The Netherlands in the armpit of the
Franco-German axis:
a shift on European defence
Photo: ANP
Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Melissa Sijm
Student Number: 10574786
Main supervisor: mw. dr. M.J.M. (Marleen) Rensen
Second Supervisor: mw.dr. K.K. (Krisztina) Lajosi-Moore July, 2018.
Abstract
‘The Benelux is, as it was, located in the armpit of France and Germany and with respect to influencing the Franco-German axis, the Benelux countries have a greater political relevance for the developments in a European context than in the past’.1 The title of the thesis refers to this quote of the Dutch ex-politician Hans van Mierlo in 1995, said during a meeting with the ministry of Foreign Affairs about the national budget. Van Mierlo meant that the Dutch had to increase their cooperation with France and Germany in order to get a stronger position within the EU. Nowadays, the current geopolitical landscape calls for a stronger security base in Europe. Although the Netherlands is still a minor player in the field of defence in the EU, it can play an important role in reforming Europe. This thesis will examine the Dutch position on the Franco-German axis within Europe. Using Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO) as a case study, research is done on the role France and Germany played in the CSDP and on the position the Netherlands took against their cooperation.
By means of a literature review, a solid background is provided for executing the case study on PESCO by using academic journals, books, newspapers, speeches, government reports and interviews. Eventually, an answer is given to the question what attitude the Netherlands hold against the Franco-German axis in regard to the CSDP. The Netherlands want to have a significant role in the development of the EU. Due to the Brexit, the Netherlands has to search for new partners in the EU. At the same time, it’s relations with both Germany and France has to strengthen to become a major player in the EU. For France and Germany, the Netherlands is important to overcome strong diverging national strategic cultures between both Member States, which was also visible in PESCO. Insights on the Franco-German relationship and its commitment to European integration, may provide better understanding of the specific field of European defence and the mutual relations within the EU.
Abbreviations
AIV Advisory Council on International Affairs.
BILD Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation
CARD Common Annual Review on Defence
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
EATC European Air Transport Command
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDA European Defence Agency
EDC European Defence Community
EDF European Defence Fund
EDU European Defence Union
EII European Intervention Initiative
EMS European Monetary System
EMU European Monetary Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EUMS EU Military Staff
HQ High Readiness Forces Headquarters
HR High Representative
IS Islamic State
MALE UAV Medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles.
MRTT Multirole tanks and transport
NATO North Atlantic Trade Organisation
NIP National Implementation Plan
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU Treaty on European Union
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
VP Vice-President
Content
Abstract...2
Abbreviations...3
Introduction...5
1. From 1945 – 2018: peaks and troughs in a Franco-German relationship...16
1.1 After the Second World War: a period of reconciliation...17
1.1.1 Different strategic cultures...19
1.1.2. Signing the Élysée Treaty...21
1.1.3. After the Élysée Treaty: the beginning of a special relationship...23
1.2 The Maastricht Treaty: A turning point in the Franco-German relationship...24
1.3. Macron and Merkel: A stumbling engine...29
2. The CSDP: (not) decisive Franco-German cooperation on defence and the Dutch interests...32
2.1. The WEU and Eurocorps...34
2.2. Different interests and national strategic cultures...36
2.3. EU battlegroups...38
2.4 External threats and challenges...41
2.5 No European army on the short term...42
2.6 Dutch-German cooperation: an asymmetric relationship...45
2.7 Dutch-France cooperation: new ambitions...46
2.8 After Brexit: the search for new partners...48
3. PESCO: a success formula in (Franco-)German defence and cooperation with the Netherlands..50
3.1 What is PESCO? The facts...51
3.2 The kick-off of PESCO...53
3.3 Waking up the sleeping beauty...54
3.4 Reaching a compromise: an inclusive and ambitious PESCO...55
3.5. PESCO: a German project...57
3.6 The Netherlands joining PESCO...59
3.6.1. Military mobility project...61
3.6.2 Ties with third countries...64
3.6.3. Encouraging Franco-German relationship on defence...64
4. Conclusion...67
Introduction
‘The Brexit referendum and the U.S. election opened our eyes. Europeans must take more responsibility for their own security’.2 On 10 June 2017, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged with these words that the current geopolitical landscape calls for a stronger security basis in Europe. Not only is one of the major powers leaving the EU, but also the new US administration has refused to back the mutual defence clause on several occasions. Furthermore, instability in the EU’s direct neighbourhood, contested multilateralism, a migration crisis and ongoing conflicts with Russia about Ukraine meant that the EU must do more for its own security.
Since 2015, France and Germany have been joining forces to achieve progress on European defence. In June 2016, High Representative Frederica Mogherini published the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. Soon after this, two Franco-German papers followed in July and September 2016, in which a joint vision and specific proposals for a European Security and Defence Union were outlined. In terms of concrete initiatives, both countries were important players in the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Common Annual Review on Defence (CARD) in 2017. Together, France and Germany have a history of both cooperation and rivalry. From the Second World War on, they have increasingly worked together so that mutual dependency and shared interests would prevent war from occurring in the future.
For this reason, it is not surprising that these two countries took the initiative to draw up plans for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) during the 90s. Launched in 1999 as a policy aiming to strengthen the security of European citizens, it relies on resources from Member States to support peace and stability in Europe and the rest of the world. For France and Germany, it is important that cooperation on defence succeeds: for the safety of Europe, but also as a symbolic success for their relationship in the field in which their cooperation started.
More generally, the two countries have become the driving forces behind the European integration process. On 22 January 1963, with the signing of the Élysée Treaty, a blueprint was made for the Franco-German motor that would eventually drive Europe. According to Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, the Élysée Treaty not only opened a new period of relations
2 Nicole Koenig, ‘France and Germany: Shifting gears on European defence?’
http://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/all-publications/france-and-germany-shifting-gears-on-european-defence-2/, consulted on January 10, 2018.
between France and Germany, but it embedded the developing Franco-German relationship within the evolving multilateral European project.3 Thus, in that sense, it marked a new era.4 Their relationship proved resilient. Until now, Germany and France have been at the centre of almost every European policy initiative: immigration, trade, the euro, defence, culture and EU enlargement. As both Merkel and Macron have emphasized, if France and Germany do not cooperate, Europe will stagnate.5 Furthermore, being members of the UN, NATO, the G8 (and additionally, for France, the Security Council) assures them a strong position internationally.
Despite these Franco-German efforts, not all Member States are keen to embrace their actions. Adriaan Schout, head of EU studies of the Institute Clingendael, argues that due to France’s grandeur, or grandiosity, in particular, it and Germany often come up with plans that are too ambitious for the Netherlands, such as a wider EU budget and stricter European regulations.6 For the Netherlands to reach its goal of becoming the third player in Europe, regular consultation is needed.7 Yet France and Germany often meet privately before a summit takes place to develop a joint plan or statement, and smaller countries often feel put aside.
