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How to retain political and ethical value in the face of nihilism: a synthesis of Nietzsche and Foucault

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How to retain Political and Ethical value in the face of Nihilism: A Synthesis of Nietzsche and Foucault

Introduction

For me, the two most important aspects of philosophy are Ethics and Politics; these concern how we should live. I consider politics to be a sort of ‘macro-ethics’; it discusses on the societal level what ethics discusses on the individual. I also accept the nihilist perspective that there is no inherent meaning or value to life. This essay elides philosophical justification of nihilism to focus on the solutions to this problem that Nietzsche and Foucault offer. Furthermore there are no justifiable objective rules for how to live. Neither Nietzsche nor Foucault offer this set of rules. Despite this, Foucault provides an understanding of the power relations that exist within politics and society. This gives us the information we need to structure our political thoughts and actions in terms of what is possible. Likewise, Nietzsche sets out the problems with the ethical sphere and the risks that come when we deny its validity. From there he tries to escape nihilism through life-affirmation.

Thus this essay will synthesise Nietzsche and Foucault in order to offer a political and ethical escape from nihilism. Nietzsche wants to make us aware of power as the central concept of life and to affirm life in the face on nihilism. Foucault wants to disclose the power relations that we exist within and offer ways of resistance. By synthesising these two philosophers I shall make both of their arguments and philosophical outlines stronger whilst remaining largely consistent with their goals, values and outlooks. We can fully explicate power relations for Nietzsche whilst helping Foucault resist negative unequal power relations. Through it we can escape nihilism and affirm life, whilst also understanding and engaging with a complex political field.

Nihilism is a threat because it leaves us with no reason to live. Because of nihilism’s factual reality, life is all that we have and has no other purpose other than itself. Nietzsche believes that we must try to hold onto it and increase its value by affirming it. Life affirmation means acceptance of life and its possibilities, taking joy in it, and trying to intensify your life experience. I think that Nietzsche, aided by Foucault, can offer us the best chance of escaping nihilism. I shall reinterpret the political aspects of Nietzsche’s theory which argue for a kind of naive aristocratic-conservative-hierarchy and then surpass it with Foucault’s more studied and complex understanding of the political-economic-social nexus. Likewise, I shall be surpassing Foucault’s concepts of ethics of the care of the self, particularly as a place of resistance, with a stronger conception of the self and ethics in the form of Nietzsche’s theory. This will be via Nietzsche’s radical understanding of an ‘aesthetic life’ and his denial of the Will to Truth in favour of life-affirmation. By constituting them as anarchists, I accept the radical nature of their philosophies and offer the best kind of political situation for escaping nihilism. Postmodern Anarchism is the best situation for the cultivation and growth of

Ubermenschen and the political form least likely to deny life. This interpretation enables me to intertwine their philosophies more fully and reveals them as the most complex, interesting and novel philosophers they can be.

To justify this synthesis I shall situate both within a proto-postmodernist philosophical stance. I think that in order to synthesise both we must position them within a largely similar position on the wider philosophical concepts, ‘eras’, and the like. I shall explain my understanding of this term in Chapter One.

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Nietzsche wrote for the ‘men of the future’ and was happy to let others push his philosophy further (pg6, 2007). Foucault, by taking his concept of power and applying it to the political field, did this. Previously Nietzsche had mainly applied his theory of the ‘Will to Power’ to the concepts of ethics and culture. For both of these philosophers the conceptions of, amongst others, power,

‘normalisation’, genealogy, and freedom are shared. This is unsurprising as Foucault claimed that he drew upon and expanded concepts taken from Nietzsche (pg262, 1997). Thus prima facie this synthesis seems justifiable.

The form of this essay will be as follows; I shall endeavour to prove that these two philosophers are compatible in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 I shall outline Nietszche’s prima facie political position, claiming both that it lacks fundamental insights and consistency with the goals of his philosophy. I shall then argue that he should be interpreted as an anarchist. In Chapter 3 I shall look to Foucault, again interpreted as an anarchist, to guide Nietzsche out of his political inadequacies, contesting Foucault’s position wherever it is problematic. In Chapter 4 I shall outline Foucault’s ‘ethical’ position of the subject. I shall outline in Chapter 5 how I think Nietzsche better creates an outline of a subject able to resist the power structures that Foucault describes and escape nihilism.

In terms of the specific periods of work of both of these philosophers I shall be looking at Nietzsche’s late work including On the Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, Beyond Good and Evil and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In terms of Foucault I shall be discussing his middle and later works specifically his lectures on governmentality and biopolitics as well as several of his later interviews, lectures and the like.

Chapter 1: Situating Nietzsche and Foucault

In this chapter I shall situate these two philosophers to justify my synthesis of them. Firstly, I shall claim that they can both be considered as proto-postmodernist philosophers; they are

postmodernists who maintain some sense of the self and normativity. I claim that whilst Nietzsche has many postmodern elements, he would consider some aspects of postmodernism life-denying. Foucault has an idea of the subject that is not straightforwardly postmodern and is normatively suggestive. I shall then again justify their synthesis by looking at their shared practice of the genealogical technique.

I understand the term ‘modernism’ as relating to elements of normativity, grand theoretical structures, and conceptions of objective truth and falsehood. ‘Postmodernism’ concerns being descriptive rather than prescriptive, instrumental rather than pertaining to completion, and fundamentally distrusting objectivity. In this sense a postmodernist can hold two opposing ideas at once, whereas a modernist must remain consistent within her theory. This is because, unlike a postmodernist, a modernist attempts to build a coherent system.

Nietzsche’s oeuvre is contradictory and inconsistent in terms of many of his beliefs and arguments. For example he makes such inconsistent claims as that he is interested in ‘truth’ and also that the ‘Will to Truth’ is a remnant of Christian slave morality. He claims distaste for states and governors yet also advocates for a return to aristocratic hierarchies. He claims sometimes that a man is strong if he can hold two inconsistent life-affirming ideas in his head simultaneously and at other times claims that the strong bind all their subordinate wills to a unitary will. He claims that no one should necessarily follow him but should extend his philosophy. Indeed this, and his aphoristic writing style,

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which aids this inconsistency, leads many postmodern philosophers, including Derrida, to claim him. Nietzsche, it seems, has a desire to be interpreted rather than be solely prescriptive or descriptive. There is much evidence for understanding Nietzsche as a postmodernist. However, I believe Nietzsche aims towards a shifting pattern of views in order to achieve certain aims or goals. Nietzsche is not looking to be a system builder. However, he is also not looking just to explain the world but to change it also.

Thus I can reasonably argue that there are some fundamental aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy that deny this simple categorisation of him as a postmodernist. The most fundamental aim of Nietzsche’s philosophy is to affirm life. Everything else is derivative to this. For example the Ubermensch is important because she is the being that can best further life (pg153, Schift, 2000). Gemes agrees arguing that Nietzsche is a modernist because he is fundamentally an affirmative spirit (pg338, 2001). For him this means that typically Nietzsche stresses the importance of finding a ‘single’ voice or ‘unitary spirit’. He accepts that unity is not a necessary aspect of subjectivity but it may be a goal for it (pg339, Gemes, 2001). By utilising Gemes I can show that Nietzsche is not a straightforward postmodernist. Nietzsche desires people to attempt a ‘self-creation’ under a unifying will; this is a form of strength and life-affirmation. For Gemes it is impossible to be an affirmative spirit without this singular voice because the death of the subject would be a form of nihilism, a state of being that Nietzsche abhors.

