Experiencing human rights : experiences, perceptions and actions of human rights in La Liniere humanitarian camp, France

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Abstract

Non-citizens have been identified as the stateless, refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons or migrant

workers. As such, the non-citizen has been much referenced by scholars as a means of exploring the tensions

between sovereignty, citizenship and human rights. Such tensions have been acknowledged by the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in a landmark 2006 report, which highlighted the

discrepancy between the rights that international human rights law guarantees non-citizens, and the lived

realities they face.

The report also called for a more wide-ranging approach to non-citizenship research. This dissertation

therefore sets out to explore this lacuna by exploring how the disjuncture between human rights and

citizenship discourses and practices impacted non-citizens' experience and perception of human rights in

the humanitarian camp of La Linière, France’s first humanitarian camp approximately 40km east of Calais.

My findings are based on three months of primary research carried out with non-citizens in La Linière, using

a qualitative multi-method approach, comprised of ethnography, in-depth, semi-structured interviews,

focus groups and a cartography session, and illustrate that rather than being the virtue of all humans, human

rights are predicated on an individual’s citizenship.

The empirical findings reveal, firstly, that in establishing La Linière, the French state knowingly created a

‘state of exception’, facilitating conditions whereby the state could be allowed to ignore human rights

violations. Additionally, although there was extensive involvement of civil society in running the camp, I

argue that many organisations were not equipped with the experience or resources to effectively and safely

meet the needs of non-citizens. As such, I suggest that La Linière can be understood as a useful and

purposeful tool created by the state in order to maintain its sovereignty in the face of international human

rights obligations.

My dissertation furthermore offers a new perspective on dominant conceptions of the ‘state of exception’

by focusing on non-citizens’ lived experiences of both, thereby adding a more human voice to what are

currently highly theoretical debates. In particular, I illustrate how while on the surface La Linière may have

appeared to restrict the agency and mobility of non-citizens, underneath it emerges as a place of active

mobilisation and action. I argue that the strategies which non-citizens pursue are chosen in response to the

(in)actions taken by the French and British governments, namely that of ever more restrictive pathways to

legally enact their rights.

Finally, the research challenges normative notions of human rights as remote forms of legal protection,

revealing that for non-citizens, the rights associated with citizenship or by virtue of being a human are never

a reality, rendering them in a perpetual state of limbo.

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Forward

I am delighted to be able to present this MSc thesis entitled,

Experiencing Human Rights

Experiences, perceptions and actions of human rights in La Linière

humanitarian camp, France

A note on layout

This thesis is divided into five key chapters, each of which are broken out into subsequent sub-sections. To further aid the reading experience, chapters and sub-sections are accompanied by a short ‘summary section’, clearly demarked by grey boxes. The intention is that these easy to digest, bite-sized summaries will provide the reader with key insights and takeout’s from each section.

It is also useful to note that Chapter 1, provides a comprehensive introduction and overview of the research; while Chapter 5, concludes the research with the key findings, including recommendations for the future of non-citizenship studies. Together, these sections should provide a comprehensive overview of the objectives and findings of this study.

Dedications and thankyou’s

This thesis is dedicated to all those who have sought the promise of human rights and been told no in the name of sovereign states. It is for anyone who has ever braved international borders in search of a better life for themselves and their families, and found only hostility and fear. It is for the men, women and children who have been labelled stateless, refugee, asylum seeker, trafficked persons or migrant worker, and yet whose labels are so often futile in the quest for human dignity.

A number of thank you’s are also necessary. Firstly, to my supervisor Professor Dennis Rodgers who said yes when so many said no. To my friends, new and old, near and far, who have allowed me time and space over the past two years. To Mum, Dad and Hugh, thank you for a lifetime of unwavering support. And finally, to Dominic, your quiet encouragement and belief in me have brought light and laughter every step of the way. Nothing would be possible without it.

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List of Abbreviations

1954 Convention 1961 Convention

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,1961

AFEJI Association of Flanders for Children, Youth and Insertion

C/O Care of

CAO Centres for Accommodation and Orientation

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989

CAT ICCPR

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 1984

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

DLST Dunkirk Legal Support Team

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights Int’nl HR regime International Human Rights Regime

INGO International Non-Government Organisation

IOM International Organisation for Migration

NGO Non-Government Organisation

OFPRA Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons

OFII French Office for Immigration and Integration

RCK Refugee Community Kitchen

UAM Unaccompanied Minors

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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List of Figures

Figure 1 - Location of La Linière and view from A16 ... 10

Figure 2 - Validation workshop presentation ... 34

Figure 3 - Welcome sign at the entrance to La Linière showing camp objectives ... 41

Figure 4 - Office space used by organisations operating at La Liniere ... 50

Figure 5 – Objectives of La Linière in relation to categories of rights ... 53

Figure 6 – Security and police positions within La Linière ... 56

Figure 7 – No Guns’ sign on the door to Gynécologie Sans Frontières and the temporary Women’s Centre... 59

Figure 8 – Rubbish at La Linière ... 61

Figure 9 – Shelters being removed (Benbourek, 2016) ... 62

Figure 10 – Shelter conditions (left) and solar panels installed on shelter roofs (right) ... 63

Figure 11 – Outside of Community Kitchen (left); conditions inside Community Kitchen (right) ... 63

Figure 12 – Examples of overcrowding in Afghan Kitchen ... 64

Figure 13 – Water and washing facilities ... 67

Figure 14 – Cooking on open fires immediately outside shelters... 68

Figure 15 – Children’s Centre (left); Adult Education Centre (right) ... 70

Figure 16 – Resident walking in open sandals in January 2017 ... 71

Figure 17 - Camp graffiti showing how non-citizens perceive human rights in La Linière ... 75

Figure 18 - The remains of the Women's Centre after it was burnt down in January 2017 ... 79

Figure 19 - Results from a survey asking non-citizens in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, "Why do you think the UK is the best country for you?" (Naughton et al., 2017) ... 80

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Overview

This research aims to examine the way in which non-citizens experience human rights. Non-citizens have been identified as the stateless, refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons or migrant workers (Weissbrodt, 2008), but as Belton makes clear “the overriding feature is that they are not citizens of our polity” (2011, p. 59).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has highlighted the discrepancy between the rights that international human rights law guarantees non-citizens and the lived realities they face (2006b, p. 5). This research is concerned with this lacuna and what measures can be taken in order to address the discrepancy between legal instruments of nationality and rights. As such, the research seeks to understand non-citizens, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and policy makers’ experiences of human rights within La Linière, France’s first humanitarian camp. The research then goes on to explore actors’ subsequent actions, if any, to overcome these discrepancies.

