Constructing the Chinese threat in outer space. A critical-constructivist review of U.S. foreign policy with regard to China's counterspace program

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CONSTRUCTING

THE CHINESE

THREAT IN

OUTER SPACE

A critical-constructivist review of U.S.

foreign policy with regard to China’s

counterspace program

Crisis and Security Management 2015-2016 Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Hans Klinkenberg (s9512543), January 22nd, 2016.

Supervisor: Dr. Ingrid d'Hooghe Second examiner: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker

ABSTRACT: China is developing weapons that can challenge U.S. space systems and services. The U.S. regards these weapons as a threat to its national security interests. This thesis argues that the ‘Chinese threat in space’ is not as apparent as it may seem.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Chinese threat in outer space

The United States is concerned with the threat of China’s military space capabilities. In the latest ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community’ (Director of National Intelligence, 2015: 7), it is argued that:

“Threats to U.S. space services will increase during 2015 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese […] military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and services and are developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict”.

Similarly, the ‘Annual Report to Congress ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’ states that the United States has expressed the concern that:

“China’s continued development of destructive space technologies represented a threat to all peaceful space-faring nations” (2015: 14).

The best example to illustrate these ‘destructive space technologies’, is China’s launch of an Anti-Satellite missile (which is normally abbreviated to ‘ASAT’) in 2007, against one of their own satellites. This ASAT-test resulted in the destruction of the Fengyun-1C weather satellite, at an altitude of 864 kilometres above the Earth’s surface. The high-velocity collision resulted in a huge amount of space debris, that will pose a hazard to other satellites for decades to come. According to NASA, the event instantly created a 15% increase in the total amount of ‘junk’ that flies around the Earth in a low orbit (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2008). Unsurprisingly, this event was highly criticized within the global space community and has led to widespread condemnation by political leaders (Zissis, 2007).

This incident, however, did not only raise concerns about the polluting effects of the space debris, it also sparked an academic discussion about the strategic significance of this

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4 demonstration of military firepower and technology. Similar to official U.S. statements, scholars like Tellis (2007), Milowicki & Johnson-Freese (2008), Wortzel (2008), and Moltz (2011) have expressed their concerns about China’s counterspace program. These authors have offered varyingacademic perspectives on the rise of China in outer space (which will be discussed in chapter 3), and the possible implications for U.S. space policy. Within this field of policy, then, a strong academic and political debate has emerged, which deals with how the U.S. should respond to China’s military space activities. While some authors (e.g. Tellis, 2007) argue that the U.S. should strive to dominate China in outer space, others (e.g. Walsh, 2007) contend that this is not wanted, since it will only spark or invigorate an arms race in space. Most significantly though, the academic debate centres around the question about China’s intent: why is China developing Anti-Satellite weapons? As will also be discussed later, most intellectuals agree on the notion that China aims to close the military gap between the People’s Liberation Army and the technologically superior military forces of the United States. At the same time, there is much less consensus on the long-term strategic intent of China. In its most basic form, the debate is positioned around the uncertainty whether China will rise peacefully, or whether it will become an increasing threat to U.S. interests.

When looking at U.S. foreign policy with respect to China’s counterspace program, it appears that the U.S. Government has embraced the notion that China is an increasing threat, at least in the space domain. Notably, this increasing threat is explained in a rather self-evident way. In short, China is represented as an increasing threat, because it develops destructive weapons that endanger the use of outer space, on which both civil and military users have become critically dependent. Moreover, without access to space services, the world could face catastrophic economic and humanitarian regression, and U.S. military forces could become incapable of upholding international stability. Consequently, the United States must step up to protect itself and all the other responsible space-faring nations, against this Chinese threat. Most prominently, this protection must be ensured by improved military means, supported by reinforced alliances and partnerships with like-minded nations.

Surprisingly though, there appears to be little documentation available that explains why these Chinese activities are deemed to be such a threat to U.S. interests. Notably, this observation is shared by American space policy experts like Johnson-Freese and Weeden:

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5 “Increasingly […] it seems speculation about Chinese intentions is based on material not publically shared, making the feasibility of both the speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to assess. For example, to my knowledge China has done nothing since its admittedly irresponsible 2007 ASAT test that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior" (United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015: 39);

“more information needs to be available about the threats that are driving the push for more space control and the concern emanating from the intelligence community. To date, the United States has been very reluctant to share many details on Chinese or Russian ASAT development or testing, and why it feels these activities pose such a signiﬁcant threat to U.S. national security space systems. That must change, if the national security space community is serious about convincing the public that these are serious threats” (Weeden, 2015).

Consequently, the absence of publicly available information on this apparent ‘Chinese threat in space’, raises the question what this threat assessment is actually based on. This is important to ask, since the political and military implications are potentially far-reaching, as they may ultimately lead to an arms race in space between the U.S. and China.

1.2 A socially constructed threat?

Presumably, the threat of China’s counterspace program is not based solely on its possession and development of anti-satellite weapons and the destructive test in 2007. That said, the absence of publicly available material offers little resources to review this assessment. On this point, Yongjin Zhang’s article ‘The eagle eyes the dragon in space—A critique’, offers an interesting perspective. Zhang, a Chinese professor of International Politics at the University of Bristol (United Kingdom), argues that the Chinese threat to the U.S. is a social construction that has “become the dominant understanding among American intellectuals and practitioners of statecraft concerning space security policy” (2013: 120). Additionally, Zhang argues that depictions of China as a threatening ‘other’ in the space domain, can be traced

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6 back explicitly to the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report, which warned that the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ (Rumsfeld, 2001: 14). More specifically, the report stated that “China’s military is developing methods and strategies for defeating the United States military in a high-tech and space-based future war” (Rumsfeld, 2001: 14). Against this background, Zhang argues, China’s 2007 ASAT test gave rise to a broader American discursive practice that “purposely constructs China as the threatening other” (2013: 114). Essentially, Zhang’s article suggests that the ‘Chinese threat in space’ is a politically motivated social construction, rather than the outcome of thorough intelligence practices. Given the “dangerous policy implications” (i.e. an arms race in space) that this U.S. perception may have, Zhang states that it is “imperative that such ‘legitimate knowledge’ is critically analysed” (2013: 120).

