Master Thesis
The exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva III peace
talks on Syria
Causes and Consequences
Lisa Gotoh
Student number: 10118330 Universiteit van Amsterdam
Master: Politicologie
Track: Internationale Betrekkingen Supervisor: Said Rezaeiejan
Second reader: Liza Mügge Date: June 24, 2016
2
TABLE OF CONTENT
Table of Content ... 2 List of Abbreviations ... 4 Abstract ... 5 1 Introduction ... 62 Academic and Societal Relevance ... 8
3 Theoretical Framework ... 10
3.1 Conflict Resolution and the Hourglass Model ... 11
3.2 Ohlson’s Causes of War and Peace ... 14
3.3 Mutually Hurting Stalemate ... 15
3.4 Mutually Enticing Opportunities ... 17
3.4.1 Commitment Problems and the Security Dilemma ... 18
3.4.2 Form of Government ... 19
3.4.3 Fragile Environment: Violence During Peace Processes ... 21
3.5 Actors ... 23
3.5.1 Primary Parties ... 23
3.5.2 Third-Party Involvement in Peacebuilding ... 24
3.5.3 State Support and Diaspora Support ... 25
3.6 Diplomacy ... 26 3.6.1 Negotiation ... 27 3.6.2 Timing ... 27 3.7 Concluding ... 30 4 Methodology ... 31 4.1 Process Tracing ... 31
4.2 Data and Variables ... 32
4.3 Actors ... 34
5 Analysis ... 36
5.1 Part 1: Status of Kurds in Syria: From Repression to Autonomy ... 36
5.2 Part 2: Actors, Interests, Relationships ... 39
5.2.1 PYD ... 39
5.2.2 High Negotiations Committee ... 44
3
5.2.4 Turkey ... 50
5.2.5 The United States ... 54
5.2.6 Russia ... 58
5.3 Part 3: Exclusion of the PYD (consequences) ... 61
6 Conclusion ... 63 7 Discussion ... 67 Bibliography ... 69 Primary sources ... 69 Secondary sources ... 73 Appendix I ... 76 Appendix II ... 81
4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
FSA – Free Syrian Army
HNC – High Negotiations Committee (Syrian Opposition)
IS – Islamic State also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh
ISSG – International Syria Support Group
KNC – Kurdish National Council
MEO – Mutually Enticing Opportunities
MHS – Mutually Hurting Stalemate
PKK – Kurdish Worker’s Party
PYD – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat also known as the Democratic Union Party
SDC – Syrian Democratic Council
SNC – Syrian National Coalition formerly known as Syrian National Council
5
ABSTRACT
How come the political party of Syrian Kurds that has received significant outside support from diaspora as well as states is excluded from the Geneva peace talks organised by the United Nations in February 2016? This thesis addresses this question departing from conflict resolution theory. Through qualitative process-tracing, causes of the exclusion of the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) are analysed. The analysis is divided into three parts: 1) the changing status of Kurds in Syria; 2) actor analysis of the six most relevant parties (PYD, High Negotiations Committee, Syrian government, Turkey, United States and Russia); 3) the consequences of excluding the PYD. Russia, the U.S. and Turkey play a significant role in the conflict. The continuous support of these three states to the combatting parties is resulting in escalation of war instead of promoting peace. Despite of Russian and American support to the PYD, Turkey managed to exclude the party from the peace talks. Reflecting on the literature of conflict resolution theory, the current setting for peace talks does not provide an fortunate setting in order to come to a sustainable peace agreement.
We find that outside support plays a significant role in the possibilities for peace negotiations. In the virtue of this, in order to start a successful peace process it is more important for the key suppliers of resources to perceive a stalemate and negotiations as a better way out than for the belligerents, in contrast to what the literature suggests. In addition, the literature seems to focus too much on the role of one third-party while this case shows there is no one third-party which can influence the conflict dynamics in such way
guaranteeing a proper conduct of conflict resolution. Rather, in an internationalized civil war, diplomatic pressures to shift the focus to conflict resolution should be put on outside
supporters providing resources to continue fighting. This case is especially complex due to the presence of at least three conflicts within the Syrian war and key parties all setting their priority on a different part of the conflict.
6
1 INTRODUCTION
Syria’s civil war began in 2011 when government forces responded with violence to non-violent civilian protests. Soon the conflict escalated and resulted in the rise of armed rebel groups. In an already instable region and without the national army nor opposition forces making major advances, the beginning of 2014 showed the rise of terrorist group Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria followed by the proclamation of the new Caliphate in June 2014 by Abu Bakr al Baghadadi. The United Nations responded with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014) which led to the formation of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, further referred to as IS). Sixty coalition partners reaffirmed their commitment in fighting and defeating IS (U.S. Department of State, 2014).
In the midst of the chaos little attention was given to the declaration of a de facto autonomy in November 2013 in northern Syria by a Syrian Kurdish group called the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat also known as the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The national Syrian army had withdrawn from the Kurdish populated North in July 2012 which opened the window for the long repressed largest ethnic minority in Syria to mobilize, organize and gain control over significant territory. Following the ideology and political strategy close to PKK leader Adbullah Öcalan’s philosophy, the group started building institutions (Federici, 2015). The YPG, the military branch of the PYD, is fighting IS most successfully on the ground in North-East Syria which has led to legitimacy and support from several actors including the U.S., Russia and factions of the Free Syrian Army (Banco, 2014). This support instigated a continuing discussion between NATO-partners Turkey, who perceive the PYD as a terrorist organization, and the U.S. who perceive them as a partner fighting a common enemy. Turkey has been a key backer of the Syrian opposition since the beginning of the civil war. The expansion of the PYD on its border has engaged Turkey into the conflict mainly fighting Kurds on its border with Syria.
Simultaneously, Russia has engaged militarily since October 2015 after the Syrian government requested support. Russia claimed cooperating in the air campaign against IS but hits in the provinces of Idlib and Hama controlled by U.S.-backed rebels suggest they have another agenda. Russia has also supported the PYD politically by opening a representative office for them in Moscow and militarily through aviation support in Syria (Ekurd Daily, 2016). Iran provides military and financial support to the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates support the Syrian opposition and have expressed their
7 preparedness to participate in the U.S.-led coalition and send ground troops to Syria with a chance of running into Iranian military and expanding the conflict over the region. Tensions have been rising between Saudia Arabia and Iran after the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr in Riyadh in January 2016 (Krever, 2016). France and the United Kingdom have also started an air campaign in November and December 2015 respectively, mainly targeting IS’ de facto capital Raqqa (BBC, 2015).
