The European Union as democracy promoter in the Southern Mediterranean: The start of the Arab Spring as turning point in the EU's normative ambition.

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MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

The European Union as democracy promoter in the Southern

Mediterranean

The start of the Arab Spring as turning point in the EU’s normative ambition

Main Supervisor: Dhr. prof. dr. M.J. Wintle

Second Supervisor: Dhr. dr. J.B.M.M.Y. Shahin

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1. Introduction

‘The European Union is founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ (Manners, 2002)

Norms and values are crucial for the EU’s identity and shape its role as an international actor. Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that ‘the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to […] consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’ as well as ‘promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global Governance’.1

Furthermore, the European Security Strategy of 2003 emphasises that spreading these norms and values worldwide is the core principle of the EU’s foreign policy. In an article published in 2002, Ian Manners sought to revitalise the debate concerning the EU's role as a military (Bull, 1982) or civilian power (Dûchene, 1972).2 He introduced the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ as the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations. According to Manners, post-Cold War politics should be more framed in a principle-oriented analyses, as the EU intends to set standards for third countries by spreading norms rather than being powerful with military or economic sources. Therefore, the EU should be considered as a normative power.3 The theory of Manners rejects the idea that the export of fundamental norms and principles is a neo-colonial practice, because it emphasises the universal character of them.4 According to Manners, the normative power of the EU derives from three sources, namely historical context (the legacy of two destructive world wars), hybrid polity (multilevel governance) and political-legal constitutionalism (treaty-based and elite-driven order). These three sources have helped to bring common principles of the member states under the same framework. Manners observed six mechanisms of diffusion through which the EU spreads norms. The first mechanism is ‘contagion’. The contagion diffusion of norms takes place through the spread of ideas from the EU to third political actors. The EU becomes a virtuous example to third countries, particularly when building regional integration. Regional organisations are created in order to imitate the European model. The second mechanism is ‘informational diffusion’. This spreads the norms of the EU through various policy declarations and initiatives. The third mechanism is ‘procedural diffusion’, which takes place when the EU institutionalises its relationship with third parties and includes normative elements in the

1_{Article 21, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 16 October 2012, Official Journal C 326.}

2_{Whitman, R.G., Normative Power Europe empirical and theoretical perspectives, edited by R. Whitman,}

Basinkstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2011, p. 2.

3_{Manners, I., ‘Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40}

(2002), pp. 252, 253.

4

Diez, T., Manners, I., ‘Reflecting on Normative Power Europe’, in: F. Berenskoetter and M. Williams eds.,

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4 dialogues and agreements. A fourth mechanism is ‘transference’, which spreads norms when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with a third country. The fifth mechanism is ‘overt diffusion’, which takes place as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third countries. The last mechanism is the ‘cultural filter’, which refers to the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity in third countries.5

An important aspect of this normative power is the promotion of democratic principles in third countries.6 After the Second World War democracy became the most desirable political system, because democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, and provide stability and peace. During the following period, the EU has attempted to spread its political system not only within its borders but also beyond. A series of instruments and measurements were implemented in order to support political reform in third countries. After the Cold War, democracy promotion was set at the top of the European Union’s external agenda. In the early 1990s, almost thirty countries transformed into a democracy. According to the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, the role of the European Community in these transitions was of crucial importance. However, countries in the Middle East and North Africa did not experience this wave of democratisation.7 These Southern Mediterranean countries have been dealing with a range of security and political issues, such as religious fundamentalism, poverty, unemployment, growing migration pressure towards the EU and authoritarian political systems. The EU linked those threats to the lack of basic democratic structures in the region. In order to counter these threats to the EU’s own welfare and security interests, it has since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 included an explicitly democracy-promoting element into its cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood. 8 The partnership provides the EU with various instruments to work towards more democratic political systems in the Southern Mediterranean countries.9

In December 2010 a series of uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa occurred, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. A wave of political liberalisation in the Arab world was finally conceivable. Therefore, the EU had to change its approach towards the Southern Neighbourhood as a response to the changing political situation. In February 2011, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, called the EU a democratising force. She stated that ‘the EU stands ready to help laying down the roots of deep democracy in its southern

5

Manners, I., ‘Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40 (2002), pp. 240-242, 244, 245.

6_{Huelss, H., ‘A force for good governance? The European Union’s normative power and standards of}

appropriate governing’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 17 (2012), p. 93-112.

7_{Huntington, S.P., ‘The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century’, in: J. Rothbaum ed.,}

Distinguished Lecture Series, London: University of Oklahoma Press 1993, pp. 3-26.

8_{Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf,}

Barcelona, 28 November 1995.

9

Pace, M., ‘Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review

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5 borderlands’, and, ‘we don’t do regime change, but system change’.10

The EU increased its focus on civil society in transition countries and linked closer cooperation to democratisation, rather than to economic reforms. After the start of the Arab Spring, the EU makes more use of bilateral instruments such as democracy assistance and political conditionality, and has abandoned the influence of regional arrangements. Despite the response to the changing political situation, the EU as a normative power faces major challenges after the start of the Arab Spring. The demand for more political reform resulted in unstable countries. Tunisia remains the only country of the Arab Spring that has seen some significant reforms in the democratic quality of its regime. Bahrain has even become more repressive, while Egypt is getting back to pre-Arab Spring levels of repression with a military dictatorship in power. Libya experienced a regime change but has turned into a failing state. The same applies to Syria, with one part of the country still being governed by the repressive Assad regime, while other parts are under control of rebels of Islamic State and other Jihadist groups.11 The EU’s capability to promote democracy in the Southern Neighbourhood depends on several factors, such as the EU's ability to properly construct its normative power, the consistency of activities and domestic circumstances. Moreover, it is important that the countries not only formally adopt the democratic norms but also institutionalise them in everyday government practices. The Arab Spring provides an opportunity to examine the EU’s normative ambition to promote democracy in the Southern Mediterranean.