This thesis is divided into five chapters, the first of which introduces the research topic, relevance and application within the research location of La Linière, France. Chapter 2 provides the Theoretical Framework and starts with an overview of the various positions on human rights, before moving on to contrast human rights with the rights attributed to nationality. This ensures a clear understanding of how human rights can be experienced by the non-citizen vis-à-vis the citizen. Next, a critique of human rights is undertaken with the aim of assessing the effectiveness of human rights for the non-citizen. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders responsible for ensuring human rights are considered. Finally, in order to address the UNHCR’s identified discrepancy between human rights and lived realities, a review of the experiences of the stateless within camps is undertaken.

Chapter 3 places the theoretical into a practical, research context. Firstly, informed by the Theoretical Framework, the Research Questions and relating Conceptual Scheme are presented; the Operationalisation of the Research Questions is also referred to and can be found in Appendix 1. Chapter 3 also describes the research’s epistemological and ontological approach. Finally, the research design is discussed, including the units of analysis, research methods, analytical approach, ethical considerations, and finally, the limitations of the research.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the empirical analysis of the data, and is therefore the most significant part of the thesis. Reflecting the units of analysis, the chapter is divided into three key sections which correspond with the research questions.

Chapter 5 concludes the thesis in a discussion section, outlining the research’s key findings, before reflecting on each stage of the research including theoretical application, methodology and analysis. The chapter concludes with recommendations for policy, practice and future research.

1.2. The Issue and Academic Relevance

Research concerning non-citizenship and human rights is pertinent for international development studies for a number of reasons. Firstly, poverty, conflict, food insecurity, land rights, and climate change – this extensive, yet not exhaustive, list of issues are all addressed within the field of

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international development. To varying degrees, each of these issues are the drivers of statuses of non-citizenship, consequently, there is a need for an interdisciplinary approach to better understand the forces behind these statuses, and how best to address them. Secondly, analysis demonstrates that human and economic development is associated with increasing emigration and as such migration can be viewed as an intrinsic part of the broader development process (de Haas, 2013). Finally, while human rights is a relatively new addition to the development lexicon (Sano, 2000; Tomasevski, 1993; Urvin, 2007), the link between development and human rights was formally recognised in ‘the right to development’ being adopted in 1986 as a UN General Assembly resolution.

As such, this research focuses on a number of interrelated issues which work to highlight the urgent need for academic attention. These issues can broadly be defined as the dichotomy between human rights and citizenship which, for the purposes of this research, is located within the context of France’s only humanitarian camp, La Linière.

To firstly consider human rights and citizenship. Conceptually the non-citizen (most commonly the refugee) has been referenced by scholars as a means of exploring the tensions between sovereignty, citizenship and human rights (Agamben, 1995, 1998, 2005; Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004a; Isin & Nyers, 2014; Nyers, 2010). This canon of work demonstrates that rather than being the virtue of all humans, human rights are predicated on an individual’s citizenship. This means that an estimated 175 million non-citizens worldwide face challenges in assuring their human rights (UNHCR, 2006b, p. 5). To consider the role of citizenship further, a report by the UNHCR (1999, p. 3), ‘What would life be like if you had no nationality?’, concluded that an individual may not be able to,

“go to university; get a job; get medical care; own property; travel; register the birth of your children; marry and found a family; enjoy legal protection; have a sense of identity and belonging; [or] participate fully in developments in a world composed of states, in which nationality is key to membership.”

In sum, without a recognised or effective nationality, an individual risks not being able to access and / or exercise a plethora of rights, which ultimately impacts on an individual’s ability to live a full life. Where this research offers new insights is how the challenges in accessing human rights are experienced by non-citizens. As such, not only does it address the UNHCR’s (2006b, p. 5) own acknowledgment of the discrepancy between human rights and the lived realities they face, but it also seeks to address scholarly calls for how distinct groups of non-citizens experience human rights.

1.3. Empirical Context

This research focuses on La Linière, France’s first state-run humanitarian camp based in Grande-Synthe, Dunkirk. In order to provide some context to the research, what follows is a brief overview of the geopolitical context of the camp and the surrounding area, as well as a brief outline of La Linière itself.

Geopolitical context

At the time of writing, the topic of non-citizens is particularly pertinent in Europe, where an unprecedented 1.3 million people, mostly from the conflict effected nations of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, sought asylum in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016). This figure does not reflect the numbers of people who have arrived in Europe and not sought asylum.

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For non-citizens determined to reach the UK, the northern France is the final hurdle in journeys ranging from as far afield as Vietnam. Consequently, informal camps along the coast of northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands have been in existence since the 1980s (Dembour & Martin, 2011, p. 126). Unofficial and unrecognised by the state, the camps across northern France provide an overt example of a lack of rights for non-citizens. Multiple reports demonstrate the French authorities’ refusal to acknowledge the camps, as well as initiatives to disperse inhabitants across the country (Dearden, 2016; Dembour & Martin, 2011; John Domokos et al., 2015).

Non-citizens seeking to reach the UK, are reluctant to claim asylum in France and are consequently viewed by French law as ‘irregular migrants’. Although rights protection is in principle for ‘everyone’, international human rights law does not recognise the right of an alien, or irregular migrants, to enter or reside in a state other than that of her own nationality; it is generally up to the state to decide who it will admit or allow to stay within its borders (Grant, 2011, p. 29). This creates specific difficulties for non-citizens.

As this research observed, both France and the UK are demonstrating and contributing to a discourse which positions persons of non-citizen status as a threat to the survival of the political community (Da Silva, 2016, p. 3). This can be observed in the UK Border Force Agency’s budget increase of over 200% in 10 years, from £150 million in 2004 to £460 million in 2014 (Border Force, 2015). Furthermore, a 2016 poll of European attitudes towards refugees found that 53% of French respondents felt that refugees were a burden on the country because they take jobs and social benefits (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons, 2016). This sentiment is echoed in French politics where politician and former President Nicolas Sarkozy has long voiced a rhetoric of anti-immigration, stating that for non-citizens to remain within French borders, they must assimilate (Osbourne, 2016).