The aim of Nietzsche’s writing is to escape nihilism by affirming life; he wants to deconstruct everything that gets in the way of life-affirmation. His primary deconstruction is of Judeo-Christian slave morality which he considers to be ascetic. The reason he so detests asceticism is because it claims that life is suffering and so attempts to retreat from life whilst still living (pg97, Nietzsche, 1996). Nietzsche considers having life to be pointless if you are just trying to flee from its

possibilities; denying life whilst living is the ultimate folly. Nihilism stems from the fact that life has no higher aim or purpose. There is no God and therefore no fundamental reason for life. God is indelibly linked to asceticism on Nietzsche’s account (pg127 ,1996). Asceticism denies this life in favour of a belief in a ‘truer’ ‘essential’ life beyond this one. Once the belief in God has been denied then asceticism should fall with it. There is no longer the possibility of an ‘objective truth’ or reason to believe in ‘another world’. The worry for Nietzsche is that everyone then falls into nihilistic despair. Nietzsche believes that life is all we have so we should celebrate it and live to the fullest (pg12, 2007). Because of this, Nietzsche thinks it is unreasonable to throw it away in this despair. We do not know the value of what we discard (pg12, 2007). Indeed, Nietzsche claims that someone within life cannot value it properly because they are viewing it from the inside (ibid). Instead, he desires that we take what we can from life. Life consists of its goals; it precisely is the Will to Power. It is the striving for the next thing. The strong can do this more successfully than the weak. Thus Nietzsche sacrifices the weak to nihilism to free the strong to embrace life more fully. Asceticism gets in the way of life-affirmation, nihilism denies its worth entirely. Thus Nietzsche sets up a direct opposition between life-affirmation and nihilism.

Gemes states that the construction of a unified self is the Ubermensch’s aim. This is because the doer is constituted by his actions but these actions do not necessarily constitute a singular doer (pg340, Gemes, 2001). This rejection of postmodernism’s appropriation of Nietzsche is valid because Nietzsche has not rejected all authority (pg341-2, Gemes, 2001). What remains is our personal authority to guarantee ourselves (pg342, Gemes, 2001).

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Whilst Nietzsche is generally in favour of multiplicity, as seen previously, this unitary will is still a potential achievement by the Ubermensch. This is achieved by reinterpreting and redirecting drives (pg344, Gemes, 2001). The position of the Ubermensch is distinct because, unlike most individuals, she can form a hierarchy of individual drives to create a totalised singularity without necessarily repressing any of them (pg344-5, Gemes, 2001). This singularity constitutes the subject (pg345, Gemes, 2001). Thus Ubermenschen are special because they have an unconscious organising master drive. Fundamentally then Gemes argues that postmodernisms’ valorisation of disorder is life-denying, which Nietzsche would find unacceptable. Thus if we understand Nietzsche as an affirmative spirit we should accept that not everybody is capable of constituting themselves as a subject but to say that none are is inappropriate. This is all connected to the idea that philosophy should shape the world. Nietzsche wants people to be affirmative, to desire things, to have and achieve goals, and to constantly push themselves forward.

However, a unitary soul is not necessary to do this. One can push in many different directions, and it is unclear at this point whether Nietzsche is advocating strength as a singular strength or the

potential to desire many opposing things simultaneously. What is clear, is that Nietzsche wants a certain normative aspect of his philosophy to remain; the aspects of willing and life-affirmation. Therefore I think that it is best to situate Nietzsche as someone who is a proto-postmodernist; he wants people to act in whatever way they see fit, as long as it is life-affirming and they actually act. We should understand life-affirming here as that which gives strength both culturally and

biologically. This is because, for Nietzsche, one’s ‘biology’ (physiology) is connected to what one can achieve in terms of furthering civilisation and continuing life itself (pg11, Nietzsche, 2007). Thus Nietzsche’s conception of life-affirmation has an aesthetic element but is also interested in the continuation of life for its own sake. For Nietzsche, life consists of the Will to Power; the constant drive to outpour one’s and to strive for ever more power (pg20, 1998). Therefore there is a

fundamentally normative aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy underlying the subjectivity of choice and personal ‘becoming’ that remains open.

If postmodernism is life-denying, then Nietzsche would reject it. David Foster Wallace argues that it is. He claims that it is massively self-referential, self-conscious, ironic and atomising (pg159-161, 1993). He claims that the uses of these techniques are entertaining and effective but also cause great despair and stasis within culture (pg171, Foster Wallace, 1993). This serves to alienate one whilst remaining part of the “million-eyed-crowd” which creates an authority vacuum (pg177-8, pg180, Foster Wallace, 1993). This causes our attention and knowledge, rather than our action, to become our chief commodities (pg181, Foster Wallace, 1993). Nietzsche, however, wants us to act (aphorism 10, pg6, 2007). Irony was formerly used to combat hypocrisy but is now just enfeebling (pg182-3, Foster Wallace, 1993). This is because, for Foster Wallace, postmodern irony is purely negative and destructive; the ironist is impossible to define or to pin down. In this situation it cannot be possible to affirm anything. For example, if one is at a party and stands at the back making quips rather than engaging with it then you are simply devaluing its potential value for yourself and everyone else. You are paying attention to it but are unwilling to find meaning within it. You are present, but unattached. Therefore you can neither determine, nor be determined. Thus strands of postmodernity would be viewed by Nietzsche as life-denying. Nietzsche is in favour of what

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Foster Wallace claims that this use of irreverent irony is to combat mass angst, thus occupying a similar role to that of Nietzsche’s ascetic priest (pg191, 1993). The priest uses ressentiment and turns it back on the weak lessening their angst but not furthering life (pg96, Nietzsche, 1996). It allows a life of pain to continue by consuming itself. Foster Wallace claims that when all experience can be deconstructed and reconfigured we are in a state of liberation in which there are simply too many choices and so this freedom to choose is not actually particularly liberating (pg191, 1993). However Nietzsche could respond that only those strong enough can actually be liberated by this. One would need a remarkable amount of strength, but the Ubermensch has this strength.

Regardless, Foster Wallace claims that real rebels (we can transfer in ‘the strong’, or ‘heroes’) risk things, risk disapproval and take chances (pg193, 1993). He claims that postmodernism, particularly postmodern irony, does not allow this. Thus postmodernism is at least partially life-denying. It opens up a myriad of options but does not allow one to fully commit to any one of them. It makes one pay attention, but not act. Thus I argue that, following Foster-Wallace’s interpretation, Nietzsche would accept certain strands of postmodernity whilst rejecting others in favour of a vague normative essence.