This brief summary of events shows the civil war in Syria has intensified and internationalized over the years. At the same time efforts have been made to initiate a
dialogue between the warring parties and analyse possibilities for conflict resolution. In June 2012 the Geneva I Conference on Syria was initiated by the UN peace envoy to Syria at that time Kofi Annan. Representatives from eight countries, the Arab League and the EU agreed that a transitional government body was needed including members of the present Syrian government and the opposition to end the war. However there was disagreement about the inclusion of President Bashar al-Assad mainly between Russia and the U.S.. During the conference key steps were outlined for the process to end violence in the Geneva communiqué (UN, 2012).
The Geneva II conference followed with the aim to bring together two delegations representing the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition to discuss the implementation of the Geneva communiqué (UN, 2013). After protracted discussions on which parties should be included and on which terms, the conference was finally held on January 22, 2014 in Montreux, Switzerland. The question of keeping President Assad in the transitional government was again the main topic of disagreement which led to the deferment of the peace negotiations after the second round in February 2014 (the Guardian, 2014). On November 14th 2015 the Arab League, the European Union (EU), the United Nations, and 17 countries held its first meeting as the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and “… agreed to support and work to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria to come into effect as soon as the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition have begun initial steps towards the transition under UN auspices on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué.” (UN, 2015i). In December 2015, the High Negotiations Committee was formed, a coalition of Syrian opposition groups to engage in peace talks with the Syrian government. On February 1 2016 formal talks officially started and on February 27 a
‘nationwide cessation of hostilities’ was established with the primary purpose of opening the roads for humanitarian aid. While progress has been made, the fighting continues and talks
8 are held in a fragile environment influenced by several actors affecting the course of action. This thesis will analyse the current peace process, the parties involved and excluded, their interests and possible outcomes/consequences for continuing the peace process in the current course. We will look specifically into the role of the PYD, their exclusion in the peace talks and the outside support they receive. This is a significant party in the conflict since the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Syria and this party has been excluded so far from negotiations while they have been ruling over a de facto autonomous area in northern Syria and continue to expand their controlled territory. Additionally, they are being supported by two major powers, the United States and Russia. We will look into the relationships of the most important parties that may influence the peace process and their relationship with the PYD and what consequences these might have for the peace talks. The central research question is: How was it decided to exclude the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) in the Geneva III peace talks on the Syrian Arab Republic and what are the consequences for excluding the party?
The outline of this thesis is as follows. First, the academic and societal relevance of the topic is discussed followed by the theoretical framework for the analysis. This thesis will offer a broad analysis of the key parties involved in the peace talks and their relationships and interests vis-a-vis the Syrian civil war. The analysis will be done through a qualitative
approach both through literature review and process-tracing, a common methodology in political science research to understand the causal mechanisms of specific events. A short summary of the history of Kurds in Syria will be given as background knowledge to understand the rise of the PYD. The analysis will then start by discussing every relevant actor, its role in the Syrian peace process and its relation with the PYD. Six actors will be subject to analysis: the PYD; the High Negotiations Committee; the Syrian government; Turkey; the United States; and Russia. We will closely look at the context and events since January 2016 when the peace talks were set up which started in February without the PYD. After having the overview of the actors and their position we will discuss the consequences of the exclusion of the PYD by looking at their behaviour since the start of the talks.
2 ACADEMIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
Academic relevance is first of all found in the continuous need for reassessment of conflict resolution theories due to the uniqueness of violent conflicts. “[W]hile the specific instances of social conflict change so rapidly, the attempt to capture the essence of the process for
9 academic discourse is a necessity for the sake of future generations.” (Korzenny & Ryan, 1990:9). However complex conflict dynamics are, it is necessary to keep on studying them in order to understand positive and negative ways to handle them which contribute to
knowledge for international security and peace.
Hayes (2012) argues that the research on democratic peace has been dominated in quantitative studies and therefore created a lacuna in understanding the underlying
mechanism of the concept. He calls for more research dedicated to the understanding of how the observed peace is generated and calls this field democratic security (2012:768). Until the past decade most studies focused on demonstrating the existence and focus on democratic structures of the concept. Through case studies democratic peace can be studied focusing on the understanding of what it is that makes this polity form peaceful and how it can be
implemented in a variety of ways such as power-sharing, depending on what form best fits to the needs of a society.
In addition, theories on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and negotiations have with few exceptions focused much on two parties, the government and a rebel group. However often and especially in contemporary civil wars there are multiple parties engaged in conflict. As will become clear in this analysis, multiple parties impact negotiations and the
possibilities for conflict resolution. Another aspect that needs more attention in the field of peacebuilding is the role of spoilers as there is still no consensus on the effect of exclusion of actors in negotiations. This study will analyse these dynamics by looking at a big insurgent movements involved in the Syrian conflict but excluded from the peace talks and its relation to other relevant parties.
As the theoretical framework will show, peacebuilding is a relatively new phenomena that has been exercised extensively by the UN since the end of the Cold War. As over two decades have passed the literature is evolving, creating a better understanding of how the international community can best respond when intervening or mediating in civil wars for conflict resolution (Menocal, 2014; Stedman, 1997; Ohlson, 2008; Walter, 1999 and many more). The key question however is how often these studies are used in practice and what the relationship is between actual diplomacy and peacebuilding theory. As a result this research will also have an inductive component to deviate from standard conflict resolution theory and see what empirical evidence there is confirming and deviating from the theories. A
constructivist and realist perspective to peace negotiations are presented in the theoretical framework in order to analyse which perspective may form a better explanation for the
10 current dynamics in the Syrian peace process.
The Syrian case is relevant for several reasons. It is a civil war that is continuing for over five years and has become internationalized. IS has expanded its operations over several nations and created a spillover effect which has reached Europe, the Brussels bombing in March 2016 being the most recent one. On top of that, there is a refugee crisis which is alarming the European Union and calls the international community to act immediately to relieve people from inhumane circumstances and the only way to stop the refugee flow is by solving the problem at the core which is the conflict in Syria.
Apart from this significance, the role of the PYD is interesting within the case since the Kurdish people in Syria have been repressed for decades by the al-Assad regime. Since the outbreak of the civil war many analyses have focused on the ethnic conflict between Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs, paying little attention to the Kurds in the region. The Syrian conflict has opened up the opportunity for Syrian Kurds to mobilize and organize themselves successfully. At this stage it is important for the international community to carefully assess which parties and concerns are legitimate and should be listened to as this will inevitably influence the prospects for sustainable peace in Syria. In addition, the PYD has so far made some interesting allies varying from the government, other opposition parties to states. The question is whether they will get the support needed to secure a spot in the negotiations on future Syrian governance and what consequences the current course of action has for conflict resolution.
