Indian Perceptions of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: a Discourse Analysis

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Indian Perceptions of the 21

st

Century Maritime Silk Road

A Discourse Analysis

by

Hendrika Francijna Van Alphen

supervised by

Dr. Lindsay Black

Leiden University

Summer 2015

Master of Arts

in

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Abstract

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) growing economic power has been

frequently linked with its growing political and military power. Academic articles and Indian newspapers interpret China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) policy in threatening and in a non-threatening ways. The dominant discourse interprets the MSR from realist (strategic competition) and liberalist (economic cooperation) perspectives.

However, the picture is not as clear-cut as it seems: the literature lacks a constructivist and poststructuralist approach. This paper attempts to fill this gap and considers the study of media representations as an important tool for understanding international relations and the promotion of foreign policy in India. It uses a

poststructuralist discourse analysis as a method in the case study on the ‘China threat’ and MSR discourse in four online Indian newspapers. In line with French

poststructuralist Foucault, it demonstrates the importance of discourse, identity, knowledge and power.

The discursive construction of China as Other in the Indian media is based on historical identity formations. Identity is at the heart the ‘China threat’ discursive foundations: the ‘String of Pearls’ (SOP), India’s neighborhood, China-Pakistan relations and the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute. In representing the ‘truth’ about the MSR as a future threat to India, the Indian media fails to address China’s

participation in global anti-piracy missions.

The ‘China threat’ discourse is produced and reproduced for India to domestically implement a strong strategic IOR policy, to invest in the army, and transnationally to deepen diplomatic ties with neighboring IOR countries and to establish a security alignment with the US and Japan.

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Acknowledgements

I extend my special thanks to Dr. Lindsay Black, my thesis supervisor, who motivated and encouraged me during the writing process. Thank you for your guidance and advice.

A special thanks goes to Teunis van Alphen for always being in my corner. Thank you, Adriana Kolbach: you are truly an inspiration for me.

Francijna van Alphen

Zaltbommel, Netherlands

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List of Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BCIM Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific

IDSA Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

IOR Indian Ocean Region

IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association

LAC Line of Actual Control

MSR Maritime Silk Road

OBOR One Belt, One Road

PLA-N People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC People’s Republic of China

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SLOCs Sea Lines of Communication

SOP ‘String of Pearls’

SREB Silk Road Economic Belt

TPP Trans Pacific Partnership

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Introduction

Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who took office in March 2013, China’s domestic and foreign policy began promoting slogans such as the “Chinese dream,”

“The Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and “The 21st_{Century Maritime Silk Road}

(MSR).”

Inside China the “Chinese dream” concept refers to achieving national rejuvenation and economic prosperity. Peaceful development is at the core of this “Chinese dream” since it is a necessary condition for China’s own development. To support this peaceful development, Xi Jinping’s leadership uses diplomacy to intensify friendly relationships with China’s neighbors and the international community. The MSR is part of the “Chinese dream” and a domestic and foreign policy to renew nationalism and to unite the PRC’s national interests into the mutual interests of other nations. The PRC believes that all people should be able to share in China’s economic success and intends to create prosperity and jobs on an

international level, through multilateral and bilateral economic cooperation.

The “Chinese dream” envisions rejuvenating two ancient silk roads: “The Silk

Road Economic Belt” and “The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” also known as

“the Belt” and “the Road” and by Chinese writers as the “One Belt, One Road”

(OBOR) initiative. The new Silk Road Economic Belt refers to the ancienct trade road that was established during the Han Dynasty of China (206 BC – 220 AD) and linked the East to the West. The less famous Silk Road on the Sea that was established during Admiral Zheng He’s maritime voyages (1405-1433), functions as the foundation for the new Maritime Silk Road.

On March 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC announced the

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Belt and Road Initiative and proposed a concrete action plan that outlines key areas for cooperation for countries along the OBOR, which are “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bond” (Vision and Actions’ 2015).

At the sea, the MSR policy encourages investments in port infrastructure. About the MSR, the action plan states: “we should push forward port infrastructure construction, build smooth land-water transportation channels, and advance port cooperation; increase sea routes and the number of voyages, and enhance information technology cooperation in maritime logistics” (‘Vision and Actions’ 2015). The MSR also promotes two Economic Corridors: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. The PRC’s aim for those corridors is to “jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road” (‘Vision and Actions’ 2015).

However, outside China, the “Chinese dream” policy and especially the MSR policy evoke questions and misperceptions. Western analysts worry that the PRC will use its “Chinese Dream” policy to increase the PRC’s prestige and power position in the multilateral global governance system. The widespread framing of the MSR and the connection to the ‘String of Pearls’ hypothesis to dominate the IOR and to become a regional player has been considerably discussed.

As a regional power in South Asia and a growing power in South East Asia, India in particular seems wary of the MSR initiative and China’s growing economic and strategic influence in its neighborhood. Since 2012, India has enhanced its “Look East Policy” to strengthen economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asian nations

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and to balance China’s influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

India was invited to join the MSR at the “17th round of Special

Representatives (SRs) Talks in New Delhi in February 2014” (Singh 2014). India decided to join the AIIB and the BCIM Economic Corridor, but did not join the MSR. Instead, the Indian Ministry of Culture launched Project Mausam for India’s maritime integration in the IOR and to protect India’s regional economic interests. Similar to the MSR, Project Mausam aims to increase cultural and economic ties in the IOR, yet brings back India at the heart of Indian Ocean trade.

The rivalry between India (metaphorically represented as ‘the Elephant’) and China (metaphorically represented as ‘the Dragon’) and their competition for regional influence is socially and historically constructed around the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the Chola accident of 1967 and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish over Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh that involved military restraints over the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Being two rising Asian giants that have the world’s most rapid growing

economies and highest populations, India and China compete over economic, political and military influence in Asia. Their bilateral relationship continues to be shaped by strategic competition and economic cooperation. India feels that China is militarily cooperating with countries in the IOR and worries about the close commercial and strategic China-Pakistan relations, China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear program and the CPEC that goes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

India and China are members of the multilateral forum of five principal emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). Both are members of the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and a

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member state (India) and an observer state (China) of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India and China are founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank.

The ‘China threat’ theory refers to China’s global emergence as a great political, economic and military power. In this thesis the ‘China threat’ term is specifically but not exclusively used to define China’s growing political, economic and military influence in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean Region can be defined as a geographical entity that includes the world’s third largest ocean. The Indian media frequently mentions the following IOR fundamental states in relation to the MSR: Djibouti and Somalia in Africa; Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in South Asia; Myanmar in South East Asia and Madagascar and the Seychelles.

The OBOR term is used in this thesis when referring to China’s whole policy initiative to promote transportation links via land and sea. The ‘China threat/MSR’ discourse refers to the discussions that portray the MSR as a future threat for India.

