“Being seen is not being understood.”
A study of the impact of ‘pacification’
on the grassroots associations of
Complexo do Alemão
Graffiti at public square: “Here is a place of art and culture”
Henry Staples – 10634762 – henry.staples@student.uva.nl
MSC (Research) International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam
Thesis supervisor: Prof Dr Kees Koonings, CEDLA/University of Amsterdam
Local Supervisor: Ellen Sluis, Barraco#55
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everyone I spent time with while living in Complexo do Alemão, in particular Ellen and Eddu for their patience and kindness in helping me with everything. Thanks also to Andre, Jess, Alan, Dan and Leo for letting me join in with O Som Do Barraco – I had a lot of fun and a have taken a lot of good memories with me. Thanks also to my newest friends Saulo and Fernando – thanks for all the beer and I hope we stay in touch. And thanks to everyone else in Complexo that helped me and made me feel welcome. Thanks also to my supervisor Kees Koonings for his advice along the way. And lastly a special thank-you to Fernando for giving up so much time helping me with Portuguese – without you I wouldn’t have had a chance.
Eu gostaria de agradecer a todos com quem eu passei algum tempo, enquanto vivia no Complexo, em especial Ellen e Eddu por sua paciência e bondade em me ajudar com tudo. Obrigado também ao Andre, Jess, Alan, Dan e Leo por me deixar participar com O Som Do Barraco. Eu me diverti muito e eu tenho muitas boas lembranças de voces. Agradeço também aos meus novos amigos Saulo e Antonio - Obrigado por toda a cerveja e eu espero que nós poderemos ficar em contato. E obrigado a todos os outros no Complexo que me ajudaram e me fizeram sentir bem-vindo. Obrigado também ao meu supervisor Kees Koonings para o seu conselho ao longo do caminho . E por último um agradecimento especial ao meu querido amigo Antonio para investir tanto tempo me ajudando com Português - sem você eu não teria tido a chance.
Figures and tables
Figure 1: UPP officers erecting concrete blocks………..…………...……...…….6
Figure 2: Concrete blocks left abandoned………...….……7
Figure 3: The public square before the event (left) and after (right). Source:
Barraco#55.org…………...………...…....………...….7
Figure 5: Aerial image of Complexo do Alemão………...………...………..10
Figure 6: Terrace of Barraco#55. Source: Hostelbookers.com...…….…..……….10
Figure 6: Visual ‘map’ of local features drawn by resident following initial
transect walk…………...……...12
Figure 7: Example of institutional mapping………...………...…………..12
Figure 8: Graffiti in Alemão: “UPP kill the innocent”………...……...………..….17
Figure 9: Data on occurrences of violence in Alemão, 2014. Source:
RioOnWatch...….19
Figure 10: Conceptual scheme………..30
Figure 11: Congregation at the evangelical church in the Alvorada
neighbourhood...35
Figure 12: Stairs leading up to Tia Natalia’s
school………...……….………36
Figure 13: Event organised by Raizes em
Movimento…...……….…..37
Figure 14: Students demonstrate cardboard dice at talk by Sergio Previdi…....…38
Figure 16: The four passions of Marcos………...………..48
Figure 17: Members of O Som do Barraco practicing with guests………...51
Figure 18: Novo Complexo do Alemão logo. Source: Novo Complexo do Alemão
website...………..52
Figure 19: Rene Silva recognised by Forbes Brazil. Source: Forbes Brazil...…..54
Figure 20: Composting machine, terrace of Barraco#55…...………..58
Figure 21: Cultural intervention using Kombi in Flamengo Park…………...….60
Figure 22: Image used by residents on social media. Translation: “We are all
Complexo #Peace in Alemão”……...………..67
Figure 23: Projection at Circulando Event. Translation “It’s time to mobilize:
Alemão resist!”.………...………....70
Figure 24: Deputy Mayor Adilson Pires speaking at a forum discussing the
university, with members of Juntos in attendance. Source: O Dia...………..………75
Figure 25: Figure 25: Scheme depicting impact of ‘pacification’ on grassroots
associations...79
Table 1: Data collection methods employed at each stage of research……....……..11
Table 2: Associations included in data collection…………...……….…13
Table of content
INTRODUCTION………..……….………6
- A struggle……….………..………..6
- Research focus and research questions………...………...……..8
- Methodology………..……….………..……….…………....………….10
o
Location………..……….…………..………..……….……….10
o
Data collected………..……….………..……….……...…11
o
Data
analysis………..……….………..…...……14
o
Reflection on research process…...………..……….………..14
- Context………..……….………...………..……….……….15
o
Rio de Janeiro………...…………..15
o
Grassroots associations………...………...…………..16
- The impact of ‘pacification’…………...……….17
o
1. Violence………...…………..17
o
2. Interaction and public space………..……….……....………….18
o
3. Regulation and mediation…………...………..19
o
4. State and private sector attention…………...…………20
o
5. Visibility and exposure………...………..21
Chapter ONE: Theoretical insight on citizenship, state formation and the role of
associations………..……….………..……….…………...…22
-
Civil society, citizenship and state formation…….………..……….……...…..22
o
Civil society and citizenship in Brazil………...……..22
o
Citizenship in the context of violence……...………23
o
State making in the ‘margins’…………...………23
-
The role of grassroots associations...25
o
Role type 1 – Participation, inclusion and awareness...25
o
Role type 2 – Communication and exchange...26
o
Role type 3 – Representation and resistance...26
-
The practices of grassroots associations...27
o
Mobilizing...27
o
Organizing...28
o
Networking...29
o
Performing...29
-
Conceptual scheme...30
Chapter TWO: Inclusion, participation and awareness…..………..……….……...32
-
Introduction... ………..……….………..……….……...32
-
Understanding the associations... ………..……….………...32
o
Who are they?... ………..……….………..……….…...32
o
What is the problem?.... ………..………..………..…...33
o
What is their role?.... ………..……….………..………...34
o
What are their practices?...36
-
Changes since ‘pacification’...39
o
Reshaping of violence...39
o
Public space...40
o
Regulation and mediation...41
o
State interventions and investment...41
-
Concluding remarks...45
Chapter THREE: Communication and exchange…...47
-
Introduction... ………..……….………..……….…………...47
-
Understanding the associations...47
o
Who are they?...47
o
What is the problem?...48
o
What is their role?...49
o
What are their practices?...52
-
Changes since ‘pacification’...53
o
Recognition, celebrity and (re)presentation...53
o
Heightened scrutiny...56
o
Changing perceptions and external contributions...57
o
Adaptation and shifting priorities...59
-
Concluding remarks...61
Chapter FOUR: Resistance, representation and political influence...62
-
Introduction... ………..……….…………...62
-
Understanding the associations... …...…………..……….…………...62
o
Who are they?...………..……….………..……….…………...63
o
What is the problem?...……...…………..……….…………...63
o
What is their role?...65
o
What are their practices?... ………..……….…………...67
-
Changes since ‘pacification’...69
o
The UPP as motivation for mobilization...69
o
Dialogue and a failed manifesto...71
o
Visibility and decline...72
o
Solidarity and the university...73
-
Concluding remarks...76
CONCLUSION...78
INTRODUCTION
A struggle
Towards the end of my time in Brazil, I took a break from research and spent a day visiting the city of Petropolis. That evening, I returned to Complexo do Alemão tired and ready for an early sleep. I opened the front door and was surprised to be greeted by a group of men and women energetically discussing something in the kitchen.
