1
“Peace Now”
As seen by three Israeli historians
Table of Contents
Introduction
P. 3 - 5
Methodology
P. 6 - 9
Israel: Historic Background
P. 10 - 14
- Ottoman / British Mandate period - Political Zionism - Establishment of Israel - Israeli society
Israel: Historiography
P. 15 - 18
- Zionist historiography - New Historians- Peace movement historiography - Peace Now historiography
The Israeli Peace Movement and Peace Now
P. 19 - 25
Biographies authors
P. 26 - 29
- Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer
1978: The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations and Camp David Accords
P. 30 - 39
- Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer
- Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion
2
1982: The First Lebanon War
P. 40 - 45
- Reuven Kaminer - Tamar S. Hermann - Atalia Omer
- Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion
The First and Second Intifada
P. 46 - 52
- Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer
- Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion
Conclusion
P. 53 - 56
3
Introduction
“Peace Now? I don’t think their office is around here…”, said a man on the balcony of an apartment building in a residential neighborhood in Tel Aviv. I had made my way from Jerusalem to visit the office of Israel’s most well-known peace organization, Peace Now (or in Hebrew: Shalom Achshav), though finding the office proved to be more difficult. I was on my way to interview a staff-member, it was mid-summer 2014, Operation Protective Edge was taking place, and the atmosphere was tense. Eventually I found the unmarked office of Peace Now in the basement of the same building where I had asked directions earlier. The man I had spoken to just before had unknowingly been living above the office of Israel’s most well-known peace organization.
During a prolonged stay in Jerusalem in 2014 my interest in Israeli peace organizations was sparked by Haaretz newspaper. Haaretz, Israel’s most politically left newspaper, featured a noticeable amount of articles and advertisements that expressed severe criticism of, and opposition to, Israeli policies regarding the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Israeli treatment of Palestinians in these territories. Frequent mention was made of peace organizations such as Peace Now. When
contrasting this with the Jerusalem Post, a right-leaning Israeli newspaper, there was a noticeable difference in articles that were published and views expressed. Considering their diverging ideological foundations these differences in tone and content is understandable, yet it showed a schism in Israeli society that I, as a foreigner with relatively little previous insight into Israeli society, had not seen before. The existence of an array of Israeli organizations that diametrically opposed Israeli policies in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip led my perception of Israel as a monolithic entity to crumble, and rightly so. The existence of peace organizations in Israel raise the question as to how and why certain individuals are critical of Israeli policies regarding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where others are not. Also, it raises the question as to how and why peace organizations were formed and what they have achieved. Of these organizations that voice opposition to Israeli policies, Peace Now is the most well-known and the largest, which is why it has my specific interest.
Peace Now is part of the Israeli peace movement, an umbrella term for a group of Israeli organizations that are ideologically diverse but have one thing in common: the aim to increase rapprochement between Israelis and Palestinians and end the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A broad-based Israeli peace movement emerged in the late 1970’s. The few Israeli peace initiatives before the late 1970s were based on the view that only the emergence of democratic, non-hostile governments in neighboring countries could bring a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: ‘since Israel is surrounded by non-democratic, hostile, states which wish to destroy it … — the argument
4 went—, there was not much Israel could do to advance peace; rather, it had to mobilize most of its resources to ensure its survival.’ 1 When Israel’s largest, most powerful neighbor Egypt revealed itself
to be a potential partner for peace and negotiations commenced between the two countries, the Israeli public realized the viable and potentially historic opportunity for peace. After a hopeful start in 1977, the negotiations stalled. It was in the wake of these difficulties that Peace Now emerged and played a leading role in mobilizing large parts of the Israeli public to encourage the government not to miss a chance at peace. Through organizing mass demonstrations Peace Now consolidated its name as a major player in the newly developed broad-based peace movement. It was Peace Now’s ability to mobilize the Israeli public to attend demonstrations that characterized its presence on the protest scene.
After I had found the Peace Now office, I learned from a staff member that the biggest demonstration in Israel’s history had not been in opposition to one of Israel’s many wars or in support of peace, but had been a demonstration in 2011 against the rising cost of living. After expressing surprise that, in a country where security issues and impending dangers are featured in the news daily, this was the issue that most people would demonstrate against, I was informed that ‘people in Israel don’t necessarily feel the occupation of the West Bank, what they do feel is their rent increasing.’ At present, a waning of public support is characteristic for most Israeli peace
organizations, as their credibility has been systematically undermined and damaged by themselves and by, most significantly, the failing of the Oslo Accords, which destroyed the hope many Israelis had for peace with the Palestinians. This is also reflected in the relatively low level of political influence which Peace Now boasts nowadays. Considering Peace Now is widely credited as being the largest Israeli peace movement, and the organization boasting impressive achievements such as organizing rallies in 1978 and 1982 that hundreds of thousands of people flocked to, the organization has relatively little influence nowadays. It has redirected its policies towards watchdog tactics and monitoring rather than mass-demonstrations.
Oddly, relatively little has been written about Peace Now, which is remarkable considering Peace Now is widely credited as being the largest Israeli peace organization with impressive achievements such as organizing rallies in 1978 and 1982 that hundreds of thousands of people flocked to. Equally remarkable is the contrast between Peace Now’s initial surge of support from the general public in the late 1970’s and the widespread disregard with which the organization is treated today. It is against this background that this thesis aims to investigate the treatment of Peace Now in the works
5 of three Israeli historians, namely Reuven Kaminer, Tamar S. Hermann and Atalia Omer (hereafter Kaminer, Hermann and Omer). In doing so, this thesis will subsequently draw conclusions on the Israeli scholarly perception of Peace Now’s appeal, its activities and its impact.
The research question at the heart of this thesis is: ‘What has been written about Peace Now since its emergence?
To focus the research, the historians’ treatment of Peace Now will be analyzed in the context of three specific watershed moments in the recent history of the state of Israel. These moments are: the 1978 peace negotiations with Egypt and subsequent Camp David Accords, the First Lebanon War in 1982 and the First and Second Intifada. The thesis is, accordingly, divided into 3 chapters,
preceded by a chapter on the historical background to the state of Israel, a chapter on the historical background to the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now, and a chapter on the historiographies of both the state of Israel and the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now. Lasty, the thesis is finalized with an overall conclusion.
6
Methodology
Focus and scope
This thesis is focused on answering the following question: ‘What has been written about Peace Now since its emergence?’ In answering this question this thesis shall conduct historiographic research by focusing on how Peace Now has been portrayed in three works written by Israeli historians. By investigating these works this thesis will gain insight into how Peace Now is portrayed by these historians. Specifically, the historians’ portrayal of the origin, dynamics and outcome Peace Now’s activities will be investigated. The three works which shall be form the basis of this thesis are:
- Reuven Kaminer: ‘The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada’ (1996).
