Unraveling Yemen's crisis : an analysis of the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

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Master Thesis Political Science - Political Economy

Unraveling Yemen’s Crisis

An analysis of the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

Renée Hoekstra (10548483)

Supervisor: dr. F. Boussaid

Second reader: drs. P.W.H. Aarts

Word count: 22.784

The Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam

June 22, 2018

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Abstract

The 2015 Yemeni Civil War is often framed as being a sectarian conflict between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni government of president Hadi. However, various shifts in sectarian alliances in the conflict indicate that there is more to the conflict than sectarian issues. This thesis examines to which extent the 2015 Yemeni Civil War can be seen as being caused by sectarian struggles or by economic grievances. Using the theory of Kalyvas about micro- and macro-cleavages in civil wars and through the method of process-tracing, an analysis has been conducted of various wars Yemen has experienced over the course of the years, previous to the 2015 civil war, in order to determine the root causes of these conflicts and subsequently the root cause of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War. The research concludes that the 2015 Yemeni Civil War has mainly been caused by structural economic grievances that have existed for a long time in the country and not by sectarian struggles. The sectarian narrative seems to be a result of the proxy-war Saudi-Arabia and Iran are fighting on Yemeni territory.

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Abbreviations

AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula CDC Constitutional Drafting Committee DRY Democratic Republic of Yemen

FAES Federation of Arab Emirates of the South

FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen FSA Federation of South-Arabia

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GoY Government of Yemen

GPC General People’s Congress IMF International Monetary Fund JMP Joint Meeting Parties

NDC National Dialogue Conference NDF National Democratic Front NLF National Liberation Front

PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970-1990) PNPA Peace and National Partnership Agreement

PRSY People’s Republic of South-Yemen (1967-1970) PSA Protectorate of South Arabia

ROY Republic of Yemen (1990-present)

SAM Shabab al Moumineen

SAP Structural Adjustment Plan

SM Southern Movement

SRC Supreme Revolutionary Committee

TPSD Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development UAR United Arab Republic

YAR Yemen Arab Republic

YCW Yemeni Civil War

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Glossary

Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi President of Yemen since 2012, previously vice-president under Saleh’s reign. Originally from South Yemen, fled from the country to Sana’a in 1986 after supporting Ali Nasser during a civil war

Ali Abdullah Saleh Former president of the ROY (until 2012) and the YAR. Part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Sided with the Houthis in 2015, murdered by Houthis in 2017

al-Ahmar family Leading family of the Hashid Confederation. Joint leaders of the Islah party. Enjoy(ed) close ties with the central government in unified Yemen

Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Military leader, head of the First Armoured Brigade. Originates from same village as Saleh, part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Longtime ally of Saleh since the 1970s, but defected in March 2011. Not related to the leading al-Ahmar family of the Hashid

confederation

AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) Established in 2009 out of a combination of Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda. Seen as one of the most dangerous branches of the organisation

GCC Initiative GCC initiative to resolve the crisis in Yemen after the 2011 uprisings. Transition proposal drafted by GCC states, in which president Saleh would resign and outlining a transition process to form a new government in Yemen

General People’s Congress (GPC) President Saleh’s ruling party. Established as a civil-society institution in 1982 when political parties were illegal in the YAR. All influential people from the country were gathered in this organisation, which was entirely loyal to Saleh

Husayn al-Houthi Leader of the Houthi Movement. Killed by GoY forces in september 2004 in the first Sa’ada War, after opposing the close ties of the government to the United States and the discrimination of Zaydi people by the government Houthi movement (or SAM) Also known as Ansar Allah or Shabab al Moumineen

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the northern governorate of Sa’ada. Involved in six wars (Sa’ada Wars) against the government from 2004-2010. Allied with Saleh in 2015 to fight Hadi’s government Islah Political party established in 1990. Drew power from two

main sources; the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashid Confederation. Officially Yemeni Congregation for Reform

Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) Coalition of opposition parties in Yemen. Consists of Islah, the Yemeni Socialist Party, al-Haqq, Union of Popular Forces, the Nasserite Party and the Baath. Opposed president Saleh during his final year as president, partially responsible for his resignation National Dialogue Conference Transitional dialogue process after the 2011 Yemeni

Uprisings. Implemented as part of the GCC Initiative; goal was to bring all political forces together in the conference to discuss the Yemen’s problems and facilitate a peaceful transition process

Salafi Part of Sunni Islam, fundamentalist

Southern Movement (SM) Or _{al Hirak}

. Emerged in 2006, fights for more

independence of southern Yemen. Consists of an extreme faction that demands secession of the South, and a more moderate faction pledging for more regional autonomy

Shayk Tribal leader

Zaydi Branch of Shia Islam, found mainly in Yemen’s northern highlands. Zaydis believe that descendants of the

prophet Mohammed (_sada)

are the only rightful rulers of

the country and the Muslim community. Zaydis are known to be very moderate, and are theologically speaking closest to Sunni islam

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Figure 1: Reference Map Yemen

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‘

’Ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes’’

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Some 50 years ago, North- and South Yemen were seen as relatively prosperous countries in the Arabian Peninsula and surpassed the living standards of the now thriving cities Abu Dhabi and Dubai. However, nowadays the tables have turned; the unified country of Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, with many internal conflicts and sharply deteriorating living standards, while other countries in the region are among the richest in the world (Lackner, 2014; Thiollet, 2014). The consecutive conflicts Yemen has experienced in the last few years have led to widespread internal displacement and an overall humanitarian crisis in the country. The current conflict in Yemen, which started in 2015, has been called the ‘forgotten war’ by some people, since it seems the world is paying little attention to the conflict and its consequences for the Yemeni people (Amnesty International, n.d.; Chang, 2018). Amnesty International even goes as far as to argue that the world has ignored the conflict altogether (Amnesty International, n.d.). An example of this ignorance is the fact that relatively little research has been done into the conflict and its underlying causes.

The current conflict in Yemen, dubbed the Yemeni Civil War, started in 2015 when former president Saleh publicly stated he had formed an alliance with the Houthi rebels, who used to be his enemies, to fight the central government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017a, p.9). This conflict followed on the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011, which saw then-president Saleh resign from office (Salisbury, 2011, p.13). Most often, the Yemeni Civil War is described as being a sectarian conflict between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni government; the main explanatory factor for the existence of the conflict is found in the tensions that exist between these two groups, and the proxy-war Saudi-Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shiite) are fighting on Yemen territory (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32).