Literature Review

In the literature, there are two ways of looking at the MSR and the ‘China threat’ theory. The first group agrees with mostly Indian and American analysts that the SOP exist, that the MSR is a new name for the SOP and that a Sino-Indian security

dilemma will occur. The second group argues that the SOP is just an invented concept, based on no real evidence and that the MSR actually provides opportunities for Sino-Indian cooperation in the region for mutual benefit.

The following sections compare and contrast these groups of literature that have made separate arguments on China’s MSR policy in the IOR. The current

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arguments on China’s MSR goals in the IOR are based on two classical theories of International Relations:

(i) The realist argument in the literature states that that China is a growing threat in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR);

(ii) The liberalist argument states that the MSR is beneficial to trade and stability in the IOR.

This section explores how realists interpret the MSR policy and why this is insufficient. It will first briefly introduce realism as an IR theory and then refer to the construction of the ‘China-threat’ in the realist discursive interpretations of the MSR. It explores the following recurring themes in the realist interpretation: the

modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N), a Sino-Indian security dilemma, and the parallel between the MSR and the SOP.

In International Relations, the realist theory is considered as the most influential theoretical tradition. “Realism is concerned with the reproduction of the international system of states. It uses notions of order, stability, deterrence and especially the balance of power, to convey its message of constraint and to reify the structure of the international system” (Burchill 1995, 83). Carr (1938) and

Morgenthau (1948) are regarded as the founding fathers of traditional realism. Carr’s

The Twenty Years' Crisis advocates that international politics are always power

politics and that statesmen should be concerned with the balance of power.

Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations focuses on human nature and explains realism as a theory that assumes the world is made up of conflicting interests and that those interests are determined in terms of power. Waltz’ Theory of International Politics more concretely defines the concept of power and shifts the focus from the human nature of statesmen and the desire to dominate to the force of anarchy and argues that

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states use economic and military power for security purposes. Waltz became the

founder of neo-realism that now is the most dominant theory for interpreting 21st

century world politics. Neo-realism advocates the balance-of-power theory; wherein states compete with each other and pursue their own interests in political economic activities. The discursive foundations of realism often include ‘arms races,’ ‘security dilemmas’ and ‘power projections.’

Realists portray the MSR initiative and China’s growing influence in the IOR as a threat and China as a rising regional power in the IOR. The Realist argument in the literature views the MSR as an expansionist policy instrument of the PRC. Khurana (2014) and Tiezzi (2014) believe that the MSR will increase China’s regional economic, cultural and military power and believe this will pose a threat to India, the US and other regional states. Tiezzi, an analyst of Chinese foreign policy for the Diplomat magazine, argues that China aims for economic dominance in the states along the MSR. Brig. (Retd) Saghal, an independent consultant at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, who served in the Indian Army for over 36 years, believes that India needs to respond to the MSR because it promotes the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor that could impact India’s threat perspective. This abides by the neorealist balance-of-power theory.

Bateman and Ho (2010), Marantidou (2014), Mohan (2010) and Sitaraman (2013) believe that a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean occurs or is emerging. They argue that the MSR initiative, the accompanying port investments and increased PLA-N activities in the IOR, may further increase this security dilemma. In contrast, Brewster argues that no security dilemma exists because it would “require each of India and China to be realistically concerned that the other is taking actions that may give a strategic advantage over it so as to create a threat” (2014b; 2015: 54).

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Realists argue that the MSR policy engages the use of hard power and soft power in the IOR to balance India and the US. Hard power is projected by the PLA-N’s development into a blue water navy; it’s enhanced capabilities and increased naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Brig.(Retd) Saghal (2014) believes that the Chinese soft power is projected through increased trade, economic and diplomatic ties and humanitarian assistance in the IOR. The OBOR initiatives such as trade

concessions, loan concessions and cultural exchanges, help China to gain consent for its actions by making its culture and ideology, norms and values, more attractive. The OBOR policy enables China to strengthen the economies of countries in the region so that all gain from mutual benefits.

Brewster (2014), Pillalamarri (2014) and Scott (2005) state that New Delhi believes that the Indian Ocean ought to be regarded as India’s Ocean. To execute this strategic vision and to balance the MSR initiative, India has strengthened its

diplomatic ties with neighboring countries, increased its defence budget and proposed the Indian Ocean maritime security grouping between India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, the Seychelles and Mauritius.

Neo-realists such as Waltz have accentuated the relationship between power politics and similar foreign policy behavior of states. According to the realist ‘China threat’ argument, this principle also applies to the Chinese MSR and the Indian Project Mausam. Parashar (2014), Pillalamarri (2014) and Tiezzi (2015) argue that India has responded to the MSR with its Project Mausam, to balance China’s political and economical influence in IOR.

In addition to similar foreign policy behavior, the realist argument relates the MSR to the increased naval activities of the PLA-N in the Indian Ocean. Marantidou (2014) and Townsend (2011) underline that whoever controls access to the Malacca

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Straits, controls the Maritime Silk Route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Geopolitically and economically, the IOR is very important for China. Holmes and Yoshihara (2008a) have mentioned that Chinese analysts worry that, in times of crisis, US naval expertise in the Asia Pacific will hold the Chinese sea-dependent economy hostage. It should be noted though that Holmes and Yoshihara look at China’s foreign policy and defence policy from a US perspective. The PLA-N’s maritime

modernization is often perceived as a threat aimed at India and the US. Holmes and Yoshihara fail to consider the Chinese view when they ‘assume’ a security dilemma and an arms race.

From a Chinese perspective, Jing (2010) and Guan (2010) argue that the PRC’s security concerns are increasingly involved in distant waters and that the PLA-N needs to protect national interests in regions far off the Mainland. Therefore the PLA-N modernization and development into a blue-water navy are necessary to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) upon which China relies for the supply of energy and for the shipping of imports and exports. According to Ye (2009), a Chinese analyst, this also means that the PLA-N needs access to overseas bases in the IOR for logistical supplies in order to secure the SLOCs and to execute anti-piracy missions.

A recurring theme in the realist literature is the parallel between the ‘String of Pearls’ and the MSR objective to invest in major seaports along the IOR. The ‘String of Pearls’ hypothesis was first introduced in a 2005 rapport that was provided to US Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld by defence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. It refers to Chinese investments in ports the Indian Ocean littorals, specifically around the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits (Dixon 2014). Gwadar in Pakistan,

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commercial port facilities in India’s neighborhood that are have been nominated as China’s ‘Pearls’. Kaplan (2009), Karnad (2015), Khurana (2008) and Malik (2011) argue that India and China are great power rivals in the IOR and that China wants to transform the ‘Pearls’ into maritime bases. Kaplan (2009) and Mohan (2010) foresee a strategic contest between China and India in the Indian Ocean. Dixon (2014), Holmes and Yoshihara (2008b) and Khurana (2008) believe that the PRC aims to strategically control locations at the SOP to use them as military assets, but they do not mention the PLA-N’s contribution to international peace and security in anti-piracy missions.

