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0 Fi gu re 1 : R ugar am a Par k Est ate c onst ructio n sit e and bystand er s (aut hor ’s photo ).

The quest to develop affordable housing

Politicizing urban governance to achieve housing affordability in Kigali, Rwanda

Charlotte Niedenhoff 12293172

M.Sc. International Development Studies Graduate School of Social Sciences charlotte-n@web.de

Supervisor: Dr. Yves Van Leynseele Second reader: Dr. Frederico Roman Ramos Local supervisor Dr. Edward Kadozi

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Abstract

Housing affordability for all citizens is currently not met in African (and other) cities. On a “quest to develop affordable housing”, this project departs from the notion that Good Urban Governance can adequately address urban inequalities in African cities. Instead, the thesis engages with African governments that are aiming to find new and inclusive approaches in the existent system. The research objective is to, firstly, deconstruct the political and economic imperatives with which Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali, Rwanda is pursued. Secondly, to outline how structural changes in the urban development structures of Kigali may contribute to more socially just cities. The analysis bases on 28 semi-structured interviews conducted in Kigali between January and March 2020, with a focus on policymakers’ and city planners’ visions and practices that shape Affordable Housing Governance. Substitute interviews with developers, researchers and architects, as well as policy and planning documents, aid in triangulating the findings.

The research finds that the Rwandan government integrates developmentalist and “world-class” (Ghertner 2011) ambitions into its urban policies and practices. Developing “affordable housing” becomes an afterthought, as the state’s visions coupled with World Bank conditionalities, unequal distribution of limited state resources, and elite interests shape the urban political agenda. Consequently, the governance approach and its translation into urban development goals and housing design are decoupled from the needs and wishes of most citizens. Lower-income urbanites are excluded from the government’s efforts to avail affordable housing. At the same time, the old Masterplan often enforces their expropriation and resettlement. With no adequate and low-cost housing options in the city, many residents relocate to urban peripheries and believe that “Kigali is not theirs”. The revised Masterplan aims to counter further exclusionary effects, though little evidence supports this transition. The research finds that whilst “affordable housing” is governed “by exception” (Ong 2006), state-centric and depoliticized urban planning negates most citizens the right to (re)produce their livelihoods in the city. Nonetheless, many government officials were open for change. Looking ahead, this research highlights existing ideas and practices for integrated urban development in Kigali. Acknowledging that it is the everyday and not “world-class” urban spaces through which cities come to life, may then also contribute to affordable and user-centric housing.

Keywords: Affordable housing; Good Urban Governance; World-class city making; Integrated urban

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Acknowledgments

This thesis, of course, could not have been grounded in the context of Kigali, had it not been for the many interviewees who lend me their time, expertise and devotion for the topic. Special regards go to the Department for Urban Planning and Construction at the City of Kigali and my very engaged colleagues who made sure that my research was not lacking information, or humor.

To my supervisor Yves Van Leynseele, who continuously pushed me to go into the spaces of thought and creativity that challenged but also rewarded me most. To my local supervisor Edward Kadozi, who was my anchor point in a new country and without whose guidance and support the data collection would have surely been impossible to gather.

Lastly to my friends turned editors, Ravi, Anne and Emma, thank you for all the comments of critique and encouragement. And to my mother, whose continuous support (i.e. François) and mathematical skillset helped me out many a time.

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Table of contents

Abstract _________________________________________________________________________ 1 Acknowledgments _________________________________________________________________ 2 Glossary _________________________________________________________________________ 4 Terminology disclaimer _____________________________________________________________ 5 List of figures _____________________________________________________________________ 6 Part I – Laying the foundation ________________________________________________________ 8 1. Urban development and housing in sub-Saharan Africa ________________________________ 9 Part 2 – Research framework _______________________________________________________ 13 2. Methodology ________________________________________________________________ 14 3. Setting the scene: Influences on Kigali’s urban development and housing policies __________ 22 4. Theoretical framework ________________________________________________________ 38 Part 3 – Analysis of empirical findings _________________________________________________ 49 5. Deconstructing Affordable Housing Governance _____________________________________ 50 6. Exclusion through Affordable Housing Governance __________________________________ 64 7. The future of integrated and adaptive housing development ___________________________ 83 Part 4 – Going forward ____________________________________________________________ 90 8. Towards socially just cities ______________________________________________________ 91 Bibliography ____________________________________________________________________ 103 Image references ________________________________________________________________ 110 Annexes _______________________________________________________________________ 111 I. Research outlook ____________________________________________________________ 111 II. Standard interview guide ______________________________________________________ 113 III. Operationalization ___________________________________________________________ 115 IV. Coding frame in atlas.ti _______________________________________________________ 119 V. Overview of interviewees _____________________________________________________ 121

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Glossary

BRD Rwanda Development Bank GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income KMP2013 Kigali Masterplan 2013 KMP2019 Kigali Masterplan 2019 RDB Rwanda Development Board RSSB Rwanda Social Security Board

UN United Nations

UN-Habitat Unites Nations Human Settlements Program

Igikari Kinyarwanda for private courtyard

Imihigo Kinyarwanda for performance contract

Umudugudu Kinyarwanda for village, the smallest organizational unit

Imidugudu Kinyarwanda for villages, refers to villagization program

Umuganda Kinyarwanda for monthly public workday

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Terminology disclaimer

To critically reflect upon the use of language, I capitalize political terms throughout this text (“Development”, “Western”, “Global North”, “Affordable Housing”, etc.). Originally referred to by Arturo Escobar (1992: 434), such reflection of terminology “highlight[s] the historical, ‘invented’ nature of […] discourse”. Language creates and perpetuates global and local inequalities. As part of the “postcolonial epistemological project” (Pieterse 2010: 210), language may thus also become a medium for exposing power structures and expressing agency of subaltern groups. For my case study, I use the more neutral terms “citizens” or “urbanites” to describe a group or individuals that have a basic right to live in the city but may make use of this right actively or passively (see also 4.3.).