“Why do you always miss the interesting stuff?” my local supervisor, Ellen, said jokingly. I asked what had happened and she explained that earlier that afternoon, police officers from the UPP ‘pacification’ program had arrived at the square outside her home and, without warning,, erected large granite blocks as a defensive wall to aid in their confrontations with local drug traffickers.
Ellen and her husband Eddu, co-founders of the organisation Barraco#55, used the space regularly, so Eddu confronted the police but had been dismissed: they were going to do as they wished and he had no right to complain. Instead, Eddu posted a photo of the blockade on Facebook.
Figure 1: UPP officers erecting concrete blocks.
Quickly the image spread through Eddu’s network as friends and members of other associations passed it on. Already there were plans to organise some kind of event or protest that was what was being discussed in the kitchen. Eddu also made contact with a friend working inside the Secretaria Municipal de Cultura, as well as contacting the newly appointed Secretary for Culture directly:
“This is a unique space returned to culture in our community… and we insist that it is a neutral space without association with the traffic or the police. That is fundamental to the construction of a policy of peace…”1
He received a response after a short time; the Secretary explained that she had contacted the Secretary for Defence about the matter and it would be addressed. Soon
after, the granite blocks were discovered knocked over in a pile and left abandoned. The UPP officers never returned to collect them.
Figure 2: Concrete blocks left abandoned.
In spite of this success, the planned event went ahead. Organised in conjunction with other associations and intended as a reclaiming of the square, the event was also linked to the emerging campaign for a university campus to be built inside the favela.2
On the day of the event, residents repainted and renovated the square, musicians performed, activists led a petition for the university campus, and all while armed UPP officers looked on from across the street.
Figure 3: The public square before the event (left) and after (right). (Source = Barraco#55).
Chatting to Eddu some time later, I asked him: “so, you won?” His response was short: “This battle yes; but not the war.”
I begin with this story because I consider it emblematic of key themes in this thesis. Conflict, resistance. Cooperation, communication, Inclusion, integration. And a clear example of how local associations are impacted by ‘pacification’.
Research focus and questions
The struggle over power and resources between a strong state and a vocal civil society is an increasingly dominant theme in contemporary Brazil. The Brazilian state has a long history of attempting to repress, silence, or coerce civil society. Inspite of that, grassroots associations have proliferated since the 1970s to become the dominant space for people to give expression and participate in the public sphere. This is particularly true for the urban poor (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). Yet despite the historical achievements of associations, Brazilian society continues to reflect huge disparities in terms of access to rights (Holston 2008) and has been negatively dubbed “the poster child for growth without equity.’’ (Gay 2010: 203, emphasis in original).
Another major theme of any contemporary account of Brazil is violence. Violence in favela neighbourhoods, in particular, has been an ongoing problem because of the presence and influence of drug gangs. Gangs have also exerted considerable influence on civil society to the point where the autonomy and legitimacy of organisations have been threatened or lost altogether (Leeds 1996, Arias 2006, McCann 2014).
Simultaneously branded as one of the more successful emerging economies (Armijo & Burgess 2010; Rohter 2010), the Brazilian state is making a concerted effort to elevate the nation on the world stage through hosting mega-events, specifically the 2014 World Cup and upcoming 2016 Olympic Games. And more than either Sao Paulo (the largest city) or Brazilia (the capital), such events are placing Rio de Janeiro centre stage, while forcing urban violence to the forefront of the agenda.
To date, the response to violence in Rio has been repressive and extreme. At their worst, police were killing, on average, one person for every 23 arrests made (Human Rights Watch 2009: 34). This combination of state and non-state violence has resulted in a continuous state of ‘low-intensity warfare’ (Koenders and Koonings 2012).
The ‘pacification’ or Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) program represents the latest attempt to curb violence in favelas. Launched in 2008 as part of an ad hoc strategy in a handful of favelas, the policy became official in 2009 and the aim shifted to establishing control across a larger number. The policy has been branded as a new and more effective means of ensuring public security, with the objective of reclaiming territories previously held by gangs or militia forces, before making concerted investment in areas such as health and education.3 Each UPP station has a headquarters with one or more bases inside the favela and there are 4 steps in the official strategy:
1. Recovery of territory 2. Establishing police 3. Permanent occupation
4. ‘Post-occupation’ – consolidation/entry of other social services.4
3 Flavie Halais (12.03.2013) “Pacifying Rio: what's behind Latin America's most talked about security
operation” Retreived from
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/pacifying-rio-whats-behind-latin-americas-most-talked-about-security-oper on 24.05.2015
The policy has been the subject of numerous studies (see Machado 2010, Koenders & Koonings 2012, Rodrigues et al. 2012) though none known to this author have focused squarely on grassroots associations as their subject of inquiry. This is worthwhile because ‘pacification’ ultimately constitutes a shift in local power relations (Koenders 2014: 17), and in that sense represents a new set of opportunities and constraints for associations. Thus how members respond to these changes will be a decisive factor in determining the future social and institutional layout of the favela. Indeed the suitability of such a study has been recognised elsewhere:
“It would be interesting…to conduct a qualitative study with the objective of understanding the current configuration of the voluntary sector in the favelas with UPP.” (Rodrigues et al 2012: 77).