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
“Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. But the way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices.” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:13)
This theoretical framework will begin with a brief discussion on the grounds of conflict resolution theory. We will focus on the stage of war limitation, peacekeeping and peace-making that are relevant for the Syrian case. Departing from Ohlson’s framework on understanding causes of war and peace, the current stage and its possibilities and obstacles will be discussed. Subsequently, three main problems are outlined which arise during these
11 stages. These are a) commitment problems; b) deciding on the form of government; and c) peace-making in a fragile environment. The latter part will also discuss consequences of excluding parties and how they can affect the peace negotiations. Next, outside support from states and diaspora to insurgent movements and its effect on conflict is discussed. The theoretical framework will then move on to theories on diplomacy in peace negotiations shedding light on a more realist perspective. This will form a counter-argument to the
previously discussed theories as it will argue for the importance of priorities, power and trust relationships and interests in practice which theories of peacebuilding often neglect or emphasize too little. From this framework the analysis will be done to study and understand the causal mechanism of why the PYD was excluded from the Geneva III peace talks on Syria. The theoretical framework will be used to understand the behaviour of the involved parties and its consequences for the Syrian peace process. The peace process in this thesis refers to the Geneva III Intra-Syrian Talks which have started on February 1, 2016 by the United Nations to come to a political solution for the Syrian civil war.
3.1 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE HOURGLASS MODEL
The academic field of conflict resolution was established in the late 1960s with the work of John Galtung (1969) who proposed a model of conflict analysis that both encompassed symmetric and asymmetric conflict. He perceived conflict as an actual or perceived
incompatibility of goals between conflicting parties generated by a difference of social values and structure. A symmetric conflict has a contradiction defined by a clash of interests
between the conflicting parties of relative equal status, while an asymmetric conflict derives from the very structure of the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other, their relationship and the conflict of interest inherent in the relationship. Attitudes are influenced by these conflicts through emotions such as fear and anger, and behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and attacks. Conflict is a dynamic process in which these three components, structure, attitudes and behaviour continuously influence one another. Conflict intensifies when conflicting parties start to organize around the structure developing hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. Subsequently, intensification of the process may draw in other parties or generate secondary conflicts within the initial conflicting parties, drawing focus of the core conflict. Eventually for sustainable conflict resolution to succeed, a change in attitude, de-escalation of conflict behaviour and transformation of relationship and conflicting interests need to be addressed (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). The hourglass model shows the escalation
12 and de-escalation phases of conflict resolution responses (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999).
The model shows the political space which narrows and widens as conflict dynamics change leading to different conflict resolution responses. Conflict containment refers to war limitation, post-ceasefire peacekeeping and confidence building and security enhancing measures. Conflict settlement includes negotiations and mediation among protagonists also referred to as elite peace-making discussing constitutional reform, and conflict transformation involves the deepest level of cultural and structural peacebuilding with the purpose of
reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). It is important to remember that in reality “[t]o some, the ultimate goal or result is conflict transformation, meaning that the conflict issue, the incompatibility, is eliminated. More often, the parties agree to place the conflict within bounds, that is, they find a way to manage or regulate the conflict without resorting to violence over an issue that will remain in some form.” (Ohlson, 2008:145).
13 (Hourglass model by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999).
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:24)
Table 1.1 shows an overview of the conflict phases and the strategic responses with examples of tactical responses.
The asymmetric nature of the conflict in Syria already rules out some of the classical conflict resolution theory that focus on conflict of interests between relatively similar parties. The only way to resolve an asymmetric conflict is through structural changes which is always in the interest of the underdog and never in the interest of the top dog who is in our case
14 Bashar al-Assad and his regime. As a structural conflict calls for structural change “it may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict.’’
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005:21). A severe asymmetric conflict can open up the possibilities for conflict resolution when the costs of the relationship becomes unbearable for all parties. Third parties play a key role in this type of conflict to assist transformation from an unbalanced relationship to a peaceful one (Ramsbotham et al., 2005).
We will focus on the War, Ceasefire and Agreement stage of conflict as these are relevant to the Syrian case and move into theories focused on these stages. Thomas Ohlson’s (2008) framework is used in which many theories fit. Within this framework we will mainly focus on the de-escalation, negotiation and mediation stage.
3.2 OHLSON’S CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE
Thomas Ohlson (2008) provides a framework relating theories on the causes of war and theories on conflict resolution. To study the outbreak of violent conflict he suggests a triple R triangle composed of Reasons, Resources and Resolve. These three clusters interact with each other and influence conflict attitudes and behaviour. Reasons arise from background
conditions, usually bound on an asymmetric character of structural dynamics of the
international system leading to weak state structure and low capabilities of governments to provide public goods. These conditions provide reasons for conflict and generate inequality on the political, economic and identity level and create a legitimacy gap. A legitimacy gap is the difference between citizens and their expectation from the state i.e. vertical legitimacy, as well as the difference between mutual acceptance and tolerance of elite and mass levels i.e. horizontal legitimacy (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1993).
Resources are also essential to the causes of armed conflict, more specifically the military and organizational capabilities and opportunity structure such as a sudden political instability, a supply offered by foreign support e.g. money, weapons, training but also fixed structures such as jungle familiarity to the parties are important resources (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978). Important to note here is the role of greed which can
sometimes explain the continuation of armed conflict due to opportunities for looting and groups profiting from the war (Ohlson, 2008). Finally, resolve is the concept in the last stage to the outbreak of conflict in which groups make a cost-benefit analysis and consider
alternatives. It is “... essentially, a black-boxed process, an aggregated cognitive concept that refers to the degree of collective mobilized mental readiness for and willingness to use
15 resources for a particular reason to achieve a particular goal.” (Ohlson, 2008:141). We will now look into the causes of peace i.e. opportunities for peacebuilding and how they relate to the triple R triangle.
Ohlson proposes three phases to conflict resolution: Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEO) and Mutually Obtained Rewards (MOR). We will explicitly outline the first two stages as these are relevant to our case study. MOR is the final phase in which the new relationship between the elites and the people are consolidated and normalized. Mutual rewards can help this process by for instance improving political participation and access to political influence and improving civil security and the rule of law (2008:151). This stage is not relevant to our case.
3.3 MUTUALLY HURTING STALEMATE
The conflict resolution process starts with the dialogue phase in which negative pressures come out of the conflict process usually related to uncertainty about victory and rising costs or constraints in resources to continue the war. The parties come in a situation where they perceive a deadlock derived from the escalation of the conflict without one party having the winning hand or prospects of a catastrophe which is perceived too costly for both parties to continue fighting, i.e. a Mutually Hurting Stalemate. This phase is important because
“[p]arties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so - when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.” (Zartman, 2001:8). Simultaneously, Zartman notes that ripe moments have to be recognized and worked with creatively since there is rarely ever a perfectly ripe time for conflict resolution.
