1 FACULTEIT DER MAATSCHAPPIJ- EN GEDRAGSWETENSCHAPPEN
Bacheloropleiding Politicologie
The intervention in Libya
and spillover to the Sahel
region
Transnational Spaces: Political Geography of Security
Judith Huismans
10002265
28/01/2014
UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
2 Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that there is a lack of attention for interventions in theory on spillover effects. Vice versa, there is a lack of attention for spillover effects in literature on interventions. I argue that this could reinforce the danger of paying too little attention to spillover effects when intervening. I will demonstrate that little attention is paid to spillover effects when intervening by looking at if and how spillover effects on the region were taken into consideration in the process of intervening in Libya. My research question is: how were the regional spillover effects taken into account in the process of intervening in Libya? I find that the spillover effects were taken into consideration in the process of intervening, that is by the African Union. However, the African Union was overshadowed by the actors leading the intervention. These actors did not pay much attention to the danger of spillover effects.
Introduction
During the 1980s, Colonel Gaddafi’s support for various international terrorist organizations, his direct involvement in murderous attacks against the US, the UK, France and Germany, and his attempts to unite the Arab world in a coalition hostile to the Western world, led him to become arguably the most reviled international figure in the West. However, after the invasion of Iraq, Gaddafi disbanded his chemical weapons programme and began a rapid process of reintegrating with the international community. The West supported his regime in pursuing the ‘war on terror’, as Libya served as a site for ‘extraordinary rendition’, which is the transferring of terrorism suspects to countries known to employ torture for the purpose of interrogation. In doing this, they overlooked the repressive domestic policies. Gaddafi’s failure to create a strong sense of national citizenship amongst the population, coupled with his oppressive policies and remoteness, had created a disjuncture between the people and the regime (Hehir, 2013: 2-3).
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt served as a catalyst and on 15 February 2011 mass demonstrations held in Benghazi soon spread throughout the rest of the country. Libya’s decent into violence provoked an unusually rapid response from both regional organizations and the UN (Hehir, 2013: 4). On 26 February the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers and passed Resolution 1970. The Resolution referred the situation to the International Criminal Court and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze against the Libyan authorities. Despite this pressure, and appeals from regional organizations, the violence continued. On 17 March the Security Council passed Resolution
3 1973 which sanctioned the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012) (Hehir, 2013: 6).
The entire operation was known as Operation Unified Protector (OUP). The intervention in Libya is often seen as a success, not only by the NATO itself, but also by scholars. Daalder and Stavridis describe the intervention as a success and even a victory in their article 'NATO's victory in Libya'. However, the intervention in Libya was only aimed at the country itself while there were significant threats to regional stability as well. According to Shaw, internal conflict cannot be approached with solely a country-specific focus. There needs to be a significant consideration of the likelihood of conflict spread before there is any international involvement. In his article, Shaw argues that the conflict in Libya has provided the external spark to restart the Tuareg secessionist conflict in Mali that had ended in 2009 (Shaw, 2013: 207). There were considerable spillover effects to other countries, such as Sudan, Niger and Chad, as well (De Waal, 2013: 75-77).
There are many theorists writing about the spillover effects of conflict. However, they do not deal with the subject of intervention. Vice versa, theory on interventions does not pay attention to spillover effects. I argue that this reinforces the danger of paying too little attention to spillover effects when intervening, as there is no such thing as a ‘road map’ for dealing with spillover effects when intervening. In this thesis I will demonstrate that little attention is paid to spillover effects when intervening, by looking at if and how spillover effects on the region were taken into consideration in the process of intervening in Libya. I expect my argument to develop as follows. First, I will look at the theory on spillover effects. In this section, I will take in account the spillover effects from the conflict in Libya to the Sahel region. Second, I will argue that there is a disjuncture between the literature on spillover effects and the literature on interventions. Third, I will look at the process of intervening in Libya. My research question is: How were the regional spillover effects taken into account in process of intervening in Libya? I will focus on the period from 15 February 2011, as this is when the uprisings began, until 31 October 2011, as this is the day Operation Unified Protector officially ended. I will especially look at the African Union, as this is the most important actor facing the danger of spillover effects, as all countries facing spillover effects are member of the African Union.
4 Theory
Theory on spillover effects
A lot of literature has been written about spillover effects and regional factors contributing to conflict. The geographic clustering of intrastate conflicts strongly suggests that the risk of civil war is not determined merely by attributes of individual countries and that regional factors and events in neighboring states can alter the prospects for violence (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008: 216). However, spatial clustering in conflict does not by itself imply a causal relationship. The observed spatial clustering of conflict could be simply due to a corresponding distribution of relevant state characteristics associated with conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008: 216). Therefore, in their article “Contagion or Confusion. Why conflicts cluster in space” Buhaug and Gleditsch develop a systematic approach to evaluating whether the spatial clustering of civil war merely reflects similarly arranged country characteristics or whether there is additional evidence suggesting cross-border contagion (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008: 216). In this systematic approach, seven specific factors are considered: the distance to the nearest conflict zone, the length of the boundary with the conflict neighbor, the existence of ethnic ties to the neighboring conflict population, refugee population from the conflict neighbor, the severity of the neighboring conflict, the nature of the neighboring conflict, and the size of the neighboring country experiencing conflict. Buhaug and Gleditsch further distinguish between different types of conflict and examine to what extent secessionist insurgencies entail different propensities for contagion than conflicts over state control (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 216).
