NGO Influence: Frame Congruence and Organizational Resources in News Coverage as factors related to the likelihood of preference attainment in Environmental EU Policy-Making

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NGO Influence.

Frame Congruence and Organizational Resources in News

Coverage as factors related to the likelihood of preference

attainment in Environmental EU

Policy-Making.

Nadine Sofia Lagerholm Lara Student number s1744348

Master Thesis

Public Administration | International and European Governance Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Leiden University The Hague, The Netherlands

10th January, 2019 Supervisor Dr. C.H.J.M. Braun

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Abstract

The study of NGO behavior and influence on EU decisions is relevant as it adds to the interest group literature. This plausibility probe case-study provides an insight on NGO influence attempts during the decision-making process of environmental EU legislation. More specifically, it examines news coverage as a platform for lobbyism through the eyes of Frame Congruence and Organizational Resources theories. The data is gathered from five

prominent European media platforms and 126 newspaper articles. From here, I analyze the frames and resources of various NGOs (and other interest groups) in order to test the plausibility of the theories and seeing whether this theoretical construct can be found in the empirical instance and thus be considered for further testing. This is done by providing suggestive testing but still not any final and conclusive answer. The results help explain the role that NGOs play in European politics through alternative ideas.

KEY WORDS. NGOs; influence; European Union; environmental policy; news coverage;

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Acknowledgement

Special thanks to my supervisor Dr. C.H.J.M. Braun of the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University, who regardless of her busy schedule, always had the time to look at my work and help me steer it in the right direction.

Thank you for your support and guidance through this process.

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1. Acronyms

NGO - Non Governmental Organization

eNGO - Environmental Non Governmental Organization MEP (s) - Member of the European Parliament

EU - European Union

T&E -Transport & Environment

CEMA - European Innovation Partnership on Agriculture EEB - European Environmental Bureau

EEA - European Environmental Agency HEAL - Health and Environment Alliance C1- Case 1 C2 - Case 2 C3 - Case 3 H1a - Hypothesis 1a H1b - Hypothesis 1b H2a - Hypothesis 2a H2b - Hypothesis 2b

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2. Introduction

October 4th, 2018. After many years of decline, International and European news media have spread the word: The European Parliament has approved a draft law which aims to reduce carbon emissions from new cars by 20% by 2025 and 40% by 2030 (Neslen, 2018; Reilhac & Carbonnel, 2018; Sigal, 2018). The proposal is a hard-won compromise between NGO environmentalists and car industry advocates as it marks another success for NGO lobbyism. However, such achievement has gone through a long period of NGO persuasion and

campaigning.

EU negotiations on reducing carbon emissions from cars goes many years back. The 2009 EU regulation on cars and CO2 emissions (Regulation 443/2009) was the first European legally binding regulation which aimed to reduce road transport impact on climate. In here, eNGOs (such as Greenpeace and T&E) played a big role in the discussions as they reacted to EU legislators and carmaker proposals through numerous accusations in press releases (EU cars & CO2, 2009). Such reaction had to be taken into account as this did not only mattered to climate change but also created public discontent and controversy. The recent draft approval on car emission reduction and the 2009 regulation are examples of how eNGO lobbyism has perhaps had an effect on EU policy. Also, as environmental concerns increase, it appears that the EU and MEPs have turned even greater attention to environmental NGOs expertise and their views.

Supranational environmental policy and the involvement of interest groups during the

decision making processes is a relevant topic in social research. As above mentioned, interest groups such as Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have turned their view to this area by trying to influence and have some kind of say during decision-making processes. This type of involvement started to be particularly evident since the negotiation process for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development back in 1992 (Sjöstedt, 1992). From then on, national and international governance have witnessed a great deal of NGO activity. An example of this is seen through the European Union, where increasingly the Commission has opened its doors to NGO participation and guidance.

As NGO participation in environmental negotiation has increased over the years, literature on the topic has expanded substantially (Sjöstedt 1992; Rietig, 2016; Hanegraaff, 2015;

Hallstrom, 2004; Dalton et al, 2003; Betsill et al, 2008; Junk, 2015; Junk & Rasmussen, 2018; etc).

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But how do these actors express their interests and lobby the decision-makers?

There are several methods for interest groups to lobby. These can be summed up into outside and inside lobbying strategies. Inside strategies relate to direct interaction with the decision makers, while outside strategies are more public related such as street protests or mass media attention. Specifically the latter has been awarded with a vast amount of research where the findings suggest that it is likely that the media functions as a forum for interest group lobbying and a major actor during legislative decision-making processes. Hence, news

coverage becomes a facilitator for NGO impact during policy making and can play a powerful role in shaping political outcomes (Robinson, 2001). A main contributor to this form of influence is the way in which issues are framed. During decision-making processes and environmental policy negotiations at the EU level, the framing of issues is crucial as they are the ways in which one can understand the outcome of policies (Junk & Rasmussen, 2018). Through the media, NGOs use the power of frames and express their opinion about certain issues expecting to influence how EU policy makers will deal with environmental policy negotiations (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Junk & Rasmussen, 2018). During policy negotiation, it is argued that if an NGO frame is congruent with the policy makers’, then frame

congruence will be achieved (Junk & Rasmussen, 2018).

Although there is an extensive amount of research focusing on the effect of mass media on NGO lobby influence in EU legislation, the literature shows how NGO lobbying strategies and the level of influence during legislative processes is a process which has not been clearly defined yet. This is related to the fact that there are a number of factors which are argued to be determinants to NGO lobbying and their portrayal of frames in mass media. Frame

congruence (between lobbyists and the policy maker) is spread among interest groups and thus every issue will involve different NGO (or any other interest group) behavior and

interest (Boräng & Naurin, 2015). This may depend on the relevance and area of the issue, the actor who’s being affected and its relevance, the actor who dominates media coverage or the amount of publicity that proposals receive. Other determinants are the type of frame that is being used (either individual or collective) or the level of the demand.