Jeong argues that attempts can always be made to change the current status of the conflict, but there is a risk of losing face if a peace attempt fails. Nevertheless, it is important to focus on creating better circumstances in which new offers can be made rather than
waiting for a natural opportunity to arise. The focus in such occasions should be on tension reduction measures to prevent the institutionalization of hostilities and create space for de-escalation (2008:193).
Another way to describe the MHS and to look for ‘ripe’ moments is by looking at the life cycle of asymmetric conflicts which implies that conflict between equal or highly
unequal powers have reduced likelihood of escalation or failure to de-escalate while moderate inequality of power increases escalation (Pruitt, 2005).
16 “Impact of asymmetry in power on the likelihood of escalation or failure to de-escalate” (Pruitt, 2005:24)
There are two explanations for this conflict spiral. With a moderate inequality in power, the stronger party insists on having the negotiations his way while the weaker party is not that impressed and will try to overwhelm the opponent by attacking. In addition, the weaker party rather acts upon his emotions which he would not dare in the high inequality case. In the escalation phase, something happens that affects the disadvantaged group(s) which increases their power and changes their perception of success. Something clearly reflected in the demonstrations that spilled over during the Arab Spring when many people started protesting due to a shift in the belief to change circumstances. Initial escalation usually begins with non-violent demonstrations and when these acts are put down non-violently the non-violent conflict is likely to break out. De-escalation is likely when either one side gets the upper hand and ends the conflict in victory or when protagonists perceive their power to be equal and perceive a MHS and start negotiating, which also relates to the balance-of-power theory, that parties of equal capabilities are unlikely to engage in violent conflict in this case, unlikely to continue fighting (Pruitt, 2005).
Blainey (1998) enhances the argument of perception as he argues that the main influence which can lead to the breakdown of diplomacy is a contradictory sense of
bargaining power. The key factor which made enemies reluctant to continue fighting and or persuade to negotiate in the first place is the agreement about their relative bargaining position. Thus it is not the actual distribution or balance of power which is vital, it is rather the way in which leaders think that power is distributed. According to Blainey, war is a dispute about the measurement of power. A diplomatic crisis is personal and emotional. This
17 can for example lead to an actor refusing to believe that it is weaker. When each side believes that it will win the war the appeal to war is greater. Blainey mentions seven main factors that influence nations in assessing their relative strength: 1) Military strength; 2) Predictions of how outside nations would behave in war; 3) Perceptions of internal unity and unity of enemy; 4) Memory of forgetfulness of the realities/suffering of war; 5) The ability to sustain the war economically as envisaged; 6) Nationalism and ideology; 7) Personalities and mental qualities of leaders who decide peace or war. Each of these factors can either promote peace or war and can lead to a disagreement of relative strength.
In this first phase to conflict resolution a behavioural change takes place often characterized by power politics, force, coercion and fear, hence not voluntary. A stalemate can be recognized through several events such as external military pressure or a change in leadership, however most often it is non-military pressure such as diplomatic actions or sanctions as well as a combination of both that produce ripeness (Ohlson, 2008). This reflects the role of the international players producing pressure for de-escalation of a conflict. The most important part in this phase for the parties to start and stay in negotiations is a perceived way out: a believe that a mutually acceptable agreement is possible through negotiation (Pruitt & Kim, 2009). The MHS however does not address conflict attitudes which means that if an agreement is reached, the negative pressures must be complemented by constructive incentives which should emerge during the negotiation and/or mediation process (Ohlson, 2008). Thus the process starts with awareness of disincentives to continue fighting for both parties which may then lead to a cease-fire and initial peace talks. The MHS mainly addresses resources of the triple R-triangle, because ripeness is produced often due to a lack of
resources and reduced opportunities to victory. However, this phase is never enough to keep the peace.
3.4 MUTUALLY ENTICING OPPORTUNITIES
Constructive incentives are part of the second phase where Mutually Enticing Opportunities are explored. This is the stage in which third parties play a key role. Especially in war-torn societies, parties rely on external assistance in most stages of the conflict resolution process meaning that these third parties can “... have a number of political, economic and military ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ at their disposal.” (Ohlson, 2008:147). We will further discuss the role of third parties in a later section.
18 Wallensteen (1994), the components of a peace agreement are often similar, falling into two categories. One is military to regulate and terminate the armed violence e.g. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, while the other is political, aimed at regulating the distribution of power e.g. constitutional changes (cited by Ohlson, 2008). As mentioned before stopping the fighting is not enough, the parties need positive incentives to keep the peace during the implementation period. MEO’s are selective incentives which can come in different forms and combinations such as a power-sharing agreement, immediate material benefits or the opportunity to gain power with legitimate means. During this phase the commitment to the agreement by the parties should be affirmed by concrete action. The horizontal relationship between the party elites are central to this phase. The elites are concerned about security, political power, recognition of identity or economic well-being, also called the fears of peace which can be expressed in security dilemmas,
commitment problems or misperceptions. These might also influence the dynamics within a party where disagreement arises on the negotiated compromise. MEO’s help change the conflict attitude and change the perceptions of the parties about themselves, each other and the issues. The MEO’s mainly deal with reasons by addressing grievances and constructing joint objectives and therefore complement the negative pressures from the MHS by making the temporary change of behaviour more structured and insured. However, for parties to successfully start the MEO phase, they have to overcome three problems: 1) they have to deal with mutual insecurity; 2) they must implement the political mechanisms for future
distribution of power and; 3) implementation takes place in a fragile environment full of challenges and threats that can lead them back to violence (Ohlson, 2008:149). Possible solutions to these problems will be discussed in chronological order.
3.4.1 COMMITMENT PROBLEMS AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA The first problem, distrust between the parties, could be addressed by constructing the negotiated agreement around credible guarantees and offering third party security guarantee. Barbara Walter studied the failure of civil war negotiations between 1940 and 1990 and concluded that it is not the incompatibility of underlying issues and resolving them but the lack of “designing credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement” that leads to failure of negotiations (1999:129). The role of third parties is crucial in overcoming the commitment problem because negotiations in civil wars need to address consolidation of the belligerents unless a partition is the outcome. To successfully implement the negotiated settlement the
19 warring parties need to demilitarize and demobilize at some point and hand over power to the administration agreed upon. A civil war causes an internal security dilemma in which actors are rapidly guided by the logic of a preemptive strike i.e. ‘I believe you will attack so I better attack first’ (Wallensteen, 2011). This offers opportunities for post-treaty exploitation such as a surprise attack after disarmament or one party taking over governance. This position of not being able to defend oneself and not having a central authority to rely on drastically
complicates prospects for cooperation (Walter, 1999).