This circle can be squared by considering the fact that Nietzsche considers truth to be a relatively unimportant factor in making decisions. He claims that the Will to Truth is a remnant of Christian slave morality and therefore inherently life-denying and reliant upon a nonexistent God (pg5, 2007, Nietzsche). We can ask; why value truth? If truth is not life-affirming then we can deny or ignore it. He claims that we should not follow theories, and whilst this is prima facie a ‘postmodern’ comment, it can also be interpreted as saying that one should not necessarily be postmodern if it is not life-affirming (aph14, pg6, 2007, Nietzsche). Postmodernists set out arguments declaring the

impossibility of being a coherent modernist. Nietzsche could ‘accept’ the truth of this and still reject it as denying. Indeed, he writes that systems in general are false because belief in them is life-denying (aph26, pg8, 2007, Nietzsche). This can be interpreted as subscribing to a postmodern interpretation or, perhaps, as refusing to accept the delineation between modernity and postmodernity by picking out aspects of both which are most useful to his project; affirming life itself.

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche claims that everything is only ever interpretation (pg33, 1998). Furthermore, Nietzsche states that “I fear we shall never be rid of God, so long as we believe in grammar” (pg20, 2007). This has been taken by postmodernists, such as Deleuze, as evidence that Nietzsche is a radical postmodernist because he denies philosophical modernism as a secularisation of Christian slave morality. Grammar, meaning etc. here can be interpreted as positing truth. However, the strong can use the apparatuses of slave morality in order to gain power and affirm life (pg15, Nietzsche, 1998). An example of this would be using democratic institutions, something that Nietzsche thinks is a secular aspect of slave morality, to gain power. Therefore just because

Nietzsche does not fit neatly into a modernist stance, it should not be claimed that he is an outright postmodernist. Nietzsche lies in the nuanced middle as a proto-postmodernist. As Nietzsche claims, falsehood is not an objection for him (pg8, 1998). The question for him is whether x is life-affirming (8-9, Nietzsche, 1998).

Foucault is similarly interpreted by many to have opposing ideas. His strategy of laying bare the machinations of public and private society whilst withholding comment and normative thrust have seen him interpreted as an anarchist, a nihilist, a neoliberal and other conflicting positions. He is still

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more straightforward to situate. Within this disagreement about his normative position, Foucault’s work is generally accepted to be a classic example of postmodernism. However I would argue that we should approach this question with some nuance. The reason for this subtle difficulty is because he engages in techniques that evade the attempt to constitute a general interpretation for him (pg101, 2001, Chambers). In doing so he manages to challenge the rules of the game by which he can be criticised. It is only by trying to constitute a general interpretation for him, that one can conclude that Foucault’s work is relativistic, unproductive or contradictory (pg102, 2001, Chambers). On this interpretation Foucault only aims for an understanding of power and knowledge’s dynamic and historical interdependence. Foucault offers analyses and methodological prescriptions but never theories. Thus Foucault subscribes to postmodernism by actively trying to disengage from potential modernist critique and criticism.

However, many critics have claimed that Foucault rejects postmodernism and goes back to the concept of the subject because of his later discourses on this topic. By reconstituting the subject he is claiming that there is an objective ‘true’ self. However, this is not the case. We can interpret Foucault as considering the subject as ‘shallow’ rather than ‘deep’. In other words there is no ‘deep’ or ‘true’ self but there is our day-to-day experience of being a self. The self exists as a useful fiction (White, 2014, pg497). It is useful for explicating how we can exist in a state of resistance to power and dominatory relations rather than being a fundamental basis for this resistance. We shall come back to this in Chapter Four.

Indeed, Foucault considers his work as a toolbox rather than as prescriptive or normative (pg917, Thiele, 1990). He outlines things without explicitly telling people what do to with this information. He tries as far as possible not to make value judgements but instead just bring out the nature of the things he discusses. These tend to, via revealing their inner workings, become attached to valuations anyway. Once we have recognised the state of the world and how it influences us then we can use this information, if we wish, to reconstitute ourselves in opposition to these structures and try to influence them. However, the very nature of the topics he discusses means that he cannot escape having some normative implications and valuations. By choosing the topics of freedom, power, political and technological control we see that these are the topics that are most important for him. By engaging with these topics he is tacitly valuing them. Therefore I can reasonably posit that these issues are normatively important for Foucault, even if he accepts that they may not be for everyone. Thus Foucault is easier to place within the postmodern milieu than Nietzsche but does have aspects of his work that are, if not normative, then suggestive, and he retains the concept of the subject in some form.

We can affirm the synthesis of these two philosophers if we consider their usage of the genealogical technique. This is standardly cited to link them but still bears establishing. Foucault takes up

Nietzsche’s concept of a genealogy and applies it to the realm of politics, institutional power and the subject. Nietzsche had previously used it on ethics, the subject and culture. This historical technique is underpinned by a fundamental conception of power as both creative and destructive of meaning. Following Thomas, genealogy is a violent interpretation of the past as an interpretation of events surrounding events, changes and developments (pg104, 1993). It is both an interpretation and an explanation (ibid.). It has two key elements: uncovering what is present, but misunderstood or disguised, and focusing on the future through a better understanding of the past. This provides new insight into the present and functions to liberate the present in terms of the future. Thus it always

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provides new interpretations for the past and future. Since they both study the world in a very similar way the two philosophers tend to reach analogous conclusions.

Foucault claims that the world of speech and desires has known “invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys” (pg76, 1971). Thus genealogy must record singular events which do not have any finality. This is because the meaning of x will change as it is reappropriated. Genealogy opposes the search for origins (pg77, Foucault, 1971). Foucault claims that there are two uses of the word

‘Ursprung’ in Nietzsche. The unstressed usage relates to origin of duty or guilty conscience whilst the stressed usage relates to the opposition between ‘Herkunft’ and ‘Ursprung’. Foucault claims that Nietzsche challenges the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung) because this is an attempt to capture something essential or pure (pg78, 1971). This is to have faith in revisionary metaphysics, something both philosophers deny. The historical beginning of things only contains the dispersion of other things (pg79, Foucault, 1971). Origins presuppose truth whereas actually, as Nietzsche shows, truth has a history itself that can be studied genealogically (pg79-80, Foucault, 1971). Therefore, for Nietzsche and Foucault, a genealogy of “values, morality, asceticism and knowledge will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning” (pg80, Foucault, 1971).

Nietzsche utilises three separate words to explain genealogy. ‘Herkunft’ relates to stock, descent or ancestry. This is to analyse a certain race or social type enabling the distinguishing of different traits either within or without that grouping (pg81, Foucault, 1971). This allows the dissociation of the self to reveal lost events and the discovery of the events that formed a trait or concept. Foucault claims that “truth or being lies at the exteriority of accidents” (ibid). This heritage is always an unstable assemblage; it shows that what was thought to be consistent with itself is not (pg82, Foucault, 1971). Nietzsche particularly brings up the concept of the body (physiology) when talking about genealogical shifts. Descent attaches itself to the body as the manifestation of what was past. Therefore genealogy in this instance is situated within explication of the body and history.

‘Enstehung’ describes emergences which are episodes of subjugation, domination and subjection. Emergence is always produced via force. It is a place of confrontation (pg84, Foucault, 1971). It is the non-place where domination and subjugation take place (pg85, Foucault, 1971). Every emergence establishes “marks of power” denoting “memories” (ibid.). For Foucault these violent emergences are then constituted within a system of rules thus entailing domination. These rules can then be utilised by the sufficiently strong to further their own aims (pg86, Foucault, 1971). Thus

interpretation is used to impose a direction which is isolated from the previous interpretation. Therefore what genealogy does, for both Nietzsche and Foucault, is record human development in this way. Enstehung is “a scene where forces are risked in the chance of confrontations, where they emerge triumphant, where they can also be confiscated” (pg93, Foucault, 1971).

