose that lying about identity by migrants signifies that a certain group of people is subaltern in relation to Dutch immigration rules. I emphasize that the effect of Dutch immigration rules (that people 'must' lie) should be assessed negatively because of its alienating effect. Building on the observations of what is wrong with Dutch immigration rules in regard to humaneness, I suggest what should be changed in order to achieve humanity. First,

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Method

In this study, I will only focus on the rules and procedures dealing with the admission of immigrants to the Netherlands. I will not examine whether the treatment, approach or expectations of the government with regard to the integration of refugees or regular migrants, taking place after people have gained rights in the Netherlands, is humane. The focus explicitly lies on the legal gates of entry – or, as will be discussed, most of the time 'barriers' – that exist in the Netherlands to selectively limit the inflow of people.

One limitation of this thesis will be that the method provides no empirical data about the phenomenon that is analyzed. There is no clear data on the frequency of ‘lying about identity’, and the personal consequences ‘lying about identity’ has for immigrants. An approach to resolve this lack of data could be to conduct interviews to better map the process and experiences of immigrants. However, this approach is not followed, for three reasons. First, due to the limited time and resources available, this thesis would only include a very narrow selection of interviews. Moreover, it is highly improbable that the information that would be retrieved from such interviews is reliable and representative, because the subject is extremely sensitive. Furthermore, conducting interviews conflicts with what will be argued in this thesis: that the way in which immigrants are asked to explain their identity to see if they fulfill the criteria set by the Dutch government to get access as a human person in the Netherlands is unacceptable. For the purpose of this master thesis I do not think it ethical to give some people yet another experience in which they have to answer questions regarding their identity (and perhaps (re-)experience the insecurity or fear probably related to this form of investigation in immigration procedures, as will be discussed in chapter three). I think it would be just as inappropriate for me to ask such personal questions as I argue it is for the Dutch government. This limitation does give rise to the risk that in some parts of this thesis, particular experiences (e.g. of a psychological nature) may be ascribed to immigrants, that are not in accordance with actual experiences. In an attempt to treat this complicated subject carefully, literary artifacts will be used in several instances to support the argumentation, thereby allowing to reflect on human feelings and motivations.

The method of this thesis is most similar to what the philosophical movement of the Frankfurter Schule referred to as Critical Theory. Max Horkheimer introduces that term for theories "that move at the interface of social science and philosophy and that maintain a conscious relationship with practice" (Leezenberg and de Vries, 2012, p. 207, own translation). According to Michiel

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below, followed by a brief description of how different chapters of this thesis will treat them more elaborately.

Leezenberg and de Vries explain, “critical theories should provide interpretations of social phenomena that put them in historical perspective” (ibid., own translation). A critical theory should "present its findings in light of the developments and social oppositions that have shaped them” (ibid., own translation). In chapter four, the social phenomenon of identity performance will be put into historical context. In line with Leezenberg and de Vries, who emphasize critical theories are derived from practice, this thesis focuses on the phenomenon of identity performance which takes place in practice and tries to explain why it exists and what it points out to us about immigration rules. Also, "critical theories anticipate a future change in society” (ibid., own translation). In order to do that, Leezenberg and de Vries write, critical theories "point to discrepancies between the functioning of social institutions and the values _{and ideals that they actually claim to embody” (ibid., own} translation). This thesis underlines the paradox between, liberal theory and the constitution on the one hand, in which equality is emphasized, and practice on the other hand, where the existence of identity performance shows that there is in fact no such equality for migrants. In chapter three, game theory supports this argument, further highlighting the inhumane character of the law. The analysis in this thesis is of a reflective nature on current policy, with the aim to be, eventually, policy guiding towards a more widely shared humanity, which will mainly be addressed in the final chapter. With this, this thesis also tries to fulfill what Leezenberg and de Vries describe as key to the practical importance of any critical theory: that it "can provide new insights [relevant] to particular social groups" (ibid., own translation). With this thesis, I aim to encourage readers to look at immigrants in a humane way, and to question (at the very least) currently existing immigration rules.

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1. Theoretical Framework

1.1 Rawls's theory of justice _&relevant critiques on its foundation

Rawls's theory of justice can be defined as deontological liberalism, which is described by Michael Sandel “as an ethic that asserts the priority of the right over the good” (1998, p. 1). The weakness of Kant’s deontological conception of justice, Rawls argues, was its “obscurity and arbitrariness” (idem, p. 13). This weakness in Kantian theory was due to the fact that it remained obscure how definite principles of justice would emerge from “an abstract, disembodied subject”, and thus “how in any case the legislation of such a subject would apply to actual human beings” (ibid.). Rawls wanted to "preserve Kant’s deontological teaching” but, at the same time, prevent this problem of un-applicability to reality in his own theory (idem, pp. 13-14). Rawls did this by proposing to derive principles from the original position, which constitutes a situation of hypothetical choice. The conditions that define it are intended to produce an outcome that can be used in practice by real humans (idem, p. 14), as Rawls is convinced “that [it] ‘enables us to envisage our objective from afar’, but not so far as to land us in the realm of transcendence” (idem, p. 24).