It has also been suggested that the “success or failure [of the UPP] in any given favela depends as much on the local history of violence as it does on the UPP strategy itself.” (McCann 2014: 191 citing World Bank 2002).5 Conducting research in Complexo do Alemão, arguably the most notorious of Rio’s favelas, is of particular value because it represents an extreme case in many respects.
The relationship between grassroots associations and the state is part of a broader debate on democratic consolidation and a struggle for citizenship. It is hoped that an understanding of the changing roles and practices of associations will give insight into whether and how new more participatory forms of citizenship are being advanced under conditions of violence:
“Under conditions of ongoing social violence, only close, detailed local studies can provide the types of insights necessary to understand the important localized political dynamics that will be essential in furthering the process of democratic consolidation in the region.” (Arias and Rodrigues 2006: 31)
Pursuant to these aims, this research is guided by the following research question:
How is Rio de Janeiro’s Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) program impacting upon the role and the practices of grassroots associations operating within Complexo do Alemão?
Following a critical realist perspective, this research explores the experiences of members of associations in the context of the implementation of the UPP program, in order to gain insight into underlying mechanisms. The research is not aligned to a single theoretical perspective: by drawing on separate perspectives, I hope to maintain flexibility and openness to alternative interpretations. Alongside the main research question, I make use of the following sub-questions:
1. Which grassroots associations operate within the Complexo do Alemão and what are their main characteristics*?
2. In what ways do members of grassroots associations come into contact with the UPP, and how do they perceive it and their relation to it?
3. What practices do grassroots associations carry out, and how have those practices altered since the UPP program was implemented?
4. What are the role(s) of grassroots associations as perceived by members and residents, and how have those altered since the UPP program was implemented?
5 I spent time in another favela and was struck by the difference in how the UPP were perceived: “Here the police are ten….the police are like family.” (Conversation with resident: 10.11.2014
*The concept of ‘main characteristics’ is operationalized as follows: - Duration of existence. - Location. - Leadership. - Membership. - Stated goal(s). Methodology Location
Figure 4: View of Complexo do Alemão.
Complexo do Alemão is a favela complex in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, consisting of thirteen communities and home to approximately 300,000 residents. During fieldwork, I resided in a research and arts centre in the Alvorada neighbourhood named Barracco#55.
Figure 5: Terrace of Barraco#55. Source = Hostelbookers.com.
Living inside the community brought advantages. Firstly, it facilitated close observation and interaction with members of Barraco#55 and their activities became a useful source of data. Secondly, I was able to experience the broader reality more intimately which
helped to build rapport with residents. Thirdly, members had contacts with other associations which served as a valuable entry-point into those circles. Fourthly, members advised me on issues including personal safety and day-to-day living. And fifthly, interaction with other guests allowed for exchange of ideas. In terms of disadvantages, owing to my affiliation with Barraco#55 I was prohibited from approaching members of certain institutions, and I also faced a higher level of personal danger than I would have living elsewhere. Overall I consider that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and I would advise the same to other researchers.
Data collected
Fieldwork was conducted for three months from October 2014 to January 2015. The research was ethnographic; a “research process based on fieldwork using a variety of (mainly qualitative) research techniques but including engagement in the lives of those being studied over an extended period of time” (Davies 1999: 4-5), and exploratory; aiming to shed light on a recent phenomenon with a view to providing suggestions for future studies. The research comprised of an initial stage to familiarise myself with the setting, followed by a main research stage which constituted the primary data collection.
Table 1: Data collection methods employed at each stage of research.
Stage Time Methods
Initial 3-4 weeks - Archival research (online blogs, newspapers) - Transect walks
- Institutional mapping - Participant observation - Informal conversation
- Association documentation (official documents, social media, formal applications)
Main 8-9 weeks - Participant observation - Informal conversation - Semi-structured interviews - Association documentation
Initially I conducted two separate transect walks with residents. This provided useful contextual information in terms of the security situation as well as key geographical information including the location of associations and UPP stations.
Figure 6: Visual ‘map’ of local features drawn by resident following initial transect walk.
Residents also aided in determining the functions and relative significance of associations, with the aid of institutional mapping exercises. Many residents were also members of associations meaning that informal conversations often gleaned direct insight into their activities.
Figure 7: Example of institutional mapping.
There are a large and growing number of local associations of various kinds in Alemão, estimated between 30 and 50. I collected data from a selection of these based largely on initial contacts. Table 2 provides a list of the associations and delineates them according to their role type, a concept to be further discussed in the theoretical chapter.
Table 2: Associations included in data collection.
Name Existed pre-UPP? Role type 1 Role type 2 Role type 3
Oca dos Curimins (Tia Natália’s School)
Yes Yes No No
Raizes em
Movimento Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educap No Yes No No
Grupo Pensar No Yes No No
Verdejar Yes Yes No Yes
Barraco#55 No Yes Yes No
O Som do Barraco No No Yes Yes
Amigos do Complexo do Alemão Yes Yes No No Voz da Comunidade Yes No Yes No Novo Complexo
do Alemão No Yes Yes No
Ocupa Alemão No No No Yes
Coletivo Papo
Reto No No Yes Yes
Alvorada church Yes Yes No No
I conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with 15 members of associations - several carried out over multiple meetings – using the following stages:
- Stage 1: Introductory questions; main characteristics of association; how do they perceive role; what are the primary practices.
- Stage 2: Opinions of pacification; general impact of pacification; specific impact (i.e. relating to association roles and practices); opinion of future.
Specific questions were altered as the research process developed in order to follow changing lines of enquiry. I also participated in various meetings and events, kept up to date with social media activity of associations and made use of other formal documents including applications for subsidies.
It was not possible to speak directly with UPP officers inside Alemão, though I had a few brief conversations with officers elsewhere which provided useful supplementary data. I had no direct contact with members of Residents Associations; owing to this, the majority of my insights into their functioning come from residents. I also made regular use of reports from newspapers and online blogs for contextual information.
In order to adhere to the concept of auditability, leaving a clear decision trail during research (Sandelowski 1986), I maintained the following notes:
1. Jottings: Notebook for on-the-spot thoughts /impressions.
2. Personal diary: daily recording of thoughts, feelings, and emotions. 3. Logbook: formal account of plans, meetings, events, and profiles of
informants.
