Forging the Welsh Nation: How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the Separatist Design?

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Forging the Welsh Nation:

How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the

Separatist Design?

Author:

Craig J Hudson

Supervisor:

Dr. Krisztina Lajosi

Second Reader: Dr. Menno Spiering

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in European Studies: Identity & Integration.

Graduate School for Humanities, Universiteit van Amsterdam (2015).

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Abstract

The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum alerted people worldwide to the possible breakup of the United Kingdom (UK). Should Scotland vote ‘Yes’, would Wales similarly choose to follow it in seceding from the union? The question became a definitive feature of media attention up to and in the aftermath of the September referendum, where though Scotland ultimately rejected independence, a still sizeable part of its population had voted to go their separate way. By contrast, Welsh support for independence had reportedly fallen to a record low. This thesis discusses the comparative dormancy of Welsh nationalism, positing that not unlike Wales itself, its separatist narrative has thus far been too divided to appear a credible alternative.

The thesis begins by stressing the distinction and mutual implications of nationalism and separatism. Namely, it posits that the latter without the former, would have little in the way of justification, while the undoubted success of the former should not be taken to presume that Welsh separatism has yet accomplished as much. The aim of this study is to highlight the latency of that transition and identifies Wales’ penchant for intranational distinction as being the major factor. To that effect, the thesis explores the divisive role played by the Welsh language as reflected in Wales inherent North-‐South divide.

It begins in chapter one by placing that linguistic division in the context of Wales’ territorial distinction from England. Chapter two documents a Welsh romantic period defined by the figure of Iolo Morganwg. It illustrates how the appropriation and innovation of its past helped spawn both a new understanding of Welshness and the difference of ideologies that dictates it. In the context of Wales’ subsequent industrial and socio-‐linguistic revolution in the nineteenth-‐twentieth centuries, chapter three traces the emergence of the modern Welsh separatist movement. Chapter four concludes by looking towards Wales’ future relationship with the United Kingdom, asking if ultimately, an interwoven fate of the Welsh language and membership of the European Union might yet instigate a latent, if unlikely common call for independence.

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List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

AM Assembly Member

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

ed. Edition

EEC The European Economic Community

EFA The European Free Alliance

EU The European Union

Fig. Figure

FUEN The Federal Union of European Nationalities

GDP Gross Domestic Product

LSE The London School of Economics

MELT Multilingual Early Language Transmission

MEP Member of the European Parliament

MP Member of Parliament (United Kingdom)

NAfW The National Assembly for Wales

SNP The Scottish National Party

UK The United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland

UKIP The UK Independence Party

UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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List of Maps & Illustrations

1.1 p. 6 The Topography of Wales

1.2 p. 8 Wales’ Early Kingdoms & The Geographical Extent of Offa’s Dyke

1.3 p. 10 Timeline Illustrating the Power Changes in the Welsh Marches 1075-‐ 1536

2.1 p. 34 Iolo Morganwg (b. Edward Williams) 1747-‐1826

2.2 p. 37 Glamorgan (Morganwg) within Iolo’s Britain

2.3 p. 45 The Proclamation Ceremony for the Newport (Casnewydd) and District National Eisteddfod, 1987 with Elerydd (W.J.Gruffydd) as Archdruid and Gwyn Tre-‐arth leading the singing on the Logan Stone.

2.4 p. 40 Examples of Iolo Morganwg’s Coelbren y Beirdd (Bardic Alphabet)

3.1 p. 49 A Section of the Former Mural Dedicated to the Chartist Rising in Newport City Centre. Artist: Kenneth Budd, 1978

3.2 p. 51 The South Wales Coalfield in 1921

3.3 p. 52 The Imbalance of Wales’ Population 1801-‐1921

4.1 p. 65 Photograph of Marine Street, Tallistown, Cwm, Blaenau Gwent

4.2 p. 69 The Offending Section of the Eurostat Map

4.3 p. 75 Map Illustrating the Percentage of Wales’ Population Born in Wales (Census, 2001)

4.4 p. 76 Map Illustrating the Percentage of Wales’ Population Able to Speak Welsh (Census, 2001)

*** COVER IMAGE: Illustration by Mitch Blunt, 2014. In Simon Jenkins (2014)

Guardian article, Wales: Can the Slumbering Dragon Awake? Refer to Bibliography.