- Tamar S. Hermann: ‘The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream’ (2009).
- Atalia Omer: ‘When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism and Justice’ (2013).
The works of Kaminer et al. were selected firstly because each of them is a professional historian and published by well-established academic presses. Secondly, the works focus solely on the Israeli peace movement and not on the broader history of Israel or general overviews on conflict resolution, in which Peace Now is sporadically mentioned but not elaborated upon. Therefore these works address the Israeli peace movement specifically and as a result Peace Now receives significant attention. Thirdly, the similar focus of the work provides an opportunity to draw comparisons and reveal contrasts between the respective approaches and analyses of these three historians.
To focus this thesis, Peace Now’s activities during three specific events in Israel’s history will be researched. These events have been selected because they constitute major political events in described by Kaminer et al. as watershed moments in Israel’s history, during which Peace Now played a part. The three events are:
- The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and Camp David Accords (1978-1980) - The First Lebanon War (1982)
7 In order to further focus the authors’ treatment of Peace Now during these events, a theory of collective action will be applied. This will be done to deepen insights gained into Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayal of Peace Now during these three events.
Theories of Collective Action
To further investigate how Kaminer et al. have approached Peace Now during the events mentioned above, this thesis will keep two approaches to collective action in mind. One of these is the approach advocated by Sidney Tarrow in his National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and
Research in Western Europe and the United States’, which argues that ‘the dynamics of social collective action are best understood in relation to the political process.2 The other approach is
advocated by Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes and Russel Spears in their article ‘Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives’, wherein they identify three socio-psychological perspectives on collective action in the context of protest.3
As Tarrow argues in his work ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States’, the study of collective behavior and social movements mirrors political events that take place. Tarrow argues that though there are differences between social movement and political groups, ‘the dynamics of social collective action are best understood in relation to the political process’.4 The study of collective action and social movement gained
momentum from the 1960s and 1970s onward due to the so-called ‘disorderly politics of the 1960s’ in Europe and the United States. In Europe a ‘new social movement’ approach developed, focused on the structural causes of social movements, as well as on the collective identities they expressed and on their relation to advanced capitalism. In the United States a ‘resource mobilization’ approach emerged, focusing on individual attitude, the groups that organized mass protest and at the form of action they undertook.5 The European new social movement approach did not pay much attention to
politics, it neglected the realm of politics in the study of social movements. The resource mobilization approach which developed in the United States focused on the psychological aspects of collective action and did not devote significant attention to the political process of collective action.6 In the
2 S. Tarrow. "National Politics And Collective Action: Recent Theory And Research In Western Europe And The United
States." Annual Review of Sociology 14.1 (1988) P. 422.
3 M. Van Zomeren, T. Postmes and R. Spears. "Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A
Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-psychological Perspectives."Psychological Bulletin 134.4 (2008) P. 504.
4 Tarrow, P. 422. 5 Idem, P. 423. 6 Idem, P. 425.
8 course of the 1980s there developed an awareness among political scientists and sociologists in the United States and Europe that ‘conventional politics might provide the opportunity structure for collective actors’.7
Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears disregard the political aspect furthered by Tarrow and focus on three socio-psychological perspectives on collective action. The three key perspectives that predict collective action are stated as being: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and a sense of social identity. In order to further clarify these terms, injustice is defined as ‘perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes. … feelings of injustice tend to be based on subjective perceptions of group-based
inequity (i.e., some inequality or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate)’.8 Efficacy refers to ‘a
sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem’, which includes political efficacy in this case.9 By social identity ‘the socially shared understandings of what it
means to be a group member, and this typically includes stereotypes of in- and out-groups in relation to each other as well as appreciations of the relative status of those groups’ is meant.10
In this context, collective action is defined as ‘expressions of protest against collective perceived disadvantages’.11 The definition encompasses attitudinal support for protest as well as the protest
intentions or behaviors of members of a social group that are directed at removing the perceived underlying causes of the group’s disadvantage or problem (examples such as signing a petition or participating in a demonstration are given).12 The model developed by van Zomeren, Postmes and
Spears applies to Peace Now, as it is an organization that expresses opposition to perceived disadvantages through actions such as demonstrations, directed at eradicating the perceived disadvantage.
The perspectives (or: predictors) of perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and social identity produce, sometimes in combination with each other, different levels of collective action. It is important to highlight that these predictors are defined as perceived and therefore as subjective. Collective action is at times approached as a response to objective (political, non socio-psychological) disadvantage, but Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears emphasize that though these objective
conditions are important to consider, their connection to collective action, popular disturbance and mass violence is ‘elusive and weak at best.’13
7 Tarrow, P. 427.
8 Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, P. 512. 9 Idem, P. 513.
10 Idem, P. 505. 11 Idem, P . 512. 12 Idem. 13 Idem, P. 505.
9 Applying these theories to Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s works is a strategy employed to find specific characteristics in their accounts of Peace Now during these three watershed moments in Israel’s history. These theories, when applied, will provide further insight into answering the research question as to what these historians’ portrayed as the origin, dynamics and outcome Peace Now’s activities. Hopefully applying this research will yield valuable results and contribute to the study of Peace Now and to the study of the Israeli peace movement in general.
Considerations
It is necessary to bear certain considerations in mind. This historiographical research is not focused on obtaining an objective ‘truth’. The aim is to identify the historians’ views regarding the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities. All three historians are Israeli nationals who have been involved with the peace movement, which undoubtedly indicates a political stance regarding Peace Now, the general peace movement and Israeli society and politics in a broader sense.
Furthermore, their views will be compared and contrasted with Tarrow’s theory on collective action and the three socio-psychological predictors of collective action as defined by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears.
10
Historical background Israel
British Mandate Period
While the Ottomans ‘seemed likely to make themselves masters of Europe’ in the sixteenth century, the empire was considerably weak at the end of the eighteenth century.14 The empire was plagued
by weak leadership, increasing decentralization, a prolonged economic crisis and external pressures from European powers.15 Proving incapable of ‘assimilating new discoveries in the art of warfare’, the
Ottoman Empire became known as the ‘sick man of Europe’ at the end of the 19th century. The
Sublime Porte’s waning power and influence, combined with an alignment with the Central Powers during the First World War and its loss in this war, proved to be the final blow to an already fragile empire. The subsequent division of large parts of the Ottoman Empire’s eastern territories among the war’s Allied Forces led to an increased European presence. While the French exerted their authority over Syria and Mount Lebanon, the British established a presence in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine.