The French and British governments’ reluctance to acknowledge non-citizens in northern France means that their indeterminate position is sustained and they are stuck between two states, both of which are refusing to accept responsibility.

Research location: La Linière

Situated between the A16 motorway and a railway track in the Département du Nord, La Linière camp opened on the 7th_{March 2016 as part of a coordinated effort by International Non-Government} Organisation (INGO), Medicine Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Grande-Synthe municipality. Costing €4 million, the camp was established out of a need to provide a sanitary and safe alternative to Basroch Camp, a pre-existing self-settlement in the northern port of Dunkirk which had been in existence for the past decade.

La Linière is run by Grande-Synthe municipality and locally appointed NGO, Association of Flanders for Children, Youth and Insertion (AFEJI). The camp was built to accommodate 1,500 residents in 387 wooden huts, however, due to systematic efforts by the state to reduce the size of the camp, there are currently 289 shelters. A full review of the infrastructure of the camp is given in Chapter 4.

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At the time of research in November 2016 – February 2017, the camp was currently over capacity by 33% with 2,000 residents; however, the population is in constant flux making it hard to keep accurate records. La Linière’s demographic is comprised of approximately 70% Kurdish, mostly from Iraq but also Syria and Iran, with the remaining made up of Iraqi Arabs, Afghans, Vietnamese and Pakistani nationals1_{(Bryan, 2016).}

The vast majority of residents were male, with approximately 160 women living on camp. At the time of research, there were an estimated 100 unaccompanied minors (UAMs) and a further 32 children ranging from 3 months old to 16 years old with their families.

Between the evening of Monday 10th_{April 2017 and the early hours of Tuesday 11}th_{April 2017, a large} fire destroyed La Linière. Media reports (Farrer, 2017) reveal that there is no intention to rebuild the camp. At the time of writing, residents were being dispersed across France to accommodation centres (Gentleman, 2017).

La Linière was chosen as the research location due its unique position as France’s first humanitarian camp, marking a step change in the state’s response to non-citizens. This suggested an interesting backdrop for a discussion around human rights, as acknowledged by the state, and non-citizenship.

1_{Interview I014, reveals camp census as of December 2016}

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth literature review aimed at informing the rationale for the research. The intention is that the theory presented provides a framework for which the research can be understood and the eventual finding can be interpreted (Bryman, 2008, p. 20).

As such, the main concepts are discussed, starting with an overview of the different conceptual approaches to human rights, before moving on to consider the various conceptual understandings of the non-citizen. This provides a platform from which to understand the intersection between human rights and citizenship, as well as ensuring the key concepts behind this research are clearly understood. Section 2.3 considers the work of Arendt and Agamben, two leading theorists whose work helps to critique understandings of human rights and the non-citizen. Here, the tension between human rights, citizenship and state sovereignty start to emerge – notions which lie at the heart of this research. Through a careful review of relevant actors, Section 2.4 questions who should be responsible for the rights of non-citizens, before ending in Section 2.5 with a consideration of how the lived realities of non-citizens, specifically the camp, providing theoretical grounding for the research location of La Linière. Chapter 2 concludes in Section 2.6. with a chapter summary, this serves as a synthesis bringing together the various theoretical elements and issues discussed.

2.1. Human rights: a theoretical perspective

What are human rights?:

In attempting to define human rights, legal scholar Marie Bénédicte Dembour (2011; 2006, 2010) draws attention to the different theoretical and conceptual understandings and in turn illustrates the challenges in arriving at a clear definition. As outlined below, Dembour (2010) categorises four schools of thought, which are each differentiated through their position to human rights law, the foundation of human rights, the realisation of human rights and the universality of human rights. Dembour’s model is useful in defining human rights along the differentiating moral, practical and legal lines which can be pursued by different actors and stakeholders.

The Natural School

The natural school of thought is the most celebrated definition of human rights, identifying human rights as entitlements which one is given simply on the virtue of being human. This definition is reflected both conceptually and practically in international human rights frameworks.

Conceptually, as political scientist Jack Donnolly (2003, p. 3) clearly encapsulates, “[h]uman rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being… [they] are the rights of all human beings, whether they are citizens or not”. The natural school upholds human rights as given entitlements for every single human which are embedded and protected in law. Through its commitment to the universalism of human rights, the natural school has long been upheld in the Western world as the most orthodox definition of human rights; however, in academic circles this orthodoxy is being to wane.

The Deliberative School

In recent years, there has been a gradual shift away from the orthodoxy of the natural school, towards the thinking of deliberative scholars. Rather than upholding human rights as given entitlements enjoyed by every human being, the deliberative school conceives human rights as political values which are agreed and chosen by liberal societies. This marks a step change from the natural school, as

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it places the autonomy with the individual to decide their own rights, as opposed to a spectrum of rights which have been prescribed as universal. Such an understanding is reflexive about the limits of human rights, as it recognises the political, cultural, social and geographical differences which make a universal discourse difficult to achieve (Merry, 2006, p. 228). The deliberative school can be seen to pursue a more culturally relative route. For deliberative scholars, while the ambition is universal human rights, it is not a given and can only be ensured through law.

The Protest School

The protest school conceives human rights as fought for claims and aspirations aimed at the protection of societies most vulnerable. While they feel human rights should ideally be upheld in law, protest scholars are sceptical of the law’s intentions and propensity to be swayed by competing values. According to this school of thought, human rights can never be realised but are the result of an enduring and perpetual struggle.

The Discourse School

The discourse school is probably the least established school of thought. Dembour (2010, p. 4) characterises the school by way of its “lack of reverence towards human rights”. For this school of thought, human rights are neither given, or do they represent the solution to human injustices, rather, the power of human rights comes in its ability to create a language by which to articulate political claims.

Discourse scholars do not call for a complete rejection of human rights, rather in the tradition of nihilism, they call for a reinterpretation of old values which have lost significance, to create new values. Scholars perceive human rights as being for those who need them, but are sceptical as to whether this is the case. While human rights exist in law, the school emphasises that it does not hold weight over other legal frameworks. Thus, human rights are neither realisable, on the contrary they have failed, nor, are they universal.