The peace treaty therefore should be designed addressing the security dilemma and committing the parties to the terms by implementing guarantees on obtaining the benefits of long-term peace. All parties could disarm step-by-step giving neither side a relative
advantage. However two problems remain, monitoring is extremely difficult and reciprocal implementation strategies ensure only that neither side get the advantage but cannot
guarantee arms, soldiers, resources to be held back for future offensive. Then, there are costly and credible signals such as unilateral disarmament which may be convincing but often not favoured by any party. Moreover parties can always hide information - therefore
demobilizing leaves parties vulnerable while refusing triggers the security dilemma which needs to be avoided. “Ultimately … the warring parties cannot credibly commit to the safe consolidation of their forces by themselves.” (Walter, 1999:137). A third party is needed to help enforce or verify this stage. When parties start to build up trust again and negotiations can move on they need to agree on a new political mechanism for future governance which also gives rise to commitment problems.
3.4.2 FORM OF GOVERNMENT
There is little consensus on this matter as no particular type of governmental system has proven to be significantly favourable to peace on the short term. There is however empirical support that majoritarian democracy is ill-advised in war-torn divided societies which clearly presented itself in Iraq after the invasion by the U.S. in 2003 as diplomat Ghassan Salamé put it in an interview: “[Paul] Bremer came with this large strategy of Tabula Rasa. That anything that exists should disappear and we should rebuild a new Iraq as soon as possible. That was sort of the obsession with some neoconservatists in America with the German and Japanese model of 1945, that you go there, you throw everything and start rebuilding.” (Ghassan Salamé, 2016). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that combatants are much more likely to sign an agreement if it reduces uncertainty by the inclusion of guaranteed positions in the
20 future government (Jarstad, 2008:106)
More conceivable is decentralization and various forms of power-sharing because the more parties get included in the implementation process, the smaller incentives are for them to become spoilers. In addition agreeing on a political system in which parties can live with if they lose by it, significantly reduces the risk of conflict recurrence on the short term (Ohslon, 2008:182). Regarding the security issues, a settlement must be reached on political terms and parties need to agree on a new central government. Here another commitment problem arises as parties know that tolerating the other in government or elections will be costly since they will pursue competing policies. The belligerents need to convince each other of not taking over power once their party is elected and gets control over instruments of government (Walter, 1999:138).
According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, it is expected that great instability will be present in countries with a wide variety of subcultures through mutually reinforcing differences. The deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies are defined by Arend Lijphart (1968) as “consociational democracies”. Consociationalism rejects the principle of majority rule because in fragmented societies many decisions have different values to the parties which make the stakes higher and therefore require more consultation than simple majority rule. In times of crisis even homogeneous and consensual democracies grasp to consociationalism as shown in many grand coalitions that were formed during the Second World War. In consociational democracies political contest is discouraged and the focus on inter-elite cooperation should become a habit (Lijphart, 1968).
Scholars agree on the fact that divisions in societies present a major obstacle to countries that are not yet democratic or not fully democratic. There is also a wide consensus on the idea that to successfully implement a democracy in divided societies, power sharing and group autonomy are key requirements (Lijphart, 2004; Gurr, 1993; Jarstad, 2008). “Power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy ‘means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture.” (Lijphart, 2004:97). These two characteristics are primary attributes to “consociational” democracy. Scholars on democratic theory have advocated power sharing as a school in democracy, socializing opponents into compromises and moderation, and as the only option for democratic governance for many divided societies.
21 involvement for security guarantee and looking for a form of governance based on
inclusiveness to address long-term concerns of the conflicting parties, the third problem is much broader.
3.4.3 FRAGILE ENVIRONMENT: VIOLENCE DURING PEACE PROCESSES Conflict resolution of armed conflict always takes place in a fragile environment. While much of the characteristics of a fragile environment for a conflict is context specific, the topic of spoilers cannot be neglected as it can significantly influence the peace process and
possibilities for negotiations. A peace process always has the potential of creating spoilers since there may be parties that do not profit by peace or by the terms and conditions being created for peace. Spoilers are the main reason why we have violence in peace negotiation and they form the greatest source of risk during civil war termination (Stedman, 1997:7). Stedman (1997) first proposed a framework categorizing spoilers and suggesting matching third-party strategies to manage them. Spoilers are differentiated by their goals and their commitment to achieving them. Depending on which type is diagnosed, Stedman offered three strategies to manage spoilers ranging from a focus on conciliation to the use of coercion. A distinction is also made between inside spoilers and outside spoilers based on whether they are participating in negotiations or not with different strategies used by the parties depending on their position. Inside spoilers often use the strategy of stealth, convincing others of their goodwill but simultaneously keep their military capabilities. Outside spoilers often use overt violence such as the assassination of moderates and looking for alliances to sabotage the peace process (Stedman, 1997).
Stedman however mainly focuses on the key warring parties in his analysis
disregarding potential spoilers. Again in managing spoilers, third parties are key players as they have the task of including and excluding parties into peace negotiations as well as to identify and include the broadest possible range of actors and interests in society to prevent excluded groups of becoming spoilers. Therefore one needs to look beyond the warring parties and also include potential parties to a conflict (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010:22). Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs (2011) define potential spoilers as former warring parties during the civil war, both state-related and non-state actors, splinter factions from these groups and new armed groups. They argue that when advocating for a wider definition of actors almost any actor may be viewed as a potential spoiler with the risk of undermining the concept itself (2011:610).
22 Spoilers can either use violent or nonviolent means and tactics to spoil peace
negotiations which can call for different responses from the intervening/mediating party (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011). It is important to keep in mind that, “[s]poiling is thus part of the bargaining process, yet all parties have different goals in mind, make different calculations of costs and risks of various methods of achieving those goals, and not all attempt to maximize their own potential gains.” (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011:614). Scholars differ in explaining spoiling behaviour. Whereas some say that focus should be on inside the party such as level of leadership and to focus on spoiler type (Stedman, 2002:14), others argue to focus on the structural environment of the peace process (Greenhill and Major, 2007:8). Key determinants are the relative power balance of parties and prevailing opportunity structures. Therefore it is argued that all parties are potential spoilers if they believe their interests are not furthered in the peace process. Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs argue that there is no use in distinguishing spoiler types since opportunity structures change over time and therefore parties continuously adjust behaviour based on calculations on risks and costs. Peacemakers thus should concentrate on influencing structural circumstances to prevent the emergence of spoilers. Eventually we need to look at both factors since both explanations are not mutually exclusive, e.g. if a party has the resources to spoil effectively it may still not do it due to its primary interest of stopping the fighting (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011:616).
