The General Will as Social Cohesion:
Repackaging Rousseau’s ‘Social Tie’ and Improving Mill’s ‘Representative
Government’
Author: Emke Visser 11424605 emkevisser@gmail.com Supervisor: Eric Schliesser Second reader: Annelien de Dijn Master Thesis Political Science Specialization: Political Theory University of Amsterdam August 2017 Word Count: 22,668
Table of contents
Chapter 1: Motivation and Methodology ... 4
Research Question and Justification: ... 4
Methodology: ... 6
Chapter 2: Social Cohesion ... 9
Introduction: ... 9
Six Features: Interdependence, incentives for group formation, conformity, external relations, organizational structure, and common culture: ... 10
Interdependence: ... 10 Incentives: ... 11 Conformity: ... 12 External relations: ... 13 Organization: ... 13 Common culture: ... 14
Recognizing social cohesion: ... 14
Institutional Structures: ... 15
Inclusive participatory democracy: ... 16
Interdependent cooperation: ... 18
Consensually validated norms: ... 19
Adaptability: ... 20
Strengths and weaknesses: ... 21
Governance structure: ... 21
Chapter 3: The General Will: Rousseaun and Millian concepts of the general will ... 23
Rousseau: The Social Contract: ... 23
Interpretations: ... 25
Objections: ... 27
Mill: Considerations on Representative Government: ... 27
Inspiration for a democratic institution that fosters social cohesion: ... 32
Chapter 4 Inclusionary Democracy ... 34
Introduction: ... 34
Popular sovereignty: ... 34
Full representation: ... 36
Impact on sovereign borders: ... 40
Socialization and homogenization: ... 41
Amalgamation Policies: ... 43
The Executive: ... 48
Similarities with Mill: ... 49
Protection of individual and minority rights: ... 50
Feasibility: ... 52
Inclusive and accepting politics: ... 53
Chapter Five: The General Will as Social Cohesion: ... 54
Inclusive participatory democracy: ... 54
Cooperative interdependence: ... 57
Consensually validated norms:... 58
Adaptability: ... 59
The General Will as Social Cohesion: ... 60
Chapter 6: Conclusion... 62
Chapter 1: Motivation and Methodology
In this thesis I improve the Rousseauian and Millian concepts of the general will and
transpose them into one democratic design. I argue that the democratic design positively impacts social cohesion. Social cohesion describes the process by which individuals come together and stay together, to the exclusion of others, in order to attain a common goal. Through this process, individuals build a sense of community and kindness with one another. (Bruhn, 2009, p. 96, 145-156). Isolating the institutional features that positively impact social cohesion and transposing them into a democratic design is the central concern of this thesis. The proposed democratic design positively impacts social cohesion because it incorporates four institutional structures that positively impact social cohesion: inclusive participatory democracy, cooperative
interdependence, consensually validated norms, and adaptability. Each of these features should have an additive effect on social cohesion. The claim that these organizational structures
positively impact social cohesion is supported by behavioural and sociological research on group behaviour.
Research Question and Justification:
Politics regards social interactions between among human in groups. For this reason I use behavioural psychological and sociological research in my argument. In this thesis, I theorize about how people actually behave rather than how they should behave. Specifically, I theorize about how people are affected by their political environment. I assume, with minimal argument, that social cohesion is a desirable outcome for society, all other things being equal. For this reason, I research the way in which a political environment can have a positive impact on social cohesion. The specific research questions I answer are: “Which institutional features positively impact social cohesion?” and, “In what manner can these institutional features be incorporated into a democratic design?” Institutional features relates to decision-making processes of a democratic design. I focus on decision-making processes in order to isolate the features that relate to governance. Specifically, these features determine who may partake in the decision-making, who is impacted, and in what manner, by these decisions, and what is considered a legitimate decision-making procedure.
Most social contract theories evolve around normative frameworks and/or assumptions about human nature and in turn relate these assumptions to organization of human groups. For
example, Rawls in Theory of Justice establishes a justifiable normative framework by which societal organization can be judged (1999). Buchanan and Tullock organize governance according to a rational choice model and argue that it is capable of generating a normatively desirable end: consent (1962). Classic social contract theories hone in on solving human conflict in a legitimate manner (Hobbes, 1651; Rousseau, 1762). The ideal that these theories attempt to achieve is a preconceived (and of course substantiated) notion of what constitutes a justifiably desirable outcome and/or means. What I believe is missing from the literature is an account of what humans determine to be optimal human organization absent of previously established normative goals. Social cohesion provides an answer to this question. Social cohesion is, in part, measured by group loyalty, satisfaction, and staying in a group despite incentives to leave (Deutsch, 1949, p. 199-231; Van Vugt, 2004, p. 585-598; Tyler, 1985, p. 72-81). This provides a good indication of what humans tend to value in group organization. Building from this premise, I desire to determine which institutional features can positively impact social cohesion and in turn incorporate them into a democratic design.
Organized association among humans is a universal phenomenon; in all areas of the world, humans socialize and form groups (Galanter, 1981, p. 417-8; Druckman, 1994, p. 44-46). In order for a group to exist, a degree of social cohesion is necessary (Bruhn, 2009, p. 47).1 Social cohesion is further characterized by identification with group norms, perceived influence of members to group processes, value attached to group members, affinity with fellow groups members, and loyalty (Carron, 1982, p. 123-138). Although the purpose of this thesis is not to design a democratic structure according to previously determined normative constraints, social cohesion does account for widely held normative beliefs. Socially cohesive groups emulate widely accepted definitions of positive societal outcomes through justifiable means. When groups are socially cohesive they are more peaceful, stable, and generate a sense of community and kindness within the group (Bruhn, 2009, p. 96). Peace and stability are generally accepted political outcomes (Williams, 2005). Moreover, groups are more socially cohesive when they are democratic, consensually accepted, and egalitarian (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598; Bruhn, 2009, p. 23, 53, 64, 77). Consent to the ruling government and democracy are widely accepted as the pillars of legitimate rule (Rousseau, 1762; Simmons, 1999, p.739-771; Sleat,
2015, p. 230-252). One may believe that it telling that what it is considered to be optimal group organization has a positive correlation with widely adhered to normative views. This observation is interesting and is worth further research. It is not however the purpose of this thesis to focus on the process through which individuals come to value social cohesion and/or legitimate decision-making processes.
My motivation for this thesis can be summed up as follows. I desire to use empirical
evidence on human and group behaviour as a reference point for designing a political institution. Social cohesion is chosen as a amiable outcome because provides an indication of the type of group organization that humans consider to be desirable. For this reason, I focus the rest of my thesis on providing the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the concept of social cohesion, which institutional features positively impact it, and how these institutional features can be incorporated into a democratic design.
