Master’s Thesis
Putin Möbius: Comparative Analysis of Vladimir Putin’s Media Portrayals in the U.S. and Russian Media During the 2014 Crimean Crisis
Dinara Khamitova ID 10583378
Supervisor: Anouk Van Drunen
Graduate School of Communication
Erasmus Mundus Master in Journalism, Media & Globalisation Master's Program in Communication Science
26.06.2014
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 4
Theoretical framework ... 6
Research design and methodology ... 14
Media outlets ... 15 CNN ... 15 Russia Today ... 16 Data population... 16 Data analysis ... 17 Results ... 18 Able politician ... 19
Target of unjust criticism ... 19
Aggressor ... 20
Annexationist ... 20
Autocrat ... 21
“Enfant terrible” of the world politics ... 21
Imperialist ... 22 Liar... 23 Untamed... 23 Anti-west politician ... 24 Legitimacy upholder ... 24 Populist ... 25
Cross media comparison ... 26
Discussion ... 30
Abstract
This study explores the differences in the ways Russian president Vladimir Putin is portrayed during the 2014 Crimean Crisis by two television networks, CNN and RT. After qualitative analysis of 247 articles, twelve narrative frames through which the political image of Putin is created are identified. They are further classified as relatively positive, relatively negative or mixed. Positive frames include ‘able politician’ and ‘target of unjust criticism’; negative narratives include ‘aggressive leader,’ ‘annexationist,’ ‘autocrat,’ ‘enfant terrible of world politics,’ ‘untamed,’ ‘liar,’ and ‘imperialist;’ and the mixed include ‘anti-west politician,’ ‘populist’ and ‘legitimacy upholder.’ It was demonstrated that negative frames are a lot more prevalent in CNN discourse if compared to RT, which reflects the current political confrontation between Russia and the United States, echoing the Cold War rhetoric.
Introduction
Russian president Vladimir Putin, named among other things the international person of the year by The Times and the world’s most powerful person by Forbes magazine in 2013, is one of the most salient figures on the global political scene who constantly attracts media attention (Boyes, 2013; Howard, 2013). Putin is a controversial figure, and the way his political image is being constructed is worth exploring, in particular given the political crisis between Russia and the Western world that followed after annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
The Russian president is covered excessively by the media both internationally and domestically. However the internal and external discourses differ quite dramatically, as the Western media are usually critical towards the Russian leader, whereas the mainstream Russian media are characterized by the tradition of journalistic censorship and self-censorship and often abstain from criticism (Herszenhorn, 2012; Rosenthal, 2014; Simons & Strovsky, 2006;
Sokolovskaja, 2011)
In spite of the Constitution officially upholding the freedom of the press, state control is ubiquitous in Russia (Simons & Strovsky, 2006; Sokolovskaja, 2011). Domestic media, with a few moderately critical exceptions, have a general tendency to frame the president in a more positive way and provide justification for his actions (Lauren, 2012). In other cases the media are used by Kremlin as framing tools, to create desired image and send certain messages (Dougherty, 2014; Foxall, 2012).
Kremlin’s efforts to maintain a positive image of Putin and frame him as a strong national leader seem to be working in Russia. It is proved by his 14 years of power (as either the president or prime-minister, a swap with Dmitry Medvedev much ridiculed by the media (Englund & Lally, 2012)), three presidential victories and over 80 percent popularity rating among Russian people as of March 2014 (Schweizer & Khrennikov, 2014). In Russia Putin is portrayed as a
strong leader, who has resurrected the country from chaos that followed after the Soviet Union collapsed. He is also perceived as a father figure, an omnipotent tsar who personally takes care of people’s problems and guaranties stability (Arutunyan, 2014, p. A24; Foxall, 2012; Lauren, 2012).
Internationally however, Putin is framed as an authoritarian ruler and does not enjoy a lot of sympathy. He has been continuously criticized for destroying democratic principles, violating human rights, repressing media, and pursuing an aggressive policy towards the neighboring states like Georgia, Estonia and Ukraine, to name just a few most frequent themes (Herszenhorn, 2012; Lauren, 2012; McFaul, 2004). Although the literature mentions these contrasts, the differences in media discourses and the way Putin is being framed have not been compared academically. Some studies focused on the construction of his political image with the use of visuals, others
investigated peculiarities of his leadership style, but none present a detailed analysis of Putin’s portrayals by the media (Foxall, 2012; Sakwa, 2008).
The differences in media portrayals of Putin are particularly relevant at the moment because of the ongoing political crisis. Russia is on the brink of war with Ukraine, whereas the United States and the European Union are trying to counteract Putin’s policy of regional expansion. The Cold War style rhetoric is becoming more common and news outlets play a crucial role in shaping and impacting it (Tadeo, 2014). This rhetoric is characterized by instances when the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry explicitly accused the Russian state funded channel RT of being “the propaganda bullhorn” used by Kremlin during the Ukrainian crisis. The Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov immediately decried the statement and accused the United States of being uncivil and monopolizing the media (Logiurato, 2014; RT, 2014c).
To investigate the differences in the way Putin is being framed domestically and
nodes of power. The contrasting discourses were very distinctive during the Cold War period and may potentially reemerge again amid the Ukranian crisis (Trenin, 2014). While Russian media form the domestic discourse, the U.S. media are part of the so-called “western” discourse through which Putin’s image is created. Since it is not feasible for this study to explore all media, two relatively comparable television networks are chosen to conduct analysis – CNN and RT – as they represent American and Russian positions accordingly (Bullough, 2013a; Thussu, 2000).
One may assume that during certain events, when issues are put on the global agenda and a lot of media coverage is generated, the differences in portraying Putin would be more salient, since more attention is being paid to political actors. The Crimean crisis that unfolded in February 2014 and progressed to Russia annexing Crimea after an (illegitimate, as many have argued) referendum is an event that satisfies these criteria (Neuger, Arkhipov, & Tanas, 2014).
The following research question has been formulated to explore this subject: What are the differences in the way Vladimir Putin is framed by the Russian and the U.S. media during the 2014 Crimean Crisis?