Due to British conquests in the southern Ottoman empire during the First World War, the newly formed League of Nations approved the British mandate over Palestine in 1922 which went into effect in 1923. Before and during the mandate period in Palestine, the British had cleared the path for the establishment of a Jewish national home through the Balfour Declaration and Sykes-Picot Agreement with France and the Churchill White Paper of 1922. In the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, Great Britain and France had established a plan determining their respective areas of influence in the Levant. Through the Balfour Declaration of the following year Great Britain expressed approval of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which was affirmed by the Churchill White Paper in 1922 despite violent objections from within Palestine.16
The British mandate period in Palestine saw a continuation of increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Between 1922 and 1939 Jewish settlements increased from 47 to 200 and Jewish land-holdings more than doubled. This caused fear and resentment among Arabs living in Palestine and led to sporadic uprisings against the British and the Jews.17
14 A. Hourani. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: New York, Toronto, 1962) P. 38. 15 Idem, P. 38.
16 C. Beckerman-Boys. "Third Parties and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Poliheuristic Decision Theory and British Mandate
Palestine Policy." Foreign Policy Analysis 3rd ser. 10 (2013) P. 226.
11 The outbreak of the Second World War made Palestine expendable to the British Empire. Soon after the war, the cost of maintaining an overseas presence in India and Palestine, as well as lending military and financial support to Turkey and Greece, meant straining a nearly bankrupt Britain.18
Coupled with Zionist ambitions and increasing Zionist attacks on British personnel and
establishments in Palestine, the British sought to relinquish their responsibilities and referred the issue of maintaining order in Palestine to a United Nations Special Committee. This committee proposed partitioning the land into Jewish and Arab states, which was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947. 19 The indigenous Arab population of Palestine
had, from the outset, rejected their country being overwhelmed by foreign immigrants. This partition plan never achieved fruition. Upon the end of the British mandate on May 14th 1948, the
establishment of the State of Israel was declared the next day by David Ben-Gurion, head of the Zionist Organization and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.
Political Zionism
The developments in Palestine are interwoven with the rise of Zionism as a political ideology in Europe. Theodor Herzl, an Austro-Hungarian Jew born in 1860, is known as the father of political Zionism. Herzl felt that Jewish assimilation in Europe had failed and he proposed a solution to the so-called ‘Jewish Question’ in his most famous work ‘Der Judenstaat’, published in 1896. The answer to the question lay in the establishment of a Jewish state, ‘a corner…where they can live in peace, no longer hounded, outcast and despised…a country that will be their own.’20 His political activities and
diplomatic endeavors, among which was the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, aimed at making the establishment of a Jewish national home a political reality. Herzl’s description of Zionism was as follows: ‘a political expression of an old idea’. It aimed at solving the ‘Jewish Question’ by modern means, but its foundation was to realize the centuries-old desire to return to Zion.21 It is this political Zionism, furthered by Herzl and also other Jewish activists and thinkers from
the late 19th century onward, that proved to be the ideological basis for the establishment of the
State of Israel. In order to understand the Israeli politico-social landscape, it is of crucial importance to keep in mind that the foundations of the Israeli state, and the central assumption of the political landscape, lie in the acceptance of the legitimacy of the Zionistic ideology.
18 H.M. Sachar. Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998.) P.3. 19 Sachar, P. 4.
20 I. Friedman. "Theodor Herzl: Political Activity and Achievements." Israel Studies 9.3 (2004) P. 47. 21 Idem, P. 68.
12 The political Zionism that Herzl and the World Zionist Organization furthered did not call on Jewry to move to Palestine to establish a national home. What was of essential importance was Jewish sovereignty over a concrete, tangible piece of land.22 Zionist immigration to, and settlement in,
Palestine had been taking place since at least 1882, ten years before Herzl’s ‘Der Judenstaat’. These immigrants, or so-called ‘practical Zionists’, went to Palestine to found colonies and work on the land.23 Compared to the number of Jews moving to the United States or to Western Europe, these
practical Zionists constituted a relatively small number. Between 1882 and 1903 (otherwise known as the first wave of immigration or ‘First Aliyah’ to Israel) about 25,000 Jewish immigrants settled in Palestine, initially in the coastal plain and Jerusalem and eventually spreading out to the north and south.24 This immigration, partly due to religious, economic and political reasons, significantly
increased with the development of political Zionism and due to Russian pogroms and the rise and spread of Nazism in Europe. Between 1903 and 1948 almost half a million Jews immigrated to Palestine and in the five years following the establishment of the State of Israel, over 700,000 Jews immigrated to the newly formed state.
The Establishment of the State of Israel
Following the establishment of the State of Israel on the 14th of May 1948, forces from Transjordan,
Syria, Egypt and Lebanon invaded the newly formed state the following day. Israeli forces managed to defeat the Arab forces in the ‘War of Independence’ as it is known in Israel. To Palestinians known as the Nakba (Arabic: the catastrophe). Besides exerting authority over the territory allotted to a Jewish state, Israeli troops also consolidated power over a significant amount of land initially meant for an Arab state, according to the UN partition plan. Mandatory Palestine was now divided into three entities, Israel, the Jordanian West Bank and the Gaza Strip, controlled by Egypt.25 From its
inception onward Israel faced attacks from Arab states on Israeli territory and on the territory it had seized in the 1948 war, the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Besides defensive wars, Israel was also involved in offensive operations, such as the unsuccessful initiative in 1956 with France and Britain to oust Nasser in the Sinai campaign, the seizure of the Golan Heights and the West Bank in 1967, the Lebanon wars in 1982 and 2006, and the frequent military campaigns in the Gaza Strip.26 Also, Israel faced and continues to face frequent opposition from the Palestinians living
in Israel (the so-called Arab-Israelis) and more directly from Palestinians living under Israeli
22 Mansfield, P. 161. 23 Idem, P. 160.
24 A. Soffer. “Demography and the Shaping of Israel’s Borders” Contemporary Jewry 10.3 (1989): 91-105. Springer Link. P. 93 25 I. Pappé. The Modern Middle East. (London: Routledge, 2005), P. 24.