1.1. Academic debate

EU democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean has been a contested issue. There is plenty of literature that states that the EU has little potential to be an influential democracy promoter in the region. Michelle Pace argues that EU actions limit any potential for normative impact in the Southern Mediterranean, because of the lack of coherence in EU policy.12 André Gerrits wonders if the EU has the right to interfere in name of their idea of democracy at all. He states that the European idea of democracy is not that appealing for third countries as the EU may think. The complex structure of the EU makes the European democracy promotion incoherent. According to Gerrits, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside on a third country.13 Vicky Reynaert emphasises that the main goal of the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean is still economic liberalisation. The EU only supports democratic aspects if they contribute to the functioning of the market. Therefore, the

10

Schumacher, T., ‘Uncertainty at the EU’s borders: narratives of EU external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern borderlands’, European Security, vol. 24 (2015), pp. 381-401.

11_{Botelho,G., ‘Arab Spring aftermath: Revolutions give way to violence, more unrest’,}

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/27/middleeast/arab-spring-aftermath/, consulted on 2 March 2016.

12_{Pace, M., ‘The EU’s interpretation of the ‘Arab Uprisings’: Understanding the different visions about}

democratic change in EU-MENA relations’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 52 (2014), pp. 969-984.

13

Gerrits, A., Democratie door interventie: De nieuwe White Man’s Burden?, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2006.

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6 EU promotes a shallow liberal democracy.14 Frank Schimmelfennig, examined the relevance of substance in studying EU democracy promotion. He emphasises that what is being promoted does not depend on what is required in the neighbouring countries, but on the EU’s capabilities and interests. The degree of interdependence between the EU and the third country is crucial. The weaker a country is, the more the EU is willing and able to promote the full range of democratic norms and vice versa.15 Tommaso Virgili has reviewed the European partnership with Egypt under the ENP, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the European promotion of democracy. His main argument is that the EU has been unable and unwilling to use negative and positive conditionality in order to drive the Egyptian government to establish a deep democracy. The EU promotion actions have proved to be weak and shallow.

Nevertheless, there is also plenty of literature that argues the opposite: that the EU does have potential to influence democratic transition in the Southern Mediterranean countries.16 Haglund Morrissey, claims that the start of the ENP had not only economic or geopolitical reasons, but also normative reasons. The spread of democracy is part of the EU’s identity.17 Tina Freyburg and Sandra Lavenex have demonstrated that democracy promotion shows effect outside an accession conditionality framework. In Morocco the EU succeeded in implanting a certain potential for democratisation within domestic legislation.18 The literature on EU democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean has mainly focused on the concept as a foreign policy. It only passingly touches on the ways in which the EU has expressed its normative ambition to promote democracy in the Southern Mediterranean. There is need for an analysis of the normative rhetoric in official EU documents on the Southern Neighbourhood.

1.2. Research design

This thesis examines the EU’s normative ambition to promote democracy in the Southern Neighbourhood right after the start of the Arab Spring. It explores the extent to which the Arab Spring constituted a fundamental turning point for the EU’s Southern Mediterranean policy. Furthermore, it provides a critical analysis of the aspects that could hinder the EU’s ambition to be an influential actor in the region. Consequently, the main research question can be formulated: ‘To what extent has the start of the Arab Spring resulted in a change of the EU’s normative aspiration to be an influential democracy promoter in the Southern Neighbourhood?’

14

Reynaert, V., ‘Preoccupied with the market: the EU as a promoter of ‘shallow’ democracy in the Mediterranean’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 16 (2011), pp. 623-637.

15_{Schimmelfennig, F., ‘How substantial is substance? Concluding reflections on the study of substance in EU}

democracy promotion’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 5 (2011), pp. 727-734.

16_{Virgili, T., ‘The “Arab Spring” and the EU’s “democracy promotion” in Egypt: A missed appointment?’,}

Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 6 (2014), pp. 42-75.

17_{Haglund Morrissey, A., ‘EU value promotion and the European Neighborhood Policy’, Southeastern Europe,}

vol. 32 (2007), pp. 39-59.

18

Freyburg, T. Et al., ‘Democracy promotion through functional cooperation? The case of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Democratization, vol. 18 (2011), pp. 1026-1054.

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7 The first chapter of the thesis elaborates on the conceptual framework of EU democracy promotion in foreign policy and the objectives, strategies and instruments. The focus is on the functioning of the instruments of democracy promotion and their origins and underlying objectives.

The second chapter of the thesis comprises the empirical analyses of the EU’s ambition to promote democracy in the Southern Neighbourhood just before and right after the start of the Arab Spring. This case study will provide insight into the changing rhetoric of the EU in the context of democracy promotion. First, it discusses the Euro-Mediterranean relation in general. It gives an overview of the development of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the current status. Then, it focuses on the role democracy promotion plays in this cooperation, and in which ways the EU has adjusted its approach towards the Southern Mediterranean in the course of the Arab Spring.

The third chapter of the thesis critically assesses the major potential challenges for the EU’s aspiration to be a powerful democracy promoter in the Southern Neighbourhood. The EU’s democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa has been criticised for over a decade for applying double standards, being inefficient, rhetorical and even imperialistic.19 An example of such critics are Richard Gillespie and Lawrence Whitehead. They observed that EU policy towards the Southern Mediterranean is primarily driven by security objectives, which tends to lead to support for authoritarian regimes rather than efforts to undermine them.20 Moreover, there has been some academic discussion about the compatibility of the Southern Mediterranean countries with a democratic system. This chapter has a different approach than the previous chapters, since rather critical secondary literature will be analysed.

1.3. Methodology

To answer the research question, EU official documents from before and right after the start of the Arab Spring will be analysed and compared. In order to examine the EU’s rhetoric and ambitions, communications and strategy papers of the European Commission will be analysed. These documents are considered to contribute to the understanding of reasons behind EU policy making. They can demonstrate to what extent the EU presents itself as a democracy promoter. Evaluations in EU policy documents can tell something about the impact of EU democracy promotion.