Erickson (2008), Holmes and Yoshihara (2008b) and Marantidou (2014) underline that China needs overseas basing access, because the PLA-N lacks experience as a blue-water navy, but foreign policy does not permit those bases because of its non-interference principle. According to Townshend (2011) the ‘Pearls’ could be seen as “conventional shipping facilities designed to connect China’s

landlocked western provinces to maritime trade routes in the Indian Ocean”. A group of American and Indian analysts believe that there is a parallel between the new MSR policy and the SOP hypothesis (Panda 2014; Tiezzi 2014; Singh 2015; Karnad 2015). Ankit Panda (2014), a foreign affairs analyst, and Tiezzi (2014) argue that MSR is used by China to rebrand the SOP and to make China’s regional maritime rise sound less threatening. Panda and Tiezzi believe that the PRC’s invitation to Sri Lanka and India, and thus the PRC’s decision to go beyond the

ASEAN-China cooperation for MSR, proves the PRC’s intensions for maritime facilities in the Indian Ocean. Both Tiezzi’s and Panda’s arguments are based on hypothetical future scenario’ that have not been proven by real evidence. Cdr. Abhijit Singh (2015), research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,

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considers the MSR loan concessions as a geopolitical instrument to gain access to maritime bases.

To summarize the realist argument: it links the MSR to the ‘China threat’ theory and equals the MSR to the String of Peals hypothesis. It envisions a security-dilemma and an arms race between India and China as great power rivals in the Indian Ocean. The realist interpretation assumes that threats are self-evident, but cannot clarify “why particular situations are understood to constitute threats to the state” (Weldes 1996: 279).

There is however reason to view the MSR in a more positive and optimistic light than the realist literature suggests. This section therefore explores the liberalist argument in the MSR literature. It will first briefly introduce liberalism as an IR theory and then how the MSR is regarded as being beneficial to trade and regional stability.

Classical liberalism believes that peace is the usual state of affairs. Classical liberals believe that free trade should be promoted, trade barriers removed and that the market drives everything. Liberals believe in the globalization of world politics. This means that nation-states are implanted in national and transnational societies, which encourages economical, cultural and social exchanges. In theory, free trade and increased commerce would expand connections between people of different nations, encourage friendly international relations, mutual understanding and prevent war.

Newer liberalism, advocated by John Stuart Mill (1848) in his On Liberty also believe that free trade would be the way to stop war. Contemporary liberalism

advocates global economic interdependence and would argue that MSR brings economic growth, welfare and jobs. The OBOR action plan underlines that a free trade network between countries along the MSR will be established to increase closer

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economic relations and to boost political trust. For liberalists, the establishment of the AIIB as a new financial mechanism for the MSR investments, the Economic

Corridors in the region and China’s membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) multilateral platform, are examples that regional economic interdependence will grow continuously.

In line with the liberal commercial peace theory, globalization, increased commercial ties and higher connectivity, would lead to economic interdependence and would increase regional stability in the IOR. The MSR would therefore foster regional economic and security cooperation because it is beneficial to regional trade and therefore likely to overcome barriers. As noted by Teshu Singh (2013), senior research officer at the Indian think thank the Indian Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies China benefits from a peaceful IOR, needs South Asian and Southeast Asian resources and markets for its own economic growth. In return, countries along the MSR are expected to anticipate the positive benefits from economic cooperation with the world’s largest economy.

During Prime Minister Modi’s China Tour in May 2015, Prime Minister Modi and Premier Li recognized the need for closer cooperation after years of Sino-Indian mistrust and recognized the economy as a key area upon which India and China agree. Godbole (2015), research assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, believes that Beijing has initiated the MSR as a “regional mechanism that promotes trade, investments and security cooperation” that could drive a new Asian regionalism (p. 298). China’s new Asia diplomacy has promoted a more inclusive economic growth for its neighboring countries.

To sum up the liberal argument, the MSR would increase economic integration in the IOR. Increased economic connectivity and economic interdependence between

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China and states that participate in the MSR would further reduce “the risks of regional instability through an iterative and mutually reinforcing process” (Khurana 2014:7). According to the liberal interdependency theory, the rise of regional

economic integration and the benefits of trade among states would outweigh territorial control and military competition.

In theory, the MSR policy encourages regional trade and cultural connectivity, which would lead to economic interdependence and enhanced regional stability. However, as shown in the realist section, not all countries along the MSR have responded positively to the MSR initiative. Despite signed Memoranda of

Understanding to foster regional economic integration, the Sino-Indian border conflict still prevails and India views the MSR in light of Indian-Pakistani historical mistrust. Therefore, the images in the literature are not so clear-cut as it seems.

This brings me to the defined gap in the literature. The realist explanation of China as a growing threat and the liberalist argument that the MSR is beneficial to trade and stability, does not explain why state policies or concrete actions are made and how they can be understood. Constructivists and poststructuralists therefore argue that the ‘China threat’ is a matter of interpretation. There is no constructivist

argument on the MSR yet; only Khurana (2014) argues that China’s increased maritime presence in the IOR relates to “the premise of Constructivism could potentially lead to “positive-sum” or “win-win” outcomes for China and the IOR states” (p. 3).

Critical constructivists such as Weldes believe that ‘security,’ ‘national interests’ and ‘threats’ are socially constructed by state officials based on how they make sense of the world around them. The Self (the state; or the state’s

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decision-become objects with characteristics and an identity ("aggressive/peaceful; threatening/ non-threatening; civilized/uncivilized”) (Weldes 1996: 281). The authors that were mentioned in previous sections forget to comment on the role of India’s national identity in India’s perception of the Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean in the construction of the ‘China threat.’

Constructivists argue that ideas, norms, values and identity influence how actors view the world. Panda (2014) underlines that through MSR, China wants to be regarded as a “great responsible power,” that contributes to building a “harmonious world” and to have “harmonious oceans.” These concepts are all part of the “Chinese dream.” Chinese ideas, norms, values and identities have influenced those concepts and the Chinese worldview applies to them. As a growing global player, China wants to be able to have a legitimate say in the construction of the rules of international governance.

The AIIB, the SCO financing institution, the BRICS New Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund will finance the MSR investments and are established as alternatives to the Bretton Woods institutions. These new financing institutions have been established to ensure a more inclusive economic growth for developing countries in the IOR. The current international financial institutions, such as the WTO and IMF are lead by neoliberal goals and often criticized for their political and economic ‘conditionalities.’ The new financing institutions enable China to follow their own political economic wishes and to grant loans to countries along the MSR without conditionalities.

What is not being said is that discourses on the MSR are constructed to protect identities. How is it possible to go beyond the two constructed identities of realism and liberalism? This thesis comes up with a third image of the MSR, based on

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constructivist thought and a poststructuralist discourse analysis. It explores the research question: how does the discourse of the ‘China threat’ undermine the Indian understanding of the MSR?