The literature suggests three important reasons for inclusion of the PYD. The first is the security dilemma, which cannot be overcome with the exclusion of the YPG. Second, the form of government, which will lack legitimacy without any inclusion of the representatives from the PYD-controlled area and third, by excluding the PYD and its affiliates, there is a risk of increasing spoilers to the current peace talks. Apart from the spoilers phenomenon there are domestic and international dynamics that harden the peace process both through obstacles during negotiations affecting actors positions or interest, or during the
implementation of new standards agreed upon in the peace process. Rebuilding a state after a civil war is a long-term process inevitably with ups and downs along the line of development due to compromises and negotiations that have taken place (Menocal, 2011:1723). So what actors play a significant role in conflict resolution?
23 3.5 ACTORS
The theory discussed so far is drawn from conflict resolution theory and centralizes the role of third parties in overcoming violence during peace negotiations and conflict recurrence. In addition, a third party can decide on the legitimacy of groups involved in combat and who should be included in the negotiations. In this section we will look closer at the actors in the conflict resolution and their influence on peace negotiations.
3.5.1 PRIMARY PARTIES
Parties in a conflict may be reluctant to recognize another party as legitimate to negotiate with during the escalation phase. “Differences among actors can be identified by their goals, attitudes toward particular issues, motivations to realize their interests, and capacities to manage relationships with other actors.” (Jeong, 2008:24). As with spoilers, parties
differentiate in their commitment and goals. Mobilization is an important aspect for a party’s level of expectation. Parties anchor their values in shared beliefs and ends and a common understanding on how to reach those ends. Shared values justify and legitimize certain group behaviour which is important to convince the third party when they intervene.
The more parties involved in conflict, the harder it is to reach a solution (Tsebelis, 2002; Cunningham, 2006). The bargaining range will become smaller as more parties join; information asymmetries increase; every actor has incentives to hold out to sign the
agreement last to get a better deal and; the more parties, the more shifting alliances which prevent negotiating blocs from emerging to get an agreement sooner (Cunningham, 2006:875-6). However, not all parties need to agree on a negotiated settlement. Parties involved in violent conflict act strategically. It may be that an agreement is reached with not all parties included. Nilsson (2008) studied this problem and found that the parties involved agree to commit to peace based on their agreement risking the left out party or parties to continue violence, which is often the case. So partial peace is possible but the peace agreement reduces the chances for reaching overall peace in the conflict and thus is less sustainable when not all parties to the conflict are included.
Walter (2003) researched the influence of multiple parties in ethnic and territorial conflict and concluded that the government is less likely to give concessions when many ethnic parties are involved as it would want to build a strong reputation to prevent future challengers from arising. Nilsson (2010) studied the presence of several rebel groups and its influence on the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. She found that while the government is
24 much more likely to settle with a stronger rebel group than a weak one, when more parties are included this significantly reduces. The problem of multi-party negotiations can be overcome by forming coalitions, however this will bring other challenges such as representativeness as negotiators speaking on behalf of a group risk the chance that the outcome might not be accepted. These are consideration third parties need to take into account when assisting in the peace process.
3.5.2 THIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING
Peacebuilding emerged in the 1990s with the United Nations taking the leading role in
assisting post-conflict states to solidify peace in society and prevent war from recurring. Soon the international community realized that the early strategy with a focus on stopping the violence on the short-term, organizing elections and promoting a market-oriented economy did not result in sufficiently good results. Therefore the peacebuilding concept needed to be revised. Peacebuilding should focus on participatory politics such as strengthening civil society and building more formal institutions that ensure the protection of human rights and security, in other words state building is essential to peacebuilding. Recognition for the need of state building within peacebuilding has shifted the process to be more focused on the long term in line with a more realistic timeframe for structural changes and developmental needs in fragile states (Menocal, 2011:1717-20).
Peace- and state building both share a fundamental concern for legitimacy. Here the focus lies on the state-society relationship. Legitimacy is defined as “the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”; states are legitimate when ‘key political elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper and binding.”(Menocal, 2011:1721). Legitimacy can be understood in many ways. It can be bestowed by international recognition through the United Nations or based on populism with the support of the people as the source of their right to rule. Legitimacy based on clientelism derives from the exchange of material benefits for political support and is based on personal relations rather than formal institutions. Traditional forms of authority create legitimacy based on norms and reciprocity grounded in social and cultural practices and is common in rural communities. Legitimacy can also be based in performance for example when an actor or group is able to provide primary goods where the government fails to do so. Finally, there is procedural legitimacy which is often found in developed countries and depends on the rule of law and accountable decision making
25 processes (Menocal, 2011).
The biggest challenge of including these matters in peacebuilding is not writing it down in an agreement but implementing it in reality which was outlined earlier in the section on implementing Mutually Enticing Opportunities in a fragile environment. International involvement in peacebuilding has been more focused on creating inclusive, responsive and representative polities and societies over time with the aim to make structural changes in the system with new legitimate rules. Peace- and state building are internal processes but also very much affected by the context like geostrategic interests, multinational interests, the media or regional integration issues. These external factors can have a significant impact on the peace process by shaping the interests of the actors involved and thus also the agenda and options for state building (Menocal, 2011:1721). To add more complexity, there is another important factor which influences peace-making and peacebuilding namely, outside support. During the Cold War it was common that insurgency groups were supported by the United States, the Soviet Union and several regional powers backed by one of these world powers. The end of the Cold War resulted in the emergence of peacebuilding changing the dynamics of outside support to insurgents significantly (Byman et al., 2001).
3.5.3 STATE SUPPORT AND DIASPORA SUPPORT
As the support from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. declined, support from neighbouring countries, diasporas and other types of non-state actors such as refugees or religious organizations, started playing a significant role in creating and sustaining strong insurgencies. This has also shifted motivations and the identity of supporters/providers in the Post-Cold war era (Byman et al., 2001).
Neighbouring states primarily support insurgents motivated by realpolitik, to increase regional influence or destabilize neighbourhood rivals (Byman et al., 2001; Kathman, 2011). Supporting insurgencies often creates chain reactions with rival states supporting
insurgencies in each other's countries. However, concern about payback may also lead states from restraining support as aggressive policy abroad may lead to rebels at home. Other motivations for state support are inter alia to support co-religionists or to gain material benefits. Often states have multiple reasons for supporting a particular insurgency. Strategic motives are common but states also support out of domestic concerns or to help the battle of their ethnic kin. States have a wide range of resources and forms of assistance to offer to insurgents such as money, arms, safe haven, diplomatic assistance and training. While
26 insurgencies rarely defeat a national army, state support often resulted in the protraction of a conflict increasing the possibilities of political settlement more favourable to the insurgents. The geopolitical emphasis however makes a state an unreliable supporter, therefore groups also seek other forms of support with more reliable partners (Byman et al., 2001:40).