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List of figures

Figure 1: Rugarama Park Estate construction site and bystanders ____________________________ 0 Figure 2: Rwandan buildings materials _________________________________________________ 8 Figure 3: Rwanda’s location in Africa __________________________________________________ 15 Figure 4: Research design flowchart __________________________________________________ 17 Figure 5: Overview of interview respondents ___________________________________________ 18 Figure 6: Rwanda’s population density increase (2000, 2010, 2020) _________________________ 23 Figure 7: View of Kigali’s hills with informal settlements ___________________________________ 24 Figure 8: Cleared site of the popular BBQ restaurant “Carwash” ____________________________ 24 Figure 9: Community meeting after umuganda workday __________________________________ 26 Figure 10: “Projected household incomes in Kigali, by quintile” _____________________________ 27 Figure 11: Website of the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) ______________________________ 29 Figure 12: Schematic diagram of Rwanda’s Affordable Housing Governance actors _____________ 30 Figure 13: Camellia Café has a long-standing tradition in Kigali’s center _______________________ 31 Figure 14: Kimisagara’s settlement changes from low-rise residential and agricultural/residential to high-rise residential and single-family residential units ________________________________________ 32 Figure 15: Rendering of downtown Kigali ______________________________________________ 32 Figure 16: Total and proportional cost evaluation of generic formal housing in East-Africa ________ 34 Figure 17: Vision City, Kigali _________________________________________________________ 35 Figure 18: Overview of case study Affordable Housing projects in Kigali ______________________ 36 Figure 19: Locations of Batsinda II and Rugarama in Kigali _________________________________ 37 Figure 20: Conceptual framework ____________________________________________________ 39 Figure 21: Formalized urban development _____________________________________________ 40 Figure 22: World-class city making ___________________________________________________ 42 Figure 23: KMP2013 rendering of Kigali’s Central Business District __________________________ 44 Figure 24: Exclusion of lower-income citizens ___________________________________________ 45 Figure 25: Integrated urban development ______________________________________________ 45 Figure 26: Image of model village in the periphery of Kigali ________________________________ 53 Figure 27: Selected landbanking sites for Affordable Housing in Kigali ________________________ 57 Figure 28: Discrepancy between state target and citizen’s financial capacities _________________ 61 Figure 29: Outer walls of an urban homestead with security guard’s hut ______________________ 65 Figure 30: Outdoor cooking in an urban inner courtyard __________________________________ 66 Figure 31: Urban inner courtyard used for cooking, washing, drying, storing, etc. _______________ 67 Figure 32: Urban inner courtyard with semi-private front courtyard and private back courtyard ___ 67 Figure 33: Plans of Rugarama Park Estate ______________________________________________ 68 Figure 34: Rendering of Rugarama Park Estate __________________________________________ 69 Figure 35: Rendering of Rugarama Park Estate with shared spaces and car parking ______________ 69 Figure 36: Incremental construction __________________________________________________ 70 Figure 37: Plans of Batsinda II _______________________________________________________ 71 Figure 38: Screenshot of RDB website aimed at attracting developers/ investors _______________ 73

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Figure 39: Current informal settlements in the periphery of Kigali ___________________________ 76 Figure 40: COntruction techniques of Batsinda II and Rugarama ____________________________ 77 Figure 41: KMP2019 rendering of new Kimironko market__________________________________ 79 Figure 42: Proposed actor diagram "Politicizing urban planning" ____________________________ 86

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Part I

– Laying the foundation

“Basically, you can create very specific conditions that allow us to develop one

fantasticall

y affordable housing project. But […] those conditions will not be

replicable or sustainable by a system. And therefore, the quest to develop

affordable housing as completely detached projects from the overall governing

system of the country […] cannot be effective and cannot go to scale.”

(Architect_2)

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1.

Urban development and

housing in sub-Saharan Africa

The beginning of 2020 saw a revival of the political and societal debate on what “good” housing is and who has access to it (cf. Ramos et al. 2020; Mitlin 2020; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE] 2020a). The debate was sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is, even now, severely impacting the economic, political and social spheres of societies across the globe. The United Nations (UN) Secretary General António Guterres emphasizes in a statement from July 2020, that “[c]ities are bearing the brunt of the crisis […]. This is especially the case in poorer areas, where the pandemic has exposed deeply rooted inequalities.” (UN Secretary General 2020b: n/a) (cf. Fracalosse de Moraes 2020). Governments’ preventive restrictions on leaving the home underlined and exacerbated the stark differences in housing size and quality (cf. Du et al. 2020). The need to stay indoors showed how socio-economic status allows or denies urbanites the (re)production of livelihoods at home and the access to urban services in their vicinity. Housing, many called, must be affordable and available for all (cf. UNECE 2020; Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2020; PES Group 2020). Inhabitants should have space for staying in good physical and mental health, for working and studying, and for recreational activities (cf. Chandran 2020; Law 2020; Fracalosse de Moraes 2020). The present-day political momentum will play a critical part in reconfiguring our social and economic lives for tomorrow (cf. Ramos et al. 2020). We must use this crisis for rethinking our ways. And where better to set an example than at the baseline for a good life, one’s own home?

The last decade has already seen increased attention on managing urban development. Academic papers tend to remind us, almost obnoxiously, of urban challenges through increased urbanization in the coming decades. This is not least of all due to the high urbanization rates that many sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing. The United Nations (UN) estimates that Africa’s urban population is projected to reach 1.5 billion by 2050 or 22% of the global population (cf. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] 2018: 23, 25). Where in 1950 only 33 million Africans lived in cities, it was 548 million in 2018 (cf. ibid. 24). In combination with the perceived restraints to “fast” or “faster urbanization” (World Bank 2019: 139), the management of urban development in Southern cities is a top donor priority. Donors underline the political and economic risks and opportunities associated with “developmental states” (Haggard 2018), such as political instability; the need to build capacity; the economic potentials promised by the creation of infrastructures and urban economic hubs; and the rights-based notion of counteracting spatial segregation (cf. Goodfellow 2020; Grant 2014; Jaffe & De Koning 2012). Extensive financial and technical aid programs are witness to the sense of urgency with which the “massive urban transition” (World Bank 2015: 1) in sub-Saharan Africa is being pursued. The formal housing sector, the World Bank and the United Nations Human Settlement Program (UN-Habitat) make out, is a strategic segment in urban development for achieving economic growth, political stability and societal prosperity (cf. World Bank 2015: 20; UN-Habitat 2011: 13pp.).

International and private sector involvement in urban and housing development in Africa, however, is deeply connected to power imbalances between nations, but also the urban rich and the poor (cf.

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McDonnell 2017; Zeiderman 2016; Hay & Muller 2012; Elleh 2011: 52pp.). The spatial proximity of elite spaces, e.g. international hotels, shopping centers, golf courses and luxury vacation homes to the much more numerous informal spaces, e.g. informal markets, informal houses, and the spontaneous leisure spaces on their sidewalks are witness to this (cf. Zeiderman 2016; Rodgers 2012). Realities of lives between the privileged and the underprivileged, as the COVID-2019 pandemic showed, are far removed. In “developed” countries, housing affordability is defined as consuming maximally 30% of the household income per month (cf. World Bank 2015: 12). “For households in low‐income countries, food expenditures alone account for 50‐60 percent of total monthly expenditures, which leaves very little— and comparatively much less than in other regions—for housing or other necessities […].” (Lozano‐ Gracia & Young 2014, as in World Bank 2015: 12). Similarly, the distribution of resources and chances for economic and political participation is unjust. “[…] [F]or policymakers, ‘affordable housing’ typically means market‐quality formal housing that can be consumed by households that cannot afford the typical market price.” (World Bank 2015: 12).

This research focuses on Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali, the capital of the East-African nation Rwanda. Kigali is alike many growing cities in sub-Saharan Africa, especially other capitals. Through its heralding role as the nation’s economic and political center, it attracts much domestic and foreign attention for both its steep developmental trajectory and its authoritarian government. It is also bequeathed with the many financial, technical and material resource constraints of a post-colonial and land-locked country. With pressures of urbanization, Affordable Housing is also “on the map” of Rwanda’s political efforts. This goes along with the acknowledgement that spatial and economic segregation of lower-income urbanites (following the implementation of the old masterplan), is neither conducive to a (economically) functioning city, nor to inclusiveness more generally. Such exclusion brought with it negative effects in the service economy; the loom of donor funding being retracted; the fear of social tensions; and, just as importantly, the belief that housing is a right to all citizens.

