Friend or foe: portrayals of China in the Taiwan 2018 election

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Friend or foe: portrayals of China in the Taiwan 2018 election

A discourse analysis of Taiwanese media in relation to cross-strait relations

Abstract:

This thesis focuses on the 2018 local elections in Taiwan; although the elections were aimed at electing officials at a local level, the relation between Taiwan and China has been heavily discussed. This thesis analyses the way in which the Liberty Times and the United Daily News, as mouthpieces of respectively the DPP and the KMT, have created a discourse on cross-strait relations. In doing so, an analysis is made of Fake News, a topic discussed mostly by the DPP, and the 1992 consensus, a topic mostly discussed by the KMT. This thesis argues that the discourse as created by the DPP-side is less stable compared to the KMT-side, as a result of the traditional viewpoints that both parties adhere to. The image of the DPP as protector of Taiwanese freedom and democracy forces the DPP to a position where they have to paint China as an aggressor, using the issue of Chinese Fake News as one of its tools. In doing so, the DPP itself uses assumptions and exaggerations, thereby becoming a producer of fake news as well. Although the KMT also makes use of assumptions and exaggerations, the fact that the KMT portrays itself as a party aimed at economic progress makes it possible to take a more neutral stance.

Name: Erik de Jong Student ID: 1039539

Program: MA East Asian Studies: China track Date: 1 July 2019

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Lindsay Black Word count: 13.721

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Introduction

On 24 November 2018, the local elections took place in Taiwan. These elections, which were accompanied by ten referendum questions that the citizens of Taiwan could vote on, decided which officials would be elected into the local government. Although the elections were focused on the local level, the debates surrounding these elections have revolved around Taiwan’s relation with China. Due to the tense nature of cross-strait relations, the results of the 2018 local elections are of major importance for Taiwan’s future. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which currently holds office, traditionally portrays itself as a protector of political and social rights, focuses on the

protection of Taiwanese values and is commonly regarded as a supporter of Taiwanese independence. The Nationalist Party of China (KMT) on the other hand, which is currently the opposition party, is traditionally a more centralized party that strives for economic success, and in doing so is a promotor of relations with China. Since the next presidential elections will be in 2020, the local elections are by many viewed as an evaluation on the current government’s performance, and the elections are expected to portray an image of the future election results.

Seeing how the political and economic position of Taiwan is tightly linked to China, a shift in power in Taiwan impacts not only China’s position and influence in the rest of Asia but will also influence the relations between China and the United States. The results of Taiwan’s elections, and a possible shift in power in the future 2020 presidential election, will therefore have an impact

spreading much further than just Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan is a model for successful democratization, and can act as an example for other developing countries (Copper, 2005).

The importance of the 2018 elections showed in the attention it received in foreign media, as even Dutch media reported on the election results. Interestingly, the KMT-victory was largely labelled as a win for China, without looking further in the factors leading up to this victory. The way in which the elections were portrayed shows the power media can have. By setting the agenda on relevant topics of discussion, the media is able to not only promote certain topics, but also to ignore certain topics if they are deemed ‘less important’, thereby shaping public opinion (McCombs, 2004). This is even more relevant in Taiwan, where media in many cases are not only highly biased, but also let this bias influence the way in which news is reported (Chen, 1998; Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012; Sullivan, 2018). Because of this, it is important to look not only at the topics covered in the discussion of the 2018 elections, but also which topics are not addressed.

In looking at the impact of media bias on representation of the 2018 elections, this thesis will attempt to answer the following question:

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How does the viewpoint of China by DPP- and KMT-favoured media impact the way in which cross-strait relations are portrayed in relation to the 2018 elections in Taiwan?

This thesis will be structured as follows: First, the concept of national identity will be discussed in relation to cross-strait relations. Due to the way in which the differences in national identity between Chinese and Taiwanese people as well as the position of these nations in the international political field has developed, this concept of national identity provides an important basis for the political relationship between China and Taiwan. Following this, this thesis discusses the role of media in framing discussion, and the way in which media impacts public opinion. This thesis will then utilize discourse analysis to analyse two newspapers, one supporting the DPP and one supporting the KMT, in their portrayal of two major topics: these topics will be the issue of fake news, and the discussion on the 1992 consensus.

The term fake news, which was used mainly by the DPP, shows a new topic in relation to China’s interference in Taiwan’s politics. Even though the notion of fake news has been around in different forms throughout time, the 2018 elections are the first elections in which the DPP has adamantly claimed that fake news was influencing the elections. Although the use of misinformation has been commonly seen, it has never before been discussed in relation to China-Taiwan relations, or during Taiwan’s election period. The discussion on the 1992 consensus on the other hand is one of the main topics in the KMT-camp, as they claim abiding by the consensus will help boost Taiwan’s economy. An analysis of these two topics therefore will not only show how news is framed for issues of both political spectrums, but will also be the first analysis of discussion of fake news as an electoral issue in Taiwan.

1. Literature Review

1.1 The Taiwan 2018 elections

The Taiwan 2018 elections were focused on electing local officials in 6 municipalities and 16 counties, where the elected officials would be appointed for a four-year term. The local elections occur in between the presidential elections; in 2016 Tsai Ing-wen was elected as president, and she is likely to aim for re-election in the 2020 presidential elections. The 2018 local elections, being the only main election round in between the two presidential elections, can therefore be seen as a way for the Taiwanese people to show whether they approve of the changes brought by the Tsai government in the past two years.

Prior to the 2018 elections, Tsai’s DPP held office in 13 out of the 20 seats, with 6 belonging to the KMT and 1 to independent runner Ko Wen-Je. This completely turned around after the

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2019). Seeing how the 2018 elections were focused on electing the local government, the focus was on domestic factors such as economy, trade, and president Tsai’s labour and pension reforms. At the time of these elections, a large concern for the Taiwanese people was the stagnation of economic growth as well as a perception of increased inequality, which 33.9% of the people perceived as a serious problem, and 59.6% of the people perceived as a very serious problem (Clark, Tan & Ho, 2018). Following Tsai’s election, she shifted focus on trade with China, which was 40% of the total trade, to other countries. A major point of this was the New Southbound Policy, in which attempts were made to increase exchanges with a total of 18 Asian and Australian countries, thereby lowering Taiwan’s economic dependence on China (Glaser, Kennedy & Mitchell, 2018). At the time of the 2018 elections, Taiwan’s economy has seen a small boost, having an economic growth of 2.9% in 2017, and an estimated growth of 2.6% over 2018 (Clark, Tan & Ho, 2018).

Aside from the election of local government officials, the elections were accompanied by a set of ten referendum questions; these were mostly based on domestic issues, regarding gay marriage and nuclear energy, but also featured one question regarding the changing of Taiwan’s name in international sporting events. This question received much criticism both from China and the Olympic committee.