Methodology

Although there is no common definition of a ‘discourse’ and there are no concrete criteria for the methods for a discourse analysis (DA), discourse analysis is an

evolving research area for studying and analyzing the “politics of representations” and for reevaluation foreign policy (Milliken 1999: 228). A discourse analysis challenges the “scientism of mainstream International Relations” (Milliken 1999: 226) and makes it possible to move beyond IR thinking in black and white theories. It provides a richer and more all-encompassing picture of what Foucault calls a 'regime of truth.’

Studying discourses as a method is often related to poststructuralism, postmodernism and critical constructivism (Milliken 1999). Poststructuralism is frequently misunderstood as postmodernism; postmodernism refers to the cultural context of a more globalized time whereas “poststructuralism is one of the

interpretative analytics that critically engages with the production and implication of these transformations” (Campbell 2007: 212).

For mainstream constructivists, identity is just a variable, for critical

constructivists and poststructuralists identity is at the heart of discourses and is central for understanding international politics. Klotz and Lynch compare two groups of constructivists and how they have used DA: the positivists and the post-positivists variants of constructivism. On the constructivists spectrum, “constructivists on the positivist end […] seek to explain social phenomena in general terms,” “post-positivists, in turn, remain more comfortable with complexity and context-specific

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claims” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14). However, Klotz and Lynch do not believe that the divergence in “sociological and anthropological variants of constructivism” (2007:18) establishes a divide in the methodology of a DA.

According to Klotz and Lynch “constructivists see “security” as a relationship historically conditioned by culture rather than an objective characteristic determined by the distribution of military capabilities.” As a result Klotz and Lynch support methodologies that take “contingency and context” (2007:17) into consideration. Interpretation of discourses is therefore absolutely necessary because, as Foucault (1991) advocated, “all knowledge involves a relationship with power in its mapping of the world” (quoted in Campbell 2007). Constructivists give a priority to “language in the constitution of reality” (Campbell 2007: 210), are skeptical of generalizations and perform “context-specific analysis” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 20).

The methodology of a poststructuralist discourse analysis is based on the “explicit discursive articulations of signs and identities and that one has to pay careful analytical attention to how signs are linked an juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize particular policies” (Hansen 2006: 45). The clear articulation of identity and Otherness are at the heart of poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen 2006: 44).

Discourse analysts believes that common assumptions about the Self and the world are being produced and reproduced by the discourse of individuals that live in particular historical and cultural circumstances. Media coverage decides what mode of representation of the ‘truth’ to tell people and in doing this “media materializations create a range of identities- us/them, victim/savior-and are necessary for a response to be organized” (Campbell 2007:220). This thesis explores how media coverage and the

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experts that are assigned to provide expert knowledge, speaks about the MSR and the ‘China threat’.

Milliken identifies three theoretical commitments upon which discourse analysts build their research: (i) “discourses as systems of signification”, (ii) “discourse productivity” and (iii) “the play of practice” (Milliken 1999: 229-230). The play of practice will be addressed by two methods: “the deconstructive method” (to exhibit the “contingent nature of a discourse” and how they produce different truths with privileging certain ‘realities’ over other), “the juxtapositional method” (to juxtapose the ‘truth’ and issues that this ‘truth’ fails to acknowledge in discourses). These methods will be combined in the case study that investigates how the Indian online newspapers perceive and construct the ‘China threat’ from diverse points of view: diplomats, (former) policymakers, scholars and strategic and maritime analysts.

Other than Milliken, Jackson (2007) elaborates how a DA can be used as a method to complicate a picture that is produced by authors on a given subject. This thesis complicates the picture that Indian strategists and authors produce of the MSR and the ‘China threat’ in the IOR.

This thesis examines 46 written English-language texts from online Indian newspapers between 2012 and 2015. The top English-language Indian newspapers that have been investigated are: The Economic Times, The Hindu, The Times of India, The Hindustan Times and the Indian Express. The specific time frame has been chosen because the SOP term was introduced in 2005, but the MSR was initiated in 2013, thus from that year the discourse on the MSR and the link with the SOP started. India, China and Japan agreed to cooperate in anti-piracy missions in the Western Indian Ocean in 2012.

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Each text was inspected for rhetorical devices and linguistic elements such as the use of time, hypothetical arguments, adjectives, metaphors, nouns, analogies, alliterations and passive structures. It explores how the ‘China threat’ discourse in India uses “the process of articulation […] in which such extant linguistic resources are combined to produce contingent and contextually specific representations of the world” (Weldes 1996:284). The use of time has been taken into consideration when exploring the author’s representation of China’s long-term ambitions and India’s long-term neglect in the IOR. It refers to the use of the future tense and its connection to hypothetical arguments of the ‘China threat’ and the use of modal auxiliary verbs (will/would, shall/should, can/could, may/might) to articulate the future implications of the ‘China threat’ for India.

Each text was also inspected for discursive devices that are used to establish the ‘China threat’ as the ‘truth.’ A poststructuralist discourse analysis enables the analyst what “actors, issues and events are privileged at the expense of others”

(Campbell 2008: 20; Milliken 1999: 229). The case study will show when, how and in what context ‘strategic experts’ have been authorized to speak about India’s future geostrategic scenario’s and how those ‘experts’ are entitled to have more reliable knowledge about a strategic affairs than others.

After examining the previously mentioned discursive and rhetorical devices it examined if these devices reinforce each other and if the discourse is unstable. A discourse becomes unstable when “links and juxtapositions come into conflict with each other” (Hansen 2006: 45). The context behind the produced ‘picture’ of the ‘China threat’ was taken into consideration as well.

There are limitations for what this thesis can do and say. Firstly, I agree with post-positivists constructivists that worldviews are constructed based on our own

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perceptions of the world. My own “philosophical and ethical” (Klotz and Lynch 2007:19) worldview has influenced the themes that I have highlighted in this thesis. My own “socially constructed world” (Klotz and Lynch 2007:21) has influenced my interpretation of selected themes and key concepts in the discourse. Secondly, a fully developed discourse analysis would be beyond the scope of the thesis. The approach in the case study is an initial inquiry, based on and motivated by a (poststructuralist) discourse analysis. It relies on a textual analysis; future work needs to take

“nonlinguistic dimensions of discourse” (Klotz and Lynch 2007:19) such as “visual imagery” (Campbell 2007: 20), since discourse should not be restricted to the

linguistic only. This thesis has only analyzed Indian news sources. Future work needs to take into account foreign policy documents and publications by think thanks.

Case Study

Indian Discourses on the China-threat and the MSR

There is a high diversity of Indian perspectives on the MSR. The power of discourses plays an important role in the construction of the ‘China-threat’ in Indian discourses, which limits the audience of the four investigated newspapers to understand China’s MSR initiative in an accurate way.

1. Two ‘China threat’ dimensions

The MSR discourse in the Indian media is based on two dimensions: a military and an economic dimension. There is a strategic discourse that identifies China as a threat and an economic discourse that does not identify China as a threat. The Indian media refers to the Sino-Indian relationship in a binary way: based on “complementarity” versus “competition” (Aneja 2015), as “competitors and collaborators” (‘A tale of 2

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nations’ 2011). The former Indian ambassador to the Netherlands, Bhaswati Mukherjee (2015) perfectly contrasts this twofold Sino-Indian relationship as an “opportunity” versus a “challenge”, cooperating versus competing, from an “economic” versus a “strategic” perspective. These two dimensions introduce

different discursive themes, assumptions and contexts. The media decides what mode of representation to choose and often uses “one mode of representation over another” (Jackson 2007: 395).