The Netherlands on the Franco-German ambitions
Although the Netherlands is still a minor player in the field of defence in the EU, the country does not want to lag behind. Therefore, it has to manoeuvre itself somehow between France and Germany. The Netherlands has been chosen as an example of a small power in the EU that can nevertheless play an important role in reforming Europe.8 This thesis will examine the Dutch position on the Franco-German axis within Europe. It will focus especially on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in general and specifically on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
3 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 9.
4 Corine Defrance, ‘The Elysée Treaty in the context of Franco-German socio-cultural relations’, German Politics and Society, nr. 1 (2013), p. 86.
5 Demorgen.be, ‘Merkel en Macron benadrukken belang Duits-Franse as op EU-top’.
https://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/merkel-en-macron-benadrukken-belang-duits-franse-as-op-eu-top-b7202563/, consulted on June 23, 2018.
6 Maaike Posthuma, ‘Nederland is moederziel alleen in de EU’, https://www.hpdetijd.nl/2017-06-20/moederziel-alleen-europese-unie/, consulted on June 23, 2018.
7 De Volkskrant, ‘Nederland zet alles op alles om de nummer drie in Europa te worden’,
https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/nederland-zet-alles-op-alles-om-de-nummer-drie-in-europa-te-worden~b1b88fbe/, consulted on June 22, 2018.
8 Hanco Jürgens, Invloed op Frans-Duitse as vraagt om creativiteit’, https://www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/invloed-op-frans-duitse-as-vraagt-om-creativiteit~b5f82301/, consulted on June 25, 2018.
In 2017, France and Germany took the initiative to activate PESCO. This framework is an instrument that deepens defence cooperation among Member States who are willing to do so. The Netherlands is one of the 25 EU Member States to participate. The idea is that through PESCO, Member States increase their effectiveness in addressing security challenges and strengthening defence cooperation within an EU framework. The project is purely
intergovernmental and therefore unique: ‘The difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the binding nature of the commitments undertaken by participating Member States’.9 Participation remains voluntary and the Member States themselves make the decisions without intervention of a supranational organ such as the European Commission.
What makes this research relevant is that debate on Franco-German relations has recently been intensified. In 2018, due to the increased tensions in Europe and in the rest of the world, a more intense defence cooperation is called for among Member States. Macron and Merkel have shown that they want to work intensively together to reform the EU. At the same time, as recognised in the Global Strategy of 2016, ‘the European Union is now
confronted with security challenges that have raised the awareness that “we need a stronger Europe”’.10 This is a huge difference from the headline of the European Security Strategy of 2003: ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’.11 What this means is that everyone is waiting to see how the major powers of the EU will respond to these new
challenges.
Taking a closer look at the subject of military integration in Germany, France and the Netherlands may generate more insight and understanding into the possibilities and
difficulties of developing CSDP, but also into the emergence of a real European army, which not everyone in the EU wants to sign up for. Hence, differences in strategic cultures between France, Germany and the Netherlands should not be underestimated. Moreover, the subject raises the question of whether or not an agreement should depend primarily on France and Germany’s ability to address technical and practical issues. Taking PESCO as an example, many challenges were presented towards a successful PESCO. One of them was whether France and Germany could collect enough Member States to align with their proposals for
9 European External Action Service, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – factsheet’,
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en, consulted on January 18, 2018.
10 European External Action Service, European Security Strategy 2016: Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe', p. 7.
11 European External Action Service, ‘European Security Strategy 2003: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, p. 1.
what it should look like.12 This point raises questions about the nature of security among Member States in 21st century Europe. Are they willing to defend both themselves and Europe? Furthermore, although its launch was successful, both France and Germany harbor different views on PESCO’s desired outcome.13 Is it now the best way forward? To sum up, insights on the Franco-German relationship and its commitment to European integration, whether directly or indirectly, may provide better understanding of the specific field of European defence policy and the mutual relations within the EU.
Liberal intergovernmentalism
In the past, much literature has been published on the CSDP and the Franco-German bilateral relationship as two separate subjects. Because the CSDP has developed slowly in regard to European integration, it is interesting to compare this policy with theories on European integration. However, at the core of the theoretical debate about the European integration process lie issues about the delegation of power between national governments and
supranational institutions. Thus, these theories look beyond the nation state, and are often not focused on bilateral relationships. A theory that corresponds better to the Franco-German bilateral relationship is the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. A contemporary exponent of this theory is Andrew Moravcsik. He and Frank Schimmelfennig hold that nation states all act in rational ways to maximize their interests. States achieve their goals through
intergovernmental negotiation and through bargaining.14 Relations between states are
determined by their position within the international hierarchy. This means that some states, such as France and Germany, are more important than others.
After the 1990s, Moravcsik adapted intergovernmentalism to the new theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. The reason was the changing situation in Europe, in particular with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Intergovernmentalists regard national governments as the most
powerful actors in the EU. According to their theory, states are rational and calculate which option maximizes their gains. This means that they regard economic interests as the most significant and thus, interests such as national security are not the dominant motivation. However, a case such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) shows that states
12 Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, ‘Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?’, Security and Defense Policy Program, nr. 033 (2017), p. 1.
13 Nicole Koenig, ‘France and Germany: Shifting gears on European defence?’
http://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/all-publications/france-and-germany-shifting-gears-on-european-defence-2/, consulted on January 10, 2018.
14 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’ in: Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez eds., European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 68.
willingly surrendered control to an overarching body, despite valuing national sovereignty on defence.15 For this reason, the original intergovernmentalism theory was somewhat modified during the 1990s to a new theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. In the latter, economic elements are seen as less important in non-economic issue areas such as foreign policy.16
Researcher Alistair Cole looks from a state-centric conceptual focus to the Franco-German relationship. Cole builds further on Moravcsiks’s theory by stating that the essence of Moravcsik’s argument is that ‘the European Community can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage interdependence through negotiated policy coordination’.17 What this means is that since their inception, European communities have been based on inter-state bargains between the leading states of France and Germany.
Furthermore, French and German leaders benefitted from European integration, because their authority is strengthened due to their power to transfer their national interests to a European level — in particular, says Cole, in treaty negotiations.
Large and small Member States
In his liberal intergovernmentalism theory, Moravcsik also notes a division of power between larger Member States such as Germany and France and smaller ones such as the Netherlands. In 1993, Moravcsik argued that large Member States are more influential than small ones. Being prosperous and relatively self-sufficient, they are important in the formation of winning coalitions in bargaining situations. As a result, they gain relatively little from agreement and can therefore afford to be ‘more discriminating’ about the terms of any agreement they will accept.18 As Cole argues: ‘small states are either bought off with side payments, or coerced into acceptance of package deals’. What Moravcsik argues is that only big states really count. France and Germany count more than others and small Member States such as the
Netherlands experience disadvantages, as such coalition dynamics favour larger states. The result is a ‘two-track’ or ‘multi-speed’ Europe, which leaves some members behind.19
Furthermore, Cole argues that economically and militarily stronger states such as France and
15 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2000, p. 79.