Theoretical framework
One of the core theoretical concepts behind the construction of a political image in media is framing. The most ubiquitous definition of framing process is suggested by Entman (1993): “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”
(Entman, 1993, p. 52). In other words frames represent certain schemas that are utilized by media professionals to communicate information about events, phenomena, issues and individuals to their audiences (Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001). Even though the audiences may not be fully aware of these schemas, they can be identified and recognized as such.
Framing research is often vague both theoretically and empirically because there is no universal approach for such analysis (Scheufele, 1999). Entman (2004) argued that despite the fact that the concept of framing is considered a “unifying thread” in political communication research, it is also criticized for being an “imprecise catchall” which is interpreted differently by different scholars (Entman, 2004, p. 5). Therefore it is necessary to clearly define and
operationalize terms for each particular research design (de Vreese, 2012; Scheufele, 1999). In a later study Entman modified the initial definition of framing to “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (Entman, 2004, p. 5). This definition is used as a core definition for this study, with a remark that “events and issues” in this particular case are replaced by a political actor.
There is certainly more to the process of framing than is included in this definition. Entman (1993) observes that there are four location points for frames in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Communicators are involved in the framing process because they decide what and how to say while being consciously or
unconsciously guided by frames. The frames are also interweaved in the text and can be identified by key words (or lack thereof), phrases, stereotyped images as well as presence of clusters of certain facts or opinions. At the point where frames get to the receiver, the framing effect may or may not occur, depending on the receiver’s thinking process and conclusions. The last location, culture, is by itself a compilation of frames that are present in the discourse and thinking patterns of a societal group. Regardless of its location framing has similar functions: to select and highlight certain elements to build an argument about a problem, its cause, evaluation or solution (Entman, 1993). Since this study is concerned with establishing the presence of
certain frames about Putin and not their effects, the main focus is put on the first two framing locations: the communicator and the text.
Having determined the process of framing, it is also important to understand the multitude of ways to classify the actual frames that have been suggested. Entman (2004) differentiates between substantive and procedural frames. Substantive frames have at least two of the four functions: defining effects or conditions as problematic, identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment and endorsing remedies or improvements. The procedural frames are more narrow and their function is to present evaluations of political actors’ legitimacy, their technique, success and representativeness (Entman, 2004). De Vreese (2012) differentiates between advocacy frames, which are used by various actors on the political scene and journalistic frames, which are created by the media (de Vreese, 2012). However, this approach is rather unbalanced as advocacy framing is a lot more evident than journalistic framing since media are more occupied with playing-up, neglecting, or juxtaposing advocacy frames, rather than reframing them (de Vreese, 2012; Gerth & Siegert, 2012).
A typology suggested by Callaghan and Schnell (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005) seems to be a better fitting solution for the present study. This classification distinguishes between issue-specific, thematic and generic frames. Issue specific frames focus on a particular event or issue, while thematic frames tend to place political issues or actors in a context. Generic frames are even broader concepts, and are described as “narrative devices journalists use to convey political information” (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005, p. 5). It is important to understand though that this distinction is quite vague and generic frames can be presented in thematic fashion. Still all types of frames can be found in the coverage of political events, issues or actors and therefore this
typology allows classifying various frames that are present in the media coverage of a political actor.
Since certain types of frames are understood as narrative devices, the concept of narrative frame is relevant and worth exploring. Even though there is no clear definition of the narrative frame, this concept has been understood as a frame that appears from media narratives and references “enduring and well-known themes” (Vaughn & Goren, 2013, p. 43). In addition to identifying the narrative frames, framing analysis is also an instrument for examining news discourses and conceptualizing them into thematic and rhetorical structures that can be used for empirical analysis (Zhongdang & Kosicki, 1993). Hence the final goal is to formulate and compare the thematic structures made up of narrative frames that constitute media discourses around Putin.
In the academic context framing is more frequently used to explore issues and events (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 2000; Cissel, 2012; García, 2011; He, Xianhong, & Xing, 2012; Supadhiloke, 2012), rather than individual social or political actors (Beail & Longworth, 2012; Carlin & Winfrey, 2009). Some scholars focused on the construction of a particular image through framing. He, Xianhong and Xing (2012) found that Chinese newspapers framed the image of the United States in China, whereas Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (2000), on the contrary, identified frames used to portay China as a communist nation in the United States. (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 2000; He et al., 2012). Supadhiloke (2012) identified frames through which Thai newspapers created images of China and the United States in Thailand (Supadhiloke, 2012).
Yet sometimes analysis focuses on concrete political actors. Grbeša (2012) identified three valenced frames in the media coverage of two presidential candidates in 2010 Croatian
elections, while Schiff (2011) examined how Bill Clinton was depicted by the media during the first two years in office and demonstrated the use of frames (Grbeša, 2012; Schiff, 2011). Beail and Longworth (2012) provide a more detailed account of how Sarah Palin was framed during the 2008 vice presidential campaign. Being a controversial figure who ignites loyalty in some and loathing in others, Palin presented a rich case for such analysis. The authors discussed the
narrative frames delivered through the media and campaign materials and identified a number of frames used to portray Palin: beauty queen, post-feminist, maverick, faithful fundamentalist, pit bull hockey mom, frontier woman, and political outsider (Beail & Longworth, 2012).
In Palin’s case framing is used as an approach to understand political perception. Frames, Beail and Longworth argue, are the stories people rely on to make sense of political events and characters. They are used by politicians to be understood by their constituents and are sometimes overlapping and coexisting (Beail & Longworth, 2012). Similarly it seems, one may assume that in Putin’s case different frames are utilized by Kremlin to create a multifaceted political
personality. For instance Foxall argued that through the official press service communication Putin is being portrayed as a father figure and a Russian James Bond (Foxall, 2012). Yet it seems that there are a lot more narratives in the media discourses concerning Putin that are to be
discovered.
Framing theory is suitable for examining portrayal of political actors, since officials, similarly to events and issues, are socially constructed. Media use standardized phrases and culturally shared terms that contain implicit evaluations to describe them (Schiff, 2011). These elements can be identified in the media discourse and analyzed in clusters of meaning that shape frames. Therefore this theoretical framework fits the objective of this study: to map and compare frames that are comprised of the salient aspects in the media coverage of a single political actor.