Methodology:
My main methods of research are conceptual argument and literature review. I use
conceptual arguments [1] to support a definition of social cohesion and [2] to determine which institutional features impact social cohesion. This is not based on one consolidated theory of social cohesion, but an amalgamation of research on social cohesion. I use literature review to provide a theoretical foundation of the concept of the general will. This is based on the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill (1762; 1861). I expound further on this concept and adapt it so that it has institutional features necessary to produce social cohesion. After the initial conceptual argument and literature review, I align the institutional features of social cohesion with the formal requirements of a political structure that fosters a general will. By connecting these two elements I argue that I answer the second question of the the thesis: that the proposed democratic institution incorporates the institutional features that positively impact social cohesion. Throughout the thesis, I address objections regarding feasibility and normative issues. In this way I hope to thoroughly display the relevance of using a political structure to foster social cohesion.
I structure my argument in the following manner. Following the introductory chapter, I present the concept of social cohesion. In that chapter I present a literature review of social cohesion. I demarcate social cohesion into two general categories. The first category provides a
general definition of social cohesion. Social cohesion is a process whereby humans initiate or maintain association with one another to achieve a common purpose or aim (Bruhn, 2009, p. 96, 145-156). Social cohesion is characterized by six specific features: interdependence, incentives to group formation, conformity, external relations, organizational structure, and common culture (Bruhn, 2009, p. 1-6). The nature and degree to which these features and characteristics are present determine the degree of social cohesion in groups. The second category regards how to impact social cohesion. There are various manners to impact social cohesion. I isolate four institutional features that positively impact social cohesion: inclusive participatory democracy, consensually validated norms, cooperative interdependence, and adaptability. These features are appropriate to incorporate into democratic institutions because they relate to decision-making procedures. Finally, I argue that by incorporating these structures, democratic institutions can increase the degree of social cohesion in polities.
Following the presentation of social cohesion in chapter two, I outline the Rousseauian and Millian general wills. The purpose of chapter three is to provide the reader with sufficient knowledge to comprehend the democratic institution that I propose. In chapter four I introduce the democratic institution. The institution comprises two decision making structures. The first decision-making procedure establishes a political identity. A political identity is composed of the political norms, values, and culture of a polity. This procedure is a formalization of Rousseau’s ‘social tie’ (1762, p. 21). It is a consensual procedure that determines the reason why a group of people desire to collectively govern over one another. The second procedure is the legislative procedure of a polity. It is an improved version of Mill’s version of representative democracy (1861). I support Mill’s commitment to wide-spread influence of the people in legislation and take it a step further. I argue that in order to secure comprehensive influence it is necessary to require wide-spread approval by and inclusion of every interest group in legislation. I present the two procedures as one democratic institution. Throughout the chapter I address obvious
normative and feasibility constraints. In the subsequent chapter (five) I connect the democratic institution and social cohesion. I explain how the democratic design includes the four
institutional features that positively impact of social cohesion. By incorporating these features, I argue that the proposed democratic institution can positively impact social cohesion. In this way, I answer both research questions. I determine which institutional structures positively impact
social cohesion and I display how these features can be incorporated into democratic institutions. The final chapter comprises a summary of the thesis.
Chapter 2: Social Cohesion Introduction:
In this chapter, I outline the concept of social cohesion. Social cohesion is a complicated concept because it refers to numerous features and characteristics of groups. Further, social scientists do not agree on exact definition of social cohesion (Bruhn, 2009, p. 47).2 The goals of this thesis is to a) distinguish the institutional features that positively impact social cohesion with the aim b) to incorporate them into a democratic design. In this chapter I achieve the first goal. To this end, I provide the reader with a simplified concept of social cohesion. My hope is to provide the reader with sufficient knowledge of the many facets of social cohesion without burdening her with unnecessary details. I hone in on the fundamental characteristics of social cohesion and the institutional features that positively impact social cohesion. In doing so I set aside aspects of social cohesion that are relevant to the concept, sui generis, but are peripheral to the aim of this thesis. I include numerous footnotes that include these aspects in order to
illuminate the reader of these peripheral features, if she is so inclined.
The lion’s share of the outline is based on the meta-analysis of John Bruhn, in The Group Effect: Social Cohesion and Health Outcomes (2009). I use Bruhn’s concept of social cohesion because he provides structure and clarity to the concept without abstracting away the nuanced definitions of psychologists and behavioural scientists. I supplement his conception with examples of studies and analyses from other researchers.
Following the introduction I provide a definition of social cohesion. Social cohesion is a property of groups that comprises six features: interdependence, incentives for group formation, conformity, external relations, organizational structure, and common culture (Bruhn, 2009, p. 1-6). How one can determine if a group is socially cohesive is by measuring the nature and presence of these features. Groups that have strong degrees of social cohesion are more stable
2 For example, the term ‘social cohesion’ is also often used interchangeably with the terms ‘social
support’ or ‘social capital’ by behavioural and social scientists. Bruhn distinguishes social cohesion from social support and social capital. He states that social support is the assistance an individual receives from immediate contacts. ‘Social capital’ refers to the networks that are available to the individual in order to achieve individual and group goals. These networks exist at various levels such as intimate contacts or global networks (Bruhn, 2009, p. 50-61). Social cohesion is different because it is more encompassing of the components related to group formation.
and generate a strong sense of community. They have members that are loyal and helpful to one another (Bruhn, 2009, p. 145-156). Next, I argue that there are four institutional features that positively impact social cohesion: inclusive participatory democracy, cooperative
interdependence, consensually validated norms, and adaptability. I provide sociological and psychological evidence to support my claim. I conclude by arguing that a democratic design can positively impact social cohesion by way of incorporating these institutional features.
Six Features: Interdependence, incentives for group formation, conformity, external relations, organizational structure, and common culture:
Social cohesion is used to describe groups who display a strong sense of community (Stanley, 2003, p. 5-17; Leydet, 2017). Social cohesion refers to the process by which individuals come together, to the exclusion of others, in pursuit of a common goal. There are material or psychological motivations for individuals to form groups. This process creates a sense of belonging among group members (Bruhn, 2009, p. 96). Members of socially cohesive groups display high degrees of trust, loyalty, reciprocity, and social identity (Bruhn, 2009, p. 145-9). Although there is little consensus regarding an exact definition of social cohesion, Bruhn argues that socially cohesive group are characterized by six group features: interdependence, incentives for group formation, conformity, external relations, organizational structure, and common culture (Bruhn, 2009, p. 1-6). One can measure social cohesion by evaluating the nature and measuring the presence of these features in groups.