This thesis is intended to perform the critical analysis that is suggested by Zhang. More precisely, it will be researched if, and how, the ‘Chinese threat in space’ is socially constructed in U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements. Additionally, it will be researched how this (supposedly) socially constructed threat is used to motivate political and military action. Evidently, when pursuing to critically analyse the phenomenon of social constructions, constructivism appears to be a good starting point to search for an applicable theoretical framework. Interestingly then, one of the key theorists within the field of constructivism, Jutta Weldes, a Professor of International Relations (who also happens to work at the University of Bristol), has performed research into the social construction of U.S. national interests in a similar case. More specifically, in her book ‘Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Weldes (1999) has researched how Soviet nuclear-capable missiles that were placed in Cuba in 1962, were socially constructed as a threat to U.S. interests. Essentially, this research describes how this threat became to be the self-evident and dominant understanding that warranted action, while excluding alternative interpretations (1999). Given the similarities between the two cases, but mostly due to the apparent social construction of the Chinese threat, this research will draw on Weldes’ theoretical approach. Thus, instead of taking the ‘Chinese threat in space’ for granted, this thesis intends to answer how this threat perception is constructed in contemporary U.S. policy documents, while excluding alternative representations.

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7 In order to help the research process, a hypothesis has been formulated:

In U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements, the apparent threat of the Chinese counterspace program is a social construction that ignores alternative interpretations, while providing warrants for political and military action.

Importantly, this hypothesis will not be tested, it is purely intended to guide the researcher. Additionally, the hypothesis may also be helpful when reading this document.

1.3 Goal and relevancy of the research

In the first place, this research is performed to gain a better understanding of the apparent social construction of the Chinese threat in outer space, and the corresponding U.S. national interest. This is relevant, since the Chinese threat in space appears to be poorly motivated, while the U.S. policy that is based on this threat could arguably lead to an arms race in space.

Secondly, the research is done in order to better inform the formation of Dutch national space policy, particularly the part that is concerned with space security. This is also relevant, since Dutch national security discourses are strongly influenced by American publications and practices. In fact, being a close ally to the United States and a newcomer to the military use of space, Dutch military and security thinking is already demonstrably influenced by U.S. representations. Additionally, Dutch intelligence services are increasingly pessimistic about Chinese intentions (De Boer, 2015. www.trouw.nl). Essentially, de Boer argues, the Dutch position appears to abandon the notion that China will rise peacefully, and in exchange regard China as a potential adversary. At the same time, however, Dutch companies and research institutes are increasing their space-related cooperation with Chinese counterparts (for example, see: ‘Important steps on the road to structural cooperation with China’ www.sron.nl; and, ‘Successful 2nd Sino-Holland Conference’ www.tno.nl). Obviously, it is important for the Netherlands to have a clear picture of geopolitical sensitivities between the U.S. and China, and the effect that Dutch policy decisions can have on the relation with either country. In fact, Dutch assessments of geopolitical developments indicate that Sino-American rivalry may have damaging consequences to Dutch national interests, especially in the economic realm (Rood

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8 et al, 2015). Therefore, a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy with regard to China’s apparent threat, and subsequently using this understanding to inform national (security) space policy, is essential for maintaining a good relation with both the U.S. and China.

Finally, this research can provide a more in-depth understanding of space security issues within the current academic debate, most prominently on the role of social constructions of national interests. Notably, this academic debate appears to be dominated by traditional theoretical approaches to security studies, such as realism and liberalism (Peoples, 2011). As a result, the research may aid in applying new approaches in the efforts of preventing an arms race in space, and provide a useful addition to the existing literature on space security.

1.4 Specific research question

The main question that needs to be answered is how China’s counterspace program is socially constructed as a threat to U.S. national interests, within U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements, and how this threat provides warrants for political and military action. Notably, this question is still broadly formulated and will be made more specific in chapter 2, by incorporating Weldes’ theoretical concepts.

In order to research the problem, the following approach has been selected. To begin with, the main context in which the research problem is situated, is the U.S.-China rivalry on a geo-political level. A basic knowledge of this context, is indispensable for understanding the research problem. Similarly, before examining U.S. foreign policy with regard to China’s counterspace program, it is necessary to gain an understanding of what this program actually entails, according to both official and academic U.S. observers. Importantly, the latter group of observers may reveal interpretations that are different than those in official statements. Thus, the geopolitical context will be addressed first, followed by a description of the U.S. view on the scope and intent of China’s counterspace program. This translates to the following sub questions:

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9 1. What is the broader context of China’s military rise, in which China's counterspace program is situated, as observed by U.S. official statements and key academic publications of the past five years?

2. What is the scope and intent of China’s counterspace program, according to U.S. official statements and key academic publications of the past ten years? Do the consulted sources provide or discuss any alternative interpretations of the Chinese counterspace program? If so, what are these alternative interpretations?