Genealogy can also be considered as a historical sense that totalises history without positing a metaphysics (pg86, Foucault, 1971). It evades absolutes (pg87, Foucault, 1971). This unstable ‘effective history’ introduces discontinuity into our very being and this is what constitutes it as such (pg88, Foucault, 1971). It denies stability. For Foucault the world is a profusion of entangled events and so history becomes, or should become, a “differential knowledge of energies and failings, heights and degenerations, poisons and antidotes” (pg90, Foucault, 1971). This effective history acknowledges that any knowledge is a perspectival knowledge. Thus truth is a matter of perspective; there can be more than one truth, and better or worse perspectives. Therefore Nietzsche’s historical

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sense is explicitly perspectival; it values its own judgements upon events and objects. Thus knowledge in turn becomes affected by the genealogical technique.

Therefore we can see that genealogy as utilised by both Foucault and Nietzsche opposes the idea of history as a ‘remembering’, a continuity, and objective knowledge. The purpose of this is to dissipate our identity so that we can reveal the heterogenous systems which then inhibit the formation of new forms of identity (pg95, Foucault, 1971). However, we must be wary of the Will to Knowledge which can enslave us (pg96, Foucault, 1971). Nietzsche, particularly, was wary of seeking truth over that which is life-affirming (pg96-7, Foucault, 1971). Searching for truth is not the highest goal for him. Therefore we can see that Foucault and Nietzsche are linked by their utilisation of the genealogical technique. Since they study history in the same way, and look for the same things within it; power, ancestry of ideas and norms, etc. this is another connection which justifies synthesising them. In this context the genealogical method is important in terms of justifying a synthesis of Nietzsche and Foucault rather than whether it is itself convincing.

Both Foucault and Nietzsche are fundamentally interested in power. Nietzsche argues that all action and life is predicated upon the Will to Power whilst Foucault thinks that every relation is a power relation. The questions of freedom and progress inherent to both their theories help add to and cement this conception. Foucault can be viewed as Nietzsche’s successor who politicizes the concept of the Will to Power into a successful instrumental and critical overview of power relations. The linkages between both philosophers’ utilisations and conceptions of power will become readily apparent throughout the course of this essay. Therefore I shall allude to it in each particular place and start the essay proper.

Chapter 2: The Political Nietzsche

There are two main ways in which scholars have tried to understand Nietzsche’s political thought. Some, such as Call and Newman, have looked at the fundamental aspects of his philosophy and then tried to extrapolate the most likely, appropriate, or desirable political affiliation for Nietzsche. Others, including Warren, have looked at his limited writing on the subject for guidance. In my opinion we should investigate whether his political writings are compatible with the more fundamental aspects of his philosophy. If they are, then we should accept them. If not, then we should discard them in favour of a more appropriate political philosophy. In this chapter I shall outline what Nietzsche values in political situations. This will include Nietzsche’s initial preferred political situation. I shall then argue that these requirements are best satisfied by positioning Nietzsche as a postmodern anarchist. I shall then claim that, despite this reinterpretation, Nietzsche’s naive understanding of politics requires Foucault’s more complex appraisal of this subject in order to be relevant to modern political and societal situations.

As I interpret Nietzsche the most fundamental aspect of his philosophy is to celebrate and aid that which is life-affirming. As a philosopher most interested in culture, cultural renewal and progression, he believes in the characteristics of the Ubermensch. The Ubermenschen, the ‘free spirits’ etc., are the people who can best drag humanity forward, as a species, into the future. The Ubermensch is the connecting pivotal point between what is life-affirming and culture-affirming. This successful flourishing culture is what the Ubermensch is caused by, initiates and continues. Affirming life leads one to do things that lead to cultural flourishing. Thus via positive action, one of the defining

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Because Nietzsche views life from an aesthetic perspective, cultural flourishing is fundamentally life-affirming. Life is aesthetic so something aesthetic such as positive culture necessarily affirms life. Cultural life specifically is aesthetic life. Therefore Nietzsche’s political philosophy is based around how best to facilitate the flourishing of these powerful people who affirm life. Aesthetics is used by Nietzsche as a counter-concept to ethics; it is what is attractive or ‘beautiful’ rather than morally correct. Nietzsche would consider culture to come under the umbrella of the aesthetic. For him aesthetics exists in a different realm to the moral as we shall see later. Culture is that which human society creates; it is the fruit of life which affirms life. Something that affirms life adds value to life and makes it worth living; it makes one desire more life. Affirming life leads to further affirmation of life and thus an escape from nihilism.

In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche writes that culture and the state are antagonists because one flourishes at the expense of the other (pg44, 2007). This is because political power lessens one’s ability to freely create. This is a reasonable claim because the less freedom one has the less one is able to do. However, many artists claim that by limiting their materials or by creating strict aesthetic rules for themselves they are forced to be even more creative. Nietzsche could respond that one could still choose to limit oneself but not having to means that one has more creative freedom. Linked to this, Nietzsche claims that equality, as part of Judeo-Christian morality, is tied to cultural decline (pg70, 2007). This is because “the pathos of distance is proper to all strong ages” (ibid.). This pathos of distance keeps the strong separate from the weak and thus enables the strong to flourish. This would make the age ‘strong’. This is because the strong can be held back from fully exhibiting their strength by caring about the weak. Thus this distance stops this care. Nietzsche also claims that the decay of all organising power is itself decadent. He means that there must be some level of structural domination for culture to flourish. He believes this because, for him, freedom contains value only because it is hard to achieve. “[The] value of a thing lies in the amount we have to pay for it” (pg71, 2007, Nietzsche). Thus Nietzsche does not necessarily value the easiest way to affirm life or get the strong to flourish.

Indeed, Nietzsche sometimes values institutions because they increase the value of freedom by making it harder to have. He claims that liberal institutions once established do not remain liberal. This is because they undermine the Will to Power and are exemplary of slave morality’s equalising nature; they make people “small, cowardly and pleasure-loving” (ibid.). However, he also claims that fighting for such institutions promotes freedom. This is because, paradoxically, war allows the illiberal instincts to be acted on. It trains men to be free. This freedom consists of the will to take responsibility and grow indifferent to hardship and sacrifice. This preserves the distance between the strong and the weak. “What does not kill me makes me stronger”; those that have the

propensity for strength are able to fulfil their potential by reacting to difficulty and hardship (2007, Nietzsche, pg5). An example of this would be philosophical argumentation; one does not create a strong theory by responding to straw-men criticisms but by engaging with the hardest possible objections to one’s theory. This theory may fail because of these objections, showing it to be ‘weak’, but if it overcomes them then it shows itself to be ‘strong’. The response I make to a potential criticism of my work, if strong, helps sure up the whole theory. Thus Nietzsche’s claim holds.

Freedom in this sense is virility and joy in victory; life-affirmation and the Will to Power. Thus on this interpretation illiberality has some attraction for Nietzsche.