The India media aggressively highlights the military (or geopolitical) dimension of the ‘China threat’ in the IOR. The connection between the so-called SOP and the MSR port investments, increased China-Pakistan military ties and the MSR’s potential strategic implications for India and other countries in India’s neighborhood, are recurring discursive themes in the military dimension. According to critical constructivists and poststructuralists, not the military, but identity is at the heart of discourses and central for understanding international politics

The Indian media represents the economic dimension of the ‘China threat’ in a more positive light. The investigated newspapers highlight the MSR’s economic opportunities in terms of investments. Discursive themes in economic dimension include India and China’s shared ideological preferences, their economic and security cooperation in BRICS forum, the BCIM Economic Corridor, the AIIB and the SCO.

2. The Genealogy of the ‘China threat’ discourse

2.1 The Discursive Foundations of the ‘China threat’ discourse

The discursive foundations (Jackson 2007: 401) of the ‘China threat’ discourse include the ‘String of Pearls,; India’s neighborhood, China-Pakistan relations, India-Pakistan relations and the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute.

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2.2 The SOP/MSR Rhetoric

Indian strategists and maritime analysts have all linked the MSR as a policy instrument to the ‘String of Pearls’ hypothesis. This has become a dominant representation, however, the usage and meaning of the SOP term remains largely unquestioned (Jackson 2007: 394).

Ever since the introduction of the SOP term in a 2005 Booz Allen Hamilton rapport, the SOP term has become a recurring theme in the ‘China threat’ discourse. Central speculations have derived from this SOP discourse, namely that the PRC intends to deploy the PLA-N in the ports that it has invested in. As referred to in the Literature Review, Khurana (2008), Kaplan (2010) and Mohan (2013) directed the academic enquiry on China’s maritime strategy in the IOR and the so-called ‘String of Pearls.’ The SOP discourse gathered momentum in June 2014 after the release of the Chinese “Blue Book” on the Indian Ocean by the Chinese Academy of Social

Science. The document provided clear policy indicators for the future PLA-N proactive role in the Indian Ocean Region.

The ‘String of Pearls’ metaphor (‘A tale of 2 nations’ 2015; Bagchi 2015; Chellaney 2015a; Chellaney 2015b; Chellaney 2015c; Diwakar 2013; Krishnan 2014a; Krishnan 2014b; Ramani 2015; Reddy 2013; Sreenivasan 2014) is frequently used in the Indian media and has been linked to the MSR to describe China's maritime ambitions in the IOR. However, the Indian authors rarely question the validity of the SOP hypothesis. Only Krishnan and Ramani refer to Zhou Bo, a Chinese strategic scholar at the Academy of Military Science, who rejects the connection of the MSR and the SOP on the official Ching.org.cn website. Zhou Bo argues that since the introduction of the SOP “phrase” (he does not call it a concept or even a theory because he does not believe in the existence of the SOP) in 2005, the SOP term still

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speculates around in academic debates, think thank reports and newspaper articles on the MSR.

Indian ‘strategic experts’ have linked the modern Maritime Silk Road to their belief that China is building a network of Chinese military and commercial facilities along its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. In fact, the ‘String of Pearls’ metaphor is a recurring “form of knowledge” that is repeatedly referred back to in texts on the MSR and thereby has become “naturalized through time and discursive practice” (Jackson 2007: 398). Since the introduction in 2005, the SOP metaphor has been treated as a self-evident concept and when the MSR was introduced in 2013 the SOP got linked to the MSR.

When linking the MSR to the ‘China threat’ thesis, authors always write about the measurements India is taking or should be taking to “countering China’s

influence, over construction of major projects, as well as the docking of China’s submarines in Colombo harbor” (Haidar 2015); to “counter China's ambitions” (Chaudhury 2015) and “to counter China in the Indian Ocean” (Tellis 2015). Most of these ‘counter measurements’ are a response to the docking of PLA-N submarines in the Colombo harbor in October 2014. The Indian media extensively reported the docking of these two submarines (one was said to be nuclear-powered) in Sri Lanka, which occurred at the same time when Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Sri Lanka. The simultaneous PLA-N docking and the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister could have been a coincidence, but it could also be linked to 2014 as a year that witnessed tricky encounters between China and Japan over the disputed islands. Nevertheless, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying, stated that the Sri Lankan government agreed on the docking and that the submarines where actually on route to participate in the anti-piracy operations at the Gulf of Aden and

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used Colombo for resupplies. The Indian newspapers do not refer to this important fact and rather portray the docking in Colombo as a confirmation for the ‘String of Pearls’ theory. In addition, China, India and Japan agreed to cooperate in anti-piracy coordination off the coast of Somalia in 2012; this is seldom mentioned when representing the MSR as a threat to India.

The discursive production of the ‘China threat’ in Indian newspapers articulate the need for India to establish security alliances with the US and Japan (and other regional partners such as Sri Lanka) to counter China’s influence in the IOR. However, the discourse is unstable when it comes to how to confront the ‘China threat.’ Haidar represents the increased strategic India- Sri-Lanka relationship as a way to “counter” the threat; Chaudhury represents India’s 'Cotton Route' as an economic policy to “counter” the threat; and Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, proposes future US and India collaboration as a way to “counter” the threat. All authors acknowledge that the ‘China threat’ in the IOR exists and that reactive measurements are necessary, yet all propose different measurements to confront the threat.

There is not enough understanding in India of the MSR because the Indian media often represents the MSR as a geopolitical threat and fails to acknowledge the MSR as an economic imperative. The Indian ‘strategic community’ has turned to the MSR/SOP rhetoric as a result of the changed Indian foreign policy of India. The ‘China threat’ discourse in India has a political nature because it is linked to India being an ally to US in its “containment China policy.” Nonetheless, the US has denied the existence of this policy (Ramani 2015).

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2.3 The Sino-Indian Border Dispute

The ‘China threat’ discourse draws upon historical “established modes of

representation” (Campbell 2007). The ongoing Sino-Indian border disputes and the historical conflicts between India and Pakistan are being brought into the present as events that are historically important for India’s identity. China and India mistrust each other over the border dispute and over China’s support for India’s “arch-rival” Pakistan.

Contemporary Sino-Indian relations have been characterized by several border disputes. In 1993, a peace agreement was signed to safeguard security along the LAC. Up till now, both India and China have different interpretations of the actual LAC and thus the Himalayan border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the ongoing border dispute, China and India have managed to build on economic and diplomatic ties but mistrust of each other’s intensions continuously shapes the misperceptions of the MSR.