My analysis bases on 28 semi-structured interviews conducted in the field, i.e. Kigali, between January and March 2020. My focus lay on government officials’ (policymakers and city planners) visions and practices shaping Affordable Housing Governance. I enriched the data with substitute interviews of developers, researchers and architects active in Kigali’s urban development and housing affordability. A research internship at the City of Kigali Department for Urban Planning and Construction, furthermore, allowed me insights into everyday planning practices. While interviewees, following the revision of the Masterplan, were keen on achieving inclusiveness, they often fell short of putting this into practice. Based on the knowledge that many wished to continuously improve their practices, this constitutes a noticeable gap in the academic and practical debate.

Practically, this gap is constituted by the failure of current Affordable Housing policies to make housing in Kigali affordable for the majority of citizens. Following the introductory quote, a prominent Rwandan architect notes that creating “one fantastically affordable housing project” will never be “replicable” (Architect_2). Inclusiveness in terms of access and cost of housing, the architect underlines, must be integrated into the “overall governing system of the country” (ibid.). This suggests, as I explore, that housing affordability can only be achieved based on a holistic understanding of urban lives and spaces.

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Academically, the thesis breaks with the “continued insistence that there is a rational policy fix for the multitude of urban development crises” (Pieterse 2010: 206). One of these crises being exclusive urban development tendencies, in part associated with a lack of housing that is affordable to the majority of (lower-income) African urbanites. Building on the title of this thesis, this project embarks upon “the quest to develop affordable housing” in Kigali, Rwanda. So far,

[…] scholarly attention has focused too little on the state as a site for innovation and delivery of a progressive agenda in the interests of the poor. Certainly, insofar as there is a need for significantly more and better urban government and administration in the global South to deliver on the now popular rights-based agenda, the field of urban studies will need to expand its more nuanced analyses of state power and institutional politics. (Parnell & Robinson 2012:

610)

With the belief that the state is central in the postcolonial undertaking, this thesis searches for starting points of “a progressive agenda in the interests of the poor”. The gathered empirical evidence of government officials and secondary respondents is fit into a “more nuanced analys[i]s of state power and institutional politics”. With knowledge on the “urban nature of African cities” (Pieterse 2010: 206) and the “concrete forms” of power exerted to (re)recreate them, I thus reassemble ways in which the state “urban government and administration” can be improved. Overall, this thesis thus contributes to a progressive understanding “the overall governing system of the country” on housing affordability and how it can be more “effective” (Architect_2).

The research objective of this thesis is thus two-fold: the main research question aims to, firstly, deconstruct the political and economic imperatives with which Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali, Rwanda is pursued and to which exclusionary effects. Secondly, it aims at outlining how structural changes in the “overall governing system” (Architect_2) may contribute to a socially just city. The analysis is structured along the three sub-research questions.

Which visions and practices underlying Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, contribute to socioeconomic and spatial exclusion and how can integrated and adaptive urban planning further social justice in the city?

1) How is the Affordable Housing discourse in Kigali governed?

Deconstruct Affordable Housing Governance as part of the government’s urban development and highlight the importance of depoliticized urban planning in these efforts

2) How does Affordable Housing Governance create socio-cultural, economic and spatial exclusion?

Understand how urban exclusion is exacerbated and perpetuated by Affordable Housing Governance

3) How can integrated and adaptive housing development work towards a more socially just Kigali?

Outline post-colonial approaches to government, municipal urban planning and urban/ housing design to achieving housing affordability

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The thesis is divided into four parts. After Part 1, the introduction, Part 2 considers the methodological approach of this qualitative research project; the multi-faceted Rwandan context and urban development and housing supply and demand in Kigali; and lastly the Theoretical Framework, which embeds the thesis in developmental debates, aspirations of creating “modern” cities, and the possibilities of social justice through integrated urban development. Part 3 comprises three empirical chapters, that draw on the data collected in the field. Chapter 5 introduces the way Affordable Housing is governed in Kigali. Chapter 6 explores the socio-cultural and (socio-)economic consequences of this governance set-up. Chapter 7 outlines new approaches towards housing affordability and thus a more socially just Kigali. Concluding and looking forward, Part 4 summarizes the key findings, connecting them to fields for further research, and ends with implications for policymaking in Rwanda.

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Part 2

– Research framework

Part 2 introduces the methodological approach of this thesis; it gives an overview of the Rwandan context in historical, geographical, political and economic terms to both urban development and housing; and gives lastly a literature review and carves out the theoretical approach.

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2.

Methodology

In the following, I discuss the methodological framework of this thesis. This spans from defining the research location; the research design; the unit of analysis chosen; the sampling methods employed; the data analysis methods used; to reflecting on research ethics and methodology respectively (cf. Bryman 2012: 39).

2.1.

Epistemological and ontological positionality

The epistemological position of this thesis is critical realism. “Scholars of southern cities have indeed been critiqued for an excessive focus on data, or ‘objectivism’ (Brenner et al. 2011) […], for not linking findings to larger (structural) explanations and frameworks.” (Lawhon & Truelove 2020: 6p.). Instead, I approach this research as the complex context that it is (see 1.2. & 4.3.). Concluding this thesis, I present a brochure on policy implications, targeted at policymakers and city planners. It is an attempt at giving back to the community that presented me with their knowledge for my research project. The ontological positionality of this research is thus constructionist.

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2.2.

Research location

Figure 3: Rwanda’s location in Africa(adapted from Shosholoza 2011).

This research project focused on growing Kigali, the political and economic capital of Rwanda (cf. Bower et al. 2019: 13). Considering that Kigali’s growth rates surpass those of most other capital cities in sub-Saharan Africa, it is a very relevant example to study (cf. World Bank 2019: 139). Efforts to increase Affordable Housing can be assumed as state-of-the-art developments in Rwanda, because Kigali attracts the most political and financial attention due to its status as capital. Furthermore, the political situation possibly promotes strict, but timely efficient urban development, and gives Rwanda its reputation as a showpiece case in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Nikuze et al. 2019: 40; World Bank 2012, as in Schaefer 2017: n/a; Bafana 2016: n/a). See chapter 3 for detailed contextualization.

An internship at the City of Kigali Department for Urban Planning and Construction embeds the thesis in the context of the location.

2.3.

Research design

The thesis bases on qualitative data, which “often conveys a strong sense of change and flux” (Bryman 2012: 402). As the time frame of the field stay did not permit for extended observations over months or even years, i.e. Urban Anthropology, the research design combines primary data for “retrospective interviewing” (Bryman 2012: 403) and secondary data for “constructing a processual account through the examination of [planning and policy] documents” (ibid.: 402) (cf. Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 119). The

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scope of the research thus reconstructs “different elements of a social system (values, beliefs, behavior and so on) [as] interconnect[ed]” (Bryman 2012: 402) through semi-structured interviews, to understand visions and practices of Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali and the motivations underlying these (cf. Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 119). The internship at the City of Kigali allowed me deeper insights into the state-centric environment of many of my interviewees. I could also access unpublished planning documents for triangulation purposes.