4. Field notes: notes on progress with data collection, mistakes, lessons, observations.
Source = Adapted from Bernard (2006:498-525)
Data analysis
Table 3 indicates how methods were employed in addressing each sub-question (participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and informal conversations were useful in tackling all sub-questions):
Table 3: Data collection methods used to answer each sub question.
Sub-question Method
1.Main characteristics Archival research Institutional mapping Transect walk
2. Contact with UPP Association documentation Transect walk
3. Practices Association documentation
4. Roles. Association documentation
Institutional mapping
Interviews and meetings were recorded and transcribed and all data coded; using codes drawn from the conceptual scheme as well as from the data.
Reflection on research process
The wide range of data sources allowed for triangulation of findings which raised questions where sources disagreed, thus enhancing internal validity. I do not consider external validity to be a good measure of quality in this case as though there are a number of ‘pacified’ favelas, Alemão is a unique case in many respects. Guba and Lincoln (1985) offer ‘transferability’: demonstrating that findings have some applicability in other contexts, which I consider relevant and hope to have achieved to some degree. It must also be made clear that the data is highly specific in that the initial selection of informants was based strongly on informal links with Barraco#55. At the same time, Alemão is undergoing rapid change meaning that research conducted at a different time could alter the data dramatically.
Particularly given the sensitive nature of the topic, I made sure to introduce myself as a researcher and was careful not to ask sensitive questions to those I was not familiar with, meaning that the majority of data stems from those I was able to spend time with
over an extended period. As my local supervisor made clear: “People might get tired of answering the same questions….Some might want to talk about the pacification, but others not”.6 The majority of informants were willing to give up time freely, though I offered thanks by offering English lessons, playing table tennis with children, taking part in musical events as well as offering support in more subtle ways such as publicising events and voting for associations in competitions.. These activities in turn benefited the research process by ensuring that I spent ample time with informants. I have anonymised all participants unless they have agreed to be included by name.
Kovats-Bernat (2002) advocates a “localized ethic” strategy, relying on advice from the local population on how to conduct research safely. For me this included avoiding taking sensitive photographs; travelling at certain times or in specific areas; and contacting police or Residents Associations. The latter advice, in particular, also links to the principle of ‘do-no-harm’ in terms of causing potential risk to members of Barraco#55. Though constraining, this gave some insight into the relations between institutions. Another aspect of the ‘do-no-harm’ principle was avoiding relaying negative information to other visitors in the interests of promoting positive perceptions; in line with the agenda of some associations. However, this had to be balanced against the safety of guests; for example, I could not avoid informing them of nearby confrontations.
Context
Rio de Janeiro
“Among the country’s major cities, Rio de Janeiro offers the most dramatic stage for the urban face of inequality and exclusion.”7
Rio de Janeiro is “a very complex megacity” (Gilbert 1995:91) where rich asfalto and poor favela neighbourhoods are found in close proximity (O’Hare and Bark 2002: 239). The term a marginidade (the marginal) is used to denote residents from a peripheria (the periphery) and reflects more than where people live, but also their status in society and what rights they have. Such distinctions have advanced the theory that the “marginalization of Rio’s poor is so extreme as to exclude them from the category of personhood.” (Perlman 2010: 316).
Drug factions in Rio formed when political prisoners integrated with the general prison population during the 1970s. They organised into a ‘movement’ and took over large swathes of territory, predominantly in favelas (Leeds 1996).8 These factions embedded themselves in communities through a combination of violence, intimidation and overt displays of concern for residents’ welfare (Arias 2006: 322-323), leading to a process of “perverse integration” (Zaluar 2000), and creating a “myth of personal security” where “critical segments of the local population feel safe despite continuing high levels of violence” (Arais and Rodrigues 2006: 55).
Favelas have a history of aggressive police interference: in the ten years up to 2008, 10,000 suspects of robbery and traffic were killed by police.9 This is partially fuelled by
6 Conversation with Ellen; 19.11.2014 7 Koenders and Koonings 2012: 4
8 The largest and most powerful being Comando Vermelho (Red Command)
9 Michel Misse (01.07.2011) “Os rearranjos de poder no Rio de Janeiro” Retreived from
their training which fosters a tendency to kill rather than arrest suspects (Gay 2010: 209); in 2007 as a direct retaliation to an outbreak of crime, military police invaded Alemão and killed 19 people, wounding dozens more.10 Incidents such as these combined with a lack of other state investment have led to the assertion that “[t]he police are the face of the state in the favelas” (Perlman 2010: 166). At the same time, pervasive mistrust of police has encouraged the acceptance of the gangs as an alternative security system (Leeds 1996: 61), and the ‘lei do morro’ (law of the hill) imposed by gangs.11
Whether ‘pacification’ represents a change from such heavy-handed intervention is open to debate. Kees and Koenders (2012) point out that “through the very use of the term ‘pacification’ the authorities implicitly acknowledge the warlike setting of this strategy’’ (12), while Machado (2010) notes that, by bestowing upon certain favelas the ‘pacification’ program, “[the] UPP contains, in practice, a dimension of reinforcing the secular dualization of the city.” (2). These arguments raise concern as to whether ‘pacification’ will be the force for peace and integration as it has been branded.
Grassroots associations
Associaçãos de Moradores (Residents Associations, hereafter AMs) were established as quasi-state institutions in the 1940s; repressed during the dictatorship, but following liberalization again became the dominant form of organizing the public sphere (Avritzer 2002: 77-102). With the growth of the drug trade, AMs were increasingly forced to compete with gangs “for the hearts and minds of the local population.’’ (Gay 1994: 98), an unequal competition given the gangs’ superior financial resources. Indeed gangs have a history of exercising direct control over AMs in order to further their interests (Leeds 1996).
Favelas have experienced a proliferation in other kinds of associations, in many cases providing services in the place of AMs (Koppleman 2009: 70). A distinction can be made between non-government orginsations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs). NGOs such as Viva Rio and AfroReggae often originate in a specific setting, begin to receive support from government and become highly professionalized; CBOs are usually smaller, run voluntarily and (usually) with less connection to political society. Despite the prevalence of violence, CBOs in Rio’s favelas have not become greatly involved in advocating non-violence (McCann 2014). Though groups publicize violence to the media, this has often been limited by fear of reprisal by gangs who impose the ‘law of silence’ (Ibid). Furthermore, in some cases these organisations have been infiltrated by gangs in much the same way as AMs (Zaluar 2004: 152).