However, it seems that when one attributes the root-cause of the conflict solely to sectarian causes, other factors are ignored. For the past few years, shifts have taken place in which actors are fighting each other in Yemen. In 2015, the unlikely Saleh-Houthi alliance was formed to fight the Hadi-government, even though Saleh’s government and the Houthis used to fight each other since 2004 and the Houthis were (partially) responsible for the resignation of Saleh as president. Then in 2017, Saleh was killed by Houthi rebels because he shifted his allegiance back to the central (Sunni) government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017b, p.6). What is striking about the before mentioned information, is that the Houthi rebels were willing to engage in a strategic partnership with their former enemy Saleh, and vice versa. This implies that there are other causes for their grievances than sectarian ones. I believe that structural economic problems can form another explanatory factor for these grievances. Economic

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problems have plagued Yemen for a long time, and since the Arab Uprisings these structural economic problems have not been addressed and solved, but have become worse. An important explanatory factor for the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011 has been found in the lack of economic diversification and the distribution of revenues towards a small group elites, which has led to great poverty among the general population (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114; Salisbury, 2011, p.3). However, in explaining the current crisis in Yemen, economic factors have received relatively little attention in the literature and research, while it seems that they can form an(other) important explanatory factor.

It thus seems that there are at least two phenomena at work in Yemen right now. The first are the ongoing economic struggles in the country, and the second the shift in sectarian alliances and parties fighting each other in the conflict. But which one of these phenomena forms the more important explanation for the conflict in Yemen that is taking place nowadays? This puzzle leads me to the following research question: To which extent can the current crisis in Yemen (2015 -present) be explained by sectarian tensions or by economic grievances? This thesis, which will try to provide an answer to the above posted question, will be a qualitative, empirical thesis. Through the method of ‘process-tracing’, the conflicts Yemen has experienced before the 2015 Civil War will be analyzed, and it will be investigated whether economic struggles or sectarian tensions form the main explanatory factor for the existence of the current crisis in Yemen. This thesis is thus not an IR study, since the focus is on the internal conflicts Yemen is experiencing and the internal factors that could (possibly) explain the current conflict in Yemen.

Chapter 1: Literature, theory and methodology

1.1 Literature Review

Many authors argue that the current conflict and humanitarian- and economic crisis in Yemen cannot be explained when one does not look at the past of the country. According to Colton (2010), Lackner (2014) and Thiollet (2014), the origin of Yemen’s present economic (and resulting humanitarian) struggles can, among other causes, be found in the changes that have taken place in the Yemeni economy between 1970-1990. Yemen was on a unique path to development, wherein its economy was mainly based on remittances citizens received from migrant workers in the Gulf States. This flow of remittances suddenly ended after the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and the government became reliant on oil wealth in order to sustain itself. Colton (2010) argues that when this developmental model collapsed and this new form of rents was introduced, that, contrary to the remittances, did not trickle down to the general population, ordinary Yemenis that used to rely on remittances were left with little means to sustain themselves and became trapped in situations of extreme poverty.

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One of the main reasons given by various authors for the recurrent crises in the country is the lack of economic diversification and the distribution of revenues towards a small group of elites. The state is very reliant on the export and production of gas and oil in order to generate revenues; the prices of oil are highly volatile and can greatly influence the state of the economy of Yemen (Salisbury, 2011, p.3). These revenues only trickle down to a few people closely related to the government, and are commonly not used for development- and social work within the country (Ahmed, 2017, p.54; Colton, 2010, p.425); large parts of the country’s economy have been allocated to small groups of elites in return for political support (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114; Salisbury, 2011, p.3). The oil production in the country is depleting however and this has led to a decline in exports, resulting in less revenues and an inability of the government to sustain even the most basic social investments (Ahmed, 2017, p.53; Salisbury, 2011, p.7). All this is taking place while the global commodity prices are rising. As a result of the lack of diversification and of water scarcity in the country, most food has to be imported. The prices of food are highly volatile and most Yemenis are simply not able to afford these commodities anymore (Ahmed, 2017, p.54). As a result of migration in the 1970s-1990s, the service and informal sectors in Yemen grew rapidly, but the industrial sector did not; the country had a highly unskilled labour force and a lack of urbanization (Colton, 2010, p.411; Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114/p.139). This, and rapid population growth, has led to great poverty among the Yemeni population and high unemployment rates (Dahlgren, 2014).

The unification of North- and South-Yemen in 1990 also forms an important explanation in the literature for the situation in the country nowadays. When the republican North and the socialist/marxist South were unified in 1990, mainly for the reason of oil exploitation along the border (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.159; Lewis, 2013, p.4), the Southern government was dismantled, privatization of services took place and subsidised healthcare and education were ended. Southern tensions towards the central government arose and this resulted in the 1994 Civil War for separatism, which the ‘North’ won. Consequently, all government officials in the South were replaced by Northern people. Up to this day, Southern people feel like their grievances are not heard, and this has led to continuing hostility towards the regime (Corstange, 2016, p.93; Lewis, 2013, p.4). As a result of economic competition between the North and the South (before and after the unification), the people in the Northern and Southern peripheries both feel that they have been ignored by the central government, which focused on the capital region and regions with natural resources. This has led to growing tensions (Salmoni, Loidolt & Wells, 2010, p.5).

Many authors argue that the various conflicts Yemen has experienced over the years have been caused by sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in the country; the Yemeni Civil War has often been interpreted as being a sectarian struggle (Müller, 2018, p.455). The majority of the people in Yemen are Shafi’ Muslims, a branch of Sunni Islam, except for the Northern and Central highlands. Here most people identify themselves as Shia Muslims (Lackner, 2017a, p.13). The Shiites claim they are economically, politically and religiously marginalized and neglected by the central government, and this

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has led to tensions and conflicts between the Shiites and the central government (Blumi, 2018, p.159; Lackner, 2017a, p.149), who most people perceive as being Sunni-dominated (Rabi, 2015, p.166).

Finally, a regional dimension forms an important explanatory factor for the existence of the current conflict in Yemen. This is the proxy-war between Saudi-Arabia (which supports president Hadi and its loyalists) and Iran (which allegedly supports the Houthis) (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32). Saudi Arabia and Iran have a longstanding history of competition for regional influence (Salisbury, 2015, p.2) and Shia Iran has been accused of supporting the Houthi rebels in Yemen (Salisbury, 2015, p.7). This support has caused concerns in Saudi Arabia over expansion of Iranian influence in the Arabian peninsula (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p.59). Yemen appears to have become a playground where the regional Saudi-Iran tensions have found a way to complicate the internal conflicts in the country even further (Salisbury, 2015, p.12).