16 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’ in: Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez eds., European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 70.
17 Alistair Cole, Franco-German relations, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 24.
18 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, nr. 4 (1993), p. 500.
Germany are expected to seek advantage by developing a hegemonic relationship with weaker neighbours, in this case the Netherlands.20
Although a universal definition of what distinguishes a large from a small member state does not exist, multiple authors (e.g., Jean Micallef Grimaud) distinguish between large EU states and a cluster of medium-small micro states. Grimaud uses the theory of Neumann and Gstöhl, which sets the dividing line between large and small states at around 16 million habitants. According to this information, Germany and France can be seen as large EU states and the Netherlands as a medium state within the category of the small states.21 This is also confirmed by researcher ArūnasMolis. He believes that what foreign policy in small states looks like often depends on the relation the state has with large neighbouring states and the extent to which small states want to adapt to changing conditions or maintain these relations. When large states threaten the national interests of a small state, the only option small states have is to set their priorities and develop their own foreign policy because of their limited military capabilities.22
Not often discussed is the relationship between France and Germany and the
Netherlands. One author who did so is Mathieu Segers. In Reis naar het continent (2013), he investigates the Dutch response to European developments from the Second World War onwards. Although the book is mainly written on European power relations, attention is given to the Franco-German axis as a major player in Dutch integration into European development. Using policy documents, Segers did research on why the Dutch in the 1950s decided to cooperate with continental countries, since they had been oriented towards the British and Americans. Segers quoted French minister of foreign affairs Maurice Couve de Murville, who in 1962 explained to George Ball, his American counterpart in European issues, why the Dutch vetoed France’s Fouchet Plan:
The Dutch had never really been interested in Europe; they had always been looking out over the waters at other areas of the world. The Dutch were, of course, in many ways the best of partners in the Community since they were the most honest and the most steady. But
20 Alistair Cole, Franco-German relations, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 23.
21 Jean Micallef Grimaud, Small States and EU Governance: Malta in EU Decision-Making Processes, Cham: Springer 2017, pp. 16-17.
22 Arūnas Molis, ‘The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy’, Baltic Security and Defence Review, nr. 8 (2006), p. 86.
they were not Europeans – at least they were not Continental Europeans – as were the French and the Germans.23
Segers wants to show that not much has changed in the past 70 years, because the Netherlands is still searching for allies.24 Also, the Netherlands moves nowadays between the continental Europeans, France and Germany, and the Atlantics, the US and the UK. It lies in the middle of these powers, with whom it has to work together on defence. Moreover, the quotation also shows how the French thought about the Netherlands. The question is whether this thought has changed since then, because cooperation is still not the same with Germany as with the Netherlands.25
Against US hegemony
Nonetheless, the idea that Germany and France would develop autonomous military equipment was not accepted by every EU member state.26 According to Molis, the
Netherlands is one of the countries that tries to keep the US in Europe for security reasons. Therefore, the country is part of the euroatlantists, which means that these countries regard both the EU and US as inseparable parts of Western civilization. Therefore, the EU’s foreign and security policy should be focused on the implementation of common interests with the US. Euroatlanticists value participation in the ESDP, because it provides a chance to influence the decisions in this sphere. As a consequence, euroatlantistic countries have tried to interfere between the French-German axis, whose interests often differ from those of the US.27 At the same time, as Barry R. Posen argues, can the development of the CSDP be seen as an attempt by the EU to build up against the US and to become less docile as an ally.28
Embedded bilateralism
Coming back to the influence of France and Germany within the EU, two authors who have addressed this subject are Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild. They approach the Franco-German connection in an empirical and historical way to study the common role of France 23 Sebastiaan Reyn, Atlantist Lost: The American experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2009, p. 414.
24 Mathieu Segers, Reis naar het continent’, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker 2013, p. 41. 25 Ibidem, p. 264.
26 Arūnas Molis, ‘The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy’, Baltic Security and Defence Review, nr. 8 (2006), p. 81.
27 Arūnas Molis, ‘The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy’, Baltic Security and Defence Review, nr. 8 (2006), p. 87.
28 Barry R. Posen, ‘European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?’, Security Studies, nr. 2 (2006), p. 185.
and Germany in Europe. They regard the Franco-German axis as a form of embedded bilateralism that has been of significant value for shaping contemporary Europe. Its combination of regularized intergovernmentalism, symbolic acts and practices and the parapublic underpinnings of international relations makes the relationship ‘historically resilient and politically adaptable’.29 Moreover, the particular nature of Franco-German relations explains the success of this bilateral connection within Europe. Therefore, these authors point to these two countries’ size, political relevance and joint weight as the core of Europe. ‘The Franco-German relationship and the two states’ powerful role in Europe are two sides of the same coin. To neglect that means to miss a crucial driver of European politics and history over half the century’.30 Moreover, Krotz and Schild argue that France and Germany have had a major impact on shaping Europe’s polity and European policies. The Franco-German impact has been crucial in key policy fields such as European monetary affairs, at moments of relaunching the community after periods of stalling, in intergovernmental-type decisions and in times of deep crisis (e.g., with the sovereign debt crisis). Through agenda setting, bilateral compromise building, crisis management, coalition building and minilateral diplomatic cooperation, France and Germany tried to influence various policy fields.31
However, on security and defence, France and Germany’s influence was less decisive, because the differences in their wishes were too vast.32
French and German strategic cultures in defence policies
Digging further into CSDP, a case study will be done on PESCO. So far only a few attempts have been made to gain insights in this framework. This is not surprising, as PESCO has only recently been set up. Many research projects conducted before its launch in December 2017 consist of predictions about its future success. For example, Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez (2017) investigate in their policy brief whether France and Germany can make PESCO work as a plan toward EU defence. They argue that they have used a phased approach in leading the process to implement it.33 According to their theory, the success of PESCO primarily depends on these countries’ ability to solve short-term technical and political issues such as monitoring the countries’ commitments. However, fundamental divisions between 29 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 35.
30 Ibidem, p. 234. 31 Ibidem, pp. 237-238. 32 Ibidem, p. 239.
33 Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, ‘Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?’, Security and Defense Policy Program, nr. 033 (2017), p. 1.