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Forging the Welsh Nation:

How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the Separatist Design?

Introduction

“After the yes campaign in Scotland, will Wales vote for independence too?” – (Morris, 2014).

This was the question, which became so prominent a feature of media headlines’ coverage of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Across the United Kingdom (U.K.) and in Wales in particular, the referendum alerted people to the possibility that a nation whose Empire once covered twenty-‐two percent of the world’s landmass, could conceivably lose one or more of its defining parts. For most, that potential was met with disbelief. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to give it its official title, is commonly regarded as having been one of the most successful political unions in history, at least by its own nationals. For over three hundred years Scotland has been a part of that union, Wales for even longer. Why now, in the early twenty-‐first century should its future unison entertain such scrutiny and how likely would it be that one of its smaller partners could choose to follow another one out of it?

For the time being at least, it would seem not very. In September 2014, the Scottish people ultimately chose to reject independence in lieu of remaining a part of the union. While in Wales, a poll recorded in the aftermath of that result suggested that a Welsh disposition for it had fallen to 3%, a “record low” (BBC, 2014i). However, though to many people’s joy, Scotland did vote ‘No’, the fact remains that at 45%, in excess of one million and a sizeable proportion of the Scottish, indeed British electorate had expressed its explicit desire to secede from the union. Although not the outcome Yes campaigners may have hoped for, the very fact that the vote even took place meant that they had succeeded in taking Scotland far closer to secession than few had ever thought possible (Wheeler, 2014).

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Surely then, just as the British media sought to discover, one could reasonably assume that a Welsh separatist faction might proportionally match their Scottish counterparts, whether or not Wales’ own membership was in question. As the poll suggests however, they do not come close. While in 2015, the Scottish National Party (SNP) dominates the Scottish political scene, both domestic and at Westminster, the same cannot be said for Plaid Cymru (The National Party of Wales). Although at the 2015 UK General Election, the party marginally increased its share of the vote in Wales to 12.1% (BBC, 2014ii), it cannot be avoided, that since its 1925 inception, it has yet to win an overall majority in Wales, where unionist parties and particularly Labour still rule the roost.

Wales unlike Scotland however, is a nation whose unique language still seems to set it apart from the rest of the UK. Although today, only a minority of its population continues to use it, their number, at 562,000 in the 2011 Census, still far outweighs the speakers of Scots-‐Gaelic in the more populous Scotland (Curtice, 1999:122). Again, one could reasonably assume that their relative numerousness might translate to a more popular affection for independence. On the face of it then, Wales is seemingly a nation, which is divided by its own language. Though those 562,000 Welsh speakers may be a minority among a predominately Anglophone Wales, with a population of only 3 million, they also represent a still sizable proportion of it. In Scotland, where just 1% of its 5.3 million people are able to speak Scots-‐Gaelic (Curtice, 1999:122), it is clear that this same division, and how that might be reflected in its politics is comparatively negligible.

It is this discrepancy, which motivates this thesis, prompting it to ask why nationalists in Wales have not been as successful as their Scottish counterparts. Rather, more specifically, this thesis questions the relative failure of Plaid Cymru to garner the same popular support as the SNP. Success and failure though, are always negotiable terms. “For Wales, see England”; Kenneth Morgan cites this infamous entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, as having “encapsulated all the humiliation and patronizing indifference which helped to launch the modern nationalist movement in the principality” (Morgan, 1982:3). However, while, nationalism is for Pyrs Gruffudd, in “its broadest sense […] simply an ideological movement that draws upon national identity in order to achieve certain political

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goals” (Gruffudd, 1999:199), this thesis entertains Welsh cultural nationalism and Welsh separatism as being two distinct, but equally intertwined entities.