13 occupation in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian frustrations reaching a fever-pitch have led to two mass civilian uprisings, the First and Second Intifada (Arabic: shaking off). The First Intifada started in December 1987, to which Israel responded with mass arrests and deportations, among others. After two years 50,000 Palestinians had been arrested, 7,000 had been wounded and more than 500 were killed.27 The suppression of this civilian uprising cost Israel dearly, it was
damaging to the morale of the military and to its international reputation. With regards to Israeli actions against the Palestinian uprising Peter Mansfield stated: ‘…it became an accepted
international truism – shared by the United States government and much of the Israeli public – that any purely military solution would be ineffective.’28 The Second Intifada, otherwise known as the
Al-Aqsa Intifada, starting in 2000 and ending in 2005 and also cost the Israelis dearly. This Second Intifada, besides leading to deaths, injuries and arrests on the Palestinian side, also resulted in the Israeli destruction of much of the West Bank’s infrastructure.29
Besides these external and internal threats, Israel experienced exceptional economic growth which allowed it to prosper as a nation. As Ilan Pappé highlights in his book ‘The Modern Middle East’, Israel’s exceptional economic growth has been impressive in light of the political instabilities it faces. Pappé highlights that this ‘exceptional status is and was won by massive American financial aid and equally important support from Jewish communities around the world.’30 The Israeli economy has
been able to develop differently than the economies of surrounding Arab states due to this aid, and successive Israeli governments have used this aid efficiently to further their local agendas.31
Besides its strong economic development, Israel also stands out in that it is a fully-functioning democratic state in the Middle East. This is, compared to other countries in the region, an
exceptional feat. Israel’s government is elected through transparent elections and there is a variety of political parties to choose from. The 8 million people living in Israel, of whom Arabs make up almost 2 million, enjoy a relatively varied media landscape with a relatively high level of freedom of expression. But, it must be said that Palestinians with an Israeli passport, the so-called Arab-Israelis, face widespread discrimination in Israel. Though all citizens get to vote, citizenship has been imposed upon a large part of the Arab-Israeli inhabitants and racism is abundant. The institutionalized racism is exemplified by Benjamin Netanyahu’s comments on the eve of the Israeli election in March 2015
27 Mansfield, P. 317. 28 Idem. 29 Pappé, P. 122. 30 Idem, P. 46. 31 Idem, P. 292.
14 during which Netanyahu attempted to boost his campaign at the last-minute by spreading the message ‘Arabs are flocking to the polls!’ in an effort to push those on the Israeli right, his supporters, to the voting stations. It can also be argued that a modern state that is in defacto occupation of its neighbors’ territory, including more than two million inhabitants, can hardly claim to be ‘democratic’.
Israeli society
The Israeli political landscape is now divided into two camps, the right which is headed by the Likud party and which stands unfavorably towards territorial concessions, protects Jewish interests more than universal rights and which stands favorably towards religion. On the other hand, the left-wing camp is headed by the Labor party and contains the Zionist Left and the Arab parties. Its main pillars are the ‘the partition of Israel to keep Israel Jewish, the defense of general values, and the restriction of the role of religion in public life.’32 In terms of their attitude towards the Palestinian question, the
rightist camp believes that Israel should hold onto as much or most of the land occupied in 1967. The leftists camp, however, believes that a territorial compromise with the Palestinians is preferable, on conditions that such an arrangement be made from a position of strength. The division between the two camps is ethnically marked, most Ashkenazim support the Labor camp, whereas most Mizrahim support the Likud camp. Interestingly, the control of both parties is in hands of Ashkenazim.
Additionally, all social movements that have come with new political messages and gathered political clout, of which Peace Now and Gush Emunim are the most important, are Ashkenazi movements.’33
32U. Rebhun and C. I. Waxman. Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns. (Hanover: Brandeis UP, 2004) P.
59.
15
Israel: Historiography
Overview Historiography Israel
In order to place the works by Kaminer et al. in their proper context, it is necessary to devote attention to an existing Israeli historiographic tradition regarding Israel’s history, that is to say the historical narratives written by Israeli historians on the establishment of the state and subsequent events. As Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israeli historians writing about Israel, they are inextricably linked to this tradition and should be viewed in this context.
Zionist historiography
In the first few decades of Israeli statehood, Israeli historians writing about Israel focused on the achievements and triumphs of Zionism.34 In his work ‘The History of Zionist Historiography: From
Apologetics to Denial’, Yoav Gelber argues: ‘The story of Jewish awakening in the diaspora and the Zionist experiment in Palestine during the first third of the twentieth century was transformed, in the next third, into a tale of Zionist triumph. But the enormous toll paid for victory was consistently avoided by Zionist historians.’ 35 During these first few decades of Israeli statehood the Central Zionist
Archives, the Israeli state archives and the IDF Archives were not yet open, which resulted in
historians relying largely on interviews with those involved in the events researched. Historians were, as Gelber puts it: ‘susceptible to the saw of the actual makers of history.’36 This led to historians
writing about how the events had been remembered instead of how they took place, accounts which were challenged by the New Historians from the 1980s onward.
New Historians
It is the opening of the archives that led to the emergence of a new trend among Israeli historians. As Anita Shapira (whom Avi Shlaim refers to as ‘The Princess of Zionist History’) writes in ‘Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the “New Historians” in Israel’, a new school of Israeli historians has taken form from the early 1980s onward.37 These historians, among whom are Avi Shlaim, Benny
Morris, Simha Flapan and Ilan Pappé, made up the first Israeli historians to systematically challenge the ‘official’ history of Israel furthered by ‘Old Historians’. The emergence of this new school of
34 Y. Gelber and B. Morris. Making Israel: The History of Zionist Historiography: From Apologetics to Denial (Ann Arbor: U of
Michigan, 2007) P. 8.
35 Idem, P. 54. 36 Idem, P. 58.
37 A. Shapira. "Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the "New Historians" in Israel." History and Memory 7.1
16 historians, who all initially wrote about the founding of the State of Israel and the War of
Independence, was no coincidence. Archive material in Israel is declassified after a period of 30 years, which led to new historical research into the War of Independence at the end of the 1970s.38
Benny Morris was the first to name those engaging in this new trend of historical writing as ‘New Historians’. He adds that these New Historians arose as a result of a new generation of scholars who had experienced, as adults, the 1967 war, the 1973 war, the 1982-1985 Lebanon war and ‘decades of rule over an embittered, rebellious Palestinian population in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.’39 Shlaim attributes an equal amount of responsibility to the opening of the archives as to a
changing political climate after the Lebanon War in 1982, which started a debate in Israeli society on it being ‘a war of choice or a war of no choice’.40 As he writes in his work ‘1948 And After’, the ‘old’
tradition highlighted the establishment of Israel as a result of pressures and persecution, while downplaying episodes of violence and Arab displacement.41 This old tradition emphasized the hostile
environment in which Israel was founded and the Arabs’ rejection of compromise and peace. This old narrative has been supplemented by a new history, the writers of these histories are described by Morris as: ‘…looking afresh at the Israeli historical experience, and their conclusions are often at odds with those of the old history.’42 Central myths to this old history are identified by Simha Flapan as,
among others, that the Israeli War of Independence ‘was waged between a relatively defenseless and weak (Jewish) David and a relatively strong (Arab) Goliath, that the Palestinians fled their homes and villages either ‘voluntarily’ – meaning for no good reason – or at the behest/orders of the Arab leaders; and that, at the war’s end, Israel was interested in making peace, but the recalcitrant Arabs preferred a perpetual war to the finish.’43 Like Flapan, Morris also adds that the Arab invasion in May
1948 was not aimed at destroying the Jewish state, instead it was an attempt by each country to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State and grab land for itself.