In voting on these topics, it is important to look at the differences between the two main parties, being the DPP and the KMT. Traditionally, the DPP is focused on maintaining a Taiwanese identity, whereas the KMT is considered a pro-China party, focusing on maintaining the status quo with China. At the same time, the KMT presents itself as a party boosting economic success. In understanding the differences between these viewpoints, as well as understanding the importance of China’s role in this relation, it is important to first look at the concept of national identity, and the way this has impacted cross-strait relations. In doing so, one can gain a clearer understanding of not only the way in which the DPP and the KMT view themselves, but also the background against which they create their stance on cross-strait relations.

1.2 Taiwan’s political history: an overview

When discussing the differences in national identity between China and Taiwan, it is first important to look at what a nation exactly is. According to Smith, a nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991). Following Smith’s perspective, the nation is a result of a people’s history, and helps in defining who we are by giving them a shared cultural and political bond. However, according to Smith this idea of a national identity is problematic as not everyone will agree on what the criteria for self-definition should be (Smith, 1991).

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When it comes to national identity, Dittmer & Kim argue that we can regard it as a collection of core sentiments and ideas of the state, with which the people can agree and identify with (Dittmer & Kim, 1993). Smith explains this in more detail, claiming that we can look at national identity as a tool for creating and adhering to legality in a nation by portraying the idea of a national identity on the state (Smith, 1991). In doing so, the state represents the notion that the people have of both themselves and the nation they live in. This idea of a national identity can therefore be used as a comparative tool to look at how Chinese and Taiwanese citizens view themselves. In China, the notion of a national identity is heavily influenced by the government’s efforts to reunite the mainland and the island of Taiwan under the banner of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)(Dittmer & Kim, 1993). When it comes to the Chinese relations with Taiwan, the common notion is still that the island is an inalienable part of China, in which reunification would be the preferred option (Dittmer & Kim, 1993). Under this notion, the people of Taiwan are considered to be Chinese, and are often referred to as brothers and sisters.1

In Taiwan, the political viewpoints are much more divided .On the one hand there is the KMT, a party with its origins in the higher classes of mainland China. Prior to losing the Chinese Civil War, after which the KMT fled to Taiwan, the KMT held position as China’s governing party. Because of this, the KMT still attests to the One-China principle and eventual unification. In doing so, the KMT

portrays the Taiwanese identity as an identity linked to the Chinese identity of the PRC. In this scenario however, unification with the mainland would be under KMT-rule, contrary to the Chinese idea of unification under China’s rule. The DPP on the other hand is a party which was founded after the KMT lifted the one-party policy in Taiwan, after which the DPP became the first opposition party. As a result, the DPP portrays itself as a political party promoting freedom and democracy. The DPP supports a Taiwanese national identity, one being clearly different from the Chinese one (Wachman, 2016). Because of this, the DPP does not strive to rule over China.

Currently, the two sides of the strait uphold a form of status quo, which is largely based upon mutual adherence to the 1992 consensus. Although the official term 1992 consensus was created in 2000, the term was the result of a meeting in 1992 between representatives of the PRC and the ROC in Hong Kong. In the 1992 consensus, the following is stated:

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of “One China”. To Peking, “one China” means the “People’s

1 Ex. During the Xi-Ma meeting in 2015, Chinese president Xi Jinping said that we are brothers in reference to the Chinese and Taiwanese people. During president Xi’s speech in 2017 he claimed that Chinese and Taiwanese are brothers and sisters of the same blood, and this and similar kin-related terms have occurred often in relation to China-Taiwan identity from China’s perspective.

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Republic of China (PRC)”, with Taiwan to become a “Special Administration Region” after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers “One China” to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1911 with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well. (Kan, 2006).

Following this statement, the representatives of China stated that China was willing to “respect and accept” the proposal, claiming that “each side use respective verbal announcements to state the one China principle.” Through this consensus, China claims that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the only acceptable change in this consensus is when the Taiwan reunites with the China, with China in the leading role. Furthermore, any mention of independence is strictly off-limits.

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected as president of Taiwan in 2016, she claimed that although she respected the “historical fact” of the 1992 talks, she did not endorse the 1992 consensus (Hickley & Niou, 112). In response, China has used a combination of hard and soft power in attempts to get president Tsai to abide by the 1992 consensus (Hickley & Niou, 112-113). Contrary to the DPP, the KMT is more accepting of the 1992 consensus, claiming it is necessary for maintaining peaceful relations with China. These differences in viewpoint with regard to the identity of Taiwanese and Chinese people is therefore important when looking at cross-strait relations, seeing how these relations are based on the principal difference in opinion on which people are part of what nation.

1.3 The role of media in Taiwan

When looking at the way in which the viewpoints of the DPP and the KMT are expressed, an

important indicator is the way issues are discussed in the mainstream media in Taiwan. As Rawnsley and Rawnsley claim, media outlets in Taiwan are heavily impacted by their political bias, where the large media outlets Liberty Times and United Daily News are commonly regarded as mouthpieces for the DPP and the KMT respectively (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2006). Hung argues this in more detail, claiming that media outlets in Taiwan focus primarily on achieving high viewer rates, and use ideology to retain and improve their market share (Hung, 2013).

Despite these biases impacting the content of media reporting, the media still plays an important role in society. According to McCombs, the most important role of the media is to set an agenda for public discussion. Although the media is not able to decide what people’s opinion is, they are capable of emphasizing the topics that are deemed worth discussing (McCombs, 2004). This idea is further discussed by Soroka, who portrays the media as a link between the public and the

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inform the public on the policies (Soroka, 2008). In this view, the media does not add anything substantial to the discussion, aside from spreading information. However, due to the impact of political biases on the content of news reports, the public is receiving heavily biased takes on the policymakers’ actions. Because of this, mainstream media in Taiwan leaves us with multiple

interpretations of the same event, where it is hard to decide which version leaves out which details. Although the notion of bias in Taiwanese media outlets is commonly accepted, and is assumed to be even more intense during election periods (Hung, 2013), very little modern research has been done on the actual content of Taiwanese media in acting on these biases. In order to shed more light on this topic, this thesis will therefore analyse the way the 2018 elections were portrayed by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News, and look at how these media outlets express their political bias in their reporting. In doing so, Discourse Analysis will be used as a tool for analysing the articles in an attempt to discover the way in which these biases are impacting the news reports on the election.