French and German strategic cultures remain. Although these issues do not obstruct the launch of PESCO, they need to be solved before making it a turning point toward a more coordinated European defence. In a comparable article, Billon-Galland emphasizes PESCO’s success by stating that the participating Member States acknowledge their shortfalls and are finally willing to work on them together. He regards its launch as being an important step in reinforcing the EU’s power next to the US in NATO.34
Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke, researchers at the Jacques Delors Institut, are also positive about PESCO, stating that it is an important step for the next decade of EU defence cooperation. They discuss the steps to be taken by France and Germany on the short-term, medium-term and medium to long-term.35 They advocate an incremental approach, so that taking small steps will lead to a solid basis for a more ambitious CSDP in the medium-term. Taken as an example, Belgium only spent 0.91% of its GDP on defence in 2016, but in the framework of PESCO, it could make a binding commitment to reach the target of 2% within ten years.
Moreover, together with Elvira Fabry and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Nicole Koenig states in a later paper that is important for France and Germany to continue their leadership role, because they have opposite views on PESCO that need to be solved.36 Therefore, continuous work towards a collective strategic vision is a central goal for France and Germany. PESCO can ‘provide substance to the narrative of a ‘Europe that protects”.37 The reason these researchers make this statement is that strategic differences between France and Germany have prevented deepening bilateral military cooperation in the past. Despite the two propagating a common thought in this regard, the CSDP is a policy area that has often been characterised by a gap between vision and action, and longstanding differences between them in terms of politics and public perception persist. Indeed, France favours crisis management operations in Africa and the Middle East to advance French security and defence policy. As also PESCO shows, France wants to create a smaller and more exclusive group of Member States that is capable of conducting military interventions jointly. Germany has acknowledged that a renewed CSDP is important, but it is often reluctant to use military instruments in
34 Teri Schultz, ‘Can PESCO provide a new European identity?’ http://www.dw.com/en/can-pesco-provide-a-new-european-identity/a-41362789, consulted on January 29, 2018.
35 Nicole Koenig, Marie Walter-Franke, ‘France and Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defence Union?’, Policy Paper, Jacques Delors Institute, nr. 2 (2017), p. 15.
36 Elvira Fabry, Nicole Koenig, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, ‘Strengthening European Defence: who sits at the pesco table, what’s on the menu’, http://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/all-publications/european-defence-who-sits-at-the-table-whats-on-the-menu/, consulted on January 31, 2018.
solving regional crises and conflicts. Moreover, in the past few years, both France and Germany have shown interest in launching a European Army.
Dutch position against the Franco-German axis on defence
Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte has always opposed a European army and is therefore often against far-reaching Franco-German defence plans. Nevertheless, Rutte also realises that in order to protect its citizens, intensified cooperation within the field of European defence is indispensable.38 This raises the following research question: what attitude does the
Netherlands hold against the Franco-German axis in regard to the Common Security and Defence Policy?
Method and sources
In order to answer the research question, a literature review will be used with respect to the theoretical framework just outlined. Its aim is to give a broad overview of the Franco-German axis and of the history of CSDP. This will provide a solid background for executing the case study on PESCO. First, secondary sources such as academic journals and books will be used to contribute to this background. The focus will be on the period from 1945 until 2018. Moreover, other media will be used to give a topical overview of the Dutch opinion on the Franco-German axis, CSDP and PESCO. Therefore, online articles and newspapers will be used in which experts give their vision of these topics. Moreover, the use of primary sources such as speeches and government reports will investigate whether the Netherlands is for or against the Franco-German relationship, and the opinion of the Dutch government on PESCO. Finally, interviews will be held with two experts on France and Germany, with an
EU-correspondent and with two experts from The Hague and Brussels on defence and on PESCO in particular. These people are selected for their expertise on the subjects that suit this
research project. In particular, they have knowledge about the current circumstances on the Dutch attitude towards PESCO and in regard to Franco-German relations. Choosing experts from different fields attempts to provide a wide range of perspectives on the subjects that fit this research project.
To answer the research question, this thesis is divided into three chapters. The first one analyses the emergence of the Franco-German relationship, as well as its scope and
38 Jelte Wiersma, ‘Den Haag heeft weer kompas; Premier Rutte markeert met historische rede eindelijk Nederlandse positie in Europese Unie’, https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2018/03/rutte-nederland-eu-128266w/, consulted on May 12, 2018.
restrictions. What explains the variable impact of this relationship across policy areas, as well as over time? Attention is given to the strategic cultures affecting France and Germany in their choices and the actors that drive the alliance, in particular Merkel and Macron.
Following a chronological course, the chapter looks at cooperation on levels such as culture, politics, economics and defence.
The second chapter describes how the ESDP developed into the CSDP in its current state before outlining the Dutch position on the Franco-German axis on defence policy. It focus on to what extent cooperation has already taken place between the Netherlands and France and Germany. The chapter is divided into sections on instances where the Franco-German cooperation on the CSDP was significant, such in EU Battlegroups and Eurocorps. This will help to show when the Franco-German cooperation is functioning well and when it is malfunctioning.
Through a case study on PESCO, the final chapter reports on the attitude of the Netherlands in regard to Germany and France’s decisions. It considers the Dutch government’s interests and motives for joining PESCO, as well as how to reflect the cooperation of the Netherlands with each country separately. PESCO will serve as a groundwork for illustrating and testing the theoretical framework.
1.
From 1945 – 2018: peaks and troughs in a Franco-German
‘I am making the proposal to Germany for a new partnership’. [...] ‘European unity – forged through Franco-German reconciliation and the reunification of Eastern and Western Europe – is our greatest success and most precious asset’.39 After Emmanuel Macron’s Sorbonne speech, expectations were high that France and Germany together would breathe new life into the Franco-German axis and into the EU. Both countries have always been considered to be the engine of Europe, promoting progressive integration of European nation-states and familiarizing other continents with Europe’s role in the world. After all, no other countries in the EU have such strong bilateral contacts. In short, because of Germany and France,
European integration became a success; although some conflicts on European integration have arisen between France and Germany throughout the past 60 years, they have always been able to strike important agreements.
Now, at least since 2012, their relations are perceived to have stalled again. An imbalance was created because Germany strengthened economically and politically, while France weakened in these areas. Thus, the Franco-German axis is seen as less effective, and new energy had to be put into the motor. With the re-election of Angela Merkel in Germany and the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017 in France, a new impetus was given to a stronger Franco-German alliance that would be able to care together for challenging issues, such as the refugee crisis, a sensitive European economy and the security of Europe. However, Hanco argues that France and Germany are already losing credibility again. He regards the differences in expectations and political style between the two leaders as too high; thus, the revival of the EU has to wait.40 But is this then the moment that, as Hans van Mierlo said as a metaphor in 1995, the Netherlands has to find itself in the armpit of France and Germany and that the time has come to join in? In 1995, Van Mierlo wanted to be one of the front runners in terms of European integration, because it would give the Netherlands a better geopolitical position as well as increase the chances for small countries within the EU.41 According to Van Mierlo, the country could no longer hide itself behind the Atlantic countries. Furthermore, the Netherlands wanted to bring an end to the traditional Dutch suspicion against France and its power politics.42 The same situation is happening again: Rutte regards Macron’s politics as French grandeur, and because the UK is leaving the EU, the
39 Sorbonne speech of Emmanuel Macron: 26 September 2017,
http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html, consulted on June 22, 2018.