Another form of support which has become increasingly important after the Cold War era is diaspora support. Diasporas are more reliable than states in their support as the
motivation is largely ethnic affinity related instead of strategic. Above all cooperating with diaspora does not involve the risk to exert control over a movement. The main form of support of diasporas is financial assistance but diasporas can also exert political pressure at host governments to help insurgents or oppose the government fighting them. Blocking diaspora support thus requires action by host governments. Palestinian movements and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) have been relying on diaspora support for decades. Diaspora support often increases after success of an insurgent movement and may dry up as campaigns are perceived as a lost cause (Byman et al., 2001:41/55).
Support is most valuable during the early development of insurgent movements as it will get a chance to organize before it is wiped out by its enemy. State and non-state support can effectively change the dynamics of a war, increasing violence, extending the conflict or turning a civil war into an international war (Byman et al., 2001). Apart from support in internationalized wars, states also make use of diplomacy in conflict resolution. In the next part a review on the role of diplomacy in international peacekeeping will be given and the literature’s perspective on positive and negative effects of diplomacy on peace negotiations will be discussed.
3.6 DIPLOMACY
The primary purpose of diplomacy is “to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law.(…) Together with the balance of power, which it both reflects and reinforces, diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states.” (Berridge, 2005:1). As pointed out in this quote diplomacy is associated with Kenneth Waltz’ balance of power theory (1979) which states that in a world without a central international institution governing, there is anarchy and states are units wishing to survive. To prevent a hegemon from arising that can attack and control them, states will try to balance the power in the international system by forming alliances. But diplomacy is not only
27 valuable as a defence mechanism but also in pro-actively supporting and promoting peace through negotiation.
3.6.1 NEGOTIATION
An important part of diplomacy is negotiations on the international level. It is a complex process as it includes amongst others, cultural factors, historical interrelationships, contextual influence and most of all it is related to power. As mentioned before conflict may arise between two parties with relatively equal power which can be studied with for instance game-theory which focuses on the strategies to get the best outcome. The other form of conflict may arise from structural differences which often is reflected in a difference between power. Similarly, as the graph from Pruitt showed the impact of asymmetry in power on conflict, power relations are an important part of negotiations. It is also important to note that diplomatic negotiations are a long process with both pre-negotiations and post-negotiations and relations are always prone to change due to changing political circumstances (Casmir, 1990:41). “Negotiations … are heavily influenced by both the participant’s perceptions and the environment in which they are conducted.” (Casmir: 1990:43). The complexity in diplomatic negotiations often leads to indecisiveness from the belief that a ‘wait-and-see attitude’ may in the long-run produce better outcomes. It is often difficult to understand the real position and topic considered important by negotiators on the basis of what they state publicly as those statements are addressed to the bystanders i.e. mass media consumers and their needs which can differ from what is said in diplomatic interactions (Casmir: 1990:44). Furthermore, timing plays an essential role for negotiations to succeed.
3.6.2 TIMING
As discussed so far, the peace process is a complex process which needs to entail decisions on power transfers, providing political and military security and overcoming commitment problems. Timing plays a crucial role in these military and political interventions in conflict. Developments in peacebuilding theories have resulted in the perception that timing is a central component for effective conflict resolution as it reduces inaction (Pinfari, 2010:37). The literature suggests that at least on these three moments time matters: for conflict resolution related to ripeness theory; in effective military and diplomatic interventions; and when negotiations have started, timing is important for negotiations to succeed (Pinfari, 2010).
28 Ripe moments to start conflict resolution have been discussed as part of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Since the development on ripeness theory, diplomats and policy advisors, especially in the Clinton administration, have increasingly taken into account the role and use of time pressure on peace negotiations. Setting deadlines to effectively guide withdrawal of troops would help nations rebuild more resolutely (Pinfari, 2010:35). This has also been picked up by current Secretary of State John Kerry when he advocated for more deadlines for conflict resolution and state building in Iraq after the U.S. intervention argued with “So far, Iraqi leaders have responded only to deadlines” (Kerry, 2006).
The diplomatic momentum, the moment in which there appears to be favourable circumstances such as a perceived mutually hurting stalemate for possible negotiated settlements, is important in prolonged conflicts. While it cannot on its own generate successful agreements, keeping the momentum can certainly advance negotiations as compared to not taking the conditions into account (Berridge, 2005:58). Time pressure and deadlines can be used to keep the diplomatic momentum. There is a consensus on this reflected in contemporary diplomacy and conflict resolution as it influences the parties’ position, expectations and pressures them to produce agreements (Pinfari, 2010). However, there is also some critique towards deadlines in relation to diplomatic momentum as some deadlines may not be credible to all parties or parties may exaggerate their positions shortly before a deadline to try and get the best result. This might in turn lead to another party withdrawing from negotiations. Nevertheless, the role of time pressure and deadlines are generally perceived as positive tools by diplomats (Pinfari, 2010:42).
Pinfari points out to the lack of reflection however in diplomatic manuals and papers on conflict resolution as they miss out on two crucial questions. The first is the assessment of results in using time pressure and deadlines in negotiations. The focus is rather on the
agreement reached instead of the quality and durability of the agreement. Second, ‘the range of alternatives available to negotiators under time pressure is portrayed as limited to either ‘favourable’ or ‘agreeable’ solutions’ (Pinfari, 2010:43). Prolonged conflicts are often asymmetric conflicts, derived from structures and conflict inherent to a relationship. This means that there are significant differences in what outcome parties want. In such cases, time pressure may hinder the negotiating parties to interact effectively and overcome these
relational problems. This is confirmed by studies in social psychology when looking at cognitive dynamics, time pressure is associated with low-quality decision making and
29 of time pressure without reference to the specific context and characteristics of decision makers.
Social experiments on time pressure and decision making criticize the combination as it would lead to “... an increase in ‘selectivity of the input of information’, where
‘information that is perceived as most important is processed first, and then processing is continued until time is up’; a decrease in the ‘accuracy of human judgments’; increased importance being paid to ‘negative information’; a ‘tendency of locking in on a strategy’ and a ‘decreas[ing] competence of finding alternative strategies in problem solving’.” (Pinfari, 2010:45). The closest consensus today from the political and social psychological perspective is that the context plays a role and time pressure in negotiations have different effects
depending on situational factors.