Regardless, there is one factor to NGO lobbying through the media which will always come first: resources. In order for interest groups to gain media coverage and excerpt their frames through this platform, it is argued that an organizations level of resources will “decide” whether they will be or not welcome. According to previous literature, the amount of

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2004; Bunea; 2013, Dalton et al, 2003; Dür & Matteo, 2012). This has to do with the fact that resources give certain power to interest groups which enable them to have certain preference towards the media. These resources can go from having a greater budget (leading to greater board, experts, investment on ways for being heard, etc.) to simply having greater connections with the newspapers themselves.

The amount of previous research does provide with a great deal of information on NGO behavior and influence through the media, however, there is no research linking directly the relation between resources, frames and the media. I believe this is relevant as these are factors constantly being mentioned in the NGO research and expanding the research in the matter could lead to greater answers and a better understanding to such interest group behavior. As a result to previous research, I argue in this paper that NGO media coverage affects their effectiveness in lobbying policy making decisions and that all NGO influence factors listed above will be determined first by who gets to portray their frames in the media (and who does not), based on their resources.

2.1. Research Question

Thus, the main research question of this paper is based on these factors as a reflection to past research questions. Examples of questions that may be asked here are:

• How interested are NGOs in sharing their ideas through the media compared to other interest groups?

• Is there any congruence among NGO frames and what are common frames found through this arena?

• How do resources relate to interest group influence and prioritization through the media?

The focus of my study is to explain the role of NGOs in Environmental EU policy-making through their behavior in the news media in a plausibility probe case study. This is done by examining the theoretical constructs of resource mobilization and frame congruence as factors related to the likelihood of preference attainment, hence influence.

The above mentioned questions capture the focus of this paper and have led to the following main research questions:

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Does the type and extent of media coverage matter for NGO frame congruence, And,

How do these organizations’ resources relate to the process?

To analyze this, three environmental EU legislations were randomly chosen and a new data set containing frames and interest group resources was generated on a sample of 126

newspaper articles. This was derived from five different European media platforms from the legislation’s period of decision-making.

2.2. Aim and Contribution

The study builds on the literature in public administration and development economics theories. These literature regards state autonomy to NGOs and view these actors as important sources of power in world politics and relevant watchdogs in the topic of globalization as they exert pressure to adopt responsible practices (Couttenier & Hatte., 2016).

The principal contribution of this paper is to complement past research argumentation by investigating whether the type and extent of media coverage through frame congruence and resources matter for NGO preference attainment and thus, influence. By doing so, I will broaden the understanding of the nature on NGO behavior during EU environmental legislation.

First, I test whether NGOs tend to share the same frames and preferred policy positions and how this may affect the final policy outcome. Second, I estimate whether resources are a determinant of media coverage on NGO lobby influence.

As this research is merely a plausibility probe, it is relevant to mention that it does not intend to provide conclusive evidence nor offer final answers to the issue, but rather explore the research topic (NGO influence) through certain areas in depth (framing of issues and resource mobilization) that will enable a greater forum for discussion and will help determine the validity of theory to see if it can be considered for further testing (Gomm et al, 2000). Also, the data gathered in this paper will provide a new way for testing existing theories and analyzing the previously considered factors involved during NGO lobbying through the media.

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2.3. Social Relevance

We are currently living in a planet were climate change has become an urgent matter as it poses a fundamental threat to everyone and people’s livelihoods are put at extreme risk. At the moment, it is fundamental that eNGOs exist and thrive as it is necessary to spread and push for environmentally friendly values and hence positively influence international climate policies. Furthermore, campaigning via news coverage is a crucial work as it does not only influence government officials but public opinion too, which can also turn into putting more pressure on governments. Creating awareness of this type of NGO influence will increase its popularity and hence, its given relevance to climate change. The more public campaigning is done, the greater the impact eNGOs and other interests groups will have. Thus, the more significant the results will be. As it is a topic that concerns and affects every citizen, one should understand how the news we read every day do not only encourage public

engagement, but perhaps also manage to influence the most relevant decisions in climate-change negotiations.

Besides current climate change concerns, research on the effect of NGO influence on policy (and other interest groups) should be of societal concern as this groups represent the citizens interest and thus enhance participatory democracy. Also, this organizations may act as mediators between the public and EU policy makers, and hence it becomes a way for the public to engage in politics.

The better we understand this groups influence, the greater the chances to learn how to enhance and improve it. Thus, I argue that it is to everyone’s convenience to discuss and understand the importance and the role of interest groups in global climate policy.

2.4. Scientific Relevance

The study of NGO influence in supranational environmental policy making is an important topic to science as it can provide greater answers to recent matters in international politics. As politics is about power and who gets what, when and how, studying NGO influence is crucial to the research on the role of interest groups in the process of policy making, as one may then be able to understand their power in politics. Moreover, the literature is still far from being exhausted, particularly due to the constant changes in the relationship between NGOs and policy makers and change over priorities at the international level; environmental issues are one great example of a tremendous shift of interest over the last couple of decades. Thus, the

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more relevance is given to certain issue (in this case, environmental policy), the more relevant it is to understand it.

Furthermore, influence is a difficult matter to measure and there are no final answers as previous research has indicated. This is because it can be measured quantitatively or

quantitatively and it is not a tangible measure. Also, it is measure that can be subject to bias or different understandings from different perspectives. In this paper, I intend to provide a new form of measuring NGO influence by introducing a thesis of a plausibility probe study based on two theoretically constructs which then are empirically tested to prove their validity.

2.5. Structure of the Thesis

The study proceeds as follows: first, I introduce previous literature related to the area of interest being NGO involvement in supranational environmental policy-making and leading to NGO influence through mass media coverage; thereafter, I develop a theoretical argument which is based on frame congruence and resource mobilization values; following an

explanation of the data used and research design.

The research analysis is divided in two. The first part (model 1) looks into analyzing the relevance of framing through the media and how this may be affected by the number of actors sharing the same frame. Later on, I look into it more specifically by codifying preferred policy positions such as safety, rights, economy or environment.

The second part of the analysis (model 2) looks into resources as a determinant of media coverage on NGO (frames) lobby influence. I will the proceed to a section in which the

empirical findings will be discussed in order to look into what was learnt and understood from the research analysis.

Lastly, a conclusion will provide a summary of the study and final remarks.

3. Literature Review

This section looks into discussing previous literature which has focused on the understanding of the increasing role, involvement and influence of NGOs in supranational environmental policy making.