According to Rawls, the original position defines “the appropriate initial status quo” (1971, p. 17). The fairness of this initial status quo guarantees that the "fundamental agreements" that are reached in it are fair as well (idem, p. 12). Rawls calls its objective “justice as fairness” (idem, p. 17). Through deliberation, parties in the original position choose principles which are rational for them to adopt (ibid.). Rawls supposes that parties in the original position are equal: unequal circumstantial factors are negated through ‘the veil of ignorance’ (idem, p. 136). Behind this veil, parties are deprived of certain knowledge: they do not possess any information about their own "place in society, ... class position or social status; nor … [do they] know [their] ... fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, ... intelligence and strength" (idem, p. 137). In addition, they do not know their "conception of the good", and lack any information about the society they belong to in terms of its political system or its history and culture (ibid.). In contrast, parties do know “they must try to protect their liberties, widen their opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting their aims whatever they are” (idem, p. 143). The exclusion of the kind of information mentioned above is necessary, Rawls writes, to make sure that, in the original position, no one has an advantage through particular "natural" or "social" circumstances in the process of adopting the principles (1980, p. 523). As a result, Rawls asserts it is possible to “establish fairness between the parties as free and equal moral persons” (ibid.). Ultimately, these principles will “serve as the effective public conception of justice for a well-ordered society” (idem, p. 524).

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Sandel formulates a critique on Rawls's theory, focussing on the process from which the Principles of Justice are derived (1998, p. 24). He underlines why Rawls's theory contains the same problem as located in Kantian metaphysics. As mentioned above, Rawls dismisses Kantian metaphysics, but seeks to retain its “moral force” (ibid.). However, Sandel suggests that, Rawls’s 'solution' – the original position – does not satisfy its aims, pointing out there is a contradiction attached to the way it functions, as Rawls assumes people can choose objectively, but at the same time maintain their identity (idem, p. 179). With this contradiction, Sandel suggests that persons in the original position cannot deliver what Rawls expects of them:

As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance

myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection

never finally secured outside the history itself (Sandel 1998, p. 179).

In brief, he shows that Rawls's “priority of the right” is connected to a “broadly Kantian conception of the person” (idem, p. 187). Consequently, the “deliberation about ends” between 'deontological selves' “can only be an exercise in arbitrariness” (idem, pp. 179-180).

Sandel underlines that Rawls uses a “conception of the person that finds expression in the ideal of the state as a neutral framework" (1998, p. 187). In other words, Rawls explained the “framework of rights” is supposed to be "neutral among ends" so that people can live their lives freely and independently (ibid.). However, Sandel observes that Rawls's original position is not neutral to start with, as it implies that the principles of justice are "beyond choice" in how the framework is set up (idem, p. 157). Strengthening this position, Alasdair Macintyre points out that a neutral framework is never a possibility (1988, p. 345). According to him, liberalism cannot supply a “neutral tradition-independent ground” (idem, p. 346) as it is, on the contrary, just another type of tradition itself (idem, p. 349) . Macintyre explains that liberal principles do lay down a theory of the good, namely, a liberal theory of the good: "[a] particular conception of the good life, of practical reasoning, and of justice” is in fact ingrained within the liberal principles themselves (idem, pp. 344-345).

So, in short, Sandel criticizes the feasibility of the original position as he questions if people can abstract themselves to make 'neutral choices' as much as Rawls asks them to, thereby showing the theory’s insensitivity to context. Moreover, following Macintyre, the way in which Rawls proposed to derive principles of justice, as well as the principles themselves, cannot be understood as neutral or ahistorical.

1.2 Rawls’s theory of justice and immigration rules

This paragraph specifically addresses the implications of Rawls's non-neutral, tradition-dependent theory on immigration rules. In _{A Theory of Justice,} Rawls takes "the basic structure of society" to be

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the "primary subject of justice" (1971, p. 3). By "the basic structure", Rawls "mean[s] a society's main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next” (1993, p. 11). That the world currently is divided up into states that each claim the right to regulate admission to their territory and citizenship is something that most liberal theorists take for granted, explains Will Kimlicka (1995, p. 124). By bringing to light this implicit assumption, he emphasizes the paradox that arises when combining the concept of equality, on which liberal theorists generally build, with the existence of states and their authority to regulate admission (ibid.). Kimlicka's observation about the nature of citizenship shows it is actually a "profound contradiction within most liberal theories" that advantages and rights connected to citizenship are simply distributed based on "group membership[s]" into which people are born (idem, pp. 124-125). Kimlicka explains that an underlying assumption that liberal theorists use is that "people are members of societal cultures, … [which] provide the context for individual choice, and that one of the functions of having separate states is to recognize the fact that people belong to separate cultures" (idem, p. 125). The notion that citizenship may be limited in order to conserve this “membership in distinct cultures” directly follows from this assumption (ibid.). Therefore, Kimlicka accepts boundaries to immigration as these "can be justified if we recognize that liberal states exist, not only to protect standard rights and opportunities of individuals, but also to protect people's cultural membership" (ibid.).

Similar to Kimlicka, Michael Walzer agrees that membership should be bounded to protect the cultural membership of people. Walzer explains, that frequently, large groups of people from places with poorer conditions seek to replace their membership with that of another, more wealthy country, where conditions are better (1983, p. 32). Walzer observes, that the fact admissions policies entail that existing members consider which applicants should be admitted to membership in their community is just, because "[t]he distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life" (idem, p. 39). He writes:

Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the

deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of

character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special

commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life (idem, p. 62).