Interdependence:
‘Interdependence’ refers to how members of a group need each other to achieve common goals. Collaboration among individuals and group formation is an adaptive mechanism. By doing so, individuals increased their chances of survival because as they improved their means of defence and aggregated resources (Galanter, 1981, 417-8). Kurt Lewin famously attributed ‘the essence of a group not [to be] the similarity or dissimilarity of its members, but their
interdependence.” This degree of interconnectedness makes the group a ‘dynamic whole’ (1948, p. 84). The actions of the sub-parts of the group affect one another as well as the nature of the group. For this reason, (change in) membership is particularly salient to interdependence (Bruhn, 2009, p. 2; Van Vugt, 2004, p. 586). Interdependence is not simply a cooperative effort to
maximize output or utility, but a vulnerable relationship between the sub-components of a group. The degree of interdependence is impacted by the group’s size and organization (Lewin, 1948, p.
84). This influences the types of benefits, at an individual or group level, that one is able to achieve and how costs and benefits are distributed within the group. Interdependence as collective action by members towards goals, positively impacts loyalty (Bruhn, 2009, p. 191). Loyalty is the tendency of a group members to preserve the group in order to achieve common goals (Carron, 1982, p. 124).
Incentives:
It is necessary that there are incentives for group membership. Morton Deutsch referred to cohesiveness as the forces that unite the sub-components of a group together and resist disturbing influences (Deutsch, 1968, p. 467). Incentives form these forces. There are two main incentives to group formation: rewards and norms. Rewards regard material benefits and norms refer to psychological benefits. The material benefits an individual or sub-part of a group can acquire from acting in cooperation with others is a crucial reason why members join and stay in a group (Bruhn, 2009, p. 3-4). It has been shown that humans evaluate their relations with others by evaluating the costs and benefits of the relationship (Cosmides, 1989, p. 187-276). After initial group formation, the groups’ right to distribute and withhold rewards gives it a position of power of the members (Bruhn, 2009, p. 3-11) The strength of the incentives for group membership positively impacts the level of social cohesion. If a group has great material rewards the group is better able to withstand disruptive forces (Bruhn, 2009, p. 3-4).
Incentives for group membership is not simply a mathematical equation. The other main motivation for group membership is an individual’s identification with group norms (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598). This benefit is attributed to decreases in neurotic stress by way of group affiliation (Galanter, 1981, p. 423-4). Humans possess a need to identify and belong with others. The more an individual identifies with the norms a group promotes, the more she stands to psychologically benefit from it (Bruhn, 2009, p. 4). These benefits are further increased when individuals voluntarily adopt group norms (Galanter, 1981, p. 423-4). Strongly cohesive groups have members that strongly and voluntarily identify with the group and its norms. A strong identity substantiates the group as members are less willing to leave the group despite compelling incentives to do so (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598).
Conformity:
Conformity is another necessary feature of groups. Conformity relates to how individuals are motivated to adapt their behaviour or norms in order to fit in with the group. A sense of
belonging provides a strong motivation to conform to the group; it is also an inherent characteristic of groups (Bruhn, 2009, p. 4-5; 80). It provides an incentive for individuals to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the group (Grossback, 1957, p. 261). Individuals may join a group initially because they identify with the norms or hope to benefit from group
membership. The desire to belong motivates them to adapt their behaviour or norms in order to continue being a member of the group or to preserve the coherence of the group. Paul Nail and colleagues argue that causes of conformity vary from a desire to: be correct and accepted, avoid rejection and conflict, accomplish group goals, establish or maintain an identity, or form and be a part of an in-group (2000, p. 454-470). For this reason, groups can adapt members’ behaviour. (Bruhn, 2009, 4-5). The manner through which conformity is achieved is important to social cohesion. Van Vugt and colleagues displayed in an experiment with groups distributing public goods that under autocratic leadership, certain behaviour among members of the group can be enforced by the leader. However, when provided with an incentive to leave, a much higher percentage of members chose to leave the autocratic group as opposed to the democratic or laissez-faire groups (Van Vugt et al, 2004, p. 1-13).3 In a similar study Lippit and White showed in a comparison between autocratic groups and democratic groups, autocratic groups worked harder than democratic ones. However, this was only the case when the leader was present (Lippitt and White, 1943 p. 485 -508). Conformity to group norms is an indication of social cohesion. The strength of this feature is strongly impacted by the manner through which conformity is achieved. When members of a group are able to influence group values, the likelihood that members will conform to them, without outside enforcement, increases (Van Vugt et al, 2004, p. 1-13).
3 Options regarding group conformity are restricted to autocratic and democratic leadership in this experiment. The reason is because in laissez-faire groups there was no regulation regarding expectations and conformity (Van Vugt et al. 2004, p. 1-13).
It is not wise to generalize these results for all societies. The studies on the importance of democratic leadership is limited in that only individuals that grew up in democratic societies were studied.4 Nonetheless, the studies on the importance of democratic leadership showed significant results that supported the hypothesis that democratically lead conformity increases group stability. It is useful for the present thesis to the degree that it is applied to already existing democratic societies.
External relations:
Groups are impacted by their relations to the external world. All groups are situated within other social structures and networks (Deutsch, 1968, p. 466-7). This can range from a team in a sport association or a country in a global political structure. The dynamics of a group are impacted by whether or not the group relates to other groups cooperatively or competitively. Moreover, how members of a group relate to individuals or groups outside her group, affects individual behaviour. Because individual behaviour influences group dynamics (Lewin, 1948, p. 84), individual association outside the group, or absence thereof, impacts group dynamics. Further, competitive or cooperative relations with other groups impacts the structure of acquiring and distributing rewards. Thus, the nature of a group’s external relations impacts its level of social cohesion (Bruhn, 2009, p. 3).
Organization:
How a group is organized impacts social cohesion. The organization of group relates to how decisions are made regarding the rules, norms, and culture of the group. It determines the
communication channels and degree of influence members have with each other and in the group (Bruhn, 2009, p. 3-4). The organizational structure determines the nature of interdependence, the protocol for determining norms and rules, and distributional structure of costs and benefits. Studies on different styles of leadership showed that democratically led groups were more cohesive than autocratic or laissez-faire groups (Van Vugt et al, 2004, p. 1-13). Groups whose norms were consensually validated and where groups members actively participated in decision-making had high degrees of social cohesion (Galanter, 1981, p. 413-427).5 Organization is an important factor in coordinating collective effort, encouraging conformity, and including
4 This selection bias is recognized by Van Vugt et al. (2004, p. 1-13)
members in decision making. These factors are important attributes of social cohesion which in turn have a positively impact on loyalty (Carron, 1982, p. 123-138). Lastly, groups that were rewarded based on a cooperative rather than a competitive basis also displayed high degrees of social cohesion (Deutsch, 1949, p. 129 -152; 1949, p. 199-231).