2.4 The Pakistan Factor

India views the MSR in light of India-Pakistan archrival relations and their historical mistrust (Aneja 2015; ‘Behind Beijing’s gifting’ 2015; Chellaney 2015; Krishnan 2014a). The Indian media does not focus on the MSR in itself, but portrays the MSR in terms of India’s concerns about the Chinese investments in the Gwadar port, the “delivery of eight Chinese attack submarines” to Pakistan (Chellaney 2015c) and the development of nuclear weapons.

Affected by the Kashmir conflict and four wars, India has always defined its foreign policy and its national identity in its opposition to Pakistan. Therefore the $11 billion new infrastructure projects that have been connected to the CPEC are often represented in relation to Pakistan as a military threat for India: “weapon transfers,

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loans and infrastructure projects allow China to use Pakistan as a cost-effective counterweight to India” (Chellaney 2015c). Since 2011, the Indian Army is

implementing strategic transformations with its eyes on the increased China-Pakistan relations.

The MSR discourse is in fact formed around matters of identity and not just around matters of the military. For critical constructivists and poststructuralists identity is at the heart of discourses and is central for understanding international politics. The hostile Other (Pakistan) has been providing a threat to the peaceful Self (India) since the separation of British India in 1947. To say that the Other is a “devil” (Aneja 2015) does not mean that the Self is an “angel”, but the Indian readers can directly recognize the “devil” and evil Other and understand India’s policy responses to prevent potential danger that could occur as a result of the MSR. This is why the discussion about the Chinese investments in Gwadar port (Ahmad 2013; Chellaney 2015b; Chellaney 2015c; Dasgupta 2014; Dasgupta 2015; Krishan 2014b; Patranobis 2013; ‘My visit to China 2015) and the ‘dangerous’ SOP-MSR connection are brought up a lot in the Indian media. Even though the Chinese foreign ministry had denied any plans to build a Naval base at Gwadar in 2011, the media continuously represents the security implications of the Gwadar port investments.

Due to deeply rooted historical mistrust and existing opposite identities, the CPEC has to be represented by the media as a future ‘threat’ to India. The media leaves out another representation, namely that the CPEC can help to improve strengthen relations between Central Asia and South Asia, foster regional economic development and regional security. The Chinese investments in the Gwadar port could serve to increase regional stability and mutual confidence between Pakistan,

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India and China, because the Gwadar port has strategic importance for Pakistan, India and China for protecting the SLOCs and for executing anti-piracy missions.

It seems as if in Indian discourses on MSR, the focus does not lay that much on MSR in itself, but more on future geopolitical scenarios between India and

Pakistan and the impacts of MSR’s CPEC on India’s threat perspective. However, this argument is instable in itself. The fact that China develops infrastructure in Pakistan,

does not mean it will make “strategic moves in POK” (Brig. (Retd) Saghal 2014).

China’s MSR initiative is related back to the historical Pakistan-India (Kashmir) conflict and thereby does not focus on MSR anymore.

As a matter of fact, China, India and Pakistan all share concerns over terrorism that originates from Pakistan. Actually, “in a conversation with a group of Indian journalists, Hu Shisheng, of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, stated, “China and Pakistan have been undergoing very close anti-terror cooperation.” India is concerned that this increased Sino-Pakistan security

cooperation might turn against India, but the cooperation could also lead to a more stability in South Asia and Central Asia.

Aneja (2015c), a journalist at the Hindu newspaper, highlights that China and Pakistan cooperate in the field of security to protect the Economic Corridor that is linked to the Gwadar port. Aneja believes this “reflects Beijing’s emerging dilemma of striking a balance between China’s “all-weather” ties with Pakistan and a rapidly maturing relationship with India, under President Xi’s watch.” China wants to

cooperate and protect peace and stability in the entire South Asian region and is aware of India’s suspicious attitude towards the MSR geostrategic implications.

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3. The Linguistic Articulation of the MSR discourse

3.1 Linguistic elements

The Maritime Silk Road has fuelled the ‘China threat’ discourse in India and has portrayed the MSR as a new term for the ‘String of Pearls’ concept. Specific linguistic elements in this ‘China threat’ discourse help produce ‘meaning’ and help construct India’s national interests through a process of ‘articulation’ (Weldes 1999).

For the MSR discourse in India, these linguistic elements include nouns such as “suspicion” (‘Linking Silk Road to Mausam’ 2015), “rivalry” (Chellaney 2015a), “threat” (Chellaney 2015c), “mistrust” (Haidar 2015), “caution” (Hindustan Times correspondent 2015), “reservations” (Haidar 2015), “deep insecurities” (Parashar 2015a); verbs such as and “concern” (Hindustan Times correspondent 2015), “concerns” (Haidar 2015) and “discomforted” (Haidar 2015); adjectives such as “aggressive,” “strong yet benign” (Chellaney 2015a), “careful”, “mindful” (Haidar 2015) and “nervous” (Associated Press Beijng 2015); metaphors like “the devil” (Aneja 2015) and “the dragon” (Pandit 2015) and analogies such as “Beijing” (Parashar 2015b), “New Delhi (Parashar 2014) and “Washington” (‘China negotiating’ 2015).

The aforementioned linguistic elements and their connotation to ‘danger’ persistently articulate the gravity of the ‘China threat.’ They are used to construct India’s national interests and imply that India should approach the MSR with care and awareness of China’s ‘disguised’ intensions. The linguistic elements also authorize or legitimize India’s foreign policy response to the MSR. In February 2014 for instance, the Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced army modernization and an

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eleven percent increase of India’s military budget for 2015/2016.1 The army built up is a reaction to the growing military strength of China and of the increased Pakistan-China ties. It should be noted though that India’s defence budget increase for

2015/2016 would result in a defence spending of USD 40 billion, whereas the PRC’s defence spending in 2014/2015 was USD 132 billion. This is a moderate budget to ‘counter’ China’s influence in the IOR.

However, with the repeated articulation of these linguistic elements “the meanings they produce come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of reality” (Weldes 1996: 285). In a way, the use of such linguistic elements articulates the ‘China threat’ as a ‘fact’ or a ‘reality.’ But these linguistic elements are actually “socially constructed and historically contingent” (p. 285).

Emotional predicates are used in the literature to express India’s doubts about China’s intensions behind the MSR. “Both India and the US are also worried that China's initiatives like MSR and AIIB could be used be used by Beijing as means to advance its strategic ambitions” (Parashar 2015b, emphasis added). “While India is also among the countries invited to join China's maritime silk route initiative, New Delhi has been alarmed by the interest shown by Sri Lanka and Maldives in the Chinese proposal” (Parashar 2014, emphasis added). A discourse analysis finds that India, New Delhi or the US occupy central subject-position in the MSR discussions. The subject representations and the characteristics (“worried,” “alarmed”) legitimize them to take action in their own national interests and to make foreign policy

decisions. The ‘China threat’/MSR discussion encourages the US-India security alignment to protect India’s national security.