The single political actor this study aims to examine is many things and without a doubt a controversial figure (Sakwa, 2008). Colton and McFaul (2003) observed that Putin’s statecraft could not be appraised “on one level or by one criterion” saying that it was not yet possible to sort through the contradictions of his thinking (Colton & McFaul, 2003, p. 10). A decade later political observers are still bewildered by his actions, dubbing him an “irrational actor” (Boyes, 2014). Sakwa defines Putin’s leadership style as “a distinctive type of neo-authoritarian
stabilization,” who did not repudiate the principles of democracy, but neither did he strengthen it (Sakwa, 2008, p. 882).
The typical rhetoric of western criticism directed at Putin usually lies in the realm of eroding democracy, repressed media freedom, human rights violations, and, more intensely so since recently, aggressive imperialistic foreign policy (Boyes, 2014; McFaul, 2004; Rosenthal, 2014). Kissinger (2014) when reflecting on the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2014 also criticizes Putin for the policy of military impositions, yet observes that “for the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one” (Kissinger, 2014). “The West adores demonizing Putin,” a Finnish journalist Anna-Lena Lauren writes in her book on Russia (Lauren, 2012). Portraying Putin as a dictator, she argues, provides a convenient and simple model to understand why Russia acts the way it does, for those who do not look for more complex explanations (Lauren, 2012).
Logically enough, the demonization of Putin as a political figure in the western media is becoming more and more evident as the crisis unfolds (Arutunyan, 2014; Kissinger, 2014; Rosenthal, 2014). References are being made to his political madness, while his actions in Ukraine are being referred to as power play where he is the one able to “put his fist where his mouth is” and start violence (Boyes, 2014; Rosenthal, 2014). Political analysts are openly
alarmed: “Vladimir Putin acting out of cold rage has abandoned the idea of a European future for his country,” “If the unpredictable Kremlin leader goes over the edge, he’ll trigger a war,” “Putin is a master tactician. Since his years as a KGB agent in Dresden in the 1980s, he has gained much expertise in finding and exploiting the West's weak spot”(Boyes, 2014, p. n.p.; Rosenthal, 2014; Speck, 2014).
Given its reach and influence, CNN is one of the prominent players in the western mainstream media discourse. Despite the international presence and claims to be free from the political and economic interests of the U.S., CNN is perceived as “the voice of the US
government and the corporate elite” and often forms the dominant perspective on certain events (Thussu, 2000, p. 356). This media rhetoric leads to formulation of Hypothesis 1: CNN frames Putin as an authoritarian ruler and demonizes his political image.
At the same time, the situation inside Russia is quite the opposite. Over the course of the last several months Putin repressed free media, sent billions of U.S. dollars from the financial reserves abroad, hosted the most expensive Olympics in history, and almost went to war with a neighboring country, yet domestically his rating sky rocketed to 82 percent (Petkova, 2014; Schweizer & Khrennikov, 2014). Despite everything Russian people genuinely like Putin, Lauren observes, most people who voted for him truly believe he is the best political option for the country. The state controlled media, she adds, are partially responsible for this paradoxical popularity (Lauren, 2012). Oswald and Voronkov (2004) argued that many Russians perceive their president not as a politician, but as a savior, whereas Foxall (2012) demonstrated that one of the roles performed by Putin and supported by his communication is the role of the “father figure” to the nation, illustrating that this trend did not disappear but developed over the years of Putin’s leadership (Foxall, 2012; Oswald & Voronkov, 2004).
The number of politically dissatisfied citizens is relatively small in proportion to the whole population, while the voice of a few (relatively) free media is weak. The media seem to play an important role in supporting Putin’s popularity. Most Russians use state television channels as a primary source of information and people trust television more than the
government, church or armed forces (White, Oates, & McAllister, 2005). The federal channels with infrastructure to access the whole country are either directly or indirectly controlled and pro-Kremlin coverage is dominant on national television (Gehlbach, 2010; Sokolovskaja, 2011). People, especially those living outside of urban areas, consume these media on the daily basis and therefore are subject to continuous pro-governmental framing.
This practice turned out to be effective enough and was employed for international use with establishment of pro-Kremlin state funded television network Russia Today (later renamed RT), which broadcasts in English, Arabic and Spanish and claims to present the alternative worldview, which differs from the one presented by the western mainstream media (Dougherty, 2014). Despite the fact that RT wants to be compared to the European BBC, France 24 and Deutsche Welle, it is still often referred to as a propaganda tool used by Kremlin to promote its agenda (Bullough, 2013b; Dougherty, 2014; Logiurato, 2014). Obviously enough, RT’s
portrayals of Putin are very likely to be different from those found in the American news outlets. Hence Hypothesis 2 is formulated as follows: RT portrays Putin as a national heroic leader and justifies his actions.
This study explores framing of Putin in the context of contemporary politics and
reemerging confrontation between the United States and Russia. When it comes to foreign affairs, media outlets create news discourses in accordance with their positions in the world order. CNN and RT have an established reputation and represent correspondingly American and
pro-Russian views of the world even if officially they claim to maintain objectivity, impartiality and integrity (Bullough, 2013a; Thussu, 2000). Therefore it is expected that Putin is framed
differently by these two media outlets.
Research design and methodology
This study is designed as a qualitative content analysis of framing in media coverage that involves Vladimir Putin. Bryman (2012) describes qualitative content analysis as the most prevalent approach that allows searching for underlying themes in the texts that are being analyzed (Bryman, 2012). Entman (1993) suggests that the frames in the news can be identified by “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). According to Tankard, headlines, photos, and quotes constitute framing mechanisms that can be used to identify and measure frames (Reese et al., 2001). This qualitative inductive analysis is based on these suggestions: the above mentioned elements are taken into consideration and classified to map the existing frames.