First, I will discuss previous research that has looked into this topic in a broader perspective, which is generally speaking about NGO involvement in supranational environmental

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policy-making. This topic leads to the factors affecting this kind of involvement and how they have managed to influence the area. The literature argues that there are different types of strategies this actors follow in order to do so, as they will be presented in here. One of these strategies is reaching mass media news coverage. This is where the main topic of interest of this research arrives, and thus, I proceed to discuss what previous researchers have come to understand about this aspect and what is still yet to understand.

3.1. NGO Involvement in Supranational Environmental Policy-Making

Previous literature shows how over the last decades, there has been an increasing role and involvement of NGOs in the processes of environmental decision-making and policy-making at the supranational level. Together with this phenomenon, the literature on the topic has developed and a lot of questions have been looked into (Sjöstedt 1993; Rietig, 2016; Hanegraaff, 2015; Dalton et al, 2003; Hallström, 2014; Beyers, 2004; Betsill, 2008; Bunea, 2013; Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Dür 2008a; Klüver, 2009; Wonka et al, 2010; Chalmers, 2011; Dür, 2008b; Dür, 2008c; Dür et al, 2015; Dür & Matteo, 2012; Löfgren & Lynggaard, 2015; Klüver et al, 2015; Junk & Rasmussen, 2018). In here, research shows both a positive and a negative behavior from governments officials towards this new form of NGO participation and it reveals a number of factors affecting this kind of participation.

In 1993, Sjöstedt wrote a book dedicated to the understanding of international environmental negotiation and gave certain relevance to the role of interest groups. He explained how this kind of participation started to be particularly evident since the negotiation process for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development back in 1992 (1993). What Sjöstedt (1993) believed made this such a particular case for NGOs was their increasing demand for access and participation in international environmental negotiations. However, Sjöstedt (1993) argued how governments were still very reluctant to NGO representation during the process of environmental negotiation due to the fact that these organizations often criticized policy makers and governments. Hence, he tries to convince the reader about the relevance of NGO participation and discusses how NGOs could make important contributions to future negotiations. This could be done by mobilizing support, contribute to agenda setting for negotiations and introducing a number of recommendations that could help authorities set priorities that would enhance effective negotiation (1993). However these are only

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recommendations and the author did not back up the argument with the results of empirical research.

Two decades later, Hallström (2014) focused specifically on NGO involvement at the

European Union level (at the general policy level and not only environmental) and continued to agree with Sjöstedt’s (1993) argument about how governments are reluctant to NGO participation. Hallström says that despite the growing number of NGOs trying to influence and the willingness of EU officials to listen (specially since integration continued through the 1990’s), most of the policy information has continued to remain a top-down matter (2014). Also, he mentions how EU officials tend to prefer the involvement of other kinds of expertise because these actors (NGOs) are often seen as poorly trained and weak actors (2014, p.179 and p.189). Regardless, just as Sjöstedt (1993), Hallström (2014) discusses the benefits of including this actors in the negotiation process. However, this time Hallström (2014) based his argument in the facts of research and demonstrated how NGOs could help in the creation of effective policy negotiation, since whenever they weren’t very active in certain policy, the processes of the negotiations would tend to be more slow and less efficient (2014). Lastly, Hallström’s (2014) findings led him to the assumption that an organization (whether NGO or any other interest group) with more resources will have more access to the negotiation arena. Bunea (2013) also looked into how some interest groups may be more or less involved during policy (specifically environmental policy at the EU level). What Bunea found, is that it does not necessarily mean that some groups are more or less accepted in policy, but that depending on the interest the group represents, the more or less chance they will have to be welcome in the process (2013). Instead of Hallström’s (2014) argument which says this actors may be less welcome because of their lack of expertise, Bunea believes that it rather depends on the policy type and how this actors may contribute, whether NGOs or other types of interest groups (2013). Also, in her findings, Bunea (2013) is brought to the argument that the organizational form of a group is also a factor for participation, which relates to some extent to Hallström’s resource theory (2014). More literature which relates to this factor will follow and special attention will be given below.

3.2. NGO influence in supranational policy-making

The researches above discussed lead to the assumption that NGOs do (sometimes) have the opportunity to influence supranational policy-making, regardless of the obstacles. Previous

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research supports this judgment by providing a number of situations in which this may be present.

For example, Rietig (2016) carried a research on supranational environmental policy and NGOs. In here, Rietig argued that successful influence had to do with vis-à-vis support, where NGOs communicate their demands and in return, government representatives listen and incorporate these information “into their own negotiation position to push for agreement on the NGOs behalf” (2016, p.269). Thus, it is understood that in order to find successful influence of NGOs in policy, it is necessary to encounter certain will and support from both parties, as this will lead to a positive behavior in negotiation. Based on this findings, and in contrary to Sjöstedt´s (1993) and Hallström’s (2014) arguments on government reluctance to NGOs, Rietig (2016) mentions how governments have started to value such involvement because their participation enhances legitimacy and the presence of public support.

Another research by Betsill et al (2008), looked into the outcomes of NGO involvement and suggested that when NGO recommendations have less impact in policy, the higher the chances they will be accepted by the policy makers and manage to influence the processes (Betsill et al, 2008). Hence, it is then assumed that the higher the impact a recommendation has on policy, the lower the chances this recommendation will be taken into account. Also, Betsill found that there are higher chances to influence if this is done at the early stage of agenda setting instead of trying to influence during latter and more specific discussions (2008). Bunea’s study (2014) also supports this theory in her findings and compliments it by arguing that besides the impact and time in policy, it is also about whether this actors support or not regulation. Meaning that, there are higher chances to influence if the actors demand for no regulation than for more regulation.