1.2 Theoretical framework

Civil wars are most often described by scholars as being binary conflicts, classified by their perceived overarching issue or cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). Weidmann (2016, p.541) states that in the literature civil wars are portrayed as ‘binary actor constellations’, in which there is a conflict between the government and a rebellious party that experiences a difference along some dimension. Almost every civil war has such a overarching issue that separates the parties fighting each other in the conflict; Kalyvas calls this overarching issue the ‘master cleavage’ in a civil war (Kalyvas, 2004, p.475; Weidmann, 2016, p.541).

Two prevailing and competing theories in explaining civil wars point to two different motivations for the violence that takes place in these wars; the greed vs. grievance dichotomy (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Both the concepts of greed and grievance are used to gain an understanding of the causes of civil wars (Hoeffler, 2011, p.274). In both these theories, civil wars are seen as a conflict between where a rebel army challenges the government. As Collier, Hoeffler & Rihner (2009, p.3) state; ‘’The defining feature of a civil war is large scale organized violence on the part of a rebel army. [...] the distinctive feature of civil war is the existence of a non-government army.’’ In the ‘greed’ explanation the focus is on economic motivations for the existence of a civil war (Keen, 2012, p.757). Civil wars are characterized by the breakdown of authority and the resulting situation of anarchy (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Rebellion in civil wars is seen as a public good and the result of collective action (Hoeffler, 2011, p.275). However, collective action problems like free-riding are inherent to the process of collective action; this habit of individuals to free-ride can only be reduced when actors actively involved in the action receive private benefits or so-called ‘selective incentives’ (Hoeffler, 2011, p.275). The ‘greed-theory’ can be seen as focussing on the importance of private gains and selective incentives, where the privatization of violence is encouraged and there is a war

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of all against all. Ethnic civil wars are often described as a result of this greed and the wars have a private nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475).

The grievance explanation on the other side prioritizes the political nature of civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). In this theory, the focus is on the existence of horizontal inequalities, which can be of social, economic, cultural or political nature. Inequalities are seen as the main cause of civil war (Keen, 2012, p.757). As Kalyvas and Weidmann both argue, and as the ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy shows, in the literature local-level violence in civil wars is most often seen as a result of the overarching master-cleavage supposedly leading the conflict; the analysis of civil wars thus takes place at the country-level (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476; Weidmann, 2016, p.541).

Various scholars have started a debate and argue that this country-level analysis, focusing on a conflict between the government and rebellious parties among a certain cleavage, is not the right level to study civil wars and have moved on to a ‘disaggregated approach’. In this approach, the focus is on the local-level violence dynamics in civil war (Weidmann, 2016, p.539). However, this approach still assumes that there is a ‘dyadic actor constellation’ between the national level, thus the government, and local challenging groups (Weidmann, 2016, p.540). In this debate about the causes of local-level violence, Kalyvas (2003) presented his theory about the ‘Ontology of Political Violence’.

Macro- and micro-level cleavages

Kalyvas disagrees with this classification of civil wars being binary conflicts and the dichotomy between greed and grievance, and argues that these wars usually entail a combination of different identities and actions, supralocal and local actors, and a combination of the private and the political (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475/p.486). According to Weidmann (2016, p.541), Kalyvas was one of the first authors to criticize the assumption that civil wars are always fought between the government and a rebel group among a certain master cleavage, and to make the resulting claim that violence in civil wars is often unrelated to the master cleavage. In his theory, Kalyvas argues that civil wars are too often qualified among an overarching issue, a ‘master cleavage’, which is commonly described in ethnic, political or ideological terms, while the true causes of the conflicts can be of a drastically different nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). According to Kalyvas, these macro-level cleavages, that are seen as the main cause of the civil war, are often not sufficient in explaining the motivations for violence at the micro-level. He argues that there is a ‘’disjunction between identities and actions at the central or elite level, on the one hand, and the local or mass level, on the other.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Actions that take place ‘on the ground’ are more likely to be related to or caused by local and/or private issues, and not by the war its main cleavage; personal conflicts, hatreds and envy play a large role in the violence that erupts at the micro-level during civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.483). These micro-level cleavages are often not caused by and have no relation to the war itself or its overarching cleavage, but often existed before the war had even started (Weidmann, 2016, p.541). In some cases individuals make use of the war to settle these local/ and or

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private issues and conflicts, that bear no relation to the causes of the war (Kalyvas, 2003, pp.474-476). Kalyvas argues that ‘’both the distribution of allegiances across the population and the violence that takes place are often (though not always) a function of preexisting local rivalries whose connection to the cleavage that informs the civil war is tenuous and loose’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.479). Weidmann argues that ‘’conflict among a master cleavage is a coordinating device that allows private actors to use violence for their private means.’’(Weidmann, 2016, p.541). A civil war thus creates an opportunity for the settling of pre-existing local conflicts by violent means (Weidmann, 2016, p.541).

Kalyvas gives several examples illustrating civil wars wherein the various micro-cleavages seem to be unrelated to the overarching supposed macro-cleavage of the civil war. One example is the case of the French Revolution, where the divisions in the provinces were highly local and bore little to no relation to the central issues (or master-cleavage) of the Revolution (Kalyvas, 2003, p.477). During the English Civil War, local structures and rivalries were still omnipresent and the labels of the struggle taking place at the national level were imposed on the local-level struggles (Kalyvas, 2003, p.478). In all the examples of sharply polarized societies Kalyvas provides, a salience of local cleavages is visible, and there is a separation visible between the center and the periphery in terms of causes and cleavages leading to violence (Kalyvas, 2003, p.479).

Overall, Kalyvas states that ‘’ambiguity is endemic to civil wars’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476); interaction between different actors, with different identities and interests is being fostered by the presence of a civil war, and the cause for the existence of a civil war is most often hidden under facades. The motives that drive the existence of a civil war are inherently complex, and framing civil wars as being binary conflicts, is misleading (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487).