What is the role of human rights?:

In reflecting on human rights, Hannah Arendt (1951, p. 439) writes that, “the concept of human rights can…never be dependent upon some inborn human dignity which de facto, aside from its guarantee by fellow men…does not exist”. Therefore, while disparate and conflicting moral and practical conceptions of human rights have been highlighted above, Arendt’s thinking suggests a common theme can be identified: that there is reason to give, at least consideration, to the freedom of the human. How this is done, whether it is in relation to rights, on what basis and by who is all up for discussion – however, all agree that the individual deserves recourse to be human and to be free. They also agree that this achievement depends on the respect of others.

Amartya Sen (2004, p. 328) alludes on this further by referring to human rights as “ethical affirmations” of human freedom which require “the importance of freedoms of human beings to be so recognised”. In understanding the role of human rights, Sen’s work is worth considering further. In his seminal work, Development as Freedom, Sen develops his ‘capabilities approach’ which consists, in its most basic reading, of two key concepts: functionings and capabilities (Sen, 1999). Functionings consist of the various things which an individual may value doing, or have reason to value being. They consist of ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ and are therefore refer to activities or states which constitute a person’s being, such as good health or being well nourished. Capabilities refer to an individual’s ability, or freedom, to achieve the functionings which a person has reason to value.

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The capabilities approach represents an approach to development which shifts the focus away from economic growth and towards development as human freedom to achieve. When considered alongside the capabilities approach, the role of human rights can be seen to “[enhance] the lives we live and the freedoms we enjoy” (Sen, 1999). Furthermore, as was outlined in the first World Conference on Human Rights in 1968, “the achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social development” (United Nations, 1968). When taken in tandem with Sen, it can be argued that the relationship between development and human rights are mutually-reinforcing; that one is dependent on the other in order to ensure life, liberty and wellbeing (Juss, 2004, p. 290). For these reasons, non-citizenship and statelessness are pertinent issues for the field of international development.

Who are rights for?:

As this research is interested in the dichotomy between the rights of citizen and non-citizen and the subsequent role of human rights, what follows is a review of the evolution of the rights of the citizen towards the universal rights of the human.

The rights of the citizen

Up until the early 20th_{century, human rights were viewed as the preserve of the nation-state. Defined} by its borders, externally the nation-state establishes the territorial limits of its sovereign power, while internally allows its citizens to claim rights and protections (Hansen, 2014, p. 253). In this way, nation-states have leveraged citizenship as a key mechanism for political membership and the subsequent allocation of rights and claims (Brysk & Shafir, 2004, p. 3).

Citizenship, and the legally recognised term of nationality, are seen to refer to the bond or membership between citizen and the state (Weis, 1979, p. 3). In its most frequently cited extract on nationality, the International Court of Justice outlines that “[n]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties” (Nottebohm Case, 1955, p. 4). Furthermore, Article 2 of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality explicitly defines nationality “the legal bond between a person and a state that does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin” (Council of Europe, 1997).

Citizenship and nationality can therefore be equated to the nation-state and, as Marshall first argued, citizenship has evolved into a full spectrum of rights (1965). As such, the state has become among the most effective enablers and protector of rights (Tilly, 1996). However, much scholarly attention has been given to the link between the nation-state and citizenship, specifically that state sovereignty results in states being able to determine and enforce nationality according to their own jurisdiction (A. Edwards & van Waas, 2014a, p. 2).

Isin and Nyers quantify three types of rights – civil, political and social – as defining modern societies’ relationship between the citizen and the state (2014, p. 2). Weissbrodt and Collins go further to indicate that in many states, nationality is a prerequisite for accessing these rights and duties (2006, p. 248). Nationality is therefore the gateway to political participation in state processes, as well as ensuring the right to return and reside in the territory of the state (Hailbronner, 2007, p. 36; UNHCR, 2012, p. 7). In sum, without a recognised nationality an individual risks not being able to access and / or exercise a plethora of rights, which ultimately impacts on an individual’s ability to live a full life. Universal human rights

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While many scholars draw attention to the “long history of human rights” (Laslett, 1988; Richardson, 1997; Stammers, 2015; Weissbrodt, 1988), the idea that human rights are of international concern is relatively new and most of what is now regarded as ‘international human rights law’ has only emerged over the last 70 years (Bilder, 1994, p. 5).

In 1945, following the atrocities of World War II, the newly established United Nations (UN) set forth an international agenda of protection, aimed at ensuring the universal assurance of human rights both internationally and by domestic governments. It was a direct response to the need for the codification of international standards for the protection of human rights and positioned the human, as opposed to the citizen, at the centre of its thinking.

As van Waas articulates, the separation of nationality and rights gave rise of the assertion that “being human is the right to have rights” (2009, p. 21). Subsequently a framework for the implementation of human rights has emerged through an international human rights regime, driven by the UN. This regime has followed much of the natural school’s thinking, advocating the universalism of human rights based on the notion that if human rights are they rights one has simply because they are a human being, then they are held universally by all human beings.

Donnolly provides a useful explanation of how rights are exercised by differentiating between the moral and political principles of “rights” which he identifies as rectitude and entitlement (Donnelly, 2003, p. 9). In referring to rectitude, rights refer to “the right thing to do”, and therefore the focus is on the righteousness of the required action, and the duty-bearer’s obligation to do “what is right”. In contrast, but equally importantly, as opposed to something being right, entitlements refer to a narrower set of rights which position an individual as “having a right”. To have a right is to be empowered to invoke claims to rights. Seen in this way, rights, in the sense of entitlements, are a special subclass of rights which are related only to a subset of human wrongs (Donnelly, 2011, p. 16).

2.2. The non-citizen and perceptions: in practice, conceptually and in discourse

Scholars increasingly draw upon the case of the non-citizen to exemplify tensions between the sovereignty of the nation-state, citizenship and human rights (Brysk & Shafir, 2004; Isin, 2012; Mcnevin, 2006; Owens, 2009, 2011). To clearly frame this research’s understanding of non-citizen, what follows is a review of how the concept can be understood in practice, conceptually and in discourse.

Summary: What are human rights?

- Human rights is not a binary discourse, rather it is widely critiqued and problematized. Human rights can be perceived differently.

- The evolution of international human rights over the past 70 years marks the separation of nationality and rights, towards the universal rights of the human.

- International human rights law provides a series of tools and instruments by which to hold states, organisations and individuals to accounts.