This makes a "(limited) right of closure" essential in Walzer's view, not only because without closure, obviously, communities could not exist, but also because the right of closure protects “the political inclusiveness of the existing communities” (idem, p. 63). Walzer thinks membership should be bounded following the "idea of distributive justice" (idem, p. 31). He seems to say that when membership is distributed in the right way, the concept of distributive justice allows for the existence

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Different from Rawls’s theory, “an account of membership rights” is the very basis of a “theory of distributive justice”, according to Walzer (idem, p. 63).

There are, however, also critics of Rawls _{Theory of Justice who look at Rawls' theoretical} starting point in a different way and, therefore, have a another view on international relations between countries. As written above, central in Rawls's theory of liberal justice is the aspect that people behind the veil of ignorance can be seen as equal moral human beings. It is argued by Rawls that “under the proper conditions, collective deliberation by rational and reasonable parties could yield agreement on impartial rules of justice” (Feltham & Cottingham, 2010, p. 42). These rules are called impartial, as they result from compromises that are made in a “collective choice-problem” between morally equal individuals, clarify Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (idem, p. 51). It is _{this particular part that} justifies the adoption of Rawls's principles. However, Howard Y. Chang writes that, as "place of birth would appear to be a circumstance that Rawls should deem ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’”, for example, Charles Beitz and Thomas W. Pogge argue in favor of taking a global view of the original position (2008, p. 13). The supporters of this vision emphasize that not only members within one society should be regarded “as free and equal moral beings”; but, rather, that this should be done on a global scale and thus include all human beings, notes Chang (ibid.).

Chang explains that Beitz asserts that "the entire world is a 'society' in which all individuals would be parties to the original position" (ibid.). Beitz writes: “Rawls's derivation of the principles of justice for the law of nations is correct but incomplete" (1975, p. 383). According to him, this incompleteness stems from the fact that Rawls does not account for the redistribution of (global) resources, which the parties in the second original position would definitely care about (ibid.). To resolve this, principles of distributive justice have to first work on a global level, before they are applied to states, Beitz argues, since, notably: "Rawls's two principles become more relevant as global distributive inequalities are reduced and a higher average level of well-being attained" (ibid.).

Pogge takes a different view of this globalized form of Rawls theory about justice. In contrast to Beitz, he is not convinced that "Rawls is really committed to requirements of global distributive justice that make demands even in the absence of international interaction" (1989, p. 241). However, Pogge does think that Rawls’s conception of justice can be seen as practical. This, to him, implies that it should take the “social position of the globally least advantaged” as the yardstick to examine the justice of “our basic institutions” (idem, p. 242). Pogge, who also thinks that – starting from Rawls's "conception of all human beings as free and equal moral persons" – one cannot only focus on "the basic structure" of a society, argues that Rawls's "entire conception of justice" should be globalized (idem, p. 240). He underlines, that, as "modern states" are not "closed schemes", the "criterion of justice for domestic institutions" that Rawls expounded is not "sufficient", because there is, in fact, a

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"global basic structure for principles of global justice to apply to" (idem, p. 240). It is exactly because of this, Pogge claims, that "we must at some point go beyond Rawls's 'first approximation' and ask how his conception of justice might be best adapted to the complexities of the real world" (idem, p. 241).

Nevertheless, Pogge does not investigate specific solutions (idem, p. 277). He mainly shows the current state of affairs is not just and should change in the future, and that maintaining it, or participating in it, makes us accomplices of that injustice (idem, p. 278). For Pogge, averting the complicity that comes from helping to maintain unjust institutions is a "negative duty": he believes that people holding a privileged position should actively oppose such complicity, and, more importantly, try to use their privileged position to change the institutions (idem, p. 277). Pogge emphasizes the need for increased awareness of the injustice of the current situation in order to create support for change. Just as the first realization that slavery and colonialism are wrong was the beginning of changes, according to Pogge, this could also be the case for international inequality (idem, p. 279).

In_{The Law of Peoples} , Rawls introduces a second veil of ignorance, intended to make justice possible in international politics (1999, p. 10). In Rawls’s view international justice is a two step process. Rawls emphasizes that the in the first step, the first original position just takes those people into consideration who are part of society (idem, p. 26). Relations with other societies and groups are disregarded, and society as a whole is considered a "closed" system (ibid.). In Rawls’s Second Original position, which follows after this step, it is “the representatives of liberal peoples [who] make an agreement with other liberal peoples” (idem, p. 10). The veil is now adapted to the international situation, and the ignorance of the parties now relates to characteristics of their society: “[t]hey do not know, for example, the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative strength of the people whose fundamental interests they represent" (idem, p. 32), and additionally, they are ignorant of "the extent of their natural resources, or the level of their economic development, or other such information" (idem, pp. 32-33). Since they are aware the societies they represent are liberal, however, they do understand that circumstances enabling constitutional democracy are present (idem, pp. 32-33). Rawls makes a distinction between peoples and states, which is "crucial" according to him, because "just peoples are fully prepared to grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals" (idem, p. 35). This willingness enables them "to offer to other peoples fair terms of political and social cooperation" (ibid.).

In Rawls's view, borders, and thus immigration rules, fulfill an important function of any society’s government to be an adequate means for that people to “take responsibility for their territory

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and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population” (idem, pp. 38-39). He argues that "the perpetuity condition" is fundamental to the political organization of a territory:

unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for

not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. In this case the asset is the people's territory and

its capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people themselves as politically

organized (idem, p. 39).