40 Hanco Jürgens, ‘Frans-Duitse as: balanceer-act waarin Nederland nog een belangrijke rol kan spelen’, Clingendael Spectator, nr. 3 (2018), p. 1.
41 Kamerstuk 23900-V nr. 39, 1994/1995.
42 Paul Brill, ‘Meester van de paradox’, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/meester-van-de-paradox~b0b4ee8d/, consulted on June 05, 2018.
search for new partners has begun. This chapter will analyse how the Franco-German axis works and present a brief history of the Franco-German partnership. Thus, questions to be addressed include the following. What links Germany and France, and what accounts for the success of their combined leadership in Europe? When does their cooperation works smoothly and when does it falter? Therefore, the Franco-German alliance will be regarded in the
context of important historical and political events from the Second World War on. Furthermore, the Netherlands will join starting from the Treaty of Maastricht, because it played an important part during the negotiations.
1.1 After the Second World War: a period of reconciliation
From the 17th century onwards, France and the Holy Roman Empire had their own hegemonic ambitions within Europe that caused conflict between these two European states. Both countries carry divisive memories of historical battles. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and World Wars I and II influenced the formation of Franco-German relation.43 Ulrich Krotz marks the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 as the starting point for Franco-German relations. The war, which caused a French defeat and the establishment of the German Empire, laid the foundation for decades of profound hostility between France and Germany and the desire for revenge from the French side. Despite some moments of good relationship, France and Germany were labelled as hereditary enmities.44
Although it looked as if the hostility that arose with the Franco-Prussian war would never come to an end, World War II represented a turning point for both countries.45 A physically exhausted Europe left France one of the four victorious powers and Germany divided into four occupation zones, both politically and economically isolated. A tangible tension between East and West required a new security strategy, on both military and political levels. As a result, initiatives were set up to prevent the possibility of Germany making war again. From the beginning of France and Germany’s cooperation in Europe, defence and security were their priorities.
During and after the Second World War, France was led by Charles de Gaulle. Initially, De Gaulle was hostile to the creation of a unified (West) German governance, because controlling Germany could guarantee France’s safety. In addition, France could
43 Alistair Cole, Franco-German relations, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 3.
44 For example: during the 1890s, Germany helped France to overcome difficulties with Britain on the African colonies.
45 Ulrich Krotz, ‘Three eras and possible futures: a long-term view on the Franco-German relationship a century after the First World War’, International Affairs, nr. 2 (2014), p. 338.
develop Europe under French leadership and thus serve French interests in Europe. However, by 1947, France realized that it was better to commit itself to creating a working partnership between the countries. France could not prevent the US and UK from supporting German economic recovery in their occupation zones, or from assisting the recovery of democracy.46 Furthermore, making Germany part of European integration provided a strong security guarantee against the Soviet Union, as an upcoming threat.47 Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Government, was convinced that it was important to reconcile France and Germany, to guarantee France’s national security and rebuild
Europe.48 The Schuman Plan of the 9th of May 1950 contained the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). For France the ECSC was a security matter: by placing the complete German production of coal and steel under a High Authority, a new war was materially impossible. Furthermore, it was also a symbolic step: by giving a High Authority supervision of French and German coal and steel, a war between hereditary enemies would be avoided. Participation in the ECSC would be the beginning of the European integration process.
The first West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, also favoured a Franco-German reconciliation, because it could help Germany recover full control of its steel industry, as well as being a tool for new relations with other Western European countries and the US.49
Furthermore, the country would receive equal terms in the ECSC negotiations; thus, it was a step in the direction of autonomous statehood.50 Adenauer also had the idea of a United States of Europe. He wanted to support the security needs of France, to stop the revival of German nationalism and to have a political instrument of containment against the Soviet Union.51 According to author Alice Ackermann, reconciliation was the best strategy to break the historically rooted conflict between France and Germany once they entered a post-conflict phase, because it meant rebuilding of trust: it provides a means by which states can overcome historical antagonism and build durable peace.52 Because reconciliation is about trust, but also about accepting cultural and political differences and active friendship, it mainly contains social and cultural features. However, Ackermann states that to completely overcome
46 Alistair Cole, Franco-German relations, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 5.
47 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 238.
48 Ibidem, p. 231.
49 Ibidem, p. 234.
50 Alistair Cole, Franco-German relations, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 7.
51 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 239.
historical antagonism, both reconciliation and aspects of realpolitik such as political,
economic and security considerations are important.53 With her article, Ackermann wanted to investigate how reconciliation is realized as a policy process. She states that reconciliation is not a means to prevent conflict, yet it creates the basis for a peaceful resolution of diverging interests (e.g., by means of bargaining and compromise). Indeed, as the community
progressed, the 1957 Treaty of Rome creating a common market was also a compromise in which each country pursued its economic self-interest, between offering Germany leadership to support its interest in market liberalisation and France its interest in the creation of common policies in agriculture, to support its agriculture in crisis.54
Other developments took place on a military level. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the increasing tensions within the Soviet Union led the US Administration to conclude that in order to defend Europe, a German rearmament was required. As a result, in October 1950, the Pleven Plan was introduced by French Prime Minister René Pleven to create a European Defence Community (EDC). As well as the ECSC, the EDC was set up to prevent the German military potential of making war again. For Germany, a supranational EDC would enhance Germany’s sovereignty and provide equality relative to other Member States. However, people feared that a European supranational army would provide an
opportunity for the US to withdraw its troops from Europe. Furthermore, not everyone agreed to re-arm Germany. As a result, by 1954, the EDC plan collapsed in France when it failed to obtain ratification. The French feared that the EDC threatened France’s national sovereignty. Moreover, with the death of Stalin, concerns about a future conflict between Eastern and Western Europe lessened and made an EDC less essential.
1.1.1 Different strategic cultures
Germany has always felt the aftermath of the wars in the first half of the 20th century. After the Second World War, the country was left with a feeling of guilt. Although it wanted a break with the past, it faced difficulties reaching consensus on defence. As a result, roughly speaking, two German narratives of the past were dominant in the 1950s.On the one hand, in order to become fully integrated into the West, anything that had to do with it —NATO, France, European integration et cetera — had to be supported by Germany. This view was in particular supported by the middle and right of the German political spectrum (SPD,
53 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 231.
