Leiden University
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Institute of Political Science
Master Thesis
Populist Radical Right Parties in the European Parliament:
Measuring the ‘Constraining Effects of Incumbency’Submitted by Douwe van der Meulen 1390805 Msc. Political Science: International Politics Word count: 9848 Supervisor: Dr. Harmen van der Veer Second reader: Dr. Simon Otjes
11 June 2019 Leiden
Abstract
For long there appeared to be a consensus in the literature that governing poses major problems for populist radical right parties. This is attributed to the core ideological features of the party family. However, recent research from Albertazzi and McDonnel (2015) disputes this consensus. This thesis further explores the apparent contradiction in the literature on the constraining effects of governing on populist radical right parties. It does so in a relatively novel way. By analysing roll-call votes from the 8th European Parliament using NOMINATE, Europe’s most important PRRPs can be compared in a fixed institutional context. This way it is possible to bypass the obstacles faced when comparing different national political systems. This thesis finds that there is indeed a constraining effect on PRRPs in the European Parliament. However, contrary to the thesis’ expectations, this constraining effect does not seem to stem from an incumbency effect, but rather from the influence of European party groups.
Introduction
Since the mid-1990’s populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been on the rise. This rise accelerated in recent years (Rooduijn, 2015). More and more European countries are (co-)governed by PRRPs (Rooduijn, 2013, p. 74). Many authors argue that the ideological core features inherent to PRRPs tend to cause great difficulties for these parties once they assume public office (McDonnell & Lewess, 2011; Mudde, 2004, 2007). Government participation tends to have a constraining effect on PRRPs. The most important mechanism regarding that constraining effect is the ‘moderating effect of incumbency’. This implies that once PRRPs are in government they tend (voluntary or not) to behave and vote less extreme than when they
were not in government (for more details, see below). However, recent research shows that Italy’s ‘Popolo della Libert à’ (People of Freedom) and ‘Lega Nord’ (Northern League) and the Swiss ‘Schweizerische Volkspartei’ (Swiss People’s Party) are exceptions to this rule (Albertazzi & McDonell, 2015). This thesis further explores the contradicting findings between those authors that say that governing has a constraining effect and those that argue that it has little constraining effect. This leads to the following research question: To what extent does government participation constrain the behaviour of European populist radical right parties?
Most research on this subject focusses on the domestic political arena. I exploit the multi-level structure of the European Parliament (EP) to provide a better comparison between parties by fixing the institutional context. This opens up the opportunity to bypass the many difficulties arising from comparing different political systems. In the EP members of a large number of European PRRPs are forced to vote in the same context on the same issues.
Populism is one of the most debated topics regarding European politics (Taguieff, 1995). In recent years, an increasing part of this debate has been concerned with the issue of radical right-wing politics. Some scholars have argued that populism and the radical right are fundamentally at odds with the liberal democratic principles, which the European Union value so greatly (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). Therefore, the influence of governing on PRRPs could have potentially important consequences for the future of Europe. This thesis adds to these debates by focussing on a recently found contradiction within the literature. Moreover, it does so in a relatively novel way.
The thesis proceeds as follows. The next section will set out the theoretical framework, which first conceptualizes populism and PRRPs. Then the current literature on PRRPs in government is discussed. The last part of this section elaborates on a selection of the literature on voting behaviour in the EP and subsequently my hypotheses. Section three elaborates on the method used in this thesis, NOMINATE, and the corresponding data, Roll-call votes and
CHES expert surveys. Section four summarises and discusses the results. The final section consists of the conclusion and discussion.
Theory Populism
Before discussing the behaviour of (governing) PRRPs in the European Parliament it is crucial to first define the various concepts concerned. In order to accurately define PRRPs it is necessary to first attend to one of the phenomenon’s core (ideological) concepts: populism. Populism is – and has been for years – a complex and much contested concept. Rooduijn (2014, p. 572) argues that “the term populism is still being applied to a wide variety of parties and politicians, and it still points in different contexts to different phenomena”. Regarding this discrepancy, Rooduijn (2014) aims to find a lowest common denominator for populism. He accomplishes this by comparing six populist parties based on a most-different systems design. He argues that populist actors share four characteristics: “(1) populists emphasize the central position of the people; (2) they criticize the elite; (3) they conceive of the people as a homogeneous entity; and (4) they proclaim a serious crisis” (Rooduijn, 2014, p. 573). These four characteristics combined are what Rooduijn (2013, p. 16) calls his universal minimal definition of populism.
Some scholars use an expanded version of the second characteristic (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; Heinisch, 2003; Panizza, 2005; Taguieff, 1995), they add an – as Rooduijn (2013) calls it – exclusionist feature. According to their definitions the ‘corrupt’ or ‘conspiring’ elite is not the only group facing criticism. A secondary group identified as hostile by populist actors is the so-called ‘others’ group. This others group is – much like the homogeneous group ‘the people’ – an “imagined community” (Mudde, 2004, p. 546). The ‘others’ group consists of whatever the populist actor perceives as unwanted people, such as foreigners, people from another race or homosexuals (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013).
Various scholars have argued that populism is not a ‘full’ ideology such as liberalism, socialism or conservatism in that it lacks an all-embracing worldview. Instead it focusses on particular political concepts, primarily the relationship between the people and the elite. Because of this ‘thin-centred ideology’, populism can easily be combined with other ideologies, such as the radical right (Freeden, 1996; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn 2013; Taggart, 2000). According to Rooduijn (2013), the inclusion of the aforementioned exclusionist feature into the definition of populism is such a combination. It is a feature associated with the right rather than the left and its inclusion would therefore create a bias toward right wing populism. If including the exclusionist feature redefines populism as right-wing populism, than which additional characteristics result in the subject of this thesis; populist radical right parties (PRRPs)?