2. Methodology

As mentioned above, this thesis will use Discourse Analysis as its main tool. In conducting this research, a comparison will be made between the discourses as constructed by the two main political parties, which are represented by two news outlets: the first one is the Liberty Times (自自自自), and the second one is the United Daily News (自自自). In doing so, the Liberty Times will be used to look at the way a DPP-favoured discourse is created, while the United Daily News will be used to look at the way a KMT-favoured discourse is created. Furthermore, in order to stay as close to the intended message as possible, all the articles will be analysed in their original language (mandarin Chinese). All

translations in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, will therefore be my own. However, first it is important to discuss the way in which Discourse Analysis operates, and the way in which it can further this study.

A key figure in the study of discourse is Michael Foucault, who views discourse as a producer of practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault, 1972). In doing so, discourse is a way of discussing topics, in which these topics are categorized against a social background. This social background, as Foucault states, is influenced by different power relations within society. In this struggle of power relations, a dominant power is able to give a statement a dominant meaning while other interpretations are moved to the background. This dominant power is then able to further reaffirm this dominant reading of the statement with different statements, thereby further establishing their preferred interpretation (Foucault, 1971). In relation to the DPP- and KMT-favoured news outlets, it is therefore likely that they will use their positions of power to further a discourse suiting their agendas. Due to the popularity of the Liberty Times and the United

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Daily News, the two companies are able to spread their message across a large public and further embed their message with the publication of new articles.

This relation between a text and its meaning is also explored by Derrida in his notion of

deconstruction. In doing so, Derrida poses the idea of a first reading, in which a statement is read

following the commonly accepted interpretation, and a second reading, in which one looks at possible different interpretations of this statement (Derrida, 1988). In doing so, the second reading challenges the power structure that caused the first, dominant reading to become the commonly accepted one. however, Derrida does not aim to replace the first reading with the second reading, and instead uses the notion of a second reading to highlight the importance of different

interpretations, and the way these come to be (Derrida, 1998).

As Miller (Miller, 1990) claims, an aspect of discourse is its lack of objectivity. Seeing how there are multiple ways of looking at the world, knowledge itself will never be truly neutral. When studying discourse, therefore, it is important to look at these different interpretations, and determine the subjective influences behind them. This is further shown in Hansen’s work on discourse analysis, who claims that the major goal of discourse analysis is to show how facts are depending on the

framing of the issue (Hansen, 2013). This builds into the poststructuralist notion on discourse

analysis, which describes it as an attempt to discover the way in which knowledge is produced. Due to the biased that are inherent to the foundations underlying knowledge production, when studying an object it is necessary to not only study the object itself, but also to look at the circumstances under which it was produced (Angermuller, 2015). In doing so, a discourse analysis can help in gaining an understanding of the political position of actors (Schneider 2013). When doing a discourse analysis, therefore, it is important to look at who does the framing, and what their motivations are. In analysing articles published by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News, it is important to keep the biases of the political parties they represent, being the DPP and the KMT, in mind. Following these biases, one can make first-hand assumptions on which aspects are likely to be promoted, and which aspects might be omitted. Further following Hansen’s argumentation, a discourse analysis then does not only look at the promoted and the omitted aspects, but goes one step beyond; it looks at the way in which these biases impact the stability of the discourses that are portrayed, and uses alternative data to look for any flaws in argumentation (Hansen, 2013). This happens for instance when one party attempts to blame another party, such as the portrayal of China as an aggressor by the DPP. In this situation, an analysis of the arguments used by the DPP can help in showcasing whether or not this is supported by data derived from sources without a DPP-bias, which can then be used to judge the stability of this discourse. In the case of the DPP, the portrayal of China as a threat is

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used as a tool for legitimizing further statements; by discussing this foundation of the greater discourse, the further statements then lose their stability as well.

In conducting this analysis, the focus will be on the way the discourse on cross-strait relations is constructed, as is done by analysing the portrayal of relevant topics. Due to the limited size and timeframe of this thesis, it is not possible to compile a full analysis on all related topics. Instead, the focus will be on two topics related to cross-strait relations, both of which were heavily discussed during the election period: these topics are 1) the 1992 consensus, and 2) the issue of Chinese fake news. The 1992 consensus as a topic has mostly been discussed by the KMT, and was used as a tool to showcase the possibilities for economic growth. The discussion of fake news on the other hand has been used mostly by the DPP during their political campaign, and was used as a tool to show the dangers of China’s interference. By using these two topics, this analysis is able to discuss favourable topics for both sides of the political spectrum, allowing for a comparison to be made in how both sides defend a favourable as well as a unfavourable topic to their party. It is important to note, however, the limitations imbedded to this analysis. First of all, even though it is commonly accepted that the Liberty Times and the United Daily News are heavily biased, maintaining a pro-DPP bias and a pro-KMT bias respectively, and show this bias throughout their reporting, they are still different from the actual political parties. Because of this, it is important to keep in mind that the news items published by these newspapers are not officially supported by the political parties, in spite of their biases. Second, the selected topics for analysis, albeit allowing for a comparison between the two sides, remain somewhat limited due to the limited size of this thesis. In order to completely understand the way in which a discourse on cross-strait relations is constructed by these two news outlets, it would be preferable to discuss a larger number of topics. In spite of this, the bias in regard to the DPP and the KMT when it comes to the way the Liberty Times and the United Daily news respectively create their news articles is commonly accepted, making this a suitable base for this research.

Timeframe

In conducting this analysis, this thesis is using both the period before as well as after the elections. For the period before the elections, a period of three months has been selected; for the period after the elections, a period of one week. The reason for this is that the election was a planned event, meaning that news coverage was likely to increase the closer this event was nearing. Because of this, going back further than three months resulted in a decrease in news coverage, while not adding relevant information. By looking at only one week after the elections, this analysis can focus primarily on the initial reaction to the election; aside from this, an extension of the period by one more week resulted in a decrease in relevant articles, thereby not adding to the overall narrative.

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Materials

In analysing the discourse on the 1992 consensus as created by the Liberty Times, the terms 1992

consensus (自自自自) and elections(自自) were used. This search resulted in 79 articles before the

elections, and 50 articles after the elections. However, in most of these articles the mention of the consensus was minimal; because of this, emphasis was put on the articles featuring the consensus in their title, while the other articles were used when relevant. This resulted in 3 articles before the elections, and 10 articles after. In analysing the discourse on the 1992 consensus as created by the United Daily News, the same terms were used, resulting in 106 articles before the election, out of which 11 articles were selected, and 23 articles after the election, out of which 7 were selected.

In analysing the discourse on Chinese fake news as created by the Liberty Times, the terms

fake news (自自自), elections (自自), and China (自自) were used. This search resulted in 149 articles before

the elections, out of which 20 articles were selected for further analysis. For the period following the elections, this search resulted in 13 articles, out of which 5 were fully relevant. In analysing the discourse on Chinese fake news as created by the United Daily News, the same terms were used. This resulted in 105 articles before the election, which then was narrowed down to 19 relevant articles before the election and 16 articles after the election. Out of these 16 articles, 4 relevant articles were selected.