This qualitative approach is similar to the one used by Beail and Longworth when examining framing of Sarah Palin. To identify the frames the authors reviewed news stories published by The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Time and Newsweek from the date of Palin’s announcement as the 2008 vice presidential nominee to the end of the campaign. This was supplemented with a review of online blogs and discussion boards as well as the official campaign materials. The most common narrative frames that appeared from this content were identified, described, and analyzed. Beail and Longworth formulate narrative frames by identifying and grouping stories that are being told within stories published in the media. This approach is supplemented by frame identification guidance adapted from Entman and thematic
classification described by Callaghan (Beail & Longworth, 2012; Callaghan & Schnell, 2005; Entman, 2004). The term “narrative frame” is considered a central term for this study and is in some situations shortened to “frame” or “narrative.”
In its nature, the approach to formulation of frames used to portray Putin is inductive: generalizable inferences are drawn from observations and a map of present frames is an outcome of this endeavor (Bryman, 2012). As suggested by Matthes (2009), an initial exploratory analysis is conducted first to identify main themes in the way Putin is being portrayed by two different media (Matthes, 2009). Based on these initial themes the core frames are mapped inductively during the process of coding and the sample is analyzed more closely to supplement and develop the emerging framing system.
Media outlets
Since media are the vehicles for the processes of political actors’ demonization or glorification, it is important to justify relevance of the two media outlets selected for this study.
CNN
Cable News Network (CNN) established in 1980 by Ted Turner in Atlanta is firmly rooted in the North-American journalistic culture and in its reporting the channel has been acting as “a vehicle for television diplomacy” (Schlesinger, 1999, p. 274). The first American all-news channel claims to be committed to nonpartisan and objective reporting, and although this
statement has been questioned on multiple occasions, it is still considered an exemplary kind of broadcast journalism (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The 24/7 commercial cable channel is available to over two billion people around the globe and despite its international outreach and journalistic standards is a vehicle of American values and views when it comes to international affairs (CNN, 2014; Schlesinger, 1999).
Russia Today
Founded in 2005 and formerly known as Russia Today, RT is a Russian state-sponsored television network developed for international audiences. It broadcasts in English, Spanish and Arabic to reach over 600 million people in over 100 countries. It was the second most-watched foreign news channel in the United States in 2011 and the fourth most-watched rolling news channel in Britain in 2012 (RT, 2014b). The channel’s mission statement asserts that “RT provides an alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints international audience with Russian viewpoint.” However, as it was mentioned before, the network has been criticized for having a distinctive pro-Russian bias. Bullough (2013) argues that RT is a powerful tool used by Kremlin to shape the public opinion about Putin and Russia not only domestically, but also abroad (Bullough, 2013b). The channel is subsidized by the state and in 2012 Putin personally refused the proposed cut in the channel’s budget, thus maintaining unconditional state support. Channel’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan when describing the editorial policy dubbed RT “the anti-Fox News.” Bullough observes that this approach has attracted international audiences who got disappointed in their national corporate media (Bullough, 2013b).
Data population
The comparative framing analysis is based on news stories and opinion pieces from RT and CNN which mention Putin and were published during and after the Crimean crisis. RT was chosen because it is a government funded network, which delivers the Russian view of the world, whereas CNN represents an American perspective on the world. News stories for the analysis are collected for the period from 11 March 2014 to 11 April 2014. This timeframe includes the following stages of the Crimean crisis: Crimea referendum preparation, referendum, Putin’s address to Senate asking to join Crimea, Putin signing the annexation bill and reaction of international community that followed.
Articles were collected using LexisNexis database (for CNN) and the official web-site archives (for RT, as it is not available through LexisNexis), by setting the above mentioned dates and “Putin” as a key word in the search criteria. The news stories and opinion pieces from each network were saved in separate documents. The final dataset included a total of 95 articles for CNN (62 news stories and 33 opinion pieces) and 152 articles for RT (116 news stories and 36 opinion pieces) divided into four sub-sets.
Data analysis
Articles were analyzed using qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA, version 11.0.8. After importing data in the program the initial reading of sampled articles with particular focus on key words, expressions, characteristics, quotes, catch phrases and headlines used in relation to Putin was conducted. All other elements pertaining to the news stories themselves were omitted and not taken into consideration.
During the second stage all Putin related segments were identified and coded. Two approaches were implemented to formulate the codes. If a segment contained a concrete characteristic, an adjective or otherwise that was used to describe Putin, this word itself was registered as a code. If a segment did not contain a particular word that described Putin but still contained information relevant to his persona, it was summarized or interpreted by using a word or a short phrase that then constituted the name of the code. All code names were kept relatively short ranging from one to seven words in length. Some segments contained attributes of more than one code and were coded accordingly. This resulted in a non-systematic compilation of codes.
CNN news data was coded first and all codes that resulted from this coding were assigned blue color. RT news data was coded afterwards and all new codes were assigned green color,
overlapping coding remained green. Then the blue was used again for new codes in CNN opinion data and green for RT opinion data. This was done in order to track the dominance of CNN and RT originated codes in each document.
The third stage involved analyzing the developed non-systematic compilation of codes and identifying the main themes. For this purpose the codes were arranged hierarchically and combined into categories based on their relevance to a particular theme. This resulted in a coherent hierarchy with several primary nodes that were interpreted as narrative frames.
Therefore each frame consists of multiple codes, which were identified in coding segments across datasets. The frames were then compared and discussed within the existing political context.
Results
After inductive content analysis a total of 1418 segments that contained information, description or evaluation of Putin’s persona and/or actions were identified and coded. This resulted in formulation of 276 codes. These codes were then organized hierarchically and arranged as 12 narrative frames that are used by CNN and RT in relation to Putin (see Appendix A). The following section contains description of each frame with their underlying hierarchies of characteristics that form the narrative in which Putin is portrayed.
Based on characteristics found in each narrative frame, they are classified as relatively positive, relatively negative or mixed, and presented in groups. Positive narratives include ‘able politician’ and ‘target of unjust criticism’; negative narratives include ‘aggressive leader,’ ‘annexationist,’ ‘autocrat,’ ‘enfant terrible of world politics,’ ‘untamed,’ ‘liar,’ and ‘imperialist;’ the mixed include ‘anti-west politician,’ ‘populist’ and ‘legitimacy upholder.’