He takes this to imply that a failure of taking care of a people’s own territory can never be compensated by “migrating into other people’s territory without their consent” (ibid.). Rawls maintains, that although "boundaries are historically arbitrary", this does not mean "that their role in the Law of Peoples cannot be justified" (ibid.). To him, the arbitrariness of the boundaries is not important: as long as the world is divided into states, there necessarily “ _must be boundaries of some kind”, and, once a society adopts the 'Law of Peoples', the 'peoples', from then deal with each other in a "reasonably just (or at least decent) Society of Peoples" (ibid.).

Rawls writes that the 'law of peoples': "will restrict a state's internal sovereignty or (political) autonomy, its alleged right to do as it wills with people within its own borders" (idem, p. 26). One way in which the “state's internal sovereignty of (political) autonomy” is restricted by being part of the 'Society of Peoples' is that states have to meet certain criteria (ibid.). For example, they must honour and respect human rights, which is why things like “persecution of religious and ethnic minorities” or “the denial of their human rights” do not exist in these countries (idem, p. 9). Other central conditions of a "sound social policy for a realistic utopia" Rawls mentions are "religious freedom and liberty of conscience, political freedom and constitutional liberties, and equal justice for women" (ibid.). The emergence of these central conditions convinces Rawls that he has sufficiently addressed "[t]he problem of immigration", as he states that the reasons people migrate, "would disappear in the Society of liberal and decent Peoples" (idem, pp. 8-9). Rawls claims: "[t]he problem of immigration is not, then, simply left aside, but is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia" (idem, p. 9).

Joseph Carens does not agree with Rawls’s last point, but is instead of the opinion that Rawls trivializes the problem. He equates Rawls’s claim with saying that there are "no serious moral issues" to restricting migration by force when “those seeking to migrate are living in conditions above some minimum threshold in their original society” (2013, p. 268). Moreover, he disagrees with Rawls on responsibility, pointing out that as future generations cannot be held accountable for what their predecessors did, it seems unfair to expect them to simply abide by the consequences of those actions, since it would prevent them from starting from a “relatively equal” position (idem, pp. 265-266). The biggest issue he has is that membership in communities is determined through birthright, which

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directly 'mediates' “the moral claims of individuals” (idem, p. 267). Carens clarifies, that as distribution of membership by birth has enormous consequences for “one’s life chances and one’s life projects”, it becomes necessary to specify how such a birthright can be reconciled with moral equality (idem, p. 268). Carens takes the fact that Rawls neglects to discuss these issues as a sign “he is implicitly seeing individuals as having moral claims only as members, not as human beings” (ibid.). He concludes, that Rawls's 'solution' cannot be identified at all with the claim all people are equal and free moral beings (idem, p. 270).

According to Carens, taking the starting position of all human beings as free and equal moral beings seriously would imply "an obligation to open our borders more fully than we do now" (Chang 2008, p. 14). Chang sees Carens taking a "global interpretation of Rawls’s original position" as he argues that beginning from “equal concern for all persons” implies that any restrictions to the movement of people become suspect, as such barriers may be discriminating only by birth, which negates that "equal concern" and is thus “at odds with liberal ideas” (ibid.). Likewise, Philip Cole takes the principle of people as equal moral beings to implicate that borders should be opened up, as “immigration controls represent the failure of the liberal project of moral equality” (2012, p. 122). For Cole it is also clear that place of birth should be among the inequalities Rawls strives to wipe out with his theory. This leads him to conclude that "the moral arbitrariness of national membership makes it an entirely unsuitable basis for the just distribution of resources and other values, and makes the power of exclusion from membership just that - the exercise of power, not of right" (idem, p. 123). Similarly, both Carens and Cole deduce the implication of open borders from the basic principle of moral equal beings in liberal theory. They agree “coercive borders” can be rejected on the basis of what Cole calls "the equality principle" (2014, p. 505), but Cole adds a further argument: "a move against the rationality principle" (ibid.). He explains that Rawls claimed in _{The Law of Peoples that} "we have to start somewhere, and that somewhere has to be boundaries of membership" (idem, p. 507). He responds:

The problem with this answer is that if we start here, then we start with national boundaries

that have been fixed not only in arbitrary ways, but also in deeply immoral ones, so how can a

theory of justice rest on theseborders? Also notice Rawls says that there must boundaries of

some kind, and I have no disagreement with that claim: the question is not whether these must

be boundaries of some kind, but whether there should be boundaries of this kind (ibid.).

Cole therefore disagrees with taking these national boundaries as the, so to speak, 'rational' starting point. He argues,"contingent or arbitrary arrangements" are not suitable as a base "when it comes to questions of migration and membership" (idem, p. 515). Where they are used as a base for migration regulations, Cole concludes, "[t]his migration regime plays a role not only in maintaining extreme inequalities of wealth across the globe, but also extreme inequalities of global power" (ibid.). This is

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in line with Carens’s argument that "inherited citizenship ... does function as a form of illegitimate privilege" (2013, p. 289).

Summarizing, Rawls's theoretical starting point of people as 'equal moral beings' leads to different conclusions on what 'liberal justice' means. For Beitz, it means that all 'equal moral beings' (and thus not only citizens) must count for the distribution of assets, which would help to create global distributive justice. Pogge concludes that change is needed because the status quo in international relations is not just (1989, p. 277). Carens and Cole follow Beitz’s and Pogge's line of reasoning, but for them, Rawls’s starting point implies open borders.