Populist radical right parties
In a similar fashion as Rooduijn’s (2013) minimum definition of populism, Mudde (2007, p. 15) has constructed a minimal definition of PRRPs “to describe the core features of the ideologies of all parties that are generally included in the party family”. These concepts can be seen as overarching concepts, to which smaller concepts can be attached. The overarching concept for the minimal definition of PRRPs is ‘nativism’. Mudde defines it as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (2007, p. 19). This (non) ‘nativeness’ is open for interpretation. It can be religious, ethnical or racial of nature. However, it always has to contain a cultural aspect (see Bennett 1990; Friedman 1967; Higham 1955). According to Mudde, this definition is more stable than alternative terms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘racist’ and it still covers the core ideology of the larger populist radical right party family.
In his comprehensive pan-European study on PRRPs, Mudde (2007) also conceptualizes the subject under study with a maximum definition. Contrary to the minimum definition, the maximum definition is constructed with a most-similar systems design in order to find the ‘greatest common denominator’. This definition deviates from the minimum definition in that it comprises two additional concepts. It consists of “a combination of three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism” (Mudde, 2007, p.22). Nativism in this sense is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (as discussed above). The second feature has been defined in various ways. Mudde’s conceptualisation encompasses an extensive focus on law and order imposed and determined by an authority, preferably one strong charismatic leader. Anti-democratic tendencies that are often associated with authoritarianism are neither included nor excluded from this definition. The third feature is populism (defined in a similar way as above).
This thesis uses the maximum definition because it fits best with the definitions used by Heinisch (2003) and McDonnell and Newell (2011) in their studies on governing PRRPs (which will be discussed later). This choice has consequences for my case selection. After all, the minimum definition encompasses more political parties than the maximum definition. However, as the data and methods section will show, the maximum definition includes enough PRRPs for a reliable comparison.
In sum, PRRPs according to the discussed definitions greatly emphasize the central position of the homogenous people whilst criticizing the elite and the ‘others’ group, furthermore they are authoritarian as defined above and to a certain extent xenophobic, finally they proclaim a certain crisis. Given the PRRPs ideological core features, how do these traits affect their position in the political arena?
PRRPs in government
Heinisch (2003) argues that the populist element makes PRRPs very successful in opposition roles. First, because PRRPs claim to represent the homogeneous entity ‘the people’, they are not confined to a core support group with specific demands for their respective niche (such as farm lobbies, business groups, trade unions or regional interests). Therefore PRRPs have a relatively high level of freedom in their policy formulation. This makes these parties flexible and able to respond relatively easily to political trends and important events. Second, in contemporary politics strong charismatic leaders are preferred over politicians who have risen to their position through intra party processes (Heinisch, 2003, p. 100)
However, the downside is that once in public office, the strengths stemming from the populist feature of PRRPs turn into disadvantages. In Heinisch’s (2003, p. 91) words, “significant weaknesses inherent in populist parties pose nearly insurmountable problems that make their long-term success in government questionable”. The most important disadvantage is the result of a so-called ‘moderating effect of incumbency’. This is an effect consisting of two mutually reinforcing mechanisms. First, when entering government PRRPs are forced to tone down their radical policy agenda and ideology due to the need for cooperation with more moderate mainstream parties (Heinisch, 2003). Secondly, after having experienced the responsibility of government, PRRPs may moderate their tone even more with the aim of achieving additional legitimacy and increased responsibility in governing (Downs, et al., 2009).
However, in toning down their extremism, PRRPs risk losing their core supporters and activists, possibly resulting in losing seats in the elections following government participation. Moreover, hard-line members of the party could cause inter-party unrest due to their dissatisfaction with the toned down behaviour. This happened to, for example, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in 2002 (Heinisch, 2003, p. 101). Various other scholars have found
mechanisms similar to the ‘moderating effect of incumbency’ in their studies (Downs, et al., 2009; McDonnel & Newell, 2011).
Where Heinisch (2003) describes these disadvantages as “nearly insurmountable problems” for PRRP’s, McDonnell and Newell (2011) are more cautious with the concluding remarks of their study on ‘outsider parties’ (which are conceptually identifiable to this thesis’ definition of PRRPs) in government. The authors argue that in general ‘outsiders’ face many challenges when moving into office which often result in a negative incumbency. The two most important reasons are first, the relinquishing of their opposition status due to the need for compromises (i.e. moderating effect of incumbency) and second, the fact that for most outsiders entering government, it is their first time (McDonnell & Newell, 2011, p. 450).
It appears as if there is a certain consensus regarding the constraining effect on governing PRRP’s – mainly due to the moderating effect of incumbency. However, both Heinisch (2003) and McDonnel and Newell (2011) note that there are exceptions (e.g. the FPÖ under Jörg Haider in 1999; the resurgence of the Italian far right in 2000; Lega Nord’s second time in office from 2001 till 2006) to the general rule – that is the constraining effects on governing PRRPs. Moreover, in their study of three right-wing populist parties (the Schweizerische Volkspartei, the Lega Nord and the Popolo della Libert à), Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015) found little to no evidence of the moderating effect of incumbency and also no negative incumbency effect. This means that the difficulties supposedly faced by PRRPs are not undisputed. This brings us back to the central question of this thesis, is there really a constraining effect for PRRPs in government?
This thesis researches that question in a novel way. Instead of studying various PRRPs in their domestic political environment I broaden the comparison by focussing on an institution in which all relevant PRRPs operate at level playing field: the EP. The biggest advantage of focussing on the EP is that problems arising from the differences between European member
states’ political systems are bypassed. At the same time the design also comes with a complication: the transferability of the constraining effects of government participation. Does the moderating effect of incumbency apply to PRRPs in the EP in a similar way as it supposedly does in national parliaments? In order to be able to answer that question it is necessary to first discuss some of the literature on political competition in the EP.