Common culture:
Common culture is the last feature of groups. Common culture refers to the common values, beliefs, norms, and expectations that provide context for appropriate behaviour in the group. Social cohesion arises when a group establishes a set of norms and values specific to the group (Carron, 1982, 123-138). This set of values in turn determines the lifestyle of the group and its members (Bruhn, 2009, p. 94). A common culture provides an incentive for group formation and also acts as a criteria for group membership (Bruhn, 2009, p. 4-5). It provides a framework for members to understand their own identity. Taking part in a common culture creates a sense of belonging among members within a group. Members are able to juxtapose their norms and values against other members in the group as well as against other individuals outside the group. This occurs even in homogeneous groups (Bruhn, 2009, p. 5). Having a common culture is vital to the sustainability of the group. It lays the groundwork for institutional organization of the group. Conflicting values is a normal feature of human interaction. However, if conflicts regarding values are not solved within a group, it destroys the groundwork upon which further organization is built. In this way it weakens social cohesion (Hunter, 1998, p. 1-37). Strongly cohesive groups have members that strongly and voluntarily identify with the group and its norms. A strong identity substantiates the group as members are less willing to leave the group despite compelling incentives to do so (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598).
Recognizing social cohesion:
In sum, social cohesion is a property of all groups. Social cohesion is a dynamic process (Bruhn, 2009, p. 61; Carron, 1982, p. 124). Social cohesion is not a static characteristic of groups. It is impacted by environmental changes and is sensitive to internal changes such as membership (Lewin, 1948, p. 84-102; Van Vugt, 2004; p. 585-598). The degree of social cohesive in each group is impacted by the nature of and degree to which each of the above features is present. Bruhn states that all socially cohesive group comprise all of the above mentioned features (2009, p. 1-6). Although each feature is a necessary, the strength of each can
vary. Each feature is measured separately through different studies (Bruhn, 2009, p. 2). Social scientists evaluate the degree of social cohesion in groups by measuring the nature and presence of the above mentioned features and characteristics. Researchers look at variables that relate to health, participation and trust in political structures, social and economic equality, adherence to laws and social structure, safety, and interaction with fellow group members.6 Socially cohesive groups are characterized by being interdependent and providing rewards to their members. There is a common culture and members adapt their behaviour to group norms. The degree of these features is further impacted by the organization of the group. When interdependence is cooperative and governance is democratic, groups show higher degrees of social cohesion
Institutional Structures:
At this point I hone in on four institutional features that can positively impact social cohesion. Most of these features were preliminarily discussed under Organization. The
institutional features comprise: inclusive participatory democracy, cooperative interdependence, consensually validated norms, and adaptability. I focus on institutional features that positively impact social cohesion because the goal of this thesis is to “a) distinguish the institutional features that positively impact social cohesion with the aim b) to incorporate them into a
democratic design.” Institutional features relate to decision-making procedures. Decision-making procedures distinguish who is involved in the decision-making, the various levels of influence the members have on the decision-making structure, what the goal of governance is, and what is viewed to be legitimate procedures. Incorporating the above mentioned institutional features is a useful method to preserve the integrity and cohesion and extant groups.
In the following sub-sections I discuss the institutional features in turn. I make clear why these institutional features have a positive impact on social cohesion. Further, I discuss the weaknesses and strengths of the evidence supporting these institutional features. Inclusive participatory democracy and cooperative interdependence have the strongest empirical evidence in support of these claims. Numerous tests have been conducted that support these claims. In
6 There is not one specific method used among researchers to do this however. For example, Bruhn refers to the national commission on the civil renewal of American measures social cohesion in the Index of National Civic Health (INCH). The INCH measures variables such as political participation, trust, and family strength (Bruhn, 2009, p. 70-71). Miringoff and Miringoff of the Institute of Innovation in Social Policy at Vassar College measure drug use, infant mortality, and wages (1999).
contrast, the claim that consensually validated norms and adaptability are important features are inferred from other research. I argue that these inferences have empirical and theoretical support. I conclude by arguing that by way of incorporating these features into a democratic institution, the institution can positively impact social cohesion. One may argue that in order to positively impact social cohesion it is necessary to take other societal concerns into account. There are other manners that are important to positively impacting social cohesion, such as creating or maintaining a sense of belonging.7 The importance of other societal factors does not entail that
governance is trivial. Throughout this chapter I provide evidence that the organization of a group has significant impacts on the degree of social cohesion. By focusing on governance, I intend to make clear which institutional features positively impact social cohesion, not to understate the importance of other societal features.
Inclusive participatory democracy:
The first organizational feature is inclusive participatory democracy. This is a democratic procedure whereby all the members (inclusive) contribute (participate) to the governance (democracy) of the group. Members are included in the decision-making processes that determine the identity and norms of the groups as well as the distribution of costs and rewards within the group. Comprehensive contribution to the decision-making processes of the group enhances the level of social cohesion in a group (Lippitt & White, 1943, p. 485 -508). Individual perception of group fairness and commitment to the group is enhanced when the individual believes that she personally contributes to the decision-making process. Van Vugt and Hart determined that members in democratically lead groups were more satisfied with the group. The salient factor in establishing this conclusion was the individual’s assessment of personal
influence in the group decisions. Those that believed that they contributed to the
7 There are other manners to impact social cohesion. For example, creating a clear frame of reference for
group formation, such as through ethnic ties can establish strong sense of belonging (Bruhn, 2009, p. 80). One may also encourage or deepen affiliation among group through collective socialization or community building. After establishing an initial sense of belonging, it is possible to encourage or deepen a sense of affiliation among groups members (Bruhn, 2009, 79-101). Finally, certain environmental factors, such as homogeneity, are known to have a positive correlation with social cohesion (Rice & Steele, 2001, p. 397-407).
Although these are important facets of social cohesion to take into consideration, they do not directly relate to decision-making processes thus are not included in this outline.
making process were most satisfied with the group (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598). Morris demonstrated that both group and personal influence are important to individual perception of procedural fairness. However, group influence in the absence of individual influence is much less valued. The ideal balance is when both group influence and individual influence is strong. In such cases, individuals were most satisfied with the group procedures and were most likely to recommend the final decisions made by the group (Morris, 2000 p. 157-167). This conclusion is supported by a study by Miller. In this study, individual were satisfied with group decisions when they agreed with the decision outcome. However, fairness of the decision was determined by how representative the decision was of the group as a whole (Miller, 1987, p 325–332).
Tyler and colleagues tested the influence of members perceived participation in the process of decision-making in combination with control of the ultimate decision. The researchers
displayed that participation in the process and the ultimate decision were both significant factors that determine group satisfaction. Nonetheless, decision-making control in combination with process involvement proved to only be slightly influential to satisfaction. As long as members contributed to the process, whether or not they determined the final decision was marginally significant to their perception of procedural fairness. Participation in process was measured by evaluating whether the participant contributed to the city council debate on the formulation of tax law (Tyler et al., 1985, p. 72-81).
