One Policy, Multiple Interpretations
EU UNDERSTANDINGS OF ENLARGEMENT TO THE FORMER
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Vera Olgers
Master thesis Political Science The European Union in a Global Order
Supervisor: dr. J.A. Jeandesboz Second reader: dr. B. Isleyen
Author: Vera Olgers
Student number: 10083340 Word count: 16,902
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor Julien Jeandesboz for his continuousand concrete feedback on my work and for making my transition from Human Geography to studying European integration more than interesting
I would also like to thank Beste Isleyen for reading my thesis.
Finally, I owe a big thank you to Querine for the continuous exchange of ideas that helped me to structure my thoughts.
Abstract
While enlargement policy is still considered the European Union’s most successful foreign policy tool, the process has slowed down significantly. The case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia being a candidate country for ten years without having the prospect of even the start of accession negotiations is the telling example of that. The EU institutions do not seem to agree whether the country is ready for taking the next step in its enlargement process, since the Council of the European Union has failed to act on the recommendation set by the European Commission and the European Parliament to open accession negotiations. This indicates that there is divergence in meaning that is given to enlarging to Macedonia by the different EU institutions. In order to understand to what extent this explains the impasse in Macedonia’s accession process, this thesis builds on a structural constructivist understanding of how European integration functions. By analysing discourses in both official publications on enlargement by the EU institutions and interviews held among EU officials, this thesis finds that where you stand explains what you stand for. The EU institutions give different meanings to enlargement and therefore, the EU practitioners act differently in Macedonia’s accession process. What for a Council official serves as a major stumbling block, can be considered a minor issue for a Commissioner. This thesis therefore concludes that what explains the current state of enlargement, as illustrated by the case of Macedonia, is the conflicting interpretation that EU actors have of the meaning of enlargement.
Key words: EU enlargement policy, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, structural
Table of content
Acknowledgments ... 1
Abstract ... 2
1. Introduction ... 4
2. Theorizing the Enlargement Debate ... 7
2.1 Rationalist Approaches ... 8 2.2 Constructivist Approaches... 9 2.3 A Holistic Framework ... 11 2.4 Conclusion ... 13 3. Researching EU enlargement...14 3.1 A Particular Case ... 15
3.2 Building a Collection of Data ... 15
3.2.1 Constructing the field: official publications ... 15
3.2.2 Interviewing the agents: EU officials working on the Macedonia file ... 18
3.3 A Three-fold Discourse Analysis ...19
3.4 Conclusion ...21
4. Framing Enlargement ... 22
4.1 The Technicalities of a Framework ... 22
4.3 Contextual differences ... 24
4.4 New Framing of Enlargement? ... 25
4.5 Conclusion ... 26
5. The Ball is in Their Court ... 28
5.1 This Blame is on Greece ... 28
5.2 The Blame is on Macedonia ... 30
5.3 Different roles, different understandings ... 32
5.4 Conclusion ... 34
6. The Joke’s on Us ... 35
6.1 Negative Consequences of Impasse ... 35
6.2 Lack of Political and Public Engagement ... 36
6.3 Recent Shifts ... 38 6.4 Conclusion ... 38 7. Conclusion ... 39 Bibliography ... 42 Primary Sources ... 42 Secondary Sources ... 44
1. Introduction
Enlargement is viewed by many as the most successful foreign policy tool of the European Union (EU). The accession of the countries of the former socialist block can be considered its foremost achievement. However, the Big Bang enlargement of 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 raised considerable concerns. There are worries about the ‘limits’ of Europe, the EU’s ‘capacity’ to take in new members and the viability of the ‘carrot and stick’ method of enlargement through conditionality measures. From 2007 onwards, only one of the seven remaining candidate countries has made it into the EU, namely Croatia. The countries that are left are those of the Western Balkans, since Iceland unilaterally pulled out of the accession process and current EU-Turkey relations do not seem to provide for a prospect of Turkish membership in the near future. In the Western Balkans, the EU opened accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro, while Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1 are waiting for the European Council’s approval to open accession
negotiations. Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo only have potential candidate status at the moment.
The thesis focuses on the accession case of Macedonia. Contrary to Albania, which has been recently granted candidate status in 2014, Macedonia has been recognized as a candidate country for ten years now, after it was granted potential candidate status during the Thessaloniki European Council summit of 2003. Since then, the opening of actual accession negotiations has been put on hold. To this day, the Council still has not set a date for the negotiations to open, despite the fact that the European Commission has repeatedly recommended this opening in its annual strategy papers for enlargement since 2009. The argumentation behind this recommendation has always been the fact that Macedonia sufficiently adheres to the political criteria set out by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 (EC, 2014b). Macedonia was in fact considered an excellent EU candidate and was used as an example for the other countries in the region (EC, 2012b).
The EU had already successfully worked with Macedonia in the 2000s when rising ethnic tensions almost led the country into civil war. Eventually, the intervention of the EU led to the Ohrid Framework in which the road to stability was set out (Risteska, 2013: 434). This was considered a first success of conflict prevention by the EU in the region, after failures in
1
From now on ‘Macedonia’ is used throughout the thesis as an abbreviated form of former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo (Elbasani, 2008: 297). For a long time afterwards, the country lived up to the expectations created by this precedent. The paradox here lies at the fact that the Council has granted Macedonia candidate status in 2005 with the clear goal of enlargement. However, even though the Commission and the European Parliament recommend the Council to start with accession negotiations, it has abstained from doing so. Since Macedonia has always been a frontrunner in the accession process among the Western Balkans countries, the question may be raised that if Macedonia cannot make it into the EU, which country can? However, although the country has been the best in class for a while, recent developments in its domestic politics have weakened its position. After nine years in power, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski has been embarrassed by wiretaps leaked by opposition leader Zoran Zaev. The recordings reveal the alarming level of corruption in the country and raise serious concerns about democracy, media freedom and independence of the judiciary, which were already a concern for the European Commission (EC, 2014a). While the revelations are getting more frequent, the political crisis has caused anti-government protests to grow ever since, with the largest protests in the country’s history. These developments in Macedonia’s domestic politics are however recent, and although they are pointed out as a source of concern by EU officials working on the Macedonia file, they do not seem sufficient by themselves to account for the twists and turns of Macedonia’s bid for EU membership.
