STATEBUILDING IN KOSOVO
AN ANALYSIS OF OWNERSHIP AND NORM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
STRATEGY OF INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING ACTORS
by
Kevin Menagie
Master’s thesis
Presented to the Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
2 Author: Kevin Menagie
Student number: 10769455
Email address: kevin.menagie@student.uva.nl Programme: Political Science
Track: European Politics and External Relations Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam Supervisor: dr. Imke Harbers Second Reader: dr. Dimitris Bouris Amsterdam, 5 June 2020
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Acknowledgements
I would like to make use of this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, dr. Imke Harbers, for her guidance while writing this thesis. Ms. Harbers’ suggestions have been of great value for my early research plans, and her extensive feedback has always kept me on the right track. I would also like to thank dr. Dimitris Bouris, for being the second reader of this thesis and for introducing me to this Master’s programme in the first place. In addition, I would like to thank Alexandru Voicu for lecturing the summer course on social sciences research methodology, which turned out to be extremely helpful while writing this thesis.
Furthermore, I cannot leave the University of Amsterdam without expressing my appreciation to the entire departments of Political Science and European Studies. Throughout my time at this university, I have had the opportunity to engage with many fascinating lecturers and students. This has allowed me to develop my personal and academic interests, and I look back at these years with great satisfaction. I would like to offer my special thanks to Valentina Vitali for her contribution to this thesis.
Discussing my research with an expert in the field has been a valuable experience, and I am very grateful for having had the opportunity to interview Ms. Vitali.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their continuous support. I owe a special word of thanks and appreciation to my parents, Peter Menagie and Petra Menagie, for unconditionally supporting my academic ambitions throughout the years.
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Abstract
Since the concept emerged in mainstream politics, political theorists have discussed many different perspectives on statebuilding success and failure. This thesis identifies a conceptual tension between two such perspectives, namely the perspective that statebuilding should take place through local ownership and the perspective that statebuilding should aim to implement liberal norms in the host country. The thesis analyses the way in which international statebuilding actors have balanced these two perspectives in Kosovo, in order to find out whether these have proved to be compatible. The thesis has analysed legislative documents and publications of statebuilding missions, and is complemented by an interview with Valentina Vitali, Human Rights Advisor at EULEX.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that statebuilding in Kosovo has largely taken place through international ownership, while much attention has been paid to the implementation of liberal norms. The thesis shows that the implementation of liberal norms was actually facilitated by
international ownership, as this has provided the international community with legal tools to
implement provisions on liberal norms in Kosovo’s legal system. However, the thesis also emphasizes the extraordinary circumstances in Kosovo, and acknowledges that local ownership could potentially be an option in other case studies. For this reason, this thesis is critical of the generality of perspectives in statebuilding literature.
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Table of contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6
INTRODUCTION 7
CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 9
PEACEBUILDING 9
STATEBUILDING 11
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 12
EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN STATEBUILDING 13
CASE BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING ACTORS 14
KFOR 15
UNMIK 15
EULEX 16
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 17
DATA ANALYSIS 19
OWNERSHIP IN STATEBUILDING MILESTONES 19
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (Appendix II) 19 Demilitarisation of Kosovo Liberation Army (Appendix III) 21 Joint Interim Administrative Structure (Appendix IV) 23 Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Appendix V) 24 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan, Appendix VI) 25
Declaration of independence 27
Establishment of the Kosovo Security Force 28
Transformation of the Kosovo Security Force into an official military force 30
IMPLEMENTATION OF LIBERAL NORMS 31
Resolutions, frameworks and other agreements 31
Specialised departments within statebuilding missions 33
RESULTS 36 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 36 CONTEXTUALISATION OF RESULTS 38 CONCLUSION 41 DISCUSSION 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY 45 APPENDICES 51
APPENDIX I:INTERVIEW WITH VALENTINA VITALI 51
APPENDIX II:UNSECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 54 APPENDIX III:UNDERTAKING OF DEMILITARISATION AND TRANSFORMATION BY THE UCK. 57 APPENDIX IV:REGULATION ON THE KOSOVO JOINT INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 60 APPENDIX V:CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 66
APPENDIX VI:COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE KOSOVO STATUS SETTLEMENT (AHTISAARI PLAN) 82 APPENDIX VII:CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO 87 APPENDIX VIII:REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE IN KOSOVO 89 APPENDIX IX:REGULATION ON THE PROHIBITION AGAINST INCITING TO NATIONAL, RACIAL, RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC HATRED, DISCORD
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List of abbreviations
COMKFOR CSDP EULEX ICTY JIAS KFOR KLA KPC KPS KSF LDK OSCE PDK PISG UCK UNMIK UNSC Commander of KFORCommon Security and Defence Policy of the European Union European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Joint Interim Administrative Structure
Kosovo Force
Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Police Service Kosovo Security Force
Democratic League of Kosovo (political party) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Democratic Party of Kosovo (political party)
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Albanian translation of KLA) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Security Council
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Introduction
“We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses”. With these words, the EU Global Strategy (2016) strikingly captures the general mindset behind the EU’s current external relations. Since the start of the 21st
century, the Union’s external relations have increasingly been focused on establishing a strong presence in the European neighbourhood, by “preventing conflict, promoting human security and addressing the root causes of instability” in its bordering regions (European External Action Service, 2016: 14).
Already in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy was established, with the objective to “to foster stabilisation, security and prosperity” in the European neighbourhood (European External Action Service, 2016). Since then, the EU has become an important actor in conflict resolution, characterised by its normative ideals and involvement in several peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. In some countries such efforts have been much more successful than in others. One of the most interesting cases is Kosovo, whose independence is still not recognised by many countries after twenty years of extensive statebuilding efforts. Some scholars claim that remarkable achievements have been made, such as the development of an effective police force and customs service (Skendaj, 2014: 459). Others, however, emphasize the inability of Kosovar authorities to govern independently, which is in part a result of the complex division of power in the country (Chandler, 2019: 545).
This thesis takes a closer look at this division of power in Kosovo, by analysing relations between local authorities and international statebuilding actors. The research primarily focuses on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), as these missions have all been heavily involved in post-war statebuilding efforts. Although all three missions contribute to a stable and peaceful Kosovo, the exact responsibilities and objectives of each mission are different. EULEX, UNMIK and KFOR complement each other, and by focusing on these three missions this research gives a complete image of statebuilding efforts in the country.