Secondly, five sub questions have been identified, which must be answered before the specific research question itself can be answered. These questions will be explained in Chapter 2, which describes the theoretical framework and the research methodology. The five sub questions are as follows:

3. What elements of the U.S. security imaginary can be identified in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

4. What subject positions or identities, and their particular interests, have been assigned to the U.S. and China, with regard to the Asia-Pacific region and the space domain, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

5. What objects of security, that are related to the use of outer space, have been articulated as a national interest that the U.S. aims to defend, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

6. How has China’s counterspace program been articulated as a threat to U.S. national interests, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

7. What arguments, that provide warrants for political or military action to protect U.S. national interests against the threat of China’s counterspace program, can be identified in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

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1.5 Reader’s guide

This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 will explain the theoretical framework and the applied methodology. Chapter 3 will answer sub questions 1 and 2, which are necessary to provide the reader with the context of this research, and to be able to understand China’s counterspace program as a part of this context as well. Next, Chapter 4 will describe the research findings and the subsequent analysis of these findings. Finally, Chapter 5 will present the researcher’s conclusions, and discuss the implications for Dutch national policy, as well as the recommendations that can be made for further research.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and

Methodology

2.1 Introduction

As described in Chapter 1, the goal of this thesis is to get a better understanding of how the U.S. threat perception of China’s counterspace program, and the attendant national interest, is socially constructed. In order to achieve this goal, the problem will be approached by using constructivism as a theoretical approach to the problem. More precisely, it will use the insights of critical constructivism, which is a subfield of constructivism.

2.2 Constructivism

Constructivism is a theoretical approach that draws on insights from cognate disciplines such as sociology. The most fundamental assumption of this approach is that the world is constituted socially through intersubjective interaction. Rather than being a theory of International Relations or security, it is a broader social theory that has been applied to issues that range from political economy (Blyth, 2002), international organization (Ruggie, 1999; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and security (Weldes 1999). As such, constructivism informs how analysts might approach the study of security. Within the field of International Relations, constructivism is often viewed as an ideational approach that focusses on the establishment of norms for international competition, while eschewing the realist views of power politics in global security (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). In contrast, a constructivist would argue that this approach enables a much more sophisticated understanding of ‘security issues’, than the traditional approaches of realism and liberalism can provide (Hopf, 1998). Essentially, constructivists would argue that ‘security dilemmas’ or perceptions of threat can only be understood, when attention is given to the role of representation, meaning-making or the politics of identity (Hopf, 1998). Moreover, social scientists like Kratochwil (1993) and Wendt (1992) have argued that constructivism can play an important role in clarifying periods of

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12 strategic changes in the global political order, whereas realism is ill-equipped to provide such a theoretical explanation (e.g. the end of the Cold War). Consequently, constructivism appears to be a promising approach to study the U.S. threat perception of China’s counterspace program, especially against the backdrop of geopolitical rivalry and change, between these states.

The key insights of constructivism are that security is a site of negotiation and contestation, in which identity and values are instruments to constitute and legitimize political action; and that agents and structures are mutually constituted, which suggests that structural change is always possible (Williams, 2010). Yet, while these insights can provide a better understanding of the dynamics and practices in world politics and security, they have not been transformed into specific conceptual frameworks. The exception to this, however, is the securitization framework. Being developed by the Copenhagen School, this framework stands out as the most significant attempt to develop a theory that evolves around the central constructivist claim that security is a social construction (Williams, 2010). ‘Securitization’ then, is the process through which an issue comes to be seen as an issue of security (Wæver et al., 1993). Subsequently, when an issue comes to be treated as an issue of national security, it is justiﬁable to use exceptional political measures to deal with it. In other words: it is securitized, meaning that the issue is treated with the same degree of urgency as military threats have been historically. Importantly, Buzan et al. (1998) argue that the meaning of security is essentially secondary to its quality of lifting issues or problems above politics. Thus, by labelling an issue as a security issue, it becomes an issue of supreme priority, which warrants extraordinary means. Within the theoretical framework of securitization, several concepts are available to research the securitization of a certain topic or issue. Examples of these are the “speech acts”, in which an authoritative person makes a “securitizing move”, before a credible audience, which then accepts the issue as a matter of security.

With regard to security in outer space, the British scholar Columba Peoples provides some good examples of both ‘securitization’ and ‘securitizing moves’. For instance, in his 2011 article ‘The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control’, Peoples argues that:

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13 “Within recent United States space policy securitization has been most noticeably prevalent and institutionalized, which is signiﬁcant given the continued pre-eminence of the United States as a space power” (Peoples, 2011: 84).

Interestingly, Peoples describes the earlier mentioned ‘Space Pearl Harbor’-analogy as a securitizing move by the U.S., in an effort to securitize the civil use of space:

“In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (or Rumsfeld Space Commission as it is often referred to owing to Donald Rumsfeld’s position as chair) pointed out that a number of states hostile to the United States could attain ASAT capabilities, and, infamously, warned that if the United States did not secure space it would face a Space Pearl Harbor. Members of the Bush administration subsequently went on to effectively endorse the space control concept, asserting the primacy of space for security by openly linking its potential civil and military uses (and thus suggesting only a minimal distinction between the two)” (2011: 85-86).

Remarkably, Peoples’ observation about securitization in U.S. space policy appears to be ‘off the scope’ in contemporary space policy literature, a notion that is confirmed by Bowen (2014: 50): “Columba Peoples rightly declares that the space weaponization debate misses the wider dynamics and understandings of space security. Securitization is proceeding virtually

unchallenged within academia” (emphasis added).Be that as it may, Peoples has convincingly argued that outer space is securitized, which makes it less obvious to perform follow-on research from the same theoretical perspective. Helpfully then, Peoples’ research tells us more about the context in which the U.S. threat perception of China is situated, but it does not explain how this perception has been constructed.

Nevertheless, constructivist epistemology offers more than the Copenhagen School’s approach. Having already described the core insights of constructivism, it is also necessary to discuss that within constructivism, the distinction can be made between conventional constructivism and critical constructivism. This distinction is most prominent in the debates over ‘identity’ (Hopf, 1998). In conventional constructivism, the central concern is to explain

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14 how national identity helps to determine a state’s interest, and consequently, how this state will act in international politics. Importantly, identity is regarded here as something that can be objectively identified and analysed ‘from the outside’. In turn, this enables the researcher to determine why states act the way they do. As such, conventional constructivism is regarded as an ideational supplement to the existing epistemology of International Relations theory. In contrast, critical constructivists are mainly concerned with exploring how some narratives of identity become dominant, while other interpretations are marginalized. Importantly, critical constructivists argue that treating identity as a rather stable phenomenon, that can be defined from the outside (i.e. a positivist approach), may only lead to identifying the dominant narrative, thereby missing any alternative interpretations. Central in this regard, are the representations of security and threats, which serve to define ‘our’ own identity, and of those from who ‘we’ should be protected. Essentially then, the concern is less with why states act in a certain way, and more with how certain political actions become possible.