Why were these factors chosen? The first factor is the distance to the nearest conflict zone. A number of mechanisms suggest its relevance. First, civil wars have been shown to have a negative impact on regional economic growth, which lowers the opportunity costs of rebellion in neighboring states. Consequences of ongoing conflict in neighboring states, such as access to cheap arms, cross-border rebel sanctuaries, and mercenaries moving across boundaries, may also contribute to the spread of violence. Such conflict externalities are likely to be mediated by distance. Buhaug and Gleditsch therefore expect the spillover effects of civil war to be felt most intensely by countries near the conflict zone, in particular those who see battles close to or crossing over their borders. This would also imply that the likelihood of cross-border contagion is positively associated with the length of the border to the conflict neighbor, the second factor (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 220).
The third factor is the existence of ethnic ties to the neighboring conflict population. Violent mobilization in one country may lead to emulation by neighboring groups facing similar conditions. Kuran (1998) suggests that ethnic conflict in other states can make groups more aware of their own
5 grievances, raise expectations of ethnic conflict at home, and make global public opinion more sympathetic toward their political demands. Given that most forms of interaction are geographically confined, Buhaug and Gleditsch expect reference examples and media attention to focus primarily on events in nearby states. Also, conflicts may spread through transnational ethnic ties, whereby mobilization by group members in one state will change the prospects for mobilization by the same group in other countries (Forsberg, 2008) (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 220-221).
The fourth factor is the refugee population from the conflict neighbor. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that large refugee populations often create severe strains on receiving countries by exacerbating resource competition in the host community, altering the local ethnic balance, and sometimes also by containing so-called refugee warriors with potentially unhealthy aspirations and prior experience from combat. Accordingly, Buhaug and Gleditsch expect countries with large influxes of refugees from a proximate conflict to be more at risk than otherwise similar conflict neighbors with limited or no refugee populations (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 221).
The fifth factor is the severity of the neighboring conflict. Bloody conflicts usually involve more combatants, cover a larger geographic area, lead to more devastating regional consequences, and generate a large number of refugees and internally displaced migrants (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 223).
The sixth factor is the nature of the neighboring conflict. Buhaug (2006) suggests distinguishing between civil wars based on the rebels’ stated objective. Buhaug and Gleditsch adopt this classification scheme and identify conflicts as either concerning territory (i.e., secession or autonomy) or government control. Separatist conflicts typically involve peripheral ethnic minority groups that have ties across the border. These conflicts should be more likely to give rise to regional demonstration effects as they appeal primarily to connected groups, in contrast to ideologically motivated revolts, which tend to employ universalistic principles (Kaufman 1996). These factors suggest that separatist conflicts should entail much greater risk of conflict in proximate states (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 222-223).
The seventh factor is the size of the neighboring country experiencing conflict. Population size is positively correlated with the number of potential linkages to actors in other states, and economic and cultural relationships between nations can facilitate the spread of arms and ideologies conducive to insurgency. Moreover, population size is often considered as a component of potential military capabilities, and a large country is more likely to be considered a potential threat to security by its
6 neighbors. Therefore, conflictual events in large countries could have a larger destabilizing effect in a region than events in smaller countries (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 221-222).
The results of the analysis by Buhaug and Gleditsch suggest that proximity and exposure play minor roles. The distance to the nearest conflict, the weighted density of conflict in the neighborhood and the influx of refugees from a conflict neighbor have little explanatory power as well. The severity of the neighboring conflict does not explain the trajectory of contagion either. Rather, they find that transnational ethnic ties seem to be an important catalyst of contagion. Their results also suggest that the demonstrated contextual effect of civil war is largely a feature of secessionist conflict. They interpret this as additional evidence that cultural ties constitute a significant risk factor that contributes to the spread of armed conflict (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 230).
Another scholar concerned with spillover effects is Terrill. In his analysis of spillover effects of the Iraq war, Terrill takes several spillover issues into account. First of all, he is concerned with the flow of refugees and displaced persons. A second concern is cross-border terrorism. Third, the potential intensification of separatism and sectarian discord in neighboring countries needs to be taken into consideration. A final concern is transnational crime. Terrill is especially concerned with the spread of sectarian divisions which, according to him, can have devastating regional consequences if not properly managed (Terrill, 2008: iii-iv).