Another alternative explanation can be found in the issue of the country’s name. The Greek government considers the desired name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ a provocation towards the Greek region of Macedonia and therefore blocks the start of accession negotiations through the consensus rule in the European Council. Greece also claims that Skopje is misappropriating large chunks of its ancient history. The enormous ‘Skopje 2014’ urban renewal project is part of that, with the building of a giant statue of a ‘warrior on horseback’ resembling Alexander the Great as the final straw. However, bilateral issues are not supposed to obstruct the accession process of a candidate country, which should only be based on the established conditionality (EC, 2014b: 17; EP, 2015a: 3). Therefore, on paper, the name issue should not be an impediment to Macedonia’s accession process.
The country’s turn to autocracy has undeniably caused serious concern in Brussels as well as in the country itself. Even so, despite this deteriorating domestic situation, the Commission and the EP still recommend that the Council decides on the start of accession negotiations. If the developments do not make a difference for them, why should it make a difference for the Council? What this suggests, in turn, is that the key to understanding the situation of accession negotiations with Macedonia lies less in the ‘objective’ domestic political situation
of the country, or in conflicts of interests among EU states, but in what enlargement means to EU practitioners. The research question posed by the thesis, accordingly, is the following:
To what extent do divergences in the meaning given to enlargement by the different EU institutions explain the impasse in Macedonia’s accession negotiations?
The thesis argues that what explains the current state of enlargement, as illustrated by the case of Macedonia, is the conflicting interpretation that EU actors have of the meaning of enlargement. It therefore investigates the standpoints of the European Commission, Council and Parliament on the accession process of Macedonia. The research tries to find out why accession negotiations have not started yet by understanding whether the three institutions perceive of enlargement differently.
To do so, the empirical analysis of the thesis consists of interviews with EU officials working on enlargement to Macedonia, complemented by the examination of selected official documents from the different EU institutions about enlargement in general and towards Macedonia in particular. Theoretically, as Chapter 2 elaborates, the thesis is based on a structural constructivist framework through which it is argued that political transformations, such as the accession process of Macedonia, “involve first and foremost changes in political meaning and value that have a determining impact on the individuals” (Kauppi, 2005: 13). In other words, the understanding of enlargement held by EU practitioners is determined by their institutional position. In light of this structural constructivist framework, the methodology detailed in Chapter 3 focuses on discourse analysis as the main tool through which the different understandings of enlargement to Macedonia by the EU institutions and officials can be investigated. Chapter 4 provides the link between the CEEC enlargement and the policy towards the Western Balkans. It embeds enlargement policy in its historic context and claims that it is not so much technical differences, but changes in the political narrative that have altered enlargement policy through the years. In Chapter 5, the thesis endeavours on the specifics of the enlargement case of Macedonia. Furthermore, it asks the question who is considered guilty for the impasse according to the EU officials. It appears that differences between EU officials in the answering this question, can be explained by the role distribution of enlargement policy in the EU. The Commission, with its technical role in enlargement policy, thinks very pragmatic about enlargement and considers it capable of aligning the candidate country to EU norms and values during the enlargement process. However, in Chapter 6, it becomes clear that the Council has instead a very political role in the policy process and wants to make sure that before a further step is taken, the country adheres to high standards. In the conclusion it is therefore argued that what explains the current state of enlargement, as illustrated by the case of Macedonia, is the conflicting interpretation that EU actors have of the meaning of enlargement.
2. Theorizing the Enlargement Debate
This chapter provides the theoretical groundwork of the thesis. As introduced in the Introduction, the driving argument of the thesis is that the impasse in Macedonia’s accession process is caused by different understanding of enlargement by EU actors. To ground this claim in theory, a comprehension of the different approaches towards interpreting the mechanism of European integration is needed. This chapter shows that the contemporary debate between rationalist and constructivist approaches to European integration, and particularly EU enlargement, do not suffice in helping to understand why enlargement happens the way it does. Instead, an approach that takes into account the role of both structure and agency in the framing of enlargement policy is needed. This holistic approach is provided by structural constructivism that through its notion of field and habitus helps to better understand how meaning is given to enlargement by the different EU institutions and officials. This theoretical framework argues that the paradox that is now apparent in European politics about Macedonia’s accession process demonstrates that ‘Brussels’ is indeed a multifaceted actor.
As mentioned above, the thesis argues that the impasse in Macedonia’s accession process is caused by different understandings of enlargement by EU actors. Therefore, the different approaches towards European integration and the mechanisms that drive this process need to be investigated. The classic debate about European integration focusses on the question
why integration occurred. On the one hand, this debate revolved around the state-centric
model stressing the importance and dominance of nation-states in the decision-making process. On the other hand, there is the idea that European integration is pushed forward through a model of multigovernance that argues that nation-states “are losing ground in the face of growing supranationalisation and regionalisation of decision-making” (Kauppi, 2005: 39). Pollack (2001) argues however, that this intergovernmentalist versus neo-functionalist debate has evolved into a discussion where the focus is not so much on who is driving integration, but how it is doing it. Through which logic do the decision-makers actually make their decision?
This contemporary debate has its focus on the more rationalist accounts of integration on the one hand, and constructivist theories that focus on the way identity constitutes action on the European level on the other. In this chapter both sides are outlined. In the first section, the rationalist approaches are outlined together with the male-functions it contains. In the second section, the constructivist approaches are explained and how they work better in accounting for the dynamics of European integration. However, since mainstream
constructivism neglects the importance of agency (Checkel, 1999), the final section introduces structural constructivism as the theoretical framework of the thesis that provides a more holistic approach. This structural constructivist approach, introduced by Pierre Bourdieu in sociology and later applied to the field of European politics by Niilo Kauppi (2005: 1), aims at providing a holistic approach (idem: 48). Holistic in the sense that it acknowledges the importance of not only structure, but of agency as well. This understanding of the mechanism behind European integration will serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis.