Cleavages and alliances

As a result, one should not only look at the overarching cleavage as a means of linking center and periphery. Kalyvas argues that violence in civil wars is not the result of a cleavage, but of an alliance between the centre and the periphery, which consequently forms the microfoundation of a civil war (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). Alliances entail transactions between local and supralocal actors. Supralocal actors provide the local actors with means that allows these local actors to gain a local advantage (e.g. weapons). In exchange, the supralocal actors rely on local conflicts and grievances to gain supporters and obtain local control and information (Kalyvas, 2003, p.485). Alliances can thus be seen as a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up process. These alliances allow local actors to participate in the conflict and bring more actors into it, whose issues and grievances do not align with the ones described in the master cleavage (van Baalen, 2014, p.15). The ideological agendas of the two parties involved do not have to be structured around the same issue; the selective benefit of violence provides support and leads to collective action. Violence in these cases is used as a resource that can lead to widespread mobilization, not as a means of coercion. When talking about alliances rather than cleavages, multiple actors rather than unitary

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ones can be included in the analysis, agency that is located in both the center and the periphery can be included and the focus is not just on one overarching issue or cleavage, but various preferences and identities can be taken into the analysis (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). Alliances are not a goal in themselves for local actors, but they can be a mean to achieve their local goals. The difference between a cleavage and an alliance becomes clear in the following quote by Kalyvas:

‘’We [...] want to think of cleavage as a symbolic formation that simplifies, streamlines, and incorporates a bewildering variety of local conflicts [...]. Similarly, alliance allows us to see civil wars as concatenations of multiple and often disparate local cleavages, more or less loosely arrayed around the master cleavage.’’

(Kalyvas, 2003, p.486).

As a result of the focus on alliances instead of on macro-cleavages in civil wars, one should not see the political and the private as separate spheres, but look at them as a combination. As Weidmann summarizes; ‘’[...] conflict along a master cleavage is a coordinating device that allows private actors to use violence for their private means. [...] political violence activates private violence’’ (Weidmann, 2016, p.541). Alliances are a means for local actors to reach certain goals, and action in civil wars is both decentralized and linked to the overarching conflict a country experiences. Violence that takes place can be simultaneously of private and political nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). As Kalyvas states; ‘’[...] the intimate character that ‘’political violence’’ often displays is not necessarily the reflection of impersonal or abstract ideological or identity-based polarization and hatred; it is also the surprising result of the interaction between the political and the private spheres.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). There is a mutual dependence between the macro- and the micro-level, and between the public and the private spheres in civil wars.

Concluding, according to Kalyvas’ theory, one has to look further than the binary face of the conflict and the perceived overarching issue or cleavage, in order to understand the true causes of a civil war (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). Civil wars cannot be explained by only looking at greed or grievance explanations, and political violence does not always have to be political in nature. Deriving actions in civil wars solely from the master cleavage is misleading; local dynamics, conflicts and cleavages have to be included into theories of civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487). Kalyvas’ argument is summarized in the following quote: ‘’It is the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil war with its particular character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487).

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Usefulness of Kalyvas’ theory

Kalyvas’ theory provides a perfect guidance for the research which will be conducted in this thesis. As argued before, it seems that there are more causes to the Yemeni Civil War than just sectarian tensions, which are commonly seen as the ‘macro-cleavage’. The various conflicts Yemen has experienced before the civil war started and the Yemeni Civil War itself will be analyzed using Kalyvas’ theory. It will be determined whether these conflicts, and eventually the civil war, are indeed mostly caused by sectarian tensions, or whether there are certain other (micro-)cleavages in the country that have also led to the situation we can observe in Yemen nowadays.

1.3 Methodology

The method used in this thesis will be, as mentioned before, a case study, and the study is qualitative in nature. This means that an intensive, in-depth analysis of Yemen will be conducted, with the goal of understanding a larger population (Creswell, 2014, p.14; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.296). A case can be seen as a specific phenomenon that is demarcated in space and time; in a case-study, one can look directly at a sequence of events that leads to a specific outcome _{, and not just at the outcome itself} (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p.225; Peters, 1998, p.141). The population targeted in this thesis will be all the countries in the MENA (Middle East and North-Africa) region experiencing some sort of sectarian conflict.

The case of Yemen has been chosen since it can be seen as a typical case (Bryman, 2012, p.70; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.297) with regard to sectarian conflicts. Many of the conflicts the country has experienced since its unification in 1990 are/have been (partially) explained as being sectarian conflicts. The conflict which started in 2015 is no different; sectarian struggles are often seen as the main explanatory factor for the current conflict since the country has a well-known history of sectarian struggles ever since its unification in 1990. The current conflict does bear all the hallmarks of being a sectarian conflict (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Al-Muslimi, 2015; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32). But are these sectarian struggles the only explanation for the existence of the current conflict? The hypothesis tested in this thesis is that the current conflict in Yemen, which started in 2015, cannot fully be explained by sectarian struggles, but that structural economic grievances also play a major role in the origin of the conflict. In this research, the dependent variable is the Yemeni Civil War, and the independent variables consist of sectarian tensions and structural economic grievances.

Data collection

Data will be collected through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources which will be used will be newspaper articles. Data will not be collected by the author itself through visiting Yemen, since this is not possible in the given timespan and because of safety-issues. Data will also be collected

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through secondary sources, being literature and government statements. Data with regard to the economic situation will be mainly collected through the World Bank database, since this is the only database that provides data on Yemen’s economic situation for the timespan to be studied.

Process-tracing

The method which will be used in this thesis to investigate what the decisive factors are in the explanation for the Yemeni Civil War is the method of process-tracing. The foundation of process-tracing is the intensive description of certain events (Collier, 2011, p.824). According to Mahoney (2012, p.571), process tracing is ‘’[...] arguably the most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research.’’ The core of process-tracing is to look at and identify causal mechanisms that link various causes (independent variables) with the outcomes (or dependent variable) in a case (Beach, 2016, p.463). One can define a causal mechanism as ‘’a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’’ (Glennan, 1996, p.52). According to Bennett (2004), the goal of process-tracing is ‘’[...] to establish which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect.’’ (Bennett, 2004, p.22). Process-tracing is a useful means to analyse causal relationships and the unfolding of events over an extensive period of time (Collier, 2011, p.824), and is a method that can be conducted while only looking at one single case (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p.225).

To determine to which extent structural economic grievances and sectarian tensions can explain the Yemeni Civil War, the four questions posed by Mahoney (2012, p.588) in his article on process-tracing will be used. He argues that these four questions ‘’[...] are often essential to the explanation of a specific outcome in a particular case.‘’ (Mahoney, 2012, p.588). The questions posed are the following (Mahoney, 2012, pp.558-589):

1) Did the outcome to be explained actually occur?

2) Did the causal factors hypothesized to explain this outcome actually occur? 3) Did the posited cause(s) actually cause the outcome?