Literature on the results of statebuilding efforts shows a remarkable diversity of theoretical perspectives. This thesis discusses conceptual tensions between two of such perspectives, with a particular focus on the practical application of these perspectives by external statebuilding actors. The first perspective that this thesis focuses on, is the argument that state institutions are ideally established under local ownership (Skendaj, 2014: 459; Saul, 2011: 166; Chandler, 2007: 71; Campbell &
Peterson, 2013: 339). This perspective is very interesting for the case of Kosovo, as many local leaders have been accused of involvement in serious crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has charged several government officials, which shows that the issue of statebuilding ownership has been rather controversial in Kosovo.
8 The second theoretical perspective that is analysed in this thesis, is the perspective that
statebuilding actors should aim to implement liberal rules and norms in the host country (Yabanci, 2016: 349; Baranci, 2020: 380; Campbell & Peterson, 2013: 336). The idea behind this argument is that these norms promote a state model that sustains peace (Campbell & Peterson, 2013: 336), while adopting such norms allows countries to integrate within international structures (Yabanci, 2016: 350). In practice, the implementation of liberal norms often also ensures the protection of minorities in post-conflict states. The perspective that statebuilding efforts should focus on the implementation of norms relies on such arguments, and is relatively widespread within statebuilding literature. This thesis mainly focuses on liberal norms in the field of human rights, which include – but are not limited to – gender equality, minority protection and the right to sexuality.
This research seeks to find out how external statebuilding actors balance the implementation of norms and the importance of local ownership. This is particularly interesting due to the conceptual tension that exists between both perspectives, as a strong presence of local powers can obstruct the implementation of liberal norms and values. An analysis of the way these perspectives have been balanced is a relevant contribution to general statebuilding literature, as both perspectives can also be applied to other post-conflict countries where external statebuilding actors are present. There has been little prior research to conceptual tensions between different theoretical perspectives, and this research intends to fill this void. In practical terms, lessons from the case of Kosovo and this particular research can contribute to statebuilding theories that are still being developed to this date, and statebuilding missions that will be established in the future.
The decision to focus on this particular case has been made because of the strong and everlasting influence of local actors in the country. Many of the country’s most influential leaders have grown to power during the war, and have been involved in politics throughout the entire
statebuilding process. Therefore, the case of Kosovo can be used to learn more about the way in which external statebuilding actors have dealt with the presence of powerful local actors and the objective to transfer their own norms. The research focuses on statebuilding missions of the European Union, the United Nations and NATO, as all three have been heavily involved in the establishment of
governmental institutions, while cooperating with local actors.
The findings of this thesis are based on resolutions, press releases, policy papers and other relevant primary sources of EULEX, UNMIK and KFOR. The research is complemented by secondary literature, in order to create a complete and independent perspective on statebuilding in Kosovo. Furthermore, the research includes an interview with Valentina Vitali, Human Rights Advisor at EULEX. Her knowledge of EULEX’ perspective on the implementation of liberal norms has been of great value for this research, both by providing new insights and confirming information extracted from other sources.
9 The first part of the thesis consists of a conceptual framework, in which the concepts of peacebuilding, statebuilding and transitional justice are defined and contextualised. These concepts are featured extensively in this research, and therefore require attention. The conceptual framework concludes with a section on different perspectives in literature to explain success and failure in statebuilding, with particular attention to the two perspectives that this research focuses on. The second chapter consists of a brief introduction of KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX, in order to provide a better understanding of the international statebuilding actors that have been present in Kosovo. Once all relevant concepts, theories and actors have been introduced, the focus shifts towards the actual research.
First, he methodology section elaborates on the research methods that have been briefly mentioned in this introduction. The thesis then continues with the actual data analysis, which is structured in two sections. The analysis starts by focusing on the question of ownership in eight major milestones that have been achieved, and shows that the majority of milestones have been achieved through international ownership. The second part of the analysis focuses on the implementation of liberal norms, and shows that this has been a priority of the international community since the early days of statebuilding. The data used for this section consists primarily of provisions on liberal norms in legal documents, but also looks at specialised departments in statebuilding missions and different initiatives that have been undertaken with the objective to transfer liberal norms. As this data is further complemented by the interview with Ms. Vitali, this section gives an impression of the full range of efforts that have been made to implement liberal norms in Kosovo. The next chapter seeks to explain and contextualise the most important findings of the data analysis, and is followed by the conclusion. The last chapter consists of a discussion section, which will elaborate on the significance of these conclusions in broader political sense, accompanied by a number of final remarks.
Concepts and theories
This chapter will define and contextualise the concepts of peacebuilding, statebuilding and transitional justice. Although these concepts are all related to each other, they will be discussed one by one. This conceptual discussion sets the stage for the theoretical perspectives that will be discussed afterwards.
Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding was first mentioned as a distinct concept in 1976 by Johan Galtung, who argued that “structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur” (Galtung, 1976: 298). This broad definition of the concept has later been narrowed down by other scholars. For example, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk have defined peacebuilding as “operations aimed at stabilising countries just emerging from periods of internal war” (Paris & Sisk, 2009: 1). This definition puts an emphasis on the fragile state of post-conflict areas, while Galtung
10 takes a more conceptual and broad approach by referring to “causes of war”. In a 2004 seminar hosted by the International Peace Academy, it was argued that peacebuilding “aims at the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced and post-conflict reconstruction with a view to avoiding a relapse into violent post-conflict” (International Peace Academy, 2004: 3). As this definition focuses on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, the International Peace Academy uses a more complete definition of the concept of peacebuilding. Others, however, make a clear distinction between these stages and believe that peacebuilding does not include all three.
This became clear when the concept emerged in mainstream politics for the first time, after the publication of the United Nation’s Agenda for Peace in 1992. In this document, peacebuilding is defined as the attempt to “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” for post-conflict areas. To emphasize the distinct character of this ‘new’ concept, the Agenda for Peace explains that there are fundamental differences with related concepts. According to the UN, preventive diplomacy “seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out”, while peacemaking and
peacekeeping “are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained”. If these approaches are undertaken successfully, “they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples” (United Nations, 1992: 4). Following this line of reasoning, the concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping are fundamentally different from the concept of peacebuilding, but can be used to improve the conditions for a peacebuilding mission. The Agenda for Peace argues that peacebuilding and conflict prevention can function as each other’s counterparts in the full range of peace efforts: “Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence” (ibid: 15-16).