2.1 Rationalist Approaches
Contemporary rationalist approaches place self-interested, utility-maximizing actors at the centre of political decision-making. Political agents always try to do what is most beneficial for them or the group that they belong to. Hence, they act through a logic of consequences (Checkel, 1999: 547). This means that agents ‘calculate’ what is the best decision through a cost-benefit analysis. Two threads can be identifies among rationalist approaches, which differ mostly in their empirical scope (Pollack, 2001: 233). In this regard, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) focusses on the intergovernmental choice for institutional design, meaning the question through which kind of institution certain policies need to be executed and decision-making has to take place. Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) on the other hand, has its focus on the day-to-day policy making inside the institutions by these intergovernmental actors (ibid.). RCI scholars acknowledge how ‘the rules of the game’, meaning the institution in or through which a decision has to be made, shapes the outcome of the decision-making process. Checkel (1999: 546) states that in this rational strand of neo-institutionalism, institutions act as constraints on the behaviour of the involved actors, they serve as the intervening variable between agents’ interests and their space to manoeuvre. RCI and LI have in common that they focus at how actors that are involved in European integration maximize the utility of membership and always act according to the outcome of cost-benefit analyses. In LI this quest for cashing one’s own interest consists of a two-step process. This process starts with the formation of domestic preferences which are then aggregated and articulated by national chiefs of government as national preferences. The second step consists of national governments taking these preferences to the intergovernmental bargaining table where “agreements reflect the relative power of each Member State” (Pollack, 2001: 225; see also Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003: 44). What is peculiar about LI however is that in order to make the theory ‘fit’ the process of enlargement of 2004/7, it needs to borrow logic from sociological institutionalism. This branch of neo-institutionalism, which will be further explained below, implies that institutions significantly influence the interests of the actor involved in the institution (Checkel, 1999: 547).
Schimmelfennig (2001) claims that in the enlargement case of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), EU member states were rhetorically entrapped. This means that according to their domestic preferences, they would only desire association agreements with the CEEC, instead of full membership. However, Schimmelfennig (idem: 68) argues that because the member states used rhetoric of a ‘return to Europe’ of the CEEC, they had to follow through on their promise and let them become full members of the EU in order not to lose credibility. This rhetoric entailed that states that “share the collective identity of an international community and adhere to its constitutive values and norms, are also entitled to join its organizations” (idem: 58-59). Thus, the common identity between the EU and the CEEC that existed according to the rhetoric of the member states, made the latter act in line with what was considered appropriate for the institution through which they operated, namely the EU. This suggests that rationalist accounts are not sufficient to fully grasp the dynamics of EU enlargement. In order to account for the logic of appropriateness underpinning these dynamics, a more constructivist approach is needed.
2.2 Constructivist Approaches
Rationalist approaches have been criticised by scholars working from a more constructivist perspective. One major point of concern is that rationalist approaches oversimplify, and therefore reinforce, the division between the national and the supranational (Kauppi, 2005: 4). Pollack (2001: 226) groups sociological institutionalism and constructivism together as being the counterpart of rationalist approaches. The logic of appropriateness is what binds social constructivism and sociological institutionalism together. The main objective of these alternative approaches is to show how ideational factors such as norms, values and worldviews dominate political actions (Saurugger, 2013: 888). These ideational factors form the interests on which actors base their behaviour. This runs counter to the idea in RCI that material factors are what forms behaviour (idem: 890). According to Christiansen et al. (1999: 538) the constructivist project is redirecting research towards “the origin and reconstruction of identities, the impact of rules and norms, the role of language and of political discourses”. Risse (2012) elaborates on the identity aspect present in social constructivism. He argues that during the previous enlargement rounds when the CEEC joined the EU, a particular enlargement discourse was present that pictured the EU as a liberal community with a market economy (idem: 92). Hence, before the new countries could join the EU, they had to become liberal communities with market economies. Because the democratizing CEEC were considered to be sharing the same identity with the EU, their accession process went relatively easy after they complied with the Copenhagen criteria and adjusted their economies. Their “almost natural right to join” made it very difficult for opponents to raise objections against their accession (ibid.). That the CEEC would become part of the EU was far from the originally anticipated outcome after the fall of the Berlin
Wall. This event changed the identity of the CEEC and the EU and altered the course of EU enlargement. The reason why social constructivism can explain changing interests is precisely because it does not hold identity to be constant as is shown above. Constructivism therefore helps to understand the process of European integration since it accounts for the changing of interests and behaviour of the agents involved caused by an evolving identity (Christiansen et al., 1999: 529). However, Kauppi (2005: 13) states that social constructivist accounts are unable to account for the material aspect of the constructions of Europe because it only looks at the discursive or symbolic side. With the material aspect Kauppi refers to the fact that these constructions are realised through the actual actions of the people working in the field and are not just ‘out there’ (ibid.). Mainstream social constructivism claim that norms have power of their own. However, norms can only exist because there are actors that actively support this norm. Social constructivism thus fails to take into account that norms are always embodied.
In the case of sociological institutionalism, the focus is on the capability of the institution to shape preferences and identities of the national elites involved in the process of European integration (Pollack, 2001: 226). Thus, in the theoretical configuration of institutionalism institutions are seen as structures external to agents that constrain or redirect the latter’s actions inside the institution (Schmidt, 2010: 14; Checkel, 1999: 547). This means that institutionalism can only account for continuity, not for change. Change is initiated solely by exogenous shocks and hence, lies outside of the institutionalist framework. Exclusively using sociological institutionalism for one’s research, may therefore lead to overlooking important nuances (Georgakakis & Weisbein, 2010: 96), namely the role of agency. The focus needs to be on how the institution has an impact on the decision-making agents involved, but also the other way around. It should not be assumed that every agent in an institution thinks the same about issues such as enlargement. Therefore, the institutionalisation process needs to be investigated. Just being part of an institution does not imply that the agent adheres to all its rules and values. A straightforward example of this can be found in the European Parliament. Take for instance the heated EP debate on the tenth of March this year where the accession process of Macedonia is discussed (EP, 2015b). Although a general statement had been produced regarding the latest progress report outlining the standpoint of the EP as a whole, this does not imply that there is consensus between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on all issues. In this particular case there is still a considerable number of MEPs that argue that accession negotiations should not be opened while at the same time the EP’s resolution on the matter expresses support for the Commission’s recommendation to indeed open these negotiations. While discussions preceding an eventual common statement are transparent in case of the EP, they are logically also present in meetings of the Commission and the Council, albeit normally behind closed doors. This importance of individual agents is
neglected by sociological institutionalism and social constructivism alike (Kauppi, 2003: 777). Considering this gap in constructivist approaches towards European integration, there is a need for an approach that does take into account the role of agency (Checkel, 1999). It is to this approach that the chapter will now turn.