Buhaug and Gleditsch find that of the seven factors they have researched, transnational ethnic ties is the only factor that serves as an important catalyst of contagion. Furthermore, Terrill also suggest that separatism and sectarian discord in neighboring countries should be the main focal point when studying spillover effects. Therefore, when studying the spillover effects of the conflict in Libya to the Sahel region, I will mainly focus on transnational ethnic ties, separatism and sectarian discord. Spillover effects to the Sahel region
Have these factors played a role in the spillover effects from the conflict in Libya? The first regional fallout of the Libya conflict was felt in Sudan. Re-equipped from Gaddafi’s weapon arsenals, fighters from the Darfurian rebel group JEM posed a major threat to the Sudanese government. They ranged across both Darfur and Kordofan and then crossed the savanna to newly independent South Sudan, which provided it with a safe haven. In February and March 2012, in close coordination with the SPLA – the army of the Republic of South-Sudan, two groups of JEM vehicles re-crossed the border northwards, entering Southern Kordofan where they played an important role in the fighting between Sudan and South Sudan in the oil-producing area of Heglig (De Waal, 2013: 75-76).
7 Other important spillover effects from the Libyan conflict were those to Mali. The Libyan armed forces had included two brigades drawn from the Malian Tuareg, and several other Saharan groups descended on Libya during the conflict. Until this point, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had been a numerically tiny group, who combined trans-Saharan smuggling operations with intermittent hostage-taking. During the Libyan conflict, AQIM acquired both weapons and soldiers in Libya. In January 2012, a coalition of up to 3,000 Tuareg separatists who had long sought an independent Azawad nation in the Sahara, along with AQIM fighters and a newly established Tuareg Islamist group, Ansar al-Dine, invaded Mali. This threat had been foreseen but President Touré of Mali did little to prepare. The Malian army was wholly unequipped to deal with the threat and turned upon Touré. Captain Anadou Sanogo mounted a coup on 21–22 March 2012. Although Captain Sanogo and his fellow officers agreed to African and international demands to return the country to civilian rule, Mali’s crisis was unresolved. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) continued its offensive, overrunning all the cities of northern Mali. On 6 April 2012 an independent Azawad state, covering the northern half of Mali, was declared (De Waal, 2013: 76).
In Niger there was also a danger of civil war, including Tuareg secessionism. However, unlike Mali, Niger was prepared. Niger had suffered a series of rebellions in the north, the most recent of which took place in the period from 2007 until 2009. This rebellion was led by the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) and the Niger Patriotic Front (NPF). This conflict was ended by the joint mediation of Mali, Algeria, Libya, the UN and Canada. Following a peace agreement in May–June 2009, the Niger government was proactive in accommodating Tuareg leaders, including appointing one as Prime Minister in April 2011. Furthermore, they pursued disarmament and integration programmes for MNJ and NPF fighters. As the Libyan regime imploded, Niger took a tough line on security, making good use of the US Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism Initiative to patrol the skies, and its own army, to disarm infiltrators, including former Tuareg rebels who had fought for Gaddafi. Nonetheless, Niger is fragile. De Waal argues that the presence of Libyan fugitives who fled to Niger with arms and money will prove destabilizing (De Waal, 2013: 76-77).
In Chad, the regime was also prepared for the consequences of the conflict in Libya. During the Libyan war, the northernmost ethnic groups and especially the Tubu, acquired even greater stockpiles of weapons than those they possessed before. The Tubu were beneficiaries of Gaddafi’s policy of Africanizing his security forces. From the late 1990s, the Tubu were in rebellion against the N’djamena government, as a result of which Tibesti, a region in the northwest of Chad, became cut
8 off from its own capital. Furthermore, Tibesti lost its income from the now-closed Libya–Chad trade routes and was deprived of services such as health and education. When the uprising began, the Tubu quickly abandoned Gaddafi and associated themselves with the Transitional National Council. Now better armed than ever, the Tubu could again present a military threat to Chad (De Waal, 2013: 77).
As became clear from the theory about spillover effects, transnational ethnic ties are important as a catalyst for contagion. Transnational ethnic ties are important for the spillover effects from the conflict in Libya to Sudan, Mali, Niger and Chad mentioned above. There were a lot of migrants from these countries in Libya. As the wealthiest country in the region, Libya was a popular destination for migrants looking for a job. Furthermore, during his reign Gaddafi recruited Saharan nomads and sub-Saharan migrants, several thousand of whom were moulded into an ‘Islamic Legion’ and others who became fractions of the Libyan military apparatus. Among these the Tuareg formed a big group. In particular Tuareg from Mali were preferred by Gaddafi, as Mali does not share a border with Libya and recruits from Niger or Chad would have been able to defect more easily and threaten him from the neighboring countries (De Waal, 2013: 63). Gaddafi made the Tuareg soldiers an inseparable part of the core of his military and security establishment on a massive scale, turning these warriors into his regime’s most loyal guardians. The collapse of Qaddafi’s regime and the subsequent breakdown of the state order all across Libya put an end to this alliance. Because of this they ended up in a state of political uncertainty and violent chaos. These groups went back to their home countries, bringing weapons from Gaddafi’s arsenal with them, spurring separatist threats (Ronen, 2013: 544-545). The factors deemed most important for spillover effects according to the literature, transnational ethnic ties and separatism, are very prominent in the spillover effects from Libya to the Sahel region.