4) How are rival hypotheses eliminated?

Definitions

In order to prevent ambiguity, two important concepts stated in the research question, will be defined, being sectarianism and economic grievances.

Sectarianism is, in the words of Salameh Kaileh, ‘any religious or sectarian barrier that is based on inherited beliefs against the ‘other’ and ‘is the tendency to undermine social cohesion by pushing for the reproduction of ancient beliefs and separations’ (Kaileh & Shams, 2014). Waseem (2010) describes sectarianism as an excessive attachment to an individual group, a particular sect or party, through which inequalities and discrimination can occur and be practiced (Waseem, 2010, p.34). In this light, sectarian

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tensions are defined as the tensions that arise from a groups inherited beliefs against the ‘other’. These tensions, inequalities and practices of discrimination can in turn lead to sectarian conflicts, in which religious or sectarian diversities are turned into a breeding ground for conflicts (Mathie, 2016, p.603).

Grievances are real or imagined causes for complaint, especially when they take place under unfair treatment, or a feeling of resentment over something one believes is wrong or unfair . In this thesis, 2 economic grievances are defined as feelings of unfair treatment with regard to economic activities.

Operationalisation

Kalyvas (2003) does not provide a clear definition of what cleavages exactly entail. In the following part, the concepts of _{cleavage, micro-cleavage}

and _{macro-cleavage} will be operationalized.

Much literature on the subject of _{cleavages focuses on the conflicts that arise out of the existence} of a certain political system, and thus provide a definition of_{political cleavages}

. Lipset and Rokkan (1967)

provide a rather broad definition of cleavages and focus on the social aspect of these cleavages. They see social cleavages as the ‘’ _{Conflicts and controversies [that] can arise out of a great variety of relationships} in the social structure.’’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p.6). In this thesis, cleavages will be seen as conflicts and divisions that exist between different population groups among a certain dimension, e.g. race, faith, region, political beliefs, along which violence is perpetrated. A rather broad definition has been chosen, since the conflicts in Yemen seem to be not only of a purely political nature, but sociological dimensions and structures in the country also seem to play an important role.

Micro-cleavages will be seen as conflicts that originate from individuals’ behaviour and their interaction with their surroundings (Verwimp, Justino & Brück, 2009, p.308). These conflicts can thus be seen as sub-national level conflicts that take place between certain sub-national level groups, and that do not have a relation to the overarching conflict (or macro-cleavage) that takes place in the country. Micro-level cleavages encompass the processes of conflict that involve either individuals, households, groups at the community level or sub-national groups and organizations or a combination of these groups; the national level (state-level) plays no significant role in these conflicts (Balcells & Justino, 2014, pp.1345-1347). Micro-cleavages and conflicts are thus the conflicts that arise at a personal or communal level. Examples of micro-cleavages are battles between different neighbourhoods, personal vendettas and clan rivalries (Weidmann, 2016, p.540).

Macro-cleavages are the conflicts that occur at the regional, national and international level and that do not really take into account the role of individual- and group interactions in a given conflict zone (Verwimp et al., 2009, p.308). Macro-level conflicts or cleavages are defined as the ‘’processes of conflict and violence that take place at the level of the sovereign state.’’ (Balcells & Justino, 2014, p.1345).

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Examples of macro-cleavages that can lead to conflicts are nation-wide ethnic identities and political ideologies (Weidmann, 2016, p.540)

Limitations and implications

The main limitation of this study is that Yemen is quite a unique country in the Middle East. The country has experienced many conflicts, of which several have been attributed to sectarian causes, that have been going on ever since 1990. Other causes have also formed important explanations, but throughout all the conflicts, sectarian struggles have always been on the forefront. Also, by researching just one case, it will be hard to generate broad generalizing statements with regard to the causes of conflicts in other MENA countries. The research findings will thus not have a high degree of external validity (Bryman, 2012, p.390). However, findings with regard to the causes and actors playing a role in the Yemeni Civil War can possibly lead to more in-depth knowledge about the complexity of civil wars, and to new insights into the structures of civil wars other countries are experiencing. A final limitation is that first-hand experiences and data will almost not be used in this thesis. The author does not have the means to collect this data by herself. Also, relatively little data is available on the topic in general. The conflict is a relatively new ‘phenomenon’ and little research has been done into the subject yet. However, if the research conducted in this thesis shows that there are other causes for the existence of the conflict in Yemen besides sectarian struggles, this will have implications for conflicts that exist in other countries in the MENA region. The results will then imply that even though a conflict seems to have been caused by sectarian struggles, this does not have to be the main explanatory factor in the origination of the conflict. If this is the case, the case of Yemen could be seen as a deviant case in the overall area of conflicts ascribed to sectarian tensions, since a new explanation is given for the existence of the conflict in Yemen, which is most commonly seen as conflict with sectarian roots.

Chapter 2: Historical Chapter

In order to be able to understand the situation in Yemen nowadays, it is important to look at the past of the country and have knowledge of the events that have led the country to its current situation. Therefore, an empirical overview of Yemen will follow. This overview is divided into two parts. The first part will describe the situation in North- and South Yemen separately from the 1960’s until the unification of the countries in 1990. Not all the events that took place can be described due to limits of time and space, so only the main events and characteristics will be mentioned. The second part will shortly look at the period of the unified Yemen, from 1990 until the Yemeni Civil War in 2015. The overview of the period of unified Yemen until 2015 will be relatively short in order to prevent iteration, since these situations will be abundantly covered in the analysis of the causes of the Yemeni Civil War.

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Figure 2: Yemen’s historical divisions

Source: _{http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen}

2.1 South Yemen: 1960’s-1990

In 1960, South Yemen consisted of various parts, that where either directly or indirectly under British rule. Back then, South Yemen was known as the Aden Colony (direct British rule) and the Eastern- and Western Aden Protectorates (indirect British rule). In 1959, the Federation of Arab Emirates of the South (FAES) was established, with the goal of bringing the various British protectorates and statelets together. On September 26, 1962, the Aden Colony was incorporated into the FAES, and the name changed to the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) (Brehoney, 2017, p.428; Lackner, 2017, p.97). However, three large states in the Eastern Aden Protectorate refused to be incorporated into the FSA; they hoped to discover oil on their territories and did not want to share these expected oil-incomes with their poor

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western neighbours. These states also differed greatly from the ones incorporated into the FSA with regard to their cultural and historical characteristics (Lackner, 2017a, p.97; Smith, 2017, p.85). Together they formed the Protectorate of South Arabia (PSA). Both the PSA and the FSA were still tied to Britain, who promised them they would gain independence in 1968 (Smith, 2017, p.87).