2.3 A Holistic Framework
Sociological approaches advocate for focusing on the actors that are embedded in social structures. The manner in which both sides have a role to play in the European integration process is of special interest (Van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158; Kauppi & Madsen, 2007: 30). Van Apeldoorn (2000: 158) makes another point of critique towards the established approaches, namely that they only consider the form of the institution and not the socioeconomic purpose that it has. Though he sets out his argument to show that elite capitalist actors are influencing the EU institutions, it also makes sense when the different standpoints of the EU institutions towards enlargement are considered. Not only form, but purpose of the institutions, the people embedded within it and their social trajectories are what explains their behaviour (Georgakakis & Weisbein, 2010: 94). According to Georgakakis and Weisbein (idem: 98) this actor-based approach allows for a redefinition of the EU’s decision-making space “as a social field instead of a set of formal institutions”.
The concept of social field comes from the works of Pierre Bourdieu. According to his
structural constructivism, the dualism between structure and agency does not exist. A pure
structuralist perspective would imply that the agents embedded in the structure would act exclusively according to what is the considered legitimate behaviour within this structural framework. On the other hand, a focus that only includes agency suggests that individuals are free to act according to their own choices and do not have to summit to anyone or anything (Hays, 1994). Bourdieu (1989) translates this notion of structure to a field, a constructed social space wherein certain rules apply. These fields function as places of power relations where all interactions are embedded. This means that agents that act within the field need to internalize its rules.
However, this does not paint the full picture. Agents bring something to the table themselves. This is what Bourdieu (ibid.) describes as habitus, namely the embodied history manifested in the agents’ schemes of perception, thought and action. In short, habitus provide how you are disposed to act. While Bourdieu goes back to one’s primary education to account for a person’s habitus, in the case of the field of enlargement policy it is more the EU’s history that is of concern.
On the one hand, habitus is the result of social structures; on the other hand, habitus also structures practices and reproduces social fields. Thus, both field and habitus reinforce each
other and together they form the practice performed in the field, meaning the actual actions that take place. This implies that adhering to the rules of the field (acting in conformity with the structure) strengthens the legitimacy of this field. The rules of the field are thereby not only confirmed but also reproduced. At the same time however the agent adds to the social field its own experiences it gained from other previous structures in which it was engaged. There is thus no dualism between structure and agency or field and habitus. Instead, they are mutually constitutive.
Kauppi (2005: 48) builds on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu to argue that structural
constructivism can serve as a more holistic approach to political processes in the EU as well.
This approach to European integration builds the bridge between the ideational factors, e.g. the notion that something has to be done, and the material factors of decision-making, which entail the actual active support of the people involved (idem: 41). According to Kauppi (idem: 47) structural constructivism “aims at analysing how individuals and groups institute structured power relations by mobilising resources and regularising certain types of interactions and values at the expense of others”. Schmidt (2010: 14) argues in line of this that the existence and maintenance of institutions derives from the agents ‘background ideational abilities’. This means that agents do not solely derive their values and norms from the institution they work in but bring with them certain ideas, habits and norms from previous structures. This is indeed what Bourdieu coined as being the habitus of agents. In the case of Macedonia’s accession process, the social field is constructed by the EU institutions that deal with enlargement and the power relations that exist between these institutions. Furthermore, the relevant Treaty articles and policy frameworks that apply to the accession process of Macedonia provide for the rules of the social field. In addition, the role distribution between the relevant institutions gives shape to the field. The agents that are active in this field are the EU officials that work on the Macedonian file. These agents bring with them different understandings of the accession process that is not always in line with the mainstream in their institution. Structural constructivism thus provides for an understanding that courses of action, policies and decisions are socially constructed and hence, are formed by the agents that deal with the matter (Jeandesboz, 2007: 390). This means that when there are differences of opinion about a certain matter, for example between MEPs about enlargement to Macedonia, these conflicting interpretations and their outcomes are productive; they construct meaning to a certain issue (ibid.). Therefore we need to look into situated action, because some actions can only be done or are only valuable when executed in a certain field (Kauppi, 2005: 49). Thus, the question needs to be asked how agents make use of the field of EU institutions to form European integration, in this case enlargement policy (idem: 39).
Kauppi (idem: 42) states that indeed the institutions of the EU hold partially differing notions of the future of Europe and thus about further enlargement. The concentration of resources on the supranational level, meaning at the level of the Commission, reinforces technocratic decision-making (idem: 44). Therefore Commission officials could be acting more as technocrats than politicians. This potentially influences the way they regard enlargement, for example to what extent enlargement is considered a political or a bureaucratic process. However, the Commission and the Council are no unitary political institutions (idem: 48), meaning that a representative of a national government might share the same opinion on Macedonia’s candidacy with a representative of the Commission while others in the Council disagree.
2.4 Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has shown that in accounting for how enlargement is understood in the EU, rationalist approaches do not suffice since they are unable to account for why member states has chosen to incorporate less prosperous countries inside the European Union. Instead, the constructivist turn provides deeper knowledge about what it means to enlarge and how differences in understandings about enlargement can be situated. However, to fully grasp the dynamics between policy ideals and outcomes and the interplay between the socially constructed reality and the material outcomes that this provides, there is need for a framework that allows these both sides to be taken into account and to acknowledge that they are mutually constitutive. Structural constructivism, as introduced by Bourdieu and equipped for studying European integration by Kauppi, will therefore serve as the theoretical framework of the thesis.
3. Researching EU enlargement
As has been presented in previous chapters, the thesis tries to find out to what extent different understandings of the enlargement process among EU institutions and officials explain the deadlock in Macedonia’s accession process. In order to research this, the accession process of Macedonia is used as a case of EU enlargement after the CEEC accession in 2004 and 2007. Hence, in trying to answer the research question, the thesis draws on information that helps to figure out the differences in meaning given to this potential enlargement of this country by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The thesis works from the apparent controversy about Macedonia’s accession process. More specifically, it focuses on the position of the three institutions since the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s decision to recommend the Council to open accession talks with Macedonia does not stroke with the actions of the Council, that has been neglecting this recommendation for the past couple of years. The collected empirical body consists of 25 official documents released by these three institutions and five interviews held with EU officials.