1.3 'Liberal justice' and Dutch immigration rules

Rawls original _{Theory of Justice} , in combination with his later works in which he makes statements on the international world order and political issues related to this, have led to a variety of criticisms that are relevant to immigration rules. Yet, in reality, these arbitrary national borders exist, and immigration restrictions are part of today's international politics.

As I already explained, Rawls defends coercive immigration policies at the level of the society. Rawls writes his_{Law of Peoples as ideal theory and thus assumes an utopian image (which} he, nevertheless calls a "realistic utopia") (1999, p. 4). In this 'realistic utopia', the countries that enter into a certain relationship with each other with regard to justice at a higher level are all 'liberal democratic governments', or at least "non-liberal but decent governments" (idem, p. 1). Such societies would agree on a joint collaboration that he calls the 'Law of Peoples', as a result of which "their mutual relations" can be understood as “reasonably just” (idem, p. 5). He explains: "constitutional democratic societies do not go to war with one another ... simply because they have no cause to go to war with one another" (idem, p. 8). Rawls states that this idea, which is part of his ideal theory, seems to be realized in reality in relations between countries within Western Europe (ibid.). As has been shown in the previous paragraph, this part of his theory also implies, according to Rawls, that in such an international setting no substantial reasons for people to immigrate remain. However, in order to prevent the possibility of deterioration of countries, he assumes, despite the fact that national borders are arbitrary, they can still function as boundaries (idem, p. 8). Moreover, this seems to be justified according to Rawls, because these bounded territories which are societies, in his ideal theory, function fairly with each other in a 'Society of Peoples'. The ultimate goal is: "that the nature of the social world allows reasonably just constitutional democratic societies existing as members of the Society of Peoples" so that eventually, "a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible" (idem, p. 6).

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Rawls’s wish obviously does not correspond to the current international reality as a lot of people are motivated to migrate. There is no degree of peace and equality between countries on a global scale as that which according to Rawls exists between European countries, as a result of which most people would want to stay in their own country because they have no or only little motivations to migrate. In paragraph 1.2 I mentioned that between the countries as 'Society of Peoples' that Rawls envisions in his ideal theory, migration rules are no longer that necessary or relevant, as Rawls suggests not much use would be made of them anyway (idem, p. 9). Therefore, according to Rawls, these borders are, albeit arbitrary, nevertheless the "effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as well as for maintaining the land's environmental integrity" (idem, p. 8).

The immigration policies that are now in use in the Netherlands are in line with Rawls's idea that national borders may carry out coercion; they are almost taken for granted, or are, as it were, 'legitimized' by the conviction that 'deterioration' (as Rawls calls it) of the country may be prevented in this way, so that Dutch society may be protected culturally and politically. Contrary to what Rawls assumes (and hopes for the future), namely that there is a greater degree of peace, resulting from a 'Society of Peoples' – something which at most could be argued to be the case between Western and European countries – in reality, that greater degree of peace does not exist: after all, the Netherlands does not only have relations with Western and European countries, but also with countries where there is indeed the motivation - or even the necessity - to migrate.

Neither do the Netherlands have a fair distribution principle for membership, as Walzer prescribes. "[M]embership itself" is, according to Walzer, "the most important good that gets distributed", explains Cole (2012, p. 123). He adds that, similar to what is discussed in paragraph 1.2, Walzer agrees that membership may be limited, but that he makes the provision that if such limitations are to be made, the distribution of membership must be done correctly. According to Cole, it follows from a predominant importance of the distribution of membership, that any unjustified exclusion of individuals from that membership means, that the justification of all other distributions among the members of the group must be called into question (ibid.). Cole writes: "unless we know that national boundaries have been constituted justly, in accordance with the basic moral principles of liberal theory, the fact that members of the nation have distributed a particular resource fairly amongst themselves similarly counts for nothing" (ibid.). In the Netherlands, no attempt has been made to create specific distributive-justice principles to try to legitimize membership and the accompanying national boundaries and immigration policies, but membership is distributed primarily by birth. "[T]he right to exclude … national membership boundaries" (ibid.), is not defended by the Netherlands by means of any globally targeted distribution principle.

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In contrast, it can be argued, in line with Carens and Cole, that the Netherlands has restrictive and coercive immigration policies at country level, based on arbitrary boundaries that are theoretically unjust, because, as these authors explain, these policies maintain unequal relationships. In reality, as assessed by Carens and Cole, it is precisely these arbitrary and unjustified boundaries that have been taken as the starting point for immigration restrictions at country level, following Rawls’s idea that countries may use coercion with the aim of 'perpetuation'. After all, despite the fact that conditions of a necessary degree of equality and justice (specified in the _{Law of Peoples} ) – as Rawls wishes for the world in international politics on the basis of arbitrary boundaries of societal structures – are not met, nevertheless, immigration rules are in force. According to Cole, this would mean Dutch immigration rules should be understood as "morally and rationally contingent arrangements" (2014, p. 513). All the practical and ethical objections that have been raised by Beitz, Pogge, Walzer, Carens and Cole in this chapter therefore apply to the Dutch immigration rules. What these immigration rules look like in detail and how they are implemented and maintained procedurally will be explained in the following chapter.