Political competition in the European Parliament
Much of the literature on political competition in the EP focusses on the question which political institution (the Parliamentarians’ nationality, national party or European party group) has the greatest influence on the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Regarding this debate most research has compared the influence of European party groups (EPGs) versus that of the nationality of MEPs. The consensus among scholars is that EPG membership is generally a better predictor for MEPs voting behaviour than nationality (Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix et al., 2007). However, Hix’s (2002) research shows that national party policies have an even greater influence on MEPs voting behaviour. This is largely due to the more effective leverage and tools at the disposal of national parties. For example, the national parties are the ones that draw up the candidate lists for the EP and can thereby effectively exclude people from participating in European elections. In other words, the national parties have the greatest influence on MEPs voting behaviour, followed by EPGs and lastly a MEPs nationality.
Other research on political competition in the EP focusses on coalition formation (Kreppel, 2000; Kreppel & Tselebis, 1999). A common subject here is the ‘grand coalition’, which refers to a coalition between the two largest EPGs; the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists (PES). Because these two party groups together command a majority of MEPs, one would expect this coalition to be the dominant factor in voting decisions, resulting in a ‘centre vs. extremes pattern’ between the grand coalition and the other
parties (Kreppel & Tselebis, 1999). However, research shows that other factors are also important, such as left-right and EU-integration ideological positions of MEPs (Kreppel, 2000; Kreppel & Tselebis, 1999).
The third literature on political competition in the EP that is important for this thesis revolves around the ideological position of MEPs. To be more precise, it focusses on the dimensionality of the politics in the EP. According to the traditional theories on European integration (intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism), European politics is driven by a single dimension, namely more or less European integration (Hix, 2001, p.664). Contrarily, Hix and Noury (2001; 2009) find in their research on voting behaviour in the EP that the traditional left-right dimension which also dominates domestic politics has the largest influence on the political arena. Additionally, they find that there are multiple dimensions with explanatory value regarding the voting behaviour of MEPs. In their comprehensive study of all roll-call votes in the EP between 1979 and 2001, Hix, et al. (2014) find that EU integration (whether MEPs prefer more or less of it) is becoming more important as a second dimension. In his research on the 4th and 5th European Parliament, Voeten (2005) corroborates importance of MEPs’ standpoints vis-à-vis the traditional left-right ideology. However, he also argues that the importance of the left-right dimension is overstated with regard to yet another contestation: the libertarian-traditional division. The libertarian-traditional contestation is also known as the GAL(Green/Alternative/Libertarian)-TAN(Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) dimension and is often associated with ‘new politics’ and the rise of radical (right) parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Rupnik, 2016; Voeten, 2005). In other words, the majority of empirical research on political contestation in the EP finds that the traditional left-right dimension is dominant. Nevertheless, EU integration and GAL-TAN are also influential, albeit on a secondary or even third dimension.
Expectations
To substantiate this thesis’ expectations I return to the question of the transferability of the moderating effects of incumbency. I argue that the supposed effect should affect PRRPs in the EP as well due to three mechanisms. First, the European Union elections are second-order elections (Hix & Marsh, 2011; Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). This means that they are considered less important than the national elections. One implication thereof is that the electorate base their choice for an EP candidate primarily on domestic issues and their (dis)satisfaction with the functioning of their current governing parties. Consequently EP election campaigns are dominated by domestic issues (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011; Reif, et al. 1997). MEPs running for (re)election therefore make electoral promises based on domestic issues. Since national party policies are the most important influence on the voting behaviour of MEPs, there is a good chance that there will be a certain flow-through effect. In other words, if the national party is subject to a moderating effect of incumbency domestically, chances are ample that the parties’ MEPs (and their voting behaviour) will be influenced as well.
Secondly, as described earlier, part of the moderating effect of incumbency is the result of an increased incentive for responsibility and moderation due to the appeal of governing. This effect is just as applicable to domestic parliamentarians as to MEPs who are up for (re)election. The third mechanism stems from the coalition effect of the moderating effect of incumbency. The majority of the political parties in the EP are aligned to a European party group (EPG). According to Mudde (2016), PRRPs have failed to form their own political group after the 2014 European elections. Moreover, PRRPs are even more dispersed between different EPGs in the 8th EP than they were during earlier parliamentary terms (Mudde, 2016, p. 36). Consequently, there is intensive interaction between PRRPs and moderate parties within the EPGs, which arguably affects the PRRPs in the EP in the same way as it supposedly does in
national parliaments (Minkenberg, 2001). Additional research shows that EPG’s are able to pressure political parties to act according to the party group’s wishes, which potentially increases the effect (Hix 2002, Kreppel, 2000, Kreppel & Tsebelis 1999). Following this logic, the moderating effect of incumbency might be even stronger in the EP.
In sum, we now know that (1) PRRPs share certain core ideological features with each other, (2) the populist dimension of these core features supposedly makes that in general government participation by PRRPs has constraining effects – the ‘moderating effect of incumbency’ most importantly, (3) MEPs prioritize national party policy above the other institutions that try to influence their voting behaviour and (4) the traditional left-right dimension is most important in the EP, followed by EU integration and GAL-TAN. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: PRRPs that participate in a government vote less extreme in the EP than PRRPs that do
not participate in a government.
In finding an answer to H1 I compare governing PRRPs with non-governing PRRPs in the EP in its entirety. Although this a good first step in answering this thesis’ central question, H1 does not take into account the possible influence of EPG’s on the voting behaviour of PRRPs. Therefore a second hypothesis is needed to control for this possible influence.