Spillover effects theory ≠ intervention theory
One subject that the theory on spillover effects does not focus on is interventions. It deals with the spillover effects of conflict. However, how these spillover effects could be reduced or prevented by an intervention is not discussed. It deals with the spillover effects of conflict. However, how these spillover effects could be reduced or prevented by an intervention is not discussed. Vice versa, theorists who write about interventions do not pay attention to spillover effects. Perhaps this is because of a focus on the state. This focus on the state becomes clear in the definition of humanitarian intervention: “The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human
9 rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the government of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Gulati and Khosa, 2013: 400). This is not only apparent in the theory on the subject, but also in practice. When intervening, the danger of spillover effects is often not taken into consideration. This could be reinforced by the hiatus in the theory, as because spillover theorists do not write about interventions, and interventionist theorists do not write about spillover effects, there is no such thing as a ‘road map’ for dealing with spillover effects when intervening.
Data & Methods
Data gathering methods
The data I will use for this thesis consist of the following. First of all, I will use academic papers. I will use those for theory on spillover effects, information on the spillover effects from the conflict in Libya to the Sahel region and for information on the intervention. Furthermore, I will use official documents, mostly by the African Union and Security Council. These documents can be used to get more information on the intervention and the role of these specific actors.
Methods of analysis
I will use a qualitative research design, as this allows me to study the subject in depth. Three features of qualitative research are noteworthy. First, an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research, whereby the former is generated out of the latter. Second, an epistemological position described as interpretivist, meaning that, in contract to the adoption of a natural scientific model in quantitative research, the stress is on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants. Three, an ontological positions described as constructionist, which implies that social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals, rather that phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in its construction (Bryman, 2008: 366).
My research design will be that of a case study which focuses on a single event: the intervention in Libya. A basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. Case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2008: 52). This is a exemplifying case, as this case epitomizes a broader category of cases in which there is no attention paid to spillover effects when intervening (Bryman, 2008: 56). My main method
10 of analysis will be the analysis of documents and materials. I will consider key events and issues identified in the literature review. Examples of this are the passing of the Resolutions 1970 and 1973. I will do a qualitative content analysis. This is probably the most prevalent approach to the qualitative analysis of documents. It comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed (Bryman, 2008: 529). I will look for information on how the spillover effects, especially transnational ethnic ties and separatism, were taken into account in the process of intervening in Libya. I will focus on the period from 15 February 2011, as this is when the uprisings began, until 31 October 2011, as this is the day Operation Unified Protector officially ended. I will especially look at the African Union, as this is the most important actor facing the danger of spillover effects. This is because of the fact that all the countries in the Sahel region are members of the African Union and their interests are expressed by the African Union. In the period from 15 February until 31 October 2011, several African leaders within the African Union expressed their doubts about the intervention, as they feared spillover effects to the region.
Analysis
Uprising and Resolution 1970
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt served as the direct catalyst for mass demonstrations held in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. This turmoil soon spread throughout the rest of the country. Libya’s decent into violence provoked an unusually rapid and robust response from both regional organizations and the United Nations (Hehir, 2013: 4). On 22 February the Organization of Islamic Conference criticized Gaddafi’s tactics as having caused a humanitarian disaster incompatible with Islamic and human values. The Arab League even suspended Libya. The first discussion by the African Union (AU) on the Libyan crisis was at the Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting of 23 February. This meeting focused on the Libyan authorities’ repression of demonstrations and the threats that Gaddafi was making against the opposition. At this time, the severity of the situation was not clear and the threat not taken very seriously by the Council (De Waal, 2013: 65). The Council did bring out a statement, saying that the Peace and Security Council ‘. . . strongly condemns the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters’. Condemnatory statements were also issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. On 25 February the UN Human Rights Council convened a special session during which they
11 condemned the violence and called for Libya to be suspended (Hehir, 2013: 4). In his speech, Ban Ki-moon emphasized the possible implications for the region, stating that “the hours and days ahead will be decisive for Libyans and their country, with equally important implications for the wider region. The statements and actions of the Security Council are eagerly awaited and will be closely followed throughout the region” (Ban Ki-moon, 2011). On 26 February the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers and passed Resolution 1970. The Resolution referred the situation to the International Criminal Court and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze against the Libyan authorities. Given that significant protests had begun only eleven days earlier, Resolution 1970 was an unusually unified and rapid response (Hehir, 2013: 5).
Build up to Resolution 1973
After the passing of Resolution 1970, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom was quick to put a no-fly zone over Libya on the table as an alternative. On February 28, five days after President Sarkozy of France had made the same move, Cameron instructed the British Ministry of Defence to plan for a military no-fly zone. On March 1, US Secretary of State Clinton said nothing was off the table (FOI, 2012: 31). On March 3, President Obama of the United States said Gaddafi had lost legitimacy and should relinquish power (FOI, 2012: 42). On 8 March the Organization of the Islamic Conference released a statement supporting a no-fly zone over Libya but excluded foreign military operations on the ground. On 10 March the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) said the Qaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy. The GCC encouraged the Arab League to initiate contact with the Interim Council in Benghazi and call on the UN Security Council to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians. This followed a 7 March GCC statement supporting a no-fly zone and calling for accountability (Security Council Report, 2011a).