Interestingly, the Agenda for Peace makes a clear distinction between conflict prevention and peacebuilding, while both could be seen as means to remove the causes of war that Galtung refers to. The International Peace Academy also refrains from making this distinction, as it is literally argued in the report that conflict prevention is one of the objectives of peacebuilding. This variety in definitions shows the lack of consensus on this relatively new topic. While the United Nations define
peacebuilding solely as a post-conflict process, other sources believe that it also includes preventive and deescalating measures. Because of its relevance for actual peacebuilding operations – such as the case study of Kosovo – this thesis will use the definition of the UN Agenda for Peace. The definition used by the UN is most relevant for the case of Kosovo, because this definition has been directly applied to peacebuilding in Kosovo through the involvement of the UN itself. It is most reasonable to follow the definitions of an actor that has actually influenced the process of peacebuilding in Kosovo. Therefore, the data analysis of this research will merely focus on peacebuilding efforts that have taken place in the aftermath of the conflict.
11 Critics of early peacebuilding efforts have pointed out that these relied on “quick fixes, such as rapid elections and bursts of economic privatization”. Such critics believed that the international community had neglected the construction of a solid foundation for a functioning government on the long term (Paris & Sisk, 2009: 2). Results of early peacebuilding operations have shown that
arrangements were required to ensure that the new leaders of post-conflict countries would actually respect the rule of law, while the absence of governmental institutions also undermined the ability to effectively govern the post-war economy (ibid).
Statebuilding
These early experiences led to a new development in peacebuilding literature, towards an emphasis on the construction of state institutions in post-conflict areas. This emphasis resulted in the emergence of statebuilding as a distinct approach within the concept of peacebuilding in the late 1990s. Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk have defined this approach as “the construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict” (ibid: 1). Susanna Campbell and Jenny Peterson agree with the view that statebuilding efforts are focused on the construction of peaceful states, while they also argue that the concept can be seen as “the antidote to ‘weak’, ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states” (Campbell & Peterson, 2013: 336).
Statebuilding theory is based on the idea that post-conflict areas can achieve security by establishing well-functioning state institutions. By constructing such institutions, statebuilding actors aim to adopt a more long-term approach compared to traditional peacebuilding. Early peacebuilding attempts had shown serious flaws due to the absence of statebuilding aspects, and the view that stable institutions were crucial for political and economic liberalisation gained popularity. Paris and Sisk argue that “institutional strengthening, alone, would not produce peace and prosperity, but without adequate attention to the statebuilding requirements of peacebuilding, war-torn states would be less likely to escape the multiple and mutually reinforcing “traps” of violence and underdevelopment” (Paris & Sisk, 2009: 3). While statebuilding itself would not solve all issues in conflict areas, Paris and Sisk deemed it necessary to prevent post-conflict instability. The application of this long-term vision is a fundamental difference with the “quick fixes” that traditional peacebuilding had been criticised for, and essentially implies that peacebuilding operations can only be successful if they also include aspects of statebuilding.
In the years that followed, it became apparent that also the concept of statebuilding had its flaws. First of all, critics pointed out the risk of post-conflict countries becoming dependent of international actors. The flaws of statebuilding also lie in less obvious dangers, such as the risk that long-term involvement could be perceived as “foreign intrusion” in domestic affairs (ibid) – or even a
12 modern form of Western imperialism (Fearon & Laitin, 2004: 7). Also, concerns were raised about the actual ability to apply statebuilding while respecting local norms and values (Paris & Sisk, 2009: 3).
Transitional Justice
In order to understand such arguments, it is important to have an understanding of the concept of transitional justice. This concept will also be important for the theoretical perspectives that will be discussed in the next section, as these will focus on the everlasting presence of individuals with a controversial background.
Transitional justice can be defined as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” and consists of “both judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, truth-seeking, reparations programmes, institutional reform or an appropriate combination thereof” (United Nations, 2010: 3). The UN has stated the intention to challenge the root causes of the conflicts it is engaged in, while maintaining a clear focus on human rights (ibid: 2). The objective of transitional justice is to contribute to the stabilisation of post-conflict areas and the prevention of further conflicts (ibid: 3).
To a certain degree, these objectives are similar to those of peacebuilding and statebuilding, as all three contribute to the stabilisation of post-conflict countries. The concept of transitional justice is relatively broad and can include mediating between involved actors, for example by encouraging certain parties to issue an apology for their role in the conflict. Other typical efforts in transitional justice are arranging compensations for victims and erecting monuments for the victims of past conflicts (Mihr, 2017: 2). Through such efforts, transitional justice can contribute to the construction of collective memory and a normalisation of social relations (Brants & Klep, 2013: 37). However, transitional justice can also include the prosecution of war criminals in a mass trial (Mihr, 2017: 2). Such attempts of seeking justice through investigations form a more distinct aspect of transitional justice, and have often included prosecuting those who have committed serious violations of
humanitarian law during the conflict (United Nations, 2010: 4). Altogether, the concept of transitional justice is aimed at the delegitimization of the past, and the strengthening of newly established
structures (Mihr, 2017: 2)
As transitional justice often takes place in fragile environments, however, external actors always have to be conscious of the possible implications of their decisions (United Nations, 2010: 4). Out of all examples of mass prosecutions in transitional justice, the Nuremberg Trials arguably form the best case to illustrate this. In these trials, the implications of prosecution were very clearly taken into consideration. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Germans had perpetrated war crimes, only the most prominent Nazis were actually prosecuted. While a small number of leaders
13 were demonised, the rest of the perpetrators were effectively excused (Fullbrook, 2018: 250). Germans who had lost their jobs due to their involvement in the war were allowed to return in 1951, and even quotas for compulsory employment of former Nazis were introduced (ibid). Besides facing the
practical difficulties of prosecuting perpetrators in such a large scale conflict, such decisions were also made out of the necessity to “move on” and focus on the reconstruction of German society.
Similar considerations have had to be made in other cases, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Any decisions to prosecute public figures in Kosovo, had to be weighed off against the societal impact that such prosecutions would have. Any actor in transitional justice has to balance the aim to prosecute criminals and the necessity to maintain stability in the host country (Corradetti et al., 2015: 3). Such considerations have also been important in the case of Kosovo, as some of the most influential figures in domestic politics have been accused of involvement in serious crimes.