H2: PRRPs in a European Party Group that participate in a government vote less extreme in
Data & Methods
To test the hypotheses, I examine the voting behaviour of PRRPs in the EP in relation to whether or not they are participating in a government. To this end, I first make a selection of which parties are PRRPs and which are not. Subsequently I make a distinction between the governing- and the non-governing PRRPs. Since the PRRP definition used in this thesis comes from Mudde’s (2007) study it seemed natural to use the list of main populist parties provided by him. However, more than a decade later this list is somewhat outdated. Therefore I turn to newer research from Mudde (2016, p. 69) in which he lists the most important populist party for each European country at the time of writing. This means that the list contains a single populist party per country (both right- and left-wing). Consequently the list needs some adjustments to serve this thesis’ purposes. After all, I am interested in a comparison between all PRRPs in the EP and not just the most important PRRP per country. Therefore I first filter the list so that only the right-wing populist parties remain. Next I consult Rooduijn, et al.’s ‘The Populist’ (2019) for possible additions (one European country could have multiple PRRPs and since Mudde only listed the single most important populist party per country, chances are PRRPs were left out). This is possible because Rooduijn’s definition of populism is similar to Mudde’s definition of populism. Subsequently I checked the website of the EP if all parties are represented in the institution (European Parliament, 2019). Finally, Döring and Manow (2018) provided me with the information needed to distinguish between the parties that are (or were) participating in a government and those that are not. The result is Table 1.
For the analysis of the PRRPs’ (and other parties’ MEPs) voting behaviour I use Roll-call votes (RCVs). This is an important form of voting in the European Parliament and one of the most widely used tools for examining voting in the EP. Casting a vote by RCV entails the possibility for every individual MEP to call either yea, nay or abstain (in the case of the EP that is). These RCVs are recorded and are therefore a very useful tool for (academic) research.
Table 1: Populist Radical Right Parties in the European Parliament
However, despite its versatile usability, roll-call voting is also subject to some criticism. Scholars have argued that there is a chance of systematic bias (Carrubba & Gabel, 1998). This is because RCVs used to only comprise roughly a third of all votes in the EP (Faas, 2003). Additionally, roll-calls were often initiated by the leadership of a EPG (Corbett et al., 2016, p. 234), which could potentially structurally influence the way in which members of these party groups vote. However, since changes in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in June 2009, all final legislative votes have to be cast by roll-call (Yordanova & Mühlböck, 2015). This counteracts both claims to some extent. Furthermore, in their comparative research on RCVs before and after the 2009 changes, Hix and Noury (2018) find no significant differences in voting cohesion for the main political groups. “These results suggest that
1 M5S is described in diverging manners (e.g. ‘big-tent’, ‘catch-all’, ‘new-politcs’). This is mainly due to the
party appealing to both left- and right-wing voters (Scaini, 2018). However, M5S satisfies all features of this thesis’ PRRP definition and is therefore considered a PRRP (for more details on unique character of M5S see, Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015).
Country Party No. of MEPs In national government
Austria Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) 4 18/12/2017-
Belgium Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) 1 -
Bulgaria Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBZ) 1 -
Denmark Danish People’s Party (DF) 4 -
Finland Finns Party (PS) 3 29/05/2015-13/06/2017
France National Front (FN) 20 -
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) 2 -
Hungary Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) 12 10/05/2014-
Italy Five Star Movement (M5S)1 17 01/06/2018-
Italy Northern League (LN) 5 01/06/2018-
Lithuania Order and Justice (TT) 1 22/11/2012-09/10/2016
Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV) 4 -
Poland Law and Justice (PiS) 14 16/11/2015-
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 2 -
selection biases in the European Parliament associated with strategic choices are negligible” (Hix & Noury, 2018, p. 211).
In this thesis I use a RCV data set which contains all votes from the 8th European Parliament held via roll-call vote between July 16th, 2014 and May 3rd, 2018. The width of the data set has some consequences for the PRRPs listed in table 1. Only ‘Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance’ (Fidesz) and ‘Law and Justice’ (PiS) have been in government for the majority of this period. The Italian ‘Five Star Movement’ (M5S) and ‘Northern League’ (LN) have entered government around the same time of the last recorded vote from the RCV data set. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) has entered government on December 12th, 2017 and therefore has only five months overlap with the RCV data set. This means that both the Italian parties and the Austrian party have been in government for only a small amount of the recorded votes in the RCV data set. Therefore, these parties will be regarded as non-governing PRRPs. The Finns Party (PS) was governing in a coalition with two other parties from 2015 till 2017. However, after two years in government the PS split between hardliners and more moderate party members. The newly elected leadership of the PS was unwilling to make concessions and tone down their radical policy ideas (most importantly regarding immigration policy). This is a good example of what the theory on governing PRRPs predicts as possible consequences of being in government for PRRPs. The PS’ inability to complete its term in office as part of a coalition effectively disqualifies PS as a (successful) governing PRRP. In light of this thesis’ central question PS will therefore also be regarded as a non-governing PRRP. Finally, the Lithuanian ‘Law and Justice’ (TT) has been in government from 2012 till 2016, which makes for little over two years overlap with the RCV data set. TT will therefore be regarded as a partially governing PRRP in this thesis. In sum, Fidesz and PiS are classified as governing PRRPs, TT is classified as a partially governing PRRP, and all other PRRPs are regarded as non-governing.
I employ the data using a scaling method called NOMINATE. This method was originally developed to analyse voting in the United States Congress (Poole & Rosenthal, 1985). It is an algorithm through which it is possible to create spatial models from parliamentary voting data. Since its development NOMINATE has “emerged as the main way of estimating actors’ locations from voting records” (Hix, et al. 2007). It has been used in both (national) parliaments (see for example Schonhardt–Bailey, 2003; Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004) and international assemblies like the United Nations General Assembly (see Voeten, 2000). There are several versions of NOMINATE (D-NOMINATE, W-NOMINATE and DW-NOMINATE). In this thesis I use Poole, et al.’s (2011) W-NOMINATE. This method lends itself well to the purposes of this thesis because of two reasons. First, the ability to reduce large complex data sets to clear manageable models. Secondly, the possibility to use the reduced data (positions of legislators) for further calculations and research. Using this method it is possible to generate a model (and subsequently visualize it) of the MEPs’ empirical voting behaviour. Subsequently, using an external source it is possible to find out whether there is a discrepancy between that empirical behaviour and the MEPs parties’ ideological preferences.