The research on the importance of participation in group decisions has received considerable support (Morris, 2000, p. 158). The research cited here presents but a handful of experiments on the subject. A weakness in these empirical studies is that most were conducted in democratic states. This presents an obvious selection bias. As Van Vugt noted, it is unclear if democratic values or values that are congruent with societal norms is the ultimate salient factor (2004, p. 11). Hulbert et al concluded that positive perception of legitimacy and fairness is further increased when the group decision are made by consensus. However, they stated that they are unable to isolate the process that leads to this perception. The process could be influenced by procedural rules included in the experiment or by internalized societal norms (Hulbert, Parks, Chen, Nam & Davis 1999, p. 58-77). This fact is a weakness in the generalizability of this thesis to non-democratic states. It further begs the question if democratic procedures are valued
because they are instilled or if humans place intrinsic value on them. These concerns are worthy of further research. Nonetheless, I do not believe that one should throw the baby out with the bathwater. The numerous studies in democratic states displayed significant results. This shows that, at least in democratic states, for reasons undetermined, democratic procedures are highly valued and are attributed to group satisfaction.
Interdependent cooperation:
Interdependence is an essential characteristic of groups. Lewin attributed the principle quality of the group to be the interconnectedness of its members (1948, p. 84). Lewin’s
articulation of interdependency as a defining characteristic of group has become fundamental in social group theory.8 Morton Deutsch studied the impact of cooperative and competitive
situations on individual and group behaviour. He characterized cooperative situations as promotively interdependent and competitive situations as contriently interdependent. In promotively interdependent situations a sub-part of a group can only achieve a goal when the other sub-parts participate as well. In contriently interdependent situations, the participation of one sub-unit towards a goal inhibits the other sub-units from achieving the goal. In his
experiment, participants in the promotively interdependent groups were instructed that their performance would be evaluated as group compared to other groups. Participants in the contriently interdependent groups were told that their performance would be evaluated in comparison to the other individuals in their group. In comparison to contriently interdependent groups, promotively interdependent groups were much more productive, had a positive
interpretation of each other’s contributions, were helpful towards each other, and had a positive disposition towards the group as a whole (Deutsch, 1949, p. 199-231). Institutional design that structures individual contributions as a group effort towards a goal exhibit higher degrees of social cohesion.
Studies of cooperation and competition inspired by Deutsch’s original hypothesis have been conducted and generated positive results. For example, Fang-Lu applied a promotively
interdependent world environment to Chinese business culture. Cooperative interdependence had positive impacts on group culture (Fang-Lu, 2010, p. 101-134 ). This study shows the potential
8 See for example references to this quote in Morris (2000 p. 157-167), Deutsch (1968, p. 467), and Bruhn (2009, p. 2), for example.
of Deutsch’s theory to extend to non-western cultures. Tjosvold studied the impact of
cooperative decision-making on corporations. When different departments of an organization were collective responsible to achieve one goal, they were more creative and open to different problem solutions (Tjosvold, 1998, p. 7-18). Understanding interdependence to be an essential quality of groups lends further support to theories of cooperation (Lewin, 1948, p. 84). A fundamental aspect of groups is working together towards a common goal. Promotive
interdependence can be viewed as an optimal organization of interdependence. Organizational structures that compel individuals or groups to work cooperatively are more likely to foster social cohesion (Deutsch, 1949, p.199-231).
Consensually validated norms:
The third institutional feature is consensually validated norms. The general importance of personal and group influence in decision-making is explained above. Decision-making regarding norms and identity is particularly salient because identification with the group is crucial to its stability (Bruhn, 2009, p. 4) The importance of self-identification with the group and group norms has been attributed to the cohesion of the group (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598; Galanter, 1981, 423-4). When individuals in a group identify with group norms, they interweave personal satisfaction with collective outcomes. For this reason they are more invested in the group and group performance (Brewer, 1979 p. 322). In order to have socially cohesive groups, the individuals must feel bonded to one another, the leaders, and the group as a concept (Piper et al, 1983, p. 95) Van Vugt and Hart refer to identification with group norms as the ‘social glue theory.’ Identification proves to be a crucial bond between the individual and the group.
Individuals categorized as high-identifiers were more likely to think favourably about the group and remain in the group when presented with attractive reasons to leave (Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598).
An individual is more likely to strongly identify with group norms when he does so
voluntarily. This is supported by research on commitment to decisions in democratic groups (see above). The same research shows that participation in decision-making is vital to members’ subjective views of the outcome’s legitimacy and commitment to it (Van Vugt et al, 2004, p 1-13; Morris, 2000, p. 158). Galanter showed that groups that have a ‘consensually validated system of beliefs’ displayed high degrees of social cohesion. In a study of religious sects,
individuals who became members voluntarily, as opposed to through induction, were high identifiers with the various values of the sect (1981, p. 413-427).
The research on the saliency of voluntarily adopted norms is less robust compared to
research on inclusive participatory democracy and cooperative interdependence. In the research I present here, the importance of consensually validated norms has not been tested in group
settings like the other two features. The support of the consensually validated norms features is attributed to connecting two compelling attributes of groups: saliency of individual participation in group decision-making as well as the importance of norms for groups. The research presented that connects these two attributes is limited because it does not juxtapose different relevant group scenarios. It would, for example, be telling to compare the relevancy of voluntary adoption of groups norms for hierarchal structured groups, such as the military, and democratically
structured groups. Galanter’s study on religious sects provides interesting insight into a relevant and real scenario (1981, p. 413-427). However, this is just one example.
Although this feature does not find direct empirical support, I contend that relating
participatory democracy and norm saliency to one another is logical. Increasing participation in defining groups norms is a means to facilitate voluntary identification with norms. This should further positively impact group stability.
Adaptability:
Adaptability is the last structural feature of social cohesion. Adaptability refers to the groups’ ability to acclimate to internal and external changes. Groups are sensitive to changes in membership and environment (Putnam, 2007, p. 137-174; Van Vugt and Hart, 2004, p. 585-598). It is particularly important to deal with changes that impact group culture. If conflicts regarding the identity of the group are not resolved, it undermines the bedrock of the group (Putnam, 2007, p. 137-174; Hunter, 1998, p. 1-37). If internal or external changes result in a change of values within a (portion of) group, the organization must be able to incorporate the change into the organization and group identity. Groups that have an organization structure that equips the members to deal with adjustments in a inclusive democratic manner, should be able to foster stability.