3.2.1. Organizational resources as a policy influence factor

Besides the above discussed, I found that a great deal of literature regards their attention to one certain aspect that seems to lead to more influence: organizational resources. These include financial resources and structural characteristics such as board and membership size. It appears that most of these research follow a resource mobilization theory which would argue that group behavior is strongly related to their organizational resources (Gamson 1975 in Dalton et al 2003). Most of the literature I found on this topic agrees on Hallström’s previously mentioned argument of how an organization with greater access to resources will

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2004; Bunea, 2013; Dür & Matteo, 2012). Also, both Hallström (2014) and Dalton et al (2003) agree on how the more financial resources an organization has, the higher the possibility for an organization to be more active. However, Dalton et al (2003) refer specifically to eNGOs in environmental policy and Hallström (2014) looks into all interest groups in EU policy. In Dalton et al’s study (2003) the main hypothesis argues how the more resources, the more political action (of any kind). This is because both financial and structural resources are required for research, infrastructure, etc. Hence, rich groups are more likely to public demonstrations and lobby decision makers. The argument is backed up by Dalton et al not only with empirical evidence of their own but also with previous research from Shaiko (1999), Dalton (1994) and Walker (1991).

This theory will be used in my study as I am interested in the relevance of resources and whether this is a factor affecting NGO lobbyism in the media and their findings serve as support to my own hypothesis. Regardless of the fact that Dalton et al (2003) give more attention to political protest as a form of outside strategy, I assume in my study that the media functions as another form of outside strategy and can be used in the same argument.

Another study which has looked into the matter of resources is Beyers (2004). In his study, Beyers compared two theoretical frameworks about political mobilization, one of them being resources (and the other one institutionalism). What Beyers adds, is the argument about how resource-based explanations are not complete enough for explaining interest group lobbying strategy behavior as this creates a way of seeing the organization only from their own

characteristics and forgetting about the relevance of the external (institutional) environment in which they exist (Beyers, 2004, p.213).

The above researches provide determinants to NGO influence, however it is difficult to

conclude that we will only be able to see NGO influence if the degree of influence wont affect the policy as much or if the form of lobbyism comes always at the exact same time in the policy time frame. I believe that from looking into the available literature, it appears there is not one and absolute determinant for NGO influence but rather many, and these provided alternatives compliment each other. NGO influence is determined by a number of factors. Whether a recommendation does not have much impact in policy, or if it is the correct moment in the decision-making process to excerpt this influence attempts, or if there is vis-à-vis support between NGOs and government officials, and most importantly (as a vast majority of literature suggests), whether the organization possess the adequate amount of resources. I

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say most importantly because my findings of previous literature led to this factor and thus, it brings me to the belief that organizational resources are one key determinant to NGO

influence.

The discussion above, leads to the question of how these actors implement their lobbying strategies once they are accepted into these decision-making arena. Meaning per se, how do they react during the right time in policy-making, how do they express their ideas even if they wont affect as much (Betsill, 2008) or how do they make use of these resources in order to affect the process.

3.3. NGO lobbying strategies

Previous literature has offered a number of answers that explain NGO lobbying behavior seen from alternative perspectives. A lot of literature agrees on how NGOs at the EU level (and more generally also at the supranational level) have two types of lobbying strategies (Beyers, 2004; Schlozman & Tiernet, 1986; Dalton et al, 2003; Dür & Mateo, 2013; Junk, 2016). The first one, inside lobbying, focuses on addressing directly the (EU) governmental institutions, and the second, outside lobbying, which instead approaches the public relations methods, such as newspaper media, advertising, social media, etc. (Junk, 2016, p.237). Some may refer to this also as “voice” (outside) and “access” (inside) strategies (Beyers, 2004). It is argued that certain groups are more prone to look for inside lobbying strategies because of certain organizational characteristics. For example, Dür & Mateo (2013) argue that business groups rely more on lobbying and inside strategies because they are resource rich and are active on distributive fields. On the other hand, professional groups focus on outside strategies (unless their interested has to do with distributive policies) as well as citizen groups, since these are less resourceful and more prone to be active on public related fields (Dür & Mateo, 2013, p.663). For instance, the above mentioned study by Dalton et al on eNGOs looked into their tactics used for influencing and found that most of this groups engage in a variety of political methods and public activities (outside lobbying strategies) such as street protest or media attention in order to “acquire resources, allies, and influence in the political process” (Dalton et al, 2003, p.744). According to them, this mix of political tactics has to do with the fact that these organizations pursue multiple goals (such as influencing public policy and shaping political discourse).

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3.3.1. The relevance of frames in NGO lobbying

Furthermore, Junk’s study (2016) found that a way in which NGO lobby and try and manage to influence has to do with the language that is being used for framing their advice and

whether their frame is congruent with the mainstream neoliberal discourse and doesn’t oppose to powerful national interests (which is both seen during outside and inside lobbying

strategies) (Junk, 2016). Besides Junk (2016) many past literature has dedicated its research to understanding how frames are related to the amount of influence an NGO can have during a decision-making process. Boräng & Naurin (2015) and Junk & Rasmussen (2018) found that frame congruence (between lobbyists and the policy maker) is spread among interest groups and thus every issue will involve different NGO (or any other interest group) behavior and interest. Thus, it is difficult to find congruence among these groups. This leads to the question of how one can measure influence with so many different frames. Junk & Rasmussen found that a way for measuring this can be done by looking into collaborative frames. Their findings suggest that this form of advocating (collective framing) will be much powerful than

individual framing (2018).

Furthermore, in Boräng & Naurin’s (2015) paper, I found about the relevance of mass media coverage and how NGOs (and other interest groups) tend to portray their interest through this kind of outside strategy. However, it is also visible how difficult it is to measure such frames and hence, measure the influence.

As earlier mentioned, a vast amount of interest group literature has been provided over the last couple of decades. Day by day, not only researchers but international organizations and negotiations continue to give more significance to this actors. Previous literature has

demonstrated a number of explanations for government officials giving access to NGOs during environmental supranational policy making, as well as clarification for interest group attitudes. The literature argues that there are alternative ways in which these organizations pursue their influence in public policy and these can be summarized into outside and inside lobbying. Also, a great amount of literature indicates that NGO outside lobbying has great relevance during decision-making processes, and one of these, as previously mentioned, is the framing of issues through the media. This argument is developed hereunder.

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3.4. NGOs and Mass Media News Coverage

As previously mentioned, a vast amount of past literature has turned their attention into the understanding of how NGO’s exercise lobbying in supranational legislation through the public (an outside lobbying strategy). The arguments lead to a number of assumptions, one of them being that the mass media news coverage is a successful medium for NGO lobbying influencing supranational environmental policy-making processes.