10 Jorge Luiz Barbosa, (05.04.2014) "As favelas após a “pacificação do território”: desafios à
democratização da cidade” Retreived from http://www.geocritiq.com/2014/04/as-favelas-apos-a-pacificacao-do-territorio-desafios-a-democratizacao-da-cidade/ on 24.05.2015.
11 The rise of ‘militia’ groups complicates the picture still further. These groups are often made up of
off-duty policemen consider themselves ‘above the law’ yet in practice maintain order through excessive force, setting up their own illegal activities (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 8).
Impact of the ‘pacification’ on Complexo do Alemão
The ‘pacification’ of Complexo do Alemão was originally scheduled for 2011 but a wave of violence moved the invasion forward to November 2010, and control passed from the army to the military police two years later. This section will introduce the discussion of the impact of the UPP in five domains.
1. Reshaping of violence
“What pacification? For me, pacification doesn’t exist”12
Violence in the majority of ‘pacified’ favelas has decreased13; yet in Alemão, the gang Comando Vermelho is contesting the territory and violence is ongoing.14 The nature of violence too has changed. Historically, the risk to residents was lessened through a combination of physical distance, predictability,15 and mutual respect between traffickers and residents; “But the bandit, he is of his, we are of ours.”16. Today, UPP officers are permanently stationed inside the community and this heightens the perception of danger: “We don’t feel secure…with police here, the shot doesn’t have a direction”17For many, the police presence is itself seen as a cause of violence: ““It was on the borders of the Complexo, never inside here, now it’s inside, we have an enemy.”18.
Figure 8: Graffiti in Alemão: “UPP kill the innocent”.
12 Interview with Tia Natália (4) 19.11.2014
13 Hearst, C. (10/06/2014) “Security Forces Increase in Rio de Janeiro for World Cup”, The Rio Times,
Retreived from http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/security-forces-increase-in-rio-de-janeiro-for-world-cup/ on 22/05/2015
14 O Globo (13.11.2014), “Policial de UPP do Alemão é baleado na cabeça em tiroteio” Retreived from
http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/policial-de-upp-do-Alemão-baleado-na-cabeca-em-tiroteio-14547551 on
24.05.2015
O Globo (12.11.2014) “Confrontos no Complexo do Alemão deixam um PM e uma adolescente feridos” http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/confrontos-no-complexo-do-Alemão-deixam-um-pm-uma-adolescente-feridos-14537741
15 Conversation with Eddu, 26.12.2014. 16 Interview with Tia Natália (1) 13.11.2014 17 Interview with Tia Natália (1) 13.11.2014 18 Interview with Marcos 23.10.2014
Moreover, UPP police react aggressively when one of their own is injured; “Anything that happens here, they double or triple the cops”19 and this fosters the opinion that “the police are not here to protect us, it’s to protect themselves.”20
Figure 9: Data on occurrences of violence in Alemão, 2014. Source: RioOnWatch.
Nor are there signs the violence is abating; 2014 was the most violent year since the initial occupation in 2010.21 Violence is detrimental to psychological wellbeing (Koonings and Kruijt 2007) and recent shootings have led to some residents leaving the favela altogether.22 In that regard, the fundamental objective of ‘pacification’ has failed. In the words of one officer: “Here is not completely pacified.”23
2. Interaction and public space
“Man I nearly got searched by the UPP on the way to the toilet”24
The opinion that UPP officers are discriminatory is widespread and fuelled by the belief that officers are under-trained: “The majority are disqualified to operate in the favela”25; “You do the training, receive the uniform, get the gun, you don’t train how to deal with people.”26 This is consistent with the finding that “[l]ower-rank military police officers who have the most contact with the population are often the least trained and prepared for their duties.” (Husain 2007: 264).
19 Interview with Marcos 23.10.2014 20 Interview with Marcos 23.10.2014
21 Betinho Casas Novas (28.03.2015) “38-Year-Old Woman Fatally Shot at Her Doorstep While
Talking to Neighbors in Alemão” Retreived from http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=21118#prettyPhoto on 24.05.2015
22 Nicole Froio, (02.04.2015) “Five Shot Dead in Complexo do Alemão in 24 Hours, Including Child,
Mother and Teen” Retreived from http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=21222 on 24.05.2015
23 Conversation with anonymous UPP officer, 24.11.2014 24 Conversation with Bruno; 27.11.2014
25 Conversation with Freddie; 17.10.2014 26 Conversation with Jonas 19.10.2014
Admittedly, some residents are more nuanced in their opinions; “There are honest police that help the community, but people don’t see those ones.”27 One resident made an explicit distinction between the UPP and other forces: “The profile you see when you talk to them [the UPP]…is different. They are thin….they are young, just out of the academy.”28 However, the strain in relations is heightened by the fact that direct communication is unsafe owing to the risk of being labelled a ‘X9’ (informer),29 implying that traffickers “still invoke a smothering fear within the community” (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 23), and are able to impose the ‘law of silence’ (Leeds 1996).30 A continuous police presence serves to heighten suspicion and thus residents walk a delicate line between powers; “Now we have two antagonistic powers inside a place …we are on the other side of the gun all the time, we don’t have guns. Police have guns, and bandits have guns, we have eyes and ears.”31 This “new and peculiar dynamic” has been noted elsewhere: “armed security forces, the traffic and residents…seem to live alongside each other, without getting too involved, in order to protect their own interests.’’ (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 23).
3. Mediation and regulation.
“To turn an arm of the repression of crime into political organization is everything that the process of democratization doesn’t need.”32
Initial resistance to the UPP resulted from uncertainty as to how it was going to impact social norms, particularly in relation to the “law of the hill” imposed by the traffickers (Zaluar 2000); “There were a lot of protests, because no-one was used to it that way, to solving the thing that way.”33 According to one resident, if a resident has a problem today, he/she would be more likely to approach the UPP than Comando Vermelho. This suggests a usurping of the gangs’ role as informal lawmaker. However I received indications that Comando Vermelho continues to play a role in appointing leaders of AMs, also affirmed in other research (Koenders and Koonings 2012 :17), and it was suggested that the UPP would not be able to change this relationship. Whatever the specifics of the current dynamic, “[a]t the bottom of these issues is the still unclear definition of boundaries of what should be the legitimate UPP involvement in community affairs.” (World Bank 2002: 15).