In order to examine the reaction of the EU to the revolts in its Southern Neighbourhood, EU documents since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 have been selected. As early as the 1970s, the European Economic Community concluded bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with eight Southern Mediterranean countries, including Tunisia and Egypt. However, this cooperation was focused on the strengthening of the economic ties. Since 1995, the cooperation has

19

Huber, D., ‘US and EU human rights and democracy promotion since the Arab Spring. Rethinking its content, targets and instruments’, The International Spectator, vol. 48 (2013), p. 98.

20_{Gillespie, R., Whitehead, L., ‘European democracy promotion in North Africa: Limits and prospects’, in: R.}

Gillespie and R. Youngs eds., The European Union and democracy promotion: The case of North Africa, London: Frank Cass 2002, p. 198.

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8 included political elements, such as democracy promotion. The following pre-Arab Spring documents have been selected: the ‘Barcelona Declaration’ of 1995, the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’ of 2004, the European Commission proposal ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ of 2008, and the essential element clause of the Mediterranean Association Agreement with Egypt of 2004. The first three documents have been selected, since they have changed the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy significantly, and express the EU’s pre-Arab Spring normative rhetoric in regional context. The Mediterranean Association Agreement with Egypt expresses the normative rhetoric in bilateral context. The outbreak of the Arab Spring demanded that the EU changed its approach. Three communications of the European Commission sketched the EU response to the Arab Spring. These communications of 2011 ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ and ‘SPRING’, will be analysed in order to determine the new approach of the EU. The comparison will focus on the goals, the role of civil society, the nature of the measures, and how these are framed in normative terms.

It is important to keep in mind that published EU documents tend to create a positive image of the EU. However, this research is primarily concerned with the EU’s aspiration to be a normative power and in which ways this is exercised. Still, there is a need to critically reflect on the documents. Secondary literature will be used for a careful consideration of the context. The literature can be found in the (digital) library of the University of Amsterdam. Furthermore, the thesis uses a personal interview with Adrianus Koetsenruijter, since he was Head of the EU Delegation to Tunisia during the Arab Spring. He could provide insight into the EU’s first response to the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia. It also uses a personal interview with Sebastian Bloching, Head of Policy of the non-profit organisation ‘European Partnership for Democracy’. This organisation supports democracy in the Southern Mediterranean vis-à-vis the EU institutions and member states. Sebastian Bloching coordinated democracy promotion initiatives of seven partner organisations from i.a. Morocco and Tunisia, and co-authored a handbook on inclusive policy dialogue. He can explain the importance of civil society within the European Southern Neighbourhood Policy. The interviews will give insight into the EU’s democracy promotion activities and instruments in the Southern Mediterranean. Moreover, the interviewees can help clarify the change of the EU’s approach towards the region after the start of the Arab Spring, and the challenges posed to the EU’s ambition to promote democracy.

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2. Democracy promotion as an EU foreign policy objective

2.1. Historical overview of EU democracy promotion

The promotion of democracy has not always been an essential foreign policy objective for the European Union. Until the end of the 1980s, cooperation with third countries had dealt mainly with economic issues and gave little concern to democracy. Since the 1990s, the EU has relied more on its democratic principles in its relations with third countries. This can be explained by the Union’s willingness to play a stronger international role and the intensification of its efforts to create a common foreign policy. That democracy promotion turned relatively late into a foreign policy objective has several reasons. First of all, it is difficult to claim that democracy is a universal right. The universal character of human rights, on the contrary, can be claimed by referring to international human rights law. Secondly, the misuse of the term ‘democracy’ in Eastern Europe and Africa did not help either. Democracy has been used to define a variety of forms of government, as for the one-party democracies in Africa and the dictatorship of the proletariat established in Eastern Europe. Finally, encouraging the government of a third country to democratise can result in the overthrow of the very same government. In the case of human rights promotion this is less the case. Accordingly, promoting democracy was too intrusive, given that the European Community emphasised its neutrality.21 Enlargement has been one driving force behind the EU’s belief that its model of liberal democracy needed to be more promoted in third countries, especially since the EU has seen authoritarian regimes change into stable democracies. The second driving force behind the development of democracy promotion is the fact that non-democratic forms of government in third countries are breeding grounds for terrorism. Consequently, terrorism could be a threat to the EU’s own security.22

The third driving force is the World Bank report on the sub-Saharan African economic crisis published in 1989. The World Bank concluded that the economic crisis in Africa was the result of the poor quality of governments. The report did not specifically recommend democracy, but it emphasised that the countries with the strongest economy, namely Botswana and Mauritius, both have parliamentary democracies and a free press. In this report, the World Bank linked democracy with development. This led the way to consensus among European member states.23 Through all the subsequent initiatives, the Community approach towards democracy promotion changed.

At first, the European Community mainly focused on democracy promotion in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the so-called ACP countries. The Lomé IV agreement of 1989 between the EC and the ACP countries was the first multilateral agreement to include political conditionality and

21_{Smith, K., European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world, 2}nd_{edition, Cambridge: Polity Press 2008,}

pp. 147, 148.

22_{Cardwell, P.J., ‘Mapping out democracy promotion in the EU’s external relations’, European Foreign Affairs}

Review, vol. 1 (2011), pp. 21-23.

23_{Smith, K., European Union Foreign Policy in a changing world, 2}nd_{edition, Cambridge: Polity Press 2008, p.}

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10 provisions on democracy and human rights. Political conditionality was in particular achieved by the requirement of a mid-term review of the financial protocol of the agreement. Nevertheless, the provisions were not linked to specific sanctions. Lomé IV was amended in 1995. Respect for democratic principles became an essential element of the Convention with the introduction of so-called essential elements clauses. This means that ACP countries who did not comply with the democratic principles risked the withdrawal of allocated funds.24 Invoking sanctions in cases of non-compliance is combined with the promotion of democracy through financial assistance and political dialogue. For violations of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, the EU invoked the essential elements clause several times in the 1990s, for instance against Nigeria, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.25 The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, replaced the Lomé system. The objectives of peace and democratic stability are priority areas of cooperation. Title II develops the political dialogue into an instrument that promotes peace and prevents violent conflicts. Sanctions are only imposed if all attempts to resolve differences have failed. Unlike in previous Lomé Agreements, the EU no longer unilaterally imposes certain democracy policies. Goals and principles are formulated in consensus with the third countries and evaluated on the basis of agreed benchmarking criteria. Periodic monitoring, peer review, and evaluation stimulate progress in democratisation through spreading the best practices. Democracy promotion is no longer limited to the public sector, but includes also the civil society. Non-state actors have a right to be consulted and to join the political dialogue. However, cooperation still takes place in the light of sanctions. Besides sanctions and political dialogue, the Cotonou Agreements provides the EU with a third instrument to bring third countries into compliance with the principles of democracy, namely programming. This implies that EU funds should be allocated to programmes rather than individual projects.26 The programme has to consist of four elements. The first is a definition of mid-term development goals. The second is the description of short-term strategies to implement these goals. The third is a specification of the destination of the EU funds. The last is the periodic monitoring and evaluation of the first three elements. Unlike previous agreements, EU funds are now conditional upon the implementation of reforms on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.27