However, NOMINATE comes with some drawbacks as well. Most importantly, for this thesis, is the number of dimensions used and the interpretation of these dimensions. Regarding the former, it is possible to create either a one-, two- or three-dimensional model with the scaling method. The three-dimensional model is generally seen as the best (meaning, the model with the highest percentage of correctly classified votes. For more details see Poole, 2005). However, the three dimensional model makes visualizing it a lot more complex. The second dilemma regarding NOMINATE is that the dimensions created by the scaling method are unidentified and therefore need a qualitative interpretation. This ‘problem’ has various possible solutions (see Hix, 2001; Voeten, 2005). In order to interpret the dimensions of the spatial model I employ the same strategy as Hix (2001) and Voeten (2005). I run a regression model
of the MEPs coordinates on the spatial model and their ideology placement in an external source. In this model, the MEPs coordinates are the dependent variables. The independent variables are retrieved from the external source.
This source is The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, 2019). For CHES’ surveys, political scientists from the European member states are periodically asked to place the national parties of their country on various policy scales. Concerning the expert surveys, Bakker et al. (2015, p. 150) “suggest that [the Chapel Hill Expert Survey] data display quite high levels of inter-expert reliability and considerable common structure with different measures. [Which] is good news for scholars aiming to examine the positions of parties on a variety of ideological and policy dimensions in a longitudinal and cross-national perspective”. The CHES policy scales used in this thesis as independent variables for the regression analysis are the same as those discussed in the theory section and operationalized as follows:
General left–right: A continuous variable that describes each party’s overall ideology
on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 5 (center) to 10 (extreme right).
European integration: A continuous variable that describes each party’s general
position on European integration on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) to 5 (neutral) to 7 (strongly in favour).
GAL–TAN: A continuous variable that describes each party’s views on democratic
freedoms and rights on a scale ranging from 0 (libertarian/postmaterialist) to 5 (center) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian). Libertarian is associated with, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. Contrarily, traditional or authoritarian parties often reject these ideas and instead value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues (Polk, et al., 2017).
Grand coalition: A dummy variable that indicates whether or not a party is part of the ‘grand coalition’ (consisting of the European party groups EPP and PES).
In government: A dummy variable that indicates whether or not a party took part in a
government.
In order to make comparison between scales and parties easier, the continuous variables in this thesis’ data set have been transmuted to (continuous) scales ranging from 0 to 1. Both the RCV- and CHES data set are provided by van der Veer (2018).
Results
The theory section elaborated upon this thesis’ expectations that governing PRRPs vote less extreme than non-governing PRRPs in the EP in general and within the same European Party Group specifically. This section’s primary interest is testing these expectations. To this end, I created a spatial model of MEPs ideal point estimates for the 8th European Parliament, using the RCV data set and Poole et al.’s (2011) W-NOMINATE scaling method. As noted before, it is possible to create one-, two- and three-dimensional models using this method. In this case, a two-dimensional model appears to suffice for the RCVs in the 8th EP term2. The results are summarised in table 11 in the appendix.
Figure 1 plots the results of the NOMINATE model. In the figure Fidesz is blue, PiS is orange, all other PRRPs are red, the EPG European People’s Party (EPP) is grey, the EPG European Conservatives and Reformist (ECR) is light green and MEPs of the rest of the parties are black. Observing figure 1, the first thing that stands out is that the ideal points of PRRPs’
2 The two-dimensional model’s APRE/GMP scores (for a detailed explanation of these statistics, see Poole,
2005) and percentage of correct classifications are much higher than those of the one-dimensional model and negligibly lower than the three-dimensional model. Moreover, visualization of the results is a lot more difficult for the three dimensional model.
Fi g u re 1 : L o ca ti o n o f ME Ps , Ju ly 2 014 –Ma y 2018 , Di m en si o n s 1 a n d 2
MEPs are quite scattered. Some other things that are worth noting is that the spread is relatively larger on the second dimension than on the first dimension. Furthermore, Fidesz and PiS are among the most centred PRRPs regarding the first dimension, but on the second dimension Fidesz and PiS are amongst the outliers. Moreover, Fidesz and PiS are relatively clustered. However, it is difficult to objectively interpret this dispersion without knowing what the plot’s dimensions are. As discussed in the previous section, I run a regression model of the MEPs coordinates on the spatial model and their ideology placement in an external source (CHES). Separate regression models are run with the MEPs coordinates on the first and second dimension as dependent variable and the independent variables discussed in the previous section (left-right, EU integration, GAL-TAN, Grand coalition and ‘In government’). The results are summarised in table 2 and 4.
Table 2 reveals that regarding the first dimension of the NOMINATE model, the independent variables left-right, EU Integration, GAL-TAN and grand coalition all have some explanatory power. In order to facilitate mutual comparison, Tables 3 and 5 show the standardized coefficients for the regression models. The standardized coefficients support the observation. The relative importance of the four variables seems to be roughly equal. Only the ‘in government’ variable is of less importance. By focussing on each PRRP individually, I find that the PRRP found furthest on the right is UKIP. As this party is known for its hard-line Euroscepticism, this supports the finding that the EU Integration scale is of some importance to the MEPs placement on the first dimension.