CDU/CU).55 However, although becoming a member of the NATO in 1955 was encouraged, advocating political goals in terms of a quest for prestige or gaining power was
unacceptable.56 On the other hand, any use of power, particularly military power, must be avoided by the Germans. In particular, the left political spectrum was against German
rearmament and against the possession of nuclear weapons.57 Furthermore, the country valued its partnership with the US. This was also demonstrated with the signing of The Élysée Treaty in 1963, which gave France the chance to force Germany to lose its connection with the US. De Gaulle desired a strong Europe that could counter American cultural and economic hegemony. Despite strong criticism from the US and opposition in the German Bundestag, France convinced Germany to approve the contract. Adenauer did, however, include an explanatory preamble that guaranteed the bond with its transatlantic partner.
Also during his presidency (1959-1969), De Gaulle used friendship with Germany to serve France’s own interest in becoming the leading power in the world. According to Alistair Cole, a strong Franco-German axis was seen by De Gaulle as a good alternative to the
unwanted and ever closer federal union under the leadership of the European Commission. Together with Germany, France wanted to lead Europe on the basis of close
intergovernmental cooperation.58
Despite their different national strategic cultures, a strong relationship between De Gaulle and Adenauer was established, because they needed each other. It was born mainly out of a necessity to establish security in Europe. Furthermore, Germany wanted to become friends with several Western nations, and with the help of Germany, France could see itself as the political centre of Europe. Wanting to anchor their relationship in something more serious, De Gaulle proposed the Élysée Treaty.
1.1.2. Signing the Élysée Treaty
On 22 January 1963, De Gaulle and Adenauer signed the Élysée Treaty: ‘Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Franco-German Cooperation’. The Treaty was of significant value for the Franco-German relationship, because it was ‘the
55 Beatrice Heuser, ‘Historical Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and Germany, 1945-90’, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, nr. 2 (1998), p. 215.
56 Ibidem, p. 222.
57 Ibidem, pp. 215-216.
foundation and the symbol of reconciliation’.59 On the one hand, this treaty was a break with the past, as it symbolically ended the phase of Franco-German reconciliation following World War II. On the other hand, it was the result of measurable rapprochement; thus, it sealed the improved relationship between the two former enemies.
Although the treaty did not establish a constitution, it has a strong institutional character. It specifies how many times the leaders of France and Germany, and also their government, should meet or consult each other in general. Since the signing of the treaty, the French president and the German chancellor have kept each other informed of their positions prior to EU summits, thus strengthening their appearance of unity to the rest of Europe.
During the 1970s, these meetings were joined regularly by 12 to 18 ministers of interior affairs. By the 1980s, the summits were attended by almost all ministers, as well as myriad civil servants.60 Moreover, the areas of education and youth affairs were added to cooperation objectives in the policy areas of defence, security and armament. Especially Adenauer thought that the future of reconciliation depended on the youth in France and Germany and that promoting understanding between these nations was important.61
Historian Corine Defrance argues that culture is not the main aim of the treaty, but still it was important for the development and deepening of cultural and socio-cultural relations between France and Germany. Therefore, she also argues that the treaty was not a break with the previous developments in Franco-German rapprochement. Instead, she states that the late 1940s and 1950s were already crucial for Franco-German cultural relations.62 Indeed, in the years following the Second World War, various initiatives were set up, mostly on an informal level by citizens and local and regional officials. Largely state-financed or organized, they include the Bureau International de Liaison et de Documentation (BILD; founded in 1945) and the Franco-German Institute in Ludwigsburg, opened in 1948. Individuals in both countries felt the need to expand societal and cultural linkages, because they believed that it was important to come together and that reconciliation was a lasting objective. Because this feeling was also shared by politicians, multiple programs adopted in both countries included youth and academic exchanges and partnerships between cities (of which the first in 1950 between Ludwigsburg and Montbéliard). Moreover, cultural institutes were set up, such as 59 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 244.
60 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 56.
61 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 241.
62 Corine Defrance, ‘The Elysée Treaty in the context of Franco-German socio-cultural relations’, German Politics and Society, nr. 1 (2013), p. 76
Goethe institutes in Lille (1957) and Paris (1962/1963).63 Defrance argues that although the government worked hard on cultural cooperation, Franco-German rapprochement started at the private level and is the result of voluntary cooperation on a cultural, social and political level.64 For instance, the Franco-German Youth Office was created in 1963 as an autonomous bilateral organisation responsible for an official agenda that features multiple (exchange) programs. As the first governmentally sponsored youth exchange organization, it became one of the most important steps toward promoting reconciliation between France and Germany on a broader basis.65 Thus, culture makes the relationship between France and Germany special, because commitment to culture comes from different layers of society. It thus strengthens interactions between states and citizens. Making the treaty durable was a combination of the requirement for regular consultation and the promotion of interaction in the society that would eventually drive Europe.66 Attempts on an official level sometimes failed, because officials tried to converge French and German societies, which were too different from one another.67
In some cases, the Élysée Treaty became more symbolic, as not all plans were implemented immediately in the 1960s and many were postponed until the early 1980s. For instance, in the light of the Élysée Treaty, multiple initiatives on defence were taken. The Commission for Security and Defence in 1982 was the first major institution extension established. What followed were the Franco-German Defense and Security Council (1988) and the Ministerial Councils (2003). As Ulrich Krotz has argued, the signing of the Elysée Treaty signified the interrelationship of Franco-German bilateralism and multilateral European integration.68 This means that the treaty was seen as the beginning of embedded bilateralism. Furthermore, Adenauer and De Gaulle, who visited each other frequently between 1958 and 1963, were an example of a special duo. Therefore,
it was mainly the symbolic actions between the two that secured their strong relationship — including the famous kiss that concluded the Élysée Treaty and became the symbol of an everlasting relationship.69
63 Ibidem.
64 Ibidem, p. 87.
65 Alice Ackermann, ‘Reconciliation as a peace-building process in post-war Europe: The Franco-German Case’, Peace & Change, nr. 3 (1994), p. 242.
66 Ibidem.
67 Corine Defrance, ‘The Elysée Treaty in the context of Franco-German socio-cultural relations’, German Politics and Society, nr. 1 (2013), p. 78.
68 Ulrich Krotz, ‘Three eras and possible futures: a long-term view on the Franco-German relationship a century after the First World War’, International Affairs, nr. 2 (2014), p. 337.
69 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 54.