- In theory, international human rights law jeopardises state sovereignty. In practice, states retain their sovereign powers.

- Due to discrepancies between international law and domestic practice, human rights can be

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Who is the non-citizen in practice?

The idea of the non-citizen has evolved in response to definitions of citizenship and nationality, as sketched above. If a citizen is taken to be an individual who has a legal bond with a state, a non-citizen is a person who has not been recognised as having effective links to the country where she is located. Thus, the non-citizen can be seen as the antithesis of the citizen. The UN identifies different groups of non-citizens, including “permanent residents, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, foreign students, temporary visitors, other kinds of non-immigrants and stateless people” (2006, p. 5). As Belton makes clear “the overriding feature is that they are not citizens of our polity” (2011, p. 59).

Brysk identifies the increasing numbers of non-citizens as evidence of a “citizenship gap” or “lack of political mechanisms to ensure individual membership, power holders accountability and respect for human rights” (2002, p. 246). To understand this in quantitative terms, there are currently 175 million individuals worldwide who lack either effective, functioning or any nationality (UNHCR, 2006b, p. 5) of which more than 21 million are refugees (UNHCR, 2016a); 10 to 12 million people are stateless (A. Edwards & van Waas, 2014b); and, 3.2 million asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2016b).

Weissbrodt identifies a number of human rights treaties aimed at the protection of non-citizens, including the 1954 Convention on Statelessness (2008, p. 36). However, as states retain the prerogative to distinguish between the citizen and the non-citizen which respect to political rights and freedom of movement, there is a significant discrepancy between the rights that international human rights law guarantee and the realities faced by the non-citizen. (UNHCR, 2006b, p. 6). This means that non-citizens may be ineligible for rights of political participations, social services and even international recognition of their status (Brysk & Shafir, 2004, p. 6). As Franke argues, non-citizens challenge universalist ideas of human rights (2009, p. 352).

Who is the non-citizen conceptually?

It is worth noting, that much of the conceptual and theoretical work concerned with non-citizens, sovereignty and rights has positioned the refugee as the non-citizen (Agamben, 1995, 1998, 2005; Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004a; Isin & Nyers, 2014; Nyers, 2010). In his report for the UN, Weissbrodt, calls for a more wide-ranging approach to non-citizenship research (2006b). As such, based on three key points, this research argues that the non-citizen more generally can be used to frame many of the same discussions. It is worth discussing this argument as it works to inform this research’s conceptual understanding and use of the non-citizen.

The first point is one of legal semantics: the term ‘refugee’ refers to a legal status which is only recognised once an individual has undergone the administrative processes of ‘Refugee Status Determination’, by which a government or the UNHCR determines whether an individual seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law. Once enrolled in this process, an individual is deemed an asylum seeker and only upon the decision of a government or the UNHCR is that status changed to ‘refugee’. This is important for the purposes of this research because, as Dembour and Martin argue, in dealing with the populations of the non-recognised, self-settlements in northern France, legal statuses are highly unclear (2011, p. 127). It is worth noting, that in his writing, “[t]he basic point is that…refugees no longer represent individual cases but rather a mass phenomenon” (1995, p. 2), Agamben seems to recognise his broad use of the term.

Secondly, this research takes issue with Agamben’s claim that, “the one and only figure of the refugee” more deeply exposes the fiction of national sovereignty, human rights and citizen. To recognise the

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breadth of “discursive and institutional domains that produce the figure of the refugee” (Owens, 2011, p. 138), the modern refugee has become a “knowable, nameable figure” (L. H. Malkki, 1995, p. 498). This is true. But these characteristics are not specific to refugees. This research argues the normative characteristics associated with the refugee can be extended to the non-citizen more generally. Finally, as will be explored in detail in Section 2.4., through camps’ regulation of the refugee in a “permanent state of exception”, Agamben positions the refugee as the ultimate “biopolitical” subject (1998, p. 71). However, the camp is not solely inhabited by refugees, but rather a space to manage all those who may fall outside of the remit of the nation-state, or as Agier describes, “the undesirables” (2011). Across the world, the stateless, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), asylum seekers, migrants and migrant workers find themselves rendered as objects of control in a camp setting.

Who is the non-citizen in discourse?

Reviews of non-citizen studies, and relating disciplines of refugee and forced migration studies, identify a lack of academic understanding of the specific perceptions and experiences of the relating research population, calling for more research to elicit non-citizen’s perceptions and experiences (Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2007; L. H. Malkki, 1996).

This research gap has been explored by Soguk who suggests that the non-citizen has been constructed by the nation-state as the “necessary other” identified through a lack of nation and citizenship and in “lacking proper agency, proper voice, proper face” (1999, p. 243). In fact, there is not one singular image of the non-citizen, rather there are thousands of multifaceted non-citizen experiences and figures whose meanings and identities have been negotiated according to specific temporal, socio-historical, political and economic structures.

It is therefore necessary to recognise the plurality and diversity of the experiences and identities of the non-citizen and the fact that their experiences are situated, positional and relational. Sigona identifies that this needs to be achieved through multiple channels and through incorporating the voices and experiences of the non-citizens themselves (2014b, p. 378). However, Anthias warns of the inherent difficulty in incorporating these experiences as they too are produced in relation to hegemonic discourses and practices (2002).

2.3. A critical perspective: How effective are human rights for non-citizens?

Across the literature, there are two predominate themes which the non-citizen works to demonstrate and exemplify, influenced most strongly by the thinking of political theorist Hannah Arendt (1906 – 1975) and philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1942) – both of who are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. Through referring to Arendt and Agamben what follows is a conceptual critique of human

Summary: Who is the non-citizen and what do they exemplify? - Non-citizens lack membership to a political community or state.

- Non-citizens consequently lack recourse to political participation, freedom of movement and social services associated with a recognised nationality.

- The non-citizen exemplifies tensions between the sovereignty of the nation-state, citizenship and human rights.

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rights, which questions the effectiveness of human rights. In particular, it will consider why non-citizens face such challenges in accessing their rights.

The right to have rights

Over the past two decades Arendt’s work on stateless and refugees populations has resulted in numerous interpretations of non-citizenship, and the contingent categories of refugee and statelessness (Benhabib, 2002; Borren, 2008; Canovan, 2002; Kesby, 2012; Krause, 2008; Oudejans, 2014).