The findings of the New Historians have been subject to severe criticism from other Israeli historians. Efraim Karsh states in 'The Unbearable Lightness of my Critics' that not only did the new historians produce nothing specifically 'new', they were repeating 'the standard Arab narrative of the conflict in an attempt to give it academic respectability.44' In addition to criticizing New Historians as furthering a pro-Palestinian agenda, Karsh accuses Morris of having made limited use of state archives and
38 Shapira, P.9.
39 B. Morris. “A Second Look at the ‘Missed Peace’ or Smoothing Out History: A Review Essay.” Journal of Palestine Studies
24.1 (1994) P. 79.
40 A. Shlaim "The War of the Israeli Historians." Oxford University Website, Jan.-Feb. 2004. 41 B. Morris. 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) P. 4. 42 Idem, P. 6.
43 Idem, P. 9.
17 questions findings in Morris’ book ‘The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949’ due to him not having had access to IDF and Haganah archives when writing the book. The criticism of Karsh extends beyond Morris alone, as he states: '...an examination of the documentation used by several key 'new historians', as well as sources withheld from their readers, led to the disturbing conclusion that Moris' distortions ...typified the modus operandi of a sizeable group of academics, journalists and commentators, who had predicated their professional careers on rewriting Israel's history.'45
In an interview in 2012, when asked the question regarding why New Historians are faced with such criticism, Shlaim answered: “I often ask myself, why are critics so angry? Because there have been many historical arguments before, but they are rarely so emotionally charged. The question is: “Why are the old historians so hot under the collar”? I think the answer lies in the politics of identity. Not in the realm of colleagueship, evidence and documents, but in the realm of the politics of identity, in other words: self-image. The image is of a liberal, decent and democratic Israeli society. Above all peace-loving, really dedicated to making peace, confronting a fanatical and deeply hostile Arab world. Theirs is the image of the victims. This is in the context of the holocaust. Three year before this ordeal, six million Jews were annihilated in the center of Christian Europe. That was the huge
psychological burden to have to cope with. The new ordeal of the war with the Arabs has to be seen, and was experienced at the time against the background of their very recent history
.”
46Additional Palestinian and Israeli historiographic genres
In addition to Zionist historiography and the works of the New Historians, other historiographical genres have also developed. Among Palestinian historians there developed a Nakba historiography,
which focused on the Palestinian loss and exile from the Nakba in 1948 onward.47 This
historiographical genre has been criticized along the same lines as the Israeli Old Historians were criticized by the New Historians. These Palestinian historians were dependent on memories and memoirs, which led to them being accused of insufficient objectivity and distance from the histories
they were writing.48 Reasons for this lack of reliable documentation is, among others, the lack of
institutions and the stateless nature of the Palestinian people. This means that ‘…ironically, only a relatively small number of Palestinian historians have researched the Nakba, leaving the field of
45 A. Naor. "A Matter of Distoriography: Efraim Karsh, the "New Historians" of Israel, Their Methodology and
Perspective." Israel Studies 6.2 (2001) P. 143.
46 T.O. Westbye. "The Historiography of Israel's New Historians; Rewriting the History of 1948." Dissertation: University of
Bergen (2012) P. 20.
47 Idem, P. 20. 48 Idem.
18 academic discussion to the Israeli historians’.49
Besides the Nakba historiography, there is also the Socialist / Communist genre of Israeli
historiography which interpreted the Arab-Israeli conflict in the framework of Marxist history. The trend in this genre was to see the Arab-Israeli conflict as a result of ‘an imperialistic colonial project and ignoring the unique circumstances of the Jewish people in the aftermath of the Holocaust.’50
Additionally, there is a genre of ‘Revised Labor-Zionist historiography’ which developed from the 1960s onwards when leaders of the Yishuv were passing away and which led to an increasing academic freedom to study and criticize the Yishuv period and its leadership.51
Besides these other historiographic genres, the histories of the New Historians that emerged from the 1980s onward represents a specific paradigm shift that revealed myths and assumptions regarding the history of Israel which had previously been largely undisputed. In the context of the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now this genre of challenging the mainstream assumptions proves an interesting parallel. Additionally it is valuable to explore the works of Kaminer et al. with the Israeli historiographical tradition as backdrop.
49 Westbye, P. 21. 50 Idem.
19
Historical Background Israeli Peace Movement and Peace Now
Surprisingly little focused historical work has been written on the Israeli peace movement. In renowned historical works on the history of the state of Israel, little attention is paid to the Israeli peace movement and even less mention is made of Peace Now. However, the works that do discuss the peace movement provide this thesis with valuable insights into the tradition of collective, political protest during the Yishuv (pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) and early-state years up to the emergence of Peace Now in 1978.
Pre-state and early-state years
Before the emergence of the so-called Israeli ‘peace movement’ in the late 1970s, there were several organized Israeli calls for peace with Arab neighbors and voices promoting a conciliatory approach to Palestinian demands. In the pre-state Yishuv period binationalism was advanced by the Covenant of Peace (in Hebrew: Brit Shalom) and the Union (in Hebrew: Ihud). The peace and rapprochement with Arabs, which these two Jewish organizations called for, seemed a legitimate Zionist option at the time.52 The Covenant of Peace was established in 1925 and is credited as the first peace group in
Palestine and can be seen, to some extent, as a precursor of Peace Now. The Covenant of Peace emphasized the centrality of peace with Arabs on the basis of moral rather than geopolitical considerations and emphasized the centrality of this issue to the entire Zionist endeavor in Palestine.53 The organization’s impact was limited. It was strongly criticized by the Zionist
establishment, never numbered more than 100 people from the same socioeconomic background and dissolved in 1933.54 The Union’s position in society preceding its collapse is characterized by
Kaminer as : ‘a voice crying in the political wilderness.’, illustrating its standing and impact.55 In the
wake of the Covenant of Peace and the Union several other similar organizations arose such as The League of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and the Young Watchmen (Hebrew: Hashomer Hatzair). These organizations also encountered staunch opposition from the Zionist establishment. Organizations such as the Covenant of Peace, the Union and others, opposed certain elements of
52 A. Omer. When Peace is not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), P. 26.
53 Idem. 54 Idem, P. 29.
55 R. Kaminer. The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada. (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex
20 Zionist expansion and worked towards Arab-Jewish rapprochement, though they still operated in a Zionist framework. The ‘right of the Jews to immigrate to Palestine and settle there’ was not criticized.56 Small, organized calls for peace and reconciliation sporadically emerged in Israel’s first
three decades of existence, but only in the late 1970s were the conditions ripe for a broader based movement to develop.