The little empirical evidence on Affordable Housing for the case study Kigali, makes this research exploratory, relating the findings in the field inductively to existing literature, and generating new theoretical insights for the case of Kigali, Rwanda and growing African capital cities more broadly (cf. Bryman 2012: 380). The research design was formulated according to its exploratory nature (see figure 4). Thick description ensures credibility and transferability of the research product (cf. Bryman 2012: 390pp.).

Due to the abrupt departure from the field, the originally planned focus group discussion could not take place and was partly substituted by the storytelling approach (see chapter 8). Storytelling was employed to imagine possible futures of Kigali’s urban development, based on interview responses and supplemented with personal experiences in the field. Such “storyline-driven modeling” (Garb et al. 2008: 1) may help policymakers as well as urban planners to visualize the effects their decisions may have on citizens and the built environment (buildings and infrastructure). This is especially useful in cases where “unequally distributed wealth development” (e.g. Kigali) seems “plausible” (Ramirez et al. 2015: 77), as it helps challenging “business-as-usual” trajectories. Usage of stories and visuals offers further research opportunities that promise to be constructive for creating integrated urban development policies and planning practices (see chapter 8).

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2.4.

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis, defined by the main research question, are the narratives and practices shaping Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali, Rwanda. The research “focuses on the gap between envisioned utopias and actual everyday lives in these planned spaces” (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 119), in accordance with Urban Anthropology. Special attention lay on government officials at national and city level, due to the state-led aspirations for urban development. Because elite groups have been outlined as specifically influential in shaping urban development, I specifically picked interviewees in executive positions (cf. McDonnell 2017: 283; Nally 2015: 347; Jacobs and Skocpol, 2006, as in Hay & Muller 2011: 80). To supplement the data and get a more nuanced (and critical) perspective on the topic, I additionally interviewed private developers, private architects, and researchers.

To make the topic of this research project more concrete, I analyzed two housing projects (Batsinda II & Rugarama Park Estate) that are currently under implementation (see 3.6.). They illustrate my argument on Affordable Housing Governance in Kigali but were not the sole focus of my interviews.

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2.5.

Sampling

The research project employed purposive, stratified sampling (cf. Bryman 2012: 416). It is common in urban research to sample participants after their professional context (e.g. public or private sector) in a purposive manner (cf. ibid.: 417). The stratum of respondents was selected from the unit of analysis, because of their position or knowledge on Affordable Housing (stratification of sample) or their involvement with the projects, Batsinda II or Rugarama Park Estate. Overall, 31 interviews were conducted with 28 respondents (see annex V). The three additional interviews with City planners were used at the end of the fieldwork, to reassess inferences and ask questions that had come up since starting the interview process. More than half (17 of 31) of the interviews were completed with government officials at different government entities and the City of Kigali. Respondents were often in senior or managerial positions (18 of 28 respondents). While many belonged to more than one group, I assigned them to the one that most defined them (e.g. City planner over architect) (see figure 5).

Figure 5: Overview of interview respondents (author’s table).

Data saturation could only be achieved for interview questions that were repeatedly posed to all respondents (cf. Bryman 2012: 425p.). Inferences to similar cases and contexts (i.e. growing African cities) were made, but further research should assess these for rigor (cf. ibid.: 427). The data was supplemented with site visits to Batsinda II and Rugarama Park Estate, as well as planning documents and literature for triangulation purposes (cf. Bryman 2012: 427) (see 2.4.).

2.6.

Data collection in the field

The interview guides were written and revised continually while in the field and in consultation with the local supervisor, ensuring familiarity with the setting (cf. Bryman 2012: 472). Interviews were always recorded, with prior consent by the participant (see 2.9.). Interviews were preferably conducted in settings of private rooms, cancelling noise distractions and making sure that interviewees could speak without being overheard (see also 2.6.). However, privacy could not always be guaranteed. Fieldnotes, on interviews and site visits, were updated frequently, keeping track of the information gathered and as a preparation for the next interviews. My interview guides, while slightly adjusted to each interviewee’s background, covered the following topics (see also annex II). Public participation, a focal

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point of my analysis, was not a central part of the interviews. It was a topic that did however come up many times, and that, I deduced upon returning from the field, was a telling example of the way state-centric planning undermines citizens’ needs and wishes.

- Definitions: affordable housing; decent housing; adequate housing

- Challenges and solutions to, as well as motivations for availing Affordable Housing - Political, economic and societal environment of Kigali/ Rwanda

- Inclusiveness in urban planning and context-specific design - Future of Kigali and of Affordable Housing

2.7.

Data analysis

Triangulation was used in order to assess the Affordable Housing narratives and practices identified in the interviews. The comparison revolved around the different and sometimes contradicting interview answers, policy and planning documents and prior theory (cf. Bryman 2012: 427). This process ensured that local knowledge was captivated and could be fed into the Critical Urban Theory that this thesis focuses on (cf. ibid.: 392). Thick description furthermore offers the basis for replication of the study for other African capital cities (cf. ibid.: 392).

Data analysis of interview content was performed through coding, ensuring transparency and flexibility of the process (cf. ibid.: 298, 304). Coding of the interview transcripts was performed in atlas.ti. Codes in the data analysis stage were based on the reviewed operationalization (annex III) and in accordance with the sub-research questions. The coding frame was assembled with “[d]iscrete dimensions”; “[m]utually exclusive categories”; “[e]xhaustive categories” (ibid.: 303). Records of codes were archived (see annex VI). Accuracy and stringency of coding definitions were verified after the first round of coding. Here, adjustments were made, both to the content of the codes and their order.

2.8.

Methodological reflections

The following reflections assess the quality of the methodological approach employed in this thesis, after Yardley’s set of criteria: “Sensitivity to context; Commitment and rigor; Transparency and coherence; Impact and importance” (Yardley 2000, as in Bryman 2009: 393). The last criterion I supplement with “Transferability” by O’Leary (2004: 58), as this is not sufficiently covered in Yardley’s catalogue.

Sensitivity to context – Considering my own positionality meant reflecting on my biases and evaluating the implications my presence and my research may have on respondents. I sensitized myself to possible negative impacts. I tread as lightly as I could when conducting interviews, especially in the beginning, not wanting to offend or make false assumptions (due to Rwanda’s political system and the post-conflict context). Informal conversations with colleagues at my internship and with my local supervisor helped me understand the context better to avoid “springing” topics on respondents that would endanger them or make them uncomfortable. Additionally, in the context of the internship, reflecting on the

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goings-on at the City of Kigali was not as challenging as anticipated, as my colleagues were often reflective of the government visions and effects these produced (cf. Thomson 2018: 2).

Commitment & rigor – To ensure rigor in finding respondents, I reached out to people before going to Rwanda. They connected me to other possible respondents. I also spoke to multiple of my colleagues and interviewees about who else to interview. The interviews paint an accurate picture of the actor landscape in Affordable Housing in Kigali. This was confirmed when multiple respondents recommended for me to talk to other people that I had either already interviewed. Only a World Bank employee would have helped to saturate data more (see chapter 8/ annex I). Due to my early return from the field, I was not able to conduct all my interviews face-to-face, conducting some of them via phone. This made it hard to gather nuance in answers on more critical questions, e.g. social cohesion.