The UPP has also imposed limitations on the freedom of favela residents by regulating baile funk events and shutting down this year’s annual Carnival celebration.34 These and other limitations are widely viewed as overly restraining; “the police like to criminalise everything that the favela does”35 and justifies Machado’s (2010) concern that the “UPPs would be the instrument of infantilization and domestication of their inhabitants” (7).
27 Conversation with Milena 27.11.2014 28 Conversation with Marcos 23.10.2014 29 Interview with Marcos 23.10.2014
30 In January, following the death of a gang member, the majority of shops inside Alemão were shut for
two days as a mark of respect.
31 Interview with Marcos 25.10.2014 32 Machado 2010: 6
33 Interview with Leonardo; 09.12.2014
34 Nicole Froio (20.02.2015) “Carnival in Alemão Repressed by Police” Retreived from
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=20337 on 24.05.2015
4. State and private sector attention “At least they entered with works.”36
Though the state has been long present in Alemão, “its presence was marked mainly by insecurity, understood as low-quality or incomplete services, specific actions and discontinuities between the various state agencies.”37 Following ‘pacification’, the favela has received an influx of attention from the state (and private) sector in the form of new investments and subsidies. On the one hand, this has been welcomed, on the other; treated with suspicion; “It’s like a late Dad. Your father abandoned you when you were a kid, and now you’re 20, ‘I’m your father!’”38
Much of the early investment was either of poor quality or short-lived; “A lot of projects started, but a lot died on the way.”39. One example is the ‘Rio Estado Digital’ internet service which lasted only a brief time and was very weak,40 though there is some evidence it continues to function in some areas.41 The brevity of projects is reminiscent of the notion of “political fatigue” where owing to a lack of accountability, “those involved gradually lost interest in undertaking the arduous activities necessary to keep these programs going” (Arias 2006: 167).
Another program, Rio+Social (formerly UPP Social) refers to the planned investments in social projects which were to follow the installation of the UPP, branded as the key to integration with the rest of the city and security as merely the first step.42 So far the project has primarily involved mapping to identify needs for future investments, but the lack of tangible investment to date has created doubt as to its potential for meaningful impact. 43 The focus on data-gathering has been criticised specifically: “information…[does] not bring about change without political will behind it.”44
Other specific investments have largely been welcomed including the Teleferico, a cable car connecting the favela to the city’s train network which isinextricably linked to the UPP in terms of location and design. Another recent investment is Praca de Conhecimento, (hereafter PDC), part of a network of state institutions providing courses including information technology, graphic design and photography. 45 Though not linked directly to the UPP, PDC forms part of state extension into the favela; “increasing
36 Interview with Mariana; 03.12.2014
37 Alan Brum Pinheiro and Thiago Matiolli (30.04.2015) “Universidade do Alemão” Retreived from
http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/opiniao/2015-04-30/alan-brum-pinheiro-e-thiago-matiolli-universidade-do-Alemão.html on 24.05.2015
38 Conversation with Marcos; 25.10.2014 39 Conversation with Antonio; 19.10.14 40 Conversation with Eddu; 21.11.2014
41 Lucilene Santy (07.04.2015) “In Alemão: Rio State Free Wi-Fi Not Available to All” Retreived from
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=21063 on 24.05.2015
42 Jay Forte (06.04.2015) “Complexo do Alemão Favela Protests After Ten-Year Old Killed” Retreived from ” http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/complexo-do-Alemão-favela-protest-after-ten-year-old-killed/ on 24.05.2015
43 Geoffrey Ramsey (22.08.2014) Making Rio’s Pacification Work: The Limits of ‘UPP Social’
Retreived from http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/rio-pacification-limits-upp-social on 24.05.2015
44 Ed Bentsi-Enchill, Jessica Goodenough, Michel Berger, (30.05.2015) “The Death of UPP Social:
Failing to Make Participation Work” Retreived from http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=17660 on 24.05.2015
45 Praca do Conhecimento official website: “Cursos e Oficinas” page, viewed here:
connections between favela and formal city go well beyond the UPP” (McCann 2014: 192).46
5. Visibility and exposure.
“The world discovered Alemão with other eyes…. Complexo has work, projects, that always existed here! But not in their heads, Complexo never had anything.”47
Complexo do Alemão has a unique position within Brazilian popular media, and is consistently portrayed as an area of intense criminal activity and violence. 48 Owing to this reputation, the UPP program has arguably placed Alemão in the media spotlight more than any other ‘pacified’ favela, resulting in heightened exposure and opportunities for associations to challenge the dominant portrait of Alemão and its residents.
At the same time, there is evidence that the UPP purposefully offers a competing presentation of reality in order to foster support for the program; indeed it has been suggested that “[i]f there has been one successful thing about the UPPs, it has been the marketing effort behind them.”49 Some associations therefore aim to publicise violence and negative police behaviour in order to demonstrate that their right to security is continuously under threat. This is creating a situation where different actors attempt to control the presentation of Alemão to suit their own ends.50 Added to this is the suggestion of collusion between security forces and the media; “When you have the media, the police works for you.”51
The remainder of the thesis will be structured as follows: the next chapter presents the theoretical ideas on which the thesis draws; the following three chapters serve to address the research questions by exploring three categories of associations in turn, and the concluding chapter summarises the findings and offers direction for future research.
46 There is some debate as to whether PDC could ever have been installed without the UPP; though a
similar educational centre has recently been installed in an ‘unpacified’ favela.
47 Interview with Tia Natália (3); 17.11.2014
48 For example: RioOnWatch (05.01.2015) “Best and Worst International Reporting on Rio’s Favelas:
2014” Retreived from http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=19807 on 24.05.2015
49 Ian Waldron (22.11.2014) “Debate Reflects on Rio’s Pacifying Police Units” Retrieved from
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=19287 on 24.05.2015
50 This theme is discussed primarily in Chapter Two. 51 Conversation with Marcos 23.10.2014
CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS ON CITIZENSHIP, STATE FORMATION
AND THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS ASSOCIATIONS
This chapter outlines the main theoretical ideas on which this thesis draws. It does this firstly, by discussing the role of grassroots associations in the context of constructing a new meaning for citizenship; and secondly, by exploring a delineation of the practices of associations with particular reference to how these have been impacted by gangs and police to date.