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The “highest type of free man” is he who has overcome the greatest resistance (ibid.). Nietzsche does not want it to be easy to achieve greatness for the strong. Nietzsche claims that it is only by being in danger that we become aware of our resources and are compelled to be strong (pg72, 2007). In other words, if you do not need to be strong, you have no chance of becoming strong. The strong cannot help but be strong but this struggle will help you realise your fullest potentiality and capabilities (pg29, 1996, Nietzsche). Thus freedom is something that needs to be seized by force for Nietzsche. Nietzsche claims that the same conditions which ‘level’ men generally also enable exceptional men to gain their exceptional qualities (pg195-6, 1998). This makes many people slaves and the few strong highly successful (pg196, 1998, Nietzsche). For Nietzsche, a species originates and becomes strong through struggling against constant hardship (pg234, 1998). Thus democracy inadvertently rears some form of ‘super-tyrant’.

However Nietzsche criticises his modern world for being unable to supply great men (pg27, 1996). Thus if modern society is the hardest place to become great one could argue that we should appreciate this situation and Nietzsche should seek to further slave morality’s grasp over the modern world so attaining one’s full strength is even harder. In response, Nietzsche’s issue with the modern world is that it is too soft so greatness is nearly impossible to achieve. It is difficult to achieve greatness because nothing is hard enough in the modern world as it is all focused on facilitating an easy life for the weak. Nietzsche claims that we have become soft in comparison to bygone eras because of the victory of slave morality (ibid.). Because I have no serious struggles, it is very difficult for me to do anything great. I neither have the drive to escape a particularly difficult situation, since I do not find myself within one, nor the wherewithal to do something truly

impressive, as I have not been challenged to improve. Slave morality’s abhorrence of suffering and cruelty means that whilst it is ‘hard’ to become great, it is easy to live, and therefore the strong cannot find situations in which to surpass themselves. Nietzsche would consider life in the West too comfortable; real discomfort is now anathema. Thus the modern world offers the ‘wrong’ sort of ‘difficulty’ for Nietzsche.

Nietzsche distinguishes between liberal democracies and successful authoritarian organisations. Democracy has only a soft amount of power of organisation (pg73, Nietzsche, 2007). Institutions are constituted by anti-liberal wills such as the will to authority so insofar as they are successful liberal institutions they will have latent tendencies towards secularised slave morality, but insofar as they are successful institutions they will have authoritarian streaks that increase the difficulty of attaining freedom. Thus democracies are still authoritarian (pg121, Nietzsche, 1998).

Despite his seeming affection for traditional aristocratic authoritarianism, Nietzsche still states that a “retrograde formation” of government is impossible (pg75, 2007, Nietzsche). We must constantly be striving forwards. This, however, contrasts with his statement that respect of authority and of tradition are inherent to institutional structures (pg73, 2007, Nietzsche). These are inherent to their stability and thus their power; an institutional structure tends to be weaker the less stable it is. Furthermore, Nietzsche claims that if you want slaves, then you should not teach them to be masters (pg74, 2007). This relates to the idea that democracy’s self-stated aim is to empower the people through their connection with and partial control over its institutions. Nietzsche recognises that institutions, particularly democratic institutions, are flawed for the kind of work he needs political structures for. However, he cannot see a way out of this issue and thus desires the ‘least bad’ option of an authoritarian aristocratic-conservative political structure. Due to his desire for

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self-overcoming and progression we cannot interpret this to be a desire for a classical form of such a political structure. It must be a new type. We can aid him in his conception of the best political structure for his fundamental philosophy of power as we shall see later.

We must also remember that Nietzsche believes that great men do not exist for public utility (pg82, 2007). They exist for themselves; for however they best affirm life and exercise their Will to Power. This is a necessary consequence of his individualistic philosophy. It is individuals rather than collectives that affirm life. Thus any political institution on Nietzsche’s account should work for them, not the other way round. The weak are also just tools for the strong to surpass themselves and become great. This is the case for Nietzsche because the weak are incapable of surpassing themselves and affirming life. It is difficult to affirm life in the face of nihilism, suffering and

hardship. If we accept Nietzsche’s strong-weak distinction we must accept this. Therefore I interpret Nietzsche as desiring any political structure that best enables the strong to flourish, regardless of any potential unpalatable consequences such a political institution might have.

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche claims that the belief in gradations of rank comes from viewing things “from above downwards” (from the strong) (pg43-4, 1998). Furthermore, he states that what is nourishing to the ‘higher class of men’ will not necessarily be so for the ‘lower class’ (pg44, Nietzsche, 1998). Thus he believes that the “common good” is a contradiction in terms (pg57, Nietzsche, 1998). This means that there is nothing that is good for both the strong and the weak; they have diametrically opposing goods. Thus the logical conclusion is that one can only aim for the good of one of these groups. Nietzsche then naturally chooses the strong. Since he believes that gradations of rank come from the strong then they are justified in creating them. Great things are only achievable by the strong and therefore democracy only brings the strong down to the level of the weak and unfairly disables them from achieving what they can (pg58, Nietzsche, 1998). I shall leave what these possible ‘great things’ are vague because the strong can be great in an almost infinite amount of conflicting and contradictory ways. Nietzsche wants to enable the strong to be great in the way that best suits the individual.Democracy is, for Nietzsche, then only a good for the weak. The nation-state should facilitate the strong to achieve what they can, whether via agonistic practices of enforced hardship or enabling; “a nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men. Yes, and then to get round them” (pg94, Nietzsche, 1998). Such a society exists just so a few beings can elevate themselves to their “higher duties” and “higher existence”; affirming life and transcending man (pg225, Nietzsche, 1998). If we accept Nietzsche’s distinction between the strong and the weak then we are forced logically into agreeing with this conclusion. What aphorism 126 (pg94, Nietzsche, 1998) tells us is that the nation-state should only be there for the strong, to enable them to surpass themselves. However, Nietzsche also claims in aphorism 166 that he greatly dislikes nations (pg99, 1998). Therefore there is a contradiction here over whether Nietzsche actually desires a state.

Whilst Nietzsche posits that being ruled over absolutely is a source of relief for some, and thus sometimes desired by ‘the herd’, he also claims that the democratic movement is part of the secularised Christian movement (pg127, 1998). Thus socialism’s aim is to autonomise the herd. He evidences this by claiming that it denies every special right and claim as well as advocating for compassion and abhorring suffering (pg128, 1998, Nietzsche). Since Christian morality also does so this is justifiable. The resultant democratisation, Nietzsche claims, makes man mediocre. To refrain from mutual hurt and to consider the other an equal, without good reason, is to deny life (pg225-6,

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Nietzsche, 1998). This is because life is “appropriation, injury, conquest [. . .] suppression [. . .] incorporation, and exploitation” (pg226, Nietzsche, 1998). Thus one must try to be the incarnation of the Will to Power as life precisely is this Will to Power. Otherwise one denies life. Nietzsche

considers intolerance a form of justice because to be tolerant is to not value the higher man as such. This is justifiable if we accept his contention that the higher man is to be valued above all.