By the time of the next PSC meeting, on 10 March, the AU was taking the situation in Libya more seriously, as it had become clear that the uprising was turning into a civil war. The PSC meeting was held at the level of heads of state and proposed a high-level ad hoc committee made up of heads of state, anticipating that this would have the required clout and influence to facilitate a negotiated solution in Libya and rally the international community behind the AU’s efforts. The meeting was chaired by the Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The themes of the meeting included the need for a ceasefire, for humanitarian assistance and for an inclusive peace agreement combined with a democratic transition (De Waal, 2013: 65-66). The danger of spillover effects was also taken into account. In their statement, the council expressed their fears that the situation in Libya would not only pose a threat to security in Libya itself, but also to the region as a whole. They
12 feared for the safety of African migrant workers in Libya. Furthermore, the council recalled the Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. The Council stated that they would like to gather more information on the presence of mercenaries in Libya and their actions, so that action can be taken (African Union, 2011a). This focus on African migrant workers and mercenaries shows a focus on transnational ethnic ties. The most substantive element in the communiqué of the meeting is paragraph 7, which became known as the ‘road map’: “The current situation in Libya calls for an urgent African action for: (i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation of the competent Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and (iv) the adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis” (African Union, 2011a). Although Gaddafi leaving office was not explicitly mentioned, the road map was designed as a way for Gaddafi to step down in a time frame of months. The AU set up an Ad Hoc High Level Committee to pursue this road map. The first meeting of the Ad Hoc High Level committee was scheduled for the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott on 19 March, after which the members would fly to Libya (De Waal, 2013: 67).
Meanwhile, on 12 March, the Arab League issued a statement noting the Libyan authorities’ use of military aircraft, mortars and heavy weaponry against civilians and calling on the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone (Council of the League of Arab States, 2011). The US, France and Britain were also following a different track from the AU, and further driving UN policy. On 17 March, the UN Security Council met to consider the escalating crisis and especially the threat to Benghazi (De Waal, 2013: 67). Later that same day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 which sanctioned the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. The Resolution condemned ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights . . . committed by the Libyan authorities’ and warned that these acts may ‘amount to crimes against humanity’. The Security Council sanctioned ‘a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ and, most significantly, authorized states to ‘take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’. The Resolution was passed with ten states voting affirmatively while China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India abstained (Hehir, 2013: 6). The three African countries on the Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) all voted for Resolution 1973. The Resolution refers to the AU efforts in its preambular section, including calling for a ceasefire and noting the decision of the AU ‘to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution’ (De Waal, 2013: 67).
13 Implementation of Resolution 1973
However, the operative provisions of Resolution 1973 were different entirely. President Sarkozy of France had no patience for the AU and its diplomatic approach. He invited Ping, the chairperson of the African Union to Paris for the 19 March ‘Summit for the Support of the Libyan People’, even though this clashed with the AU’s previously scheduled meeting in Nouakchott. Ping later commented that he was surely right for not going, lending legitimacy to an agenda different from that of the AU. The Ad Hoc Committee met in Nouakchott on 19 March, hosted by President Aziz. Present were Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, Amadou Toumani Touré (‘ATT’) of Mali and ministers representing presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Jacob Zuma of South Africa. Mauritania provided a plane to fly to Tripoli the following day. However, 19 March 2011 was the day on which the no-fly zone came into effect. The Panel members received a message from the US and the UN saying that their security could not be guaranteed, should they proceed with their visit. The communiqué published at the end of the meeting reflected the disappointment of the participants for not having been able to travel to Libya for a peace mission (De Waal, 2013: 67-68).
On 25 March, consultations were held at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Representatives of the AU Peace and Security Council, a majority of UN Security Council members (including the five permanent members), the Arab League, the EU, the OIC, Libya’s neighboring countries and other parties attended. Also in attendance was a delegation from Tripoli. The Transitional National Council was invited but did not attend. A communiqué stressed the urgency of a ceasefire, political dialogue between the Libyan parties, the need to establish transitional mechanisms and continued international coordination on the Libyan crisis (Security Council Report, 2011b). During this meeting, emphasis was put on the danger of spillover effects. The meeting “recognized that the continuation and aggravation of the current crisis in Libya has serious implications for the neighboring countries and the other countries of the region, as well as for regional security and stability, in particular with regard to the illicit proliferation of arms, terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime. It registered the commitment of the AU to work with the countries of the region, in particular those of the sahelo saharan belt, relevant international organizations and interested partners to address, in a satisfactory manner, the problems at hand” (African Union, 2011b).
The African Union did not go to London for the 29 March meeting of Foreign Ministers and leaders from the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, the European Union and NATO. At that meeting, the Libya Contact Group was established. The AU was not included. The Contact Group
14 called for Gaddafi to relinquish power and expressed support for the TNC, with some of its members extending recognition to the TNC as the sovereign authority of Libya (De Waal, 2013: 68).