Although the concepts of peacebuilding, statebuilding and transitional justice show
similarities, they also show remarkable differences in the way they approach conflicts. Transitional justice is specifically aimed at seeking justice for victims and normalising relations between involved actors of the conflict. The final objective is to leave the past behind and continue in the right direction, and can be achieved through both judicial and social efforts. Following the definition of the United Nations, peacebuilding consists of post-conflict efforts that remove conditions for new outbursts of the conflict. Statebuilding can be seen as a distinct approach within peacebuilding, and is focused on the construction of stable institutions in the host country. As these concepts are related but also show fundamental differences, it is important to take all three into consideration in discussions on conflict resolution.
Explaining success and failure in statebuilding
Literature shows different theoretical perspectives to explain success and failure in statebuilding efforts. One of the perspectives that is most prominently featured in this literature, is the perspective that statebuilding is ideally exercised through local ownership. According to this perspective, national actors should take the lead in statebuilding efforts, and govern themselves essentially through self-determination (Saul, 2011: 166). David Chandler criticises the notion that “locally derived political solutions are likely to be problematic”, and believes that this idea is potentially the most worrying in current statebuilding practices (Chandler, 2007: 71). Campbell and Peterson also emphasise the importance of local ownership, and even argue that the predominant top-down approach in
statebuilding has the potential to give rise to future outbreaks of violence, and thus work against the objectives of statebuilding (Campbell & Peterson, 2013: 339).
14 Another theoretical perspective that is often featured in statebuilding literature, is the argument that external actors should transfer liberal norms and values in order to boost statebuilding efforts. The idea behind this perspective, is that it will be easier to continue with statebuilding efforts once the presence of external actors is locally perceived as legitimate and desirable (Yabanci, 2016: 347; Baracani, 2020: 380). Besides that, it can be argued that the implementation of liberal norms can function as a solid foundation for a democratic post-war society. As argued by Campbell and Peterson, “international actors promote a model of the state that they believe will sustain peace: one grounded in democracy, rule of law, and a market-oriented economy”. By promoting such norms, statebuilding aims to develop institutions that are perceived as legitimate and representative of its own population (Campbell & Peterson, 2013: 336).
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, there is a conceptual tension between these two perspectives, as the transfer of norms can be seriously obstructed by local ownership. If local actors are taking the lead in statebuilding efforts and external actors take upon a supportive role, it is much less likely that the host country will adjust its norms to international standards. International
statebuilding actors generally attempt to implement liberal norms in different manners, for example by training and educating domestic institutions. However, the most direct and arguably the most powerful strategy is to incorporate these norms in agreements and laws in the state structure of the host country. As long as international actors are leading statebuilding efforts, they are able to do this and thus to directly implement liberal norms. If statebuilding efforts are led through local ownership, however, local actors have no incentive to adjust to norms different from their own, and are likely to focus solely on the construction of new institutions. Therefore, local ownership and the implementation of liberal norms appear to be incompatible, despite the fact that both are often mentioned in statebuilding literature. This thesis uses the case study of Kosovo to illustrate the practical ways in which external statebuilding actors have dealt with this conceptual tension.
Case background: international statebuilding actors
Since the Balkan War of the 1990s, there have been three important missions that have been set up by the international community: the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). This chapter will briefly introduce the missions, in order to provide an overview of involved actors in this research.
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KFOR
KFOR has been established after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999, and is concerned with providing international security presence in Kosovo. KFOR’s initial main responsibility was to ensure safety in the country, by focusing on the demilitarisation of armed forces and preventing further hostilities (Gërxhi, 2017: 123). The responsibility to provide security also included facilitating the safe return of refugees and contributing to the demining process (United Nations, 1999b: 3). Despite its usual approach of being involved through supervision, the continuing presence of KFOR troops has also allowed NATO to interfere when it was necessary. A notable example is the decision to deploy additional troops after a new outbreak of ethnic violence in 2004 (KFOR, n.d., About Us: History). However, the number of KFOR troops has over time decreased from 50,000 to 4,000 (NATO, 2019).
The most significant projects that KFOR has been engaged in, consisted of demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army and supervising the establishment of several institutions, such as the Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Security Force. The establishment of such institutions can be seen as an important step in preparing Kosovo for future self-determination. A further elaboration on the responsibilities of KFOR will follow in the data analysis, when UNSC Resolution 1244 will be discussed as one of the milestones in statebuilding.
Interestingly, KFOR can be defined as a peacebuilding mission in nature, with specific statebuilding ambitions developed along the way. The initial objective to provide security in a post-war country is a clear example of peacebuilding, while KFOR’s involvement in the formation of state institutions is closely related to the concept of statebuilding. Above all, this shows the rather thin line between both concepts.
UNMIK
Like KFOR, the establishment of UNMIK was a direct result of Resolution 1244. While KFOR was assigned the responsibility over the international security presence, UNMIK is concerned with the international civil presence in Kosovo. This included the establishment of an interim government, and leading the development of local authorities. UNMIK has shown a willingness to cooperate with local actors, which resulted in the establishment of a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (2000) and Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (2002). The PDK and the LDK – the two main political parties after the conflict – were both involved in this new structure (Brand, 2003: 3; Perritt, 2008: 154).
As outlined in Resolution 1244, many of UNMIK’s initial responsibilities have now been transferred to local institutions. Since Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence in 2008, the focus
16 of UNMIK shifted towards “the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in
Kosovo”, and supervising the development of local institutions (United Nations, n.d., UNMIK Fact Sheet). However, UNMIK has certainly been the most influential statebuilding actor in the country and has been heavily involved in setting up the state structure of post-war Kosovo. As with KFOR, more information on the exact responsibilities of UNMIK will follow when UNSC Resolution 1244 is discussed.
EULEX
The EULEX mission was established in 2008, after the declaration of independence. EULEX took over the rule of law executive powers from UNMIK (UNMIK, n.d., Rule of Law in Kosovo and the Mandate of UNMIK), and also operates within the framework of Resolution 1244 (EULEX, n.d., Short History of EULEX). In comparison to the other two statebuilding missions, EULEX shows a clear emphasis on supporting local authorities in their daily functioning. To be more precise, the objective of the mission is to “assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices” (Council of the EU, 2008). The responsibilities of EULEX also include ensuring that acts of crime are properly investigated and prosecuted (ibid).
Contrary to KFOR and UNMIK, EULEX could start cooperating with officially recognised authorities from the start. This allowed the mission to identify the strengths and weaknesses of local institutions, and contribute to the development of “an independent multi-ethnic justice system, police, and customs service” (EULEX, n.d., Short History of EULEX). The mission has been extended several times, and adjustments to its mandate have facilitated the gradual transfer of responsibilities to local institutions. In line with these adjustments, the number of EULEX staff members has been downsized several times (ibid).