The importance of adaptability is, like the consensually validated norms features, not empirically tested but inferred from other knowledge of groups. This inference is easily
comprehensible. As has been elucidated and reiterated often in this chapter, identification with group norms is a salient feature of group. When identification occurs voluntarily, this
substantiates the stability of the group. With this knowledge, it is reasonable to conclude that the norms that dictate group identity should reflect the dispositions of the current group. If a
structure is flexible to the changes in dispositions of group members and has the means to verify that the norms reflect the wishes of its members, it is more likely to achieve this desirable quality.
Strengths and weaknesses:
I argue that there are four institutional features that can positively impact social cohesion in groups. The first two features are supported with strong empirical evidence. The main
weaknesses of the research is a) selection bias of participants in democratic countries and the unclarity regarding the process that leads individuals to value these features. The last two features are indirectly supported by empirical evidence. Consensually validated norms and adaptability are conclusions based on the knowledge of groups and knowledge of inclusive participatory democracy. Although one is more certain of features that use empirically tested and proven theories, the last two features incorporate the empirically tested knowledge of groups and groups behaviour convincingly.
Governance structure:
The purpose of this thesis is to design a democratic institution that positively impacts internal social cohesion. I argue that a democratic institution that employs the four institutional features outlined above can positively impact social cohesion. My argument rests on the empirical evidence presented above. The research shows that these features have a positive impact on or have a positive correlation with social cohesion. Based on these research results, one can reasonably expect that integrating these features into a democratic institution should positively impact social cohesion. These four features are suitable for democratic institutions because they comprise decision-making processes. I do not contend that it is necessary to incorporate all four features in order to positively impact social cohesion. The research that I refer to on inclusive participatory democracy and cooperative interdependence has been executed separately. Both research outcomes were significant. It is unclear how influential each feature is when incorporated separately or in addition to another feature. This ambiguity is of course
unfortunate. However, this thesis is limited to identifying the institutional features that positively impact as opposed to a more robust analysis of the degree of impact of and the relationship between different features. Such an analysis is appropriate for further research.
Chapter 3: The General Will: Rousseaun and Millian concepts of the general will
In the current and following chapter I present a political structure that secures the general will and argue that it positively impacts social cohesion. The political structure that I propose is inspired by the Rousseauean and Millian concepts of the general will.9 To help the reader fully comprehend the proposed political structure, I provide a summary of these concepts here. The summary consists of an outline of the Rousseauean and Millian concepts as well as common interpretations thereof. It is not my intention to provide new interpretations nor provide supporting arguments for existing interpretations. Rather, I intend to clearly encapsulate the concepts. This is to make transparent which components of the general will I draw inspiration from. It is not necessary for my thesis to enter the debate on the correct interpretation of
Rousseau and Mill. This is because I do not argue that the proposed political structure is a better interpretation of the Rousseauean and Millian ones, but that it is an improved one. Instead, I intend to make clear which components I use and improve in the proposed political structure.
Rousseau: The Social Contract:
In this section I summarize Rousseau’s general will as presented in the Social Contract (1762). Next, I outline two main interpretations of the general will. The first interpretation is referred to as the ‘formal requirement’ interpretation and the second as the ‘substantive’ interpretation (Williams, 2015, p. 219-246). I end the section with a summary of common objections to Rousseau’s general will. It is useful to include these objections here in order to illustrate in the following chapter that the improved version of the general will addresses these criticisms.
Rousseau discusses the general will most thoroughly in the Social Contract (1762). He argues that the solution to the state of nature is a political institution that formulates legislation according to the general will (1762, p. 10-12). There are three components to his argument. First, the diagnosis of society as the state of nature (1762, p. 7, 10). Second, a definition of the general will (1762, p. 10-14). Last, how the general will can help society escape the state of nature (Rousseau, 1762, p. 10, 18-9, 22). Rousseau relies on certain assumptions of society and politics
9 Mill does not use the term ‘general will.’ Rather, he refers to the ‘general interest’ and the ‘common
which are important to note in order to understand the concept. Let me discuss the three components and these assumptions in turn.
Individual liberty is defined as being free from any type of obstruction (Rousseau, 1762, p. 14). When men associate with each other without any type of regulation, those endowed with natural strengths and talents are more able to secure liberty for themselves while hindering the freedom of others (Rousseau, 1762, p. 14, 17). The combination of liberty defined as freedom from obstruction with the necessity of association forms the dilemma of the state of nature. The unequal distribution of strengths entails that some will be more free than others (1762, p. 1-10). The problem for Rousseau is, “to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before (1762, p. 9).” Securing individual freedom as a group is possible, according to Rousseau, if the general will directs the sovereign (Rousseau, 1762, p. 10, 18-9, 22).
In chapter four of the Social Contract, Rousseau states the general will to be the common interest of an association (1762, p. 18). It is the subtraction of the dissimilarities between citizens. The difference is the social tie that binds the citizens together (1762, p. 21). Rousseau argues that it is necessary for there to be some degree of similarity among individuals to form a political unit among them. A social tie, decided through unanimity, is a necessary condition of the general will (1762, p. 18, 84). For this reason it is permissible to contract or expand a political unit to accommodate the boundaries of a social tie (1762, p. 36). The social tie is also referred to as the common good (1762, p. 18). If the common good guides the sovereign, then the association escapes the state of nature. Individual liberty is maximized; the individuals are collectively free (1762, p. 10-14).
The sovereign is guided by the general will through the following process. Sovereignty is accrued solely to the citizens. The citizens or their representatives have the power to legislate (1762, p. 29-39). Government is referred to as a separate institution that has an advisory or executive role. The government cannot act without the approval of the sovereign (1762, p. 42-48). The citizens of a polity determine what the general will is. This is done through majority or supermajority voting. Citizens vote in favour or against legislation by evaluating whether or not it is in the common good. The citizens do not think in particular or factional interests when
approving legislation (1762, p. 84-85). Rousseau notes that the majority, that is the ‘judgment’ which guides the general will, is not always enlightened. He recognizes that, although the right of determining the general will rests with the majority, the majority needs to be taught to think in terms of the general will, as opposed to particular interests (1762, p. 29). He does not state that factional interests do not exist, but that they should be subservient to the common interest (1762, p. 13). This is because the general will is different than the sum of all particular interests; it is the common good of collective (1762, p. 20-21; 82). Popular sovereignty entails that the general will must be flexible and reflective of each polity (1762, p. 6, 98). Rousseau states that different laws and political structures are suitable for different times and places (1762, p. 35). In order to be accurate, it is important to regularly pose two questions to the citizens: does the governmental structure reflect the general will? and do the representatives of government reflect the general will (1762, p. 80)?