Civil society, citizenship and state formation
Civil society and citizenship in Brazil
“Brazil’s citizens, even at the extremes, have found in that project of citizenship a common ground.” 52
Civil society is constituted of “the range of institutions that lie between and intersect with both the state and economy” (Voss and Williams 2009: 10) including voluntary associations, community-based organizations, social movements and other collectives. The primary function of civil society is limiting state power through acting as an intermediary between state and citizen (Diamond (1994), though other scholars remind us not to treat civil society as an entirely independent from the state (Evers 1995). Despite a democratic transition thirty years in the making and a proliferation of civil society organisations, Brazil is home to intense social and economic injustice, a democracy that fails to deliver key rights to all citizens and a state which tends to repress or co-opt change (Gay 1988: 12). As such, the argument that a dense civil society will contribute to the success of democracy (Putnam 1993) has been called into question and scholars now increasingly recognise that “the density of civil society is less important than the dynamic between civil society and political society” (Donaghey 2013: 79). This is where the concept of citizenship becomes crucial.
Citizenship is defined as “a complex regulatory regime by which the state moulds people into particular kinds of subjects, and by which citizens also hold the state accountable to their interests”. (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 693). Holston (2008) suggests that “the realization of citizenship is the central and not the collateral issue of democracy” (311) and further, that “the processes and practices that define citizenship are inherently disjunctive-not cumulative, linear or evenly distributed among citizens” (Ibid). Thus citizenship and how we collectively define it is constantly contested “pushed along by the development of social conflicts…as social groups compete with each other over access to resources” (Turner 1990: 194).
Dagnino (2007) offers a useful dichotomy between citizenship as framed within the “participatory project” and the “neoliberal project”. The latter centres on a discourse where citizenship is exercised by taking part in market transactions. This form of citizenship is problematic for the pursuit of a more egalitarian society because it restricts what are considered legitimate rights to pursue. When economic rights are placed central, other rights are relegated to commodities and this justifies the retreat of
the state from service provision: “the market is offered as a surrogate for citizenship” (Dagnino 2007: 553). Holston (2008) discusses the first social law in Brazil, the so-called Law of Two-Thirds, and suggests that “[t]he regime’s most effective strategy…was to make the state’s legal definitions of labor the overwhelming focus of working-class citizenship….focusing the universe of their demands for rights and justice on their labor experience” (191) leading to a citizenship of “inclusively inegalitarian national membership’’ and serving as “a system for the differential distribution of rights.’’(64). Participatory citizenship is synonymous with the struggle for the expansion and deepening of democracy, including the struggle for rights such as education, security and housing. Holston labels this insurgency: “a counter-politics that destabilizes the dominant regime of citizenship, renders it vulnerable, and defamiliarizes the coherence with which it usually presents itself to us” (2009: 15). The struggle for participatory citizenship is therefore a useful way of understanding the role of civil society in broad terms, which “begins with the struggle for rights to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen’s dignity” (2008: 313).
Citizenship in the context of violence
“The aspect of urban exclusion in Rio de Janeiro in general, and favela life in particular that has emerged most forcefully over the past two decades is its face of violence” 53
The struggle for participatory citizenship is made more complex and difficult in a context of violence. Firstly, violence directly inhibits the establishment and maintenance of key rights resulting in “everyday violations of civil citizenship” (Holston 2008: 14). The struggle is further undermined when security forces refuse to grant “privileges to bandits” (Caldeira 2000) by inferring that rights depend on the character and moral worth of individuals.
Beyond this, ‘new violence’ in Latin American cities (Koonings and Kruijt 2004) involves a web of state and non-state actors and this makes the goal of participatory citizenship even more difficult to achieve.54 While Leeds (1996) argues that drug traffickers operate as a ‘parallel power’, Arias (2006) proposes that drug trafficking is a part of the very political functioning of the city, and that a symbiotic relationship between the drug trafficking network, civil society and political institutions is often deeply embedded within the existing framework. In that context, both the state and civil society are “ambivalent actors” (Ibid 128) working to tackle violence while simultaneously facilitating its continuation. McCann (2014) builds on this by discussing how the failure of residents associations to develop accountability and transparency made them highly susceptible to gang control, directly undermining their ability to make autonomous decisions (37-38).
State-making in the “margins”
“Why is the favela not part of the city? Why is it a place of exception?”55
53 Koenders and Koonings 2012: 5
54 The notion of ‘violent pluaralism’ also holds that violence has its origins partly within the state
apparatus (Arias 2006, Arias and Goldstein 2010).
The state is an elusive concept, as are the consequences that derive from its ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ in a particular setting. If as in the present case, the focus is largely on shifting power relations, Foucualt (1980a) reminds us that “[o]ne cannot confine oneself to analyzing the State apparatus alone if one wants to grasp the mechanisms of power in their detail and complexity” (72). Building on this, Mitchell (1991) adopts the notion of “state effect” and suggests that “it [the state] should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist.” (94).
The structural effects of the state are often most dramatically felt in the so-called ‘margins’. Importantly, margins are not areas where the state is absent altogether; it is instead more fruitful to consider them as “sites where the state is constantly refounding its modes of order and lawmaking” (Das and Poole 2004: 8). Owing to this, margins are where state effects are felt “most visibly, most horrifically—and most energetically, creatively, ambiguously.” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 41).
Violence and control has long formed a central aspect of theoretical debates on the state. Tilly (1985) noted that states provide protection as a double-edged commodity; providing shelter against enemies and at the same time triggering a fear of those enemies: in this way “governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers” (170–71). As noted in other literature, “[m]any states are formed through histories of pacification, forced assimilation and exclusion rather than the stabilizing actions of ‘civil society’.” (Kelly and Shah 2006: 251). Such a conception of the state provides a “useful counter to models that either see the state–society relationship as formed through a consensual social contract” (Ibid 252).
Why has the state failed to provide control in the favela ‘margins’ to date? Caldeira and Holston (1999) point out that democratic theory typically assumes the pacification of societal violence through democracy as a civilizing process, but this “supposed resolution of violence is an expression—even a charade—of the particular histories of a few nation-states” (725-726). Thus extra-legal violence endures “as a result of a specific form of state failure” (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 2). Considering state power as “the resources available to state managers in their governance of society in relation to societal actors”, (Barnett 2012: 41) this failure in the Brazilian case starts to appear deliberate. The ‘pacification’ program is then perhaps best understood as an attempt at (neo-liberal) state formation in the ‘margins’; indeed other studies have adopted this as their central frame of analysis (Sluis 2011, Koenders 2014).