Development of the general peace movement
The development of the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now are inextricably linked and, in many ways, the same. The Six-Day war in 1967 had unexpected ramifications in Israeli society. The military defeat of Syria, Jordan and Egypt and the subsequent Israeli land grabs of the Golan heights from Syria, the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, and the West Bank from Jordan, led to an increased polarization of Israeli public opinion.57 Several small protest movements arose opposing the use of
the territories won in 1967’s Six-Day war as ‘bargaining chips’ in negotiations with Arab countries, which led to the development of the ‘Land for Peace’ formula.58 This formula was advocated by those
that called for a return of most territories won by Israel in the 1967 war and who promoted a conciliatory approach to Israel’s Arab neighbors as well as the Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other side of the political spectrum were the supported of the Greater Israel movement, which called for incorporating the newly won territories into Israel and settling them with Jewish populations.59 Since 1967 there has not been a uniform Israeli
consensus on what to do with these territories, though those in the peace movement have always opposed the Greater Israel movement. The Six-Day war provided those advocating peace and rapprochement with a framework to work from, namely a ‘Land for Peace’ formula accompanied by a strong opposition to those who pledged for an incorporation of the occupied territories.
The ‘Land for Peace’ formula took hold among the public in the late 1970s when the visit of Egypt’s President Anwar al Sadat in 1977 made a peace agreement with Egypt seem a viable option. Besides the peace agreement with Egypt becoming a realistic possibility and the ‘Land for Peace’ formula spreading to different sectors in Israeli society, a reshuffling of Israel’s political dynamics had taken place. In 1977 the Labor party lost power in the Knesset after thirty years and those advocating the Greater Israel ideology took control. This contributed to the conditions that led to the emergence of a mass peace movement.60 Once the peace negotiations with Egypt reached a deadlock, the
56 Omer, P. 31.
57 A. Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000) P. 286. 58 S.Helman. "Peace Movements in Israel." Jewish Women’s Archive. Web.
59 Idem. 60 Idem.
21 sentiment that the Israeli negotiators were missing a chance at peace due to a commitment to the Greater Israel ideology became widespread. This sentiment was channeled into a peace movement, initially headed by one group, that, without professing any political affiliation, wanted one thing: Peace Now.
David Frank writes in his article ‘Shalom Achshav: Rituals of the Israeli Peace Movement’ that the general Israeli peace movement developed as a response to a so-called ‘peace-ritual’.61 Frank argues
that the Israeli perception of the Middle East was dramatically changed by the Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, which contained several ritualistic elements.62 Firstly, Sadat’s visit and speech to
the Knesset made the Israeli public see a peace treaty with Egypt as a realistic possibility, and secondly, it showed Israelis that there were mutual interests to be considered, as well as shared cultural and religious norms with Egypt.63 These developments, termed ‘ritualistic’ by Frank, led to a
fundamental shift in the worldview of many Israelis resulting in a climate that allowed a broad-based peace movement to emerge.64Frank traces the peace movement back to the ‘Movement For a
Different Zionism’, established in Jerusalem two weeks after Likud-leader Menachem Begin became Prime Minister in the summer of 1977. Begin represented the dominant view in Israeli society that favored maintaining the status quo as well as the settlement and annexation of territories won in the 1967 war.65 Those involved in the ‘Movement for a Different Zionism’ paired up with a group from
Tel Aviv in their opposition to Begin, and drafted a letter to be spread around Israel to garner mass support for their cause (which included support for Palestinian autonomy and flexible negotiation policies).66 This movement evidently set a precedent for those that initiated the development of
Peace Now.
Development Peace Now
Peace Now has its roots in the widespread Israeli discontent that accompanied the stalled Israeli-Egyptian peace talks in 1978 and the public’s desire for peace with Egypt. As a result of this
discontentment, almost 350 Israeli military reservists signed the following letter which was published in several Israeli newspapers.67 It is the founding document of Peace Now:
61 D.A. Frank. “Shalom Achshav”- Rituals of The Israeli Peace Movement Communication Monographs 48.3 (1981) P.7. 62 Idem, P.8.
63 Idem, P. 9. 64 Idem, P. 9. 65 Idem, P. 10. 66 Idem, P. 10.
22 ‘Dear Sir,
Citizens that also serve as soldiers and officers in the reserve forces are sending this letter to you. The following words are not written with a light heart. However at this time when new horizons of peace and cooperation are for the first time being proposed to the State of Israel, we feel obliged to call upon you to prevent taking any steps that could cause endless problems to our people and our state.
We are writing this with deep anxiety, as a government that prefers the existence of the State of Israel within the borders of “Greater Israel” to its existence in peace with good neighborliness, will be difficult for us to accept. A government that prefers existence of settlements beyond the Green Line to elimination of this historic conflict with creation of normalization of relationships in our region will evoke questions regarding the path we are taking. A government policy that will cause a continuation of control over million Arabs will hurt the Jewish-democratic character of the state, and will make it difficult for us to identify with the path of the State of Israel.
We are aware of the security needs of the State of Israel and the difficulties facing the path to peace. But we know that true security will only be reached with the arrival of peace. The power of the IDF is in the identification of its soldiers with the path of the State of Israel.’68
This letter, known as the ‘Officers’ Letter’, was addressed to Menachem Begin, the Likud Prime Minister of Israel at the time, and expressed the reservists’ doubts and fears when it came to the government’s attitude and intentions regarding the peace talks with Egypt. The sentiments
articulated in the letter drew widespread attention and some 250,000 Israelis joined in signing it. The widespread support of the letter led to an organizational impulse, and Peace Now became an official player in the realm of protest. Peace Now quickly grew into Israel’s largest peace organization, as it was (and still is, though on a much smaller scale) able to mobilize the public and organize
demonstrations on a significantly larger scale than other organizations. In their call for the government not to miss a chance at peace with Egypt, the organization won the endorsement of thirty Knesset members from six parties as well as support from the public on an unprecedented scale.69 The evening before the Israeli delegation left for peace talks with Egypt in the United States,
Peace Now organized a demonstration in Tel Aviv which an estimated 100,000 people flocked to. This
68Peace Now. The Officers’ Letter – March 1978. (http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/officers-letter-march-1978). 69 Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.P. 371.