First, as this is an area of interest of this research, it is relevant to discuss how mass media has become increasingly prominent in legislative affairs at all levels according to previous

research interest on the matter. This is because, according to Bowers, it is a powerful medium for sharing information and, if used correctly, it can help “get issues of concern on the

political agenda” as the use of news is a central element in the process of making laws (1990, p.1376). Thus, actors such as government officials and interest groups must care into using it skillfully (Bowers, 1990). Also, in a series of researches dedicated to the topic of NGO influence in politics, it was found that the media “played a critical role in interpreting data, educating public opinion and changing attitudes of governments” (Sjöstedt, p.228, 1992; Rietig, 2016).

According to Boräng & Naurin (2015), it seems likely that the media is a facilitator for NGO impact in decision-making processes. In environmental European politics, it is argued that NGO lobbyism and framing through the media depends on the amount of coverage that the actual lobbyist receives, and this will thus affect “their ability to influence the way issues are defined in policy debates and subsequently the way policy makers think about these issues” (Boräng & Naurin, 2015, p.500). Hence, the more media coverage an EU legislation receives, the better the frame congruence will be (p.500). However, Junk & Rasmussen believe that since newspaper articles are written by the journalists and these are the actors who get to choose the content, framing issues through the media can be subject to bias, and thus, frame congruence becomes difficult to measure (2018). Hence, it seems that it becomes difficult to measure news coverage as sometimes these news might be altered by the journalists

themselves and the information subject to measurement might not be reliable.

Moreover, as above mentioned, resources are sometimes considered to be a determinant for NGO influence and the media is also affected by this factor since it appears to be that sometimes the interest group and their resource capacity may be a determinant for media attention and news coverage (Boräng & Naurin, 201).

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According to another study by Trevor (2013), this leads to an uneven distribution between the information posted and an unfair portrayal of interests. Because of this, it has been claimed that outside strategies are only but a myth, since most organizations do not have enough of this resources (Trevor, 2013, p.408). Regardless, based on Beyers (2004) findings, outside strategies are widely used among interest groups (at the European union level) and these strategies are extensively combined with inside strategies. In my study, I will consider this findings and will depart from the hypothesis that the media is also a widely used forum for NGO lobbyism as this is another form of outside strategy. However, differences are likely to be found between the attention given to public protests and news media coverage.

In short, the available literature argues that mass media is a major actor during legislative decision-making processes and thus, interest groups are interested in the portrayal of their interests (and thus lobbying) through it. Hence, the mass media is a facilitator for NGO impact during policy-making. However, there are a number of factors to be taken into account: Whether the media manages to impact such processes depends on whether the lobbyist receives enough coverage, as increasing media coverage will lead to greater frame congruence. Also, past research argues that resources are a key factor to whether the NGO (or interest group in general) will manage to portray their frames through the media and thus have an impact in decision-making processes. However there is little information to prove whether this arguments do almost always happen during legislation processes and because of the biased setting in which they are set, the frame congruence might not even be entirely correct. Thus, there is a mix of information on whether this area (the media) is or isn’t a viable form of measuring NGO influence and whether NGOs are interested enough in portraying their interests through it.

3.5. Evaluation of Research Methods

As I have looked into a number of researches related to my area of interested, I have also carefully given attention to their own research designs as they might support my study so I can predict successful ways of measuring influence and answering my main questions. The research designs that have caught my attention the most and which seem to be more helpful

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for my study were specially analyzed. In here, I proceed to discuss them and I explain how this models may support mine.

Measuring frame congruence is a way of measuring levels of influence attempts as previous literature suggests (above discussed). There are a number of ways to measure frames and frame congruence. For example, Boräng & Naurin (2015) looked into the frames of 144 interviews with Commission officials in relation to 55 legislative proposals and all media coverage frame congruence between NGO and commission officials found on the matter during this period. The way in which they coded frame congruence is based on a logistic regression model which was fairly simple and surprisingly helpful. If the Commission official and the interests group gave two completely different answers in their interviews and no congruence at all was found, they coded it as 1, when both actors shared the same frame they coded frame congruence as 3 and doubtful similar questions were coded as 2 (partial

congruence). Also, in order to measure the scope of media influence (another aspect of interest in my study), they looked into 6 different newspapers which covered European politics and all articles featuring the legislative proposal of interest. In here, they also used logistic regression models and a a given value of 0 to business actors and 1 to civil groups and from these values they predicted influence probability and frame congruence among present actors in media articles.

In Bunea’s (2013) study on why some interest groups are more successful than others when influencing EU policy, she also made use of a dichotomous variable and a form of logistic regression model to indicate preference attainment. In a part of her study and specifically of my interest for the understanding of organizational resources and interests, Bunea looks into the number of organizations participating in consultations and adds a categorical variable indicating different types of interest groups (2013). In here, she is also interested in understanding which organizations are more likely to achieve more or less influence and whether this is or not a feature affecting lobbying success.

As I perceived a successful research during this papers, I will proceed to create a similar research design which can provide the answers to my study. Of course, as their researches are not entirely focused in my questions of interest, I intend to adjust their studies and form of research design to mine. I simply evaluate these researches and take what is necessary to support my study, as this will serve as form of guide. Also, as my study is a plausibility probe, there is no need to involve the use of formal models as this is what this type of studies

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avoids and leaves for further, more in depth studies. Moreover, using previous research which has successfully answered their questions with the use of this research design will also make my study more reliable.

3.6. Identifying the gap in the literature

This thesis aims to contribute to a greater insight in the area of European politics and the way in which NGOs influence policy-making processes, specifically in the environmental area. Past literature (above discussed) enlightens the reader with a lot of information on the matter; from environmental supranational politics to interest group impact and involvement, etc. However, there is need for further research on the topic as many questions are still not clear enough and could use complimentary findings. I argue that the literature lacks the elementary facts such as the quantity of NGOs that participate in this processes, how they do it and why, how much is the media interested in their participation or whether these actors are being present enough, how do frames and successful influence relate etc. Many questions come to mind which are yet unanswered. The objective of my study is to contribute to this knowledge by providing new answers based on approaches and theories discussed in this section. By looking into what is available so far, I am brought to the assumption that there are two main determinants for outside lobbying and NGO influence in supranational environmental

decision making processes: NGO organizational resources and the way in which they portray their message through the media (an outside form of lobbying), such as frames (which may or may not lead to frame congruence). In here, I also argue that there is still very little known on whether NGOs do have impact despite their increasing involvement and more theory and empirical testing would contribute to a better and more reliable understanding of it.