Transparency & coherence – Given my critical stance towards Development, I decided that I would feel most comfortable when looking at people employed in a job that I myself might aspire to, with similar (in relative terms) financial means (see 2.1.) (cf. Hay & Muller 2012). While residents of Affordable Housing did not exist because no project had been completed yet, I also had multiple reasons not to interview possible “beneficiaries”. It felt impossible for me at the time of planning and conducting my research to relate to these stakeholder groups personally. Additionally, there was the very practical reason of a language barrier to Kinyarwanda, as I did not speak it or had time to learn it, and I was informed beforehand that most lower-income groups would not speak (sufficient) English for interviewing (cf. Hay & Muller 2012; informal conversation with local supervisor 11.11.2019). Hiring a translator would have obstructed nuance in answers, in my opinion, something that was later confirmed, as certain terminology became central for my analysis. Additionally, the interview guides were used multiple times for comparability in the answer set, changing the wording only slightly for better comprehension.

Impact, importance & transferability - This thesis addresses an academic gap, because there is often no spare time or funding to do extensive research into topics that are not “marketable”, e.g. Affordable Housing within the Rwandan government. Inferences cannot be made for citizens more generally, or the Affordable Housing target groups. In my analysis, I refer to these groups in the capacities they were mentioned by the interviewees, whose decision-making power in turn shapes policymaking, urban planning and housing design. Implications for policymaking are summarized in a brochure and will be forwarded to my interviewees (see chapter 8). Transferability exists for other growing African cities, especially capital and New Towns aspiring to modernize fast. The analysis of Kigali’s authoritarian urban governance regimes may be transferable to other such contexts, just like cities that are developing housing with World Bank involvement. The structural and resource constraints of Kigali can be found in other sub-Saharan African cities and may allow inferences (cf. Harrison 2006: 323, as in Pieterse 2010: 210; Mann & Berry 2016: 129p.).

2.9.

Ethical reflections

The following summarizes the measures taken to ensure voluntary participation, informed consent, safety in participation, confidentiality and trust of respondents during data collection. It was central to

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this research undertaking to cause no harm or danger to participants. Such “’ethics in practice’ or the everyday ethical issues that arise in the doing of research” (Guillemin et al. 2004: 263) meant being sensitive to participants’ burden of time; giving participants the opportunity for informed consent; handling notes and transcripts confidentially (cf. ibid.: 264).

Mutually beneficial participation – Following the notion of the “postcolonial epistemological project” (Pieterse 2010: 210) (see 4.3.), the research aimed at a mutually beneficial relationship between researcher and participants (cf. Guillemin et al. 2004: 270). During the research process, I lay special attention on highlighting promising ideas “on the ground” and being constructively critical (see 4.3. and 7) (cf. Ferguson 2011; informal conversation with local supervisor on 24.01.2020). I acknowledge that perspectives and professional interactions are constantly shifting, and their state is highly dependent on the beholder. I considered the implications my positionality as a white, middle-class woman from Europe would have for conducting research in a Southern context and analyzing my findings (cf. Bryman 2012: 34).

Voluntary participation – I aimed at keeping my interview requests via email and phone transparent in their intent. At the beginning of an interview, I read an “informed consent disclaimer” (see annex II). Most respondents agreed to the terms presented. Two interviewees did not allow me to use the information until I was given permission to do so by their superior, which I was unable to get. Accordingly, these interviews were not quoted.

Safety – It was not always possible to conduct the interview in a private setting, due to office set-up of many interviewees. This, as well as the purposive sampling approach cannot guarantee anonymity. At times, respondents seemed very conscious of what they were saying when speaking of political topics. I did not insist on answers here. This made confidentiality especially important (see below).

Confidentiality – The informed consent disclaimer also included a section about treating all personal details with confidentiality. I promised not to use people’s names accordingly. Responses were transcribed without personal details/ pronouns.

Trust – My interviews were arranged through purposive sampling, thus ensuring a basic level of trust through the initial referral by a mutual context. Due to a political “scandal” a few years ago surrounding Batsinda II, a couple of potential respondents were reluctant to participate. In most cases, their skepticism could be smoothed out. Even after several phone calls, emails and reaching out to superiors, one specific interview did not happen.

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3.

Setting the scene: Influences

on Kigali’s urban development

and housing policies

This chapter sets Kigali in its historical, geographical, demographic, political, and economic context, which define the city’s development. Setting the scene for this thesis, I show how these influences shape the city and inform policy and practice of urban development and housing.

3.1. Historical class tensions and urban securitization

The management of urbanization is intricately linked with urban securitization and thus the post-genocide and post-war reconstruction context of Rwanda (cf. Eramian 2020; Goodfellow & Smith 2013). After the 35-year long Rwandan civil war that ended in the summer of 1994 in the capital, Kigali is today an outwardly peaceful city. However, strict urban management and urban securitization have been reported in Kigali (cf. Goodfellow & Smith 2013).

During colonization, grudges by Hutus against more wealthy family members and neighbors (i.e. Tutsi) were harbored by the Belgians, benefitting their stronghold on power, and effectively initiating the civil war and later genocide at the Rwandan independence in 1962 (cf. Mamdani 2001, as in Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 3p.; Straus & Waldorf 2011: 318). International help was retracted, later causing a guilty obligation in donor countries and organizations to aid Rwanda in its reconstruction (cf. Straus & Waldorf 2011: 106). A group of Tutsis, the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), co-led by Paul Kagame, won the war in 1994 and thus ended the genocide (cf. ibid.). Distrust amongst Rwandans remains widespread, because Hutus, incited by the Hutu power and long-standing socio-economic rivalries, had turned against their Tutsi and moderate Hutu neighbors and family members, (cf. Straus 2006: 51p.; Newbury 1988, as in Eramian 2020: 5).

Post-conflict, Kigali faced “a severe shortage of housing and employment” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 3). Many Kigalians, without reconciliation, had to share neighborhoods or even homes once again (cf. ibid.: 5). Ownership, of land and property, had been connected to the original resentment between the groups. It was thus also these spheres that the government set out to allocate swiftly and monitor tightly. The Rwandan Land Reform (2004) aimed at formalizing access to land and decreasing social tensions (cf. Schaefer 2017: n/a). Land tenure and property ownership remains important until today (see 6.1.).

3.2. Geography, topography and demographics

Rwanda is a densely populated country (see figure 6). Its population size was numbered at 12.5 million people in 2018 (cf. World Bank 2020c). Remarkably, 40% of the population are under 14 years old (Plecher 2020: n/a).

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Figure 6: Rwanda’s population density increase (2000, 2010, 2020). Low – high: yellow, green, blue (WorldPop 2018).

The capital Kigali is the geographical center of Rwanda. All major national roads cross through the city, most national and international bus connections also pass through Kigali (see 2.2.). It is also the political node of the country, accumulating most international businesses and development organizations in just a few neighborhoods (cf. field observations).

Post-conflict, the capital’s growth rate was “[…] unprecedented [compared to] anywhere in the world in the past 60 years.” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 1), reaching 18% between 1995 and 2000 (United Nations Development Program 2009, as in ibid.: 1). Since 2001, the population increased by about one million people to 1,630,657 in 2017 (Bower et al. 2019: 21). The capital draws in-migration from rural regions, as well as the Rwandan diaspora from abroad.