23 was the largest political demonstration in Israel’s history up to that point and sent a strong signal to the government.70
The peace agreements that followed the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, the Camp David Accords, were signed in the United States in September 1978 and a definitive peace treaty between Egypt and Israel followed. The accords were met with demonstrations of support by Peace Now and
counter-demonstrations by the nationalist camp opposing the accords.71 Besides the opposition of the
nationalist camp, a public opinion poll conducted during that time showed that there was overwhelming support for the accords from almost 82% of the general public.72 Overwhelming
support from the public aside, Begin had difficulties convincing Israeli parliament, the Knesset, that the Camp David Accords were in Israel’s favor. Upon his return to Israel from the United States, Begin was, among others, accused of presenting the Knesset with a ‘fait accompli’.73 Eventually, when the
accords came to a vote in the Knesset, a 17-hour long debate resulted in 84 votes in favor, 19 against and 17 abstentions.74 The official peace treaty was signed in March 1979 in Washington D.C. and it
was implemented relatively smoothly.75
Though the Israeli peace treaty with Egypt was a victory for the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now, it constituted a bitter disappointment to Palestinians. The initial intentions of the Egyptian camp to incorporate issues regarding Palestinians self-rule in the peace treaty were ultimately abandoned as a result of Israeli objections. As a result Sadat was frequently accused of betraying the Palestinians and striking a selfish deal with Israel in order to secure Egyptian interests.76
Though it is difficult to establish direct causal links between Peace Now’s activities and the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the mass support Peace Now managed to garner in 1978 indicated that it had a level of popular support and influence on the public. Several years later, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Peace Now managed to organize a demonstration in Tel Aviv that protested Israeli actions. Though Peace Now was relatively late in publicly denouncing the invasion of its northern neighbor, for which it was sharply criticized, it managed to put together a protest that was attended by an estimated 400,000 people. Again, Peace Now had been involved in organizing the largest demonstration Israel had ever seen.
70 Shlaim, P. 371. 71 Idem. 72 Idem, P. 377. 73 Idem, P. 376. 74 Idem, P. 377. 75 Idem, P. 381. 76 Sachar, P. 289.
24 More than ten years later, in the process leading up to the Oslo Accords in the mid 1990’s, Peace Now was on the margins of Israeli society. The organization had become politically ostracized and ignored, which it remains to this day. Henry Rosenfeld, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Haifa, wrote the following about Peace Now’s waning influence in as early as 1983:’…its activity was sporadic, and in recent years it was seen on the average very little, its original directness was
restricted and became more ‘academic’ (its leadership is more and more influenced by certain university circles) and it did not succeed in attracting new supporters from among the youth…it has become less political.’77 Peace Now’s influence had seemingly waned due to a variety of factors after
just a few years. The Oslo Accords in the mid-90s, which were welcomed warmly by Peace Now and the rest of the peace movement, did not lead to a comprehensive peace deal and resulted in a political stalemate, interrupted by outbursts of violence. The failed Oslo Accords and the subsequent bouts of Israeli and Palestinian violence had the result of diminishing the reputation and role of the peace movement and of Peace Now. Currently, Peace Now is often portrayed as a group of eccentric leftists, instead of an organization with a serious political platform.
Despite Peace Now’s position on the sideline of Israeli politics, it remains the largest peace
organization in Israel. Currently the organization counts 10,000 members from the Middle East and around the world and states its mission as working towards the only viable option, being ‘the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories adjacent to Israel, which were occupied as a result of the 1967 war – A Two State Solution’.78 While Peace Now’s initial goal was to promote peace with Egypt, the organization has redirected its policies after the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Peace Now initiated a call for peace with the Palestinians, based on the two state solution formula. This formula has been publicly adopted by most mainstream Israeli political parties and become accepted by most Israelis, although the degree to which this view is held with any real conviction remains questionable. Some claim this is thanks to the Israeli peace movement, though again causal links are difficult to verify. Besides promoting the two state solution, Peace Now’s other main objective is ‘offering support to the right of Israel to exist within secure borders and the right of its neighbors to do the same.’79 Peace Now’s adherence to nationalist principles is evident in its objectives, though it is at
times difficult to assess whether this is due to genuine conviction or to ensure wider public support of the organization.
In 2014 Peace Now was still able to organize demonstrations of several thousand people strong. This
77 H. Rosenfeld. The Missing Part in the ‘Unnecessary War’ (Journal of Palestine Studies, 01 October 1983, Vol.13(1),
pp.196-200) P. 197.
78 Peace Now. Who We Are. Web. 79 Peace Now. Who We Are. Web.
25 is, though, a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of people that showed up to protests in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Up to this day Peace Now operates through public campaigns,
advertisements, petitions, conferences, dialogue groups and demonstrations, among others. However Peace Now’s role in the political sphere and its influence are much diminished.
26
Short Biographies Authors
This chapter features concise biographies of the historians whose work is central to this thesis, and provides an equally short introduction to their works. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israelis with personal links to the Israeli peace movement. All three have written historical accounts of the Israeli peace movement with significant references to Peace Now. Besides these similarities, all three have written from different theoretical approaches which provides for an interesting reading of the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities.
Reuven Kaminer
Reuven Kaminer was born in Detroit in 1929 and immigrated to Israel in 1951, where he became a prominent commentator and activist on the Israeli left. Kaminer is a member of the ‘Democratic Front for Peace and Equality’, an organization that aimed to mobilize its supporters for peace in opposition to government policy of occupation, and has also been an active member of Peace Now. His personal convictions undoubtedly played a part in the scholarly pursuit of writing the book ‘The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada’. Kaminer and his wife, a co-founder of the women’s peace group ‘Women in Black’, established ‘the Reuven and Dafna Kaminer Archive’ in the National Library of Israel, which is an archive of the radical left in Israel from the Six-Day War to the end of the eighties. According to the National Library of Israel, the Kaminers occupied central roles in different organizations of Israel’s radical left.80 Professionally, Kaminer held
the position of Vice Provost of the School for Overseas Students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and currently practices law in Jerusalem.
Kaminer’s book was published in 1996 and constitutes a political history of the general Israeli peace movement, with a focus on its main components, as they battle against the policy of their own government.81 His overarching view is that peace organizations illustrate a high level of political
thinking and strategizing, which is overlooked by most. Kaminer answers questions as to how the protest movement in Israel emerged and grew in response to circumstances created by the First Intifada between 1987 and 1991. Kaminer’s focus on the peace movement during the First Intifada in particular is due to his assessment that this period saw an increased involvement of the peace movement in the political process, and an unprecedented level of cooperation and solidarity between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories.82
80 "Reuven and Dafna Kaminer Archive." The National Library of Israel. Web. 81 Kaminer P. xii.
27 Kaminer states that he believes to have ‘presented a fair and accurate account of the Israeli peace movement’s response to the Palestinian Intifada’, though his personal peace activism should be kept in mind while reading his work.83 His personal affiliation with the peace movement and his definition
of the movement as
‘…t
he sum of all the organized political forces which attributed a major degree of responsibility to Israel for the emergence and the continuation of the Israel-Arab conflict.’84 illustrate his view of the peace movement vis-à-vis the Israeli mainstream.
Kaminer identifies forces as being part of the peace movement if they blame Israel for the Israel-Arab conflict.Given the fact that the book focuses on the First Intifada (then: the Palestinian Intifada, as the Second Intifada had not erupted yet) and that is was published in 1996, there is no mention of the Oslo Accords and their aftermath or of the Second Intifada.