The use of documents together with interviews helps to contrast the policy ideal with practice. Kauppi (2005) argues that in order to understand what the construction of enlargement policy means in practice, the researcher has to go to the field. Only then can the researcher understand what this changing reality means for the people “engaged in a web of activities and discourses” (idem: 13). This needs an interpretive approach to the data, because in the end the thesis looks not necessarily for explanations but more for an understanding of how this policy plays out in the field (Bryman, 2008: 15). The two types of data complement each other, since the design is based on the theoretical premises of structural constructivism, which tries to defy the dualism between structure and agency. The data collection builds on this notion. The documents show what has been agreed upon after extensive negotiations and provide the structure, or the field of enlargement policy. The interviews may reveal aspects of the process that led to the drafting of the documents and provides for an analysis of the behaviour of the agents active in this field.
The data is analysed through discourse analysis which will be further explained in the data analysis section of this chapter. Diez (1999: 610) argues that the meaning of words, and thus written documents and spoken interviews, depends on their discursive context and that this context can change over time. Therefore, the collected data runs from 2009 till 2015 to account for discrepancies that develop over time.
The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, the choice for a case-study design is explained and justified. In the second section, the data collection is outlined and the exact documents and interviewees are presented. Then in the final section, the chapter moves on to set out the data analysis, which consists of a discourse analysis working from three different angles, namely the context, the argumentative structure and used metaphors. In addition, this section provides the link with the theoretical framework, research question and driving argument of the thesis. The chapter ends with a conclusion which also provides the link to the following chapters.
3.1 A Particular Case
To better understand how EU enlargement is viewed upon in the European institutions, the accession process of Macedonia is taken as a case in the research. Della Porta and Keating (2008: 226) argue that the challenge of investigating a case is that while uncovering its particular meaning, the results should potentially be related to other cases. Bryman (2008: 52-53) argues however, that a case study should provide for a detailed and intensive analysis and should only be done when the case is the focus of interest in its own right. In this research, Macedonia is indeed not randomly selected from the list of candidate countries in the Western Balkans. The situation in the country is of specific interest, since there is a paradox between the EU institutions regarding the pace of Macedonia’s accession. At the same time however, the question of why this country’s accession process is so particular relates immediately to the roads to membership of other (Balkan) countries and how they compare to Macedonia. Therefore, the research is focusing on the question how different meanings of enlargement explain the impasse in Macedonia’s accession process. The particularities of this case should help to find more general understandings of contemporary EU enlargement.
3.2 Building a Collection of Data
As mentioned above, my research consists of two types of data, namely official reports, conclusions and resolutions of the EU institutions on the one hand and interviews with EU officials on the other. In this section the choice of data is explained and justified.
3.2.1 Constructing the field: official publications
For the documentary analysis, the thesis draws on a collection of documents from the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Firstly, to construct the position of the Commission a number of six Progress Reports of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (2009 - 2014) 2. are analysed together with six Enlargement Strategy and Main
Challenges (2009 – 2014) Since the Commission has recommended the Council to open
accession negotiations with Macedonia for the first time in 2009, all the documents used in the analysis date from 2009 until 2014 or 2010 until 2015. This use of repeated communications of the same type of document may lead to distinguishing certain group-based attitudes (Van Dijk, 2006: 134). The progress reports and strategy papers are easily retrieved from the Commission website. These documents are presented as the annual “enlargement package” of the Commission. This package consists of country specific progress reports and more general strategy papers that are presented to the Council and the Parliament each year around October. In the progress reports, the Commission assesses what has been achieved in the previous year regarding Macedonia’s alignment to the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire. The progress reports serve as a baseline from which the other EU institutions form their own statements. In addition to the country specific progress reports, the Commission publishes their enlargement strategy towards candidate and potential candidate countries, together with its understanding of the main challenges for enlargement towards these countries. Furthermore, these publications contain the Commission’s recommendations that include, since the strategy paper of 2009-2010, the recommendation to open accession negotiations with Macedonia (EC, 2009b: 19). They are therefore an essential part of the documentary analysis.
Secondly, to construct the position of the Council regarding enlargement to Macedonia, a number of six Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association
Process (2009 – 2014) are analysed. The extra Council conclusions on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2015) is also added, though it is different in structure compared to
the annual Council conclusions. The Council conclusions contain general points about the Council’s enlargement strategy in which the Council takes note of progress reports of (potential) candidate countries and outlines key challenges regarding future EU enlargement. In addition, it has statements specifically regarding the Western Balkans (with the exception of the conclusions of 2014) and points regarding each country. These documents are therefore well equipped to help to understand where, according to the Council, the impediments to Macedonia’s accession are situated. On the one hand, the remarks on enlargement in general will be analysed and on the other, notions of enlargement to the Western Balkans and naturally to Macedonia in particular will be investigated. Since the domestic situation has been deteriorating recently, the Council has released a separate set of conclusions on the situation in Macedonia on the 21st of April 2015. These Council
conclusions on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been mentioned multiple times by the interviewees as being a significant step in the relation between Macedonia and the EU. Therefore, this document is submitted to the collection of Council documents. This brings the total amount of Council documents to seven. All conclusions mentioned are openly available via the Council website.
Finally, in the case of the standpoint of the European Parliament, a number of six European
Parliament resolutions on the Progress Reports on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2010 – 2015) are analysed. These resolutions are adopted annually. In each of
them, the EP comments on the progress reports of the European Commission about Macedonia. They take note of the recent reports of international organizations dealing with the Macedonian case and give reasons for the statements they make in the publication. The statements include for example that the EP utters its concerns about the domestic situation and that the EP is calling for more active EU engagement (EP, 2015a). The resolutions run from 2010 (on the Commission’s progress report of 2009) till 2015 and hence consist of six documents. The resolutions can be retrieved from the EP website. This part of the documentary analysis will be complemented occasionally by the EP debate of the tenth of March of this year about Macedonia’s accession process to provide for the internal Parliamentary discussion about the issue. In the following table the analysed documents are listed. They are grouped per institution and type of report.
Table 3.1 Overview of analysed documents.