Almost five centuries after its union with England, Wales is now arguably more recognizable a nation than it has ever been. On the other hand, it is also a divided one; its divisions seemingly more entrenched than ever. Over time, two Wales’ emerged amidst a European wide process of nation building and cultural fact-‐ finding. Wales however, came relatively late to that process; so late in fact that the terms England and Britain had already become practically synonymous (Berger et al, 1999:10). Consequently, this thesis correlates Welsh separatism’s relative dormancy with a distinct intranational division that emerged in the same period. This distinction describes competing philosophies of “Welshness”, bound by linguistic difference and distinguished by Wales’ North-‐South divide. These divisions are put forward as having been the major factors inhibiting the spread of a separatist inclination, whose own narrative is so divisive that one Wales seems very much a work in progress.

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Chapter 1 Borders and Belonging: Uncovering the Welsh Nation &

the Concepts that Necessitate its Study

A Brief History of the Anglo-‐Welsh Border

The most effective borders, that is to say, those which are most stringently respected, are more often than not, those frontiers which have emerged as the product of one or more competing ideologies which require an other to affirm their own existence. The overarching logic is such, that group identities are more readily established when they are able to define themselves by what they are not. To an extent, they are agreed upon, at least over time. However, in some instances, borders are not so much agreed upon as they are imposed, whether by force or by concerted administrative effort.

The present-‐day national borders inside Africa for instance, still stand as testament to the former ‘Great’ European powers’ scramble for the continent during the colonial period. The need for drawing borders around territories to segregate them from those of rival communities or powers may not be a uniquely European phenomenon, but has undoubtedly been best illustrated by the actions of European states. Whatever their degree of relevance, borders are almost always contentious and the practices of maintaining them equally so. Designating a border often has the effect of dividing otherwise contiguous political or ethnic groups, in some instances even demanding that traditional adversaries live side by side. Consequently, tension is inevitable and in many cases boils over into violent conflict.

Where does one community stop and another begin and does this necessarily reflect ethno-‐territorial congruence? This chapter examines the relative significance of the Anglo-‐Welsh border to the formation of a Welsh national consciousness, and aims to place it in the context of Welsh separatism, asking if Wales had ever been a distinct nation. The situation is of course complicated by the fact that England and Wales, actually belong to the same state. Consequently,

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there are no controls, so to speak, save the toll to enter Wales at the Second Severn Crossing and so the ways in which their separate territories are delineated are dependent on a variety of factors. This thesis stresses linguistic difference, underlined by the Welsh language as having been the major dynamic, almost irrespective of people’s ability to speak it today, a concept which is dealt with further in chapters three and four.

The Cartographer’s Dream

Firstly, there are particular geographical differences between the two nations, which point to the possibility of a topographically defined border, the cartographer’s dream. For instance, while England is mostly flat, but for a few upland areas in the North and South West of the country, Wales is largely mountainous. The spine of the latter is characterised by the continuous Cambrian Mountain range, stretching from the Brecon Beacons and Black Mountains in the South to the great peaks of Snowdonia (Welsh: Eryri) in the North, while the South is also defined by the deep, uncompromising valleys which seem to scar its landscape. Were one to view the border from above (See Fig. 1.1), the change in topography becomes inescapable, so much so that the historian Gerald Morgan has argued that; “this is indeed different country, and largely because of those hills, [Wales] really is a different country” (Morgan, 2013:27).

Undoubtedly, there is a sense of environmental determinism attached to that statement, a theory, which, though popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is now practically discredited. However, Morgan elaborates to distinguish a mental as well as linguistic border that demarcates the two nations. Together they reflect the non-‐physical dimensions of crossing what resembles a naturally defined border. While the linguistic border pertains to the differences in language between the two nations, this mental border as Morgan describes it, “deserves a fuller treatment than anyone has yet given it” (Morgan, 2013:27). Broadly speaking, this seems to refer to the border’s basic conception. Certainly today, there may be a case for arguing that cultural differences such as proverbs, jokes and even sporting rivalries may invoke a stronger sense of difference than the overt politics of borders.