Between 2020 and 2032, considering moderate projections, Kigali’s population is estimated to increase from a rounded 1.6 million people to 2.5 million (Bower et al. 2019: 7). Medium growth projections estimate that Kigali’s number of households will almost double from 367,078 households in 2018, to 721,036 households in 2032 (cf. ibid.: 6). Interestingly, the number of people per household has steadily decreased from 2011 to 2017 (cf. ibid.: 34). Projections predict a further decrease from originally 4.17 people per households at medium rate, to 3.48 in 2030 (cf. ibid.: 36). Here, an increase in smaller families and single households is likely the reason, though this decrease will probably stop when comparing it to other African cities (cf. ibid.: 34).

Lush hillsides define much of the Rwanda’s topography. It is also a landlocked country of only 24,670km², and thus smaller than the Netherlands with 33,760km² (cf. Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] n/d). Land pressures, due to the small size, further decreased by uninhabitable steep slopes and coupled with high population growth, have been increasing (see figure 7). Whereas the population density in 2000 was at 321.6 people/m², it rose to 498.7 people/m² in 2018 (FAO & World Bank 2020a). For reference, the Netherlands had a population density of 511.5 people/m² in 2018 (FAO & World Bank 2020b).

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Figure 7: View of Kigali’s hills with informal settlements (foreground) commonly located on (steep) slopes (author’s photo).

In Kigali, informally built settlements are often located in valleys, mostly wetlands, and on steep slopes. Climate change can here be felt most severely, as heavy rainfalls destroy many structurally weak houses (cf. Researcher_2). Needed technical expertise on both topological evaluation of hills and structurally sound housing design hikes up prices. Additionally, wetlands, due to their ecological and recreational properties, have been consistently cleared of settlements in the last years (see figure 8).

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3.3. Political climate

The political climate in Rwanda is dominated by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), headed by President Paul Kagame since 2000 (Lemarchand & Clay 2020). The RPF can been equated with the Rwandan government (cf. Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 432). “Long-term observers of the region such as Mamdani (2001), Pottier (2002), Reyntjens (2004, 2010) and Lemarchand (2007) have lamented the government’s dictatorial tendencies, miscarriages of justice and what they perceive as veiled ethnic exclusion.” (Goodfellow 2013: 445). The monopoly of political power is used to silence dissidents nationally (cf. Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 432). However, with covert ways of governing, Rwanda is still perceived as the 4th least corrupt country on the African continent (cf. Transparency International).

While donors have exhibited a more un-forbearing stance to the government’s undemocratic practices and human rights violations in recent years, the country’s heeding to Development ideals still make it a “donor darling” (Straus & Waldorf 2011: 7) (see also 4.1.) (cf. Mann & Berry 2016: 129). “Governance and Home Grown Initiatives” (Republic of Rwanda 2020c: n/a) have been applauded and promoted internationally as a best practice (cf. Mayar 2019). These management practices stem from pre-colonial times and were officially reestablished “[…] in order to build the nation, promote national culture, and restore dignity.” (Rwanda Governance Board 2017: n/a). Yet, they have also been criticized for furthering the control of the government through securitizing all aspects of Rwandan life and especially “public debate” (Beswick 2010, as in Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 12). In its covert way of concentrating power,

The GoR [Government of Rwanda] pursues […] [socio-economic] transformation through three overarching strategies: first, it provides massive social spending, aiming to increase living standards and reduce potential unrest. Second, it seeks to re-engineer the physical and

institutional environment, making sure it is amenable to business and political control. Third, it works on peoples’ minds to ‘sensitise’ them to the values of nationalism and progress. (Mann &

Berry 2016: 133)

The following three “homegrown solutions” (Republic of Rwanda 2020c: n/a) and their role in top-down planning are central for the later analysis (Part 3):

a) The annual National Leadership Retreat, umwiherero in Kinyarwanda, which congregates all higher governmental management to discuss the state of the nation, and core themes for the upcoming financial year (cf. Mayar 2019: n/a). During one such Retreat, (Affordable) Housing was put on the political agenda and thus declared a key sector for Rwanda’s development (cf. Planner_2).

b) Performance contracts, imihigo in Kinyarwanda, are meant to make leaders accountable for their (in)action. The goals set during the Retreat are binding, their follow-through monitored. (cf. Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 9). “In practice, however, ‘the chain of accountability goes upwards towards higher authorities and not downwards towards the population’” (Ingelaere 2010: 288p., as in Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 433).

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c) The monthly voluntary community workday, umuganda in Kinyarwanda, “can also be seen as facilitating “horizontal” engagement among citizens, which helps to strengthen existing norms” and “serves as an occasion for top-down local government “sensitisation” of

communities regarding development plans” (Purdeková 2011, as in Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 11) (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Community meeting after umuganda workday. Citizens are informed, and conflicts resolved (author’s photo).

In Kigali, this culminates in the institutionalization of “silence” (ibid.), shutting down most critique from civil society organizations and individuals (cf. Human Rights Watch 2020; Nikuze et al. 2019: 40; Thomson 2018; Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 445). Goodfellow describes this deeply ingrained “politics of silence” in the capital, as creating “path-dependent patterns of behavior” of citizens themselves, through “self-reinforcing dynamics” (Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 445p.). “In Kigali, an aversion to protest and noise has arguably become a social norm.” (ibid.: 446). The “security agenda” (Coward 2009: 400, as in Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 3) in Kigali is also used to make it a safe investment, living and leisure environment (see 3.5.).

3.4. Economic climate

Economically, the Rwandan government pursues high ambitions. “Recent formulations of Vision 2050 [not yet published] set a target of achieving upper-middle-income status by 2035 and high-income status by 2050.” (World Bank 2019: xvii). The GDP growth rate was at 6.6% in 2019, making it the 4th

largest growing economy in that year (cf. World Bank 2020a). Nonetheless, Rwanda’s gross national income (GNI) per capita lay at 2,070$ (PPP, current international $) in 2018, which was still far below that of the sub-Saharan African region in general at 3,667$ (PPP, current international $) in the same year (cf. World Bank 2020b). Notably for the later analysis, income in the lower three quintiles are projected to rise only marginally between 2018 and 2032 (see figure 10). While inequality has been decreasing steadily since 2010 (first measured in 2000), it is still high (refer again to figure 10). In most

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recent calculations, Rwanda scores at a 43.7 (1 complete equality - 100 complete inequality), which shows big income gaps (cf. World Bank 2016: n/a). For comparison, Ghana scores at 43.5, the USA at 41.4, and the Netherlands at 28.2 in the same year (cf. ibid.). The state’s unchecked power has been said to undermine socio-economic development, as it favors elite interests over those of wider society or marginalized groups (cf. Mann & Berry 2016: 133; Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 433).

Figure 10: “Projected household incomes in Kigali, by quintile, with 1.3% annual real income growth (annual EURO from RWF, 2017 Prices)” (author's graphic, as in Bower et al. 2019: 59).