As the majority of local authorities had already been given shape once EULEX began operating, the mission has been less involved in making adjustments to the state structure of Kosovo. EULEX’ activities have focused on supporting local authorities in a more literal sense, by providing logistic, legal and operational support. For example, EULEX has “contributed to drafting, amending or commenting on 96 percent of laws proposed since 2008 and provided legislative assistance to Kosovo authorities on over 150 laws” (Rashiti, 2019: 4). The mission has also set up a witness protection programme and functions as the second security responder in Kosovo by offering support to the crowd and riot control capability of the Kosovo Police (EULEX, n.d., Short History of EULEX).
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Research methodology
The next chapter consists of the data analysis, and focuses on several pieces of legislation and policy documents issued by EULEX, UNMIK and KFOR. This is a helpful method to learn more about the practical application of the theoretical perspectives this research is focusing on – and eventually to answer the main research question. The chapter illustrates the way in which the three statebuilding actors have dealt with the tension between local ownership and the implementation of norms.
However, this thesis does not seek to find documents in which it was explicitly mentioned that one of the two was given priority. Instead, the research adopts an implicit approach, by analysing the nature of the activities of the statebuilding actors. A preference for transferring liberal norms and values, could for example be indicated by training programmes to promote the rule of law and educate local officials. A preference for statebuilding through local ownership, could instead be indicated by adopting a supporting role in statebuilding activities.
The chapter is divided in two parts – one for each theoretical perspective. The first part focuses on the question whether statebuilding has been achieved through international or local ownership, while the second part discusses the practical application of the perspective that statebuilding actors should focus on the implementation of liberal norms and values. In order to determine whether statebuilding has taken place through local ownership, the analysis focuses on a number of the most important milestones of statebuilding efforts in Kosovo. As the selected milestones cover the most prominent achievements in statebuilding, an analysis of these milestones will give a representative impression of relations between international and local actors in the
moments that have determined the Kosovar state structure. Furthermore, the chronological order of the milestones will make it possible to determine whether any shifts in ownership have taken place over time.
In total, eight major milestones will be discussed – although some of these are closely related. The first milestone that will be analysed, is UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution was briefly mentioned before, and functions as the foundation for the mandates of KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX. The second milestone is the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and also pays attention to its transformation into the Kosovo Protection Corps. This milestone is followed by the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure in 2000, while the fourth milestone marks the introduction of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in 2001. The fifth milestone is the Ahtisaari Plan of 2007, which discussed the future status of Kosovo. Afterwards the chapter will discuss the declaration of Kosovar independence in 2008, which is arguably the most salient milestone that has been achieved. The seventh milestone is directly related to Kosovo’s independence, and consists of the establishment of Kosovo Security Force. The eight and last milestone is the decision to transform the KSF into an official military force in 2018.
18 The findings of the analysis rely mostly on legislation and official publications of the
statebuilding missions. UNMIK and EULEX have published most of their press releases online, and in the case of UNMIK this also concerns an archive with all press briefings between 2000 and 2008. This has made it possible to get into detail about the way these statebuilding efforts have developed, and to develop a relatively complete image of the activities that UNMIK and EULEX have been engaged in throughout its existence. The online archive of KFOR is relatively limited, so this part of the analysis relies mostly on official resolutions, complemented by several useful news articles on its website. In order to find relevant material in the large amount of available information, the selected data primarily consists of official legislation, and publications from the months prior to important decisions and developments. This has proved to be an effective strategy in order to find the most relevant data for the analysis.
In order to guarantee the quality of selected sources, this research follows the criteria of John Scott. He suggests that the quality of documents can be assessed by their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott, 1990: 6; Bryman, 2012: 544). As the analysis relies on official documents issued by UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX and Kosovo’s government, the authenticity, credibility and meaning should be guaranteed. As the used sources mainly consist of legal agreements that have been implemented into Kosovo’s state apparatus, the material is also representative for the milestones in question.
As mentioned before, the second part of the analysis focuses on the question to what extent UNMIK, EULEX and KFOR have focused on the implementation of liberal norms and values in Kosovo. In order to determine whether this has been the case, the chapter outlines several strategies that have been developed in order to realise this objective. As such efforts have not always led to concrete milestones, attention will be given to the full range of efforts that the statebuilding missions have undertaken. This includes normative provisions in resolutions and other legal documents. However, it also concerns information on specialised departments within statebuilding missions focused on liberal norms.
Finally, this section is complemented by an interview with Valentina Vitali, Human Rights Adivsor of Kosovo (Appendix I). Ms. Vitali is concerned with the integration, facilitation and promotion of human rights into the mandate and functioning of EULEX (Vitali, 2020), and therefore also indirectly with the implementation of human rights in Kosovo. In combination with the other sources of data that have been used, the interview has contributed to the objective to give a complete impression of the way in which KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX have tried to incorporate liberal norms in their activities. Following the advice of Bryman, the questions of the interview are characterised by a sense of generality in order to put an emphasis on the interviewee’s point of view (Bryman, 2012: 470). The questions in the interview were designed with the objective to learn more about Ms. Vitali’s
19 view on the implementation of human rights within EULEX’ daily functioning, and the development of Kosovo in terms of human rights. EULEX has given permission to publish certain sections of the interview, which have been added to this thesis as an appendix.
Data analysis
As mentioned in the methodology section, this chapter consists of two parts. The first part analyses eight major milestones in statebuilding, and focuses on the question whether these milestones have been achieved through local ownership or leadership of international statebuilding actors. The second part of the chapter analyses the way in which KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX have implemented liberal norms in Kosovo. Altogether, this chapter illustrates the way in which external statebuilding actors balance the implementation of norms and the importance of local ownership.
Ownership in statebuilding milestones
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (Appendix II)
The first milestone to be discussed, is UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution has been adopted in 1999, and demanded the “immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable” (UN, 1999b: point 3). The resolution has functioned as the foundation for the mandates of all three statebuilding missions, and called for extensive autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ibid: point 10). It is important to point out that despite calling for extensive autonomy, the resolution did not call for Kosovo’s independence. In fact, the call for extensive autonomy implies that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia. In the opening lines of the resolution, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are even explicitly reaffirmed (ibid: 2).
The resolution also allowed the UN to “facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” (ibid: point 11e). This decision has had major implications for statebuilding in Kosovo, as it confirmed the status of the UN as the leading actor in the process of negotiating
Kosovo’s status. As a result, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 can be seen as a defining moment in statebuilding and in the relation between local authorities and international statebuilding actors. The fact that the UN was given the authority to facilitate the negotiation process, illustrates the leading role of the UN in early statebuilding attempts.