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The Indian newspapers frequently use metaphors to uncomplicated the

complex MSR threat. Chellaney (2015a) metaphorically refers to the MSR in the title of his opinionated piece: “A Silk Glove for China’s Iron Fist.” China’s friendly and peaceful MSR rhetoric is contested by juxtaposing “glove” versus “fist” and “silk” versus “iron”. The author metaphorically represents China as an “Iron Fist” and not as a “Silk Glove” in order to make the MSR and the ‘China threat’ more understandable to the audience.

3.2 Hypothetical Arguments

The authors that have linked the MSR to the ‘China threat’ theory are essentially all saying the same thing: ‘the MSR could be a threat to India in the future’ (Khurana 2014; Parashar 2015a; Parashar 2015b; Patranobis 2013; Singh 2015; Sreenivasan 2014). The four investigated Indian newspapers assign ‘experts’, ranging from journalists, specialist of the Indian Navy to former Indian Ambassadors, to provide expert knowledge on the strategic implications of the MSR to India. However, this ‘expert’ knowledge relies on hypothetical arguments only and often uses modal auxiliary verbs.

In fact, the hypothetical arguments are based on the ‘String of Pearls’

hypothesis and believe that ‘if’ the Pearls or commercial ports that China has invested in under the MSR or BCIM ‘will’ be transformed into military bases, China ‘could’ become a regional power in South and Southeast Asia and this ‘would’ challenge India’s position in the Indian Ocean. The hypothetical arguments believe that China is hiding its strategic intent to dominate the Indian Ocean behind the commercial cover of the MSR. Verbs such as ‘surmise’ and ‘suppose’ are often used to articulate the ‘secrecy’ behind the MSR. Using hypothetical arguments enable the authors to convince the Indian government of the need to refocus on the Indian Ocean again, to

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transform their security priorities and to invest in the army. As a result the Indian Navy published the “Indian Maritime Doctrine” in 2007. Some authors have found proof of India’s foreign policy response to balance China in Southeast Asia in the opening up of the government financed Sittwe Port in Myanmar, at the Bay of Bengal in 2013. In addition, the closer US-India bilateral relationship is often portrayed as a way to counterbalance China’s ‘quest’ for regional hegemony, however the increased US-India ties could also be interpreted as a consequence of the US focus on fighting terrorism in South Asia since 2001.

Contrary to the message that the Indian media wants to convey, the so-called ‘secrecy’ around the Chinese MSR investments in the ports, does not indicate that Beijing will transform those ports for geo-political purposes and to deploy PLA-N vessels. The identified ‘Pearls’ are unlikely to be used as naval bases because the reconstruction would cost billions of dollars (Kostecka 2010 China analyst with the US Navy).

The discourse on the MSR as a ‘threat’ to India leaves out the representation of the MSR purely that purely serves the PRC’s economic interests in the IOR. Deng Xiaoping, leader from 1978-1992, implemented economic reforms that led to the focus of China’s economic development on extensive economic relations with Asian nations and on exports. Nowadays, China’s economy is still highly depended on exports and the MSR was introduced as a policy to revive trade and investments relations with Asian nations, to revive its declining exports and not to seek regional dominance and a sphere of interest in the Indian Ocean.

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4. China as a Contributor to International Peace and Security

The media representation that the MSR could be a threat to India in the future, neglects the PRC’s efforts in the global cooperation in combating piracy. When authors link the SOP concept to the MSR, they exclusively show one side of the story and choose a threatening representation of the MSR over a non-threatening

representation.

Indian authors, strategic analysts and policymakers are ‘writing’ future Sino-Indian maritime competition in the Sino-Indian Ocean when they link the MSR to the SOP, but they leave out an important factor: China’s contribution to international peace and security. The PLA-N has been participating in anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean since 2008. Ever since, China has contributed vessels to multinational anti-piracy patrols that escort commercial ships and react to anti-piracy threats in for instance the Gulf of Aden. This explains why China has joined the IORA and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IONS). It also explains why the PLA-N needs access to overseas bases in the IOR, namely for the necessary logistical supplies in order to execute the anti-piracy missions.

The Indian media uses discursive devices to authorize ‘strategic experts’ to speak about the MSR and to predict future implications for India. Times of India journalist, Sachin Parashar (2015b, emphasis added) for instance quotes one of these ‘experts’ with the purpose of demonstrating the Indian government that it has to transform its security priorities: “according to one of India's foremost strategic affairs expert, Brahma Chellaney, China is negotiating a naval base in Djibouti, which overlooks the narrow Bab al-Mandeb straits, as part of its larger Indian Ocean plans. Integral to these plans is China's Maritime Silk Road project, which will challenge India in its own maritime backyard," he says, adding that ultimately a Chinese

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military threat from the south will emerge against India.” The Times of India furthermore refers to the agreement between Djibouti and Beijing that was signed in February 2014 and enables the PLA-N to use the Djibouti naval base, “a move that

angered Washington” (‘China negotiating’ 2015, emphasis added). The discursive

device (“strategic affairs expert”), the future predications (use of future tense) and emotion predicates (“angered”) are used to linguistically articulate the severity of the ‘China threat’ for India.

It should be noted though, that both authors only show one side of the PLA-N picture in the Indian Ocean, yet fail to show a different picture, namely that the Chinese negotiations over a naval base in Djibouti, are necessary for the PLA-N’s anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, a mission that has been renewed in April 2015. Therefore, the discourse that links the SOP to the MSR is unstable because it includes a juxtaposition of two ‘China’ representations: (i) China as a military threat and (ii) China as a contributor to international peace and security.

The Indian media does represent the Chinese negotiations over a naval base in Djibouti as a ‘threat,’ but at the same time do not represent the American and

Japanese military bases in Djibouti as ‘threats.’ The investigated newspapers

selectively portray China’s efforts in anti-piracy missions and hardly mention the joint anti-piracy coordination between India, Japan and China in the Gulf of Aden.

The Indian media has extensively covered Japan-India cooperation in anti-piracy missions, but covers China-India maritime cooperation less frequently. Already in 2004 the Hindu reported of Indo-Japanese joint anti-piracy exercises (Bhatt 2004). In 2011, the Hindu reported the 2011 Japan-India Defence Policy Dialogue in Tokyo and quoted former Indian defence Minister A.K. Antony, who “noted that both India

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and Japan are exchanging escort schedules of their naval vessels deployed in the Gulf of Aden region signaling coordination in anti-piracy efforts” (Prasad 2011).

According to the four investigated Indian newspapers, it is accepted for the US and for Japan to have naval bases in Djibouti, but it is not accepted for China. Indian media often portrays Japan-India and US-India maritime security cooperation as closely observing the ‘China threat’ in the Indian Ocean (Pandit 2014; Pandit 2015).