However, Nietzsche also claims that he finds authoritarianism distasteful, though useful in that it can achieve a unified will (pg146, 1998). Indeed, he claims that ‘free spirits’ tend to be ‘good Europeans’ in the sense of being cosmopolitan and anti-nationalistic, but also that sometimes they are indeed ‘patriots’ (pg193, Nietzsche, 1998). He relates this to the fact that one can be a ‘great statesmen’ but still do awful things; as we have seen, it is not what he achieves that is important, rather, that he achieves it (pg194, Nietzsche, 1998). In the same way, whilst abhorring democratic movements, Nietzsche still recognises that they have created an “essentially supernational and nomadic species of man who possesses [. . .] a maximum of the art and power of adaptation as his typical distinction” (ibid.). Nietzsche claims that this pertains to Anarchism, thus potentially alluding to some small fondness he has for it. Here then we can see the first inkling that Nietzsche has more anarchistic leanings than he himself thought. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that in general the European problem is that of creating a new ruling class (pg210, 1998). However, in the same breath he claims that exceptional people do not favour ‘rulers’ because they do not like ‘rules’ generally. Thus they have to create new values to exhibit a new form of politics. Furthermore, apolitical Ubermenschen may not desire political power but seek to achieve their Will to Power in alternative ways. Thus

hierarchical political systems will only favour some, not all, Ubermenschen.

All this confusion and contradiction stems from the fact that ‘free spirits’, Ubermenschen, etc. can be exceptional in an almost infinite amount of ways. The only defining characteristics of

Ubermenschen are their almost unbounded Will to Power and the life-affirmation inherent in everything they do and every way they act. Therefore a political system that enables one type of hero will disable another. Thus we need a political system that can enable all the different possible Ubermenschen whilst making it satisfactorily hard for them.

Thus I think the best way of situating Nietzsche, within at least a vague political milieu, is as an anarchist. Nietzsche is critical of Anarchism, but this is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what Anarchism can offer to his philosophy of power and life-affirmation. Nietzsche derides

Anarchism because he thinks it is a product of ressentiment. This ressentiment, and the values of equality and democracy that it brings, came about because of the slave revolt in morality. Thus Nietzsche considers democracy a product of this slave revolt, and Anarchism as its most extreme result. Ressentiment is an attitude that characterises slave morality. In other words, Nietzsche considered anarchists to be nihilists full of bad conscience and resentment. Nietzsche was explicitly opposed to all such radical politics because he saw them as manifestations of ‘herd politics’ (48, Call, 2001).

Anarchism can be defined as a rejection of all political authority. This is because anarchists argue that the state embodies the oppression, enslavement, degradation and exploitation of man. It is the fundamental oppressor in society. The state is autonomous and has its own logics of domination and self-perpetuation. Any economic exploitation is then derived from this. This is reflected in bourgeois relations. Anarchists believe this autonomy of the state means it cannot be trusted as an instrument

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for revolution. However, Nietzsche would disagree arguing that the state apparatus can be used by powerful men to dominate. In this case the state would be justified. Indeed, there are many points of contention between Nietzsche and classical Anarchism. An anarchist could respond that it would be impossible for individual men to really control the state apparatus as it is too complex and dispersed to function like that. They claim that despotism and oppression are embedded in this very structure. This would seem to limit the possibilities and advantages that a Nietzschean Ubermensch could have by ruling with it. This would be Foucault’s argument too as we shall see later. Indeed Nietzsche also sees modern man as ‘tamed’ by the state because it is a dominating structure that imposes a “regularized interiorisation” upon people (Newman, 2000). In other words it forces the self to change from without. This will link to Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics. In this way, both Nietzsche and anarchists reject the concept of the ‘social contract’ whereby the citizens of a state agree to be ruled in return for benefits like safety and security.

Classical Anarchism has an essentially optimistic perspective about human nature. Anarchists argue that the state has a negative effect on relations that would otherwise be mutually sympathetic. Thus classical Anarchism can be seen as a struggle between ‘natural authority’ (our inborn ways of acting) and ‘artificial authority’ (the power of the state). They believe that humans have innate moral and intellectual capacities. Thus the state represses human potentiality. Nietzsche would partially agree with this particular statement, whilst noting that not everyone has this potentiality, and that the state would potentially enable others. Classical Anarchism’s point of resistance therefore is within human subjectivity; our innate natures would better rule us than the state. However, this implies that human essence will only come out into the world once political power has been destroyed. Kropotkin for example argues that “mutual aid is the predominant fact of nature”; man is naturally cooperative, sociable and altruistic (2017, pg5). Thus, for him, morality evolves out of our natural tendency to band together in mutually assisting and cooperative groups. Since our morality is inherent the state is superfluous. However, because classical Anarchism sets up this essential opposition between state and society it creates a binary, dialectical logic that means that Anarchism requires the state to exist. Anarchism in this way can only exist in opposition to the state. Therefore classical Anarchism obeys the general rules of ressentiment. Ressentiment requires an opposition to define itself against. Nietzsche classifies it as resentment and envy of the strong (pg23-25, 1996). Its fundamental term is negative; it defines the positive in relation to the negative i.e. good is that which is not evil. Through Anarchisms’ radical exteriority this ressentiment emerges. Therefore we can see that Nietzsche is right, under his understanding, to criticise Anarchism. This is because this dialectic suggests that man would have an incomplete identity without the state; without something to resist, without oppression, the subject could not see itself as moral or rational. Therefore, the anarchist’s identity is complete in its incompleteness, and the state is essential to this. Anarchism can only posit people as both moral and rational by defining political power as immoral and

irrational. Anarchists cannot ‘know’ what their true identities are because the political oppression of the state conceals it from them.

Furthermore, since classical Anarchism seeks to overcome power it is necessarily a politics of ressentiment. Any attempt to deny power is conditioned by power relations and therefore this excludes potential identities which are ‘acts of power’. Nietzsche believed that any attempt to exclude and deny power is a form of ressentiment. Anarchism can therefore only escape

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resist power. This is not paradoxical because power is itself only a relationship of forces; power is everywhere. Thus one has to choose a separate power relation to resist a prior power relation. An example of this is Brexit; rather than it being a question of explicit ‘sovereignty’ or ‘subjugation’ to the European Union British citizens actually had to decide whether they wanted to be part of the EU power bloc or another, such as the USA. In trying to resist the European Union’s power Britain has to engage with another. Nietzsche could argue that Britain should aim to be totally self-sufficient and so not have to engage with other powers. However, even if one is self-sufficient there are still power relations; the European Union or another power bloc could try to damage Britain. Here we need to distinguish between relations of power and relations of domination. Relations of domination, in a definition that Foucault would agree with, only come into being when power relations have ‘congealed’ so as to stop the flow of power. In other words, power becomes stable and stagnant in one direction. It is these relations of domination that define the state. Since separating from power is impossible we are all potentially liable when it comes to relations of domination. Thus an anarchist must be constantly on guard against this, and can successfully do so, as it is possible to minimize the relation of domination.