As was already mentioned in the first chapter, one of the leading theorists in this field is Jutta Weldes (Williams, 2010; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015). In her book ‘Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1999), Weldes explains how it was possible (and even commonsensical) for U.S. decision-makers, to view the Soviet attempts to supply nuclear weapons to Cuba as an aggressive rather than a defensive act. The theoretical framework that was used in Weldes’ research, will also be applied in this thesis, since it deals with a similar problem. More specifically, comparable to the Cuban missile crisis, the apparent threat of China’s counterspace program to U.S. national interests, is explained in a rather self-evident way that strongly appeals to common sense. Therefore, for the purpose of looking beyond the “Chinese threat”-narrative that was presented in chapter 1, Weldes’ theoretical framework appears to be a suitable approach to critically analyse the context and language in which it is couched.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

In her book ‘Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1999), Jutta Weldes contends that national interests are, by definition, a social construction. Essentially, she argues that the ‘Cuban missile crisis’ has been successfully represented as a

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15 crisis, in which the Soviet installation of nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba was interpreted as “a severe threat to U.S. national interests” (1999: 1). Yet, while this representation seems very plausible to most Americans (1999), Weldes argues that the notion of a ‘crisis’ cannot be based on the “mere fact of the missile installation” alone (1999: 1). In other words, physical facts by themselves do not determine a threat, it is the meaning that is attached to them that does (1999). In that sense, Weldes (1999: 7) argues that:

“Rather than being self-evident, threats, and the corresponding national interest, are fundamentally matters of interpretation.”

To support this notion, Weldes has researched how the national interest of a state is constructed, by examining the processes of interpretation that it is based upon. Notably, this approach dismisses the realist notion that “threats to a state’s national interests can be accurately recognized” (Weldes, 1999: 6). Moreover, realism does not take into account the “historically and culturally specific content ascribed by state officials and others to the national interest” (Weldes, 1999: 8). Therefore, by referring to Wendt’s criticism on realism (1992), Weldes suggests that the intersubjectively constituted identities and interests of states are the product of collective meanings, that are rooted in a political and cultural context (1999). Nonetheless, where Wendt treats states as unitary actors, whose identities and interests are formed by interstate interaction, Weldes argues that a state cannot be regarded as a unitary actor, because it is represented by individuals that act in the name of the state. In turn, these individuals have their own appreciation of the world and of the place of their state within the international system (1999). Weldes continues that: “This appreciation […] is necessarily rooted in collective meanings already produced, at least in part, in domestic political and cultural contexts” (1999: 9). To summarize, Weldes states the following:

“In contrast to the realist conception of the national interest as an objective category, I contend that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings within which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood.” (1999: 10, emphasis added).

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16 The security imaginary

Essentially, these intersubjective and culturally established meanings are provided by the ‘security imaginary’ of states (Weldes, 1999). “A security imaginary”, Weldes argues, “is […] a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created” (1999: 10). This concept of the ‘security imaginary’ is derived from Castoriadis’ ‘social imaginary’, which helps a particular society to provide “answers to a variety of questions, including “Who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? […] What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking? (Castoriadis, 1987: 145-146). These questions must be answered, because “society must define its identity, its articulation, the world, its relation to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires” (Castoriadis, 1987: 146-147). Similarly, Weldes contends that:

“the security imaginary of a state provides what might be called the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international system are constructed. National interests, in turn, emerge out of these representations” (1999: 10).

Subsequently, this claim raises the question by whom these representations, and thus the national interest, are constructed. Weldes comes to the conclusion that “the national interest is produced primarily, although not exclusively, by foreign policy decision makers” (1999: 11). Furthermore, she describes that the reason that these representations are constructed, is quite simply that for the state to act, these decision makers must describe to themselves the nature of the specific situation they face (1999). For instance, in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, “U.S. officials functioned within the post-war U.S. security imaginary, which permitted the representation of the international system as one of “cold war.”” (1999: 12). Within this representation, the placement of Russian missiles on Cuba “had then to be interpreted specifically as a Cuban missile crisis” (1999: 12, emphasis in original), in order for the state to act. Essentially, these “layers of interpretation”, which are necessary for state officials to make decisions and act, “are grounded in and produced out of the security imaginary” (1999: 12).

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17 Most importantly though, is to answer the question how national interests are socially constructed. Here, Weldes explains that state officials “create representations that serve, first, to populate the world with a variety of objects, including both the self (that is, the state in question and its authorized officials) and others” (1999: 13). Simultaneously, each of these objects is given an identity, that is endowed with characteristics that are sometimes precise, and at other times vague (Weldes, 1999). For instance, an object might be endowed with leadership, it might be freedom-promoting, it might be weak or strong, responsible or reckless and potentially dangerous.

Secondly, Weldes continues, “such representations posit well-defined relations among these diverse objects” (1999: 13). Often, these relations appear as quasi-causal arguments, which means that the suggested causal chains are not empirically valid on their own terms. Nonetheless, the strength of these arguments lies not in their validity, but in their capability to provide “warranting conditions” for state action (Fay, 1975: 85). As such, they “help to specify, among other things, which objects are to be protected and which constitute threats” (Weldes, 1999: 13). For example, the domino theory proscribed that when a small state was conquered by communism, other surrounding states would follow. In the case of ‘Vietnam’, it was therefore ‘legitimate’ and ‘necessary’ for the U.S. to ‘protect’ South Vietnam from falling prey to ‘communist aggression’ (Weldes, 1999).