Meeting Gaddafi
The Ad Hoc Committee met again in Nouakchott on 9 April. This time, the UN gave permission to fly to Tripoli and they met with Gaddafi the following day. In the meeting, Gaddafi insisted that his country was victim of an aggression and that Africa should stand on his side. He rejected accusations that his army and security services had killed a large number of civilians. Instead he leveled accusations against the demonstrators in the east of Libya. Gaddafi opposed any visit to Benghazi by the High Level Ad Hoc Committee. In response, the Heads of State insisted that attacks against civilians had to stop. The Heads of State stated that Gaddafi had no choice but to negotiate with the TNC, and that any solution had to be based on the aspirations of the Libyan people to democracy and respect for human rights. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee also argued that Libya lacked the means to stand up to the international coalition and Gaddafi should therefore be realistic about its options. Finally, they told him that the delegation would continue to Benghazi whether he liked it or not: they were not seeking his authorization. Gaddafi accepted, in principle, the AU road map including the ceasefire and negotiations. The next day the AU leaders flew to Benghazi, where the TNC leadership rejected the plan. Mustafa Abdel Jalil announced that the road map was not acceptable because it did not include the immediate departure of Gaddafi (De Waal, 2013: 68).
Regime change?
Africa’s caution about the regime change project led by the TNC and NATO was dismissed and derided by most international commentators. On 10 April, BBC’s Will Ross wrote: “The African Union does not have a good reputation when it comes to solving crises . . . any intervention which does not involve the removal from power of Col Gaddafi will be seen by some as the AU saving the Libyan leader. It has often been accused of standing up for the incumbents and is criticized as being a club which serves the interests of the continent’s presidents more than the people. The situation is muddied by money. Col Gaddafi has bankrolled the AU for years and he has bought friends in Africa. South Africa and Uganda are on the AU panel. Col Gaddafi has previously supported both South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, and Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni before they came to power. Although neither country would admit this history influences their stance on Col Gaddafi, some may say it means they cannot be honest brokers in peace talks” (Ross, 2011). According to De Waal, these are misrepresentations and caricatures of the AU position (De Waal, 2013: 59).
15 The situation in Libya and the wish of achieving an early resolution of the crisis were an important theme for the Second Annual US-AU High Level meeting held in Washington, on 20 and 21 April. The AU delegation held consultations with several senior American officials, including Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. During those consultations, the United States acknowledged AU’s efforts to achieve a ceasefire, while reiterating the need for greater coordination within the international community. The US stressed that any ceasefire would require an immediate end to all attacks on civilians and the withdrawal of the Libyan Government forces from all cities they have forcibly entered into, occupied or besieged. From their point of view, such a ceasefire should also include Col. Gaddafi’s departure from power. On its part, the AU delegation highlighted the key components of the AU Road map for the Resolution of the crisis in Libya, namely: an immediate cessation of hostilities, the diligent delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, the protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrant workers, and an inclusive dialogue and a transitional period leading to political reforms. The AU stressed that the determination of the participants in such a process, as well as the issue of political leadership, are best left to the Libyans themselves (African Union, 2011c).
Beyond objectives
On 25 April the Ad Hoc Committee met with representatives of the Libyan government and the TNC in Addis Ababa. There was no breakthrough. The following day the PSC met to receive the report on the Committee’s efforts to date. This report and the following discussion raises important concerns regarding spillover effects: mercenaries recruited to fight in Libya, migrant workers in Libya, and the concerns of Saharan and Sahelian countries concerning arms proliferation, terrorism and transnational crime (African Union, 2011c). The report states that the prevailing situation, if not addressed swiftly and effectively, will have far reaching consequences for Libya and its neighbors, as well as for international peace and security. The council highlights the concerns of a number of countries, including those in the region, regarding the proliferation of arms taken from the Libyan arms depots, as well as reports according to which terrorist elements are taking advantage of the current developments to further their agenda in the region and beyond (African Union, 2011c: 10). Furthermore, the “Council states that it is crucial for their partners to take fully into account the primary role to be played by the AU, as Africa, particularly Libya’s neighbors, stand to be the continent that will be the most affected by the continuation and deterioration of the current situation” (African Union, 2011c: 12). The Council stresses that it is imperative that all countries and organizations involved in the implementation of resolution 1973 (2011) act in a manner strictly consistent with the provisions of that resolution. Actions going beyond the limits of that resolution or
16 convenient interpretation of its provisions will weaken international legality. Also, it will make it harder to achieve a lasting solution to the crisis(African Union, 2011c: 12).
At an Extraordinary Summit meeting a month later, on 25 May 2011, the AU called for an immediate pause in fighting, for ceasefire monitors, and for a Framework Agreement for Political Solution. The Chairperson’s report stated: “It is becoming increasingly clear that the pursuit of the military operations will not only undermine the very purpose for which resolutions 1970 and 1973 (2011) were adopted, i.e. the protection of civilians, but also compound any transition to democratic institutions, while adding to the threats facing the countries of the region in terms of security and terrorism and the socio-economic burden resulting from the repatriation of migrant workers. This is all the more urgent as the military campaign is significantly expanding beyond the objectives for which it was in the first place authorized, raising questions about the legality and legitimacy of some of the actions being carried out and the agenda being pursued” (African Union, 2011d). This is a reference to the major controversy surrounding NATO's prosecution of the campaign. The rebels proved to be unable to defend their positions and without NATO support they would have been overrun. To prevent this, and the killing of civilians that would allegedly follow, NATO’s strategy changed from the initial focus on debilitating the regime’s military bases and heavy weapons to a more expansive set of targets, including regime change. China, Russia and South Africa publicly criticized what they saw as NATO’s illegitimate interpretation of Resolution 1973. By the end of May, the mission was faltering as the rebel-held cities Misrata and Jebel Nafusa seemed about to fall, prompting France to unilaterally air-drop weapons to the rebels (Hehir, 2013: 5).