Newman offers a solution for a non-ressentiment version of Anarchism (2000). Since taking down the institutions and apparatus of the state via revolution would ignore the power relations the state is built upon, Newman claims that this would allow new forms of domination and power relations to arise. Because of this supposition, the only reasonable response for Newman is agonism (2000). This supposition is justified because the State exists because of power relations rather than the other way round. The State is just these power relations having become relations of domination. Since one can aim for less oppressive and dominatory power relations we can overcome particularly dubious relations via working on ourselves. By transforming our relation to power by accepting its necessity anarchists can posit a version of Anarchism without ressentiment. Since this is an active willing of nihilism, this transcends nihilism in a way that Newman thinks Nietzsche would find appropriate (2000). This could be life-affirming enough for Nietzsche through affirming the Will to Power via creative, life-affirming values; to self-overcome. Affirming both difference and contingency is to become strong. Thus a sort of Anarchism could exist that would escape Nietzsche’s contention that all Anarchism is a product of ressentiment and slave morality. This lends Nietzsche’s political thought the opportunities that Anarchism offers it for achieving the fundamental goals of his philosophy. Nietzsche advocated a conservative “aristocratic radicalism” because his only political concern was the production of Ubermenschen, the beings who would “inherit the earth” (48, Call, 2001). Call however notes that Nietzsche also developed his own critique of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, the state and the economics that justified a potential interpretation of Nietzsche as an anarchist (pg49, 2001). Thus if we can accept Call’s interpretation we will have this justification.

Call points out that Nietzsche’s critiques tend to be focused around culture (ibid.). I shall leave Nietzsche’s notion of culture vague so as to enable his theory to affirm as broad an array of lifestyles and cultural aspects as possible. For the sake of brevity I shall again elide justification for this. Thus Nietzsche’s critiques of Capitalism and the state are only significant if they posit these structures as dangerous to culture. We have seen that for Nietzsche culture and life-affirmation are inherently bound up so this is a justified position to take. Also, Nietzsche’s philosophy potentially widens the scope of anarchist critique by including culture and ‘political culture’. Call claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy points towards elements of postmodern Anarchism by creating an “anarchy of the

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subject” which undermines the concept of subjectivity (pg49-50, 2001). This in turn damages subject-centred reason (pg50, 2001). Without this concept of subjectivity subject-centred reason cannot hold as there is no subject to justify it.

Call claims that Nietzsche does this by creating an anarchy of becoming; a continuous project of both self-overcoming and self-creation (pg52, 2001). Consequently our subjectivity becomes fluid,

dispersed and pluralistic. Call justifies this by claiming that Nietzsche’s work is performative rather than prescriptive. Because of this performative style Call claims we should interpret Nietzsche to be saying that we should use the concept of cruelty as a tool to redesign both ourselves and our institutions (pg54, 2001). This radical redesign would be performed via an “infinitely spiralling critique and a permanent linguistic revolution” (ibid.). This conception of cruelty is justified in two ways. Firstly in terms of it being necessary to self-overcome as one cannot surpass oneself without rejecting (being cruel to) the self that one was. Secondly it is justified by Nietzsche’s distinction between the strong and the weak and his focus on the necessity of the ‘pathos of distance’. This ‘cruel’ distance enables the achievement of greatness.

As we have seen Nietzsche finds Anarchism problematic because he sees it as a destructive form of cultural nihilism (pg56, Call, 2001). He sees anarchists as representative of a fragmented and decadent political culture (pg57, Call, 2001). This is an issue for him both because it is not, and may prevent, a vibrant European culture. Nietzsche thought that political culture develops in the same way as biological evolutionary forces. This view encouraged him to take the long view and regard culture in terms of large historical processes. Call claims that Nietzsche rejects both Nationalism and classical Anarchism because it obstructs the establishment of a genuine pan-European culture (pg58, 2001). Indeed, Nietzsche claims that “Europe wishes to be one” (pg218, 1998). However, a

postmodern anarchist could articulate such a thought in terms of a postmodern ‘commons’. This would entail ‘difference’ along with “provisional tactical alliances” (pg59, Call, 2001). In other words, postmodern Anarchism has a kind of theoretical commons in which a radical political culture could grow which uses Nietzsche’s concepts of self-overcoming and value creation. Call evidences this with Zarathustra who claims that the creator of new values is either a criminal or an anarchist, depending on the political implications (pg60, 2001).

As further evidence Call quotes from On the Genealogy of Morals; “a legal order thought of as sovereign and universal [. . .] as a means of preventing all struggle in general [. . .] would be a principle hostile to life” (ibid.). The extension of the legal realm is directly responsible for an unhealthy culture. Finally, again quoting Zarathustra, Call claims that Nietzsche accepts that the state is life-denying (pg62, 2001). This is because it obstructs a genuine self-surpassing by restricting the strong’s space to do so. However, because of this it is genuinely difficult to act on one’s strength. Therefore it makes freedom even more precious. One could respond that in an agonistic

postmodern anarchist situation it will be just as difficult to achieve strength as one must overcome everyone else still and assert one’s power in all situations equally. Thus an Ubermensch whose created values are in keeping with the state’s aims would find it easier to live within such a nation-state than an anarchy. We cannot know for definite whether one is more difficult than the other and thus more valuable as we have no historical examples of such a postmodern anarchy. However, it seems reasonable at least to posit that such an anarchy could be just as valuable to Nietzsche’s goals as a state. Thus postmodern Anarchism can help Nietzsche escape the necessity of a political

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commons, that enables the strong to selfovercome and create their own values. Indeed, since such an anarchy is not life-denying, unlike the state, it has added benefits in comparison to the

aristocratic conservatism Nietzsche advocates.

For such an anarchy to be palatable to Nietzsche I must be able to show that it is in keeping with his anarchy of the subject. Concerning this, Ansell-Pearson claims that On the Genealogy of Morals aimed to show that a subject’s conscience and free will is not a necessary condition (pg64, Call, 2001). Nietzsche thinks of free will as an error. This is because, for Nietzsche, actions are the result of the socio-cultural forces that have constituted the individual performing them. There is no being behind doing for Nietzsche (pg29, 1996). The actor and the action are one, and the ‘actor’ is constituted by what preceded him i.e. his ancestry etc. This has radical ramifications for politics (pg65, Call, 2001). Liberal theories and institutions for example depend upon a completely different idea of subjectivity to be coherent; there is a person who makes decisions and then acts on them. Nietzsche contests this.

Instead, for Nietzsche, change is fundamental to who and what we are (pg66, Call, 2001). His philosophy, like postmodern Anarchism, is a philosophy of becoming. This concept of becoming, according to Call, implies a radical personal responsibility which is fundamental to Anarchism. Both postmodern Anarchism and Nietzsche can consider humans to be works of art in progress. There is only one imperative shared by both: “become who you are, create yourself a masterpiece” (ibid.). This involves revaluing and creating new values. Therefore we can see that this understanding of Anarchism is already fairly close to Nietzsche’s fundamental conception of the purpose and aim of humanity and individuals. Humans are ‘selves-in-process’ (pg67, 2001, Call). Therefore there is at least the possibility of interpreting Nietzsche as a postmodern anarchist. For my argument to hold, it is only necessary that Nietzsche can be posited as a postmodern anarchist rather than this being his only possibility. If I can show that it is useful to his fundamental goals, i.e. appropriate to interpret him in this way, and that I can situate him along the same lines of Foucault, then it is justified to use both to aid the other.