It is important to highlight that the state is not entering a vacuum but “encounters a complex setting of actors, networks and strategies …that are, in turn, part of broader connections and processes at the city and state level” (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 1). Returning to our understanding of citizenship, it is clear that to contribute beneficially to the lives of residents, state authorities must conjointly address extra-legal violence and the promotion of a participatory citizenship (Ibid: 4). As has been noted, though police presence may change certain dynamics, “a greater state presence does not necessarily control violence” (Arias 2006: 128) nor guarantee that the security system adheres to or fosters the key principles of democracy (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 30). Indeed research on the subject is beginning to present ‘pacification’ as an advance of the “neo-liberal project” of citizenship by facilitating integration of the favela in the wider economy without meaningfully establishing other rights.
Having positioned civil society and citizenship in the context of violence and conceptualised the UPP as a kind of state formation, I move on to elaborate a conceptual understanding of grassroots associations.
The role of grassroots associations
Smith (1997) defines grassroots associations as “locally based and basically autonomous, volunteer-run, non-profit groups that have an official membership of volunteers” (Smith, 1997a). I choose not to adopt such a definition as to do so would rule out many associations which nevertheless remain relevant in terms of tackling the research question.56 Thus after combined consultation with literature and the data gathered, I suggest that the struggle to advance participatory citizenship consists of three separate yet interrelated ‘role types’. These roles are not mutually exclusive and a single association may be involved in practices which imply the achievement of multiple roles.
1 - Encouraging local participation, fostering inclusion and raising awareness of issues such as citizenship, rights and duties.
2 - Communicating and exchanging within and beyond the community in order to foster solidarities, change perceptions and promote integration.
3 – Representing residents, resisting ‘negative’ changes and struggling for greater influence in political decision-making.
Role type 1 - Participation, inclusion and awareness.
Associations under this role type create a ‘space’ wherein citizens communicate and interact with one another. There is some debate in the scholarship as to how these spaces are formed and maintained. Habermas (1984) suggests that organisations play a “defensive’’ role in the sense of protecting existing spaces of communication, while Avritzer et al (2002) contends that such a conception overlooks the potential for associations to generate new solidarities, create new public spaces, and expand or revitalize existing spaces (2002:46). Whichever theorist one adheres to, these spaces can lead to important benefits for democracy. Diamond argues that one of the key ways is through “stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship.” (1994: 7-8). He argues that these spaces act as “schools of citizenship’’ which help to develop “tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and respect for other viewpoints” (Ibid 8). Clemens (2000) qualifies this by pointing out that the benefits are inhibited by a high level of professionalization and working within the constraints of government programs (11).
Associations corresponding to this role type are often involved in the provision of public goods (Clemens 2000 citing Baker 1983; Beito 2000). Where state provision is deficient or lacking, the burden tends to fall more heavily on them (Douglas 1987), indeed the absence of the state has historically been a source of legitimacy for neighbourhood associations (Koenders and Koonings 2012: 16). The central question is whether ‘pacification’ alters this role, and if so, how.
56 Balitani (2002) even suggests that the meaning of ‘grassroots’ depends on the scale in question and
that “grassroots and nongrassroots should be differentiated in terms of the degree of vulnerability to global policy and economic shifts.” (Balitani 2002: 396).
Role type 2 – Communication and exchange.
Associations communicate between one another and with external actors for a number of reasons. The notion of social capital becomes useful here. Social capital is understood as the benefits that accrue from connection with others, “a powerful resource for achieving occupational advancement, social status, and economic rewards.” (Putnam 1995: 321). Scholars distinguish between ‘bonding’ social capital; connections between individuals or organisations within a community, and ‘bridging’ social capital; between individuals in a community and external actors. It has been shown that bonding social capital benefits the urban poor (De Wit and Berner 2009: 942) and aids in the functioning of organizations (Adler and Kwon 2002). Diamond (1994) also argues that internal communication can aid in the dissemination of “information about government activities that does not depend on what government says it is doing” which “make[s] it more difficult to cover up repression and abuses of power.” (10).57 In the context of violence, it has been noted that gangs “offer alternative channels for social integration” (Koonings and Koenders 2012: 3) which can undermine efforts to promote bonding.58 Elsewhere it has been suggested that ‘bridging’ social capital is more beneficial for the disadvantaged (Putnam 1995: 322). Placing participatory citizenship as central, this research follows Dagnino’s (2007) understanding that communication with external groups is carried out in order to demonstrate that residents are worthy of the rights which they are claiming. Dagnino cites Telles’ (1994) notion of the ‘incivility tradition’ which encapsulates how poverty is considered a sign of inferiority. In a context of violence, the problem is worsened by the perception that residents are liable to engage in criminal activity (Perlman 2010). Associations can attempt to tackle this directly: the Assembleia do Povo (People’s Assembly), a movement of favela residents contacted the media to demonstrate that they were not “idlers, misfits, or prostitutes, as they were assumed to be, but decent working citizens who therefore should be seen as bearers of rights” (Dagnino 2007: 551 citing Dagnino 1994b). As well as challenging the portrayal of residents, links to the media have also been shown to lower levels of violence (Arias 2006). Indeed, these strategies have already been observed in Alemão since ‘pacification’; “the youngsters…are working to de-stigmatize the favela and to tear down an imaginary wall that used to surround their community.” (Sluis 2011: 37).
Importantly, not all scholars are positive about the benefits of social capital. Harriss (2001) argues that it “systematically evades issues of context and power’’ (13) and even Putnam admits that social capital can be counter-productive (1995: 922). This argument would suggest that in order to address issues of power, associations require links to political society, bringing us to our next role type.
Role type 3 – Representation, resistance and political influence.
The goal of influencing political decision-making is at the core of advancing participatory citizenship. According to Diamond (1994) this is done by “creating channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests.” (8), and is reminiscent of a third form of social capital, ‘linking’, which emphasises building connections to political parties (Woolcock 1998). Importantly, Dagnino (2007) argues this is more than about claiming a specific set of rights, but rather as citizens becoming active subjects:
57 Here we see a connection with the first role type in terms of promoting residents’ awareness of issues. 58 Arias (2006) also refers to the “intense inward-based social capital” propagated by gangs (124).