The fact that I combine methodology and theory of different successful studies in my paper creates a unique paper which can provide alternative answers and understandings of what has already been studied.

3.7. Conceptualization

In this section, I proceed with the conceptualization of a number of relevant concepts that I use in my study such as:

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- NGOs - Framing of issues - Organizational resources - Influence - Frame congruence - Preference attainment

The meanings of this concepts are based on the literature above discussed and how these literature explains and relates to them.

In this study the main actors of research are Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The definition used through this paper is based on Junk & Hanegraaff’s concept which argues an NGO is “a strict non-profit public-interest organization” and “organizations that rely on support from individuals and/or defend interests that transcend the individual economic interests of the supporting constituency” (Junk, 2016; p,92, Hanegraaff, 2015).

The theory of framing is one of the two theories that my study utilizes throughout the research and which will be further developed in the theoretical section. According to the theory of framing, frames are ways in which actors emphasize certain dimensions of a policy issue by “selecting some aspects of reality, and making the more salient at the expense of other aspects” (Entman, 1993 and Riker, 1986 in Boräng & Naurin, 2015, p.501). Hence, in this paper, the framing of issues relates to the act of identifying what is at stake in a particular area of policy and looking into “specific matters of controversy in a policy debate” (Daviter, 2009 in Boräng and Naurin, 2015, p.501).

The second theory present in this study is the theory of organizational resources. In here, organizational resources relate to the resources that every organization may possess. This can be financial, media related, technical, contacts, size of the organization such as membership and board, etc. According to this theory, the greater the resources the greater the chances actors will have to influence policy (Junk, 2016). This argument will be further developed.

The last three concepts (influence, frame congruence and preference attainment) are used interchangeably over my study as both preference attainment and frame congruence can be seen as another term for influence. However, there are some differences as to when they are used and why.

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For example, according to Dür et al (2015) influence is seen when “actors are able to obtain policies they prefer while averting policies they dislike..” and “these outcomes depend on the actions or some prosperities of the influential actor” (p.964). However, if for example an NGO does not manage to move an outcome into their completely preferred course, Dür argues it does still perform a certain degree of influence (Dür, 2008).

Preference attainment is used in Bunea’s study (2015) as she refers to this as another

definition for lobbying success and (policy) influence (p.554). More specifically in her study, preference attainment is seen when interest groups of translate “their policy preferences into the text of the Commission’s legislative proposal” (p.557). In Dür (2008), three ways in which influence can be measured are mentioned, and one of this is preference attainment (the other two are process tracing and attributed influence). The theory of preference attainment perceives influence in the distance between an outcome and the actors ideal point, which in this case, preference attainment would be expected between an NGOs portrayal of frame and its congruence with the final outcome of a policy (p.566, Dür, 2008a). Hence, a form of frame congruence. Boräng & Naurin, refer to frame congruence as “the degree to which key policy makers frames correspond to the frames of lobbyists” (2015. p.499).

Regardless of their differences, in my study, these three concepts are the ideal point where NGOs and interest groups manage to exercise and succeed during lobbying processes. This study takes frame congruence as a way in which one can measure the influence or preference attainment by looking into all NGO frames present in the data.

3.8. Summary

The available literature and a thorough analysis of it has, in summary, led me to the following:

• NGOs are actors present in supranational policy making. • They do manage to influence policy to some extent.

• There are different lobbying strategies to do so and certain factors affecting this process.

From here, three factors strike out the most:

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Group behavior is strongly related to their organizational resources and an organization with greater access to resources will often have better access to policy makers – or lobbying platforms-, thus greater chances to influence policy-making processes.

2. Frame congruence as type of influence success

Frames can be used for measuring interest group influence. This is because being able to find frame congruence will mean an understanding between the policy maker and the lobbyists (as both frames are related) where it is thus assumed that the lobbyist managed to influence at some level.

3. The media as a forum for lobbyism.

The media is one popular outside lobbying strategy used by NGOs (and other interest groups) in order to influence supranational policy-making processes. Whether the media manages to impact such processes depends on whether the lobbyist receives enough coverage. In here, organizational resources may be an important determinant. Also, the use of the media by NGOs and the measurement of its influence may be an area which is subject to a number of bias.

From these arguments, I am brought to my main research questions based on what I believe is still yet not clearly answered and further research is needed: Whether the type and extent of media coverage affect the likelihood of NGO preference attainment and whether

organizational resources relate to this process.

In the coming section (4. Theory), I focus on the theoretical construct that can support in the depiction of this area.

4. Theory

After having presented the previous and available literature on interest group influence in supranational decisions, I have identified that there is a growing involvement of NGOs in this area. Together with this, increasing literature has dedicated its research to the understanding of NGO lobbying behavior and the relevance of outside lobbying strategies, such as the previously mentioned methods of newspaper media, advertising, social media, etc. Lobbying through mass media news coverage is a strategy which has caught particular attention. This has to do with the fact that according to the literature, the media is a successful medium for

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NGO impact as it is a relevant forum for sharing legislative affair topics and decision-making processes at all levels.

In this paper, I depart from the assumption that NGO framing of issues through the media is a determinant of NGO influence during supranational environmental decision-making

processes because this will establish how policy makers (and the public) will perceive the message and will thus lead (or not) to preference attainment. However, as a complementary argument and support to previous research, I add that before this process is even conceived, there is one cause that will first determine the actor allowed to portray their interests through the media, that is, the resources of a group.

Thus, the main research question of this paper is based on these two factors as a reflection to past research questions and asks,

Does the type and extent of media coverage affect the likelihood of NGO preference attainment?

And if so,

How do organizational resources relate to the process?