After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the EU started to shift its focus from the ACP countries to the CEE countries. The prospect of membership helped to transform former communist countries into stable liberal democracies. The PHARE aid programme, established in 1989, initially only focused on providing technical assistance for economic reforms. In 1992, a democracy assistance programme was included in the PHARE programme. Between 1991 and

24_{Art. 366, Lomé IV bis Convention, Mauritius, signed on 4 November 1995.}

25_{Stacy, H., Human rights for the 21}st_{century: Sovereignty, civil Society, culture, Stanford Studies in human}

rights, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009, p. 215.

26_{Börzel, T., Risse, T., ‘One size fits all! EU policies for the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule}

of law’, Workshop on democracy promotion, October 2004, Center for Development, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, pp. 1-6.

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11 1996, the EU signed twelve association agreements with CEE countries. These agreements were intended to support the economic, political and social transition in CEE countries and contained provisions on democracy. In 1992, essential elements clauses were included, making accession and financial aid conditional upon compliance with democratic principles. In consequence of the successful transformation, most of the CEE countries joined the European Union in 2004. The European Council adopted the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. These criteria define whether a country is qualified to join the European Union. One of the membership criteria contains the following:

Functional democratic governance requires that all citizens of the country should be able to participate, on an equal basis, in the political decision making at every single governing level, from local municipalities up to the highest, national, level. This also requires free elections with a secret ballot, the right to establish political parties without any hindrance from the state, fair and equal access to a free press, free trade union organisations, freedom of personal opinion, and executive powers restricted by laws and allowing free access to judges independent of the executive.28

Given the success of membership as a tool for democratisation, the EU invoked membership conditionality as an instrument to stabilise the Western Balkans. In 1997, the EU opened a PHARE programme in that region.

The European Council Resolution of November 1991 on ‘Human Rights, Democracy and Development’ was the first EC document that established external democracy promotion as both an objective and a condition of the EC’s cooperation with developing countries. In this resolution, the European Council emphasises a more positive approach in order to promote democracy. Rather than pressuring countries into compliance, an open and constructive dialogue is preferable. ‘An open and constructive dialogue between the Community and the governments of developing countries can make a very important contribution to the promotion of human rights and democracy’. The thought resolution includes various initiatives, such as active support for the role of NGOs, which are necessary for a sustainable democracy.29

The European Union is a major democracy promoter through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was established in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht. Three of the five joint actions, as part of the CFSP, supported democracy by sending election observers to Russia, South-Africa and the Gaza Strip. The Maastricht Treaty can be seen as the cornerstone in the institutionalisation of EU democracy promotion.30 The treaty incorporated provisions of the 1991 European Council resolution. Art. 11 of the Treaty on the EU formulates the objectives for the CFSP action. Two objectives are: safeguarding the common values of the Union and developing and consolidating democracy. The common values are not further clarified in the Maastricht Treaty. The

28_{Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, 21-22 June 1993.}

29_{Annex V, European Council, ‘Declaration on Human Rights, Democracy and Development’, June 1991.}

30

Axyonova, V., The European Union’s democratization policy for Central Asia: Failed in success or

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12 Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty includes the devotion of the member states to the democratic principles.31 The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1995, elevated the status of the Preamble principles to the founding principles of the EU.32 In doing so, democracy finally got a European status. In art. 177 and art. 181 of the Treaty of Nice, that came into force in 2003, the objective of democracy promotion is also formulated.33

The aim of promoting democracy in third countries has been repeatedly highlighted in EU documents, for instance in the European Commission’s Communication of May 2001 on ‘The EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries’, and the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of December 2011 on ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a More Effective Approach’. Furthermore, in 2012 the Council of the European Union established a ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan for Democracy and Human Rights’, in which several actions are listed to promote democracy in third countries: ‘The EU will strengthen its work with partners worldwide to support democracy, notably the development of genuine and credible electoral processes and representative and transparent democratic institutions at the service of the citizen. […] A vigorous and independent civil society is essential to the functioning of democracy.’34

Today, the EU has a comprehensive programme for democracy promotion in place governing all its external relations with third countries. In 2015, the Council adopted a new action plan on human rights and democracy for the period 2015-2019. With this plan, based on the strategic framework and action plan of 2012, the Council reaffirms the EU’s commitment to promote democracy in third countries. The focus is, even more than in previous plans, on local actors and civil society.35 The promotion of democracy is part of the cooperation and association policies of the EU. The European Union coordinates much of its democracy support through the European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), launched in 2006. This instrument replaced and built upon the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights of 2000. Its aim is to encourage democracy and human rights from the inside. Human rights and democratic principles are interdependent. Certain human rights, such as civil and political rights and the right to vote, are thought necessary to create a sustainable democracy. The EIDHR allocates funds for local promotion activities, primarily in partnership with NGOs and international organisations. The EIDHR can intervene without the agreement of the governments of third countries. It supports groups or individuals within civil society who defend democracy and intergovernmental organisations that implement the international

31_{9/C 191/01, Maastricht Treaty, Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1992.}

32_{97/C 340/01, art. 6, Amsterdam Treaty, Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997.} 33

2001/C 80/01, art. 177 and art. 181, Nice Treaty, Nice, signed on 26 February 2000.