Table 4 reveals that regarding the second dimension of the model it is the variation of MEP attitudes on the left-right and GAL-TAN scales that accounts most strongly for the coordinates of the MEPs ideal points (see table 5 for the standardized coefficients for the second dimension). The other independent variables have relatively little explanatory power on the second dimension. Here too, focussing on the individual PRRP supports the findings to
some extent. The PRRP at the bottom of figure 1 (the diagonal line of ideal points) is M5S. This party votes in accordance with left-wing parties regarding issues such as environment and minority rights. Especially the last subject is one particularly opposed by Fidesz (Kornai, 2015; Rupnik, 2016), which is the PRRP at the most upper end of figure 1. In other words, the positioning of the PRRPs relative to each other seem to support the results of the regression models.
Table 2: The Relation between MEP Ideology and MEP Nominate Location on the 1st Dimension
Independent Variables
MEP Location on Nominate 1st dimension
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept -0.507*** (0.038) 0.830*** (0.033) -0.371*** (0.036) 0.534*** (0.017) 0.368*** (0.021) Left/Right 1.220*** (0.063) EUIntegration -0.943*** (0.044) GAL/TAN 1.019*** (0.060) Gr. Coalition -0.594*** (0.023) In Gov. -0.299*** (0.029) N (valid) 725 722 722 837 837 N (missing) 115 118 118 3 3 Adjusted R² 0.338 0.394 0.285 0.437 0.110 F statistic 370.1 469.1 288.1 648.9 104.7 Notes: p<0.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Table 3: Standardized coefficients for the models used to explain MEPs NOMINATE location on the 1st dimension
Models used to explain MEPs NOMINATE location on the 1st dimension Left/Right EUIntegration GAL/TAN Gr. Coalition In Gov. Standardized
coefficient
Table 4: The Relation between MEP Ideology and MEP Nominate Location on the 2nd Dimensionn
Independent Variables
MEP Location on Nominate 2nd dimension
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept -0.935*** (0.045) 0.003 (0.055) -0.617*** (0.046) -0.158*** (0.029) -0.093** (0.029) Left/Right 1.844*** (0.075) EU Integration 0.153* (0.073) GAL/TAN 1.338*** (0.078) Gr. Coalition 0.407*** (0.040) In Gov. 0.302*** (0.041) N (valid) 725 722 722 837 837 N (missing) 115 118 118 3 3 Adjusted R² 0.455 0.005 0.290 0.111 0.061 F statistic 604.2 4.414 295.2 105.8 55.44 Notes: p<0.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Table 5: Standardized coefficients for the models used to explain MEPs NOMINATE location on the 2nd dimension
Models used to explain MEPs NOMINATE location on the 2nd dimension Left/Right EUIntegration GAL/TAN Gr. Coalition In Gov. Standardized
coefficient
0.675 0.078 0.539 0.335 0.250
Interestingly, the results of the regression models deviate substantially from extant research on voting behaviour in the EP. The majority of the research on voting behaviour in the EP finds that the first dimension is related to the classic left-right dimension and the second dimension to the EU integration dimension (Hix, 2001; Hix, et al., 2007, 2014; Marks & Steenbergen, 2002). Whereas, voting in the 8th European parliament cannot be explained by two ideological variables in a similar straight forward fashion. All the independent variables tested above explain at least some variation on either of the two dimensions. However interesting, these findings do not make analysing figure 1 much easier. In order to answer the
thesis’ hypotheses more calculations are needed. Since the CHES variables all influence MEPs positioning to some extent, the CHES data will form the guideline for the rest of the result section.
To explore whether governing PRRPs vote less extreme than non-governing PRRPs in the EP (see hypothesis H1) I compare the empirical voting behaviour of Fidesz and PiS with their ideological preferences. As mentioned above, it seems like Fidesz and PiS vote similar to the EPP and ECR respectively. I test whether this is true by employing the normal distribution from probability theory. Assuming the placement of the EPGs’ MEPs is subject to a normal distribution, it is possible to calculate the space within which 95% of the MEPs are located. This can be done by multiplying the standard deviation of the mean location of an EPG by the standard normal score (1.96). The resulting value can then be added to or subtracted from the mean coordinate of the EPG on the first and second dimension to calculate the borders of the space. In more abstract terms this looks like the following:
LEPG = MEPG – SD*1.96 UEPG = MEPG + SD*1.96
where LEPG is the coordinate of the lower limit of the space, MEPG is the coordinate of the mean position of the EPG, SD is the standard deviation and UEPG is the coordinate of the upper limit of the space. To create the complete space this formula has to be applied to both the first and the second dimension. Applying this method to the EPP results in the following ranges: 0.206 till 0.395 for the first dimension and 0.449 till 1.063 for the second dimension of figure 1 (for an overview, see table 12 in the appendix). Calculating the mean coordinates of Fidesz on the first and second dimension results in 0.346 and 0.855, respectively. This means that the coordinates of Fidesz’s MEPs fall within the space that contains 95% of the EPP’s parliamentarians. In other words, Fidesz votes in line with the EPP. Employing the same
method to PiS and the ECR results in a similar outcome (see table 12 in the appendix), that is PiS voting in line with the ECR.
Having established that the governing PRRPs Fidesz and PiS vote conform their EPGs EPP and ECR, I turn to the in figure 1 observed differences between Fidesz and PiS and the other PRRPs, respectively. I use a t-test to examine whether the observed differences in mean location of the groups is statistically significant. The results of the t-tests are presented in table 6 and 7. The differences in the mean location between Fidesz and the PRRPS and between PiS and the PRRPs are both statistically significant (based on 95% confidence level). In other words, the empirical voting behaviour of Fidesz’s and PiS’s representatives in the European Parliament is significantly different from that of the other PRRP’s MEPs. In sum, the empirical voting data shows that Fidesz and PiS vote in line with their EPG’s and not conform the other PRRPs.