An overview of all the articles used in these two analyses will be provided in the Appendix.

3. First analysis: The 1992 consensus

In the first analysis, the discourse on the 1992 consensus as was created by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News will be analysed, after which the two different discourses will be compared to each other. This will be done by looking at the way in which the consensus was portrayed in relation to different parties, as well as looking at the way in which it was related to cross-strait relations.

3.1 The Liberty Times: before the election

When looking at the articles published in the Liberty Times in the period leading up to the election, the most notable aspect is the actual lack of discussion of the 1992 consensus. Although the term was mentioned an average of almost one article a day in the three months leading up to the election, there was a great overlap in information, and the information itself was mostly used as a piece of background information. In the seventy-eight articles published, the 1992 consensus was the main topic in only three. The lack of major reporting regarding the 1992 consensus in itself shows a lack of importance given to the consensus in relation to the election. This lack of reporting is especially striking when compared to the reporting by the United Daily News, as will be discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4. The question that rises, is whether this is intentional or not. After all, the media are an

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important tool in setting the agenda for public debate, and by deliberately not mentioning it, the public’s attention can be pointed towards other issues.

A common occurrence in the discourse on the 1992 consensus as created by these articles is the focus on strong, one-dimensional statements, in which the 1992 consensus is portrayed as the sole cause for successfully maintaining cross-strait relations. One article, published a month prior to the election, showed China’s viewpoint, with the title of the article reading as follows: “if there is no acceptance of the 1992 consensus, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office harshly said, we will not meet with the Mainland Affairs Council”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT01). This statement refers to the motivation for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office for cancelling a scheduled meeting with Taiwan’s

Mainland Affairs Council. In the other two articles, the 1992 consensus has been discussed only from the viewpoint of KMT-members. One of the articles quotes KMT-chairman Wu Den-yih, who claims that the 1992 consensus of one China, two interpretations is very simple: “China is satisfied with the

one China, and we are happy with the two interpretations”( 自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT02).

Furthermore, as Wu is quoted saying in the same article, “only by having one China, two

interpretations as well as the 1992 consensus, have we been able to maintain cross-strait relations until today”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT02). Another article quotes KMT-candidate Ding Shouzhong further emphasizing the importance of the consensus: “only when accepting the 1992 consensus in cross-strait interactions will relations improve, which will make Taiwan’s economy better(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT03).

The way in which the viewpoint as expressed by China is portrayed, frames the acceptance of the 1992 consensus as a fundamental basis for cross-strait relations. Furthermore, the nature of the consensus is directly portrayed as a power tool, as the title of the article suggests: The relation between China and Taiwan, following this title, is one in which Taiwan has to submit itself to the consensus if it wishes to meet with China. The unfriendly stance of China is further emphasized by the use of the word harshly, showing the reluctance of China to further cross-strait relations in a friendly way. Furthermore, the use of the if.. then.. construction implies a lack of discussion: the only way for Taiwan to meet with China is to submit itself to China’s wishes. However, this portrayal of the consensus as a power tool by China implies that Taiwan will definitely be negatively affected by adhering to the consensus; the Liberty Times however does not show any arguments for this. The same construction is applied when discussing the KMT, as they too emphasize the importance of the 1992 consensus in maintaining good relations with China; in this case, it is done by using the word

only (自) in describing the necessity. By using the word only in these situations, the KMT, just like

China’s Taiwan Affairs Council, removes the discussion of alternatives: by claiming that abiding by the consensus is the only way, it becomes irrelevant to discuss how good this solution is, as there are no

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other possibilities. These statements also excludes the Chen administration from 2000 until 2008, during which president Chen did not acknowledge the 1992 consensus (Copper, 2002).

Secondly, these assumptions are limiting Taiwan’s economy to its relations with China, without addressing any other possibilities for economic growth. A clear example of such an alternative is the New Southbound Policy, which aims at improving ties with other East-Asian countries and therefore making Taiwan less dependable on China. Although it is nigh impossible to precisely predict the future of economic developments, one cannot say that there are no alternatives to trade with China only.

Mention of the 1992 consensus from DPP-candidates, on the other hand, is limited in

comparison. However, the premise is clear: As DPP-candidate Yao Wen-chih mentioned, “If Ko Wen-Je or Ding Shouzhong wins, the world media will immediately say that we support two sides, one family,

the 1992 consensus, or that an agent of China will have become mayor; that would be a humiliation

for democracy”( 自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT04).

The assumption being made here is that both independent candidate Ko Wen-Je, famous for his statement that the two sides are one family, and KMT-candidate Ding Shouzhong are both agents of China. This is then directly linked to a detriment to democracy. In doing so, the narrative is created that both Ko and Ding are abiding by China’s rules, rather than looking for cooperation. However, the claims made are clear exaggerations, as there is no proof that either Ko or Ding is affiliated to China, nor that either of them has plans, or even has the power to turn Taiwan’s political system away from democracy. Furthermore, if the Taiwanese voters freely choose to elect Ding Shouzhong or Ko Wen-Je, this is in fact evidence of a working democracy, as the candidates are elected following a democratic election. By painting the opponents of the DPP as opponents of democracy however, the DPP is able to emphasize its role as protector of Taiwan’s democracy.

Following the above statements, the Liberty Times creates a strong connection between the acceptance of the 1992 consensus and the KMT; if one supports the KMT, this means he or she will thereby support the 1992 consensus, and supporting the 1992 consensus means one supports the vision of the KMT. The differentiation between the DPP on the one hand and the relation between the KMT, the 1992 consensus and China on the other hand is therefore quite clear. As Yao Wen-chih states: “supporting Ding Shouzhong, is supporting Ma Ying-jeou, KMT-chairman Wu Den-yih, the National Women’s League, former PRC-leader Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zemin, because they all accepted the 1992 consensus” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自) (LT05). The assumption is made here that by a small act such as supporting Ding Shouzhong, one ends up supporting the ideology of China’s leaders, seeing how they all have the same view of the 1992 consensus. Because of this, one cannot support either the 1992 consensus or Ding Shouzhong

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without having to admit that he or she actually supports the PRC. This way in which China is

demonized, combined with the emphasis on the KMT’s positive attitude towards China, further aids in portraying the DPP as protector of Taiwan’s freedom and democracy. Seeing how China attempts to attack these values, supporting a party that aims to reach out to this aggressive enemy would equal attacking these values. However, this line of argumentation is a major exaggeration, as there are many differences in values and ideologies between the different people mentioned aside from their agreement on one issue; although they may all support the 1992 consensus, that is by no means a guarantee that people supporting Ding Shouzhong will support any of the other people mentioned by Wu.