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The Imagined Border

Alternatively, a man made border which reflects now loosely defined, but predominantly linguistic difference can also be observed. Before the thirteenth century, the Wales we conceive today did not exist as a political or cultural entity. Much as the English realm was divided between rival kingdoms so Wales was divided between rival Brythonic chiefdoms. Morgan adds that, Wales was so geographically fragmented by its own mountains and rivers that, “it fell naturally into [these] minor kingdoms, which often fought each other” (Morgan, 2013:28).

Fig. 1.1

The Topography of Wales

Source : Page 1. Gwyn Alf WILLIAMS. (1985). When Was Wales ? The History, People and Culture of an Ancient Country. London.

Penguin Books.

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Indeed, Gwynfor Evans, the former president of Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales), has noted that the very concept of a unified Welsh territory, united by a common use of the Welsh language, did not emerge until the ascendancy of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, or Llywelyn the Great (1172-‐1240), whose rule (1195-‐1240) would eventually take in the majority of Wales’ territory (Evans, 2000:31). On the other hand, John Davies contests that from 1055 to 1063, Wales had been ‘one’, under Gruffydd ap Llywelyn, “a feat with neither precedent nor successor" (Davies, 1993:100). Evidently, to this day there is disagreement as to how Welsh history ought be narrated.

Nonetheless, most historians agree that the most obvious expression of a will to delineate between an English and Welsh territory is Offa’s Dyke (Welsh: Clawdd Offa), a ditch, but effectively a Welsh equivalent to Hadrian’s Wall. Few seem to note its significance even if comparatively, its construction was much more recent. By the mid–eighth century, the Welsh Kingdoms shared a boundary with Mercia which had become the dominant English kingdom under the rule of King Offa (Morgan, 2013:28). Offa sought to incorporate Wales into his growing kingdom, though, ultimately his failure to do so led him to consult the then Kings of Powys and Gwent, the Easternmost of the then Welsh chiefdoms (Baxter, 2011: The Independent). The consequence of this consultation in turn led to the border being given a physical expression, with the Mercians building a colossal ditch extending 177 miles from Chepstow (Welsh: Cas-‐Gwent) in Gwent to Prestatyn on the North Welsh Coast (See Fig. 1.2). Evans adds that, unlike Hadrian’s Wall, the purpose of Offa’s Dyke had not been defensive, but rather to “denote the frontier clearly” (Evans, 2000:24).

It seems fair to say, that perhaps the herculean effort involved in that process actually signifies that the Mercians were not so much trying to keep the Welsh out of their own territory as they were attempting to define themselves in relation to those same Welsh tribes. The Welsh were seemingly alien, (Welsh: anghyfiaith) since they were not of the same language or culture (Morgan, 2013:29-‐30). Wales then, was far from unified at the time in a political sense. However, the Mercians, whose dyke, seemingly corresponds to a clear geographical distinction having been inscribed upon the earth, had identified Wales’ unique culture as other. Thus

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its demarcation would form the basis of Wales’ cultural distinction until its incorporation into England under the Tudor reign several centuries later.

The Welsh Marches: An Ambiguous Political Frontier

In a political context, Wales’ distinction became progressively blurred in the intervening centuries. This was largely the consequence of the Norman Conquest and the Anglo-‐Norman campaigns which eventually succeeded it. Gwynfor Evans comments, that in Wales, the fact is often alluded to that while the Normans conquered the larger England in weeks, “it took centuries […] with the might of the Anglo-‐Norman empire behind them to overcome the resistance of the Welsh” (Evans, 2000:32). Understandably, as the major figure in the Welsh nationalist

Fig. 1.2

Wales’ Early Kingdoms & The Geographical Extent of

Offa’s Dyke

Source: Page 65. John DAVIES. (1993). A History of Wales. London. Penguin.

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movement for much of his lifetime, it is worth considering that Evans is liable to make a political point, and accentuate any distinctions there might be.