It appears that India, Japan and China all have a common security agenda; they all want to protect themselves from piracy and want to secure the SLOCs. Only the Economic Times refers to anti-piracy coordination between India, Japan and China (‘India, China, Japan’ 2012). In 2012, Rear Admiral Khanna replied to an enquiry about the poor “coordination and cooperation” between Chinese and Indian navies in the Gulf of Aden. Gokhale (2012) from the Diplomat mentioned “an

agreement between China, India and Japan to coordinate over combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden is an encouraging sign of military cooperation.” The Economic Times referred to a Xinhua article and stated that “China today said its cooperation with the Indian and Japanese navies on international naval escort activities against pirates was proceeding smoothly and winning accolades from the shipping industry” (‘China, Japan, India cooperating’ 2012). The other Indian newspapers did not report on the success of the India-China-Japan cooperation.

5. Identities and Otherness

Indian authors of the newspaper articles have the power to choose a hostile MSR representation over a peaceful MSR representation. This power enables them to portray the Other (China and the MSR) as a prevalent threat and the Self as a

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‘peaceful’ South Asian regional power that will be ‘encircled’ by China’s South Asian ‘String’ of maritime bases.

Hansen (2006) argues that “although identity is relationally constructed, and the Self therefore always articulated through a differentiation against an Other, one might not necessarily find that all text construct this through a slavish juxtaposition of a Self and an Other” (Hansen 2006: 44). The discursive construction of China as Other in the Indian media does not always specifically articulate strong Self/Other identity formations.

When referring to China as a “strong power” (Chellaney 2015a) and as “aggressive,” this does not mean that India is not powerful or not aggressive. Even though no repetitive juxtapositions are used, the readers for whom the article is written do understand that they are not supposed to question he implied ‘Indian’ components of the juxtaposition, namely that India is a weaker maritime power and peaceful in nature and that it needs to build on security alignments with the US and Japan to protect ‘national interests.

In addition, discursive disappearance in the discourse on the MSR as a growing threat to India, articulates identities that “at one time might cease to be important” (Hansen 2006: 44). Even though a ‘threatening’ representation of China as the Other is chosen more often over a ‘nonthreatening’ representation (Jackson 2007), discursive disappearance enables authors to represent the Other as an “aggressive” (Haidar 2015) and “a hostile power” (Chellaney 2015b) when writing about the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute the MSR’s future threat to India, and as “peaceful” and “tranquility” (Aneja 2015b) when writing about economic opportunities of the MSR.

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The MSR discourse and the writings of the ‘China-threat’ often refer to the 1962 Sino-Indian war to legitimize India’s suspicion about China’s intensions in the IOR. China has been India’s ‘frenemy’ Other since the 1960s, which would

seemingly make the audience believe that this historical lesson legitimizes foreign policy actions to protect the “national interests” (Milliken 1999: 247). The historical lesson was drawn from Nehru’s misjudgment of the Chinese intensions towards the disputed Himalayan border and the Indian Army being poorly equipped and poorly armed for the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

In response to China's Military Strategy White Paper 2015, Indian Navy chief admiral Dhowan (‘India monitoring' 2015) said, “The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s activities are minutely monitored by Indian Navy and our belief is that the responsibility of protecting Indian Ocean and our coastline lies with the navy.” The ‘China threat’ discourse in India makes it seem self-evident that the world order is made up of nation-states that need to protect their own borders. This realist view legitimates the nation-state to protect the security of the people and gives security providers, such as the Navy, the legitimacy and ‘the responsibility of protecting.’ The discourse also makes it seem ‘self-evident’ that the Indian Ocean should be regarded as India’s Ocean as a central of the Indian identity. But the structure of the world in nation-states is actually a political process and thus in fact not self-evident. The newspaper authorizes the Chief Admiral as the expert provider and his words have the power to communicate a vision of what India’s role is the Indian Ocean, namely to monitoring against the PLA-N activities and protecting.

However, his view of the ‘China threat’ in the IOR and the AIIB and the MSR as instruments of China’s strategic plans is contested in itself. India has joined the AIIB as a founding member and although India has not joined the MSR, India has

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welcomed the MSR investments in India’s infrastructure. Khurana (2014),

commander in the Indian Navy and research fellow at the New Delhi based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses states that the Chinese investments as outlined under the MSR and the BCIM Economic Corridor will actually bring about “regional maritime and economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region” (p. 4-5) and thus not competition.

6. Juxtaposition

The ‘China threat’ discourse portrays China as having long-term ambitions in the Indian Ocean, whereas it portrays India as having neglected its presence in the Indian Ocean for a long-term. However, this juxtaposition fails to mention context and certain factors that have enabled China’s more proactive role in the IOR and have hindered India to play a greater role in the IOR.

6.1 China’s long-term ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region

Authors employ the future sense to portray China’s growing and long-term ambitions in the IOR. “For years China has sought to encircle South Asia with a string of pearls” (Chellaney 2015a, emphasis added); “Beijing will eventually justify PLA-N presence in the region citing security of the maritime silk route ” (Singh 2015: 295, emphasis added); and “China will defend what it rightfully considers its own

territory” (Saran 2015, emphasis added). Addiitonaly ,the harsh tone of the alliterative assonance “determined and decisive China” (Jacob 2015) emphasizes the Chinese long-term ambitions for the IOR. The Pakistan Factor in China’s long-term IOR ambitions has been highlighted as well as “the longtime friendship between China and Pakistan, rooted in a time when both countries were deeply mistrustful of India,

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The media metaphorically depicts the Indian-Chinese action in the Indian Ocean as a “theatre” or a “site of global contestation” (Hindustan Times

correspondent 2015) where a “maritime great game”(Parashar 2015a) and a “strategic game”(Jacob 2015) are being played. The IOR is presented as a theatre where the MSR is “a symphony orchestrated by a Chinese conductor” (Saran 2015).

The PLA-N’s increased efforts in anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean have enabled Chinese action in the IOR. Since China’s integration with the global economy, its economic development has become largely dependent on imports and exports. Around 80 percent of China’s oil transport from the Middle East and Africa, cross the Bay of Bengal, through the Malacca Strait, via the South China Sea to the Mainland. In line with realist thought it is in the national interest of China, but also of India to protect their maritime interests in the IOR such as the SLOCs. The July 2015 PRC’s Defence white paper is based on the importance of the “security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication” and envisions more future overseas operations and a long-term PLA-N presence in the Indian Ocean.

6.2 India’s long-time neglect of the Indian Ocean Region

A recurring theme in the ‘China threat’ discourse is India’s long-time neglect of the IOR in its foreign policy. India is “long accused” (Parashar 2014) of remaining a “silent” (Dasgupta 2014; Jacob T. 2015) and “mute” (Parashar 2014) spectator of the MSR, driven by “silence” and “inaction” (Jacob T. 2015). Nouns such as “vacillation” and “hesitation” (‘Linking Silk Road to Mausam’ 2015) furthermore articulate India’s long-term indecisiveness of the IOR. Saying that India is “mute” enables the authors to blame the previous governments for wrong policies towards the MSR and the IOR and to force the Modi, who is in office since May 2014, to respond to the MSR with a

Indian Perceptions of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: a Discourse Analysis