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2. Dutch immigration rules

2.1 The difference between asylum and regular immigration

Today, in Dutch immigration law, a distinction is made between refugees and regular immigrants. In the Aliens Act 2000 this difference is established by making a distinction in the rules and procedures that, on the one hand apply for obtaining a regular residence permit and on the other, those which are intended to grant residence permits for asylum. A refugee is defined by the Dutch government as someone considered to be rightly worried about persecution in his or her home country, because it is considered unsafe for people of their “ethnicity or social group; religion, nationality” or for those who hold particular "political beliefs" (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-h). According to part 1 of section 29 in Chapter 3 of the Aliens Act 2000, temporary asylum residence permits can be granted to people who are refugees in accordance with the Refugee Convention and to other people who have shown in their asylum procedure that they have well-founded reasons to believe to be at risk of serious damage when they would be sent back (Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 2000). Such reasons could include the risk of the death penalty, execution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and possibly exposure to serious threats to the life or person of a citizen (ibid.).

In addition to the law specifying that the Netherlands may grant residence permits of asylum to people in case of "compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature" and when obliged by international commitments to do so, Article 13 of the Aliens Act 2000 states that, with regard to the granting of regular residence permits, a demand for residence will only be acknowledged when "the presence of the foreign national substantially serves Dutch interests" (ibid., own translation). So, people who are not at risk of such kind of dangers in their country of origin fall into a category of migrants to which apply very different rules and procedures of admission. A concept which makes it easier to analyze the distinction between asylum seekers and this other group of migrants is Bas Schotel's term 'normal migrant'. Schotel explains that the term ‘normal migrant’ helps to distinguish between migrants who have a “preferred status” and those who do not (2012, p. 12). “Normal immigrants”, adds Schotel, are “migrants who do not have a legal right to admission” (idem, p. 11). Normal migrants may be granted permission, writes Schotel, “when beneficial to the receiving country” (idem, pp. 11-12). Countries like the Netherlands have no “legal duty” to allow normal migrants admission to the country, in contrast to refugees, who can claim their right to be admitted through asylum procedures (idem, p. 12). The need for protection of an asylum seeker, as well as the check if someone meets the criteria to obtain a regular residence permits, are assessed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a; Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). In the next paragraphs, I will explain the different kind of rules and related procedures in more detail.

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2.2 Regular immigration

The Dutch government communicates, that foreign nationals may obtain a residence permit under specific circumstances (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). Foreigners from outside the European Union or EER-region, from countries which have a visa-duty, who want to live in the Netherlands for a period longer than ninety days, need to apply for a residence permit. They can apply for a residence permit outside the Netherlands through the 'tev'-procedure (regulated in the Modern Migration Policy Act since 2013). In this way, foreigners can apply for a special temporary visa (abbreviated in Dutch as 'mvv') or a residence permit. If the application is granted, the applicant may enter the country (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-i).

Regarding immigration rules for normal migrants in the Netherlands, Schotel's explanation mentioned above, describing that with regard to 'normal migration', admission is often based on migrants' beneficiality to the country, seems fitting. Migrants who are expected to make a valuable contribution to the Dutch economy, culture or disciplines of science get rights to stay in the country more easily (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-d). Concerning work-related immigration, the (intellectual) background of immigrants matters. To illustrate, since 2017, rules have been adapted to permit students, so-called 'knowledge immigrants', and scientists more freedom in starting their own business (ibid.; Government of the Netherlands, 2017). The Dutch government underlines that, with such adaptations to rules, which augment certain migrants’ opportunities, the aim is to promote the position of the Netherlands in the global economy (ibid.).

However, even for immigrants who meet the requirements for regular immigration, immigration is a fairly complicated and costly affair, for which, among other things, many administrative steps have to be taken (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, n.d.-c; Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst n.d.-d). For example, even a highly skilled immigrant, 'welcomed' to the Netherlands by the government because of his potential economical contribution, must have signed an employment contract prior to application with an employer or research institution that is recognized by the IND as a referent, and is required to demonstrate that he/she meets specific wage requirements (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst n.d.-c). So, to only submit an application in the first place, the immigrant is asked to prove sufficient income, and it seems to be assumed that the immigrant already has a network in the Netherlands since it is expected that (s)he has arranged a valid contract.

2.3 Asylum procedures

The asylum procedure, on the contrary, is a legal procedure in which the IND decides if people who claim that they are not safe or that they cannot get sufficient protection in their own country will be granted rights of residence (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers 2015-d, p. 1). The Dutch Government explains that the number of requests for asylum from countries that it perceives as

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safe is high, and that these requests "put extra pressure on the asylum system" (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-j, own translation). In order to reduce the costs of asylum procedures, the Government states that "it is important to deal with these asylum requests as efficiently as possible" (ibid., own translation). Therefore, since 2016, a key defining factor in the Dutch asylum process has been the so-called 'list of safe countries'. In a news item published by the Dutch government about the extension of the list of safe countries, is written that "asylum seekers from safe countries have nearly no chance of obtaining an asylum permit" (Government of the Netherlands, 2016, own translation).

The inclusion or omission of the applicant’s reported country of origin on this list determines the type of asylum procedure that is started. Therefore, the first thing that happens to a migrant applying for asylum is that the IND decides which procedure is applicable, depending on the applicant’s country of origin. If that country of origin is not on the list of safe countries, the application is dealt with in the General Asylum Procedure (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-c). If, however, it is on the list, a special, shortened asylum procedure, called the Simplified Procedure, is started (ibid.).