Nonetheless, while common leadership united the Anglo-‐Saxons at the time of the Norman Conquest, it is doubtful whether the same can be said for the Welsh chiefdoms, as outlined above. Morgan argues that, “since there was no single king and army to oppose them; there was no single [emphasis added] Welsh kingdom to conquer” (Morgan, 2013:31). Indeed, Sean Davies suggests that as near total as Llywelyn’s rule had been, he had struggled to hold down the “obdurately independent sub-‐kingdom of Glamorgan” (Davies, 2015). This may explain the relative difficulty the Normans had in conquering Wales. However, they would ultimately exercise their influence over Welsh daily life and this was largely achieved by means of the Marcher Lordships, or the Marches. The impact of these self-‐governing military bodies would be long lasting and felt up to the Act of Union near five centuries later.

Although the Marches were themselves subject to the English crown, they also retained a substantial degree of autonomous power and were not directly accountable to English governance (Evans, 2000:32). By the time of Edward I’s reign (1272-‐1307), Evans suggests that practically the whole of Wales had become not so dissimilar to “one great March of which large parts were in the possession of the king himself” (Evans, 2000:72). In 1282, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, popularly known as Llywelyn the Last, dies. Although, briefly succeeded by his younger brother, Llywelyn is commonly regarded as having been the last sovereign Prince and King (from 1258) of Wales. Soon after, Edward I having executed the younger Dafydd ap Gruffydd (1238-‐1283), proclaimed his successful conquest of Wales in the Statute of Rhuddlan, 1284, before dividing its territory again between March and Principality. While Wales had yet to be politically united with England, the royal statute that now governed it had made its territory a detached, de facto possession of the English crown (Morgan, 2013:32).

For Morgan, the Marches had acted principally as “a buffer zone between the Principality and the kingdom of England” (Morgan, 2013:32). Once again therefore, there is a case to make for an English monarch as having effectively

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defined his kingdom in relation to the Welsh. For the next two and a half centuries, the ambiguity of the Marches would define Wales ambiguity as a nation, as well as its loosely defined border with England (See Fig. 1.3 below).

That status would finally change with the enactment of the Laws in Wales Acts (1536 and 1543) under England’s Henry VIII (Morgan, 2013:32-‐33). Ultimately, the Acts declared that:

“…This said country or dominion of Wales shall be, stand and continue for ever henceforth incorporated, united and annexed to and with this Realm of England” (Evans, 2000:99).

“Annexed”, does not imply a harmonious Act of Union, as the Laws in Wales Acts are popularly known. This may explain why today, separatists such as Evans commonly refer to it in less romanticized terms as the Act of Incorporation. Was Wales’ territory united with England so much as it was seized? Perhaps unsurprisingly, Evans prefers to liken this union to Jonah’s biblical union with the whale (Evans, 2000:99).

Fig. 1.3

Timeline Illustrating the Power Changes in the Welsh Marches 1075-‐1536

Source: Page 109. John DAVIES. (1993). A History of Wales. London. Penguin.

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The border drawn up by the Laws in Wales Acts has barely changed to the present day. Today, it broadly and erratically traces that line decided upon by the Acts and which follows the rivers: Dee, Vyrnwy, Teme, Monnow and ultimately the Wye. However, a consequence of allowing geography to dictate the border was that it was not entirely respectful of the language boundary. Many communities, including Welsh-‐speaking ones were divided either side of it. Avoiding the aforementioned segregation of contiguous communities is difficult to avoid in determining a border. However, since Wales was being incorporated into England, it is doubtful whether the language barrier caused the legal draftsmen much concern. Thus from 1543, the Anglo-‐Welsh border bore very little political significance, other than administrative until finally in 1743, Morgan notes Wales as having vanished entirely as a political concept, when “an Act of 1743 laid down […]

“[…] That where the Kingdom of England…hath been or shall be mentioned in any Act of Parliament, the same has been and shall…be deemed and taken to comprehend and include the Dominion of Wales” (Morgan, 2013:36).

Is Wales a Nation?

It may be possible to construe these Acts as the final nails in the coffin of the fledgling Welsh Nation. Certainly, this has so far been proven in a political sense, since to date there is still no such thing as an independent Welsh state. Yet somehow, that territory’s conception as a nation survived, a survival that is posited by this thesis as being most intimately linked to the survival of its own unique language. With the enactment of the Laws in Wales Acts, one could reasonably suppose that Wales’ loss of political distinction should necessarily lead to the extinction of its language. However, in spite of Wales’ own internal divisions, including a notable North-‐South divide, its common language would acquire a renewed significance from the latter half of the eighteenth century. Simply put, this thesis posits that Wales is a nation, because in spite of its differences, a Welsh community of sorts is emerging from them.