Table 6: Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Coordinates x-axis and Coordinates y-axis by party (Fidesz-PRRPs)
Outcome Group 95% CI for
Mean Difference Fidesz Other PRRPs M SD n M SD n t df Coord x-axis 0.342 0.022 13 0.746 0.161 127 0.372, 0.434 25.865*** 130.96 Coord y-axis 0.860 0.059 13 0.041 0.446 127 -0.904, -0.734 -19.071*** 131.49
Notes: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. CI = Confidence Interval. Coord x-axis ranges from -1
to 1. Coord y-axis ranges from -1 to 1. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Table 7: Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Coordinates x-axis and Coordinates y-axis by party (PiS-PRRPs)
Outcome Group 95% CI for
Mean Difference PiS Other PRRPs M SD n M SD n t df Coord x-axis 0.597 0.013 21 0.727 0.204 119 0.092, 0.168 6.838*** 122.39 Coord y-axis 0.556 0.049 21 0.039 0.489 119 -0.608, -0.425 -11.155*** 128.32
Notes: M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. CI = Confidence Interval. Coord x-axis ranges from -1
Next I compare these findings with the ideological preferences of Fidesz and PiS. To this end, in tables 8 and 9 I summarised the mean positions of the governing PRRPs, their EPGs and the non-governing PRRPs on the CHES scales. Columns 5 and 6 display the difference/distance between the governing PRRPs and the two other groups. Table 8 reveals that the difference between Fidesz and the PRRPs for all three scales is markedly smaller than the difference between Fidesz and the EPP. In other words, Fidesz’s ideology is more in line with that of the other PRRPs than with the EPP. The results in table 9 are less one sided. The difference between PiS and the PRRPs and the difference between PiS and ECR is practically even for the left-right scale. Concerning the EU Integration scale, the difference between PiS and the ECR is smaller than the difference between the ECR and the other PRRPs. Regarding the third scale, GAL-TAN, the difference between PiS and ECR is larger than the difference between PiS and the other PRRPs. Put differently, PiS’s ideology is closer to ECR regarding EU Integration issues, closer to the other PRRPs regarding GAL-TAN and equal to ECR and the other PRRPs regarding the left-right scale.
In addition to these observations, table 8 and 9 show that, ideologically, Fidesz and PiS are, with respect to nearly all CHES scales (with the placement of PiS on the EU integration scale being the only exception) placed more towards the extremes of the scales than their EPG’s (as noted in the data section, the scales range from 0 to 1 with 0 and 1 being the most extreme standpoints and 0.5 being the centre). Moreover, in general Fidesz and PiS are ideologically closer to the other PRRPs than to their EPG’s. In other words, the empirical voting behaviour of Fidesz and PiS does not match what one would expect when looking at the parties’ ideology. Based on ideology alone one would predict Fidesz and PiS to vote less centred and more alike the other PRRPs. But the empirical evidence stemming from the 8th EP’s RCVs proves otherwise. Therefore, I cannot reject my first hypothesis. Governing PRRPs vote less extreme in the 8th EP than the non-governing PRRPs. However, the question what causes this effect is
still unanswered. Is it the fact that Fidesz and PiS are part of a government that causes them to vote less extreme, or is it the influence of their EPGs? In order to answer this question I shift my focus to the ECR. In the ECR are both a governing PRRP (PiS) and non-governing PRRPs (PS, DF, BBZ, and AfD3), which makes it possible to test whether it is the influence of incumbency or EPGs which causes PRRPs to vote less extreme. To this end, I repeat the steps taken to test H1 for the ECR specifically.
Table 8: Ideological distance between Fidesz, EPP and the PRRPs
EPP Fidesz PRRPs Diff.
EPP-Fidesz Diff. PRRPs-Fidesz Left/Right 0.676 0.793 0.861 0.117 0.069 EUIntegration 0.826 0.286 0.156 0.540 0.129 GAL/TAN 0.648 0.864 0.882 0.216 0.018
Notes: GAL/TAN = Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist.
Left//Right, EUIntegration and GAL/TAN ranges from 0 to 1. Table 9: Ideological distance between PiS, ECR and the PRRPs
ECR PiS PRRPs Diff.
ECR-PiS Diff. PRRPs-PiS Left/Right 0.730 0.794 0.861 0.064 0.067 EUIntegration 0.411 0.471 0.156 0.059 0.314 GAL/TAN 0.733 0.847 0.882 0.114 0.035
Notes: GAL/TAN = Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist.
Left//Right, EUIntegration and GAL/TAN ranges from 0 to 1.
Figure 2 shows only the ideal voting points for the MEPS of the ECR. The red triangles portray the MEPs of PiS, the blue triangles the MEPs of the other PRRPs and the black circles the rest of the MEPs in the ECR. At first sight the PRRP MEPs (governing and non-governing)
Fi g u re 2 : L o ca ti o n o f ECR' s ME Ps , Ju ly 2014 –Ma y 2018, Di m en si o n s 1 a n d 2 N o tes: T h e r a n g es o f Dim en si o n 1 a n d 2 h a ve b ee n a d ju st ed to cre a te a cl ea rer p lo t
and PRRP MEPs seem quite evenly distributed. There are a couple of outliers: two non-governing PRRP MEPs on the right side and one non-PRRP MEP at the bottom and left side most notably. Employing the same ‘normal distribution method’ as used for testing H1 confirms this observation. All the PRRPs in the ECR fall within the space of the ECR. The results of the calculations are summarised in table 13 in the appendix. This means that all PRRPs (both governing and non-governing) from the ECR vote cohesively and in line with the ECR ideology. Subsequently I calculate the differences in ideology between PiS, two non-governing PRRPs in the ECR (PS and DF. There is no CHES data available for AfD and BBZ) and the mean of the ECR in its entirety. The results are summarised in table 10.