For Arendt, the non-citizen reveals the impotence of human rights. In lieu of membership of a political community and the associated rights, all the non-citizen has to rely upon are their intrinsic human rights as human beings. However, without the institutions and laws to enforce these rights, they are meaningless and only confirm the vulnerability of the citizen. Arendt concludes, that the non-citizen therefore lacks the fundamental “right to have rights”, or in other words, the political and legal recognition associated with the membership to a political community (Arendt, 1973). Therefore, for Arendt, the protection of the non-citizen can only be overcome through granting “the right to have rights” – citizenship.

To consider the argument in more detail, Arendt firstly takes issue with the idea of the universalism of human rights, instead drawing attention to the link between human rights and the structures of the nation-state and citizenship. Arendt criticises “the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights…which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilised countries” (1973, p. 279).

For Arendt, despite the universal claims of human rights, in a world dominated by sovereign nation-states, the implications of a lack of citizenship result not only in the denial of the specific rights associated with citizenship, but also the protection “of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever” (Arendt, 1973, p. 297). It is therefore only the nation-state which can grant rights with any meaning. Consequently, as the source of rights the nation-state effectively excludes those who are not citizens from accessing human rights on the basis of their non-citizenship. Therefore, those most in need of ‘inalienable’ human rights – those without a right to citizenship – are in no position to claim them (Owens, 2011, p. 137).

This led Arendt to argue that, “the rights of man…proved to be unenforceable…whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any state” (1973, p. 293). Without the legal and political status of her former citizenship, and therefore reduced to “a human being in general”, the non-citizen finds herself to be devoid of all human rights – to be rightless (1973, p. 302). As Benhabib points out, this discrepancy is borne out of the UDHR which is based on the assumption of state sovereignty (2004b).

Although Arendt’s critique of human rights is far reaching, Isaac’s argues that she is not completely dismissive of human rights per se, rather that human rights need to be better guaranteed through political means (2002). Parekh shares Isaac’s thinking, suggesting that Arendt accepts the fluidity of rights and tries to reconcile this through suggesting a more suitable approach to their realisation - politics (2004, p. 50). In contrast, Benhabib claims that Arendt’s belief that human rights can only be guaranteed through human commitment is a sceptical view of the fragility of human rights (Benhabib, 2004a). Isin and Nyers call for a rephrasing of the “right to have rights”, suggesting instead that what is a stake is the right to claim rights as human rights are not predetermined but have to be claimed in the first instance (2014, p. 8; Juss, 2004, p. 291).

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Agamben goes beyond Arendt in his critique of rights to suggest that human rights are merely “biopolitical” rights (Agamben, 1998; Lechte & Newman, 2012). Agamben agrees with Arendt that the power of the sovereign lies in the exceptional power to exclude an individual from the political community (1998, p. 8); however, he extends the idea further to identify that as a result of political exclusion, the non-citizen reveals the life of homo sacer, or “one who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (1998, p. 7). Exclusion from the political community therefore results in a state of “bare life”, which Agamben views as being based on the simple biological existence shared with animals (1998, p. 1). Bare life stands apart from a person who lives in a political community and holds rights which they can exercise (Rygiel, 2011, p. 3).Thus, for Agamben to be a member of the political community described by Arendt is not only a practical impossibility, but would inscribe us further within the mechanisms of the state whose raison de’etre is the regulation of the biopolitical life of the population. The non-citizen therefore reveals that the political communities which Arendt positions as the “right to have rights”, are disappearing and the associated figure of the citizen will soon be replaced by the figure upon which a new political philosophy can be established: the non-citizen (Brown, 2011, p. 152).

Freedom of movement: a place in the world

The notion of ‘a place in the world’ has been developed by Arendt to demonstrate that the first impact of statelessness is the loss of an individual’s home, defined as “the entire social texture into which they were born” and as such, “a distinct place in the world” as recognised and guaranteed by others (1973, pp. 293–294).

Arendt’s notion of place demonstrates that nationality, which influences an individuals’ right to enter and reside in a state, is contravened through statelessness. Unlike nationals, there is no state a stateless person may enter and / or reside by way of right. In framing this impasse within a legal framework, it is useful to refer to article 13 of the UDHR which outlines that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State”.

This is significant because, firstly, because it highlights that practically humans require a place in the world simply to reside, and secondly, that it is only through obtaining a recognised place in the world that an individual’s political actions can be expressed. Oudejans develops this idea further to argue that the stateless are not only without a world in the politically sense, but they are also nowhere in the world in the legal sense (2014, p. 8).

Kesby’s Arendtian reflections are more specific, locating space specifically to, “ …a state, in which nationals can live and reside as of right without the constant threat of expulsion” (2012, p. 21). Thus, the enduring assumption of the international legal system is prefaced on an individual being in possession of the nationality of at least one state. Leveraging the ideas of Arendt and Kesby, ‘place’ works as a conceptual and literal dimension through which to analyse the human right, and need, for somewhere in the world to exist. ‘Place’ emphasises both the physical site associated with rights, as well as the legal recognition of the individual as a rights-bearer within and by a defined space.

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In sum, ‘place’ is constructed both spatially, through the international system of states, and legally through the bond of nationality to that state. Through these spatial and legal definitions, an individual’s right to reside and (re)enter a state is determined, and thus a “place in the world” assigned or denied(2005, p. 697).

2.4. Who is responsible for the rights of the non-citizen and how effective are they?

In light of the discrepancy between the rights guaranteed by international human rights law and the lived realities faced by non-citizens, this section asks who is responsible for the protection and assurance of the rights of non-citizen. It does so with a specific focus on human rights practices as exhibited by four possible candidates: the state, civil society and non-citizens.

The state

The state’s role is to develop and enact policies regarding the management of non-citizens. The state therefore plays a crucial role in how the rights of non-citizens are perceived, experienced and enacted. In conceptually assessing state’s responsibilities for ensuring the rights of non-citizen’s Gibney draws attention to two opposed responses: partialism and impartialism (2004, p. 23). Both views are discussed below.

Partialism

Partialism views states as distinct cultural communities which possess the right to self-determination and therefore justifies the state’s power and responsibility to prioritise the interests of its own citizens over those of the non-citizen. Through this position, partialism privileges the interests of the citizen and is characteristic of conservative and constitutionalist strands of political theory. These positions fail to problematize questions surrounding membership to a political community, ignoring the responsibility of states to non-citizens and focusing on citizens.