On 30 May, President Zuma of South-Africa flew to Tripoli to present the proposals, focusing on a ceasefire to be monitored by the AU, UN and Arab League, leading to a transitional period culminating in elections. The main question was whether Gaddafi would be ready to step down. The African leaders who had interacted with him in April were convinced that his commitment to the road map remained, including his promise not to be part of the transition. However, the meeting with Gaddafi was a disappointment. He restated his commitment to ‘not being part of the negotiation process’ (African Union, 2011e). The next day in Benghazi, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the TNC, again said that there was no possibility of talking to Gaddafi, who had irredeemably lost credibility and was just playing games (De Waal, 2013: 71). A week later, the chair of the AU Ad Hoc Committee, President Abdel Aziz, told AFP that Gaddafi ‘can no longer lead Libya. His departure has become necessary... He must be made to leave without causing more damage’ (AFP, 2011a). On 9
17 June the Libya Contact Group met in Abu Dhabi and they also reasserted that Gaddafi must leave power. They endorsed the TNC’s road map for political transition. Furthermore, they acknowledged AU efforts and looked forward to working with African states to reinforce the message that Gaddafi must go (Security Council Report, 2011c).
Negotiated solution
However, the AU pressed on, hoping that the way in which the war had apparently descended into stalemate would make both sides accept the need for a negotiated solution. The Ad Hoc Committee spelled out its plan for the transition at a meeting in Pretoria on 26 June. During this meeting, “the ad hoc Committee reiterates the call made by the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, for the stopping of NATO bombings and the observance of a humanitarian pause”. In addition, the Committee, once again, underlined the threats that the persistence of the current situation poses to peace and regional security. Furthermore, the High-Level ad hoc Committee “appeals to all Libyans to heed this call to allow Africans to continue to provide Africa-owned and Africa-led solutions to our problems” (African Union, 2011e).
In a Security Council meeting on 27 June, the representative of South-Africa stated that despite the military action, the situation has deteriorated. Furthermore, he stated South-Africa from the beginning has stressed the importance of a political solution and not a military one. The intention was never regime change; nor was it the targeting of individuals. He states that the African Union is central to any solution in Libya and will continue its efforts towards finding a political solution to the crisis there (Security Council, 2011a). However, international actions were heading in the opposite direction. Also on 27 June, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), requested arrest warrants for Colonel Gaddafi, his son Saif al Islam and Abdalla al Sanussi, head of military intelligence. The arrest warrants threatened to close the door on any solution that involved Gaddafi going quietly into exile. On the six-monthly Summit of the AU in Malabo in July, it was resolved that Africa would not cooperate with the ICC warrants, a decision that was derided by the international press as evidence for the AU’s preference for siding with rich dictators. This publicity overshadowed the fact that African leaders overwhelmingly preferred for Gaddafi to relinquish power, and indeed Gaddafi soon afterwards began intimating that he might indeed talk to France and the TNC on that basis (AFP, 2011b) (De Waal, 2013: 71-72).
In the seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Malabo on 30 June and 1 July 2011, the AU came up with proposals for a
18 framework agreement on a political solution to the crisis in Libya. The following is stated: “As the conflict in Libya enters its sixth month, with the attendant consequences for the civilian population, as well as for long-term security and stability in that country and in the region as a whole, it is critical that we step up our efforts to encourage the Libyan parties to seek a political solution. It is our conviction that the proposals endorsed in Malabo offer a viable basis for bringing the current conflict to an end, ensuring the effective protection of the civilian population and ushering in a political process that will make it possible to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people for democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights” (Security Council, 2011b).
The summit was followed by a meeting in Addis Ababa on 19 July to address the steps required for a ceasefire and a transition. The Libyan government came to Addis Ababa for the meeting but the TNC did not. In a meeting of the Security Council on 28 July, the representative of South-Africa brings up the road map again. He reiterates that South-Africa has noted the calls for Gaddafi to go, but they believe that this will not bring a political solution any closer. The political process must be Libyan-led and owned. Furthermore, he states that “taking sides in any internal conflict situation in an effort to institute regime change in Libya sets a dangerous precedent that will surely damage the credibility of the Council and its resolutions. We have also noted the call encouraging the unfreezing of Libyan assets. Unfreezing assets to support one side of the conflict would, in our view, be in violation of the sanctions regime and further complicate the situation” (Security Council, 2011c).