As such, while Wales today remains very much a part of the United Kingdom, there is also a case for questioning whether its political independence might yet be revived. Since 1999, it has been governed domestically by its own devolved

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government, the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW), a limited but bilingual legislative body (since 2011), which given a mandate by the Welsh people proves that a Welsh nation’s political dominion has actually strengthened over time. Just how this point was reached in the intervening nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be the focus of chapters two and three, which aim to illustrate the bearing of cultural events in the past for Wales’ relative political position in the present.

Indeed, to glance at the present, suggests that the idea of Wales has still far from vanished, in spite of the narratives which divide its community. England and Wales today make up one entity of the three legal systems that form the U.K., the others being Scots Law and Northern Ireland Law. However, while the two nations may be one and the same in the legal definition, the conceptualization of a Welsh Nation has somehow survived in a distinct cultural dominion, as much as it has done in its geographical manifestation.

The Devolution process, alluded to above, has been central to Wales’ modern progression as a political entity, as it has been for Scotland and Northern Ireland and now appears set to for English city regions as well (Wintour, 2015: The Guardian). According to the UK Parliament, devolution in the United Kingdom involves the transfer of “varying levels of powers from the UK Parliament to the UK’s [devolved] nations” (UK Parliament, 2015). Since devolution therefore requires that law making powers be transferred out of the centre, it seems as though Wales is in the process of travelling full circle with regard to its relationship with the British establishment. If 1536 was the defining moment in Wales becoming a part of the modern United Kingdom and 1743 a pivotal year in its centralization; then Wales in 2015 seems to have reacquired some of the ambiguity of the past having once more become increasingly distanced from the centre. How far that distance will be allowed to develop, the people that demand it and along what lines are just some of the core questions this thesis plans to address.

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Where is Modern Wales?

In May 2015, the UK Chancellor George Osborne delivered a speech in Manchester shortly after his party’s victory at the general election. In it, Osborne outlined his vision on building a Northern powerhouse in England as part of a radical English city-‐region devolution plan.

“We all know that the old model of trying to run everything in our country from the centre of London is broken. It’s led to an unbalanced economy. It’s made people feel remote from the decisions that affect their lives. It’s not good for our prosperity or for our democracy. And that is precisely what we intend to do, not just in the north of England but across the nation. We will deliver the devolution to Scotland and Wales we promised” (Osborne, 2015).

Osborne aims to justify the increasingly common acknowledgement of the “appropriateness” for UK devolution; that fundamentally, it represents the next logical development to any state’s modern political sphere (Wyn Jones & Scully, 2012:72). That hasn’t always been his party’s position. Today though, in order that the electorate should feel less disenfranchised by the establishment, the major parties have recognized the need to become more accountable to it. At least this appears to be the reasoning behind the city-‐region devolution scheme.

Whether the same can be said for the Welsh electorate’s own rationale for supporting devolution is another matter. Wales like Scotland and Northern Ireland now has a distinct political identity in its own right, at least within the United Kingdom, arguably more so than it ever has had before. This is worth remembering and the central point of this chapter. Consequently, it may be supposed that a newly defined populace might naturally be predisposed to alternate reasoning, especially when its unique culture is one which is also underlined by an altogether different language.

England’s North-‐South divide is commonly referenced both in politics and popular culture. With rectifying that division at the heart of the Osborne devolution scheme, it is no coincidence that he chose to make his speech in Manchester; “Britain’s fastest growing city” (Leese, 2014). However, few outside of Wales seem to be aware of Wales’ own North-‐South divide. Rhys Jones and Carwyn Fowler cite inequalities in economic development across Wales as having created internal

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tension between the North and South (Jones & Fowler, 2007:92). However, this is not the only trend to emerge that has demarcated Wales internally. This thesis posits that a modern division over the Welsh language (Cymraeg) has also abetted Wales’ North-‐South divide.