3.2 The Liberty Times: After the elections

When looking at the discussion of the 1992 consensus in the week following the elections, the large amount of articles is immediately noticeable, with an average of almost seven articles published each day. In the selected articles, the consensus is portrayed as something that negatively impacts Taiwan. However, that is not even the main problem. According to a survey by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University Research Centre, “64.3% of Taiwanese people do not know what the 1992 consensus embodies” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)( LT06). The insinuation being made here is that public opinion regarding the consensus is difficult to trust, since a majority of people does not know the contents of what they are talking about. This further extends to serve as a counterargument for any criticism on the government’s cross-strait policies. Seeing how people do not understand the basis of China-Taiwan relations, criticism on the relevant policies becomes less relevant.

An important link that is made in the articles following the elections is that between the 1992 consensus and the KMT. The most notable example of this is following KMT-member Han Kuo-yu who won the local elections in Gaoxiong. Han, who together with others, stated his support for the 1992 consensus. Furthermore, one article explains that the KMT has always linked the 1992 consensus to economy, claiming that “recognizing the 1992 consensus and leaning towards China will help to revitalize Taiwan’s economy (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT08). By constantly discussing the 1992 consensus in relation to the KMT, the notion is created that supporting the KMT equals

supporting the 1992 consensus and vice versa. Because of this, any positive or negative discussion of the 1992 consensus therefore impacts the value judgement of the KMT.

When discussing the question “Is it [The 1992 consensus] really the cure-all for Taiwan’s economy?” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT07), the answer is a resounding no. The reader “must know, that the Chinese band-aid that is the 1992 consensus will not be able to heal the slump of Taiwan’s economy.” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT08). This statement makes the assumption that there is a relation between the 1992 consensus and economic growth, in which the sole goal of adhering to

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the consensus is claimed to be helping the economy. Seeing how the 1992 consensus is linked solely to boosting the economy, the claim that the consensus actually does not aid in boosting the economy means that the act of adhering to the consensus loses its value. This portrayal also leaves out any other aspects adherence to the consensus might provide that do not directly result in boosting Taiwan’s economy such as political stability.

The description of the 1992 consensus, however, goes even further than removing any positive effects. Using statistics from the National Development Council, a planning agency that is part of the Taiwanese government, an article shows how the economic situation under two DPP-governments led by Chen Shui-bian’s and Tsai Ing-wen’s have both had a “green light of prospering” (自自自自)(LT07) for 59.37% and 65.52% of the time respectively, whereas the economic situation under KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou only had a green light for 37.5% of the time. This is linked to the “lack of the 1992 consensus” (自自自自自自) by the two DPP candidates, and the “acceptance of the consensus” (自自自自自) by the KMT candidate. Furthermore, the growth of salaries was also higher during the Tsai period compared to the earlier Ma period. As the article concludes, “the reader can judge who wins and who loses” (自自自自自自自自自自)(LT07). As this description implies, adhering to the 1992 consensus is not only not helpful for Taiwan’s economy, it is even counterproductive. Although one gains the impression that, following this argumentation, adhering to the 1992 consensus has a negative impact on the economy, this equation does not take into account any other factors that may have had an influence on economic performance. The global financial crisis, which started halfway 2007 and spread further from 2008, conveniently happened at the end of the Chen-presidency and the beginning of the Ma-presidency. During this period, Taiwan was far from the only nation facing economic problems, and these problems were in no way related to Ma’s accepting of the 1992 consensus. Similarly, there is no evidence provided to the claim that Chen’s presidency as well as Tsai’s presidency received a longer period of “green lights” is directly linked to their attitude towards the consensus. By creating an image of the 1992 consensus as something that will negatively impact Taiwan while simultaneously emphasizing the KMT’s support for the consensus, the notion is created that supporting the KMT equal supporting the 1992 consensus and therefore harming Taiwan. This message, however, depends completely on the claim that the economy under DPP rule has been significantly better than under KMT rule, and that this will therefore remain the same in the future. The economic success of the Chen presidency from 2000 until 2008, which is presented as an argument against accepting the 1992 consensus, is a questionable argument, as his presidency was known for corruption and economic crises(Chai, 2015), and his presidency has been among the main reasons for the DPP’s fall in popularity(Copper, 2012).

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Changes following the election results

When comparing the articles published before the elections to those published after the elections, a number of differences in regard to the discussion of the 1992 consensus can be seen. The first, and most obvious change, is the amount of articles published discussing the consensus. While having published seventy-eight articles in a three month period, meaning an average of less than one article a day, the post-election week resulted in an average of seven articles a day.

When looking at the way the discourse has developed following the election results, there is still a clear stance against acceptance of the 1992 consensus. At the same time, support of the consensus is still discussed in relation to the KMT’s endorsement. However, contrary to the period before the elections, the tone is less aggressive. Whereas before the elections the KMT was portrayed as a puppet of China, and an actor that would threaten Taiwan’s democracy, the articles published after the elections focused on debunking the KMT’s promises of economic benefits in relation to the consensus. Seeing how the elections resulted in a loss for the DPP as the result of a democratic election, the claim that the people that voted for the KMT are voting against democracy becomes even more of an exaggeration than it already was. However, by debunking any promised economic opportunities provided by adhering to the consensus, the consensus can still be used by the DPP as a tool to criticize the KMT.

3.3 The United Daily News: before the election

When looking at the discourse as portrayed by the United Daily News, the 1992 consensus is portrayed in a very different way. This shows not only in the people and parties quoted, but also by the quotes that are used. In the articles published in the United Daily News before the election, the 1992 consensus is portrayed mostly as a basic requirement for cross-strait communication, at the very least by China. The Taiwan Affairs Bureau “reaffirmed that the one China principle is the political basis for cross-strait relations; to adhere to the 1992 consensus, and to oppose Taiwanese

independence.”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN01). Because of this, if there is to be any trade with China, the consensus will have to be accepted. Although the statement, similarly to the statement quoted by the Liberty Times(LT01), states that adherence to the consensus is necessary for cross-strait relations, the United Daily News shows the relations in a constructing way. Instead of using a negative sentence structure, e.g. no adherence means no cross-strait relations, adherence to the consensus is painted as an opportunity for trade. However, the result remains the same, as China continues to uphold its belief that the 1992 consensus has to be accepted.

When looking at the portrayal of the 1992 consensus by the KMT, the way in which China interprets the consensus is made to be less important. As KMT-chairman Wu Den-yih claims, the 1992 consensus is simply one China, two interpretations, in which “mainlanders look at one China, and will

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be satisfied; we look at two interpretations, and be assured.”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自 自自自自自自自自自)(UDN03). Following this logic, Taiwanese people do not have to worry about the political aspect of the consensus, as both parties basically agree to disagree. However, the consensus is much more than this. China’s claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and China’s leaders have repeatedly stated that reunification is the only acceptable result of cross-strait relations.2_This

viewpoint, combined with the political and economic power of China compared to Taiwan, makes it impossible to simply ignore the political aspect.