Finally, by populating the world with meaningful objects and describing how they are related (providing warranting arguments), “these representations have already defined the national interest” (Weldes, 1999: 14, emphasis in original). To clarify this final point, Weldes explains that, “once a situation has been described, […] the national interest has already been determined; it emerges out of the representations of identities and relationships constructed by state officials” (1999: 14, emphasis in original).

Consequently, the security imaginary provides the structure from within which the problems that are faced by states – the threats to national interests – are ultimately constructed (Weldes, 1999). Therefore, Weldes contends, when examining a state’s security imaginary and the representations through which its national interests are constructed, it does not suffice to ask the conventional question of why particular decisions were made (1999). In fact, Weldes

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18 argues, these types of questions are incomplete, since they generally “take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen”, thereby creating certain possibilities and excluding others (Doty, 1993: 298). Instead, Weldes contends, her research focusses on how it is possible, “for the officials of the state to understand its national interest in one particular way rather than in some other way. The brief answer is that it is possible, and indeed commonsensical, because these national interests emerge out of representations enabled by and constructed from within the security imaginary” (1999: 16).

In further conceptualising how the national interest is socially constructed, Weldes states that:

“Through the articulation of meaning and the interpellation of subjects, a particular meaning of the national interest emerges and comes to be commonsensical and legitimate” (1999: 112).

These concepts – articulation and interpellation – are the central elements in the theoretical framework. Therefore, they will be discussed in more detail below. Furthermore, the theoretical framework is visualized in Figure 1, which shows how these concepts function within the security imaginary, and how they are central in constructing national interests. It is a simplified schematic image of the theoretical framework, which should help to understand how the theoretical concepts are interrelated.

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19 Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the theoretical framework (by author).

Articulation

‘Articulation’ refers to the process “through which meaning is produced, out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources” (Weldes, 1999: 98). Through articulation, different terms and ideas are welded in associative chains, that make up an identifiable whole (Hall, 1985). Most of these terms and ideas, already make sense within a particular society:

“In the postwar United States, for example, these linguistic elements included nouns like “terrorist” and “puppets”; adjectives like “totalitarian,” “expansionary,” and “defensive”; metaphors like “the market” or “dominos”; and analogies such as those to “Munich” or “Pearl Harbor.”” (Weldes, 1999: 98).

In the process of articulation, these linguistic resources are combined and recombined to produce very specific representations of particular phenomena, and to provide very particular meanings on which action is then based. Through repeated articulation, “these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality” (Weldes, 1999: 98-99). Nonetheless, despite the commonsensical appearance of the

US security imaginary reality constraints

US National Interest

Meaning making

Particular practices of representation

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20 chains of association between such linguistic elements, they are in fact socially constructed and historically contingent, rather than logically necessary (Weldes, 1999). In other words, alternative representations of a particular phenomenon are always possible. To clarify this point, Weldes describes the articulation of the U.S. conception of its national greatness, and the connection to its global and expansionary vision of its national mission. Notably, an alternative articulation could have been connoted to U.S. greatness, namely an introverted understanding of the U.S. mission, that focussed on the development of democracy and liberty within the U.S. itself (the vision that has often been associated with Thomas Jefferson (Hunt, 1987)). However, through specific, historically contingent processes, a durable vision of U.S. greatness combined with an “extroverted, missionary and ultimately global U.S. foreign policy”, was forged (Weldes, 1999: 101). Therefore, Weldes concludes that:

“the world of international politics, the place of a particular state within it, and the consequent national interests attributed to that state are not objective facts to be discovered; instead, they are the products of contingent, historically forged articulations of linguistic and symbolic elements already present within the security imaginary of the state” (1999: 102).

To sum up, the process of articulation, which takes place within the security imaginary of a state, makes possible a particular and commonsensical understanding of a problem or phenomenon, thereby excluding alternative understandings.

Interpellation

Another process in the construction of national interest, is the interpellation of subjects (Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1985). ‘Interpellation’ refers to “a dual process whereby subject positions or identities are created and concrete individuals are interpellated by […] those subject positions” (Althusser, 1971). The first part of this definition, means that “specific subject positions are created when social relations are depicted” (Weldes, 1999: 103). Each subject position or identity entails a different representation of the world, and the place of the subject in this world. Furthermore, these subject positions are characterized by particular interests.

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21 Within a state’s security imaginary, different subject positions are created, including the ‘own’ state, and ‘other’ states (Weldes, 1999). Logically, Weldes contends, the central subject position within a state’s security imaginary, is that of the state itself:

“”the United States” becomes the central subject […] it is not only the most important object to be protected, but is also the subject charged with doing the protecting. “The United States”, then, is the nodal position from which the imaginary is spoken, around which all other subject positions revolve, and into which individuals may (or may not) be interpellated. The interests articulated in this imaginary are the interests of the fictional subject “the United States” and the central warrants for action it generates justify and legitimize actions taken by that subject” (1999: 104).

This statement already introduces the second part of what the notion of interpellation entails, which is the process that causes concrete individuals to recognize themselves in these representations. In other words, the given subject position or identity accounts for the individuals own experience, because they appear to be common sense in the world as they know it. Importantly, the U.S. security imaginary has accomplished the task of interpellating, by representing the U.S. as a community, mostly through the ubiquitous use of the term “we” (Weldes, 1999: 105):

“Part of the strength, common-sense status, and legitimacy of orthodox postwar representations of U.S. national interests has resulted precisely from the often unproblematical identification of Americans with “we, the United States” – the imagined U.S. subject of the security imaginary”.