1.1.3. After the Élysée Treaty: the beginning of a special relationship
Despite their symbolic reconciliation, the two countries held conflicting political visions. Particularly on defence, their strong cooperation could not be taken for granted. France’s unilateral vision of defence contradicted that of NATO, of which Germany had become a partner. Furthermore, from the early 1950s until the end of the De Gaulle’s presidencies in 1969, France was the ruling power over Germany at the bilateral level. Germany also accepted that France held some sort of control over the country. As a result, France and Germany had a peaceful relationship. At the end of the 1960s, their relationship was politically more balanced: Germany had become a strong industrial and financial power, France an agricultural and military one.70 For a long time, the loss of its status as a world power could be obscured by France’s grandeur and its active European integration policy. In practice, this led to France’s decision in 1960 to keep up its power in Europe by becoming a member of the highly selective group of nuclear powers. Moreover, France became a permanent member of the UN security council, gaining status through its neo-colonial relationship with Francophone African states. Despite its efforts, however, France could not hide its weakening condition. During the presidency of Pompidou (1969-1974), it was confronted with Brandt (1969-1974) and West Germany’s rising economic weight.
Furthermore, Germany exercised a more active foreign policy, demonstrated by its increased involvement in NATO. For this reason, Pompidou decided to remove the French veto against British accession to the European community to bring in a potential ally against German power and to balance German influence within Europe.71 In the end, the chemistry between Brandt and Pompidou was not as strong as between their predecessors. Krotz and Schild argue that this became problematic. According to them, cooperation between France and Germany depended not only on cooperation fields such as security and foreign policy, but also on the chemistry among its leaders. This dynamic is also true if you look at the attempts on a cultural level: because the relationship weakened among Pompidou and Brandt, all efforts attempted after the Élysée Treaty did not result in the expected convergence on an official level.72 Later on, the special relationship revived between Schmidt (1974-1982) and Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981), who supported the Franco-German partnership in almost every policy area. Their most successful achievement was the European Monetary System (EMS). Furthermore, cultural cooperation intensified, as joint research programs were established, agreements
70 Ibidem, p. 36.
71 Ibidem.
72 Corine Defrance, ‘The Elysée Treaty in the context of Franco-German socio-cultural relations’, German Politics and Society, nr. 1 (2013), p. 79.
signed on the regulation of bilingual education and because of the recognition of training and university degrees.73 Although the strong relationship between France and Germany consisted mainly of practical results, symbolic gestures such as the September 1978 meeting of
d’Estaing and Schmidt at Charlemagne’s throne in Aachen Cathedral put a stamp on their strong relationship.
These symbolic gestures also continued in the 1980s. The memorable image of Kohl and Mitterrand holding hands at the grave fields at Verdun in 1984 refers to the idea of belonging together, overcoming a history of war and suffering and the changes in European politics.74 Some actions repeat constantly, such as the various commemorations and the first visit to each other’s country after the change of state. Furthermore, the stability of the French-German axis also helped European political and economic integration to continue. In 1985, France and Germany signed the Schengen Agreement, which abolished border controls and made traveling through Europe much easier. In 1986, the European Act was signed, with the aim of creating a common market before the end of 1992.
1.2 The Maastricht Treaty: A turning point in the Franco-German relationship
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new situation was created in Europe. It was obvious that Germany would become an important player in the EU. Furthermore, the Soviet Union collapsed, and new countries wanted to become a members. Therefore, a closer union was the only way to prevent new chaos and war from occurring in the future.75 Thus, although the idea of the EC as a security project had become less important in the past decades, a monetary union had to be set up to renew the European project as a peace project.
However, the Franco-German cooperation had become less stable. German chancellor Kohl introduced his famous ten-point plan in the Bundestag in Bonn, offering a timeline for German reunification. French president Mitterand felt betrayed, because he was not informed in advance. As a consequence of his frustration with German unity, Mitterand started a closer relationship with Russia and made symbolic visits to Poland and Eastern Germany. The results were augmented tensions between Germany and France. Nevertheless, Mitterrand knew that the reunification of Germany was inevitable. From the Schuman plan in 1952 onwards, the French European policy had always focused on restricting German power, and 73 Ibidem.
74 Hanco Jürgens, ‘De smalle marges van de Frans-Duitse as’, https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/de-smalle-marges-van-de-frans-duitse, consulted on June 05, 2018.
75 Mathieu Segers, ‘2DOC: De Europese Droom’, https://www.human.nl/2doc/2017/europese-droom.html’, consulted on June 23, 2018.
Mitterand wanted to do the same again.76 He came up with a compromise: all European Member States would care for the reunification of both Germanys in exchange for German agreement to an Economic and Monetary Union in the Maastricht Treaty with a joint currency as its climax. Kohl knew that, for Germany, the value of the deutschemark was extremely high, and it would never become better than the euro. Nevertheless, Nie wieder Krieg (‘never a war again’) was more important than a strong currency; thus, Kohl agreed to the
compromise.
The above moment shows that compromises are clearly an important part of the Franco-German relationship. According to Dutch economist and banker André Szasz, the euro was a French wish and a German concession. It was France that desired a joint currency, because it wanted to restrict Germany’s monetary strength.77 This is also confirmed by Krotz and Schild, but the results of a mutual exchange of concessions between France and Germany also needed to correspond to the preferences of other Member States.78 Nevertheless, Krotz and Schild argue that Member States often accept Franco-German compromises, because they feel that their preferences are represented by either France or Germany. Furthermore, the costs of complex multilateral negotiations are much higher than negotiations between two
countries, and thus a bilateral meeting provides efficiency gains. For France and Germany, a compromise does not mean the convergence of ideas: by means of an exchange of
concessions, they are able to build bridges between opposing camps in the EU.79 At the same time, Carine Germond and Henning Türk (authors of the book A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe) argue that, in general, when France and Germany fail to achieve an agreement and to harmonize their ideas on essential issues, bilateral crises and even
stagnation in Europe often result. The reason is that other European Member States reckon on Franco-German cooperation. When France and Germany cannot come to an agreement, other Member States lose trust in this bilateral cooperation and think that a solution will never be reached. By contrast, when Germany and France find consensus, more integration is
reached.80 Thus, the Franco-German relationship is also built on expectations created by other
76 Ibidem.
77 André Szasz, ‘De euro en der Fluch der bösen Tat’, Duitsland-Frankrijk in Europa: een blijvend onbegrip’, in: Hanco Jürgens en Ton Nijhuis ed., De vleugels van de adelaar, Amsterdam: Boom 2017, p. 179.
78 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and embedded bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to twenty-first century politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, pp. 40-41.
79 Ibidem, p. 41.
80 Carine Germond, Henning Türk, A history of Franco-German relations in Europe: From “Hereditary Enemies” to Partners, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, p. 7.