As Tamir suggests, the partialist argument therefore hinges on the exclusive rights of states which are derived from moral claims to the self-determination of peoples or nations and the “widest possible degree of autonomy” (1995, p. 74). It is characteristic of partialism to emphasise that membership in a modern state involves sharing a common identity based on cultural values. Sovereignty is therefore seen as the guarantor of the survival of national communities and their cultural integrity. This has led Walzer to suggest that the community of citizens is the “ideal political order” (Gibney, 2004; Walzer, 1983, p. 101). In considering the non-citizen, Seidman suggests that the privileging of citizens logically

Summary: How effective are human rights for the non-citizen?

- For Arendt, the non-citizen reveals the ineffectiveness of human rights which are not based on the virtue of humanity, but rather on the basis of political community: citizenship.

- All rights are dependent on one’s citizenship which she perceives as contingent with a place in the world.

- For Agamben, the non-citizen reveals the practical impossibility of belonging to a political community.

- States’ ability to restrict the freedom of movement and a right to a “place in the world” further exemplify the ineffectiveness of human rights against the sovereignty of the state.

- The literature reveals the intersection between human rights and the rights of citizens; and consequently, how rights can be perceived differently.

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implies a diminished concern for non-citizens based both on a lack of legal status and shared cultural values (1995, p. 135). Partialism is recognisable in state approaches to non-citizens across the world and in this way evidences the sovereign power of the state as opposed to the rights of the non-citizen. As Dembour and Martin indicate in their reflection on the current humanitarian provision in Calais, the partialist response of the French authorities can perhaps best be understood in regards to comments by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, in his claim that “there must be only two categories of foreigners in France, those who wish to stay and integrate…and those who will be accompanied back home” (2011, p. 137).

Impartialism

Impartialism views states as cosmopolitan moral agents which have a moral responsibility to equally consider the rights of citizens and non-citizens (Gibney, 2004, p. 59). In this way, impartialism not only offers a powerful moral counter-argument to partialism, but also represents a radical alternative to dominant state practices.

Impartialism views current state treatment of non-citizens as a gross violation of human liberty and the right of individuals to reside where they wish (Dummett, 2001). As Carens argues, the liberty to move freely is particularly significant in an era characterised by huge inequalities between countries and determines standards of living and political security (Carens, 2000). Critiques of the acquisition of citizenship have led scholars such as Shachar to view citizenship as “a matter of inherited entitlement” which benefits some and excludes others which do not share the same ‘birth right’ and therefore only serves to promote inequalities (2007, pp. 367–369).

In calling for an approach which recognises the claims of humanity over the citizen, impartialism requires states to pursue policies on behalf of those beyond the state, which in turn would work to undermine practices which represent equality and justice within the state (Gibney, 2004, p. 82). Similar dichotomies can be seen within the concepts of ‘letting die’ and ‘make live’ (Foucault, 2003; Li, 2012; Mbembe, 2003). While letting die thinking ascertains that a population will be allowed to die if it is rendered “surplus to requirements”, ‘make live’ considers why governing authorities would elect not to intervene when they could, or chose to abandon one population in favour of another (Li, 2012, p. 66).

Civil society

Numerous scholars draw attention to the role of civil society, comprised of individuals, NGOs, educators, cultural bodies and grassroots initiatives, as key drivers in both holding states to account, in the practice, advancement and challenging of international human rights norms, as well as delivering frontline responses to humanitarian crises (Ball & Gready, 2006; Hannum, 1994; Slaughter, 1994).

Tsutsui et al, argue that “social movements have played critical roles both in elevating the standards of human rights in international law and in leveraging these standards into better local practices” (2012, p. 367). In one of numerous examples, they point to the 1945 UN Conference on International Organisation in San Francisco, where over 1,200 NGOs lobbied states to accord human rights a central place in the UN (2012, p. 370). Indeed, over the past 60 years, civil society has responded to opportunities in the global system dominated by the UN, to advocate for stronger human rights norms, resulting in more binding treaties and legal instruments. The result, is that civil society can transform the “empty promises” of governments into improved human rights practices (Tsutsui & Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 1402)

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In critiquing the role of civil society, it is worth considering what Baxi has termed the “problematic of representational power” (2008, p. 53). All over the world civil society organisations and individuals proclaim to speak on behalf of others, indeed much human rights advocacy is carried out large NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. While there is no denying the positive intention of this work, through the concept of the “problematic of representational power” Baxi questions the democratic processes of these institutions and the channels of participation and community between them and the people they claim to represent. Furthermore, as McCann indicates, civil society’s mobilisation around the international legal framework is double-sided. On the one hand, it works to endorse the international status quo, whilst simultaneously providing only limited opportunities for episodic challenges of the hegemonic system (2006).

Additionally, as Tsutsui and Hafner-Burton point out, civil society’s role in holding governments to account is vital, however, they are not a replacement for state involvement (2005, p. 1402). Indeed, NGOs can often act as an excuse for the state’s lack of involvement. Indeed in Calais, where all humanitarian support is provided by NGOs, many of which have emerged in direct response to the situation in Calais, already reluctant to engage, the French authorities are further removed from providing any assistance. The case of Calais highlights further challenges of expert provision; where assistance for shelter, food and education are all provided by new initiatives, many of which have no previous experience, a lack of checks and balances, best practice and safeguards are in place – in spite of carrying out hugely needed work. Calais highlights the noticeable lack of established unilateral and multilateral non-state actors and NGOs, such as the UNHCR or the Red Cross, neither of which have a permanent presence in Calais and in the case of the former have had little to say beyond the fact that they are concerned about conditions in the camps (Schmitt, 2016).

Non-citizens

In considering whose responsibility it is to ensure the rights of non-citizens, it is worth baring reference to non-citizens themselves.

In distinction to Agamben’s conception of “bare life”, competing scholarly work draws attention to the politicisation of the non-citizen through the “politics of migration” and the “politics of control” (Rygiel, 2011; Squire, 2009). Indeed, Agamben has been criticised for fostering “a rather one sided and flattening conception of migrant subjects” (Walters, 2008, p. 188) and increasingly there is a call to pay more attention to the social, political, geographic and economic relations which comprise the lived realities of the non-citizen camp (Rygiel, 2011, p. 3).