The southern Yemeni liberation war was fought over five years, from 1963-1967, and mainly played out between two different liberation movements: the National Liberation Front (NLF), which had a nationalist anti-British sentiment, and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which followed a Nasserist ideology (Brehoney, 2017, p.429; Lackner, 2017, pp.98-99). The British Federal Army played a relatively minor role in this liberation struggle, as the two liberation movements fought as violent battles against each other as they did against the British. In August 1967 the NLF won the battle decisively. The British handed over the symbols of power on November 30, 1967 (Lackner, 2017a, p.99) and the NLF proclaimed the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY). Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi became president of the PRSY (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.18). In 1970, southern Yemen was renamed into the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (Lackner, 2017a, p.100).

At independence, the PDRY inherited an appalling economic situation; there were limited natural resources and in the highlands were few agricultural areas. The PDRY had expected to rely its economy on the Aden Port and its associated industrial industries. This however was thwarted by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which led to the closure of the Suez Canal, which continued until 1975. The PDRY had almost no resources to build its economy on (Brehoney, 2017, p.429; Lackner, 2017, p.106). The resulting economic policies of the NLF-regime focused on agricultural areas that had previously been neglected and began a policy of land reform. The former lands of British and FLOSY supporters were handed over to sharecroppers and the government implemented a policy that reduced the size of land an individual could hold. It also sponsored (sometimes violent) uprisings from peasants against their landowners and seized their lands (Lackner, 2017a, p.105). This policy of turning land into state farms was not very successful, but it did led to more equality within the new country (Lackner, 2017a, p.106). Other policies of the NLF included the nationalisation of many industrial and commercial businesses, development policies focussing on agriculture and infrastructure and the restriction of foreign finances. This eventually led to a more stable economic situation. The PDRY was the only socialist state in the Arabian Peninsula and received economic aid from countries like Russia and China, which helped the country develop, but the aid was not enough to drastically strengthen the PDRY economy (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.108). The living standards in the country were quite high, education and medical aid were free and housing rents low (Lackner, 2017a, p.107). Social and economic differentials were greatly reduced by the time of the unification and men and women were seen as equals. Tribal tensions were seen as a social problem, and in 1968 the Tribal Reconciliation Decree was issued, which stated that tribal disputes had to be solved through the judicial system (Lackner, 2017a, p.110). The regime tried to (forcibly) reduce

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tribalism, which was seen as allegiances based on ethnicity or family origin (Lackner, 2017b _{, p.698). The} government ensured all groups were reasonably represented in the government and parties, as a means to reduce conflict.

In the period after southern independence until unification, internal struggles and conflicts dominated the country. Many leaders of the FLOSY had been exiled into North Yemen, but there were significant struggles within the NLF. There were two different factions, being the hard-line Marxist revolutionaries and the still extreme, but more realistic socialists (Brehoney, 2017, p.429). These struggles were partially solved in June 1969 when the ‘lefts’ (Marxists) within the NLF expelled the ‘rights’ and Salem Ruba’i Ali, known as Saleem, replaced president Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi (Lackner, 2010, p.100).

The period from 1969 onwards was politically speaking a violent period, with frequent uprisings. The NLF integrated other left-wing parties into its organisation; in 1978, the NLF, Baath and Communist parties merged into the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). The YSP became the sole party in the country (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.111). Various political struggles took place during the above mentioned period, mainly between a more populist, Maoist NLF faction led by president Saleem, and the Marxist faction (Brehoney, 2017, p.432). President Saleem attracted many ordinary Yemenis with his policies, but other NLF politicians did not appreciate these policies, as Saleem reduced the power of the bureaucracy and frequently bypassed administrative- and party structures (Lackner, 2017a, p.112). In June 1978 the tensions reached their peak when the opposing faction accused Saleem of being involved in the assassination of Ahmad al-Ghashmi, president of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Saleem was demanded to go into exile on June 25, but was arrested and executed after a failed coup on June 26. This led to a few days of fighting and the imprisonment of various supporters of Saleem (Brehoney, 2017, p.432). By the end of 1978, Saleem’s rival Abdul Fattah Ismail had become both the president of the PDRY and secretary general (party leader). In April 1980 he went to the Soviet Union into exile as a result of his insistence to be both president and leader of the YSP-party, and the less ideological prime minister Ali Nasser Mohammed became president, secretary general and remained prime-minister (Brehoney, 2017, p.433). In 1985, members of the opposition and Abdul Fattah’s allies accused Ali Nasser of accumulating too much personal power and of monopolization of all three leadership positions. He handed over his position as prime-minister to Haidar al-Attas and agreed to let Abdul Fattah return to the political stage (Brehoney, 2017, p.434; Lackner, 2017, p.113). The political situation escalated in 1986 into what has come to be known as the ‘13 Januari Events’, when Ali Nasser tried to assassinate all his enemies during a meeting. Many leaders were killed, Abdul Fattah being one of them. This was followed by a short civil war which lasted for 12 days and cost an estimated 10.000 lives (Salisbury, 2017a, p.5). Ali Nasser was defeated and fled to Sana’a, accompanied by many supporters (Brehoney, 2017, p.434). Among these supporters was Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi, the future president of unified Yemen. After these events, Ali

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Salem al-Beedh became secretary general and Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas president of the PDRY (Lackner, 2017a, p.114). The 13 January events led to a reconsideration of the policy the party used to follow, and political and economic reforms were initiated. During the last few years of the PDRY, oil was discovered, economic diversification was attempted and foreign financial support was more and more accepted. The economic situation improved, but in 1989 unification negotiations had started, a process which was initiated by Saleh, the president of North-Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.114).