In the general procedure, asylum seekers are given at least six days to rest after their journey (ibid.). During these six days, asylum seekers are also expected to prepare themselves for their asylum procedure. They receive "information about the asylum procedure; help from a lawyer [who will then also be present during the interviews in the days that follow]; [and] a medical declaration for use during their asylum procedure" (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). In the Simplified Procedure, however, the applicant does not get this 'rest and preparation' time. There, asylum seekers are interviewed directly, without a lawyer (ibid.). In a single interview, the asylum seeker has the possibility to explain his/her identity and need for protection. The Dutch government stresses that in the Simplified Procedure, "arguments must be more convincing than for asylum seekers from countries that are not on the list" (ibid.). This interview is the asylum seeker's one and only chance to give all the information that shows their need of asylum (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al. 2017, p. 5). There are two possible outcomes. Either the IND needs more time for examination, after which "the IND will further deal with your asylum application in the General Asylum Procedure" (ibid.), or, more probably, the IND decides the asylum seeker does "not comply with the conditions for an asylum residence permit" (ibid.). After rejection the applicant faces several consequences. In the first place, (s)he has the responsibility to leave the Netherlands immediately, without financial support (unless (s)he appeals against this decision) (idem, p. 6). Moreover, a rejected applicant from a ‘safe country’ is prohibited from traveling inside the Schengen zone, made up of 26 EU countries, for a period of two years (ibid.). When a rejected applicant does not return to his/her country of origin voluntarily, their removal can be forced (ibid.).

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In the General Asylum Procedure, on the contrary, an asylum seeker does not have to explain their reasons to apply for asylum immediately. After the six days ‘rest and preparation time’, the General Asylum Procedure consists of two interviews. Asylum seekers are told that in these interviews clarity, honesty and completeness are very important (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-d, pp. 4-5). During the 'initial interview', taking place on the first day of the official procedure, the asylum seeker is asked to identify him/herself. In this interview, an IND officer asks the applicant questions on his/her identity, nationality and travel route (idem, p. 4). After the initial interview, an asylum seeker in the General Procedure has one day in between to prepare for the second interview with a lawyer (ibid.). In this conversation the lawyer discusses the report that has been made of the first interview with the asylum seeker. Optionally, the lawyer informs the IND about necessary corrections in case of errors or omissions in the report (ibid.). On the third day of the procedure, a second interview takes place, in which the asylum seeker is expected to tell the reasons for applying for asylum (idem, p. 5). In the next days, one of the following three results will be communicated to the applicant. The applicant can (1) be granted asylum, (2) be referred to the Extended Asylum Procedure, or (3), refused (idem, p. 5). When an asylum seeker does not fulfil the set up conditions (and (s)he does not appeal against this decision), (s)he is transferred to another centre where (s)he has (a maximum of) twenty eight days to prepare for departure (idem, p. 6).

For extra clarity, the differences between the procedures are summarized in the table below, based on the information provided in the leaflets that are handed out to asylum seekers, in which the processes are described (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al, 2015-a; Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-b; Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-c; Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-d; Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2017; Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, 2017).

General Procedure Simplified Procedure

Preceding to the procedure Time to rest and prepare, including medical examination, information facilities and meeting with lawyer

No time to rest or prepare. No medical examination nor lawyer.

During the procedure 2 interviews:

Interview 1: identification Interview 2: explanation of reason for applying (together with a lawyer)

1 interview: identification and explanation of reason for applying

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Subsequent options after the procedure

1. Asylum granted 2. More time necessary:

Extended Procedure 3. Not admitted: this means

still 28 days of shelter

1. More time necessary: applicant starts in General Procedure

2. Not admitted: this means immediate loss of shelter + travel ban of 2 years in Schengen Zone

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3. Immigration rules in practice

3.1 Inhumane expectations

In the previous chapter, it has been shown there is a strong emphasis on the level of education, employment and business potential in the selection of normal immigrants. Based on the requirements of 'normal' immigration procedures, I want to emphasize that it is plausible to assume that only a small percentage of the group that falls into the category of normal migrants is able to fulfill these conditions to be admitted as a 'normal migrant'. In other words, it is not reasonable that all migrants who do not qualify as refugees are able to migrate successfully through an immigration procedure that is in fact meant for them. From this observation, it follows that, when people of this group want to live or work in the Netherlands, they could be tempted to try to find another way to make this possible, namely through the asylum procedure. That procedure, however, is not meant to function as an alternative to the normal immigration procedure. According to the law, people should only be able to enter through 'normal immigration rules', unless they can prove via a asylum procedure that they are unsafe in their own country. As shown in chapter two, according to the Dutch government, too many people who are not unsafe (enough) in their own country apply for asylum. In order to get a better financial grip on all these applications, the Simplified Procedure was created, as mentioned in chapter two. By differentiating the procedure on the basis of a list of safe countries, the Dutch government openly demonstrates for whom residence permits via the asylum procedures are intended.

In the media, the group not entitled to stay but nevertheless attempting to obtain residence through the asylum procedure, is often portrayed by politicians as trying to profit economically from Dutch prosperity, in the sense of abusing the system. Carens writes:

the classic picture of the 'asylum abuser,' someone who is really just an economic migrant

with no strong moral claim to entry and who is seeking to get into a rich democratic state

through a mechanism that is supposed to be reserved for refugees … informs much of the

popular discourse … in Europe (2013, p. 210).