Able politician
“In diplomacy, like in sales, success often depends on making your adversaries believe they proposed the result you wanted. By that measure, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have closed the sale on annexing Crimea from Ukraine,” one of CNN political analysis pieces opens (Cohen, 2014). This is one of the manifestatons of ‘able politician’ frame through which Putin is portrayed as an active and mostly successful politician. He performs certain functions: holds negotiations, argues Russia’s position and signs decrees. Besides the functional qualities such as ‘acting in official capacity’ and ‘being a powerful orator’ this frame includes leadership characteristics such as ‘ambitious,’ ‘determined’ and ‘willing to take responsibility.’ One of the indicators of his political abilities is that he ‘is taken seriously by the EU’ and has ‘an invincible will.’ On top of this Putin is described as ‘the defender of Russian position,’ who ‘guards Russia’s interests’ and ‘consolidates the country.’ Another dimension of this frame is formed by personal qualities that are divided into ‘rational’ and ‘strong.’ Rational includes qualities like ‘reasonable,’ ‘thorough,’ ‘strategic thinker,’ while ‘strong’ is supplemented by ‘undaunted’ and ‘sportive.’ This frame is a lot more prevalent in RT discourse, rather that CNN, with datasets having 74 and 32 codings accordingly.
Target of unjust criticism
“The EU spin on Western corporate media is that relentlessly demonized President Putin wants to “destabilize” Ukraine and create a Russian sphere of influence in southern and eastern Ukraine as far as Odessa. Oh yes, and annex Transnistria,” reads RT opinion piece (Escobar, 2014). Within this frame Putin is portrayed as ‘demonized and undeservingly isolated by the West,’ ‘depicted as an aggressor,’ ‘biased against in media’ and ‘labeled as propagandist.’ It is also being stressed that he is ‘not aggressive towards the West,’ ‘pro peaceful methods’
‘nonmilitant,’ and ‘forced to act the way he does.’ This narrative is the only RT specific frame (35 codings), which is completely absent in CNN data.
Aggressor
“The contrast between this approach and that of President Putin could not be starker. Putin appears to see the world through a unique prism of winner takes all and loser loses everything. He represents a 19th century “law of the jungle” mentality, in the words of Angela Merkel. This makes Russia an altogether more dangerous neighbor, ” another CNN article reads (Niblett, 2014). The core of this frame is Putin’s militaristic rhetoric and aggressive actions. Militaristic theme is touched upon when he is described as ‘coercive,’ ‘belligerent,’ ‘dangerous’ and ‘pugnacious.’ Another dimension is his regional aggression towards Georgia, Ukraine and Europe. Logically enough, this aggression leads to Putin ‘triggering crisis and conflicts,’ and his general ‘not willing to cooperate’ attitude. Another layer of this narrative is a set of strong personal characteristics used to describe him, such as ‘bandit,’ ‘thug,’ ‘thief’ and ‘bastard murderer.’ This layer is very CNN specific, with six out of seven codings originating from the CNN dataset. Generally this frame is also more prevalent in CNN, with 138 codings in total, against 11 identified in RT dataset.
Annexationist
“Russia has finalized the legal process of taking Crimea under its sovereignty, as
President Putin signed a law amending the Russian constitution to reflect the transition,” reads a story published by RT (RT, 2014a). CNN puts it differently: “…[Biden] called Putin’s moves to add Crimea to the Russian Federation a “blatant, blatant violation of international law” and “nothing more than a land grab,” reads another CNN article (Cohen & Watkins, 2014). Given that the explored timeframe spans the Crimean crisis, annexationist is another salient frame through which Putin is portrayed. A variety of terms is used in this narrative, ranging from
‘invader,’ ‘land grabber’ and ‘separatist’ typical for CNN discourse to the politician who ‘accepted,’ ‘joined’ and ‘integrated’ Crimea typical for RT discourse. Generally this frame is twice as dominant in CNN data compared to RT with 62 and 29 codings accordingly.
Autocrat
“Putin's closest associates, the men who have enriched themselves in his autocratic system, will swear their support,” previses another CNN article (Ghitis, 2014a). Putin is described as an autocrat on many occasions and this narrative can also be subdivided into four sub-narratives. First come all typical characteristics of an authoritarian ruler such as ‘repressing political opposition and media,’ ‘supporting repressive laws,’ ‘opposing reform,’ ‘afraid of rule of law’, ‘stern,’ ‘iron-fisted’ and ‘dictator.’ There is also a dimension from which Putin appears as ‘creator of anti-democratic state with no values,’ ‘creator of corrupt regime’ and also creator of a specific ideology referred to as ‘Putin doctrine.’ Another part of this narrative is Putin being portrayed as a ‘leader of elite group’ involving high ranking officials and oligarchs, and also him being loyal to this group of people, who are considered his friends. The final dimension is the depiction of Putin as an ‘omnipotent’ leader, who is ‘playing by his own rules,’ is the center of power and attention and in many cases is a ‘sole decision maker.’ This narrative is also a lot more typical for CNN data, compared to RT with 155 and 44 codings accordingly.
“Enfant terrible” of the world politics
“Putin can also take a page from other bad guys who didn’t obey existing rules. Maybe their successful experiences have taught Vladimir Putin that it's OK to play an enfant terrible of the world's politics. Just look at Fidel Castro, Kim Jong Un and even Bashar al-Assad – they are all doing quite well, aren't they?” reads another CNN opinion piece (Volkov, 2014). This
narrative of Putin being an obnoxious child in global politics is also composed of several sub-narratives. The first one refers to his irrationality, him being ‘controversial,’ ‘incapable of
thinking straight,’ ‘hard to understand,’ as well as ‘applying twisted logic,’ ‘saying nonsense’ and ‘having inferiority complex.’ The second layer of this narrative is about Putin, as one of CNN reporters put it, being “drunk on power” (Lister, 2014). It also involves him being
‘uncontrollable,’ ‘unpredictable’ and ‘stubborn.’ The last dimension portrays Putin as an ‘unwise strategist,’ who ‘violates international law,’ ‘misreads the west,’ implements ‘irrational economic strategy,’ undermines Russia’s security and interests, is ‘strategically paranoid’ and ‘doomed to fail.’ This frame is dominant almost only in CNN dataset with its 69 codings against only 2 found in RT data.