Prior to Wales’ territorial demarcation by Offa’s Dyke, the language had been the distinct feature, which had signaled Wales’ anghyfiaith, its ‘otherness’ from Offa’s Mercia and today’s England. However, time and a rigorous process of Anglicization began by the Anglo-‐Normans and pursued up to the 20th_{Century
has}

ravaged the Welsh language. Communities and regions across Wales have become divided between speakers and non-‐speakers. In fact, the censuses of 2001 and 2011 divulged that today, only as many as 20% of Wales’ citizens are now capable of speaking the language fluently (Davies & Williams, 2009:144). The decline of the language has been so alarming, that only around a century earlier and that figure had been almost as high as 50% (Poulin, 2012:47). Wales today then, is a nation, which is both economically and linguistically divided, if indeed it is fair to call it a nation. Consequently, its modern geopolitical presence does not seem so dissimilar to the territory once controlled by rival chiefdoms centuries earlier.

Indeed, Jones and Fowler deliberate a seminal article by Emrys George Bowen, Le Pays de Galles (1959). The pair note Bowen’s assertion that the Pays of Wales “should be looked upon as something quite distinct from the larger political unit of the same name” (Jones & Fowler, 2007:90). This Pays they identify, is concentrated on a “cultural heartland in the north and west”, adding that broadly speaking this heartland reflects the “particular cultural endowment of the Welsh language” (Jones & Fowler, 2007:90). Bowen’s work thus raises the idea of a discrepancy between Wales as we conceive it and the Wales of the Welsh people. This assertion entertains the deeply contentious notion that a Welsh person could be considered more or less Welsh dependent upon their ability, or lack thereof to speak the Welsh language. However farfetched an idea this might be, it is an alarmingly ethnocentric one, popular both in Wales and in England, even raised by academics such as Bowen and one that the remainder of this thesis will argue has been the major factor in impeding the spread of a more inclusive idea of the Welsh

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nation. Chapter three gives this notion more attention than it is logical to do so here.

If it is true that the Welsh language has been the major element in shaping the Welsh cultural space to the present, then it seems natural to suppose that protecting it should logically create the conditions that would secure the continued survival of a Welsh nation. That being said, for as long as there has been a discussion to that effect, its participants have been divided over the best means to pursuing that. Jones and Fowler have acknowledged these competing narratives to the Welsh cultural space as having emanated from civil society on the one hand, and from the devolved powers of the NAfW on the other (Jones & Fowler, 2007:92).

There may arguably be a case for presuming that Wales’ political dimension has now supplanted its cultural significance, irrespective of the former having originally been inspired by the latter. However, the idea that a Welsh nation had been preserved, even founded on a cultural-‐linguistic difference remains highly evocative and will be explored further in the following chapter. Indeed, the results of the 2011 Welsh Assembly Referendum seem to lend credence to Morgan’s claim of a mental border having been strengthened by its impact. However its low turnout suggests that it may be too early to make such claims (Morgan, 2013:39). The debate that stems from this query draws into question the ‘success’, for want of a better word, of the Welsh nationalist cause and which ultimately sets the tone for the inquiry of this thesis.

A Theoretical Approach to Welsh Nationalism

Before moving on, an important distinction must first be highlighted and several significant theories referenced as a consequence of the inner complexities that arise in studying nationalism. The introduction stressed, that this thesis conceives of Welsh cultural nationalism and Welsh separatist nationalism as being two distinct but equally intertwined entities. Namely, it posits that the latter without the former, would have little in the way of justification, while the clear successes of the former should not be taken to presume that Welsh separatism has yet accomplished as much. This may result in the conclusion that one has been

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successful while the other has not, or rather, that time will ultimately tell whether that will be the case.

Nationalism is commonly taken to presume Separatism, which it often exemplifies, but on which it is not solely based. Consequently, asking why Welsh nationalism is not as prominent as Scottish nationalism is not only too narrow a question but is also practically devoid of meaning. Joep Leerssen for instance, suggests that nationalist movements often begin in the study (Leerssen, 2006:562), and often with little sentiment for the overt separatism that sometimes succeeds them.