The focus on neoliberal policies enabling both privatization and attracting foreign investment make it the “2nd best place to do business in Africa” (Republic of Rwanda 2020a: n/a) (cf. Goodfellow & Smith

2013: 7). The aspiration is to “leapfrog” from a mainly agricultural-led (24% of the market in 2019)

economy, skipping manufacturing (18%), to a service-led one (49%) (cf. Republic of Rwanda 2020b; Behuria & Goodfellow 2019: 582). Rwanda is poor in natural resources, making the import of construction materials expensive, and furthering the country’s ambitions to develop a service-centered economy (cf. Mann & Berry 2016: 129p.). Special attention is heeded to the expansion of the IT and tourism sector, hoped to bring fast delivery on the developmental agenda (cf. Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 9). “The use of market language helps attract much-needed international investment to embolden parastatal companies while fomenting a developmental ideology among the elite.” (Mann & Berry 2016: 121). Here, authors have also described how the need for overt corruption is needed less, as the state is centralizing investment in what are deemed priority areas through parastatal and private companies (cf. Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012 and Kelsall 2013, as in ibid.: 124). Notably, with a weak initial private sector, the Rwandan government “[…] cannot ‘pick winners’; instead, it must build winners from

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scratch.” (ibid.: 131). Public-private-partnerships (PPPs), one of the pillars of neoliberalization, have become a central method of state control, and thus elite participation (ibid.: 131). Investments in urban development especially are inhibited by frequent legislative changes and “[…] allegations of non-competitive tendering and inadequate competition policies” (Gökgür 2012a, as in ibid. 131pp.). To circumvent donor interference in the government’s national and regional politics, “[…] the GoR publically asserts that reducing aid dependency is about dignity, [while] it is also part of its power accumulation strategy linked to the use of force.” (Mann & Berry 2016: 130). The funding and implementation of the Kigali Masterplan (KMP2013) exemplifies this (see 3.5.). Overall, Rwanda records high economic growth and impressive societal achievements, such as “increased health and education coverage” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 7). While donors are not always in favor of the Rwandan way of building the economy, they continue to fund it mainly due to this reason. The Rwandan government skillfully uses its reputation as “[…] an aid-supported ‘African success story’.“(Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 7) to manage donor influence for its own agenda (cf. Ansoms & Rostagno 2012: 429; Mann & Berry 2016: 137p.). A Rwandan minister acknowledges, “we don’t listen to them [donors] anyway; that is the beauty of Rwanda” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 10). The “donor darling” (Straus & Waldorf 2011: 7) may thus also aim to free itself from the trap of Development through low-skill labor and lack of value added and become a robust economy in the global arena (cf. Chase-Dunn & Grell-Brisk 2019).

3.5. Urban development in Kigali

The Rwandan government and the World Bank see tightly managed urbanization as a chance to grow the economic sectors that are housed in urban areas, mostly the service sector (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 7, 9; Abubakar and Doan 2017, as in Leynseele & Bontje 2019: 211). The government believes that “things have to go well in the city first” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 13). The capital’s development envisions what all of Rwanda may someday become. Kigali thus holds a flagship role in the government’s plans and making Kigali a “modern” city are pursued with very costly efforts to build e.g. the landmark Convention Center and extending the golf course (cf. Behuria & Goodfellow 2019: 595; Watson 2014: 217; Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 2). Attracting foreign investment is deemed an imperative in the city’s development to become a “modern” capital (see figure 11).

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Figure 11: Website of the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), aiming to attract foreign investment, also in housing and other infrastructure (RDB 2020a, screenshot on 05.05.2020).

High urbanization rates also strain the supply of land and property available (see 3.2.). Currently, “about 95% Rwandan land is privately owned” (Planner_1), “very few actual plots of land that are not developed or on sale in the market“ (Architect_1). The Land Reform coupled with urbanization and targeted urban development skyrockets the demand for land and property prices.

In order to manage urbanization, the Rwandan government has set up several steering and facilitating institutions, operating in a top-down manner (see also 3.3. & 6.1.) (cf. National Urban Forum [NUF] 2019: 16 & 28). In Affordable Housing specifically several government entities have clearly separate, but interlinked tasks.

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Figure 12: Schematic diagram of Rwanda’s Affordable Housing Governance actors (author’s graphic, based on Policymaker_1; Policymaker_3; Planner_3).

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In terms of planning regulations, following the Land Reform, master planning was the next step in organizing the city. The last Masterplan (KMP2013) was reputedly exclusive in its zoning and was used to enforce expropriation and resettlement of poorer citizens. It especially asked for increased density through constructing further buildings on their property or stocking up existing buildings, as well as the use of certain “modern” construction materials (cf. Watson 2014: 217; Joshi et al. 2013: 26). Adhering to the regulations was not financially feasible for many lower-income urbanites (cf. Goodfellow 2020: 13; Watson 2014: 216). Street vending was banned, and commercial-residential mixed-use buildings were torn down (cf. Policymaker_1). This was especially the case in the city center, where low-rise buildings made way for high-rise ones (see figure 13). Because “public interest” was given as a reason for strict follow-through of the KMP2013, former land and property were not compensated at market value (cf. Planner_3). Hinting at underlying government considerations when shaping urban development, the KMP2013 was “purportedly paid for entirely with the government’s own resources” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 10). The government pushes the “enterprise-led growth” (Mann & Berry 2016: 138), especially in urban areas such as Kigali, over e.g. “agricultural productivity”, a focus of many donors (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 10). Thus, being considered a safe, stable and non-corrupt country has become one of Rwanda’s main currencies to attract foreign investment (see figure 15) (cf. Purdeková 2011 & 2012, as in Mann & Berry 2016: 205; Grant 2014: 310).

Figure 13: Camellia Café has a long-standing tradition in Kigali’s center. Left: old, low-rise Camellia (author’s photo), right: new Camellia in a shopping mall (Kigali Business Center 2019).

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Figure 14: Kimisagara’s informal settlements, to the left of Kigali’s CBD, rezoned under the KMP2013: Changes from low-rise residential and agricultural/residential to high-rise residential and single-family residential units (Wijk 2020, based on Kigali City Council 2010 /bachelor’s thesis).

Figure 15: Rendering of downtown Kigali (Surbana, as in Karunakaran et al. 2010: 59).

After international criticism, the revised Masterplan (KMP2019) now aims for mixed-used zoning and upgrading unplanned settlements as strategies to improve livelihoods and counter spatial segregation of poorer Kigalians towards the urban periphery (cf. Planner_3). Incremental upgrading, furthermore, targets urbanites with lower financial capacities to upgrade their homes or businesses in line with the

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KMP2019 over time (cf. Bhatia et al. 2018: 277). While the KMP2019 is not yet implemented, a look at the unpublished plans indicated that resettlement may continue (see 6.3.).

3.6.