In more practical terms, the resolution established an international security presence and an international civil presence. The responsibilities of security forces included deterring renewed hostilities, demilitarising armed groups, facilitating the safe return of displaced persons, ensuring
20 public safety and order, supervising demining and conducting border monitoring duties (ibid: point 9). The civil presence was authorised to install an interim administration, which would oversee the development of self-governing institutions (ibid: point 11). Other responsibilities of the civil presence included supporting the reconstruction of infrastructure, economy and humanitarian aid. The civil presence was authorised to establish local police forces, while it was also assigned the responsibility to perform basic civilian administrative functions (ibid). The resolution announced a close cooperation between the civil presence and the security presence, and together these forces would contribute to a peaceful and normal life for the people of Kosovo (ibid: point 10). The desire to set up an international security presence and an international civil presence has eventually led to the establishment of KFOR and UNMIK, which have used this section of Resolution 1244 as the foundation of their mandates. The resolution has also resulted in the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the establishment of several local institutions, but more about this will follow in the next section.
Due to the far-stretching influence of the decisions that it introduced, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 can be seen as the first major milestone of statebuilding efforts in Kosovo. The resolution directly influenced Kosovo’s state structure by installing an interim administration. As the UN was authorised to facilitate negotiations regarding the future status of Kosovo, the resolution has also defined relations between local authorities and international statebuilding actors. Later, the resolution would even function as the foundation for the mandates of KFOR, UNMIK and EULEX. Altogether, the resolution shows that early statebuilding attempts were not exercised through local ownership, but were instead led by international actors, and the UN in particular.
Several sections of the resolution illustrate this newly established power balance between local actors and international statebuilders. The resolution states that “a number of Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo” (ibid: point 4), and demands that the Kosovo
Liberation Army will be demilitarised (ibid: point 9b). At the same time, the resolution decides on the presence of international civil and security forces (ibid: point 5), and even demands that the involved parties will fully cooperate with the ICTY (ibid: point 14). The resolution issued demands to both Serb and Kosovar leaders, while unilaterally deciding upon its own presence. This illustrates once more that local actors had relatively little influence on early statebuilding attempts, against the will of certain local leaders who expressed their desire to become an independent and self-governing country. Some of the country’s leaders did not agree with the leading role of the UN, and the decision to reaffirm the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A notable example of this attitude is the fact that a number of mayors refused to recognise the authority of UNMIK in the earliest stages of its presence (Brand, 2003: 25).
21
Demilitarisation of Kosovo Liberation Army (Appendix III)
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, the responsibilities outlined in Resolution 1244 have also resulted into the establishment and transformation of several local institutions. This also concerned the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) - a remarkably successful guerrilla movement, fighting against the regime of the Serbian government during the war. In the 1990s this movement had grown rapidly, as Kosovar nationalism was stimulated by tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Many
influential Albanians were arrested, while many others left leave the country to create an ethnic Albanian diaspora all over Europe and the United States. While being in exile, these protesters remained in touch with militants in Kosovo itself, and created a strong foundation for the movement that would later become the KLA (Perritt, 2008: 7). The development of Kosovar nationalism further accelerated once Slobodan Milosevic decided to revoke the political autonomy that Kosovo had gained under Tito – first through peaceful resistance, later through support of nationalist movements (Mulaj, 2008: 1106). The fact that the international community did intervene in the violent conflict in Bosnia and seemed to “forget” about Kosovo, convinced many Kosovars that only an armed conflict would lead to results (Perritt, 2008: 32; Mulaj, 2008: 1109).
The KLA turned out to be a major actor in the war, especially once the KLA managed to gain international sympathy in Europe and the United States (Perritt, 2008: 63). The aggression that was shown by Serbian forces shocked the international community, and allowed the KLA to grow rapidly – both domestically and internationally (ibid: 3). Despite the fact that the KLA was still labelled a terrorist group by the USA in late 1998 (ibid: 130), the movement had become so influential that it could not be ignored in post-war statebuilding. However, already in 1999 it was agreed on that there would be no place for paramilitary forces in post-war Kosovo (United Nations, 1999b: point 3), and that the KLA should transform into a civil force after the war (Özerdem, 2003: 80). Later that year, the KLA agreed to “demilitarise and reintegrate into civil society” (Kosovo Liberation Army, 1999: point 1). In the same agreement, the KLA vowed to respect the authority of external statebuilding actors, and to “renounce the use of force to comply with the directions of the Commander of the international security force in Kosovo (COMKFOR), and where applicable the bead of the interim civil
administration for Kosovo (UNMIK), and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the implementation of this undertaking” (ibid: point 1-2).
In line with these agreements, Resolution 1244 called for the demilitarisation of the KLA and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) – a civil service agency cooperating closely with UNMIK. Likewise, Resolution 1244 led to the establishment of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which was set up by UNMIK and trained by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Gippert, 2016: 55). The establishment of the KPS and the KPC once more illustrates the leading role of the UN in this stage of statebuilding, and the extent to which Resolution 1244 has influenced the state structure of Kosovo. The KLA had largely filled up the power vacuum left behind
22 by Serbian forces (Gashi & Molnar, 2012: 51). By demilitarising the movement, the international community prevented the KLA from establishing a permanent administration.
Despite the desire of self-determination, the incentive to cooperate with NATO was eventually strong enough to convince the KLA to sign an agreement on demilitarisation and transformation in June 1999 – only ten days after Resolution 1244 had been adopted. In this agreement, the KLA pledged to “follow the procedures established by COMKFOR for the phased demilitarisation,
transformation and monitoring of UCK forces in Kosovo and for further regulation of their activities” (Kosovo Liberation Army, 1999: point 22). As this section of the agreement makes clear, the
demilitarisation of the KLA was led by KFOR. The phased demilitarisation officially took ninety days, and included a ban on the possession of weapons, wearing uniforms and organising parades (ibid: point 23). However, it is important to note that some weapons remained with former KLA members. These members formed unofficial armed structures, which caused the actual process of
demilitarisation taking much longer than the envisaged period of ninety days (Gashi & Molnar, 2012: 53).