I can use Conte to show that whilst Nietzsche denigrates the decadent conditions of the modern world he can also be in favour of alternative models (pg381, 1999). By defining the political as the “set of organisations, representations and practices which bears upon the distribution of power” Conte can extend the political sphere beyond just the institutions of government (ibid.). It is clear that Nietzsche can be construed as an anti-statist according to Conte as Nietzsche calls the state “the coldest of all cold monsters” and a parasite (ibid.). Conte claims that the higher types of men who desire to self-determine should be allowed to refrain from political participation so that they can advance themselves (pg383, 1999). He argues that the state, because of how it is constituted, cannot allow these individual achievements. The higher men are the only ones who can escape nihilism, the purpose of Nietzsche’s writings. Furthermore, through the culture they create and things they do they can move us away from a “nihilistic age” (1998). This aids everyone but is not their (main) purpose. Therefore we must look for an alternative type of political organisation in order to support the ‘higher men’ as those most able to affirm life.

Nietzsche sees only the triumph of the weak behind universal emancipation (pg384, Conte, 1999). For him resentment is behind all social values. He claims that great cultural moments have always been times of political corruption. Pertaining to anarchists particularly, he claims that their impulses

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for subversion and destruction are aspects of ressentiment in that it aims to defeat privilege (pg385-6, Conte, 1999). However, this just relates to social Anarchism (pg38(pg385-6, Conte, 1999). Indeed, Bakunin claimed that the species advances through individual initiative (ibid.). By utilising Bakunin I can show that there are many different types of Anarchism, not all of which clash with Nietzsche’s

fundamental tenets. Bakunin’s theory specifically helps elucidate that Anarchism is not necessarily as Nietzsche perceives it. Bakunin celebrates the natural diversity of strengths and abilities. He aims for humanity’s highest potential. Therefore he seeks “the abolition of fictitious, privileged, legal and official influences”, not necessarily a lack of leadership (ibid.). If x is better at leading than y then x should be allowed to do it. Furthermore, Bakunin’s theory of collective self-discipline helps realise a model of self-determination which is based upon the “natural incidence of higher intellects upon the lower” (ibid.). This theory aims to create a system of voluntary and mutual influence based on both self-restraint and the use of personal initiative. This ‘natural’ leadership enables reciprocal

interaction while recognising inequality. Thus this formation of Anarchism is not as far away from Nietzsche’s ideal as he supposed. It can account for the natural incidence of difference between the strong and the weak.

Anarchists often talk about praxis (direct action) as necessary for implementing change within the political realm. Nietzsche has reservations concerning such actions because he believes in the necessity of patience surrounding a process that will ultimately achieve or further higher goals (pg387, Conte, 1999). Nietzsche thinks that “men are capable of consciously resolving to evolve themselves to a new culture” (ibid.). Further, he believes that genuine progress can only be achieved through ‘better individuals’ not by institutions (pg388, 1999, Conte).

Nietzsche considers that revolutions tend to be socially divisive events and infused with Christian value judgements because they give the majority a chance to act. Therefore one will be generally unsuccessful at escaping from Christian morality through revolution. Moreover, Conte claims

Nietzsche only considers social change appropriate when a new nature has been produced in people via novel critical vision. Thus Nietzsche advocates a “gradual transformation of mind” (ibid.).

However, he also tries to eliminate false reverence for things that obstruct this potential progress. Indeed through the very nature of his genealogical approach he shows that whatever exists does not necessarily have the right to. Thus Nietzsche could advocate a kind of revolutionary gradualism. This would be a movement towards fundamental shifts in social organisation through individual efforts at self-improvement. This is constituted by struggles against old modes of life to build new instincts. Conte argues that potential achievement can be harmed by convention, arbitrary distinctions, or unwarranted privileges and that this leads to the social order being threatened (pg390, 1999). He claims that the individual should be situated in a position to achieve the best she can. This would constitute the best possible societal arrangement for both the strong and the weak. He still accepts that a pathos of distance is necessary to keep the strong’s creative abilities intact and to enable them to develop these abilities. This is all acceptable within my interpretation of Nietzsche. Thus Conte advocates an organisational model in which these higher men direct resources in a politically open society. There are no institutional mechanisms so when new capacities are needed and old ones are outgrown it is easy to reshuffle. However, it seems politically naive to assume that

everything will work in the intended fashion. Those with power have tended to desire holding onto it so new capacities may not be supported and the situation could ‘congeal’ into a structure of

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In response, Nietzsche could deny that this competition over power is necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, Conte claims that this competitive situation enables experimenting for the ongoing creation of higher values. Thus it enables and acknowledges a plurality of possible higher values within a plurality of changeable yet vaguely ordered constructs. Therefore it also presumes the existence of competing perspectives which avert some of the destructive effects of ressentiment because people will be unwilling to make ‘final’ socio-political judgements. Nietzsche could thus be interpreted as desirous of a culturally sustained order of achievement that protects the intersubjective processes of individuation (pg391, 1999, Conte).This enables me to expand Nietzsche’s conception of what it is to affirm life, something that he would appreciate but was unable to do because of his historical milieu. Such a society would be meritocratic and sustained by a self-regulating community of individuals. This would relate to the equality of equals. This equality is an agonistic principle where people have the same right to assert epistemic authority, but not necessarily the same claim. This equality of access does not entail an equal right to allocation. Through this acknowledgement of distinctions between individuals there is constituted an agonistic order of rank that helps individuals self-overcome. Thus within this anarchistic format, the strong can rise to the top through agonistic struggle. This satisfies Nietzsche’s most important criterion. This agonistic equality can then

constitute a framework for social unity. It is a practice which enables a space for adversarial respect and undogmatic identity. It also enables the pathos of distance (pg392, Conte, 1999). It legitimises difference and qualifies equality. Thus we can see that it is reasonable to reinterpret Nietzsche, via his fundamental goals, as a postmodern anarchist.

Warren however, posits that there are several weak aspects of Nietzsche’s potential political philosophy. By utilising Warren’s critique of Nietzsche’s politics I can show that it is necessary to supplement his theory with Foucault’s. Warren claims that human powers can be organised so they constitute an agency that can act in the socio-historical world (pg207, 1988). Warren claims that “exploitation, domination, struggle, mastery over others and hierarchy are inevitable aspects of politics and society for Nietzsche” (ibid.). This is because, for Nietzsche, “exploitation [. . .] belongs to the essence of what lives [. . .] it is a consequence of the will to power” (ibid.).

However, Warren is also aware that there is more than one Nietzsche. There is the Nietzsche whose philosophy of power celebrates domination, exploitation etc. and the Nietzsche whose philosophy of human agency shows how individuality, responsibility and positive freedom are consistent with reciprocity and equality (pg208, Warren, 1988). Like me, Warren posits that Nietzsche’s politics are inconsistent with his philosophical project because his metaphysics denies his politics. Warren claims that this is because Nietzsche did not have appropriate categories for analysing contemporary social organisations. He claims that this point is particularly relevant for organisations like markets and bureaucracies. Indeed, Warren claims that market economies and bureaucracies are not reducible to Christian-moral culture (pg214, 1988). This all comes out particularly in two errors. The first of these errors is Nietzsche’s comparison between how the human will is organised and how society is organised. It is very clear that the characteristics of human action are not analogous to societys’ characteristics.This is both methodologically and substantively suspect. Not all social or political events happen because of the strong individual’s will. Rather, the structures of state and society cause change. For example the bureaucratic structure of the EU affects what can and cannot be done within it. As it is set up as a neoliberal international supra-structure with many checks and balances then this is how it acts with only limited possibility for action and change within this base structure by the individuals that constitute it. As shown by the failure of the League of Nations,

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