Institution: Document: Number:
European Commission
Progress Reports of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2009 -
2014) 6
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges (2009 – 2014). 6
Council of the European Union
Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association
Process (2009 – 2014) 6
Council conclusions on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2015) 1
European Parliament
European Parliament resolutions on the Progress Reports on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2010 – 2015) 3
6 European Parliament (2015b) 2014 Progress report on the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (debate), 10 March 2015
3Occasionally complemented by: European Parliament (2015b) 2014 Progress report on the former Yugoslav
3.2.2 Interviewing the agents: EU officials working on the Macedonia file
Documents are however, not the only data collected for this research. To gain deeper insights on the politics of enlargement policy and thus to complement the document analysis, the thesis draws on interviews with EU officials. This part of the analysis is based on five interviews conducted among different EU officials.4
Since the aim is to interview people who are relevant to the research question, a purposive sampling strategy has been used (Bryman, 2008: 458). Bryman (ibid.) gives two general approaches to purposive sampling, namely snowball sampling and theoretical sampling. Although I was redirected to the right and/or available person in two cases, the snowball sampling frame has not been used, since these redirections happened before the interviews took place and were unintentional. Theoretical sampling is a method that bases the sampling size on the level of theoretical saturation the sample brings with it. If all the acquired theoretical concepts are covered, there is no need to further expand the sample size (idem: 415-416). In this research, theoretical saturation has been reached when each relevant institution is in some way represented by an interviewee. In other words, the aim is to interview at least one official from each relevant institution. Potential interviewees were emailed directly using the ‘who is who?’ website function of the EU to extract their e-mail addresses. Special importance was given to reaching out to people from the different EU institutions, namely the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU. Another criterion was that the interviewees had to have some kind of connection with the accession process of Macedonia in their daily work. I have reached out to eleven EU officials resulting in five interviews held during two research trips to Brussels in May 2015. The interviews took place in either the office of the respective respondent or at a cafeteria. Every interviewee is active in a different part of the ‘field’ that is the EU. The participants consist of two Council officials, one EP worker, one Commission bureaucrat and an EEAS employee.
Contrary to the resolutions and reports used in the documentary analysis, interviews are of course not ‘easily retrieved’ from EU websites. However, the collection of interviewees is satisfactory, since it covers the different EU institutions. Although no actual MEPs were interviewed (they were non-responsive or unable to meet me), the interviewed EP official did provide sufficient information about the role of the EP in the accession process of Macedonia. Theoretical saturation has thus been reached.
4 The names and occupations of the interviewees, as well as the interview transcripts, have been provided
All interviews lasted between 30 and 50 minutes and four out of five have been recorded. Since the interviews were held in a semi-structured format, a list of questions has been used for each interview. However, depending on the course of the interview, the order of questions changed or questions did not need to be asked since the interviewee ‘answered’ the question by themselves. Interviewing in this manner provided structure for comparability of the interviews, while allowing the respondents to answer questions on their own terms (May, 2011: 135).
Table 3.2 Overview of EU officials interviewed.
Institution: Number of interviewees:
European Commission 1 Council of the European Union 2 European Parliament 1 European External Action Service 1
3.3 A Three-fold Discourse Analysis
For the analysis of the collected data, the thesis moves away from general statements about enlargement in order to find more contextual explanations. This means it will not be measuring the extent to which Macedonia is adhering to the Copenhagen criteria, or investigate whether all the scope conditions for successful Europeanization are in place. Instead, a qualitative approach is used. A qualitative or interpretive research is useful for understanding events or processes, since it is equipped to discover the meaning people attribute to their behaviour in the external world. An interpretive analysis can therefore explain the way agents justify their actions in a certain structure or field. In addition, what is taken to be valid or true is not necessarily fixed, but is embedded in structures that also form the identity of a certain group or institution. Van Dijk (2006: 121) argues that “when group members explain, motivate or legitimate their (group-based) actions, they typically do so in terms of ideological discourse”. However, this does not imply that members of a certain group only carry out the ideas and values of the group, they do have their own understandings and beliefs (idem: 124). This is indeed the link with the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter. Structural constructivism takes note of the actor as well as the structure in which the actor behaves. Both actor and structure figure as different sides of the same coin and should not be distinguished from one another. This is why the theoretical premises of structural constructivism fit this research design.
In addition, contrary to quantitative methods, qualitative approaches account not only for what has been produced but also how the decisions which informed the production have been
made (May, 2011: 210). A political problem should therefore be examined in relation “to the particular narrative in which it is discussed” (Hajer, 2006: 66). Therefore, a discourse analysis is used for the examination of the official documents and the transcription of the interviews. The analysis is based on the following definition of discourse by Hajer (idem: 67) who understands: “discourse as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices”. Discourses are able to form and constrain what is thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation (Neumann, 2008: 62). To borrow from Hajer (2006: 66) again: “a narrative constructs a particular problem” (emphasis in original). In the case of this research the problem is the apparent disagreement between the EU institutions whether or not to open accession negotiations with Macedonia. Thus, the focus of the analysis lies on the discovering of ideas, concepts and categories in the documents and interviews to find out which meaning is given to enlarging to Macedonia and how this is uttered through practices, such as recommending opening accession negotiations. The discourse analysis is performed on both official documents and interviews with EU officials. Both types of texts are analysed using a three-fold analysis which is outlined below. Firstly, the context of the document or interview is considered. Here, the focus lies on the production of the text. Who made decisions about the text? What is their role in the policy process? Do the producers all think the same about the text? How does the document or interview fit into the concerned policy process? (Ginger, 2006: 347). Hajer (2006: 70) poses the term discourse coalition in this regard: “discourse should always be conceived of in interrelation with the practices in which it is produced, reproduced and transformed”. Thus, the manner in which the document has come to life and who is responsible for it relate to any discourse established in the text. Secondly, the structure of the text itself is considered. Here the aim is to distinguish certain story lines that prevail in the structure of the official documents and interviews (idem: 69). To do this, relations between the mentioned objects and subjects will be investigated (Ginger, 2006: 347), for example between the member states and Macedonia, or the enlargement process and the domestic situation of Macedonia. In addition, the dominant and subordinate themes in the texts are uncovered and interpreted (ibid.). When relations and themes are mapped, the question is raised on how the given information (or absent information for that matter) relates to the story line and what this says about the normative position of the text. In this case, special focus is given to the connection between the technical information, for example the level of Macedonia’s alignment to the acquis, and policy decisions such as whether or not opening accession negotiations. In sum, in this part of the analysis the link between the argumentative structure or story line and the political position of the (producer of) the text is made. Finally, the use of metaphors and/or emblematic issues is analysed (Hajer, 2006: 68). The focus lies on how an
emblem is used to exhibit a general understanding of how an issue such as the deadlock of Macedonia’s accession process is constructed (ibid.). In addition, the exact way the documents and interviewees speak of certain subjects is part of the analysis, whether they belong to the in- or outgroup (Van Dijk, 2006: 124). Thus, the use of words such as ‘us’ and ‘our’ opposed to ‘them’ and ‘their’ is examined.