34_{Regulation No 11855/12, Council of the European Union, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on}

Human Rights and Democracy, 25 June 2012.

35

Regulation No 10897/15, Council of the European Union, ‘Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019’, 20 July 2015.

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13 mechanisms for the protection of democracy and human rights. The EIDHR works almost exclusively bottom-up by supporting civil society. One tool the EIDHR uses is monitoring electoral processes.36 It has a budget of approximately 157 million euros a year including electoral observations. Today, the EIDHR is funding more than 1200 projects in 100 countries.37

The Treaty of Lisbon, that came into force in 2009, acknowledges democracy as a value to be upheld internally and externally. The treaty has a general provision that supports the presumption of the EU’s mandate to promote democracy abroad. ‘The Union’s action on the international stage shall be guided by the principles that has inspired its own creation and which it seeks to advance in the wider world.’ Art. 3 TEU defines the general aims of the EU, which include promotion of peace and its values. Paragraph 5 specifies this aim: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests’. In contrast with previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty identifies the values of the EU in article 2. Democracy is one of the values the EU is founded on. Art. 21(1) TEU requires the EU’s external actions to be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creations, such as democracy, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world. The EU shall seek to develop relations and partnerships with third countries that share these principles. Art. 21(2) TEU includes the safeguard, consolidation and support of the values. The combination of the objectives of art. 21 of the Lisbon Treaty suggests a stronger obligation attached to democracy than before, because democracy not only needs to be safeguarded but also consolidated and supported. ‘Thus, according to article 21 TEU in its external relations the Union’s action shall be guided by democracy as a principle, the Union shall safeguard democracy as a value, and it shall ‘consolidate and support’ democracy as an objective.’38

Art. 205 TFEU confirms this combination of values, principles and objectives. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty expanded the scope of art. 49 TEU concerning the legal basis for any European country to join the EU. Candidate states are now required not only to adhere to the values of the EU themselves, but they should also promote these values abroad. There is no absolute level required in promotion democracy as an objective. The Lisbon Treaty creates scope for achieving traditional objectives alongside or instead of democracy promotion. The latter depends on the coherence of the EU’s democracy promotion.39

2.2. Instruments of EU democracy promotion

The EU uses various instruments to promote democracy. The most used tools are: political conditionality with the threat of sanctions, aid, diplomatic instruments such as the political dialogue, civilian and military missions, education of public officials, the building of civil society and the

36_{Regulation No 1889/2006, European Parliament and the Council, ‘Establishing a financing instrument for the}

promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide’, 20 December 2006

37_{‘Stories from the field’, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/eidhr_en, consulted on 23 March 2016} 38_{Ghazaryan, N., The European Neighbourhood Policy and the democratic values of the EU: a legal analysis,}

Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014, p. 17.

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14 observation of elections in third countries. Both private and public actors play a role in the democracy promotion instruments, which absorb billions of euros every year.40 Instruments can be distinguished in many different ways, for instance, bottom-up versus top-down, state – versus civil-society-oriented, bilateral versus multilateral. Most often, instruments are classified as positive or negative.41 The strategy of the EU is to reward positive reform towards a stable democracy, using positive instruments, and to punish negative reform using negative instruments. First, The EU’s approach was characterised as top-down with an emphasis on the building of an institutional framework for democracy. Nowadays, the EU prefers a bottom-up approach based on incentives and dialogue with a key role for the civil society in third countries. Third countries that transform into a democracy have been promised benefits, including aid, association agreements and even eventually becoming an EU member state.42

Many CFSP joint actions involve the observation of elections in developing countries. In June 1998 the Council agreed guidelines on election observation. The EU observes around ten elections a year, and has coordinated international operations, for instance in the Gaza Strip and Cambodia. Furthermore, the EU gives technical and material assistance, including voting equipment. Diplomacy can also contribute to the promotion of democracy. The advantage of political dialogue is that it is less coercive. The civilian and military missions that the EU has so far undertaken in third countries also tried to foster democratic reform, though these have usually been short in duration and small in size. Support for civil society is especially coordinated through the EIDHR. It assigns funds to local projects and allocates funds largely outside the control of the governments of the third countries. In this way, it tends to strengthen the democratic process from below. According to Peter Kotzian, Michèle Knodt and Sigita Urdze, the EIDHR allocates progressively more funds to countries whose civil society and democracy is already on the way. The EU tends to support democracy only once the process of democratisation has been started in transition countries.43 The use of political conditionality is a top-down approach to promoting democracy. Partnership and Association Agreements declare that respect for democracy is an essential element of the cooperation. The EU is granting benefits, either in the form of democracy assistance or trade-related advantages. However, these rewards propose certain conditions. Since 1995, essential elements clauses have been included in the agreements between the EU and third countries. Those clauses provide the EU with the right to take appropriate action if the third country disrespects the democratic principles. Advantages granted are conditional on the third country’s behaviour and can be suspended in the case of non-compliance with democratic standards.

40_{Köppinger, P., ‘Worldwide promotion of democracy: challenges, role and strategy of the European Union’,}

Dialogue on Development Policy, European Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, June 2007, p. 15.

41_{Kotzian, P., Knodt, M., Urdze, S., ‘Instruments of the EU’s external democracy promotion’, Journal of}

Common Market Studies, vol. 49 (2011), p. 999.

42_{Lovell, D., ‘Democracy promotion as foreign policy: Some cautionary reflections’, The Hague Journal of}

Diplomacy, vol. 2 (2007), p. 110.