Situational factors are “the distribution of payoffs and the negotiations’ goals’; task or context variables and the personal characteristics of bargainers” (Pinfari, 2010:46). The first debate is important as there is significant difference in time pressure in negotiations with cooperative goals and competitive goals. Time pressure can have positive effects on negotiations in a cooperative context but intensifies competitiveness in a hostile context which is demonstrated through social experiments. In reality and in the international politics context, negotiations are rarely held without competitive goals and more importantly, in real life the conditions in which the negotiations take places have an impact on the choice for cooperation or competition. Therefore it is important to highlight task or context variables that influence a “negotiator’s cognitive process in determining the effect of time pressure on negotiation” (Pinfari, 2010:48).
Particularly on three task or context variables time pressure has a negative impact on decision-making: “when the issues at stake are complex; when the task and/or the
information available are highly ambiguous; and when group dynamics come into play.” (Pinfari, 2010:48). For the first problem Pinfari researched the Camp David Agreement and concluded that “even when a negotiation in its entirety can be described as very complex, time pressure can produce positive results if the structure of the issues at stake, the strategies of the actors involved and the skill of the mediators all concur in effectively sequencing issues evenly throughout the talks.” (2010:220). Time pressure has a negative impact on negotiators speaking on behalf of a group risking the chance that the outcome might not be accepted. Moreover, having no deadlines will give room to more opinions and perspectives that can be taken into account.
30 The third situational factor which has an impact on time pressure and its effect on decision making is personal characteristics of the negotiator. On the one hand individual characteristics and the approach to the negotiations affect the impact of time pressure on outcomes. On the other studies have shown the effect of individuals’ cultural background in relation to time. As most North European cultures are more concerned with time management and schedules while Arab and Latino cultures are more characterized by doing many things at once by involving people and completion of transaction rather than adherence to pre-set schedules (Hall, 1983:46 cited by Pinfari, 2010)
Concluding, it is important to realize that the diplomatic manuals presented over the past two decades which say something about time pressure on negotiations are often
misrepresented and downplay the detrimental effect. Pinfari’s study finds that while time pressure may have a positive effect on conflict resolution in the short-term, it often does not in the long term as the agreement tends to lack in sustainability (2010:226).
3.7 CONCLUDING
As the theoretical framework shows there are several theories for conflict resolution in divided societies in an internationalized civil war. The Syrian civil war is an asymmetric conflict with multiple parties and is continuing for over five years due to a moderate inequality of power between the belligerents. Third party involvement is necessary to overcome the internal security dilemma between warring parties in order for them to act in line with their commitments. Scholars also agree that power sharing may be the only form of democratic governance that may succeed in highly divided, heterogeneous societies. Finally, for peace negotiations to succeed, parties need to deal with a fragile environment including (potential) spoilers. Third parties again play a key role in assessing which parties should be included in negotiations and what legitimate demands are.
Simultaneously, outside support can significantly influence the belief of warring parties that they will end the war in victory. Over the years the Syrian conflict has become internationalized through state support but also diaspora support dragging the Kurdish
question into the conflict. The question arises whether conflict resolution theory is applicable in reality as the executers, diplomats, have their own interest next to the interest of
peacebuilding. We will analyse the relevant parties to test the theories and get an understanding of why the PYD was excluded from the 2016 peace talks.
31
4 METHODOLOGY
A qualitative case study will be done through a combination of literature review and process tracing. To answer the central question to this thesis the analysis is split in three parts: 1) analysis of the evolving status of Kurds in Syria; 2) analysis of actors, interests and relationships; 3) analysis of consequences of the exclusion of the PYD in the Geneva III peace talks. The first part will focus on the changing status of Kurds in Syria by reflecting on their history and the influence of recent events including the civil war on their position in Syria. The second part will be the main part of analysis and addresses the causal mechanism on how it is that the PYD was excluded from the Syrian peace talks. Through the analysis of multiple sources an overview of the actors will be given to which the theoretical framework is mirrored to understand decision-making processes. Finally, departing from the spoilers mechanism outlined in the theoretical framework a process-tracing analysis will be done on the PYD’s behaviour since its exclusion at the start of the peace talks in February 2016. The analysis in this thesis is done for the purpose of theory-testing and theory-building meaning that the variables from the theoretical framework will be discussed per actor and in addition the analysis will contribute to theory-building in the study of similar topics in future research.
4.1 PROCESS TRACING
Process tracing is the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011:823). On the one hand, it offers causal analysis of the peace process that unfolds over time based on careful description of changes and causation. On the other hand, process tracing looks at sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables (Mahoney, 2010:125-31). Process tracing will be used in this thesis as interpretivist analysis of the internal reasons actors give for their actions. A case study is done to give more insight into the dynamics of the Syrian civil war and attempts for conflict resolution by the international community. Process tracing investigates how initial conditions are translated into a particular outcome (Vennesson, 2008).Since “[p]rocess tracing is particularly useful for the analysis of decision-making processes, especially in multi-level settings and when there is no clear separation between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables” (Zeitlin, 2016), it seems the right method for analysing the Geneva III peace talks. An interpretive case study will be done using the theoretical framework to provide explanations for the Syrian case with the purpose of evaluating and refining theories. “Process tracing is a fundamental element of empirical
32 case study research because it provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the
preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them. Process tracing helps the researcher to uncover, directly and indirectly, what actors want, know and compute” (Simon 1985: 295 cited in Vennesson, 2008:233).
We will analyse the international context, the roles and interests of the relevant actors involved in the peace process, the decision-making process and the outcome. The primary purpose for using process tracing as a method is to gain insight into the causal mechanisms of when and why a group like the PYD is excluded from peace talks, evaluate prior explanatory hypothesis from the theoretical framework and discuss the consequences based on the
theoretical framework. We will analyse the evolving relationships of the actors with the PYD, research how events unfold over time since the beginning of the peace talks and analyse what characterizes key steps in the process. For the analysis a timeline is made noting key events that influence interests and actions of the actors involved (see appendix 1). The timeline shows events since January 2016 until the end of the second round of peace talks on April 27 and the announcement in the beginning of May by the U.S. of a new approach if the Syrian government does not cooperate to set a political transition in motion and move out President Assad before the deadline of August 2016.
4.2 DATA AND VARIABLES
The data for the analysis is retrieved from several primary sources such as official
government statements but also news articles containing interviews with spokespersons of parties, as well as secondary scientific sources such as books and previous research on the topic. The first part of analysis will provide relevant background knowledge for the evolving position of Syrian Kurds and the resulting establishment of the PYD. The data for this part of the analysis is mainly collected from secondary sources such as books and historical studies on Kurds in Syria.
The second part of analysis will outline the involvement of each actor in the Syrian conflict, its interest and its role related to conflict resolution theory discussed in the
theoretical framework. For this part of the analysis we have outlined the following variables and indicators for operationalization:
Variable Indicator Question