Table 3.3 Overview of data analysis
Discourse analysis: Mode of analysis:
Context The focus lies on the production of the text: who, why, how?
Structure
The aim is to distinguish certain story lines that prevail in the structure of the official documents and interviews: story lines and themes link to political position of the producer.
Metaphors The focus lies on how an emblem is used to exhibit a general understanding of how an issue is constructed: metaphors, examples, us/them.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the thesis is going to research its question of how different understandings of enlargement are explaining the impasse in Macedonia’s accession process. The selected documents and interviews provide for a rich, diverse body of data. Furthermore, it connects the methodology with the theoretical framework of the thesis since it focuses on the structure of the enlargement policy field (documents) and tries to figure out how the agents active in the field understand their position and their role in the Macedonian accession process (interviews). Through the three-fold analysis of discourse the documents and interviews are thoroughly researched. In the next chapters the empirical body will be examined through this particular system of discourse analysis. To do this properly however, further attention needs to be given to how enlargement policy has changed since the 2004-2007 rounds until the current situation where the Western Balkans are up for enlargement. Therefore, the following chapter deals with the specificities and new challenges of EU enlargement after the ‘Big Bang’.
4.
Framing Enlargement
The previous chapters have provided the theoretical and methodological frameworks for the thesis. In order to come to an understanding of how different meanings given to enlargement have developed, a genealogy of the policy from the Big Bang enlargement to the current candidacy of the Wester Balkans is appropriate. Enlargement has been widely considered the EU’s most successful policy tool (Commission official, 2015). Especially, the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) is seen as a great achievement, since it united a divided continent. The EU felt a sense of responsibility to these countries and stated that they should ‘return to Europe’, since they shared the same European identity (Risse, 2012). The tool that the EU used for preparing the CEEC for membership was conditionality. In that sense, not much has changed in the accession process of the Western Balkans. The
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) used for engaging with this region extensively
makes use of conditionality tools as well. In this chapter, the EU approach to the Western Balkans, including the SAP, is compared with the previous accession process of the CEEC. This comparison is then used to account for certain understandings of enlargement that are apparent today in order to answer the research question. In the first section, the genealogy of the SAP is covered and its technical similarities and differences with the CEEC accession process are considered. In the second section, the more contextual and political differences are outlined. Finally, the chapter provides an answer to the question how enlargement policy is framed as a key issue in EU politics and how this framing has changed over time.
4.1
The Technicalities of a Framework
While the EU was working on CEEC accession, the countries of the Western Balkans were entrenched in numerous conflicts. This made the region a direct concern for European security, but at the same time it was not considered to be part of the ‘European mainstream’ (Elbasani, 2008: 294). This made the EU’s intervention in the region mainly focused on containing crises and not so much working on a possible European future for the respective countries. However, this changed due to the Yugoslav wars happening throughout the 1990s. The EU launched its Regional Approach that supported neighbourly relations through regional cooperation, but still did not include any mention of a European perspective (idem: 295- 296). This changed in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo in 1999. This was the second time the EU failed to prevent escalation of a conflict (after Bosnia in 1991-1995) and it therefore forced the EU to change its former policies with the Balkans. This has eventually led to the Stabilization and Association Process that, according to Elbasani (idem: 298),
brought the region into the European mainstream, meaning that it provided a European perspective for the respective countries.
This policy framework uses the same mechanisms as the accession process of the CEEC. According to Phinnemore (2013: 28) “no analysis of the EU’s relations with the Western Balkans can fail to ignore the similarities with its engagement with the CEEC during the 1990s and the years leading up to their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007”. For instance, the focus in the SAP is, just like it was for the CEEC, on trade liberalization instead of financial aid (ibid.) and utilizes a graduated frame of conditionality that was also present during CEEC enlargement. Both frameworks use the Copenhagen criteria as the main rules countries need to adhere to, implying that the goal of the SAP is indeed EU membership. However, differences between both accession processes are present as well. On the question what has changed in enlargement policy compared to the CEEC enlargement rounds, one EP official answered that “it has changed slightly […], it has been increasingly clear that some chapters […] are very important, which are talking about democratic reform, independence of the judiciary, rule of law. […] The idea is now […] that these chapters should be one of the first ones to be opened and one of the last to be closed, because they’re so difficult” (EP official, 2015). In addition to the order of chapters to negotiate, there are other changes in the contemporary enlargement process. In the case of the Western Balkans, the Copenhagen criteria have been supplemented by conditions on regional cooperation (a leftover form the Regional Approach) and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Phinnemore, 2013: 29). The policy framework thus contains a more bilateral approach in that it differentiates between the Balkan countries, instead of considering them as a block, which was indeed the case in the CEEC enlargement process. The bilateral focus however, runs against the regional dimension of the policy framework (Elbasani, 2008: 301). In addition, the SAP brings with it a dual approach to the Western Balkans, namely stability and association. Elbasani calls it a “complex, if not conflictual, agenda” (ibid.) that signifies that the main goal for the EU was, or is, stabilization (idem: 299) and not necessarily a European perspective.
While taken these differences into account, in general it can be stated that the additional requirements included in the SAP together with its dual focus do not signify a completely new policy framework for the Western Balkans. The technical criteria are thus more or less the same for the CEEC and the countries in the Western Balkans. Schimmelfennig (2008: 933) goes a little further and claims that the only thing that has changed is the level of domestic problems in the SAP countries. According to him the political conditionality has remained the same, but because of these domestic issues, its effectiveness has weakened. However, what Schimmelfennig fails to take into account is that although the technical criteria have
remained more or less consistent throughout both accession processes, the context in which this all played out has changed, and not solely domestically in the SAP countries. Phinnemore (2013: 27) underwrites this when saying that while the prospect of enlargement still depends partly on the speed and manner in which countries reform, in the end it is also about how much integration the EU is willing to provide. This and other contextual aspects will be elaborated in the next section.