Tamar Hermann
Tamar Hermann is an Israeli who has lived, studied and worked in Israel for most of her life. After finishing her Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD degrees in Israel and spending time at Princeton University, Hermann took up academic positions in Israel. She is currently a professor of political science and Dean of Academic Studies at the Open University of Israel. In addition to this position, she co-directs the Peace Index project at Tel Aviv University, a project that evaluates Israeli public opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict through monthly surveys. Hermann also holds the position of senior research fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, which credits Hermann’s expertise in the areas of public opinion and the formation of national policy, as well as civil society. 85 She has written
extensively about the peace movement and grassroots activism and is referred to by the Israel Policy Forum as ‘Israel’s leading academic pollster’ due to her work at the Israel Democracy Institute and the Peace Index project.86
Her book ‘‘The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream’ was published in 2009. In contrast to Kaminer, Hermann has written a history of the peace movement from the perspective of social movement theory, with a specific focus on the period preceding, during and following the Oslo Accords. The overarching question that guides her work is why so many Israelis like to hate the peace movement or ignore it altogether. The surprising premise of Hermann’s book is that the peace movement did indeed make a political difference, which is unexpected, given that the title of the book suggests a rather gloomy analysis of the peace movement’s impact. As Hermann focuses on the social history of the peace movement, the work focuses on the actions and ideologies of ‘collective
83 Kaminer, P. xiii. 84 Idem, P. xii.
85 The Israel Democracy Institute. "Prof. Tamar Hermann." The Israel Democracy Institute. Web. 86 S. Spiegel. "Tamar Hermann on Israeli Public Opinion." Israel Policy Forum. Web.
28 challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.’87 The Israeli peace movement, and hence Peace Now, constitute such a
collective challenge. Due to the peace movement challenging the status quo, Hermann states that the wider Israeli public has identified the peace movement, from the late 1990’s onwards, as collaborating with outside forces that are critical of Israel. Hermann characterizes this treatment of the peace movement as a method of ‘scapegoating’ implying that the peace movement receives blame for the sins committed by the wider, Israeli community.88 In the introduction to her book she
thanks peace activist friends and colleagues for enriching her work.89 Like Kaminer, Hermann’s
connections to the Israeli peace movement undoubtedly play a part in her professional endeavors.
Atalia Omer
Atalia Omer is an Israeli national who, after completing her military service, pursued higher education in the United States. She completed a BA in Islamic and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Santa Barbara in California in 2000, after which she pursued an MA in Theological Studies at Harvard University. After earning her PhD at Harvard, Omer went on to work at the University of Notre Dame where she is currently Associate Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peace Studies as well as Faculty Fellow at the Center for the Study of Religion and Society.
The book ‘When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp thinks about religion, nationalism and Justice’ was published in 2013. The aim of the book, an extension of her PhD research, is to re-examine Israeli identities in the context of the Israeli peace movement so as to re-examine and enhance opportunities for peacebuilding.It was published by the University of Chicago Press in 2013, the same year in which she co-authored a book titled ‘Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook’. Omer researches and analyzes the Israeli peace movement from a socio-political approach. While looking at the construction and reframing of identities in the context of the Israeli peace movement, Hermann aims to look at different ways in which peace-making can be approached in a conflict that is defined by identity claims. 90 The reframing of identities is necessary to achieve a solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, argues Omer, which implies that her book itself should be seen as a peace-building initiative.
The author mentions being raised in Israel in a privileged, Ashkenazi environment that was highly critical of Israeli culture and of the religious coercion which was perceived in the Jewish
87 Hermann, P. 14. 88 Idem, P. 2. 89 Idem, p. viii. 90 Idem, P. ix.
29 state.91 Having been active in the Israeli peace movement consistently throughout her life, Omer
acknowledges a personal commitment to the overarching vision of the movement.
Conclusion
As mentioned earlier, Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israeli historians who have written historical accounts of the Israeli peace movement with significant references to Peace Now. All three authors write in English, have experience living and working abroad and have significant ties with peace activists and/or the peace movement. They originate from a politically left Israeli background, which is important to keep in mind when researching their portrayal of Peace Now. Also, Omer’s work, as it is the most recently published work, contains references to both Kaminer and Hermann. In turn, Hermann refers to Kaminer several times, which shows they were familiar with each other’s work. Kaminer’s book was published before Hermann and Omer’s books, and therefore does not contain references to either Hermann or Omer’s book. Besides coming from similar backgrounds and being aware of each other’s work on different levels, all three have written from different theoretical approaches which might lead to different perceptions and portrayals of Peace Now in their works. Additionally, the generational gap between Kaminer, Hermann and Omer is to be considered when assessing their portrayal of Peace Now.
30
1978 and the Camp David Accords
Introduction
Events that unfolded in Israel in the late 1970s, specifically during the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, provide the focus of this chapter. The 1970s in Israel were characterized by, among others, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the 1977 defeat of the Labor party for the first time in Israel’s history, Operation Litani in 1978 against the infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon and the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, the Camp David Accords, in 1978 and subsequent peace treaty the following year. The Yom Kippur war launched by Syria and Egypt took Israel completely by surprise and signified a tipping point in Israeli policy.92 The Syrian and Egyptian
attacks showed Israel that the occupation of the Golan, the West Bank and the Sinai was not a sustainable state of affairs that could be continued indefinitely.93 This Israeli realization, in
combination with Egypt and Syria suffering vast losses, meant that all three states involved adopted a more realistic attitude towards each other than before.94 Besides this shift in attitude towards
external states, Israel also experienced a shift in domestic politics four years later. The victory of the Likud party in the 1977 elections meant a dramatic shift from the Labor party’s pragmatic approach to the occupied territories. Where the Labor party emphasized the security considerations regarding the occupied territories, the Likud party based its actions on the ideological goal of holding onto and expanding “Greater Israel”.95
The peace negotiations preceding the signing of the historic agreement in 1978 at Camp David in the United States saw the emergence of a broad-based Israeli peace movement. Though Israeli
organizations calling for peace with Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbors had existed before Begin’s and Sadat’s negotiations started in 1977, the scale of Israeli support for peace with Egypt when that opportunity actually arose was unprecedented. Organized calls for peace, such as by Peace Now, became part of a broader movement that gained momentum during the peace negotiations.
This chapter will focus on the views of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer regarding the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities during the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations. Firstly their accounts of the origins, dynamics and outcomes of Peace Now’s activities will be discussed. Secondly, their accounts will be placed in the context of Tarrow’s emphasis on the political component to
9292 Shlaim, P. 319. 93 Idem.
94 Idem. 95 Idem, P. 353.