Table 20: Ideological distance between PS, DF, ECR and the PRRPs
ECR PRRPs PS Diff. ECR-PS Diff. PRRPs-PS DF Diff. ECR-DF Diff. PRRPs-DF Left/Right 0.730 0.861 0.511 0.219 0.350 0.690 0.040 0.171 EUIntegration 0.411 0.156 0.100 0.311 0.056 0.152 0.230 0.005 GAL/TAN 0.733 0.882 0.911 0.178 0.029 0.840 0.107 0.042
Notes: GAL/TAN = Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist. Left//Right,
EUIntegration and GAL/TAN ranges from 0 to 1.
For the majority of the scales the non-governing PPRPs are ideologically closer to the other PRRPs than to the ECR. Moreover, the non-governing PRRPs are ideologically more often placed on the extreme side vis-à-vis the ECR than on the centre side of the scales vis-à-vis the ECR. In other words, both governing and non-governing PRRPs from the ECR voted less extreme in the 8th European Parliament than their ideology would predict. Therefore, I have to reject my hypothesis H2. Consequently, contrary to my expectations, it seems that it is not the effect of incumbency but the influence of EPGs that makes PRRPs vote less extreme in the EP. To discover whether government participation has an (additional) effect alongside the influence
of EPGs requires more research. The following and also last section elaborates on the implications of this thesis’ findings.
Discussion
This thesis explores the contradicting findings regarding the constraining effects on governing PRRPs in a novel way. In order to answer the question ‘To what extent does government participation constrain the behaviour of European populist radical right parties?’, I have
looked at the voting behaviour of PRRPs in the 8th European Parliament. Using the NOMINATE scaling method I created a two-dimensional model and corresponding plot of MEPs ideal voting points. Comparing the empirical voting behaviour of the governing PRRPs Fidesz and PiS with that of their EPGs and the non-governing PRRPs and subsequently comparing the ideologies of these actors reveals that there is indeed a constraining effect. However, contrary to this thesis’ expectations, this is not due to government participation. The moderating effect found here stems from the influence of the EPGs. Therefore, the constraining effects do not only affect the governing PRRPs, but also the non-governing PRRPs. These results appear to be good news for the European Union. After all pacification of the continent is at the heart of the institution. The results of this thesis implies that such a trend is affecting the PRRPs in the EP. Nevertheless, more research is needed to explore whether there is a (albeit weaker) moderating effect of incumbency in addition to the influence of the party groups. One suggestion is to repeat this study for other EP terms, so that parties can be compared over time and with different EPG compositions.
In addition to the answer to the research question, this thesis has some other important implications. First, extant research articulates the notion that the first dimension in the EP predominantly corresponds with the traditional left-right dimension (which, given how NOMINATE works, makes left-right the most important dimension in the EP) and the second dimension to the EU integration dimension (Hix, 2001; Hix, et al., 2007, 2014; Marks &
Steenbergen, 2002). This thesis shows that such a straight forward interpretation of the dimensions is no longer applicable to the EP. MEPs attitudes regarding the left-right, EU integration and GAL-TAN dimensions and the influence of the grand coalition all seem to affect their respective voting behaviour. This is important for future research into voting behaviour of MEPs. Changing political dimensions might indicate a shift in politics all together. Second, Hix (2002) found that MEPs national party policies are a stronger influence on MEPs voting behaviour than their EPGs. This thesis contradicts this conclusion to some extent. This thesis shows that in the 8th European Parliament, the EPGs had a large enough influence to make PRRPs vote less extreme than there ideology would suggest. This observation is reinforced by the fact that affiliation with EPGs is voluntary. The PRRPs have chosen voluntarily to join a EPG that does not share their ideology.
Third, another observation stemming from NOMINATE plot figure 1 is that PRRPs are quite dispersed. Meaning, their empirical voting behaviour is not cohesive. Given that the dimensions of the nominate model relate to such a wide range of subjects, it is clear that PRRPs are not as united as one would expect. The fact that the PRRPs did not manage to set up their own party group in 2014 reinforces this observation. Despite the common core features of PRRPs described in the theory section, the parties seem to be quite different. This shows that, despite various extensive literatures that have tried this, it remains difficult to capture these parties under a common denominator or party family.
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Appendix
Table 11: Summary Results of W-Nominate Model
No. of roll-call votes
No. of roll-calls that could not be analysed No. of roll-call votes in final analysis No. of MEPs
No. of MEPs who could not be analysed No. of MEPs in final analysis
Total vote decisions analysed
Per cent of vote decisions classified correctly by a one-dimensional model Per cent of vote decisions classified correctly by a two-dimensional model Per cent of vote decisions classified correctly by a three-dimensional model Aggregate proportional reduction in error of one dimension
Aggregate proportional reduction in error of two dimensions Aggregate proportional reduction in error of three dimensions Geometric mean probability of one dimension
Geometric mean probability of two dimensions Geometric mean probability of three dimensions
7163 237 6926 840 160 680 4,336,975 84.27 92.56 93.51 0.342 0.689 0.729 0.714 0.814 0.829
Table 12: Euclidian range of EPP/Fidesz and ECR/PiS
1st dim. min 1st dim.
max 1st dim. mean party 2nd dim. min 2nd dim. max 2nd dim. mean party EPP 0.2061689 0.3946347 0.449349 1.062524 Fidesz 0.3462376 0.855277 ECR 0.5323225 0.7143784 0.2396499 0.8528245 PiS 0.6004286 0.5566962
Table 13: Euclidian range of ECR and ECR’s non-governing PRRPs 1st dim. min 1st dim.
max 1st dim. mean party 2nd dim. min 2nd dim. max 2nd dim. mean party ECR 0.528254 0.7115145 0.1392066 0.9508397 AfD 0.7015693 0.4752113 DF 0.6419773 0.3187846 PS 0.6483479 0.4915552 BBZ 0.5997965 0.5423848