4.3 Contextual differences
In the previous section it was concluded that although there are technical differences between the enlargement policy during the CEEC enlargement and the current one for the Western Balkans, on the whole the structure of the policy has remained the same. This section argues that this is not the case for the (political) context during which the accession processes take place. First, the expanded size of the EU is considered as having an influence on enlargement policy. Secondly, the increasing lack of public and political support for the accession process marks a significant step in the framing of enlargement policy. Finally, the role of the historic setting is considered.
One obvious contextual difference with the enlargement round of 2004 and 2007 is the sheer size of the EU. The Union consisted of fifteen member states during the CEEC enlargement and since then has almost doubled its number to 28. Phinnemore (2013: 29) claims that a smaller number of members together with the economic growth at the time provided for a relatively smooth integration process in the 2000s compared to the current situation.
In addition, there appears to be a popular ambivalence and sometimes even hostility towards further integration (ibid.). The fading willingness of member states to enlarge has been conceptualized by some scholars as ‘enlargement fatigue’. Szolucha (2010: 1) defines fatigue as the unwillingness to grant EU membership to new states. This seems to be the case for the accession of the Western Balkans and is partly triggered by the challenges of integrating the CEEC, especially Bulgaria and Romania (Szolucha, 2010, in: Vachudova, 2014: 123). Woelk (2013: 470) argues that the Western Balkans even have to deal with pre-accession fatigue, meaning that even before actual negotiations have started, the member states are not putting an effort in the accession process. Vachudova (2014: 125) however, claims that the hampering process is not so much caused by indifference from the member states, but by difficult conditions in the (potential) candidate countries of the Western Balkans. According to her, the “underlying dynamics of enlargement remain largely the same because enlargement brings economic and especially geopolitical benefits over time” (ibid.). Phinnemore (2013: 33) acknowledges that indeed there has been no clearly expressed opposition to a European future for the Western Balkans. However, some member states have tried to block progress in the accession process of some countries. The name conflict
between Greece and Macedonia is one example of this, since Greece is said to be blocking the opening of accession negotiations between Macedonia and the EU (this will be further investigated in the following chapters). According to Phinnemore (ibid.), there does exist a shared preference between the member states for a more gradual process of enlargement, which is leading EU policy officials to seek alternatives to full membership for these countries (Szolucha, 2010: 1). Some EU leaders have asked for a slowing down of the process, since their public support for enlargement is waning. This has led German Chancellor Angela Merkel to propose a ‘privileged partnership’ for the Western Balkans as on option for the European perspective that is promised to the region (Elbasani, 2008: 305). Grabbe (2014: 41) therefore, concludes that Croatia’s accession may prove to be the last new member for the coming decade that gains full membership. The German case exemplifies that there is a possibility that a new type of partnership will come into existence that is permanently less than full membership. However, there have not yet been any written confirmation from the EU side that this indeed is a possible outcome of the accession process of the Western Balkans.
Besides the changing size of the EU and its ambivalence towards enlargement, there is another reason for the difficult accession process of the Western Balkans. Phinnemore (2013: 30) argues that the historic setting is completely different when compared to the CEEC enlargement. In the latter case, it was the collapse of the Soviet-Union and the end of the Cold War that came with it, that provided for a narrative of the CEEC ‘returning to Europe’. However, in the case of the Western Balkans, the EU is presented with a group of weak states, still recovering from the after maths of the Yugoslav wars and dealing with ethnic tensions (ibid.). According to Turhan (2010: 3), the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars in the beginning of the 1990s revealed the EU’s impotence to act as a game changer in these particular conflicts. This has led to a securitization of the EU enlargement policy, with high conditionality and the externalization of EU policy. The outlook on membership was given to the Western Balkans to secure Europe’s ‘backyard’, even more so since the region is enclosed by the EU since the previous enlargement rounds. This has made the EU to step into the accession process with a negative connotation, namely the idea that ties between the EU and the Western Balkans need to be tied to prevent them from descending in just another conflict.
4.4 New Framing of Enlargement?
Taken all these differences into account, how has the CEEC enlargement contributed to the way enlargement policy is understood in contemporary Europe? This section argues that enlargement policy now includes an extra focus on the level of sustainability of the
implemented reforms, the fight against corruption and whether there exists a conflict over a candidate country’s status.
According to Grabbe (2014: 47), it is at least clear to the EU that state-building should come before EU membership, especially in the young countries of the Western Balkans. This means that state-institutions need to be build, corruption has to be banned and independence of the judiciary guaranteed. Only then should a country become eligible for membership. According to one EP official the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 have shown that issues like the rule of law and independence of the judiciary are not simply reforms that you implement in a new country and be done with it: “It’s a sort of administrative culture, or political culture [that] has to change and it doesn’t change overnight and it may not be enough to just do a law, you […] have to also live it, fill it with life and this might take years” (EP official, 2015). This indicates that in general, the enlargement process will take longer than before. This political culture that needs to change implies also that in the case of Macedonia, officials from both government and opposition need to understand that even though they differ in opinion, they still need to find compromises since they have a shared responsibility (Council official I, 2015). The growing distrust between both sides indicates however, that it will indeed take years before a culture of collaboration is fully established in the country.
In addition, there is the problem of corruption that is of serious concern for the EU. Corruption provided for severe difficulties with the integration of Bulgaria and Romania
after they became EU member states. To prevent a repetition of this, conditionality is extra
high for the Western Balkans (Grabbe, 2014). Therefore the process of pre-accession is taking longer with the Western Balkans than with the CEEC countries, with the extreme case of Macedonia being a candidate country for ten years without the setting of a date for opening accession negotiations.
This increased length of time in the waiting room is also cause by another lesson the EU learned from the Big Bang enlargement. The case of Cyprus showed that it should not allow in a country with an unresolved conflict over its status (idem: 50). The EU’s optimism proved to be misplaced since this bilateral problem has now became EU wide, at least according to Cyprus. Therefore, the EU is hesitant to strengthen its ties with countries that are dealing with bilateral issues, whether they are about the shared border or the acknowledgement of a country’s name (Grabbe, 2010: 5). This has contributed to the slow accession process of Macedonia since its issues with Greece and Bulgaria have yet to be settled.
4.5 Conclusion
The technical and contextual differences of enlargement policy between then and now have shown that it has become an increasingly problematized policy. Looking at the evolution of