43

Kotzian, P., Knodt, M., Urdze, S., ‘Instruments of the EU’s external democracy promotion’, Journal of

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15 The EU responded almost three times more often to non-democratic practices in third countries with an essential elements clause than in countries without one. Sanctions are the strongest measure, and are therefore rarely used as an instrument for promoting democracy. Sanctions are by definition negative and function as a punishment for the political and economic elites of the third country. Sanctions are of political or economic nature and may include visa restrictions, the freezing of bank accounts of persons and institutions, approving or disapproving declarations, embargos and aid restrictions. Aid restrictions occur in the form of withholding or reducing of the EU’s technical democracy assistance. Another form of sanctions is ‘rhetorical action’. This consists of social and symbolic forms of punishment. When countries comply with democratic principles the EU often reacts with social rewards, such as public praise and invitations to intergovernmental meeting. However, in cases of non-compliance, the EU punishes the democracy violator by isolation or embarrassment.44 An option is public criticism by supporting the reports of other international organisations. For most sanctions, unanimity within the Council of the European Union is necessary. However, rhetorical action can be issued by EU institutions other than the Council and has less far-reaching implications. Therefore, rhetorical action is low on decision-making costs. As far as aid restrictions are concerned, the Commission decides autonomously without Council approval. Decisions regarding democratisation assistance are decided by the Council with qualified majority. Democratisation assistance and aid restrictions are moderate on decision-making costs.

The EU lacks the resources to promote democracy equally in all countries in transition. As a consequence, it designates priority countries resulting in differences between third countries in response to the violation of democratic principles. Firstly, a difference in EU responses to potential member states in cases of non-compliance exists. Secondly, a difference in response to neighbouring countries exists as well. These countries are of significant importance for the EU’s own security. The best protection for the EU is well-governed democracies along its borders. That is why the EU emphasises the promotion of democracy in countries close by and is more willing to apply more costly instruments there like sanctions, aid restrictions or democracy assistance. The EU has responded three times more often to non-compliance in the neighbouring countries than in non-neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the EU responds more intensely towards close countries.45

2.3. Conclusion

Democracy promotion became an EU foreign policy objective in the 1990s. Today, the EU has a comprehensive programme for democracy promotion in place. First, it had a top-down approach with an emphasis on the building of an institutional framework for democracy. An important instrument

44_{Smith, K., European Union Foreign Policy in a changing World, 2}nd_{edition, Cambridge: Polity Press 2008,}

pp. 156-159.

45

Warkotsch, A., ‘Non-compliance and instrumental variation in EU democracy promotion’, Journal of

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16 was political conditionality with the possibility of imposing sanctions. Nowadays, the EU’s approach can be characterised as bottom-up with an emphasis on incentives and political dialogue, and a key role for civil society in third countries. Cooperation still takes place with the threat of sanctions, but these are only imposed as a last resort. The EU rewards positive reform towards a sustainable democracy by using positive instruments, and punishes negative reform by using negative instruments. The EU emphasises the promotion of democracy in countries close by and is more willing to apply more costly instruments there like aid restrictions or democracy assistance, since neighbouring countries are of significant importance for the EU’s own security.

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17

3. Democracy promotion in the Southern Neighbourhood

3.1. Historical overview of the European Southern Neighbourhood Policy

The European Economic Community concluded preferential agreements as early as 1969 with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Three years later, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was established. The European Community concluded within this framework bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with eight Southern Mediterranean countries, including Israel, Tunisia and Egypt. The cooperation in the context of the GMP was mainly focused on strengthening the economic ties. The policy of the European Union towards the Southern Mediterranean has since then undergone major metamorphoses. The first metamorphosis was the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in November 1995. The main incentives for the start of a partnership between the then 15 European member states and 12 Southern Mediterranean countries46 were the European concerns about the instability in North Africa, and the southern concerns about the EU’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. The Southern Neighbourhood feared unequal treatment. The Barcelona Process expanded the scope of the Southern Neighbourhood Policy in various significant ways. The most important expansion was the move from financial aid towards a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Besides this economic aspect, cooperation at two other levels occurred: the political and security level, and the cultural, human and social level. On the political level, respect for the principles of the rule of law and democracy became a central element. Since then, the EU has included an explicit democracy promoting element into its cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood. Democracy should be promoted through multilateral and bilateral political dialogues arranged by new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.47 These agreements provide a suitable framework for political dialogue between the EU and Mediterranean countries and replaced the agreements of the 1970s. All the Agreements include an essential element clause, which states that respect for democratic principles and human rights are an essential element of the agreement. What is noteworthy, is that the EU has never withdrawn an agreement with an authoritarian Mediterranean country whose actions clashed with human rights or democratic principles.48

However, despite the ambitions, the Barcelona Process has proved ineffective. The partnership started in a time when peace talks and multilateralism characterised the Southern Neighbourhood. Years later, this was no longer the case. The ambition to create an area of peace, prosperity and stability was undermined by the escalating Israel-Palestine conflict. The Barcelona Process did not

46

Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

47

Tömmel, I., ‘The new Neighborhood Policy of the EU: An appropriate response to the Arab Spring?’,

Democracy and Security, vol. 9 (2013), pp.19-39.

48_{Lucia Serena Rossi, F., The EU after Lisbon: Amending or coping with the existing treaties?, Cham: Springer}

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18 lead to the desired wave of democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, the southern countries criticised the dominant role of the EU within the partnership. The Barcelona Process became soon known as an asymmetric partnership. The difference in prosperity between northern and southern countries remained, and the free-trade area only resulted in obstacles in economic cooperation. Consequently, the partnership became under serious reform pressure. 49

Furthermore, the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 had an effect on EU-Southern Mediterranean relations. The strategy states that the European Union ‘can be a formidable force for good in the world’. According to the strategy, the EU should also address the social problems in the Southern Mediterranean countries: ‘The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’. The security strategy states that trade could be a powerful tool for promoting reform.50

In view of the lack of success of the Barcelona Process, a new framework for European-Mediterranean relations named the European Neighbourhood Policy was created in 2004. It was a realisation of the foreign and security policy after the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003. Its main emphasis is still economic cooperation, but it also contains tools for the promotion of democracy, such as, the encouraging of grassroots projects, aiming at promoting civil society initiatives in support of democratisation.51

In 2006 the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was launched. Its aim is to promote democracy and human rights in third countries. Certain human rights, such as civil and political rights and the right to vote, are thought necessary to create a stable democracy. Therefore, human rights and democracy are interdependent. The initiative provides funding for promotion activities primarily in partnership with NGOs and international organisations. The EIDHR can intervene without the agreement of the government of the third country in question.52 It supports groups or individuals within civil society who defend democracy and intergovernmental organisations that implement the international mechanisms for the protection of democracy and human rights. The EIDHR works almost exclusively bottom-up by supporting civil society. One tool the EIDHR uses is observing elections.53

At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in July 2008 the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created. The Union is a forum for discussing regional strategy. It has the aim to consolidate

49_{Del Sarto R. A., Schumacher T., ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at stake with the European neighbourhood}

policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 10 (2005), pp. 17-38.