Imperialist
“Indeed, there is a growing danger that the combination of strong words and weak actions (the essence of symbolic liberalism) will lead Putin to believe he can continue to incrementally rebuild the Russian Empire by gradually absorbing various pieces around the periphery,”
Gingrich writes in an opinion piece for CNN (Gingrich, 2014). Putin’s imperialistic ambitions are reflected quite saliently in the way he is covered and this narrative also consists of several layers. The first dimension combines Putin’s imperialistic ambitions, with his expansionist strategy and the role of ‘collector of Russian lands’ and ‘creator of Eurasian union.’ The second encompasses the nostalgia for Soviet times and refers to Putin building another ‘iron curtain’ through his politics of isolation and ‘Russia has its own way’ rhetoric. In this narrative he is also being described as a ‘Soviet style politician’ and a ‘KGB man.’ Another layer of this frame is Putin portrayed as ‘revanchist’ who ‘goes backwards’ by returning to ‘Cold War,’ trying to ‘redesign world order,’ and ‘rewrite history’. This narrative is predominantly present in CNN discourse compared to RT with 95 and 6 codings accordingly.
Liar
“In this twilight zone of make-believe, Russian troops invade after removing the insignias from their uniforms and Putin explains, “You can go to a store and buy a uniform,” claiming they are local “self-defense forces.” Maybe Crimean shops also sell machine guns and armored
personnel carriers. In this world of double-speak and misinformation, Moscow is manipulating the message, intimidating, twisting facts and lying – the more absurd the propaganda the better,” reads another CNN piece on Crimean crisis (Ghitis, 2014b). This narrative is composed of Putin being ‘not trustworthy,’ ‘manipulating’ and ‘deceptive’ as well as a ‘propagandist,’ who ‘distorts history’ and ‘demonizes the West.’ This is a smaller scale narrative frame, which is interwoven in CNN discourse (36 codings) and completely absent in RT discourse.
Untamed
“If an emboldened Putin now makes the mistake of thinking he can extend his modern-day form of rolling Anschluss into these areas, he must be knocked back very hard indeed,” cries out another CNN story (Tisdall, 2014). Putin often appears in the context where an action is called upon to curb him, by various methods including ‘isolating,’ ‘containing,’ and ‘punishing’ him. This is often substantiated by portraying Putin as a frightening actor, who is ‘harsh,’
‘angry,’ ‘enraged,’ ‘anxious,’ ‘frustrated,’ ‘intimidating’ and ‘threatening.’ On top of this Putin is ‘oblivious to sanctions,’ ‘unfazed’ and ‘defiant’ in his reaction to the attempts to tame him. Another layer of this narrative refers to the fact that Putin is a ‘nuclear powered’ ‘reason for concern,’ who threatens to cut gas supply to Europe and therefore ‘needs to be taken seriously.’ This narrative is almost four times more prevalent in CNN data compared to RT with 100 and 28 codings accordingly.
Anti-west politician
“Putin places the current effort to isolate and pressure Russia in a centuries-old pattern of Western hostility,” explains Putin’s mind one of the CNN opinion pieces (Gingrich, 2014). The contraposition of Putin to the general West is quite salient in both RT and CNN narratives. This frame is formed by four dimensions. The first is a general West rhetoric including NATO and opposing EU-Ukraine unification sentiments. The second one refers to Putin’s anti-Americanism, including characteristics such as ‘threatened by the U.S.,’ ‘provoked by the U.S.’ and ‘U.S. enemy.’ The third dimension is summarized as ‘fighting the West back,’ which includes the ‘accusing, criticizing, and blaming the West’ rhetoric, as well as Putin being
depicted as a ‘counterbalance to the West,’ ‘destroying western hypocrisies,’ ‘not bending to the West,’ ‘creating problems for the West,’ ‘supporting Assad’ and ‘being sarcastic towards the West.’ The fourth dimension refers to Putin being ‘criticized by the West’ and being ‘pressured by the West,’ the latter is very salient in the light of sanctions against Russia adopted by the U.S. and the EU. Generally this frame is also a lot more prevalent in CNN data than RT with 127 and 67 codings accordingly.
Legitimacy upholder
“Putin drew attention to the inability and unwillingness of the current Kiev authorities to curb rampant ultra-nationalist and radical groups, destabilizing and terrorizing civilians,
including Russian-speaking population, and our fellow citizens,” RT quotes the official Kremlin statement. “Vladimir Putin also addressed the Ukrainian people, urging them not to believe that Russia is looking to split the country,” refers to Putin’s actions another RT reporter (RT, 2014d, 2014e). One of the most salient and multidimensional narrative frames refers to Putin’s attempts to maintain his legitimacy on the international scene. First of all, he is quoted as refuting the Cold War rhetoric and ‘denying military intentions.’ Another layer is added when it is mentioned that
he ‘respects partners, contractual agreements and international treaties,’ as well as ‘honors obligations.’