Member States.81 For this reason, the two countries are seen as capable of having the upper hand in the EU: if relations between them had developed in a different way, Europe too would look different.82
However, despite the compromise Mitterrand made, German reunification increased its economic and political prevalence in the EU.83 Furthermore, France lost its status as the winner of the Second World War. For Europe expert Luuk van Middelaar, the moment this historical deal was made is a turning point in the post-war history of Franco-German relations.84
Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, Dutch prime minister Lubbers and German chancellor Kohl were in a poor relationship with each other. The Netherlands was critical towards a possible German reunification and hoped that the security structures in Europe would remain unchanged. However, during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the
relationship between them improved. Both Kohl and Lubbers had the same goal: the creation of a monetary union.85 Furthermore, although France and Germany were the hegemonic powers in the EU, support of the Netherlands was important to let the European Monetary Union (EMU) succeed. Because Lubbers had always had a good relationship with the UK, Kohl needed him in his negotiations, to counter Franco-German initiatives in Europe. Because the UK was not enthusiastic to set up a EMU, Lubbers was expected to keep Britain on board.86
Furthermore, with the Maastricht Treaty, The Netherlands thought it had the support from Germany for a federal Europe. However, this appeared not to be true. Moreover, Lubbers wanted the European Central Bank in Amsterdam, but Kohl insisted that it be
established in Frankfurt. Thus, the Netherlands felt threatened by Germany as a bigger power in the EU. However, since the second half of the 1990s, the image of the Germans in the Netherlands has been ameliorated. With a new cabinet headed by Wim Kok, a new start was
81 Ulrich Krotz, Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 9.
82 Ibidem, p. 41.
83 Ibidem, p. 36.
84 Luuk van Middelaar, ‘Duitsland-Frankrijk in Europa: een blijvend onbegrip’, in: Hanco Jürgens en Ton Nijhuis ed., De vleugels van de adelaar, Amsterdam: Boom 2017, p. 151.
85 Jo Cortenraedt, ‘Jo Cortenraedt en Mathieu Segers over Europa’, https://l1.nl/jo-cortenraedt-over-zijn-boek-het-verdrag-van-maastricht-25-jaar-later-126492/?pagina=15, consulted on June 26, 2018.
made on foreign policy.87 From 1994 onwards, The Netherlands became an important partner of Germany in respect to the EMU.88
After the Maastricht Treaty
Historian Mathieu Segers argues that after Maastricht, the EU made significant steps forward, including the removed borders, the introduction of the euro, and the expansion of the EU. However, he also argues that mistakes were made during the preparation of the treaty. The project was too technical, and citizens were approached too rationally: citizens had no clue what the treaty was about. This oversight resulted in dissatisfaction and in a too technocratic project, because the idea of stability and security in Europe, with which the EU project started, is less present.89
In 1995, a report was published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands, which advocated the search for connection with the Franco-German axis.90 As Hans van Mierlo made clear with his metaphor is that the Benelux has to find itself in the armpit of France and Germany, because Europe changed since the US was distancing itself from Europe. Thus, the Netherlands had to become less dependent on the Atlantic countries. Furthermore, Van Mierlo made clear that the Dutch have long been suspicious of France and its political ideas.91 This attitude is also confirmed by researcher Sven Leif Ragnar de Roode. For his book he used 1200 quality newspapers to analyse perceptions of European integration in the Dutch Press in the 1950s and 1990s. This analysis shows that in the Netherlands in the 1950s, a constant fear of Franco-German domination existed. In particular, centre-right wing papers took the process of European integration as a Franco-German affair. The fear of potential German aggression after the war was replaced or accompanied by fear of Franco-German subjugation of the Netherlands. The editorials investigated even offered a solution, which was that the Netherlands had to unite with France and Germany. These editorials regarded the low countries as guiding countries that could have a leading task internationally. ‘The Netherlands were small and powerless, thus the message, but they were progressive, innovative and daring’.92 Moreover, the integration of Britain was regarded as a counterweight
87 Ton Nijhuis, ‘Van betekenisvolle ander naar een van ons: kantelend Duitslandbeeld in Nederland’, in: Hanco Jürgens en Ton Nijhuis ed., De vleugels van de adelaar, Amsterdam: Boom 2017, p. 163.
88 Ibidem, p. 169.
89 Mathieu Segers, ‘Jo Cortenraedt en Mathieu Segers over Europa’, https://l1.nl/jo-cortenraedt-over-zijn-boek-het-verdrag-van-maastricht-25-jaar-later-126492/?pagina=15, consulted on June 26, 2018.
90 Kamerstuk 23900-V nr. 39, 1994/1995.
91 Ibidem.
92 Sven Leif Ragnar de Roode, Seeing Europe through the Nation: The Role of National Self-Images in the Perception of European Integration in the English, German and Dutch Press in the 1950s and 1990s, Stuttgart:
against Franco-German dominance. In the 1990s, however, the demand for a British presence to offset such domination became less important, which also shows that France and Germany were no longer seen as an acute threat to Dutch autonomy.93 Although the relationship with France remained difficult, that between the Netherlands and Germany improved (e.g., Dutch– German exchange programs between journalists were set up for them to learn about each other’s cultures).94
Around 2004, mutual interest between the Netherlands and both France and Germany even diminished, in part because of a joint decision in 2004-2005 by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder to undermine the Stability and Growth Pact, the budgetary principle of which Germany was seen as guardian. The relationship between the Netherlands and Germany only increased again when Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2006. Because Germany prevailed during the financial crisis of 2008, the Netherlands started to orient itself more strongly towards Germany. Still, Germany kept looking for a compromise with France.95
The bond between the Netherlands and the Franco-Germany axis weakened again in 2010, when Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel agreed that future sovereign bailouts from the ESM would require losses to be imposed on the private sector involved. Furthermore, Merkel abandoned the principle of automatic sanction on countries that infringe on the Stability and Growth Pact. Merkel and Sarkozy got along well because both countries were obliged to consult more often due to the economic crisis, which improved their relationship. However, between Hollande and Merkel there were tensions again. What can be concluded from the Franco-German history is that in times of crisis (such as with the fall of the Berlin Wall), both France and Germany try to play a visible role in the EU. For instance, during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Merkel and Hollande went to Minsk together to broker an agreement between Russia and Ukraine. However, the euro crisis of 2012 showed an asymmetry in their relationship. The French and German governments held long-standing, diverging
interpretations of the future of the euro. Because France was too weak economically,
Germany took the lead to save the euro in the end, becoming the most powerful country in the EU.96 Moreover, France began working together with Spain and Italy as the Southern
Franz Steiner Verlag 2012, p. 236.
93 Ibidem, p. 237.
94 Interview Hanco Jürgens, Amsterdam, April 06, 2018.
95 Ton Nijhuis, ‘Van betekenisvolle ander naar een van ons: kantelend Duitslandbeeld in Nederland’, in: Hanco Jürgens en Ton Nijhuis ed., De vleugels van de adelaar, Amsterdam: Boom 2017, p. 169.
96 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Rethinking Franco-German relations: a historical perspective’, Policy Contribution, nr. 29 (2017), p. 2.