Additionally, existing subject positions, which are already entailed within the U.S. security imaginary, provide a location from which particular representations can be made meaningful. In that sense, Weldes describes subject positions such as “the “freedom-loving democrat” who abhors communism, the “concerned American patriot” who believes that “we” must protect Americans abroad, and the “civilized Westerner” appalled by the excesses of Middle Eastern terrorism. These identities help to make sense of the claims, the representations and

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22 quasi-causal arguments, articulated in the security imaginary” (1999: 107). The following quote illustrates this link between subject positions and representations:

“since “we” Americans are freedom-loving democrats and civilized Westerners, it

makes sense to claim that “our” U.S. actions abroad are designed to promote liberty

and freedom, not self-interest or tyranny. Since “we” are concerned American patriots, the United States clearly has a right to do all that it deems necessary to protect the American free way of life” (Weldes, 1999: 107, emphasis added).

Essentially, then, national interests are social constructions that emerge out of representations that are enabled by and produced out of the security imaginary of a state. These representations are already social constructions themselves, partly through the processes of articulation and interpellation. It is “through the articulation of meaning and the interpellation of subjects, [that] a particular meaning of the national interest emerges and comes to be commonsensical and legitimate” (Weldes, 1999: 112).

In discussing the limitations of the production of meanings out of state’s security imaginary, Weldes addresses the fact that social constructions are limited by “real factors” (1999: 102). For example, it cannot be denied that the Soviets placed nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba in 1962. As a result, the existence of these missiles functions as a “reality constraint” on the social construction of plausible narratives. However, the meanings attached and articulated to those missiles are contingent and contestable. Therefore, the meanings produced out of state’s security imaginary are not “dictated” by real factors, since it is instead the ‘constructed meaning’ that determines the apparent importance of a given fact (Castoriadis, 1987: 128).

Application of the theoretical framework

All of the concepts of the theoretical framework will be applied, with the exception of the second part of the concept of interpellation. This is the part that describes that individuals are interpellated by a specific representation of a subject position or identity, meaning that they can “recognize themselves” in it, and can “speak it spontaneously as its author” (Hall, 1985: 107). Essentially, the extent to which individuals are interpellated into a certain subject

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23 position or identity is not as important in this thesis, as it is in Weldes’ research in the Cuba missile crisis. Notably, her research was aimed at gaining a better understanding of the construction of U.S. national interest, in times of a crisis. Consequently, it was imperative to understand how ‘interpellated individuals’ came to view the situation they faced, and how they acted upon it. In the research being performed here, it is not necessary to concentrate on a decision-making process, since there is no crisis situation to begin with. Furthermore, knowledge about the interpellation of individuals does not significantly contribute to a better understanding of the current U.S. policy towards the Chinese counterspace program, since it can be assumed that the individuals that wrote this policy, and those that advertise it, are interpellated into the representations that they provide. In contrast, in a possible future reconstruction of a crisis between the U.S. and China in the space domain, it would greatly matter to know to what extent individual decision-makers are interpellated by particular subject positions, since it will partly determine their meaning-making of the events.

2.4 Methodology

In order to answer the research question, this research will apply a qualitative research method. It will be a single case study (Swanborn, 2010), in which China’s counterspace program is the unit of analysis that is used to research the phenomenon of social constructions in U.S. foreign policy.

The researcher has chosen a qualitative research method, because this type of research allows for an in-depth analysis of a problem. Specifically, it uses an ‘intensive approach’ (Swanborn, 2010), meaning that the research will focus on only one specific instance of the phenomenon of social construction, in this case the apparent threat of China’s counterspace program. Consequently, the research entails a single case study, in which the apparent threat of China’s counterspace program is the actual case. Importantly, this approach allows for an in-depth research on the social phenomenon, and not so much on China’s counterspace program. That said, this does not mean that the case itself is not of interest. In fact, it has been chosen because there is a strong U.S. debate about China’s intent in space. Obviously, this debate on Chinese intent is not limited to outer space, as it is part of a much larger debate about China’s rise, and how this may threaten U.S. interests. Conceivably, a deeper knowledge of the

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24 phenomenon will likely result in a better understanding of the case too. Notably then, the outcomes of this research will be used to inform Dutch national space policy, rather than for generalisation into a wider research domain. Nonetheless, this single case study could generate some tentative ideas about the possible generalisation of the results, which could be answered by complimentary case studies. For example, the results may incentivize a similar theoretical approach towards other policy areas in the security domain, like cybersecurity or missile defence. Arguably, these ‘security topics’ are also subject to identity politics and securitization.

Limitations and challenges

While recognizing that a wider scope would increase the validity of the research (e.g. a comparative case study could have been performed, by also looking at the relevant foreign policy documents of the United Kingdom and France), this is unfeasible to research within the given time period. Similarly, a quantitative element could have been added, by measuring to what extent specific subject positions are repeated in the media. More importantly though, the research is limited by the fact that it is not being analysed how the subject positions, that will be identified in the policy documents, have come to be the dominant narrative among policy-makers. While the research findings will likely provide a better understanding of the social construction of the ‘Chinese threat in space’, within U.S. policy documents, they will not disclose how this construction ‘emerged’ from a national discourse. Consequently, an in-depth analysis of U.S. policy discourse on the subject of space security, would likely provide a much better understanding of the phenomenon of social construction within this field.

2.5 Data collection methods

The data collection in this research is focussed on linguistic aspects of national interest construction. This is not to say the non-linguistic practices do not play a role in this process. In fact, linguistic and non-linguistic practices are “inextricably connected” and “mutually constitutive” in the production of meanings of social phenomena (Weldes, 1999: 110). As an example, Weldes explains that the “we” of the imagined U.S. community, is not only constructed through words and ideas about uniqueness and greatness, but also by the waving of U.S. flags at parades, the singing of the national anthem, the patrolling of territory borders,

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25 the surveillance of other states and the global deployment of U.S. military forces. Together, these linguistic and non-linguistic practices establish what it means to “be an American”. Nonetheless, despite the importance of these non-linguistic practices, this research focusses exclusively on the linguistic practices, which have real and independent effects on the construction of national interest (1999).