Another dimension refers to all support and approval received by Putin from other countries or political actors, such as the BRICS and China in particular, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and some groups and individuals in Europe. It is also stressed that he is an ‘ally of Europe’ who supports ties with this region. The next layer of this narrative frame refers to Putin both trying to and actually justifying his actions. This is achieved by portraying him as a ‘savior,’
‘peacekeeper,’ ‘terrorism fighter,’ ‘guarantor of security,’ and protector of Crimean Tatars, ethnic Russians who live abroad and eastern Ukrainians. On top of this he criticizes Ukraine for the current crisis and blames the illegitimate government in Kiev for escalating it. Besides, he also provides historical justification for annexing Crimea and criticizes previous Russian rulers who allowed its separation from Russia. In the context of Crimean crisis Putin is also portrayed as ‘Ukraine helper’ who respects the country and is ‘willing to cooperate with Ukraine,’ is ‘urging real help for Ukraine’ from EU and the US and is the ‘sole carrier of Ukraine burden.’ The final dimension of this frame is Putin’s ‘willingness to discuss,’ which is expressed in his ‘partaking in diplomatic efforts,’ ‘initiating the dialogue,’ ‘proposing to build a common European house Russia-west alliance’ as well as cooperation with NATO, US and European businesses. This frame is more prevalent in RT dataset compared to CNN with 127 and 84 codings accordingly. Populist
“Though condemned by the West, the Russian leader was at the height of his popularity hours after the annexation. Crowds gathered at the capital to sing and dance. “Vladimir,
Vladimir, we love you!” one woman said, “We bow to you.” To some Russians, it symbolized a defeat against the West,” observes abother CNN reporter (Karimi, 2014). Populist is a
he ‘opposes repressions,’ ‘follows people’s will,’ ‘protects civil rights and freedoms,’ ‘respects multinationality’ and is generally ‘concerned’ for people. The next layer refers to him being ‘admired for his deeds,’ as well as being a ‘god like’ ‘hero.’ Another level describes his personal qualities: he is ‘benevolent,’ ‘thankful,’ ‘kind,’ ‘patient,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘honest’ and ‘proud of Russia.’ On top of this there is a layer of Putin’s popularity in Russia: he is ‘trusted by people,’ ‘supported by Russian elites,’ ‘popular in Crimea.’ On a more spiritual level he ‘resonates with the Russians’ because he is ‘close to Russia's heroes’ and ‘appeals to Russian soul.’ “Putin in many senses, on many levels, crystallizes the Russian national consciousness,” biographer Alexander Korobko told CNN. “For the past 100 years perhaps, we have never had a leader who would appeal to the Russian soul ... as much as Putin,” reads another CNN article (Smith & Eshchenko, 2014). This frame is the only relatively equally distributed one, with 49 and 41 codings for CNN and RT data accordingly.
Cross media comparison
Since the frames were formulated based on the characteristics and key words found in both RT and CNN data, it is important to establish which frames are more dominant and typical in each category of content. Even though two datasets somewhat differ in number of articles (RT – 152 and CNN – 95) the datasets are still comparable, because they cover the same time period. Besides, even though there are more RT articles than CNN, CNN data contains more coded segments (468 and 950 accordingly). This may have happened because CNN is a lot more explicit in its reporting on and evaluation of Putin’s actions, while RT is trying to abstain from providing clear assessment unless they are positive or quotations put in context.
As illustrated by the numbers mentioned above and the visual graphs below, some of the frames are more prevalent in CNN discourse, whereas others are more typical for RT. Figure 1
illustrates the general distribution of frames based on the number of coded segments for each frame. The size and color of circles illustrate the presence of the frame: the bigger the circle and the more red color it has, the more prevalent is the frame.
Figure 1. General distribution of frames, symbolic representation.
Figure 2 illustrates general distribution of frames based on the number of coded segments for each frame, showing the actual numbers of frames instead of visual representation.
Figure 2. General distribution of frames, representation based on number of coded segments
Figure 3 illustrates which frames are more salient for RT and CNN datasets. It uses the same size and color approach as Figure 1, only representation is based on the number of codings for each dataset, not the total number of frames.
Figure 3. Distribution of frames in each dataset
Figure 4 illustrates in which dataset each frame is more prevalent. It uses the same size and color approach as Figures 1 and 3, only representation is based on the number of codings for each frame, not the total number of frames.
Figure 4. Distribution of frames across datasets
Based on this data, it is clear that RT discourse is dominated by ‘able politician,’ ‘target of unjust criticism,’ ‘populist’ and ‘legitimacy upholder’ narratives, with the latter being the most dominant one. Whereas ‘aggressive leader,’ ‘annexationist,’ ‘anti-West politician,’ ‘autocrat,’ ‘enfant terrible of world politics,’ ‘untamed,’ ‘liar,’ ‘imperialist’ and ‘populist’ are more salient
in CNN discourse. Among these, ‘autocrat,’ ‘anti-West’ and ‘aggressive leader’ are the most frequently appearing narratives in CNN dataset.
Since there are significant differences between general news and opinion pieces, Figure 5 illustrates the salience of each frame in four sets of data, with subdivision of data into general news and opinion pieces categories for both RT and CNN. It is clear from this graph that ‘target of unjust criticism’ is a lot more dominant in RT opinion set rather than regular news, possibly because in a more open format it is allowed to go further in justifying Putin’s actions. On the other hand, CNN opinion dataset is dominated by ‘enfant terrible,’ ‘untamed,’ ‘liar,’ and ‘imperialist’ frames, whereas in CNN news materials these narratives are somewhat less
dominant. It can also be explained by the format and ability of opinion writers to make stronger statements compared to regular news reporters.
Figure 5. Distribution of frames across five datasets
Based on presented data and differences in the distribution of narrative frames, it is possible to conclude that there is enough evidence to support both hypotheses:
H1: CNN frames Putin as an authoritarian ruler and demonizes his political image – generally supported, since the frames ‘aggressive leader,’ ‘annexationist,’ ‘anti-west politician,’
‘autocrat,’ ‘enfant terrible of world politics,’ ‘untamed,’ ‘liar,’ and ‘imperialist’ are prevalent in the dataset.
H2: RT portrays Putin as a national heroic leader and justifies his actions – generally supported, since the frames ‘able politician,’ ‘target of unjust criticism,’ ‘legitimacy upholder’ and ‘populist’ are prevalent in the dataset.
Discussion
This study focused on location of frames in two of four locations described by Entman: communicator and the text (Entman, 1993). Twelve narrative frames were identified in these locations that fit quite logically in the confrontational political and media environment during and after the Crimean crisis. The developed framework with apparent differences in distribution and prevalence of frames in two explored discourses allows answering the research question: certain differences in the way Putin is portrayed and framed by Russian and American media during the Crimean Crisis can be identified.
Some differences are apparent from the distribution of positive and negative narrative frames. Both positive narratives dominate the RT discourse, which constructs a dignified image of an able politician and portrays him as a victim of unfair criticism from western foes. All negative narratives are prevalent in CNN discourse, which contains open criticism of Putin’s politics and his governing style. This apparent polarization of negative versus positive in Putin’s image with corresponding prevalence in CNN and RT data is the major difference in the way he is being portrayed.