Kigali’s housing supply and demand

Along with a changed approach to urban development came higher political attention to the provision of Affordable Housing in Kigali. The Rwandan government acknowledges that, “[t]he quantity of housing production is still low and its cost does not match the purchasing power of the majority.” (Ministry of Infrastructure [MININFRA] 2020: n/a). It furthermore concedes that due to this “[m]ost urban residents still access housing through informal practices, because the formal sector cannot offer housing access schemes which cater to all.” (ibid.). For donors, housing had already been a developmental focus since the late 1990s, who “were heavily financing housing refurbishment” (Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 7). Multiple studies conducted in the last decade, together with donor funding, outlined the housing needs in Kigali and informed Rwandan policymaking (Bower et al. 2019; NUF 2019; City of Kigali 2012). The ICG report on the “Housing need in Kigali” (2019) shows that there is an estimated need for new housing amounting to 447,094 houses between 2018 and 2030 (cf. Bower et al. 2019: 48pp.). In 2015, Rwanda’s capital Kigali had 151,149 residential buildings. This includes a backlog of existing units in need of replacement totaling 133,105 dwelling units (cf. ibid.; NUF 2019: 12). The report underlines, however, that these numbers should be read with caution, as the Rwandan government views housing as inadequate that is not in danger of collapse and does not pose health risks to the inhabitants. There is nonetheless a need “[…] of new (non-replacement) houses required […] [which] starts at 15,443 in 2018 and rises to 26,259 in 2032, assuming medium population growth, and medium household size scenarios […]” (Bower et al. 2019: 10). The gap in housing, and especially affordable options serving urbanites “below the top two income quintiles” (ibid.: 13), could not be plainer (see figure 10 in 3.5). Additionally, rental or condominium laws are weak and do not protect the rights of the owners or renters as the laws of land tenure do, making renting an unviable option for many (cf. Researcher_2). Mostly low-income citizens face further hurdles to build or upgrade formally, as they are less likely to gain access to government support for lack of political clout and financial capacities. The need for a “professional construction signoff” due to the strict construction regulations, noted in the Construction Code and the masterplans, and the costs of this combined with “limited professional capacity […] within the City of Kigali to do this”, hike compliance costs. These are “over 200 percent higher in Rwanda than in Johannesburg” (cf. Gardneret al. 2019: 34). Additionally, the high share of taxes on the total cost of a housing unit exacerbates hurdles for individuals to meet their housing needs on the formal market. When comparing the costs of building a standard housing unit, heeding to regulations, in East-African capitals, Kigali notably has the highest construction costs relationally to the total price (see figure 16). Compliance costs, with 3% of the total price, are also slightly higher relationally. Totaling with 31,452USD, however, a Rwandan standard house is less than half as expensive as a Ugandan one (67,241USD) (cf. ibid.). Nonetheless, recalling that the GNI lay at 2,070$ (PPP, current international $) in 2018, the average Rwandan can still not afford a standard home.

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Figure 16: Total and proportional cost evaluation of generic formal housing for in Kigali (Rwanda), Kampala (Uganda), Nairobi (Kenya) (author’s graphic after CAHF 2015/2016: n/a).

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The overarching policy in Affordable Housing are the “Prime Minister’s Instructions” […] on Obtaining Government Support for Affordable and High Density Housing Projects”, enacted in 2017 (cf. Republic of Rwanda 2017). The official definition of affordability in housing bases on current income levels (cf. Policymaker_2; Policymaker_3). The Instructions, as conditioned by the World Bank, additionally promote the high density construction, use of local construction materials; use of local labor; and increasing local labor skills (cf. Abdel Aziz 2018: 12p.; Republic of Rwanda 2017: 190). And yet, the focus lies on “developing the real estate sector […] [with] a strong focus on the ‘high-end’” (cf. Behuria & Goodfellow2019: 594). Vision City is one such example, with retail prices far above what most citizens can afford and with a flagship role as “reputedly the largest real estate project in East Africa” (ibid.) (see figure 17).

Figure 17: Vision City, a flagship project by the government serving high-income clients (author’s photo).

To overcome financial hurdles of both individuals and developers seeking to make a profit, the World Bank established the Affordable Housing Fund, which pledged 150 million USD to the Rwandan government between 2019 and 2023 (cf. World Bank 2020d). The Rwandan government’s budget on urban development and affordable housing in Kigali and secondary cities for the fiscal year 2020/2021 is almost 5 million USD (cf. Kagire 2020). Very notably, this means that the World Bank Fund (per year) equates to six times the government’s budget for this topic. In comparison, the Fund also equates to 10% of the Rwandan government’s national budget (2018/19 revised) (cf. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 2020). These shares reflect the power the World Bank has in attaching conditionalities to its loan. With the funding, the government subsidies basic infrastructure with 30% and gives tax breaks on importing materials for developers (cf. Planner_2; Planner_3; Policymaker_1; Policymaker_2). Note that the above diagram by the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance (CAHF) numbered infrastructure costs in Kigali at 16% of the total housing costs. Additionally, it offers reduced prices on mortgage loans for the “beneficiaries” from current market rates of 22% to subsidized rates of 11% and a longer amortization period, 15 years (cf. ibid). Still, “[e]ven subsidized prices remain unaffordable for low‐ income groups and are not financially sustainable to bring to scale to meet demand. As such, in such situations, subsidies end up compensating for housing market dysfunctions and inefficiencies in place.” (World Bank 2015: 13). Note the World Bank’s focus on “dysfunctions and inefficiencies” as part of the its Development approach (see 4.1. & 5.2.).

Currently, two projects, Batsinda II and Rugarama Park Estate, are under implementation with governmental/ World Bank subsidies (see figure 18). Both projects are about a 15min. car drive from the center (CBD/ City Hall) (see figure 19). They mostly differ in two aspects: Batsinda II is a

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mandated project aiming at “state-of-the-art” apartment construction, also through its use of pre-cast panels. Rugarama is the first project that is actually “affordable” by government definition and uses a technology that was specifically designed for the East-African context, using smaller concrete blocks that are cast on site.

Figure 18: Overview of case study Affordable Housing projects in Kigali (interviews 2020; De Zwarte Hond 2019). Photos: left: Batsinda II construction site, right: Rugarama model townhouse (author’s photos).

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Figure 19: Locations of Batsinda II and Rugarama in Kigali (adjustments from map base by City of Kigali 2020).

3.7.

Concluding thoughts

Embedded in the context of post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda is struggling with structural constraints like most other “developing” countries. The options to avail Affordable Housing are especially affected by this. Notably, the World Bank holds a powerful role in this.

These [population growth] rates of change would put states with even the most robust institutions under strain. In a very poor country where infrastructure, bureaucratic state capacity and social fabric have all been ravaged by genocide and war, the challenge of coping with this degree of demographic and socioeconomic change is almost unimaginable.

(Goodfellow & Smith 2013: 1)

Considering the government aspiration to present Kigali as a “modern” and safe capital and thus entryway for foreign investment into all of Rwanda, these constraints are certainly “unimaginable”. Strict urban regulations fighting informality have so far been the state’s answer.

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Although there is a regulation to conduct housing provision according to local regulation no 6/1999, which stated that the government will provide decent and affordable housing to

The problems and challenges in high-rise housing as also stated in draft of Policy and Strategic Plan of High-rise Housing in Urban Area year 2007-2011 that basic problem which

All ICT KPIs used are based on data percentage of households whose at least one member has the referent indicator; physical access indicators are ICT assets/ devices (television,

Participants were asked to give a short opinion on each of the three clips they were shown, followed by a few more focused questions on whether they felt that the subtitles