In order to research these linguistic practices, it must be determined which sources can be used to collect relevant data. According to Weldes, the state plays the most prominent role in the production of national interest (1999). More specifically, it is through the foreign policy and national security apparatuses, that the U.S. national interest is constructed. Examples of these are the President’s Administration, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. Therefore, the primary source of analysis are the statements in U.S. foreign policy documents, that explain the goals of the policy, the means that are necessary to achieve these goals, and the arguments that defend both the goals and the means. Additionally, a set of “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser, 1971: 142-143) are also responsible for the construction of national interest. These apparatuses include schools, religious institutions, the media, cultural institutions and even family members of state officials. According to Weldes, the media play a “critical role” in the dissemination and reproduction of representations of the U.S. national interest (1999: 108). Furthermore, a subset of “intellectual apparatuses” can be identified within the ideological state apparatuses. These consist mostly of think tanks, lobby groups, private research centers and the universities (Weldes, 1999). Importantly, these intellectual and academic institutions play an important role in providing “the rationale” for the activities of the state (Weldes, 1999: 109).

‘Intellectual apparatuses’ as a source

Having established that the state is the central site at which the national interest is defined, the primary focus of this research is on the language of state officials. However, since the statements made by ‘intellectual apparatuses’ are important to provide a better insight in the underlying motivation of national policy, these sources will be used to construct a more comprehensive representation of the topic. In fact, data from these sources may also present

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26 alternative policy options for the U.S. Government, which may enable a better understanding of the problem situation. Therefore, the data from official publications will be combined with data from academic publications, in order to provide the historical context and development of China’s counterspace program, and the U.S. perspective on these developments, in the past ten years. The outcome of this desk research will be described in chapter 3.

Mass media as a source

As stated above, the media are also an important source, especially when measuring the reproduction of the U.S. national interest. That said, the intent of this research is not to measure to what extent the media have reproduced the meaning that U.S. policy-makers have attached to the Chinese counterspace program. Therefore, the data collection will not take into account what is offered by mass media. Notably, this does not exclude the use of public statements or interviews that are given by state officials. However, data from these sources will be drawn from original transcripts or posts, and not from secondary sources that are based on these statements.

To summarize, the research will apply both desk research and document analysis, because these sources will provide the empirical data that is needed to answer the specific research question. Notably, this method was also used by Weldes (1999) in ‘Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis’. Importantly though, Weldes also included other sources (see above), since her research also involved the analysis of the decision-making process during a crisis. Nonetheless, within the scope of this thesis, the use of desk research and policy documents should provide sufficient data to meaningfully apply the theoretical framework. Other examples of this method, in the same research field, can be found in Kaufman’s research into the role ‘narratives of identity’ in the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict (2009) and Doty’s post-positivist approach to U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines (1993).

2.6 Core research

The data collection for the research will be performed on official publications of the U.S. Government, that are related to the topic of this research. More specifically, these

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27 publications must be concerned with national security strategy, foreign policy, space policy, threats to U.S. national interests, or military developments in China. Furthermore, the focus of this research will be on the most current versions of such documents, since many of these publications are not issued annually (e.g. the Quadrennial Defense Review). Consequently, the following documents have been identified as the primary sources for data collection1_:

 National Security Strategy, NSS (2015);

 National Military Strategy, NMS (2015);

 Quadrennial Defense Review, QDR (2014);

 Defense Strategic Guidance ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership’, DSG (2012);

 National Security Space Strategy, NSSS (2011);

 National Space Policy, NSP (2010);

 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, WTA (2015);

 Annual Report to Congress ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, MSDP (2015).

With the intent of answering the specific research question, these sources will be systematically scanned for linguistic elements that can be used to fill in the different concepts of the theoretical model. For each concept, a number of key search terms have been identified, that will help to find the relevant data in the selected sources. These search terms have been selected by the researcher, with the assumption that they are the indicators that will lead to relevant empirical findings. Notably, these search terms have been tested first, in order to determine the usability and suitability of the selected sources. As a result of this preliminary testing, it turned out that the NSS produced by far the most ‘hits’ on the search terms (49 in total). This can be explained by the fact that this document is also the most ‘political’ source within the selected sources, and therefore provides the most data with regard to U.S. values and responsibilities (which are relevant terms in this research). On the other hand, the WTA delivered a total of only three hits, which can be explained by the very specific topic of this document: threats to U.S. national interests. Nonetheless, these few hits are an important part of this research, since they mention China as the most prominent threat to U.S. interests with regard to space systems and services. In fact, where the NSS often uses diplomatic terms to point at the ‘threat in space’, the WTA makes this concrete by specifically

1_{In order to simplify further reference to these documents, the three or four letter bold-printed abbreviations}

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28 mentioning China as the actual threat that is being referred to. In short, the preliminary testing of the search terms has shown that all the primary sources provide sufficient empirical data to perform the research.

Importantly, though, the data collection is not limited by the identified search terms, since relevant data can also be found in second-order search queries. A good example of this is the search for the United States’ role in the international system. When the key search term ‘role’ is used, it will be quickly identified that ‘leadership’ is often mentioned as a role for the United States. Consequently, the second-order search will then focus on the search term ‘leadership’, in order to gather more empirical data on the international role of the United States.

Lastly, by systematically scanning documents for empirical ‘truths’, the research may provide an inaccurate representation of a documents’ general message, or miss out on linguistic elements that contradict with the research findings. Therefore, in order to preclude any confirmation bias, the researcher will review the full content of the primary sources. Any identified statements that contradict with the research findings will be addressed in chapter 4, after the presentation of the research findings. To further clarify the data collection process, the operationalisation of the concepts will be discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

U.S. security imaginary

Based on the discussion of the U.S. security imaginary in paragraph 2.3, the concept is defined as follows:

“a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created” (Weldes, 1999: 10).