In the Netherlands the label 'economic refugee' is frequently used for this purpose. Amnesty International explains that the notion 'economic refugee' "is a term [used] for those who would not have fled for political reasons, but to find a better standard of living. The term is often used disapprovingly, in the sense of 'not real' refugees" (Amnesty International Nederland, n.d., own translation). In reality, the organization stresses, this distinction is difficult to make. For instance, in practice, economic motivations are likely to be the result of political reasons (ibid.). Carens underlines "the picture of the failed claimant as ipso facto an asylum abuser is a gross distortion of reality", because "most asylum applications have some basis in dangers and hardships that the claimant faces" (2013, p. 211). Moreover, Castles et al. explain it is problematic to categorize migrants by

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distinguishing, for example, between migrants that are ‘forced’ to migrate and migrants that migrate ‘voluntarily’, as there exist inequalities in migration possibilities (2014, p. 26). This can blur the distinction the Dutch government wants to make. Additionally, Carens emphasizes that asylum seekers "often have little idea about what legal principles govern the refugee system and whether the reasons that have led them to flee their country of origin will be considered sufficient to qualify them for refugee status" (2013, p. 211). Therefore, it can be doubtful that an immigrant would agree with the label 'economic refugee' when the main reasons for applying for asylum are economic, but the underlying cause of these poor economic conditions are the political circumstances in the country of origin. Nonetheless, government party VVD uses the word fortune seeker ('gelukszoeker') when referring to this group, emphasizing the Netherlands should only help 'real' refugees (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. n.d.-b).

Not only expressions by politicians, also the Dutch asylum rules themselves reflect this image of the suspected 'abuse' of the system: the way in which the rules and procedures have been drawn up underlines first the fact that asylum seekers must make their reasons for applying very clear in a convincing manner in the designated asylum procedure, to ‘prove’ that they are not safe and can not receive (sufficient) protection in their country of origin, and, secondly, that a sanction on rejection for someone originating from a safe country includes a travel ban of two years (as explained in chapter one). If an asylum seeker is not found to be unsafe in their own country, the conditions to be entitled to stay are not met. This means, that this person is considered by the government to belong in the category 'normal' migrants, and thus would need to meet different conditions to be entitled to stay in the Netherlands: namely, the 'normal' immigration rules. It seems the government depicts the use of the asylum procedure by those migrants as abuse of the system. In the next paragraphs, I attempt to show that this should be viewed differently.

A great deal of emphasis is placed on 'the truth' by Dutch politicians, as it is important to find out who the 'real refugees' are, for the rules to function in the way they wish. In the explanation of the asylum procedures in chapter two I mentioned the government demands applicants to tell the truth about their identity and reasons for applying for asylum. This will now further be analyzed.

The IND emphasizes the importance of truth telling by immigrants repeatedly. Two examples illustrating this are found in the communication towards immigrants:

explain who you are fully and clearly. Always give your true details and not those of a false

(travel) document. Also state if you have used an alias (=pseudonym) at any time. Your

documents and your statements will namely be checked to see if they are genuine (Central

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(Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-d, p. 4).

When the IND finds out that an asylum seeker has, nevertheless, lied during the interviews (or presented false documents), the IND warns this can lead to a negative outcome of the asylum request (Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers et al., 2015-d, p. 4). In the Aliens Act 2000, Article 30b, it is written that the granting of a residence permit can be dismissed when an applicant "has misled our Minister by providing false information or documents about their identity or nationality or by omitting to supply relevant information or documents that could have had a negative influence on the decision" (Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 2000, own translation). Furthermore, the decision for rejection can be made if "the foreign national has, likely in bad faith, destroyed or has gotten rid of an identity or travel document that could have helped to establish his identity or nationality" or "has made inconsistent and contradictory, apparently false or clearly improbable statements that are in conflict with sufficiently verified information about the country of origin" (ibid., own translation). In addition, articles 32 to 35 prescribe a residence permit for a definite period of time can be withdrawn or rejected if the government finds out at a later time that this person has “provided incorrect data or has withheld data where that data would have led to rejection of the original application or its renewal" (ibid., own translation). The same sanctions apply regarding the granting of regular residence permits (described in article 16), the extension of the regular residence permit to a specific period (which is written in article 18), and applications for a regular residence permit for an indefinite period (stated in article 21) (ibid.).

Even though the IND emphasizes immigrants should not lie, there may obviously be immigrants who do so, if they think this might improve their chance to obtain a residence permit. Where does this emphasis on truth telling and the contempt for lying in relation to immigration rules come from?

Kant is presumably "the most well known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy", explains Thomas L. Carson (2010, p. 67). He adds, "Kant’s moral theory is one of the most important theories of moral obligation in the history of philosophy" (ibid.). The traditional way of reading Kant, Helga Varden (2010, p. 405) points out, entails the understanding that lying is always wrong. Varden explains, that due to his convictions about lying, Kant is heavily criticized for ignoring "the inhumane consequences of his theory", as he advocated "the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command" (idem, p. 403).

Brian Feltham and John Cottingham explain, that according to Kant, impartiality is located within the self (2010, p. 17). This refers to the fact that, following Kant, individuals should, when making choices about their 'ends', consider if these choices could be generalized "to be a maxim for

Achieving our humanity : Dutch immigration policies and the limits of liberal justice : to what extent are Dutch immigration rules limited, in theory and practice, with regard to humaneness?