While focusing on the economic aspects of adherence to the consensus, adherence is portrayed as a bringer of economic prosperity. As KMT-candidate Ding Shouzhong claimed: “under the basis of the 1992 consensus, the two sides can maintain peace and expand the economy, but we don’t rely on the mainland as the DPP insinuates”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN04). This statement carries multiple assumptions. First of all, it portrays the image of the 1992 consensus as a tool in maintaining peace, framing the consensus as something positive. The same logic goes for the consensus as tool in stimulating the economy. At the same time, by claiming there is no reliance on the mainland, the consensus is portrayed as not being a power tool. While the DPP, as is also explained in the previous section, claims the 1992 consensus places Taiwan in a lower position, Ding’s claim instead removes this negative connotation. The positive impact of abiding by the 1992 consensus is further showcased in an article on Chinese netizens, who in response to a Q&A on a mainland social forum “flocked to answer that ‘if Han Kuo-yu wins, I will definitely travel to Taiwan’”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN05). Following these reasonings, there is no reason not to accept the consensus, as it does not harm the Taiwanese people, and accepting it therefore seems a very logical response. This argument however does not provide any concrete promises, especially on a national scale, and neither does it indicate how many people “flocked” to show their support. Furthermore, while some Chinese netizens might decide to visit Taiwan and spend their money there, this can hardly be considered a considerable boost of the economy. At the same time, as a study in late 2018 showed, the percentage of tourists visiting Taiwan has been growing over the past seven years, and has continued this growth after president Tsai was sworn in in 2016 (Lee, 2018). This further counters not only the promise of a future boost in Chinese tourists, but also lessens the importance of Chinese tourists for Taiwan’s tourism economy.

When discussing the standpoint of the DPP on the 1992 consensus, the articles mostly focus on the relation between the KMT and China, in which the KMT supposedly takes a subjective position. According to DPP-cadres, “The KMT has not dared to strike back in the face of the CCP’s 2 See for example Xi Jinping’s New Year speech on January 1st_{, 2019, Xi Jinping’s speech during the National People’s Congress on March}

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pressure, and during past rule the KMT has excessively relied on China” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN02). However, this is mostly explained by the difference between the DPP’s focus on politics versus the pragmatic and economic approach of the KMT. As one other article states, The DPP “resorts to an ideology of unification versus independence, which shows that in this election, the DPP is on its last legs” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN06). The fact that the DPP focuses on retaining a Taiwanese identity, with the eventual ideal of independence, does however in no way indicate that the DPP is on its last legs, as this is one of the DPP’s core viewpoints, and is therefore nothing new. Furthermore, the unification versus independence discussion is a relevant one in regard to the 1992 consensus, as China has clearly stated that it aims for unification, whereas a small

fraction of the Taiwanese people support this ideal.3

3.4 The United Daily News: after the election

In the analysed articles, two strong connections are made in the discussion of the 1992 consensus. The first one is the link between the 1992 consensus and the KMT: according to Zhu Lilun, elected mayor of New Taipei City, “adherence to the 1992 consensus has always been KMT-policy”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN07). Because of this, “any mayor that is a KMT-member will follow this policy”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN07). These claims do not only show the unity of the KMT, but also the strong support for adherence to the consensus.

The second connection being made is that between the consensus and economic prosperity, while steering away from politics. According to Han Kuo-yu, “the 1992 consensus is not poison”(自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN08). The consensus therefore, according to Han, “is not managing politics, and neither is it sacrificing sovereignty”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN08). What Han and the KMT are doing therefore, is focusing on revitalizing the economy, rather than playing political games. The purpose of adhering to the consensus, then, is strengthening ties with China, which will naturally improve Taiwan’s economic situation. If the elected mayors were to accept the consensus, “China will also let these counties get a sweet taste of ‘goods in, people out’”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN09), referring to Han’s plans of creating city-to-city connections with China, allowing Gaoxiong to export goods and increase tourism. Following the election results, this has been one of Han’s main goals. Such a promise is however highly based on speculation, and there is no guarantee that accepting the 1992 consensus in itself will directly lead to the ‘sweet taste’ that Han mentioned. Similar to the worries regarding the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement that lead to the Sunflower

3 In a study conducted in August 2018 by Taiwan’s Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, only 5% of the Taiwanese people supported eventual unification with China (Chen, 2018)

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Movement in 2014, the improved ties with China might lead to an increased presence of Chinese businesses in Taiwan, and could actually harm Taiwan’s local economies.

Furthermore, a number of articles have discussed the plans of KMT-electives to set up work groups in order to increase cross-strait contacts(UDN09). One article even reported that Gaoxiong tourist agencies “have already received a message from a Chinese travel agency with a request to plan journeys”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN10). Similar to the above-mentioned examples, this argument does not provide concrete proof of a scale that would impact the economy of a city, let alone an entire country.

Changes following the election results

The main change following the election and the KMT’s win is the direct attitude taken in regard to the 1992 consensus. Whereas before the election the KMT took a passive attitude in its plans with regard to China, and merely claimed that abiding by the 1992 would yield positive results, following the KMT’s victory in the election focus is more on future plans aimed at improving relations with China, and letting the economy flourish. The relation between the consensus and economic benefits on the other hand has stayed the same, as this is the basis for the argument supporting the KMT’s

adherence to the consensus. With regard to the political stance of the United Daily News, it is therefore expected that this message would stay the same.

3.5 Comparison between Liberty Times and United Daily News

When looking at the way the 1992 consensus is portrayed in the Liberty Times and the United Daily News, the main difference is quite apparent. The Liberty Times portrays adherence to the consensus as something that will harm both the economy as well as the level of democracy in Taiwan; the United Daily News on the other hand portrays adherence to the consensus as an opportunity for the economy to flourish, without having any noticeable negative impact. Whereas the Liberty Times in multiple articles provides data to support claims on economy; the United Daily News on the other hand uses mostly plans and promises, but fails to back them up with data. At the same time, where the plans referred to by the United Daily News provide clear examples, such as Chinese netizens “flocking” to voice their support for Han Kuo-yu, the fact that these examples are all on a local level. Because of this, it is hard to translate the impact of such promises to a national level, and by providing any further data the United Daily News could very well undermine its own claim. Despite this difference, one can argue that the data provided by the Liberty Times, such as the amount of months in which the economy was doing well, is far from providing a full picture of the economic situation in a total period of eighteen years.