Figure 3: Timeline South Yemen 1960’s-1990

2.2 North Yemen: 1960’s-1990

North Yemen used to be part of the Ottoman Empire until 1918, when it became part of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (led by Iman Badr of the Zaydi Hashemite Hamid-al Din family). On september 26 1962, the same day the FSA was proclaimed in South Yemen, the Mutawakkilite Imamate in Sana’a was overthrown during a military coup, led by officers influenced by the ideas of Arab Nationalism (Blumi, 2018, p.85; Lackner, 2017, p.98). They established the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) on the same day (Lackner, 2017a, p.98). Abdullah Sallal became president (Burrowes, 1991, p.484)._{This coup led to} the Northern Yemeni civil war, which played out between 1962 and 1970 between forces loyal to the Imam (royalists) and republicans. The republicans were supported by Nasser and his Egyptian troops until the Six Day War in 1967 led to a withdrawal of these forces (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The royalists (Zaydis) were openly supported by Saudi Arabia (Lackner, 2017a, p.99) . The main goal of the republicans was to 3

3_{This was the time of the ‘Arab Cold War’, when there were tensions between Arab republics and Arab monarchies.}

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establish a state that could maintain public security, while providing society a minimal level of services (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). With the help of Egyptian advisers, many ministries and state agencies were quickly erected; however, these institutions mainly existed in name, and did not function (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). On November 5, 1967 the republicans started the Siege of Sana’a in order to remove president Sallal from his office. He was sent into exile and replaced by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The North Yemen Civil War ended with the defeat of the royalists in 1970 and the consequent Compromise of 1970, and the republicans set up a new regime that included remnants of the royalist regime (Burrowes, 1991, p.486; Lackner, 2017a, p.100).

The Egyptians left behind an economically ruined country with nothing as much as resembling a government, and the political situation after the civil war was very troubling (Blumi, 2018, p.121). al-Iryani led a succession of various governments and switched often between accepting and declining Saudi Arabia’s influence into the domestic politics of the YAR (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). A Republic Council was established by al-Iryani in 1970 in an effort to impartially distribute the spoils of the new state that would be erected after Egypt’s occupation. The goal was to grant tribal leaders high state offices in exchange for their allegiance (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The objectives of the council to create political and economic stability were greatly undermined by concessions that were being made to the al-Ahmar clan, which is a leading shaikhly family from the Hashed confederation (Lackner, 2017a, p.11) and this partially led to the fall of the government in 1974 (Blumi, 2018, p.121). al-Iryani did manage to erect some ministries and agencies, like the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Yemen and the Central Planning Organization (CPO) (Burrowes, 1991, p.487). In 1974, al-Iryani was overthrown in a bloodless coup and Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamdi became president (Blumi, 2018, p.124). al-Hamdi wanted to establish an independent, modern Yemen wherein everyone would benefit from its good governance and economic policies (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). al-Hamdi set up locally run projects based on incomes out of remittances and the local _{zakat (an annual} tax Muslims pay) to develop communities with minimal state interference, which became an important part of the national economy (Blumi, 2018, p.127). For many people, al-Hamdi was the ‘ideal’ president, admired because of his ambitions to create a modern, independent Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). However, al-Hamdi was assassinated in October 1977 after only three years of rule and was succeeded by Ahmed al-Ghashmi, who in turn was assassinated in June 1978 as a revenge for the execution of al-Hamdi. This assassination led to the execution of president Salem Ruba’i Ali (Saleem) in the PDRY. Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of the YAR in July 1978. Almost immediately after Saleh came into power, the YAR reversed its locally focused development agenda (Blumi, 2018, p.134). Saleh built a regime based on patronage and benefited from the shift that took place in the balance of power

and establish a pan-Arabic republic under Egyptian leadership. Saudi-Arabia saw this as a threat to its own

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between the population and the ruler. Starting in the mid-1980s, remittances send back to ordinary Yemenis dropped, while the government suddenly had a large income through the export of oil (Lackner, 2017a, p.102). Through the use of these oil incomes, Saleh ensured the loyalty of different groups and institutions in the country. In 1982, he established the General People’s Congress (GPC), which supposedly was a civil-society institution in which all political interests and views had to be represented. However, the GPC turned out to be an organisation entirely loyal to Saleh (Burrowes, 1991, p.493; Lackner, 2017a, p.102). During the time the GPC was established, political parties were illegal in the country, and all influential people were gathered in this institution (Lackner, 2017a, p.102). Under Saleh’s rule, five-year plans from the World Bank were executed and foreign development aid was accepted. Saleh facilitated the establishment of a modern financial infrastructure in a bid to please foreign donor, made sure that the productivity of Yemen could be monetized and he facilitated the labor-export from Yemen to neighbouring oil-economies. Under Saleh’s rule, the YAR was open for both development and capital investment at the same time (Blumi, 2018, p.139).

The YAR had a striking tribal organization; tribes played a large role in the political, social and cultural spheres (Burrowes, 1991, p.484). Especially in the Northern Highlands, tribes are an important unit of identification and action for people, and could be organised into large tribal confederations (Burrowes, 1991, p.484). During the 1962-1970 Civil War, the balance of power between the state and the tribal peripheral areas was in favor of the tribes, who saw the battle between the republicans and the royalists as a way to gain autonomy. After the Civil War the influence of the central YAR government did not reach these peripheral areas, even though al-Iryani tried to achieve this by granting these tribal leaders high state offices in exchange for their allegiance (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). In the 1980s however, president Saleh did manage to increase the government's’ presence in the Northern Highlands; he launched development projects in remote areas, erected regional development authorities and harshly shut down any tribal challenges and protests (Burrowes, 1991, p.488).

Contrary to the PDRY, the YAR relied heavily on foreign aid. Saudi-Arabia was its largest contributor, and these incomes were used to solve the economic crises of the 1970s. Northern-Yemenis had free entry into Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf States, and many men migrated to these countries during the 1970s, sending their remittances back to the YAR (Blumi, 2018, p.122). This led to an unusual situation, since the population in the YAR was relatively wealthy, while the state was poor (Blumi, 2018, p.123; Lackner, 2017a, p.103). As a result, people invested in improving their living situations out of their own pockets, and did not rely on the state for this. This time was seen as a hopeful period in the YAR’s development path. As a result of these economic improvements, education expanded and the lifestyles of many people changed (Lackner, 2017a, pp.103-104). Another result of this inflow of remittances was that rural communities were not involved in development programs advocated by organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Remittances were spend locally and ensured that

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the YAR continued to be a ‘traditional’ economy, wherein the peasants preserved their economic independence (Blumi, 2018, p.123; Burrowes, 1991, p.497). All of this however changed after the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, which meant that many Yemeni men could no longer work abroad, and the flow of remittances stopped (Burrowes, 1991, p.498). The patronage system implemented by Saleh led to dissatisfaction among the general population, since the state could not provide adequate and expected services to its population and uphold the living standards the population had become used to (Burrows 1991, p.499). The state tried to perform its more traditional functions and introduced new plans to develop, among other things, the oil and gas sectors, infrastructure and agricultural production (Burrowes, 1991, p.499), and in 1984, oil was discovered in the Mareb region (Blumi, 2018, p.149; Lackner, 2017a, p.107). From the mid-1980s onward, it seemed that the government could make true on its promises about political and socioeconomic development and change (Burrowes, 1991, p.500)