50

European Security Strategy, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

51_{COM(2004) 0373 Final, European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy paper’, Brussels,}

12 May 2004.

52_{‘How we support democracy and human rights?’, http://www.eidhr.eu/supporting-dandhrs, consulted on 30}

March 2016.

53

Regulation No 1889/2006, European Parliament and the Council, ‘Establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide’, 20 December 2006.

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19 the Euro-Mediterranean partnership that was set up in 1995. The main goal of the Union is promoting stability and prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean.54

The start of the Arab Spring in December 2010 changed the situation in the Mediterranean drastically. Due to the demonstrations for more democracy and prosperity, the EU had to change their approach and include the democracy movements in the Arab world in their considerations. Three communications of the European Commission illustrate the EU’s response to the start of the Arab Spring. The first one, ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ (PfDSP), was published in March 2011. The new approach has enabled the EU to strengthen its support for Southern Mediterranean countries that undertake political and economic reform. Examples are reform of the public administration and tax systems. The strategy also emphasises a bigger role for civil society, in particular through the creation of a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility.55 Two months later, the second communication, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, was published. It further developed the previous PfDSP. The review was a response to the ongoing revolution in the Southern Mediterranean countries, and introduced more technical and financial assistance to pursue political reform.56 The third communication, entitled ‘SPRING’, was published in September 2011. The SPRING programme provided additional support to the southern partners who make progress in democratic reform. The budget for the period 2011-2013 was 540 million euros.

Within the framework of the new Southern Neighbourhood Policy a European Endowment for Democracy was launched. Its aim is to support political parties, journalists, non-registered NGOs and other social partners who have problems with accessing EU funding in their effort to promote democracy as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law.57 With this approach, the ENP tactic of economic cooperation leading to democracy was reversed. The conditionality for a closer cooperation is now linked to democratisation, instead of to economic reforms as in the years before. First, the EU had the idea that the liberalisation of the economies of authoritarian Mediterranean countries would lead to democratisation. Nowadays, the EU has increased its focus on the civil societies in transition countries like Egypt. The EU makes more use of bilateral instruments, such as democracy assistance and political conditionality, and has abandoned the influence of regional arrangements. This has made the policy approach towards the Southern neighbourhood more flexible.

54_{COM (2008) 319 Final, European Commission, ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, 20 May}

2008.

55

COM (2011) 200 Final, European Commission, ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8 March 2011.

56

COM (2011) 303 Final, European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, Brussels, 25 May 2011.

57_{IP/12/1199, European Commission, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy – Support for the}

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20 To examine the response of the EU to the start of the Arab Spring, EU official documents from before and right after the start of the uprisings will be compared. The following pre-Arab Spring documents have been selected: the ‘Barcelona Declaration’ of 1995 which established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the essential element clause of the Mediterranean Association Agreement with Egypt of 2004, the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’ of 2004, and the European Commission proposal ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ of 2008. The communications of the European Commission of 2011 ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ and ‘SPRING’, will be analysed in order to determine the reaction of the EU to the start of the Arab Spring. The comparison will focus on the objectives, the role of civil society, the nature of the measures, and how these are framed in normative terms. The focus is on the attention paid to democracy promotion. It will concentrate on how often the EU policy makers have referred to the selected issues related to democracy promotion.

3.2. The analysis of official EU documents on the Southern Mediterranean

3.2.1. The objectives

The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 contains an ambitious approach, aimed at cooperation in a broad set of policy areas, such as technology, fisheries, energy and environmental protection. It has three main objectives: the creation of a common area of peace and stability through a political and security partnership, an area of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the establishment of a free-trade area, and the strengthening of social and cultural ties through a social, cultural and human partnership. The latter partnership aims to promote understanding between cultures and facilitates interaction between civil societies. The Barcelona Process mainly focuses on economic and security issues. It reaffirms a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability, such as combating terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime, illegal immigration, and corruption. After all, stability in the Southern Neighbourhood is of major importance for the EU’s own security. The Barcelona Declaration states that the southern countries should develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, ‘while recognising in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural economic and judicial system’.58

This is an interesting statement, because it implies the normative ambition of the EU to spread its norms and values over the Southern Mediterranean. However, the third countries are free to implement these principles in their own way. The Barcelona Process did not consider the fact that the Southern Mediterranean was not joined together in a union. Consequently, there emerged an unequal partnership between the EU and the southern countries. The southern countries responded

58_{‘Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership’, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf,}

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21 bilaterally to the EU’s multilateral plans.59

The objective of the new framework for European-Southern Mediterranean relations named the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004 is: ‘to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned’. The promotion of democracy is not included in the main objectives. The approach proposed by the ENP has mainly economic implications, while the Barcelona Declaration focuses also on other objectives. The so-called bilateral Action Plans contain a number of priorities in order to strengthen commitment to democracy. The drawing up of an Action Plan will depend on particular circumstances, such as the political and economic situation.60 The ENP rewards political reform, but says nothing on how to stimulate reform in the Southern Mediterranean countries that have lagged behind in this aspect. The communication of the European Commission ‘Barcelona Process: the Union for the Mediterranean’ of 2008 states that the goals of the Barcelona Declaration remain valid. ‘The challenge of the UfM is to enhance multilateral relations, increase ownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens’. The promotion of democracy is not identified as an objective. The term ‘democracy’ is only mentioned three times, and solely when it concerns the commitment of the Barcelona Declaration to democracy.61