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When looking at the people quoted in the articles, an overwhelming majority is affiliated with the KMT, with the newly elected mayor of Gaoxiong Han Kuo-yu being quoted most frequently. Although both newspapers focus on the emphasis Han places on his adherence to the consensus, the Liberty Times further focuses on his subordinate attitude towards China, while the United Daily News focuses on the ways in which Han will revitalize the economy.

The narratives as presented by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News show great similarities to the general viewpoints of the DPP and the KMT, in which the Liberty Times emphasizes the importance of protecting Taiwan from China’s threat, and the dangers of abiding by China’s demands in the form of the 1992 consensus. At the same time, the United Daily News, similar to the KMT’s viewpoints, emphasizes the positive aspects of keeping good relations with China, and focuses on boosting Taiwan’s economy.

4. Second analysis: Fake News

In the second analysis, the discourse on the topic of fake news will be analysed as was discussed by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News. When discussing the notion of fake news in Chinese, it is important to note the linguistic differences. Although in English, the commonly accepted term for misinformation in the media is fake news, in Taiwan there are two terms with a similar meaning. The first term is 自自自 (literally fake news), referring to fake news items. The second term is 自自自 (literally

fake information), being an umbrella term for both fake news items as well as intentionally untrue

information.

For this analysis, the second term will be used primarily, in order to provide a wider view. Articles using the first term have been used for supplementary information.

4.1 The Liberty Times: Before the election

The first notable aspect of the discussion of fake news by the Liberty Times is the question of whether or not there was in fact concrete evidence of this interference by China, which has been a major point of discussion in this debate. In the overwhelming majority of the articles, this question has not been discussed. Instead, the influence and usage of fake news by China has been portrayed as a given, with the majority of the articles not providing any background information on this statement. Articles published by the Liberty Times used titles such as “misinformation disturbs elections”(自自自自自自) (LT09), or “China spreads mis-information to interfere in Taiwan’s democratic elections”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT10). The usage of these sorts of statements claims Chinese interference as a given, removing the need to discuss factuality. The evidence provided for this mis-information however, is very limited. When discussing China’s methods, they are described as “various means”(自自自自)(LT09).

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The only concrete example that is provided is the case of the Kansai Airport incident, in which a Taiwan representative committed suicide following a storm of accusations blaming him for the lack of assistance to stranded Taiwanese tourists in Japan. These accusations turned out to be based on the false claim that the Taiwanese government did not help stranded Taiwanese tourists, a claim which was later traced back to users located in Beijing. Although this in itself is a quite accurate accusation regarding fake news, the question is to what extent this really was a move by the Chinese government aimed at interfering in the elections.

The claim that China uses fake news, as the Liberty Times reports, is supported by other countries: “England, the USA, and Japan all explicitly claim that China is using its internet army to interfere in Taiwan’s election with mis-information and fake news”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT10). When looking at the statements above, an image is painted of China as an aggressor, and Taiwan as the innocent victim.

The above-mentioned interference by China is then linked to Taiwan’s democracy, claiming that “this election is the crucial moment in the development of Taiwan’s democracy”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT11), with other articles quoting Tsai Ing-wen’s statements that Chinese interference “hurts democracy”(自自自自)(LT12). By portraying China as an aggressor that attacks Taiwan’s values, this claim provides support for the traditional claim of the DPP as protector of freedom and democracy, as well

as its anti-China stance. The claim that this election is a crucial point in regard to Taiwan’s democracy

is a difficult one; although the democratic multi-party system in Taiwan is still developing, and this election will likely be important in its impact to the 2020 presidential elections, the importance of this election as a crucial moment in the development of Taiwan’s democracy is an overstatement. The portrayal of China as an aggressor in such an important moment aids in strengthening the DPP’s anti-China narrative, and can be used as a tool for rallying the people in support of the DPP as protector of Taiwan’s freedom and democracy.

4.2 Liberty Times: After the election

Following the election results, and the dramatic loss for the DPP, the amount of articles published in regard to fake news drastically decreased.

When discussing the notion of fake news after the elections, it was mainly as an explaining factor for the DPP’s loss. In a number of articles published after the elections, fake news was listed as one of the factors next to a lack of clarity on the referendum questions and the impact of China’s internet army, stating that “these are all factors that influenced the elections”(自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT14). All three of these arguments can essentially be seen as a clearing of self-responsibility, blaming both the public and China for the DPP’s loss. On the other hand, many articles published after the election results claim that the results show a general dissatisfaction of the public with the DPP’s governance.

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Claiming that there are a number of other factors involved, however, places the loss outside of the DPP’s hands, and clears the DPP of the need for such self-reflection.

Another articles goes even further on the fake news claim: an unnamed scholar states that “after the elections (China) will not go easy, I fear that this is the new normal, and the government needs to seriously face this issue of national security”(自自自自自自自,自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT15). The claim that this is a matter of national security creates an excuse for the government to react to this in a harsh way; and allows for strict measures in fighting fake news. The same article quoted a Taiwanese university professor stating that “fighting fake news is safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy, not harming freedom of speech” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(LT15).

An article published three weeks after the elections reported on the revision of seven laws by the government in order to combat fake news, with the harshest law carrying a sentence to life imprisonment when the spread of fake news has lethal consequences (LT16). These laws, which were the final result of the promise Tsai Ing-wen made shortly after being elected in 2016, where she said she would find a solution to increase the trust of the people in media and in the government.

The claim that Taiwan’s democracy is being threatened allows for the creation of such amendments, which due to the unclear nature of fake news makes for a complication in the legal system. Following these amendments, it has become more dangerous to publish news, even when one is initially certain of its credibility. The fact that the government is allowed to decide the details of what is fake news clears a way into using these amendments for political gain, as it can also be used to remove unfavourable views by portraying them as fake news. To claim that this is in no way influencing freedom of speech is therefore contestable.

Changes following the election results

In essence, the election results did not provide a large change in the narrative regarding fake news. The articles published in the period before the elections the topic stressed that fake news was impacting the elections, a trend which was continued in the articles published after the elections, where fake news was used as an explanation for the DPP’s loss. A possible explanation for the fact that this message stayed the same might be the amendments made later on to a number of laws, using the threat of fake news as a justification for these amendments. If the DPP were to tone down their framing of the threat of fake news, the argument of free speech as a protest against these amendments would gain support.

4.3 United Daily News: before the elections

The first notable aspect of the discussion of fake news is the moderate way in which quotes by president Tsai’s statements are presented. A statement by Tsai that is often used in these articles is regarding fake news, “some of it even originates from China”(自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN12, UDN13).