Liberty is secured because all members of a polity participate in determining the general will. Rousseau states that all male members of a polity unit must be enfranchised. The general will regards the whole polity, and the “whole is not the whole minus one part (1762, p. 28).” More importantly, the general will secures liberty because it must be general in definition and application. Thus, legislation cannot regard a portion of society nor can legislation differentiate in how it is applied to different segments of society (1762, p. 86). This ensures that no voter is motivated to pass unduly oppressive laws. The generality requirements ensure that no legislation is overly burdensome (1762, p. 11). Conversely, all legislation should, if anything, enhance overall freedom (1762, p. 10-14). For this reason, the polity may legitimately force those who voted against a piece of legislation to conform to it. In doing so, the polity is only being forced the objector to be free (1762, p. 14).
Interpretations:
It is difficult to concisely define Rousseau’s general will. Many scholars have noted that Rousseau wrote extensively on the general will, but left the definition ambiguous (Russell, 1972, p. 698). The two main ways to interpret the general will is as a formal requirement or a
substantive goal (Williams, 2015, p. 219-246). The first view states that the general will is simply a set of procedural requirements that, when satisfied, legitimize the sovereign. The
second interpretation views the general will as an objective ideal. A manner to square the two, is to argue that the procedural requirements simply enable the citizens to discover that ideal.
The formal requirement position focuses on the procedural provisions of the general will. Rousseau clearly places necessary conditions for the general will to be determined. Authors who support this claim state that there are four clear procedural requirements: 1) generality of subject matter, 2) general applicability of legislation, 3) all members participate in approving legislation, and 4) all members think for themselves (Sreenivasan, 2000, p. 574). Requirements one to three are addressed above. The fourth requirement relates to Rousseau’s demand that there be no factions in society. This ensures that the honest opinions, unadulterated by group interests, are represented (1762, p. 21). On this view, the general will does not have a previously determined content. It is entirely reflective of the polity in question. Others argue that Rousseau separated the general will entirely from justice and law. The general will is subject to no moral conditions, save the procedural requirements (Scott, 1994, p. 490-491).
The substantive view of the general will looks to Rousseau’s other works for inspiration. David Jay Williams states that one must ask why Rousseau chose this set of procedural
requirements to legitimize the state. One finds an answer to this question by looking to his other texts. There one discovers that Rousseau was fiercely dedicated to justice (Williams, 2015, p. 219-246). Talmon argued that Rousseau believed the general will was a platonic ideal. The general will is an abstract yet true justice that could be discovered by man (1952). According to the substantive interpretation, Rousseau believed it was necessary to secure the free will of all individuals in order to discover this true justice (Bertram, 2017, p. 3.1). This is the answer to Williams’ question above. The procedural requirements Rousseau advocates secure liberty for each individual; the political structure prevents oppression of any individual or group. The substantive view does not deny that Rousseau placed formal requirements on the general will. Supporters of this view simply argue that the purpose of these requirements is to reveal an abstract yet objective general will (Williams, 2015, p. 219-246). Such an interpretation is supported by Rousseau’s statement that the majority is sometimes incorrect (Rousseau, 1762, p. 29). This gives reason to believe that the general will must not only meet procedural
Objections:
The general will has received much criticism since its publication. The main criticisms are that the general will legitimizes tyranny and oppresses individuality. The general will legitimizes tyranny by accruing all power to a majority. Krause argues that Rousseau’s diagnosis of the state of nature is correct, but that his solution is erroneous. Referring to Montesquieu, she states that not all power is unjust, but it is always suspect. The best solution to the state of nature is to separate powers and establish a political institution with checks and balances. The different institutions protect the rights of various groups in society (Krause, 2015, p. 147-172). Talmon argued that by making the general will coterminous with popular sovereignty, Rousseau laid the grounds for totalitarian democracy. This is specifically salient when the general will is attributed to a platonic ideal that is discovered through majority rule. This legitimizes the majority’s interpretation of justice and its right to have full control (Talmon, 1952). Rousseau believed that the inclusion of all members in society together with the generality requirement should prevent tyranny. This response to the tyranny objection is found unconvincing (Bertram, 2010, 3.3). A more general concern of Rousseau is derived from Montesquieu’s critique of republics. Montesquieu argued that republics require implementing a uniformed identity (Montesquieu, 1748, IV.V). This is impermissible because humans develop their identity based on various different levels of associations (Krause, 2015, p. 147-172). Rousseau’s general will obstructs liberty because it makes particular and factional interests subservient to the common interest (1762, p. 84-85). Individuals have multiple identities that are inspired by different associations. By stating one identity to take precedence of another, Rousseau is undermining liberty (Krause, 2015, p. 147-172).
Mill: Considerations on Representative Government:
In this section I summarize Mill’s conception of the ‘general will.’ Mill does not use the term ‘general will.’ Rather, he refers to the ‘general interest’ and the ‘common good’ of society (Mill, 1861, p. 19, 23, 46, e.g.). Unlike Rousseau, Mill did not dedicate a piece of work to this concept. Rather, he refers to the general interest or the common good in different pieces of writing (Mill; 1861; 1863; 1869). In Considerations on Representative Government (RG), one finds the most thorough discussion of the general interest (1861). Below, I provide an outline of Mill’s general interest as presented in RG. First, I provide a definition of Mill’s general interest.
Next, I present four institutional arrangements that Mill advocated as necessary for discovering the general will.
The definition of Mill’s general interest has two related components: the nature of the general interest and the process through which to discover it. According to Mill, the general interest are policy objectives, the outcomes of which, are beneficial to society as a whole by way of taking into consideration the specific needs and interests of all groups of society (1861, p. 16, 23, 38, 40, 46, 82, 93). Mill argued that the best manner to discover the general will is through debate among representatives of all segments of society (1861, p. 39, 60, 68).
Mill states the general interest to be a political outcome, such as legislation or policy, that promotes the well-being of society as a whole. Mill argued that legislation benefits society as a whole if the specific conditions and concerns of every strata of society is taken into account in legislation (1861, p. 16, 23, 38, 40, 46, 82, 93). Mill differed from Rousseau in that Mill did not believe that the general will was an objective ideal to be discovered through individual wisdom (Urbinati, 2002, p. 76-123). Discovering the general interest required unmasking the concerns and interests of every group of society and ensuring that legislation took the conditions of every group into account (1861, p. 39, 79-80) . The exact definition of the conditions and concerns of different groups of society were best communicated by the groups themselves (1861, p. 39, 79-80). For this reason, Mill argued that every strata should participate in the discussion on and influence how legislation is formulated (1861, p. 85, 282 ). This position was substantiated by an argument that man’s knowledge is fallible. According to Mill, this was especially true in the social sciences. One could not assume that through scientific observation one can discern what the conditions and concerns of society are (Mill, 1991, p. 37-42). These concerns were best conveyed through representatives of the groups themselves (Mill, 1861, p. 39, 79-80).