This section thus looks into discussing explanatory factors of how the media (as an outside lobbying strategy) can be a successful method for facilitating NGO influence in supranational decision-making processes. The theoretical framework will hence support and guide this study for analyzing the above mentioned research questions.

I will now proceed to discuss two main explanatory factors and assumed theoretical relations related to the type an extent of media coverage.

4.1. Frame Congruence

Frames are based on the “selection of some aspects of reality, and making them more salient at the expense of other aspects (Entma, 1993 in Boräng and Naurin, 2015, p.501). In policy issues, policy frames refer to what is found to be “at stake” (Daviter, 2009 in Boräng and

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way in which issues are being framed will determine whether it will attract the attention of the party of interest. Frames have the ability of affecting how policy makers deal with choices and react in favor of certain interests where it sometimes may even relate to policy outcomes and preference attainment (Junk & Rasmussen, 2018, p.4). Preference attainment means that the influence of an actor is reflected in the distance between an outcome and the actors ideal point (Dür, 2008a, p.566); it is not necessarily a synonym of influence or a method for it, but rather a theory that analyses influence of interest groups (Vannoni, 2016). Non state actors, including NGOs, have thus made use of the power of frames in order to manage and influence policy maker decisions. When policy-maker’s frames (their perceptions of policy proposals) correspond to the frame of NGOs (as lobbyists), then frame congruence is obtained (Boräng & Naurin 2015). Frame congruence thus, involves the influence of these actors into the decision-making progress into some degree.

One area in which NGO frames are often seen (and studied) is the mass media. This has to do with the fact the media plays a critical role for data interpretation as it raises public pressure and alters policy makers’ attitudes. Thus, it becomes an ideal (outside) strategy for NGO lobbying. However, based on previous findings, I argue that there are two contextual factors affecting the process of frame congruence through the media: the quantity of NGO attention given to policy issues through the media and the way in which frames are portrayed, either individually or collectively.

The first factor mentioned is relevant because, as previous research suggests, the amount of mass media news coverage will affect the NGOs’ “ability to influence the way issues are defined in policy debates and subsequently the way policy makers think about these issues” (Boräng & Nuaurin, 2015, p.500). If there is a low presence of NGO media coverage when a policy issue is at stake, then the chances that policy makers’ will turn their view into these frames will be low. I argue this because low presence of NGO media coverage (towards a policy issue) will lead to little popularity and public attention. Thus, there will be no public pressure altering policy-makers’ attitudes. In other words, low presence of NGO frames media coverage will lead to little probabilities for achieving preference attainment.

If NGOs (as a whole) perform this type of outside lobbying strategy, then it should be taken into account that the amount and type of media coverage will relate to the degree of

preference attainment. Hence, I argue that

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Hypothesis Ia : The more NGO attention given to a policy issue through news media

coverage, the higher the likelihood of achieving preference attainment.

As the extent of NGO media coverage (hence NGO frames) is relevant, it is also argued how individual advocating and (NGO) framing will not be as powerful as collective (NGO)

framing (Junk & Rasmussen, 2018). This is because an individual frame will only be based on the actor itself and its specific constituency, while collective framing will relate to more than one actor promoting the same type of frame and shared organization values (Boräng & Naurin, 2015, p. 502). If one policy issue receives various types of frames, then one issue is blurred by the others. Such argument has to do with the fact that “adding new entrants with new perspectives to the process increases the chances of upsetting the equilibrium” (Boräng & Naurin, 2015, p. 502). In contrast, if one policy issue receives less types of frames and these frames are alike, then the frames become stronger and more prone to catch the attention of policy makers’.

Thus, I assume that,

Hypothesis Ib: If the policy issue is supported through collective framing, frame

congruence will be greater and hence, NGO influence will increase.

Thys, frame congruence is more likely when the amount of NGO news coverage is more extensive and the frames portrayed by NGOs coincide.

4.2. Organizational Resources

Besides looking into the type and extent of frames in media coverage as a factor affecting the likelihood of frame congruence, I argue one should also take into account the relevance of (NGO) organizational-level characteristics as past research demonstrates its relevance (Junk, 2014). This factor is crucial to the study and understating of NGO influence and lobbying through the media because the characteristics of the organization will also determine their behavior. One significant organizational-level characteristic has to do with the resources of an organization. This characteristic is claimed to be particularly important because having

greater resources may favor its lobbying strategies (Junk, 2014). Also, as previously

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influencing decision-making processes, and specifically when looking into outside strategies (Dalton et al, 2003; Hallström, 2014; Junk, 2016). Furthermore, resource mobilization theory supports this and argues that interest group behavior is strongly dependent on the

organizational resources and this will hence determine the influence success.

Regarding lobbying through the media, resources are argued to be quite relevant since more resources (financial, media related, technical, contacts, etc.) increase the chance that the media will give attention to these organization’s interests (Junk, 2016; Trevor, 2006). This has to do with the fact that resourceful groups may have greater power and influence when bringing out their ideas and beliefs to journalists by having better contacts, power (e.g. by having the capacity to sue businesses and thus create news) or experts (Trevor, 2006). Also, an organizational resources theory is based on the argument that groups and organizations with greater resources are less required to look for other types of outside lobbying such as protests and others, since they have the expertise (they can afford scientists and experts to write reports per se) and can rather rely on their ability to share their ideas quite accurately through news coverage (Trevor, 2016, p.410).

The above discussed leads to the assumption that,

Hypothesis 2a: An NGO with greater resources will receive greater mass media coverage.

Hence, greater chances for achieving influence.

Besides this assumption, another factor to take into account when looking into the relevance of an organizations’ resources is the type of actor that we are studying. It is argued that certain groups are more prone to look for inside or outside lobbying strategies depending on their resources such as budget, membership or staff quantity. For example, previous research indicates that business groups rely more on inside lobbying strategies because they are resource rich (richer than other interest groups) and as the literature argues, resources will matter the most when looking into inside strategies (Dalton et al, 2003; Hallström, 2014; Junk, 2016; Dür & Mateo, 2013). (Dür & Mateo, 2013). Instead, due to their lower level of resources, NGOs are argued to rely more on outside lobbying strategies which would then rely more on public pressure (Dür & Mateo, 2013, p.663). This is an interesting argument as H2a assumes that NGOs with greater resources have greater chances for media coverage, however, if it is about another interest group with greater resources, this actor will instead refer to inside lobbying strategies as it becomes somehow more powerful.