In order to populate this concept with relevant data, the following sub question (3) must be answered:

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What elements of the U.S. security imaginary can be identified in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

With the intent of finding relevant empirical data in the primary sources, the data collection will look for statements that describe well-established meanings and social relations, which define the world, the international system and the place of the U.S. in it. More specifically, in order to find well-established meanings, the search will focus on linguistic elements that describe core values of the United States. Furthermore, the research will look for linguistic elements that describe the core principles of the international system, and the role of the U.S. in this international system, in order to identify well-established social relations. The key search terms that will be used for this are: values, principles, international system,

international order, role, responsibility, United States.

Interpellation

Based on the discussion of the concept of interpellation in paragraph 2.3, it is defined as follows2_:

“A dual process whereby subject positions or identities are created and concrete individuals are interpellated by […] those subject positions” (Weldes, 1999: 103).

In order to populate the concept of ‘interpellation’ with relevant data, the following sub question (4) must be answered:

What subject positions or identities, and their particular interests, have been assigned to the U.S. and China, with regard to the Asia-Pacific region and the space domain, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

Evidently, the choice to look for subject positions of both the U.S. and China, is based on the fact that these nations are the main subjects of this research. Notably though, the

2_{As explained in the Theory section, the research will not look at the actual interpellation of individuals.}

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30 differentiation between the Asia-Pacific region and the space domain is important, because the developments in the space domain are not isolated from the developments in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, the latter part may provide the context in which the developments in outer space are taking place. With the intent of finding relevant empirical data in the primary sources, the data collection will look for statements that describe subject positions or identities and the particular interests that are assigned to them. More specifically, in order to find these subject positions or identities, the search will focus on linguistic elements that describe the role and/or behaviour of the U.S in the Asia-Pacific and in the space domain. Similarly, it will focus on linguistic elements that describe the role and/or behaviour of China in the Asia-Pacific and in the space domain. Furthermore, the research will look for linguistic elements that describe the interest of both the U.S. and China, within the Asia-Pacific region and in the space domain, in order to identify the particular interests that are assigned to them in the respective areas. The key search terms that will be used for this are: United States,

China, Pacific, space domain, outer space, space, role, responsibility, behaviour, interest.

Articulation

Based on the discussion of the concept of articulation in paragraph 2.3, it is defined as follows:

“the process [in which] particular phenomena are represented in very specific ways and given very particular meanings on which action is then based” (Weldes, 1999: 98).

As Weldes explains (1999), it is relevant to identify the objects of security that a state is willing to defend, as well as the threats that these objects, and the attendant national interest, are faced with. Consequently, in order to populate the concept of articulation with relevant data, the following sub questions (5 and 6) must be answered:

What objects of security, that are related to the space domain, have been articulated as a national interest that the U.S. aims to defend, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

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How has China’s counterspace program been articulated as a threat to U.S. national interests, in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

Furthermore, Weldes (1999) describes that it should be identified what quasi-causal arguments are used to define the relations between different subjects and objects, and to provide warrants for possible foreign policy or military actions. In order to populate this final part of the concept of articulation with relevant data, the following sub question (7) must be answered:

What arguments, that provide warrants for political or military action to protect U.S. national interests against the threat of China’s counterspace program, can be identified in contemporary U.S. foreign policy documents and official statements?

With the intent of finding relevant empirical data in the primary sources, the data collection will, first, look for statements about objects of security which the U.S. is determined to defend. More specifically, in order to find objects of security that are relevant to the research being performed, the search will focus on linguistic elements that describe the space domain, U.S. space systems or U.S. military capabilities, since these are the objects that are generally referred to in policy documents and literature on this subject. Additionally, the research will also look for linguistic elements that describe that the U.S. is determined to defend such an object. The key search terms that will be used for this are: space, space systems, space

infrastructure, military capabilities, military power, military advantages, national interest, defend, protect, security, vital, crucial, critical, vulnerable.

Secondly, in order to identify threats to the aforementioned objects of security and the attendant national interest, the data collection will look for representations of China’s counterspace program as a threat to U.S. national interests. Notably, the Introduction chapter already discussed that the Chinese counterspace program is a regarded as a ‘threat to U.S. space systems’. Nonetheless, in the light of the research being performed, it is relevant to identify how this threat is articulated in the primary sources. More specifically, the search will focus on linguistic elements that describe China’s counterspace program as a threat, hazard, risk or danger to: the space domain, U.S. space systems or U.S. military capabilities. Notably,

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32 these linguistic elements are based on the assumption that the defense of these objects are found to be described as a U.S. national interest. The key search terms that will be used for this are: China, Chinese, military space, counterspace, threat, hazard, risk, danger, challenge,

attack.

Finally, the data collection will look for arguments3_{that both define the relations between}

various subject positions and objects of security, and provide warrants for political or military action. Since this research looks into the relation between the U.S. and China in general, and the perceived threat of China’s counterspace program against U.S. national interests in particular, the research will focus on these subjects and objects respectively. More specifically, the search will focus on linguistic elements that describe the necessity to protect U.S. national interests against the threat of China's counterspace program. Additionally, the research will look for linguistic elements that describe the political or military action that is needed to

ensure this protection. The key search terms that will be used for this are: China, Chinese, nations, states, actors, those, other, some, U.S., United States, allies, partners, we, counterspace, military space, space program, threat, hazard, risk, danger, challenge, protect, defend, national interest, space systems, space domain, space. The reason to include terms

like some, we and other, is that policy documents often make implicit referrals to a particular subject, in an otherwise explicit statement. Therefore, when looking for statements about China, the search criteria must be broadened in order to identify the arguments that are related to its counterspace program.

An overview of the operationalisation of the theoretical concepts is provided in Appendix A.

2.7 Data analysis methods

The data that is collected from the selected sources, will be analysed with the use of the theoretical framework. First, the research findings will be processed by the researcher, as follows:

3_{Since arguments are not readily identifiable as being ‘quasi-causal’, this part of the research will focus on}

finding the arguments ‘as they are’. However, the analysis of the research findings will examine whether an argument qualifies as ‘quasi-causal’.