The demilitarisation of the KLA was part of the broader objective to transform the movement into the newly established KPC, which was given the responsibilities “to respond in cases of disasters; to perform search and rescue missions; to ensure capacities for humanitarian assistance to isolated areas; to assist in demining and to contribute in reconstruction of infrastructure and communities” (ibid: 54). While the large majority of KPC personnel consisted of former KLA members (Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012: 134), the transformation of KLA to KPC led to a serious
downgrade of their responsibilities. As KFOR was in charge of recruitment, organised training
sessions, and also took care of the daily supervision of the KPC (Gashi & Molnar, 2012: 56), it is clear that KFOR was in control over the functioning of the KPC. What may seem a symbolic transformation at first sight, has therefore in fact been an important milestone in post-war statebuilding.
Attempts to make a clear distinction between extremist elements of the KLA and the civil nature of the KPC have contributed to the legitimisation of the KPC among the local population. However, critics have argued that the absence of further steps in transitional justice has undermined the image of the KPC as a legitimate force (Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012: 134). In later years, former KLA members with extremist sentiments were sanctioned and sometimes even
extinguished from the KPC in order to improve this image (ibid).
Altogether, efforts to demilitarise the KLA were made to ensure the extensive autonomy of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while setting up local authorities and preparing them for eventual self-determination. As such steps were initiated by the UNSC Resolution and led by KFOR and UNMIK, it is clear that the first statebuilding efforts were not exercised through local ownership. In order to achieve self-determination for Kosovo in the future, the international
23 community first established state institutions and installed an interim administration under
international leadership, while imposing a serious limitation on the responsibilities of local authorities.
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (Appendix IV)
The third milestone that will be discussed is the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in 2000. As mentioned before, UNSC Resolution 1244 authorised the civil presence to install an interim administration. Despite the fact that this allowed the UNMIK to provide the interim administration of Kosovo alone, the UN has shown a willingness to involve local actors from the start. This was a result of the notion that UNMIK could only gain public support by including local actors in its administrative responsibilities (Brand, 2003: 12), and has led to the establishment of the JIAS – the first actual political structure that emerged in post-war Kosovo.
According to UNMIK Regulation 2000/1, “representatives of political forces of Kosovo share provisional administrative management with UNMIK” (UNMIK, 2000a: section 1). This decision clearly contributed to the centralisation of Kosovo’s political structure, as local leaders were now obligated to transform and progressively integrate existing structures into the JIAS. According to the regulation, “all other Kosovo structures of an executive, legislative or judicial nature shall cease to exist” (ibid). In return for their commitment, local leaders were offered a seat at the political table, although their influence remained relatively minor due to the organisational structure of the JIAS. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General was assigned to lead the structure. This Special Representative was advised by the Interim Administrative Council, which consisted of four UNMIK members and four Kosovar members – one of them being a Kosovo Serb (ibid: section 4). While the political involvement of Kosovo’s leaders could be seen as an indication of local ownership, the structure of the JIAS illustrates that their power was in fact rather limited. As argued by Marcus Brand, “no Kosovar within JIAS could take a valid decision without the approval of an international counterpart or supervisor” (Brand, 2003: 15).
One of the main reasons the local leaders decided to sign the agreement on the establishment of the JIAS nonetheless, was UNMIK’s decision to accept the national law of 1989 as the applicable law in post-war Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999: section 1; Brand, 2003: 12-13). In that sense the support of local leaders has been vital for the establishment of the JIAS, and it could be argued that the agreement was reached through a certain degree of local ownership. However, it is important to realize that in legal perspective the establishment of the JIAS was not based on the agreement between UNMIK and the local leaders. The decisions only legally entered force once the agreement was transformed into a (near identical) regulation one month later. This may seem an irrelevant detail in broader political perspective, but it is a very significant fact for discussions regarding ownership. In legal perspective, the establishment of the JIAS was solely based on an act by the Special Representative of the
24 Secretary-General of the UN (Brand, 2003: 13). Despite the importance of local support for the
establishment of the JIAS and the willingness of the UN to cooperate with local leaders, such details illustrate that the legal ownership still lay with the UN. This is further substantiated by the stipulation that the Special Representative “retains legislative and executive authority” in the eventual structure of the JIAS (UNMIK, 2000a: section 1).
It was already determined in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that UNMIK’s administrative responsibilities would gradually be transferred to the newly established institutions (United Nations, 1999b: point 11d). As the resolution did not contain a clear timetable to fulfil this task, UNMIK unilaterally decided that this transfer would only take place once it believed Kosovo’s political forces were “sufficiently mature for being entrusted with such authority” (Brand, 2003: 28-29). This illustrates once more that UNMIK was the main decision-maker within the JIAS, and that this milestone has not been achieved through local ownership.
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Appendix V)
The next milestone in statebuilding was reached in 2001, when the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was signed. This framework contributed to the further development of post-war state structures, as it resulted into the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). This structure consisted of a President, Assembly,
Government, Courts and a selection of other relevant bodies and institutions (UNMIK, 2001: point 1.5). The PISG were assigned a wide range of responsibilities, including economic policy, budgetary issues, foreign trade, industry, education, youth, sport and culture (ibid, chapter 5). The large amount of responsibilities that is outlined in the framework emphasizes the objective to prepare local actors for eventual self-determination. Despite the fact that a serious number of responsibilities still remained with UNMIK (ibid, chapter 8), it has to be said that the majority of these are aimed at supervision and do not appear to obstruct the development of local institutions and the preparation for self-governance.
The framework has been of significant importance for wider political developments regarding the status of Kosovo, as it explicitly acknowledges the “unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes of Kosovo”, and defines Kosovars as a distinct group of people (ibid, chapter 1). This early acknowledgement of Kosovo’s statehood set out the lines that would later be followed in negotiations on Kosovo’s status, and is especially noteworthy as UNMIK had previously been very careful not to undertake any steps that would presumably prejudge the outcome of this process (Brand, 2003: 31). The determination to remain neutral in discussions on Kosovo’s status was also the reason that UNMIK insisted on developing a legal framework, while blocking local attempts of establishing an actual constitution (ibid). However, the political significance of the framework is undisputed – not in the last place because it led to the first general elections of the country.
25 The introduction of the framework acknowledges the “legitimate aspirations of the people of Kosovo to live in freedom, in peace, and in friendly relations with other people in the region”, while emphasizing that the JIAS has contributed to this objective by gradually allowing local actors to take responsibility for the administration in Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001: preamble). It is argued that the PISG are set up to contribute to the further development of self-government, and should be established by holding free elections (ibid). UNMIK pledged to transfer responsibilities to the newly established PISG, but it also stressed that the ultimate authority would remain with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (ibid).