The mixed narratives are present in both datasets, but usually put in context consistent with each medium’s agenda and thus also contain differences. For instance, ‘anti-west politician’ is usually defined as something negative by CNN, whereas RT may go as far as to praise Putin’s
ability to ‘counterbalance’ and ‘fight back’ the West. Similar logic applies to ‘populist’ –in RT dataset Putin is portrayed as benevolent and loved ruler who cares for people, whereas in CNN discourse he is criticized for populist policies and inexplicable popularity among Russians. ‘Legitimacy upholder’ is also a contradictory narrative, which in CNN context is more focused on Putin’s attempts to justify his actions, whereas RT puts a lot more focus on Putin’s willingness to discuss and cooperate. The same is true for ‘annexationist’ – in RT’s words Putin does not annex, but joins Crimea, he is concerned not with regional expansion, but with establishing historical justice, he is not aggressive towards the neighboring country, but is acting fiercely to protect fellow Russians abroad. These subtle differences in rhetoric are scattered around the data, but when put together they create two very different images of Putin, even though sometimes they are located within one theme.
Despite these dominating tendencies, relatively negative frames do manifest in RT discourse, and positive frames do manifest in CNN discourse. No matter how sharp the crisis is, media environment is not black and white and cannot be divided into two distinct categories of negative and positive – there is a multitude of fuzzy gray areas in both cases. Criticism is sometimes interwoven in RT data, often to be refuted in the next paragraph, whereas CNN in its zeal for objectivity does present aspects contributing to positive perception of Putin, even if they are immediately followed by harsh criticism. Yet in the American discourse Putin is frequently portrayed as an aggressive annexationist, enfant terrible of world politics with unjustified imperialistic ambitions, a lying autocrat and populist in one body, who needs to be tamed and who is desperately trying to maintain his legitimacy. From RT discourse he appears as a successful and strong political leader who has become the center of criticism for his assertive
actions mainly intended to protect fellow Russians. This is how the differences in distribution of frames in CNN and RT create two different portraits of the same politician.
Since the previous literature focusing on Putin’s portrayals is scarce, this study
contributed to the academic discussion by focusing on him as a political persona, as well as by exploring the differences that occur in his portrayals due to the nature and origin of particular media outlets. Some narratives have layers that are consistent with Foxall’s (2012) findings, for instance, “militarized masculinity” suggested by Foxall is consistent with ‘strong’ and
‘militaristic,’ “action man” with ‘initiating action’ and “father figure” with ‘caring about people’ (Foxall, 2012). Yet it is important to note that Foxall explored visual rhetoric pertaining to the vacation photographs published by Kremlin, which can be interpreted quite differently compared to the linguistic discourse that exists in media environment in the time of crisis.
This study also continues academic discussion on the role of media at the time of international crisis. It is consistent with Thussu’s findings who argued that CNN’s coverage of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was framed through the lens of U.S. interests and without sufficient criticism, thus altering the view of crisis in Kosovo (Thussu, 2000). As it was illustrated, similar framing tendencies are found in portrayals of Putin by both CNN and RT.
The results also demonstrate that objectivity in journalism is a vague concept, and therefore contribute to the ongoing academic discussion (Hackett, 1984; Maras, 2013; Ryan, 2001; Thussu, 2000). Even if a media outlet claims to be professional and objective (both RT and CNN do that, as it was discussed earlier) it is very much affected by political situation and
foreign affairs agenda, with perception of certain politicians as friends or foes being reflected in media discourses. In Putin’s case this effect is quite straightforward: CNN perceives him as an adversary and therefore uses its power to undermine his political image, whereas RT tirelessly
finds facts and arguments to support Putin and ultimately creates his idealized image. With Putin being a controversial and complex figure, the truth is not likely to be found on either of these extremes.
The societal implication of the results may be important, since media contribute to shaping public opinion and the results demonstrate a clear bias in media coverage (McCombs, Holbert, & Kiousis, 2011). The distinctively negative light in which Putin is being portrayed by CNN might contribute to his image abroad, both among regular citizens and politicians, and as such would require certain action to be taken to curb his aggression. Another societal implication might be the clever use of propaganda that is in place with RT. It might have a similar effect, only in opposite direction, with audiences being brainwashed and exposed to carefully selected and framed information. The RT’s meticulous work to bring up the good in Putin’s actions may result in a more positive perception of him and his politics, both in Russia and abroad. The results provide some evidence that RT is indeed the Russian version of Fox News, the network much criticized for the lack of balance in its reporting and dubbed a “propaganda machine” (Brock & Rabin-Havt, 2012, p. iv; Bullough, 2013a).
Another effect of framing could occur on the audience level, if the propagandistic
tendencies become too apparent and obvious to media consumers they might lose the remains of trust, become alienated, quit consuming the mainstream media, and, for example, drift to the social media for more reliable (even if more subjective) and truthful information.
These notions need to be substantiated by further research, since this study did not focus on the mechanisms behind state propaganda, which might also be a worthy endeavor, taking into consideration Russia's politics of isolation and growing confrontation between Moscow and Washington that followed after annexation of Crimea. Neither did it focus on the effects that identified differences might have on public opinion, particular individuals, or international
politics (as Entman’s receiver and culture framing locations were not included in the analysis). Another direction is to explore the role media play during international conflicts by framing issues in particular way consistent with their countries’ political interests. It may also be interesting to compare visual cues that are used to create political image of Putin, since media environment surrounding him is highly visualized.
Limitations
External validity is relatively high, since the results are consistent with the present political situation and power balancing between the U.S. and Russia that has become more evident after the Crimean crisis. However, the extent to which the research results are
generalizable would depend on particular media outlets. It was assumed that CNN presents a generally pro-American view of the world, while RT is clearly pro-Russian. Whether these results can be generalized to the whole media landscape in any of two countries is debatable, since there is a multitude of media that may have various agendas and thus use different frames to portray Putin. Inter coder reliability is low, since there was only one coder and some of the codes were summarized and interpreted subjectively. Another limitation of this study is a limited number of media outlets that were studied. It is also important to understand that visual components of these stories were not taken into consideration
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