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Interesting to note is that in relation to this quote by Tsai, neither the Liberty Times or the United Daily News discuss which other countries are responsible for the spread of fake news. Although president Tsai has expressed much stronger language towards fake news, as is shown in the articles published by the Liberty Times, these quotes are rarely used by the United Daily News. By claiming that only a part of the fake news is originated from China, the issue of Chinese fake news is portrayed as something less worrisome in comparison to the claim that it will destroy democracy, as she was quoted saying in Liberty Times articles. Furthermore, this claim removes the assumption that China is the sole perpetrator of fake news, or that fake news is rampantly used to influence Taiwan’s elections in the way the Liberty Times claims.

One argument regarding the discussion of fake news that is often mentioned in the articles published by United Daily News is the lack of concrete evidence provided by the Tsai government. One article claims that when “media went one step further to ask whether there was concrete evidence that the mainland (China) had interfered with the elections, which (Mainland Affairs Council spokesperson) Chiu Chui-Cheng did not reveal” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)

(UDN14). Going even further than that, multiple articles quote KMT-members blaming president Tsai for her obsession with fake news. An example of this is KMT legislator Ko Chih-en, saying that

“president Tsai’s meaning (in regard to fake news), seems to be that when something is

disadvantageous to the office, it can all be considered fake news and mis-information” (自自自自自自自自自 自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN15). Another article quoted KMT-member Sun Ta-Chien, claiming that “when using the word ‘fake’, can you really pretend all the problems disappeared?” 自自自 自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自 UDN16自. These statements highlight the obvious problem inherent to the issue of fake news, being that it is not only very hard to immediately define what exactly is fake news. By overexaggerating and ridiculing president Tsai’s emphasis on the issue of fake news, the discussion gets shut down as president Tsai’s opinion gets invalidated. When looking at the political relation between China and Taiwan, it is quite logical that president Tsai and the DPP would suffer a great deal more from China’s efforts compared to the KMT, since the DPP’s viewpoints on Taiwan’s identity are in contrast with those of China. The problem once again is that of evidence; although there might very well be a large amount of fake news directed at the Tsai administration, without evidence it is hard to prove this case.

Another topic mentioned in a number of articles is the relation between fighting fake news and the protection of freedom of speech. One of the analysed articles even compared the fighting of fake news to the martial law during Chiang Kai-shek’s rule(article 6). This is a very serious comparison, as the martial law era in Taiwan gave the government the mandate to arrest anyone that criticized the

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government (Rawnsley, 2000). By comparing the current government’s efforts to curb fake news to the repressive period of martial law, the government’s acts are immediately branded as incorrect.

4.4 United Daily News: After the elections

Following the election results, the reporting on fake news by the United Daily News decreased, with only three articles directly discussing fake news in the period following the elections. In these articles, the DPP is heavily criticized for its emphasis on fake news, stating that it is merely “the same as previous elections, where the DPP tries to ignite the people’s worries about China” (自自自自自自自自自自自自 自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN17). By reducing the issue of fake news to simply a campaigning strategy of the DPP, the topic of fake news becomes less of an issue to be resolved and instead turns into one of the DPP’s slogans. This statement however does not take into account earlier instances in which the Chinese government has uttered strong statements regarding Taiwan’s political position as well as the numerous military drills performed by China. Reducing any worries about a threat from China to mere political rhetoric therefore is in clear discrepancy with reality. The official goal of China remains that Taiwan has to be reunified with China; and although peaceful reunification is preferable, China “reserves the right to use force to bring Taiwan under its control”(Blanchard & Lee, 2019).

Another article quoted professor Li Ming, saying that “the voters’ thoughts changed, and they don’t want to be kidnapped by the DPP anymore” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN18). In

portraying the electoral victory by the KMT as a liberating event, the emphasis is put on the contrast between the positive results of the elections and the shady rhetoric that had been used by the DPP up until now. By not voting for the DPP, the public is then seen to be ‘freed’ from this rhetoric, portraying the KMT victory as a positive outcome for Taiwan. In the same article, professor Li Ming blames the DPP for focusing solely on China, “whereas the United States act frequently, the DPP does not talk about the factor of American influencing the elections”(自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN18). This is further supported in another article by professor Chen Zhijie, who claims that “the United States and China have both in different ways acted out experimental interference in Taiwan’s elections” (自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自自)(UDN19). When looking at the second statement, there is a striking break with the rest of the narrative, in which the DPP’s claims that China was interfering in the elections was heavily criticized. By using the word “both”(自), Chen actually acknowledges that China has interfered in the elections, but somewhat dismisses this by saying ‘but others do it too’. Not only is this actually expanding on the problem the DPP keeps on repeating, it is also in complete contrast with earlier efforts to frame the DPP as a party that keeps on repeating the same old baseless claims.

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Changes following the election results

When comparing the period before the election to the period after the election, the main narrative seems to be very similar. Similar to the earlier articles, the articles published after the election results further attack the DPP and its claim that China is interfering in the elections. In doing so, the lack of evidence is used as proof that the DPP is merely using the same old scare tactic as they used in previous elections, and that this is the reason why they lost.

4.5 Comparison between Liberty Times and United Daily News

When looking at the way the issue of fake news is presented by the Liberty Times and the United Daily News, the main difference is in the object of criticism. The Liberty Times emphasizes the claim that China is hurting the Taiwanese people by interfering in the elections. At the same time, the Liberty Times emphasizes the way in which the KMT’s positive attitude towards China is problematic, which leads to the conclusion that supporting the KMT means being against Taiwan’s democracy. The United Daily News on the other hand focuses on the flaws in the DPP’s argumentation, and criticizes the DPP’s lack of tangible proof. The United Daily News at the same time contradicts itself in its criticism of the DPP by claiming that aside from China, the United States has also interfered in the elections.

Similar to the discussion regarding the 1992 consensus, the narratives presented by the two news outlets show strong similarities to the DPP- and the KMT-viewpoints, as the Liberty Times hammers on the threat that China poses, whereas the United Daily News attempts to tone down on its portrayal of the ‘China threat’, and puts it into perspective with other factors.

5. Conclusion

In this thesis, a comparison has been made between the discourse as created by DPP-favoured media outlet the Liberty Times, and the one as created by KMT-favoured media outlet the United Daily News, arguing from the commonly accepted notion that the Liberty Times and the United Daily News are biased in regard to their reporting, supporting the DPP and the KMT respectively (Chen, 1998; Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012; Sullivan, 2018). In doing so, this thesis utilized discourse analysis as a tool to look at the way in which the two sides created their respective discourses. This was done by focusing on the way in which the pro-DPP and the pro-KMT bias of the Liberty Times and the United Daily News respectively caused both sides to adhere to their own line of argumentation, by following the traditional standpoints of the DPP and the KMT. In addition, the analysis focused on the way in which these traditional standpoints influenced the discourse created around the 2018 local elections in Taiwan, and way in which this required both sides to tell their own story. In doing so, this thesis attempted to answer the following research question:

Friend or foe: portrayals of China in the Taiwan 2018 election