On one hand, this framework indicates an important step towards the ultimate objective of self-determination. UNMIK shows a clear determination to develop local authorities, and assign them serious powers by gradually transferring its own responsibilities. However, once again it becomes clear that there is a difference between (eventual) self-determination and local ownership in
statebuilding itself. Despite showing the intention to involve local actors in the statebuilding process, it is still UNMIK that had the authority to establish these new institutions. Therefore, the framework confirms that the PISG were not established through local ownership. This becomes even more obvious in the second chapter of the framework, which outlines that the authorities of the PISG had to be exercised consistent with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (ibid, chapter 2). In other words: the self-governing institutions were legally obliged to follow UN guidelines. Any doubts with regard to the question of ownership are taken away by a clause stating that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General holds the authority to intervene when the actions of the PISG are inconsistent with UNSC Resolution 1244 (ibid, chapter 12). Due to such conditions, critics have argued that UNMIK only transferred its administrative responsibilities, while leaving its political responsibilities untouched (Brand, 2003: 40).
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan, Appendix VI)
The fourth milestone that requires attention, is the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. The draft proposal was issued in 2007 under leadership of Martti Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the UN, and is also known as the Ahtisaari Plan. The proposal is a report on Kosovo’s future status, based on negotiations with both Serbian and Kosovar leaders. The proposal is particularly noteworthy due to the pessimistic conclusion that both parties would not be able to reach an agreement on
Kosovo’s status (United Nations, 2007: section 1). Ahtisaari emphasized the need to find a rapid solution, as he argued that the development of Kosovo had been seriously obstructed by the uncertainty of its future states (ibid: section 4).
In order to resolve the issue, Ahtisaari believed there was only one possible solution: an independent Kosovo, under the supervision of the international community for a set period of time
26 (ibid: section 5). The proposal rules out several alternatives, as Ahtisaari believed reintegration into Serbia would provoke violent opposition (ibid: section 7) and continued international administration would obstruct further development of the economy and political stability (ibid: section 9). In an attempt to take away concerns about setting a precedent for other separative movements within Europe, the plan emphasized that the case of Kosovo was unique and that its desire for independence was legitimised by extraordinary circumstances (ibid: section 15; Perritt, 2010: 167).
Despite his pledge for independence, Ahtisaari acknowledged that the capacity of local institutions was still limited, and required support in order to be developed up to required standards (United Nations, 2007: section 11). Concretely, the plan suggested the establishment of three
international authorities with merely corrective and supportive powers, consisting of an International Civilian Representative, an International Steering Group and an International Civilian Office. The proposal also suggests the continuation of KFOR, and the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy Mission (ibid: section 11-13) – which would later be known as EULEX.
After adopting a much more de-escalating approach in previous proposals and agreements, the Ahtisaari plan explicitly points out the contrast between the peaceful nature of Kosovo’s initial resistance and Milosevic’s oppressive regime. The proposal even argues that the people of Kosovo only turned to armed resistance after facing systematic discrimination and an effective elimination from public life (ibid: section 6). The proposal shows a clear linguistic contrast with previous UN statements by adopting such a clear stance in the conflict. Although the Ahtisaari Plan was
internationally received as “the most detailed and sophisticated structure for protecting minority rights in a multi-ethnic society ever developed through international diplomacy” (Perritt, 2010: 165), the proposal was received negatively in Serbia and unsurprisingly led to much controversy. When Ahtisaari visited Belgrade for a meeting with the Serbian President, unprecedented security measures had to be taken to guarantee Ahtisaari’s safety (ibid: 163).
In the end, the Ahtisaari Plan was only a proposal and did not give Kosovo any legal backing for declaring its independence. It was widely expected that Ahtisaari’s recommendations would be endorsed by the UN Security Council (ibid: 170), but this was obstructed by Serbian and Russian opposition to the plan (ibid: 172-173). The inability of EU countries to develop a common stance also negatively influenced the support of neutral UN Security Council members. Many of these countries were likely to follow European countries if they would have proposed a solution together, but had no incentive to support Kosovo’s independence themselves (ibid: 175).
Despite such extensive efforts, the Security Council eventually failed to endorse the Ahtisaari Plan. However, the plan is still significant because it was the first time the international community openly supported Kosovo’s independence. This illustrates a new turn in Kosovo’s status process, and can therefore still be seen as an important milestone. In terms of ownership, it is clear that the
27 Ahtisaari Plan was initiated by the UN. However, this is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which authorised the UN to facilitate these negotiations. In contrary to the previous milestones, the Ahtisaari Plan shows a willingness to continue statebuilding through a greater degree of local ownership. In the eighth section of the plan, Ahtisaari literally argues that Kosovar expectations for more ownership in local affairs are legitimate (United Nations, 2007: section 8).
Declaration of independence
Despite extensive attempts to convince Serbia and Russia by making serious adjustments and
compromises to the Ahtisaari Plan, international negotiations eventually collapsed in 2007. In the end, the EU, the US and Russia even formed a ‘troika’ to oversee negotiations between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbian government. However, these attempts did not manage to force a
breakthrough, as both parties proved to be unwilling to make further concessions (Borgen, 2008: 1). Only a few months later, however, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence and committed itself to the recommendations of the Ahtisaari Plan. This was in fact a result of the
collapsed negotiations, and the perception that a uniliteral declaration was the only remaining realistic option to achieve independence (ibid: 3). It is worth noting that the possibility of a unilateral
declaration of independence had been considered before by the international community. This option had been discussed during a conference in 2007, but this was not made public due to concerns that it could negatively influence the chances reaching an agreement on a Security Council resolution (Perritt, 2010: 177). This option has always had the preference of the international community, but behind the scenes the US even pledged to “stand by our commitment to Plan B, if necessary” (ibid: 177).
In the declaration of independence, Kosovo’s leaders emphasized the desire to “become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies”, while expressing regret over the failure to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s status (BBC, 2008). Interestingly, the declaration argues that the Ahtisaari Plan “provides Kosovo with a comprehensive framework for its future development and is in line with the highest European standards of human rights and good governance”, which is later
specified by declaring Kosovo a “democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law” (ibid). Furthermore, the leaders of Kosovo explicitly welcome the continuation of KFOR, while “inviting an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission” (ibid).
As the supportive character of civilian presence was particularly emphasized, the declaration of independence redefined relations between UNMIK and local authorities and can thus be seen as a milestone in terms of ownership. In fact, the declaration as a whole can be seen as an important step