This understanding of the general interest lead Mill to support using deliberation among parties that represent the diverging interests of society to discover the general will (1861, p. 40, 69, 74-76, 95). Mill was a democrat in favour of majority voting, provided representatives evaluated legislation in light of the common good (1861, p. 85). Through deliberation, the
representatives of the diverging interests of society were able to aggregate their knowledge (Mill, 1861, p. 16, 82, 93). The culmination of different expertise on the interests and welfare of society ensured that the group came closer to discovering what was in the general interest than if they
had acted individually (Mill, 1861, p. 16, 74-76, 95). During the deliberation, representatives not only conveyed their interests. They were required to translate the diverging interests of society into a definition of a common good (Mill, 1861, p. 40, 74-6, 94). By way of having a debate, the representative’s convictions of what the common good was, were tested in light of another’s perspective. If one’s argument could not answer another’s objections, then one must rationally adjust his perspective. Conversely, if one’s argument could withstand counterarguments, then her argument was substantiated. This process filtered out fallacies and left the participants closer to a correct definition of the general interest than if they acted individually (Mill, 1861, p. 68).
Including diverging and controversial opinions in the debate enhances its quality as it provides more means of testing arguments (Mill, 1871, 74-76).
In sum, the general interest is best discovered through debate among representatives of all the various interests in society. The representatives evaluate each other’s arguments based on merit, whereby all well-reasoned arguments (from minorities and the majority) influence the group’s decision on the general interest. After having discovered the general interest, the representatives vote in favour of legislation in light of whether or not it coincides with the
common good. In this way, majority voting did not simply reflect the interests of the majority but deliberately took the concerns and conditions of minorities into account.
In RG, Mill designs a governmental institution which should facilitate the type of debate necessary to discover the general interest. There are four features of this institution. The first is a deliberative democracy. The second and third regard the electoral process: proportional
representation and plural voting. The last is separation of parliament and the executive. The role of deliberative democracy, as a debate among representatives of the various
interests in society, has been discussed above. Further, Mill illustrates how the representatives of society should view their role so as to foster a reasonable discussion on the general will. The representative in parliament is required to be an advocate of her constituent’s particular interests. As a collective group, the representatives are deliberators for the public as a whole (Mill, 1861, p. 46). Nadia Urbinati refers to this type of debate as an ‘agonistic deliberative procedure.’ The representatives are required to passionately plead the cases of their electorates while intentionally include the interests of other groups of society in the discussion (Urbinati, 2002, p. 81-104). Thus, discovering the general will is not simply an abstract discussion by representatives on what
the general will is. The representatives must purposefully include the specific interests of all their electorates (1861, p. 57-70). Mill presents the style of debate, as depicted above, and specifies how representatives should act in order to make the debate a success.
According to Mill, an agonistic debate has two requirements: an accurate representation of the various interests of society and competent deliberators. He emphasized that all groups of society must participate in the discussion and influence the outcome of politics (1861, p. 16, 23, 38-40). To ensure that all participate, Mill proposed full enfranchisement of literate adults (both male and female) as well as proportional representation (Mill, 1861, p. 79-80; 84-114). A degree of intellectual and moral competence was needed in order to ensure that the debate took minority interests into account. For this reason, Mill proposed that the morally and intellectually
competent be afford more political clout through plural voting (1861, p. 110-123). In RG, Mill argues in favour of full enfranchisement of adults (1861, p. 102-118). He believed that the individual is best capable of determining what her interests are and selecting a representative to defend those interests (1861, p. 39, 79-80). In RG, Mill endorses a specific style of proportional representation called the single transferable vote. Mill supports this system because it ensures that minorities are represented and that each voter has a specific representative (1861, p. 84-114). However, Mill believed that a degree of competence was necessary in order to translate representation of all interests in parliament into influencing legislation (Mill, 1861, 112-119). First, Mill believed that society as an aggregate needed to have a minimal degree of
education in order for this system of government to be successful (1861, p. 8-10, 46, 105, 110). Even with a minimal degree of education, it was still possible that the majority of representatives would ignore the arguments and welfare of minorities. Mill believed that bestowing the educated elite, which at that time formed a minority, with more political influence would safeguard against oppression by the majority (1861, p. 112). Mill proposed using plural voting to achieve this end. Plural voting ensures that the higher educated voters are able to elect more representatives in proportion to the less educated. The representatives of the higher educated form a large enough portion of parliament that it is necessary for them to approve legislation in order for it to pass. They were small enough that they could not act alone however (1861, p. 112-119). The educated elite were not required to think in their own interests. They were tasked with ensuring that the
majority also listened to the needs of minorities (1861, p. 112). They steered the debate towards an intellectual and reasonable discussion of the general interest (1861, p. 96).
Mill’s advocacy of radical democracy and an educated aristocracy is perplexing (Zakaras, 2007, p. 200). In terms of the general interest, it leaves the reader unclear about how one is best to discover what the general interest is. Many view Mill as a fierce supporter of competition in political debate (Varouxakis, 1999, 6-7). As Urbinati indicates, his support for plural voting cannot be squared with his commitment to competition. In skewing electoral voting power in the elites’ favour, Mill creates an uneven playing field for the lesser educated (Urbinati, 2002, p. 99, 103). Although this can be viewed as an inegalitarian means to an egalitarian end (Talmon, 1952, p. 107), it does not provide clarity on what Mill believed the best approach to discovering the general will is. Even though his enthusiasm for plural voting waned, it does not provide support for an interpretation of Mill as a radical democrat. His enthusiasm abated because it proved too difficult to distinguish between the intellectually competent and the wealthy or powerful in society (Talmon; 1952, p.100; Mill, 1861, p. 110). It is nonetheless transparent that Mill’s
admiration of education and intelligence was strong (Baum, 2003, p. 404-428; Mill, 1861, p. 84). Although these two positions, radical democracy and educated aristocracy, are in tension with one another, what is clear is that Mill believed that the general interest is best discovered through representation of all interests of society in parliament and legislation (1861, p. 16, 93). From his writings, one gathers that he supported a balance between competent and popular rule. Alas, he does not provide a straightforward answer to what the ideal balance is.
Mill supported separating the parliament and executive because the skill sets that the bodies required of their agents were incompatible with each other. The parliament was the sovereign (1861, p. 37, 39-40 56-70). The parliament’s duties were to discover the general interest through agonistic discussion and approve of proposed legislation (1861, p. 95). The nature of this work required critical thinking and antagonistic debate. The executive was required to formulate legislation and fulfill the quotidian bureaucratic tasks involved in running a state (1861, p. 56 -70; 60). This work requires civil servants who are experts in specific fields and who are capable of routine and monotonous jobs (Mill, 1861, p. 64-70). Allowing overlap could lead the
parliamentary discussions to become routine or technocratic and the executive to become impassioned and unorganized (1861, p. 69-70). Routine, in the context of political debate, was