In stark contrast to “bare life”, this perspective illuminates a propensity for agency, where non-citizens utilise mobility as a tool to destabilise the sovereignty of the nation-state and notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ territorial borders. In positioning the non-citizen as politicised and social subjects, they can be seen to have been created in and as a result of migrationary movements. Therefore, for scholars such as Papadopoulos et al as spaces of the non-citizen, camps can be seen less in the Agambien sense of “repressive regimes of incarceration” and more as sites of “decelerated circulation of mobility” (2008, p. 198).

Calais is an interesting example of non-citizen action, because as Rygiel notes, it is a community where inhabitants reveal their resourcefulness in managing a precarious and temporal situation. A short film made for The Guardian.com in 2015 reveals non-citizens and volunteers coming together to make makeshift homes, a school, restaurants and places of worship from found and donated materials (John Domokos et al., 2015). In this sense, the camp can be depicted as a space of social relations, where acts of citizenship emerge.

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To view the non-citizen simply as representative of “bare life” is to ignore how non-citizen’s assert their agency in navigating, negotiating and resisting the border controls which necessitate their situation (Rygiel, 2011, p. 13). Additionally, and returning to the thinking of human rights discourse scholars, to view the camp as a site of exception is to accept and reinforce the state’s rhetoric which positions the camp as exceptional so as to assert its sovereign control over rights to mobility.

Finally, there is a small body of research that suggests people smuggling is an act of non-citizens asserting human rights. Hidalogo (2016) argues that people smuggling is sometimes a permissible means of helping people fleeing dangers to evade immigration systems which work to favour states and not those in need. This argument also draws on the thoughts of Protest Scholars (reviewed within the theoretical framework), who are sceptical of the intentions of human rights law which they consider to favour state sovereignty as opposed to the rights of the individual (Dembour, 2010).

2.5. What are the lived experiences of the non-citizen?

In order to understand the perspectives of non-citizens, this section recognises the need to understand the lived experiences and realities of non-citizens, in relation to human rights practices.

Places of the non-citizen: the camp

In lack of a place to call their own, van Waas (2008, p. 242) draws attention to the practical reality of the non-citizen to be detained or confined to camps. In their broadest nature, refugee camps, self-settlements, Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, prisons and ghettos are leveraged by states, NGOs or UN agencies as a means of containing people displaced by humanitarian and / or natural disasters (S. Turner, 2015).

In terms of the remit of this research, the camp is a necessary concept to consider as it frames the reality of the non-citizens on the borders of Calais in northern France. Methodologically, ‘place’ is the chosen concept, as it is less abstract than ‘space’ (Sanchez-Alala, 2012, p. 121). Additionally, as Creswell (2004) argues, place signifies and is full of meanings which relate to lived-experiences. Why the camp?

The UNHCR (de Costa, 2012) prescribes that camps are intended to provide residents with a safe and secure environment. Thus, on a practical level, as noted above, camps are exceptional and temporal solutions to emergency situations until normality can be achieved. Whether unofficial self-settlements established autonomously or official camps overseen by the UNHCR and associated bodies, at their

Summary: Who is responsible for the rights of the non-citizen and how effective are they? - Comprised of a wide range of far reaching norms, instruments and actors the international

human rights regimes hold the remit and powers to ensure the rights of non-citizens; however, issues of compliance, budgetary challenges and political bias are potential challenges.

- State practices are characterised by partialism which privileges the interests of citizens over non-citizens.

- Civil society plays an active and powerful role in ensuring the rights of non-citizens, however there are also concerns of a lack of accountability, representation and expert provision. - There are a number of different actors who can be seen to be responsible for ensuring the

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most basic they ensure fundamental human needs of water, food and shelter. At their most established, they resemble a functioning city, meeting educational and medical needs; with restaurants and shops offering recourse to black-market goods and economic-based income; and, systems of governance and security, established through official channels and autonomously through the community (Agier, 2011).

Conceptually, for Turner, the result is to prevent the “contamination” of the nation and its citizens by non-citizens (2015, p. 141). Similarly, Malkki has argued that refugees are “matter out of place” and are ‘managed’ accordingly by states so as not to disrupt the “national order of things” (Malkki, 1995). Exception of the camp

Further analysis can be achieved through referring to Agamben’s conceptualisation of the camp as a “space of exception”, which has received much theoretical attention over the past two decades (1995, 1998). Agamben positions the camp as a space of the deprivation of rights and immobilisation born from a political system where the “functional nexus between the determinate localisation (land) and a determinate order (the State)” enters in to a crisis (1995, p. 174).

For Agamben, those who are excluded from the political community find themselves in a “state of exception”, a temporal suspension of the rule of law by sovereign power until a state of danger is overcome. However, the camp offers a unique site of analysis which reveals a “space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (1998, p. 76). Thus, what was once a temporal state is made permanent through the spatial organisation of the camp. For Agamben, camps are not just exceptional spaces but they are also normalised in their role in the political community of citizens (1998, p. 166). As Sigona elaborates, the consequence is that questions of citizenship and individual rights are eroded, superseded and rejected (2014a, p. 5). Similarly, Isin and Rygiel (2007, p. 181) refer to the camp as an “abject space” where,

“increasingly distressed, displaced and disposed peoples are condemned to the status of strangers, outsiders and aliens (e.g. refugees, unlawful combatants, insurgents and the conquered) and stripped of their (existent and potential) citizenships (rights of becoming political)…”

Agamben’s conception of a space of exception is useful in highlighting how sovereignty can be used as a tool to define a “zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule” (1998, p. 170) – or in the context of this research, citizen and non-citizen.

As Owens points out, citizens exist on a continuum with refugees in that they are a “better-tended to herd” but are increasingly indistinguishable from homo sacer (Owens, 2011, p. 141).Therefore, for Agamben, the exception has become the rule in contemporary democratic states (Goldstein, 2007, p. 53). Rather than being an exceptional moment, the state of exception has become the norm – a permanent condition where the retraction of rights is justified and accepted as a result of a permanent state of war which require the sovereign’s unrestrained response (Agamben, 1998, p. 54).

In sum, for Agamben, the camp is significant because it undermines the nexus between nation-state-territory, indeed “by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, the refugee brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis” (Agamben, 2000, p. 21).