Towards the end
On 8 August the Libya Sanctions Committee received a request from the US seeking the release to the TNC of 1.5 billion USD for humanitarian needs. South Africa put a hold on the decision (sanctions committees operate by consensus) as it was concerned that unfreezing the funds would be interpreted as recognition of the TNC. It also wanted to wait for the AU Peace and Security Council Heads of State and Government-level meeting on 26 August before making a decision. However, on 24 August the US circulated a draft resolution that would be subject to a Council vote and therefore not be affected by South Africa’s objection. Following consultations an agreement was reached to refer to “relevant authorities” rather than the TNC and a decision to allow for release of the funds was reached at committee level on 25 August (Security Council Report, 2011d).
In the meantime, on 21 August, TNC fighters entered Tripoli and the war swung decisively in their favor. Several African governments, such as those of Nigeria and Ethiopia, recognized the TNC in the
19 following days, and called for the AU to do the same. After this, the AU’s diplomatic efforts were at best remedial, reiterating its proposal for a national dialogue and an all-inclusive transitional government. The TNC was irritated by the AU’s reluctance to recognize it as the legitimate authority in Libya. Even after the President of the AU, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, stated that the ‘AU recognizes the TNC as the representatives of the Libyan people as they form an inclusive transitional government’ at the UN General Assembly in New York in September it took a further month for the AU to decide that, ‘taking into account the uniqueness of the situation in Libya and the exceptional circumstances surrounding it, and without prejudice to the relevant AU instruments, to authorize the current authorities in Libya to occupy the seat of Libya in the AU and its organs’. This happened on 20 October, the day Gaddafi died (African Union, 2011f) (De Waal, 2013: 73). Operation Unified Protector officially ended on 31 October: Colonel Gaddafi was dead and the National Transitional Council was in power (Hehir, 2013: 6).
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have looked at how spillover effects to the Sahel region were taken into consideration in the process of intervening in Libya. My research question is: how were the regional spillover effects taken into account in the process of intervening in Libya? I have focused on the period from 15 February 2011, as this is when the uprisings began, until 31 October 2011, as this is the day Operation Unified Protector officially ended.
I have developed my argument as follows. First, I have looked at the theory on spillover effects. Buhaug and Gleditsch find that of the seven factors they have researched, transnational ethnic ties is the only factor that serves as an important catalyst of contagion. Furthermore, Terrill also suggest that separatism and sectarian discord in neighboring countries should be the main focal point when studying spillover effects. Therefore, when studying the spillover effects of the conflict in Libya to the Sahel region, I have focused on transnational ethnic ties, separatism and sectarian discord.
In this section I have also established the spillover effects of the conflict in Libya to the Sahel region. There were spillover effects to Sudan, Mali, Niger and Chad. There were a lot of migrants from these countries in Libya. As the wealthiest country in the region, Libya was a popular destination for migrants looking for a job. Furthermore, during his reign Gaddafi recruited Saharan nomads and sub-Saharan migrants, several thousand of whom were moulded into an ‘Islamic Legion’ and others who became fractions of the diverse Libyan military apparatus. The collapse of Qaddafi’s regime and the
20 subsequent breakdown of the state order all across Libya put an end to this alliance. These groups went back to their home countries, bringing weapons from Gaddafi’s arsenal with them, spurring separatist threats. The factors deemed most important for spillover effects according to the literature, transnational ethnic ties and separatism, are thus very prominent in the spillover effects from Libya to the Sahel region.
Second, I have argued that there is a disjuncture between the literature on spillover effects and the literature on interventions. Theory on spillover effects from conflicts does not pay attention to interventions. It deals with the spillover effects of conflict. However, how these spillover effects could be reduced or prevented by an intervention is not discussed. Vice versa, theory on interventions does not pay attention to spillover effects. I argue that this reinforces the danger of paying too little attention to spillover effects when intervening, as there is no such thing as a ‘road map’ for dealing with spillover effects when intervening.
Third, I have looked at the process of intervening in Libya, to see how the spillover effects, and especially transnational ethnic ties and separatism, were taken into account. I have especially looked at the African Union, as this is the most important actor facing the danger of spillover effects. This is because of the fact that all the countries in the Sahel region are members of the African Union. Therefore, their interests are expressed by the African Union. In the period from 15 February until 31 October 2011, several African leaders within the African Union expressed their doubts about the intervention, as they feared spillover effects to the region. This became clear by analyzing official documents by the African Union and Security Council. Members of the African Union have brought up the danger of spillover effects on several occasions. From their statements, it is clear that they understand the danger of transnational ethnic ties and separatism. In trying to avoid these spillover effects, they put strong emphasis on the need for a political solution, instead of a military one. In trying to impose a political solution, they came up with a road map. Furthermore, they negotiated with Gaddafi on several occasions. However, other international actors, such as France and the United States, were trying to achieve regime change and focused mainly on the military aspect of the intervention. In conclusion, the spillover effects were taken into consideration in the process of intervening, that is by the African Union. However, the African Union was overshadowed by the actors leading the intervention. These actors did not pay much attention to the danger of spillover effects. Unfortunately, spillover effects to the Sahel region, due to transnational ethnic ties and separatism, were not prevented.
21 A recommendation for further research would be for theorists writing about spillover effects to pay more attention to the subject of interventions. Vice versa, theorists writing about intervention could pay more attention to spillover effects. Hopefully, this will lead to more attention for spillover effects when intervening.
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