Where the Welsh language is in comparative good health to its Scots-‐Gaelic counterpart, there lies the significance that this thesis reasons why for so long the Welsh felt little need to pursue anything more than a scholarly defence of its culture. Leerssen adds that, “nationalism stands out amidst other ideologies in that it formulates a political agenda on the basis of a cultural ideal” (Leerssen, 2006:562). On the one hand, this may account for why Welsh nationalism has traditionally built its ideal around the protection of the Welsh language as a step to eventually pursuing a separatist agenda. On the other, the fact that Wales is rather more linguistically divided than Scotland, might also account for its relative failure.

Leerssen and Anne Marie-‐Thiesse raise several key theories that permeate this thesis. Nationalism, according to Leerssen, emerges as a concept in the nineteenth century and on the basis of a specific political and cultural agenda. In his Nationalism and the cultivation of culture, Leerssen proposes that, “all nationalism is cultural nationalism” (Leerssen, 2006:559-‐560), to suggest that all nationalist movements desire a certain congruence between their territory and the constituent nationality. To this notion, Thiesse has added, that the nation is not so much determined by its monarch but rather is conceived of by its sense of community:

“Elle n’est pas déterminée par le monarque, son existence est indépendante des aléas de l’histoire dynastique ou militaire. La nation ressemble fort au Peuple de la philosophie politique, ce Peuple qui, selon les théoriciens du contrat social, peut seul conférer la légitimité du pouvoir” (Thiesse, 1999:12).

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Wales, in its territorial conception largely derives its right to survive from that concept, much as a would-‐be Welsh state likely would its right to exist. So far, this idea has been applied to the demarcation of a Welsh territory as distinct from an English one, but will be revived throughout as it is again applied to the notion of Wales’ intra-‐national division regarding the Welsh language.

This idea of congruence, the geopolitical ideal of the nation-‐state is something that underlines Leerssen’s theory of Ethnotypes (Leerssen, 2006:17), the idea so often espoused by nationalist movements that each nation has a “separate character, identity or soul” and which Leerssen also recognizes in separatist movements. This idea, which predicates what a nation or nationality, is, based on what it is not, has been applied by states attempting to consolidate their territories through centralization, just as it has been by separatist movements hoping to justify their withdrawal from that same “uncongenial state” (Leerssen, 2006:21). Certainly, it is true of the United Kingdom, just as it is true of the rationale which underpins Welsh separatism, and which, while contentious, is considered by this thesis for having factored in its relative failure.

As if to bolster this concept, Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation is worth consideration. For Anderson, the nation “is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006:6). Above all, the nation is for Anderson and Thiesse, a community, but like all nations, all communities are ostensibly imagined, the products of patriotic creativity. This is a view shared by Eric Hobsbawm. While Hobsbawm elaborates on the role played by invented tradition in the construction of popular mindset, the observations made by Anne-‐Marie Thiesse, on ancestral cult and the truly international development of nationality offer intriguing insight.

Leerssen’s theory of geopolitical congruence appears to be supported by Anderson and its relevance to Wales illustrated by a discussion of the Anglo-‐Welsh border. Anderson suggests, that the nation is “imagined as limited because even the largest of them […] has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind” (Anderson, 2006:7). A nation then has to limit itself so as to define itself; it requires its other to elucidate it and

Forging the Welsh Nation: How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the Separatist Design?

Forging the Welsh Nation:

How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the

Separatist Design?

Author:

Craig J Hudson

Supervisor:

Dr. Krisztina Lajosi

Second Reader: Dr. Menno Spiering

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in European Studies: Identity & Integration.

Graduate School for Humanities, Universiteit van Amsterdam (2015).

Abstract

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms & Abbreviations

List of Maps & Illustrations

Forging the Welsh Nation:

How has Intranational Distinction Hindered the Separatist Design?

Introduction

Chapter 1

Borders and Belonging: Uncovering the Welsh Nation &

the Concepts that Necessitate its Study