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Thus, it would then be assumed that interest groups with greater resources (e.g. business or professional groups) would not be as interested in sharing their views and lobbying through mass media. And as a consequence to this, NGOs would be the most present actors

incorporating this kind of lobbying strategy.

This leads to my third assumption which argues that,

Hypothesis 2b: It is expected that NGOs are more present during mass media coverage

than other interest groups with greater resource capacity.

This assumption is relevant since this will mean that NGOs do not compete with other actors through these medium and thus, communicating via the media might be a powerful area for lobbyism where most attention would be dedicated to them.

These arguments led me to two main theoretical relations. The first one is based on the framing of issues through the media and how this leads to greater NGO frame congruence. If the extent of NGO frames in media coverage is supported by collaborative frames rather than individual, then the frame congruence will be greater.

The second one is supported by the idea that an NGO who is acquired with greater resources will be given greater media attention and thus, the higher the chances these organization will achieve frame congruence. However if the interest group is not an NGO and has greater resources, it will not look into influencing through the media but will rather turn into inside lobbying strategies. Thus, NGOs should be the most present actors are actors in the framing of issues through mass media coverage.

The following section will explain the methodology to be employed in order to continue this study and analyze the above mentioned hypotheses.

5. Data and Research Design

5.1. Operationalization

The reason of this section is to translate the above mentioned theories into the empirics of research in order to sharpen previous hypotheses of the literature; in other words,

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operationalize the study (Toshkov, 2016). The empirics are probe empirics as this paper is based on a plausibility probe study. To analyze these hypotheses, I look into NGO media involvement during European Union environmental policy issues.

The main actor of interest of this study are NGOs. The actors I focus on are explicitly the ones which have participated over the data gathered in the media documents from the

consultation period of Regulation (EU) 2015/757, Directive (EU) 2016/2284 and Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 (all concerning atmospheric pollutants and reduction of carbon emissions). The selection of this actors has been based on the concept of NGOs above mentioned. Also, other interest actors will be mentioned as they will act as a method of (influence) comparison. These actors are professional groups and business groups that were also present over the data gathered in the consultation period of the previously mentioned legislations. Professional groups refers to associations of practitioners of a certain profession, and business groups refers to all association firms, sectorial and peak. I chose to sample these two groups because these are groups who tend to be interested in affecting change at the international level and are active in inside lobbying as well. Also, previous literature mentions this groups when comparing NGOs to other interest groups, as they mention the relevance of organizational resources and characteristics of groups in influence results (Dür & Mateo, 2013; Boräng & Naurin, 2015). Other interest groups are excluded from this research also because they simply do not participate in this processes as the data gathered did not spot any of their activity. Perhaps they are active in lobbying policy processes but not during the data collection of this study.

The research is made in two parts, as one part of the study looks into answers based on NGO frames in European news coverage and the second part of the study is interested in answers that come from the internal area of the organizations (meaning the organizational resources they possess) and the effect this has on media coverage. Thus, I divided the research into two different models.

To answer the first part of the study, I focus on the framing of issues and frame congruence in NGOs media statements (Model 1). NGO influence is the main dependent variable of the study. As it was already mentioned in the conceptualization section and theory, frames are a way in which certain aspects or reality are selected since these are the most salient and main messages of something that is being communicated. As it has been experienced over previous research, it is not easy to calculate and study frames to understand influence. Because of this,

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I selected ways in which this process can be less complicated. To avoid a very “personal” way of selecting frames (avoiding bias) I selected the frames based on a generic emphasis, as this can be applicable across many policy areas and at all levels (Junk & Rasmussen, 2018, p.13). Also, previous research backs up the process.

In Model 2, the main dependent variable is also NGO influence, but instead of looking into frames and media coverage I look into organizational resources and the effect this has on their media coverage (hence, influence). I test the hypotheses by gathering data from the internal aspects of the organization that involve information regarding their resources. In order to compare resource mobilization among NGOs, three resource variables were used: budget (most recent annual budgets), staff size (specifically the board) and membership size. The selection criteria for these type of resources is related to the fact that those resources are tangible assets, while other types or resources such as reputation, expertise,

connections/relationships and name recognition are non tangible assets and thus, much more difficult to calculate. Also, these type of variables have been previously used in research based on resource mobilization theories (Trevor, 2006).

5.1.1. Data Collection

The empirical data used is this study is derived from media documents from European newspapers, NGO websites and annual statements; all written in English as this is the language in which they were all presented and hence it was not necessary to look into documents with other languages. If one would want to broaden the research, it could be possible to look into other languages and national European newspapers, as well as national European NGOs so that the conclusions could be greater. However, as I only focus at the European Union level as a whole, I did not consider this a necessary factor to the research. Also, adding more languages to the research would require native speakers or else

unsystematic errors could follow during the selection of frames. All available news media documents were used in this research and no selection was necessary as I required as many data as possible to increase validity of the research. All data was manually gathered and coded.

5.1.2. MODEL 1 : Frames

In order to determine NGO media coverage and frames during the decision-making process of the legislations selected, activity from 33 non-state actors was identified (25 NGOs, 7

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business groups and 1 professional group) over a sample of 126 newspaper media articles. These articles were derived from the collection of media mobilization during the 2-capture project, led by my thesis supervisor Dr. C. Braun. As I participated in the codification process of these project during my thesis capstone, I was allowed to make use of such data in my own research.

Table 1. Overview of dependent and independent control variables and measurement.

VARIABLE MEASUREMENT / VALUE

MODEL 1

Dependent Variable (H1a)

NGO Influence 0= no frame congruence

1= frame congruence through a frame supporting the issue

Independent Variables 2= frame congruence through a frame not supporting the issue

Frames /

Frame Congruence (H1b)

1= Safety 2= Rights Collaborative Frames 3= Economy

4= Environment 5= Culture

MODEL 2

Dependent Variable

NGO Influence (H2a & H2b)

-Budget

Independent Variable -Staff Size Interest group mobilization

(NGOs, Business and Professional groups)