Figure 4: Timeline North Yemen 1960’s-1990

2.3 Clashes and cooperation between North- and South Yemen

The YAR and PDRY had a longstanding relationship before their formal independence in respectively 1962 and 1967. People had moved between the two countries for centuries, either as a result of conflicts, political disagreements or natural causes like drought, that led to famines (Lackner, 2017a, p.114). Many communities in both the PDRY and the YAR welcomed people from the other country through these refugee flows (Lackner, 2017a, p.115). After the declaration of independence in de PDRY, supporters of the FLOSY movement, merchants and industrialists affected by the nationalization movement taking place and ousted rulers, fled to the YAR (Lackner, 2017a, p.115). What makes this long standing relationship even more obvious is the fact that the YAR reserved seats in its National Assembly

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for southern delegates, while the PDRY openly pledged its commitment to the idea of Yemeni unity in a pledge of allegiance (Lackner, 2015, p.116).

However, even though the two states seemed open to the idea of unity, this did not stop them from fighting two border wars in 1972 and 1979 respectively, which both ended with a unification agreement (Lackner, 2017a, p.116). Even though these agreements were not seen as being taken seriously by both the countries, the agreement of 1979 did lay the foundation for the unification of both countries in different sectors, such as health and education (Lackner, 2017a, p.116).

The relationships between the YAR and PDRY greatly improved between 1982 and 1988 (Burrowes, 1991, p.500). In May 1988 a process of demilitarization was started in the border areas of Marib and Shabwah, because of the oil that was found in these regions (Blumi, 2018, p.152; Burrowes, 1991, p.500). The idea of unification became even more attractive because the unification promised the generation of great oil revenues. In 1989, a national pact (_al-Mithaq

) was drafted and approved through

separate referenda in the YAR and PDRY (Blumi, 2018, p.152). The process of unification had begun.

2.4 Unified Yemen: 1990-2011

After the positive results of the referendum, many joint meetings were held between representatives of the YAR and the PDRY and on November 13, 1989 a complete unification was agreed upon between YAR president Saleh and PDRY secretary general al-Beedh (Lackner, 2017a, p.117). The Republic of Yemen (ROY) was proclaimed by president Saleh on 22 May 1990 (Burrowes, 1991, p.501; Lackner, 2017a, p.118). Despite large popular support, a few groups in both countries (and abroad; mainly Saudi Arabia) strongly opposed the unification (Lackner, 2017a, p.118).

A transition period of 30 months was agreed on, in order to merge the various state institutions and reorganize the political lives. Legislative elections would be held in November 1992 (Burrowes, 1991, p.501). The ROY was to be governed by a Presidential Council, which consisted of five members and from which the president and vice-president would be chosen, a 39-member cabinet, built up from representatives from both the YAR and the PDRY, and a House of Representatives with 301 members. The country would be governed from Sana’a (Burrowes, 1991, p.501). YAR president Saleh became president of the ROY, while PDRY secretary general al-Beedh became vice-president.

Even though legislation would be combined and adjusted to incorporate wishes from both the countries, unified Yemen was ruled by the form of administration and the laws that had existed in the YAR, generating dismay in the former PDRY (Lackner, 2017a, p.118). Only a few months after the unification, political rivalries emerged and the administrative quality quickly deteriorated; killings and assassinations among YSP militants were common during the 1990-1992 period; these murders were attributed to Saleh’s security services (Blumi, 2018, p.168; Lackner, 2017a, p.119). In 1994 a civil war broke out between the central government of president Saleh and a southern secession movement led by vice-president al-Beedh. The war was won by Saleh’s forces on July 7 (Lackner, 2017a, p.119). After this

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war, the YAR was ruled by the principles that had been common in the YAR under Saleh’s rule and systems of patronage were omnipresent (Lackner, 2017a, p.119). After the end of the 1994 civil war, political power became more and more concentrated in the hands of shaykhs, the military and northern businessmen (Brandt, 2017, p.127).

The formal government had basically no power and was a tool in the hands of the elite. The democratic foundation and freedom of speech the country started out with in 1990, did not last. However, the ROY held up a facade of democracy and this facade was enough to gain the support from many Western states, (Lackner, 2017a, pp.119-120). After the Civil War of 1994, many more conflicts followed between the central government and various rebellion groups, mainly playing out in the Northern area of the country, along the Yemeni-Saudi border (Blumi, 2018, p.166). The Saleh-government resorted to a policy of sectarianism against these rebels, and made use of the anti-Iranian rhetoric that circulated in the ROY (Blumi, 2018, p.165). Of all these rebellion groups, the North Yemen Houthi Movement is the most well known. The Houthi insurgency started in 2004 when Saleh’s forces were sent on a mission to kill Houthi leader Husayn al-Houthi because of his opposition to the central government, which had gained popular support. Between 2004 and 2009, six wars between the Houthis and the central government were fought; the conflict ended with a ceasefire in 2010 (Lackner, 2017a, p.20). Eventually, after the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011, in which many people were killed by the government security services and Saleh was severely wounded during an attack, Saleh resigned from office and vice-president Hadi became president of the ROY for a two year transitional period (Lackner, 2017a, p.20). After the Yemeni Uprisings, violence in the country endured while president Hadi tried to create a new government in the country (Lackner, 2017a, pp.20-21). In 2015, the Yemeni Civil war broke out between the Houthi movement and its allies, and the central government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017a, p.9).

Chapter 3: Actors in Yemen’s conflicts

For the sake of clarity and because of the complex nature of the past and present conflicts in Yemen, an overview of the actors involved in Yemen’s conflicts will be given before the actual analysis of the causes of the Yemeni Civil War will be conducted.

3.1 Local actors

The Houthi Movement, also known under the name of Shabab al Moumineen (SAM), meaning ‘Believing Youth’ or _{Ansar Allah}

, meaning ‘Partisans of God’, originated from the Northern Yemeni

Governorate of Sa’ada and is part of the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam (Freeman, 2009, p.1008). Zaydis believe that descendants of the prophet Mohammed (the _{sada) are the only rightful rulers of the country} and the Muslim community, which differentiates them from other groups in Yemen (Lackner, 2017a,

Unraveling Yemen's crisis : an analysis of the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

Master Thesis Political Science - Political Economy