The EU’s Mediterranean Policy before the Arab Spring is not considered successful. It mainly failed in its ambition to support democracy. The tension between the promotion of democracy and the security needs was reflected in the conceptual change from the Barcelona Declaration to the ENP and the UfM. The Barcelona Declaration stresses that the ambition of turning the Southern Mediterranean into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation requires the strengthening of democracy. With the ENP the goal of the EU shifted from a normative long-term democratisation to a strategic short-term stabilisation of authoritarian regimes in the Southern Mediterranean. The approach of the UfM shows a further decline in the EU's normative ambitions. It focuses on technical forms of cooperation in a limited set of areas, such as environment, technology, and energy, because these areas are not specifically political and do not risk tension with authoritarian governments. Before the Arab Spring, the EU often complimented undemocratic leaders, such as Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt and, al-Assad of Syria, for the achieved economic reforms, but did not bring up the lack of democratisation.62 The EU believed that economic reform would eventually lead to democratisation. To conclude, the pre-Arab Spring policy toward the Southern Mediterranean seems to have declined in its normative goals, particularly with regard to the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and

59_{Hollis, R., ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis of the ‘Arab Spring’’, International}

Affairs, vol. 88 (2012), p. 83.

60

COM(2004) 0373 Final, European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy paper’, Brussels, 12 May 2004.

61

COM (2008) 319 Final, European Commission, ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, 20 May 2008.

62_{Behr, T. ‘The EU’s Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the leopard change its spots?’,}

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22 strengthening of civil society. On the other hand, the EU's own interests, especially those referring to security matters, played a more prominent role.

The start of the Arab Spring in 2011 asked for a change in the EU’s southern neighbourhood policy. The new approach focuses on the creation of a ‘democracy partnership’ through its support for the ongoing reform processes in the Southern Neighbourhood. Democratisation of these countries became the main objective of the EU. The first communication after the start of the Arab Spring, ‘A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity’, contains concrete plans to support the democratisation processes. An example is the allocation of 17 million euros to Tunisia for immediate short-term support for democratic transformation, including an EU Election Observation Mission. In order to promote political reform, the EU sets out an ‘incentive based approach based on more differentiation among Southern Mediterranean countries’, the so-called ‘more for more’ policy. Those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to get more support in terms of aid, trade and mobility from the EU. The first response of the EU mainly focuses on adequately monitored, free and fair elections. In its communication, the European Commission suggests fewer priorities, based on more precise benchmarks against which performance would be evaluated. The objectives are extended and enhanced political dialogues with the partner countries and more short- and mid-term projects. In order to reach these objectives, the Commission announced an increase in funding, and the establishment of a European Neighbourhood Instrument, which consists not only of EU funds but also funds from the European Investment Bank and other international financial institutions.63 The second communication after the start of the Arab Spring, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, emphasises the concept of ‘deep democracy’. According to the EU, ‘the building of deep and sustainable democracies requires not only regular and free elections, but also a broader set of preconditions that includes rights to exercise free speech, form opposition parties, and other civil and human rights, such as the freedom of thought, and religion’. The objectives of this approach are, besides democratic transformation and institutions-building, a stronger partnership with the people, and sustainable and inclusive economic development. The first objective includes issues such as constitutional reform, reform of the judiciary, and the fight against corruption.64

In conclusion, after the start of the Arab Spring, the EU increased its normative ambition to spread democracy over the Southern Mediterranean. The objectives focus more on democracy than before the Arab Spring. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity states: ‘the EU has had to overcome historical hurdles. This success story was possible when hope triumphed over fear and freedom triumphed over repression. […] The EU wants to support them in building real democracies and peaceful and prosperous societies. Each country and people will of course choose their own path

63

64_{COM (2011) 303 Final, European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, Brussels,}

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23 and make their own choices’.65

The term ‘democracy’ is used more often than before: in the first Arab Spring communication of the European Commission 13 times, and in the second communication 25 times. In comparison, the Barcelona Declaration mentions it two times, and the communication concerning the Union for the Mediterranean three times. Furthermore, the EU’s response to the start of the Arab Spring EU contains more concrete steps to achieve a stable democracy. The framework offered in the new approach has a liberal character, because it focuses primarily on a balance between civil society and the state, viewed as essential for a sustainable democracy.66 It focuses on state-building and civil society. Nevertheless, economic development and the challenges of migration still play a major role in the approach of the EU.

A striking difference between the documents from before and after the start of the Arab Spring, is the use of the terms ‘promotion’ and ‘support’. The EU used the term ‘promotion’ more often before than during the beginning of the Arab Spring. In the Arab Spring documents ‘A partnership for democracy and Shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ and ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’, the term ‘promotion’ is used no more than three times. By way of contrast, the term ‘support’ is used 144 times. In illustration of the contrast, the Barcelona Declaration used the term ‘promotion’ seven times, and the term ‘support’ eleven times. In an interview with Sebastian Bloching of the non-profit organisation ‘European Partnership for Democracy’, he stated that ‘the EU has increasingly emphasised the use of the term ‘support’ instead of ‘promotion’, because the Bush Administration also used this term for doubtful endeavours, such as the Iraq invasion. In order to differentiate itself from a flawed US policy, i.e. building democracy through military intervention, it prefers the use of democracy support.’67

3.2.2. The role of civil society

The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 recognises the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development. A specific aim is to strengthen the instruments of decentralised cooperation, and to encourage exchanges between those active in the reform process: leaders of political and civil society, universities, the media, NGOs, and trade unions. Youth plays especially an important role. According to the declaration, ministers, senior officials and experts should keep in touch with those active in civil society.68 Nevertheless, the term ‘civil society’ is mentioned only five times in the declaration. The ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’ of 2004 emphasises that the way to achieve the objectives is to connect the peoples of the EU and its neighbours. ‘People-to-people

65

66_{Teti, A., ‘The EU’s first response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A critical discourse analysis of the Partnership for}

Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 17 (2012), pp. 272, 273.

67

Bloching, Sebastian, Interview by Sophie van der Velden, Personal interview, Brussels, 27 January 2016.

68_{‘Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership’, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf,}

The European Union as democracy promoter in the Southern Mediterranean: The start of the Arab Spring as turning point in the EU's normative ambition.

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities