Burundi and Rwanda:
A comparative study of sexual violence in genocide
Photo: Reuters/Corinne Dufka. Rwanda 19 July 1994
Lara Alias
Amsterdam, March 2015
Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Supervisor and first reader: Karel Berkhoff (NIOD) Second reader: Thijs Bouwknegt (NIOD)
University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Humanities
M.A. Program Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Acknowledgements 1
Introduction 2
Sexual violence and warfare 2
The definition of sexual violence 7
What is genocide? 9
Methodology 11
1. Violence and Genocide in Burundi 12
Independence and ethnic division 14
Dictatorship and oppression 16
The 1972 Genocide against Hutus 18
Conclusion 22
2. Violence and Genocide in Rwanda 23
The Social and Ethnic Revolution of 1959 – 1962 25
The Rwandan Republics 26
Civil war and society 30
The 1994 Genocide against Tutsis 34
Conclusion 37
3. Sexual violence in Burundi 39
Burundian women and the 1972 Genocide 40
4. Sexual violence in Rwanda 42
Rwandan women during the civil war 43
Rwandan women and the 1994 Genocide 45
Sexual violence by militias 48
Rape by the military sector and civilian authorities 49
Collective sexual slavery 50
Individual sexual slavery 51
Sexual violence and mutilation 52
Conclusion 55
Misogynist rhetoric in a comparative perspective 57
Bibliography 64
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank the brave men and women who did not only survive these horrible ordeals, but were strong enough to make known their terrible stories and experiences whilst defying alienation and exclusion by their communities. Thank you all for your bravery and strength.
Also, I would like to thank the woman who focused my attention to the importance of gender-relations within society. Professor dr. Pamela Pattynama and her class ‘Media, Culture and Identity’ at the University of Amsterdam not only inspired me in my studies, it inspired and changed me as a person.
Likewise, I would like to thank the strongest woman I know, my mother. She inspires me on a daily-basis and has made me the person I am today. Furthermore, she has always been there for me when I felt unsure about this research and has taught me to always follow my heart and gut instinct. Additionally, I would like to thank my family and friends,
especially Pieter Nicolai, for their love and support and for guiding me when I felt extremely lost. A special thanks goes out to Sytze de Jong, Richenell Clark and Helena Uzelac.
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Karel Berkhoff, for letting me figure things out all by myself and pushing me when needed. Also a special thanks goes out to my second reader Thijs Bouwknegt.
Introduction
During the genocidal conflicts of the 1990s, namely the Rwandan and Bosnian genocide, rape played an important and prominent role within the events. During the Rwandan genocide approximately 90% of Rwandan women were sexually abused.1 According to the UN
approximately 60,000 women were sexually assaulted during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia.2 The 1971 conflict in Bangladesh between Bangladesh and Pakistan led to 3
million deaths, 10 million refugees and between 200,000 and 400,000 victims of sexual violence.3 Mass rapes and rape camps were not uncommon during the conflict. The
Cambodian genocide, in comparison, has a different character. It seems that on sexual violence during the Khmer Rouge regime there is not a lot of information. Survivor
testimonies are scarce but there is evidence that sexual violence, even though not as prevalent as other genocides, did occur. But what explains the limited amount of sexual violence against enemies of the Cambodian regime? Why are there big differences between cases with a relatively small amount of sexual violence and cases in which almost the entire female population was the victim of sexual violence, such as the case of Rwanda?
Even though many scholars wrote about sexual violence during conflict, up until now there has been little research to find out why the level of sexual violence differs from conflict to conflict. Is it because of ideology, social factors or perhaps other elements? To find out this research will compare Burundi and Rwanda, both former Belgian colonies in Africa, with a similar ethnic composition, during their genocides. These genocides had the same actors, and occurred only a few decades apart. When looking at modern genocides one finds that during every genocidal event sexual violence has occurred, however the extent to which sexual violence occurred differs. The core question of this research is which elements determine the level of sexual violence during genocidal events.
Sexual violence and warfare
Rape has accompanied multiple wars, often under the cover of religions or revolutions and has been around since written record. Rape is described in the Bible in the story of Dinah and 1 P.A. Weitsman, ‘The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and
Rwanda’, in: Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008) no. 3, 561-578, 573.
2 http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml [16-06-2014].
3 K.G. Neill, ‘Duty, Honor, Rape: Sexual Assault Against Women During War’, in: Journal of
in Hammurabi’s code.4 Furthermore, during the times of the ancient Greeks rape was socially
accepted within warfare, with women as legitimate booty, concubines, slave labors and trophy’s. Even in the beginning of the twentieth century, survivor testimonies described rape during the Armenian Genocide, but that did not received a lot of attention. However, a shift occurred during the First World War. ‘When the Germans invaded Belgium in August 1914, rape was suddenly catapulted into prominence as the international metaphor of Belgian humiliation.’5 During the Second World War, according to Brownmiller, for the Germans, and
to a similar extent for the Japanese, rape began to play a serious and logical role in the
achievement of what they saw as their ultimate objective: the total humiliation and destruction of inferior peoples and the establishment of their own master race, despite German legislation against the so-called ‘race defilement’.6 Although there was evidence of sexual violence in the
transcripts of the Nuremberg Trials, amongst others about torture, forced prostitution, sexual mutilation and rape; and article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention discussed the safety of women during warfare; after the Holocaust time and time again we have seen that women remain vulnerable for sexual violence.7 In fact many genocides in the 20th century have been
accompanied by sexual violence, often in large numbers. Therefore one can conclude that rape has become an inherent element of modern genocide, since it contributes to the total humiliation and destruction of inferior peoples.
Sexual violence remains an effective tool during warfare for it does not only affect the women in question, but the entire social group, as well as social and environmental
conditions.
‘Should one accept the view that rape can be seen in nearly any culture and at any time of history, it can then be debated that a patriarchal ideology of rape has subsequently developed, allowing the act to evolve into a principal weapon of power over women. This ideology particularly manifests itself during times 4 S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will. Men, Women and Rape. A Conscious Process of
Intimidation By Which all Men Keep All Women in a State of Fear (New York 1975) 35.
5 S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 40. 6 Ibidem, 49.
7 K. D. Askin, War Crimes Against Women. Prosecution in International War Tribunals (The Hague 1997) 97.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Article 27.
‘Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.’
of war, instilling rape as being a man’s conquest over a woman’s body, a triumph of physical strength and manhood. Taken further, this ideology has the effect of becoming a conscious process of intimidation in which men as a gender group keep women as a whole in a perpetual state of fear.’8
Considering that sexual violence is a process of intimidation, one must conclude that sexual violence has nothing to do with desire but with power. Rape should not be seen as ‘an
aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation of aggression.’9 Sexual
violence therefore is an expression of rage, violence, dominance, degradation, humiliation and submission.10 In this view gang rapes are a demonstration of masculinity, establishing ones
status within the group.11 In the context of war, mass rape has an additional message: it does
not only humiliate women, it communicates towards males that the men around the women in question are unable to protect ‘their’ women, thus wounding them in their masculinity and branding them as incompetent.12 ‘The historic price of a woman’s protection by a man against
a man was the imposition of chastity and monogamy. A crime committed against her body became a crime against the male estate.’13
Therefore, rape can also be seen as a genocidal tool if used to eliminate group identity, either by murder or physical and mental harm. Sexual assault, rape and forced prostitution can lead to death, either directly, through killing subsequent to rape, or indirectly trough infection with STI’s such as HIV.14 ‘Sexual assault also can create physical damage that
prevents women from becoming pregnant in the future or mental harm that prevents a woman from voluntarily engaging in sexual activity and conceiving.’15 The stigma of being a victim
of sexual violence can lead to isolation and expulsion from the group, especially within a patriarchal society. Furthermore, forced impregnation in a patriarchal society means the imposition ethnicity, for in such a society the father and perpetrator passes it on. Therefore sexual violence can be seen as ‘social death’ since it harms not only the ‘social vitality’ of a 8 K.G. Neill, Duty, Honor, Rape, 44.
9 R. Seifert, ‘War and Rape. A Preliminary Analysis’, in: A. Stiglmayer, (ed.), Mass Rape: the
War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Nebraska 1994) 54-72, 55.
10 R. Seifert, War and Rape, ibidem. 11 Ibidem, 56.
12 Ibidem, 59.
13 S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 17.
14 R.M. Schott, ‘War Rape, Natality and Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research 13 (2011) no. 1-2, 5-21, 9.
community and its relations but also all other aspects that give meaning to one’s identity and links one to both past and future. 16 ‘Gender and sex are linked to population and group
survival through socialisation, marriage and family patterns, and reproduction. Reproduction serves to continue the group: genocide to destroy it.’17 Often genocides are gender specific.
In some genocides the focus lays on male members of the targeted group, while spearing the lives of children and women. In others all members of the group are targets for the
perpetrators. Within genocidal events sexual violence can assume a different character. In the twentieth century the role of sexual violence within genocide changed. It evolved from being tolerated, to being encouraged and sanctioned, to institutionalization and instrumentalization as a war tactic in Bosnia and Rwanda.18
According to Helen Fein when looking at modern genocide from the twentieth century onwards, there was no longer any general incentive by the perpetrator to preserve and protect women of the victim group, not even to save them in order to utilise them as slaves.
Furthermore, perpetrators of modern genocide usually have shown little interest in
appropriating the reproduction of women of the victim-group. This all is regardless of the type of genocide.19 Fein distinguishes four types of genocide, namely: an ideological genocide to
fulfill an ideology or myth; retributive genocide to eliminate a real or potential threat; developmental genocide to eliminate an indigenous group impeding economic exploitation and development; and despotic genocide to spread terror.20 These categories can overlap and
motives might vary in different time-periods. In her article Fein classifies Rwanda as a retributive and gender-specific genocide in which rape served as an instrumental policy. To offer some sort of an explanation for the difference between gender-specific genocides and gender-neutral genocides, such as the Holocaust and the regime of the Khmer Rouge, she argues that rape was not reported as a pattern by the principal perpetrators, and both genocides showed a lack of a pattern of gender discrimination and sanctioned rape.21 Even
though Fein has a good point, her explanation seems incomplete.
Dara Kay Cohen in her work ‘Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)’ uses dataset of rape during civil war over three decades in order to 16 Ibidem, 10.
17 H. Fein, ‘Genocide and Gender: The Uses of Women and Group Destiny’, in: Journal of
Genocide Research 1 (1999) no. 1, 43-63, 43.
18 H. Fein, Genocide and Gender, 49. 19 Ibidem, 59.
20 Ibidem, 45. 21 Ibidem, 58, 53.
find out why some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do. In her work she argues that it is not more likely for rape to occur during ethnic wars, genocides, or in countries with greater gender inequality.22 She offers the explanation of ‘combatant
socialization’. ‘Rape -especially gang rape- enables groups with forcibly recruited fighters to create bonds of loyalty and esteem from initial circumstances of fear and mistrust.’23
Participation in group rape in this view is a component of hazing new members and
maintaining social order among existing members.24 ‘The “need” for bonding may be greater
in groups that have forcibly recruited their fighters and where the members must immediately begin to depend on each other for protection, food, shelter, and survival despite having little foundation for mutual trust.’25 However her explanation is inconclusive in the case of Rwanda
since the Interahamwe did not need to forcibly recruit its members. Furthermore she argues that ‘the statistically significant coefficient indicates that genocide may actually decrease the likelihood of rape—perhaps because of pollution norms… Finally, ethnic cleansing is
negatively associated with rape by insurgents.’26 In the case of Rwanda many victims recalled
remarks about ethnicity during or after the event and in Rwanda sexual violence can be seen as a genocidal tool. Therefore Cohen’s alternative explanation seems inconclusive in the case of rape during genocidal events.
Scholar Peter Uvin argues that the dynamics that led to massive violence in Burundi and Rwanda are textbook cases in which ethnicity led to different processes.27 ‘Burundi is a
case of superimposition of social cleavages, with fault lines in political power, economic wealth, and ethnicity reinforcing each other. In Rwanda the dividing line between the haves and the have-nots was regional and social, not ethnic…whenever this elite was threatened, it exacerbated ethnic divisions to thwart democratization and power sharing.’28 The main
strength of the political regimes in Rwanda ‘lay not in their oppression, but in their capacity to legitimize themselves.’29 The political regimes in Rwanda did not only portray themselves as
in the pursuit of economic development for the masses, they installed a true democracy 22 D.K. Cohen, ‘Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980 – 2009)’, in:
American Political Science Review 107 (2013) no. 3, 461-477, 461.
23 D.K. Cohen, Explaining Rape during Civil War, ibidem. 24 Ibidem, 456.
25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem, 471.
27 P. Uvin, Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda, 253. 28 Ibidem.
representing the majority.30 This ideology was accompanied by a legitimized structural and
institutional discrimination towards Tutsis. ‘It was part of the institutional structure of Hutu power-administrative reminders that the Tutsi were different from everyone else and the state was watching out for the interests of the majority Hutu.’31 In contrast, in Burundi ethnicity
was used differently by the political regime. ‘In Burundi the ruling elite represented a very narrow social base. It thus could not use an ethnic-social discourse to legitimize its position and faced a more permanent (and often violent) challenge.’32 When looking at Uvin’s theory,
and his distinction between the utilization of ethnicity within a genocidal context, one can conclude that this differentiation is essential to the development of genocide. Perhaps it is this division that is crucial to the treatment of females during a genocidal event.
The definition of sexual violence
Many national courts and international organizations established their own definitions of sexual violence. Those established by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were
internationally seen as groundbreaking. The case against Jean-Paul Akayesu proved to be the first in which international criminal law established a legal definition for sexual violence while holding him accountable for acts of genocide and sexual violence. According to the Trial Chamber rape is:
‘A form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts…Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation,
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed
30 Ibidem, 257-258. 31 Ibidem, 258. 32 Ibidem.
on a person under circumstances which are coercive. This act must be committed:
(a) as part of a wide spread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population;
(c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds.’33
In this definition sexual violence was not only a physical invasion of the sexual nature, but sexual violence could also be part of a genocidal campaign as will be shown in the chapter on sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide. Mere months after the Akayesu judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled in the Anto Furundžija case:
‘Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the objective elements of rape:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.’34
In this research sexual violence is any sexual act that violates one’s physical integrity, by force, threat of force or coercion, including rape, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization. Furthermore, in this definition perpetrators can be of both the male and female sex, as well as the victims. Sexual abuse is often directed towards females, but one must not forget that males can also be the subject of sexual violence. Especially during the Yugoslav conflict of the last decade of the twentieth century Bosniak males were often targets in the camps, as exemplified by the following event:
33 Prosecutor v. Akayezu, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 597-598.
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf [04-02-2014].
34 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No.: IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 185. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf [04-02-2014].
‘After G and Witness H had been forced to pull Jasmin Hrnic’s body about the hangar floor they were ordered to jump down into the inspection pit, then Fikret Harambasic, who was naked and bloody from beating, was made to jump into the pit with them and Witness H was ordered to lick his naked bottom and G to suck his penis and then to bite his testicles. Meanwhile a group of men in uniform stood around the inspection pit watching and shouting to bite harder. All three were then made to get out of the pit onto the hangar floor and Witness H was threatened with a knife that both his eyes would be cut out if he did not hold Fikret Harambasic’s mouth closed from screaming; G was then made to lie between the naked Fikret Harambasic’s legs, and while the latter struggled, hit and bite his testicles. G then bit off one of Fikret Harambasic’s testicles and spit it out and was told he was free to leave.’35
In this research the focus will be on female targets for this is somewhat easier to research considering the greater amount of silence and shame surrounding males and their sexual abuse.
What is genocide?
The term genocide was coined by the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his book ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’. In the book he combined the Greek genos, ‘race, people’ and Latin cīdere ‘to kill’, entailing ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.’36 According to Lemkin
genocide did not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, but rather a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.37 Within this
definition the disintegration of political and social institutions, culture, language, nationalism, religion and economic existence; the destruction of personal liberty, health, dignity, and the 35 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-I-T, Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgment, 7 may 1997, para. 206.
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf [04-02-2014].
See more on sexual violence directed towards males in Bosnia: A. Gopsill, ‘Implausible Victims. Sexual Abuse of Men within Detention Facilities in Bosnia, 1992-1995’, MA Thesis,
University of Amsterdam, 2014.
36 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government,
Proposals for Redress (Washington 1944) 79.
lives of individuals belonging to such groups are included. During the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-1946, the term genocide was mentioned, but since there was no a legal, internationally ratified definition, prominent members of the Nazi regime were only prosecuted for crimes against humanity. In 1948 the United Nations General Assembly recognized genocide with the ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (CPPCG). According to the CPPCG, genocide means:
‘Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’38
Even though the CPPCG definition was based on the broad definition constructed by Lemkin, it was broad and narrow at the same time. One of the arguments of the critics has been that the definition does not include political groups. Furthermore, since it is not exactly clear what the destruction of groups “in part” means, the definition remains vague and difficult to implement during conflicts. Since the adoption of the CPPCG, many scholars have offered alternative definitions, with or without the inclusion of political groups. Those important for this work are the definitions coined by Helen Fein and Martin Shaw:
‘Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.’39
‘Genocide is a form of violent social conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction. Genocidal action is action in which 38 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf [12-06-2014]. 39 H. Fein, ‘Genocide: A Sociological Perspective’, in: Current Sociology 38 (1990) no. 1, 1-126, 24.
armed power organizations treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups.’40
My definition is based on those discussed above, and includes the destruction of political groups: Genocide is a sustained purposeful action to collectively destroy a national, ethnic, racial, gendered, political or religious group, directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom the perpetrators regard as members of the groups.
The most important distinguishing element of genocide, differentiating it from crimes against humanity, is mens rea, or the intent to destroy. However, even with all the above, genocide remains difficult to prove or to prosecute. Genocide often occurs during armed conflicts or war and remains closely linked to crimes against humanity.
Methodology
Because sexual violence remains an underreported offence, the data used in this work is limited. It is mostly based on survivor testimonies, amongst others conducted by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or the United Nations, or on secondary literature, for example by the well-known Great Lakes scholar René Lemarchand. In the case of Burundi, the data primarily used is derived from survivor testimonies in refugee camps in Tanzania in a time when sexual violence wasn’t as high up political agenda’s as nowadays or received as much public attention. Notably, after the genocide in Burundi the event was completely distorted by the Micombero regime and society became even more repressed. Therefore my theory, in the case of Burundi, based on little data availability, is constricted.
Important for the chapters on Rwanda were the extensive works Shattered Lives conducted by Binaifer Nowrojee and Leave None To Tell The Story by Allison Des Forges. In comparison to the genocide in Burundi, much has been written on Rwanda, the genocide, and, of course, on the failed UN mission. Even on the subject of sexual violence in Rwanda many works have been published. The legal aspect, extremism in Rwandan society, and the amount of sexual violence during the genocide, all have been extensively researched with scholars such as Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Adam Jones, and Philip Verwimp famed for their work on
Rwanda. Despite the comprehensive historiography on the subject of (sexual) violence in Rwanda, the level of sexual violence within genocides, in general, remains underexposed.
1.
Violence and Genocide in Burundi
Prior to the European colonization at the end of the 19th century, Burundi consisted of a
caste-like Kingdom. This Burundian Kingdom was well organized, hierarchical and feudal with the power concentrated around the Mwami, or King.41 The Mwami was a sacred and absolute
monarch with the Ganwa, or princes of the blood, as his descendants and real power holders in the Kingdom.42 These Ganwa considered themselves to be a special ruling class, belonging
to neither Tutsi, Hutu nor Twa. 43 Besides the Royal family, others high up in the social
hierarchy were the Abanganwa, high-ranking nobles.44 These provincial governors ruled in
name of the King and dominated Tutsi, Hutu and Twa inhabitants. ‘At the court, the king chose his close advisers among what was called the Abanyarurimbi, “those who can judge”’, whose origins consisted of both Tutsis and Hutus.45 In the Burundian Kingdom the cattle
herding Tutsis made up 14% of the population. The Tutsi category was subdivided in two groups, the lower-level Tutsi-Hima and the Tutsi-Banyaguru, those higher on the social ladder. Society furthermore consisted of agricultural Hutus (85%) and the pygmoid Twa (1%).46 Even though all social groups were dominated by the Royal family and the
Abanganwa, Hutus and Tutsis were not equal. In comparison to Hutus, Tutsis were
considered as aristocracy.
At the end of the 19th century the colonization of the African continent by European
superpowers was in full swing. This phenomenon, also known as ‘the Scramble for Africa’, transformed the continent in a short period of time in European subjects. Burundi and 41 B.W. Ndiaye, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in
Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories: Addendum Report of the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Burundi from 19 to 29 April 1995, 24 July 1995, para. B.
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/4-add1.htm [06-02-2014],
42 R. Lemarchand and D. Martin, ‘Selective Genocide in Burundi’, in: Minority Rights Group (1974) no. 20, 7.
43 R. Kruger and K. Kruger, From bloodshed to hope in Burundi. Our Embassy years (Austin 2007) 25.
44 G. Prunier, ‘Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?’, in: Writenet, October 1994, 4. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c00.html [03-05-2014].
45 G. Prunier, Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?, 3.
Rwanda became part of German East Africa. The conquest of the Great Lakes region didn’t go without bloodshed.
‘In their effort to gain control of the territory, the Germans found already allies among the Batare who were estranged from the Bezi-king - Mwezi Gisabo. The king’s initial resistance to German rule earned the Crown great popularity with the masses, which it was able to manipulate toward the end of the colonial period. The Germans later recognized the legitimacy of the Crown and
switched their support to the Bezi, thus enabling Gisebo to consolidate his rule over the territory. Pacification of rebellious chiefs was carried out with the use of extreme violence.’47
After Germany’s defeat in the First World War, Belgium invaded the region in 1916, then known as Ruanda-Urundi. Thus began its military occupation until 1924. After the Treaty of Versailles, Ruanda-Urundi became a class-B mandate in an administrative union with Belgian Congo under the Belgian administration. During the Belgian administration the Kingdoms in place were allowed to continue their rule. ‘The king was protected by but not a direct tool of the Belgians’.48 ‘Belgian trusteeship imposed forced labor, taxes and campaigns of
pacification’, furthermore it lead to peasant uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s directed towards the Batare fraction, who were generally seen as Belgian allies.49
Administrative reforms introduced by the Belgians from 1929 onwards led to the so-called ‘Tutsification’ of the administrative body of the colony.50 The Belgian administration
transformed the once social classes into ethnic divisions based on physical features. Tall physique, lighter skin and narrow noses from that moment on were identified with wealth, power and Tutsis. Connecting the Belgian racial theory with the Caucasoid race proved legitimate for the Belgian administration to favor Tutsis and put them in power holding positions. In Rwanda this proved crucial for the post-colonial ethnic tensions. Because of the complex social stratification in Burundi, ‘the “tutsification” was in fact rather a
“baganwaization”, most of the post-1929 chiefs being Abaganwa rather than “ordinary”
47 P.O. Daley, Gender and Genocide in Burundi. The search for Spaces of Peace in the Great
Lakes Region (Oxford 2008) 48.
48 G. Prunier, Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?, 4.
49 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, ‘Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance’, in: African Security
Review 8 (1999) no. 6, 84-94, 84.
Tutsi.’51 In addition, in Burundi the ethnic groups weren’t as well defined and confined in
comparison to Rwanda. Therefore at the end of the Belgian rule, the Burundian society wasn’t as ethnic and racially divided as in Rwanda.
Independence and ethnic division
After the Second World War Ruanda-Urundi became a United Nations trust territory under Charter 12, supervised by Belgium, with the goal to establish independence.52 The
dismantling of European colonies after the Second World War reinforced African
independence movements. 1956 saw the introduction of vote in Ruanda-Urundi and in the late 1950s various political parties were created.53 At the end of the decennia Parti Democrate
Chretien (PDC) and Union Pour Le Progrès National (UPRONA) were established.
UPRONA was created by prince Louis Rwagasore, the son of King Mwambutsa IV (r. 1915-1966). The power of Louis Rwagasore lied in the fact that he tried to unify the several ethnic groups. He himself a Ganwa, married a Hutu girl while the political party had an ethnically mixed backing.54 The only party at the time, who was ethnically homogenous, was the Parti
Du Peuple (PP), the party of the people with Hutu-only membership.55
The 1961 elections were won by UPRONA. The elections made Louis Ragawasore Prime Minister and the country was on its way to independence. However, the euphoria of the elections didn’t last. The ethnic, social and political rivalries in society would have a tragic and significant, long-lasting influence on Burundi. The division between Hutu and Tutsi were along the lines of the Abanganwa families. The Batare and Bezi families were the two main lineages. Early on, during colonial times, the Germans supported the Batare fraction while the royal family sided with the Bezi family. During the colonization by the Belgians the Bezi family was favored. However, because of the clever politician Pierre Baranyanka there was a shift. ‘During the late colonial period, one can say that Chief Baranyanka certainly had more influence over the Belgians than the light-headed playboy-king Mwambutsa’. 56 Therefore the
51 Ibidem.
52 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter12.shtml [07-02-2014]. 53 R. Lemarchand and D. Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi, 8.
R. Lemarchand, ‘Ethnic genocide’, in: Society 12 (1975) no.2, 50-60, 52.
54 G. Prunier, Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?, 6. 55 Ibidem.
post-war Belgian administration tolerated Baranyanka’s party Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC) for they considered it a lesser evil then UPRONA.57
The political tension in Burundian society was at its peak in October 1961 when Louis Rwagasore was assassinated by the Greek Ioannis Karageorgis. Karageorgis acted on behalf of the ousted Batare family, ‘who anachronistically saw UPRONA's victory as a triumph for the rival Bezi family’.58 After the assassination of Rwagasore, ethnic tensions flared up, fueled
by the late 1950s Hutu-revolution in Rwanda, creating an ethnic divide within UPRONA. Immediately the party was ‘Tutsified’. The following year, on 1 July 1962, Burundi became independent. However, ethnic tension only increased. After the independence, strengthened by ethnic tension in Rwanda, the division between Tutsis and Hutus heightened. Especially with thousands of Rwandan Tutsi asylum seekers entering the country.59
‘The Kamenge riots, in January 1962, provided the JNR with a unique opportunity to establish its credentials as a radical organization The crunch came on January 14, when the president of the JNR, Prime Niyongabo, held a tempestuous meeting in the Kamenge quarter of Bujumbura, attended by a score of JNR militants. Shortly thereafter, a series of armed raids was launched against local Hutu trade unionists and members of PP. A manhunt got under way, accompanied by arson and murder…This sudden surge of ethnic violence shocked the Hutu leadership of UPRONA, and its repercussions were
immediately felt within the party.’60
The Kamenge riots led to a definitive split and a leadership crisis in the UPRONA
administration in September of that year when the Tutsi/Hutu divide became insuperable.61
The therefrom-resulting power vacuum was filled by Mwami Mwambutsa IV Bangiriceng (r. 1915 - July 1966). Nevertheless, post-colonial Burundi remained highly unstable with six governments between 1962 and 1966.62 When in 1965 Pierre Ngendandumwe, Louis
57 Ibidem. 58 Ibidem, 6.
59 R. Lemarchand, ‘The Burundian Genocide’, in: S. Totten and W. S. Parsons (eds.), Century
of Genocide. Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts (London and New York 2004) 323-339,
325.
60 JNR (Jeunesse Nationaliste Rawagasora), Youth wing of UPRONA.
R. Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic conflict and Genocide (New York 1996) 62-63. 61 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 85.
Rwagasore’s old lieutenant, became Prime Minister, the tide seemed to change. However, on the day he announced his new cabinet on 15 January 1965, he was shot dead.63
In May 1965 elections to the National Assembly led to a triumphant victory for a Hutu candidate.64 Despite the victory, King Mwambutsa IV didn’t appoint the Hutu candidate, but
rather the Ganwa Léopold Bihumugani. Bihumugani, a former personal secretary of the King and protégé of the court, became Prime Minister.65 This angered the Burundian Hutu elite.
After three years of independence, in 1965, the Hutu elite wanted to take action. On 18 October 1965 Hutu officers tried to seize power and overthrow the monarchy.66 Immediately
Mwami Mwambutsa IV fled to Zaire and never returned to Burundi.67 The coup failed but
had severe consequences for the Hutu population in Burundi. Hutu leaders were purged and other high placed Hutus were removed from government and the army. From that moment onwards the exclusion of Hutus was apparent with a small Tutsi minority in power.
Dictatorship and oppression
The 1965 attempted coup led to the death of approximately 500 Tutsi and 2000 Hutu victims, as well as during the elections of 1966.68 After the departure of Mwami Mwambutsa IV,
Léopold Biha remained in charge. This, however, changed with the return of Mwambutsu’s son, Charles Ndizeye, who returned to Burundi as prince regent.69 Immediately Ndizeye
revoked the newly established constitution, dismissed Biha’s administration, crowned himself Mwami Ntare V on 8 July 1966 and appointed Captain Michael Micombero as Prime
Minister. Micombero, a Tutsi-Hima from the Bururi region, made a name for himself during the 1965 failed coup as the leader of the Tutsi soldiers. Ntare’s reign proved very short when several months after the appointment of Micombero, on 28 November 1966, Michael
Micombero overthrew the monarchy and established Burundi’s Republic.
Even though Micombero portrayed himself as a forerunner of African Socialism with ties to the People’s Republic of China, Burundi became a country ruled by a military dictator. Shortly after his assumption of power, he made himself President; Minister of Defense; 63 G. Prunier, Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?, 7.
64 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Genocide, 325. 65 Ibidem, 326.
66 T. Bundervoet, ‘Livestock, Land and Political Power: The 1993 Killings in Burundi’, in:
Journal of Peace Research 46 (2009) no. 3, 357-376, 360.
67 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 86. 68 B.W. Ndiaye, Addendum Report of the Special Rapporteur, para. B. 69 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 86.
Lieutenant General; and head of UPRONA. Furthermore, he banned all other political parties.70 ‘During Micombero's regime, power became increasingly concentrated in the hands
of a small ethno-regional group, the Tutsi-Hima clan from the southern province of Bururi.’71
Immediately at the beginning of his reign, Micombero speeded up the militarization of
Burundian society. ‘It attempted to instill military values into all social groups; into the young by creating a new youth movement, Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore (JRR); military
values in the workplace trough the creation of a new trade union, Union des Travailleurs du Burundi (UTB), and into women’s organizations via the newly-formed Union des Femmes du Burundi (UFB).’ 72 With this militarization Micombero tried to portray himself as a
progressive leader. However, Micombero’s regime was characterized by its reign of terror. Fear dominated public life. Although public references to ethnicity became repressed and a taboo, Hutu Burundians remained second-class citizens. During his regime, Micombero’s paranoia grew simultaneously with his battle against three different internal enemies.73 Since
he overthrew the monarchy, loyalists and Abanganwa elite were seen as enemies of the state. Secondly, Micombero felt threatened by other Tutsis, for in his mind they could challenge his regime. Originally, Banyaguru-Tutsis were higher up the social ladder and had a better position in Burundian society. This led to feelings of resentment and an inferiority complex amongst Tutsi-Hima. As a Tutsi-Hima from Bururi, Micombero mistrusted Tutsis belonging to the Banyaguru-group, Tutsis from central provinces and those not originating from Bururi. As his regionalism grew, the possibilities to exclude and rule over the Tutsi-Banyaguru advanced. Lastly, Micombero tried his hardest to prevent the Hutu majority to seize power. The alienation, isolation, silencing and exclusion of citizens, predominantly Hutus and others in Burundian society who could challenge Micombero’s leadership, were tools to reach his goal of autocracy.
In order to repress the Hutu majority, Micombero, ‘surprisingly’, discovered an alleged Hutu plot. ‘After the discovery of an alleged Hutu plot in 1969, 70 Hutu personalities,
civilians, military, were arrested on the grounds of conspiring against the state; 25 were meted out a death sentence, and 19 of them were immediately executed.’74 The same scheme was
used to repress Banyaruguru Tutsis and those belonging to the elite. On 12 July 1971, the 70 P.O. Daley, Gender and Genocide in Burundi, 66.
71 T. Bundervoet, Livestock, Land and Political Power, 360. 72 P.O. Daley, Gender and Genocide in Burundi, 66.
73 Ibidem.
Micombero administration disclosed a Banyaruguru and Ganwa anti-government, ‘monarchial’ plot.75 The trial of nine of these personalities was on 12 January 1972. Afterwards several were executed. As fear continued to dominate public life and society remained oppressed by the Micombero regime, ethnic tension ultimately led to the disastrous events of 1972.
The 1972 Genocide against Hutus
‘In the months preceding the slaughter, the country seemed to be tottering on the brink of anarchy. The long simmering struggle between Tutsi-Hima and Tutsi-Banyaruguru was threatening to get out of hand. The country was washed with rumors of plots and counterplots, leading to the arrest and bogus trials of scores of Banyaruguru politicians. Meanwhile, the ruling clique, headed by President Michel Micombero, and consisting principally of Tutsi-Hima from the Bururi province, saw its legitimacy plummet. Nothing could have done more to solidify Tutsi solidarities than the looming threat of a violent Hutu uprising.’76
In March 1972 the paranoid Micombero became obsessed with the idea of the exiled Ntare V, raising mercenary force to reclaim his throne.77 A rumored arms deal with Uganda’s dictator
Idi Amin and German gunrunners led to action.78 With the help of Idi Amin, Micombero had
the former king abducted, returned to Burundi, arrested and put under house arrest in Gitega. The abduction of the former king was not disclosed to the public.
On 29 April Micombero suddenly dismissed the cabinet. Immediately a Hutu
insurgency was launched in the southwestern region of Burundi, in particular in the villages of Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac:
‘In a matter of hours terror was unleashed by Hutu upon Tutsi. Countless atrocities were reported by eyewitnesses, including the evisceration of pregnant women and the hacking off of limbs. In Bururi, all military and civilian
authorities were killed. After seizing control of the armories in Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac, the insurgents proceeded to kill every Tutsi in sight, as well as a 75 R. Lemarchand and D. Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi, 26.
76 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Genocide, 324.
77 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 86. 78 R. Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic conflict and Genocide, 92.
number of Hutu who refused to join the rebels. During the first week of violence it is thought that the insurgency claimed the lives of anywhere from 2000 to 3000, most of them Tutsi. At this point, in an attempt to build a political base, some of the insurgents retreated to Vyanda, near the provincial capital of Bururi, and proclaimed a mysterious “République de Martyazo.” A week later government troops brought the nascent experiment to an end. By then, though, the repression had already caused untold casualties throughout the country.’79
In order to prevent Ntare’s hiding place in turning into a rallying point for the rebels, soon after the start of the insurgency, the former king was assassinated.80 Afterwards, the execution
of Ntare proved a convenient post facto justification.81 Namely, because it led to the
implication of the Banyaruguru in an anti-government plot. In this narrative King Ntare V arrived before the insurgence and tried to provoke uprising to restore monarchy. ‘Official interpretations of these events point to two different sets of actors plotting against the government: ex-king Ntare, who, according to Micombero, tried to ‘trap him’, presumably with the complicity of foreign mercenaries; and Hutus, including top-ranking personalities in the army and the government.’82
One day after the dismissal of the cabinet and the insurgence in southwest Burundi, martial law was proclaimed and President Micomero received military assistance from Zaire.83 Soon after the Hutu insurgency in the countryside was not only repressed, but a
full-scale genocide towards the Hutu elite of Burundi was launched. As one of the key characters of a genocide, the killings in the subsequent months were systematically. According to American diplomat Thomas Melady:
‘By mid-May the Western diplomatic corps, plus the ambassadors of Zaire and Rwanda, felt that the Burundi government had completed its mop-up of the remaining rebels and that the killings now were part of an effort to eliminate the increasing numbers of Hutus. We had reports that every morning trucks would leave the army camp and other installations for the outskirts of 79 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Genocide, 325.
80 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 86. 81 R. Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic conflict and Genocide, 92.
82 Ibidem.
Bujumbura. Hundreds of bodies would consequently be placed in newly dug mass graves. We later learned that the pattern was being repeated throughout the country [..] in mid-may there was a body evidence that Tutsi leaders were arresting and executing (all without trial) Hutu intellectuals, teachers, and secondary-school students. We feared that few, if any, educated professionals among the Hutus would survive. In my report of the state department on May 10, I indicated for the first time that the embassy felt the period of civil strife was clearly past and the actions now were approaching selective genocide. This opinion was shared by most diplomats.’84
During Burundi’s genocide the use of media was extensively used:
‘Government Burundi had a different account of events: On the night of the uprising, 29 April, Radio Bujumbura announced that a “monarchist and imperialistic plot” had been uncovered, and that curfew had been imposed on Burundi. On May 1, radio Bujumbura announced that the uprising was organized by Mulelist guerillas from Zaire, Rwandan Tutsi refugees, and Burundians. On May 4, it was announced that the uprising was organized by ‘tribalists’ (euphemism for Hutu). On May 16, the embassy of Burundi in Brussels alleged that the instigators of violence were Hutu and Mulelist rebels whose “goal was to kill the Tutsi”’.85
‘The government radio broadcasts encouraged the population to “hunt down the python in the grass”, an order which was interpreted by Tutsi in the interior as license to exterminate all educated Hutu, down to the level of secondary, and, in some cases, even primary schoolchildren. Army units commandeered merchants’ lorries and mission vehicles, and drove up to schools removing whole batches of children at a time. Tutsi pupils prepared lists of their Hutu classmates to make identification by officials more straightforward.’86
84 L. Malkki, Purity and Exile. Violence, memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu
Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago 1996) 32, citing: T.P. Melady, Burundi: The Tragic Years
(Maryknoll 1974) 15.
85 L. Malkki, Purity and Exile, 34. Citing: W. Weinstein, Historical dictionary of Burundi (Metuchen 1976) 36, 37.
86 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Genocide, 326. Citing: J. Greenland, ‘Ethnic Discrimination in Rwanda and Burundi’, in: Foreign Affairs: Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental
The first victims during the genocide were the Hutu insurgents. Afterwards approximately 750 Hutu troops were systematically assassinated by their Tutsi commanders.87 Hutu members
of the Gendarmerie soon followed. Next in line were Hutu students and teachers in secondary and technical schools. Not even a month after the beginning of the insurgency, approximately 45 percent of primary school teachers, and almost all secondary teachers were missing. 88 ‘In a
scenario that recur time and again, groups of soldiers and JRR would suddenly show up in classrooms, call Hutu students by name and take them away.’89‘Universities, secondary
schools, and other educational institutions lost a substantial part of their pupil numbers. Since these children, teenagers or younger, weren’t involved in politics, what was the reason to eliminate them? According to scholar and Great Lakes expert Rène Lemarchand: ‘not only Hutu elites but potential elites were physically liquidated.’90 The genocide, that lasted from
May until August, was planned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Artémon Simbaniye; Minister of Interior and Justice Albert Shibura; and executive secretary of UPRONA André Yanda.91
These three planners, all three of them Tutsi-Hima, were assisted by the army and the JRR in a systematic manner:
‘In most instances, the arrests and subsequent executions were conducted by mixed teams of army men and JRR elements consisting of a dozen individuals; and where neither group could be summoned in sufficient numbers, arms were distributed to local Tutsi males with instructions to act as surrogate
paramilitary groups. In an atmosphere saturated with fear, the killing of Hutu seemed to have become part of the civic duty expected of every Tutsi citizen. A number of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda accepted the assignment with little or no hesitation. Particularly in the northern region, where refugee camps were located, much of the killing was done by Tutsi refugees, perhaps as much out
Freedoms: A World Survey 4 (1976) 95-133, 120.
87 R. Lemarchand, ‘The Burundian Killings of 1972’, in: Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, 27 June 2008, 5.
http://www.massviolence.org/IMG/article_PDF/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972.pdf [10-03-2014].
88 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Killings of 1972, 5. 89 Ibidem.
90 Ibidem.
of revenge as out of fear that they might once again be the target of Hutu violence.’92
Even though the most victims were civil servants and members of the Hutu elite, all sectors were in some way affected, even the Church. ‘Reporting from Bujumbura in early June, Marvine Howe (1972) noted that “12 Hutu priests are said to have been killed, and thousands of Protestant pastors, school directors and teachers”.’93 While the perpetrators of the 1972 genocide mostly targeted members of the
civil service and the elite, ordinary peasants and workers were also under threat as villages were burned and crops destroyed forcing them to become refugees.94
Conclusion
The 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda, the fear of a full-scale Tutsi slaughter by Hutus,
complex politics and ethnic relations, and the plummeting legitimacy of the Bururi ruling elite all contributed to the 1972 genocide. The conflict, that lasted from May to August, resulted in the deaths of between 100.000 - 150.000 Burundians.95 Approximately 150.000 Burundians of
Hutu descend fled to neighboring countries, among others Tanzania.96 While many lost their
lives in 1972, the international community remained indifferent and silent. ‘There is a general dearth of source materials and little detail other than Belgian publications and those put out by the Burundi Government itself.’97 After the conflict, the Burundian authorities published ‘The
White Paper, on the Real Causes and Consequences of the Attempted Genocide Against the Tutsi Ethny in Burundi’, released June 26, 1972.98 In the White Paper only Hutu rebels were
held responsible for the massacres. According to the Paper the rebels first mutilated children in front of their parents and sexually abused women. If these women were pregnant they were disemboweled. Later, males and the elderly were massacred. Furthermore, the paper declared Tutsis as the victims of the genocidal massacre, instead of the genocide directed towards Hutus.
92 Ibidem, 327.
93 Ibidem. 327. Citing: M. Howe, ‘Slaughter in Burundi’, in: New York Times, 11 June 1972, 4. 94 P.O. Daley, Gender and Genocide in Burundi, 69.
95 R. Lemarchand, The Burundian Genocide, 325.
96 R. Cornwell and H. de Beer, Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance, 86.
97 W. Weinstein, ‘Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa: The Revolt in Burundi, 1972’, in: Africa Today 19 (1972) No. 4, 17-37, 27.
Because the international community never intervened and remained indifferent, perpetrators of the 1972 genocide remained in power. Furthermore, even though references to ethnicity were taboo in Burundian society, Hutus remained second-class citizens. Despite international silence, the 1972 genocide remained of great importance for internal, Tutsi and Hutu relations in the Great Lakes region. Additionally, the 1972 genocide played an enormous part in not only the Hutu narrative in Burundi, but also in the history of Burundi’s mirror-state, ultimately leading to both countries disastrous last decennium of the twentieth century.
2.
Violence and Genocide in Rwanda
Before the African continent was affected by the European ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the late 19th century, traditional Rwanda consisted of an absolute monarchy with an umwaami, or
king, at the center of power.99 According to Lucien Bäck, the Umwaami was divine and he
was the personification of the African country. A royal code of conduct determined the succession of the king. Oftentimes he was succeeded by his male offspring; however this could be challenged which, in case of a passing of the Umwaami, led to strong opposition and anarchy in pre-colonial Rwanda.100 Rwanda was governed by a highly advanced
administrative body.101 In pre-colonial Rwanda the system of patronage was not
uncommon.102As opposed to the believes of the European colonizers, the Rwandan Kingdom
was highly sophisticated with Kinyarwanda as their single developed language, a developed common set of religious and philosophical beliefs and its own culture with song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric.103
Inhabitants of the Rwandan Kingdom were divided into three categories based on social classes. During the twentieth century these categories got a racial meaning. Originally Tutsis were persons rich in cattle and agriculture, and Hutus persons of inferior status who offered their services to a person of a higher status in return for cattle.104 The Hutus were
mostly agricultural farmers, whereas Tutsis generally herded cattle. Within the clientele
99L. R. Bäck, ‘Traditional Rwanda: Deconsecrating a Sacred Kingdom’, in: H. J. Claessen, (ed.), et al., The Study of The State (Leiden 1981) 15-34, 21.
100 L. R. Bäck, Traditional Rwanda, ibidem. 101 L. R. Bäck, ibidem, 22.
102 Ibidem.
103 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story (New York 1999) 31. 104L. R. Bäck, Traditional Rwanda, 23.
society, social mobility was possible. This however did not apply to the Twa, or pygmies, who during the Kingdom era were forest dwellers and lived by hunting and gathering.105
The late 19th century meant the occupation, colonization and annexation of the African
continent and Rwanda was no exception. Visited by Dr. Oscar Baumann in 1892 and Count Adolf von Götzen in 1894, the Rwandan colonization by Germany officially started in the 1890s. 106 This lasted almost two decades. After Germany’s defeat in the First World War, the
peace of Versailles abolished the country’s colonies. The colonial administration over Rwanda was transferred to Belgium in a mandate given by the League of Nations. According to Alison des Forges the Belgium administration had a profound impact on the political body and relations in Rwanda:
‘At the same time that the Belgians enabled the officials to demand more from the people, they decreed that Tutsi alone should be officials. They
systematically removed Hutu from positions of power and they excluded them from higher education, which was meant mostly as preparation for careers in the administration. Thus they imposed a Tutsi monopoly of public life not just for the 1920s and 1930s, but for the next generation as well. The only Hutu to escape relegation to the laboring masses were those few permitted to study in religious seminaries.’107
The Belgians preferred Tutsi in power positions because they regarded Tutsis as more European in the evolutionary hierarchy, an important component of Social Darwinism. In their evolutionary view the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were ‘three distinct, long existent and internally coherent blocks of people, the local representatives of three major population groups, the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid.’108 Therefore it was logical and deserving in the
ideology of the Belgian administration to put Tutsis in power holding positions, leading to the establishment a Tutsi elite and a subordinate Hutu majority. To consolidate the divide
between the different racial groups, the Belgian administration in 1926 issued ethnic identity card as means of identification.109
105 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 32. 106 L.R. Bäck, Traditional Rwanda, 15.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no.: ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 80. 107 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 34.
108 Ibidem.
109 A. J. Kuperman, ‘The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Sometimes Mediators Do More Damage Than Good’, in: SAIS Review 16(1996) no.1, 221-240, 223.
After the Second World War the worldwide decolonization by European powers was put in motion. Chapter 12 established an international trusteeship by the United Nations.110
According to the trusteeship Belgium had to administer Rwanda’s independence. ‘Belgium continued its support for the Tutsi until the 1950s. Then, faced with the end of colonial rule and with pressure from the United Nations, which supervised the administration of Rwanda under the trusteeship system, the colonial administrators began to increase possibilities for Hutu to participate in public life.’111
Belgium, after the Second World War, had to change its colonial practices and depart from their Tutsi-elite established dominance. For the first time under the Belgian administration Hutus were somewhat allowed in various facets of Rwandan political and intellectual life. However this did not lead to the beginning of Hutu dominance.
The Social and Ethnic Revolution of 1959 - 1962
The demographics and political power structures in Rwanda changed drastically under the influence of the Hutu freedom movements of the late 1950s. In the 1950s the Hutu elite sought ways to achieve power within Rwanda. An association of these elite members drafted and published their Bahutu Manifesto on 24 March 1957.112 The manifest articulated their
goals and beliefs, mainly seeking liberation from the oppression of the Belgian colonizer and Tutsi dominance. The manifesto was highly criticized by the Tutsi elite and increased ethnic tension within Rwanda. The peacekeeper between the ethnic groups was King Mutara Rudahigwa, leader since 1931.113 His unexpected death in 1959 made his half-brother Kigeli
Ndahindurwa, King Kigeli V of Rwanda. According to Des Forges it appeared that the new King was ‘heavily influenced by the most conservative Tutsi group.’114 Therefore ethnic
tension only increased and the influence of moderate political parties decreased. Within this tense setting the political party Parmehutu (Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des 110 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter12.shtml
111 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 34.
112 B. Emansueto Forster, ‘The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda’, in: A. Hjort af Ornäs and M.A. Mohammed Salih, red., (eds.), Ecology and Politics. Environmental Stress and Security in
Africa (Motala 1989) 145-156, 150.
113 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 36. 114 Ibidem.
Bahutu) was established in 1959. The party exclusively addressed the Hutu majority in
Rwanda and set out to achieve Hutu independence and emancipation.
Ethnic tension sparked on 1 November 1959 when four Tutsi men attacked a Hutu leader on his way from church.115 ‘In reprisal, the Hutu burnt down and looted Tutsi houses.’116
The ethnic conflict lasted until 12 November when Belgian troops stopped the violence. The Belgian administration immediately called for reforms in the form of elections for chiefs and counselors in Rwanda.117 The elections were a great victory for Parmehutu. On 6 February
1961 Self-government was granted by the Belgian administration.118 A referendum organized
under the auspice of the UN, to choose between a monarchy and a republic led to an overwhelming vote for the establishment of a republic with 80 percent of the votes.119 Soon
King Kigeli V was exiled with his sympathizers and the First Republic was established under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda as the President of the Rwandan Republic.
The revolution of 1959-1964 could be seen as a social revolution, as well as an ethnic revolution. The Hutu revolution and the Hutu dominance from 1959 onwards led to a great number of deaths and a Tutsi exodus. Nearly 20,000 Tutsis lost their lives in the revolution out of a population of 350,000 and ten thousands fled the country.120 Within the Hutu
legitimatization of power there emerged a discourse wherein the Tutsi population was characterized as alien, as opposed to the indigenous Hutu.121 Furthermore, Tutsi was only
defined as a race and never as an ethnic group. According to Mamdani this has the implication that a race distinction points to foreign, not included into society, therefore reaffirming the isolated position of Tutsi within the Rwandan society.122 This image of Tutsi as alien
remained a persistent stereotype within society. The Rwandan Republics
The First Rwandan Republic lasted from 1 July 1962 until 5 July 1973. The period under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda could be characterized as relatively peaceful but associated 115 B. Emansueto Forster, The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda, 150.
116 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no.: ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 89. 117 B. Emansueto Forster, The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda, 150.
118 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no.: ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 89. 119 B. Emansueto Forster, The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda, 150.
120 R. Lemarchand, ‘Disconnecting the threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust reconsidered’, in:
Journal of Genocide Research 4(2002) no. 4, 499-518, 503.
121 M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Oxford 2002) 134.
with the increased exclusion of Tutsis within the Rwandan society and strengthening of MDR Parmehutu and the military.123 From 1961 onwards members of the exiled Tutsi community
attempted to return to power in Rwanda and launched several attacks from bases in Uganda and Burundi.124 These guerilla refugees were referred to as inyenzi, or cockroaches, for their
relentlessness. The attacks from the refugees had severe consequences for the remaining Tutsi in Rwanda. Because of the refugee rebels, Rwanda’s hard-line Hutu’s increased the
oppression of internal Tutsis. ‘The government’s policy was intended to reduce domestic support for the rebels and to deter any further attacks, and it caused many more Tutsi to flee as refugees.’125 Hutu officials accused Tutsi of aiding the refugees and thus furthering the
annihilation of the ethnic group.126 The refugees posted a real threat to the Rwandan
government when the refugees in 1963 came within a distance of ten miles from the Rwandan capital Kigali.127 This led to horrific reprisals and severe anti-Tutsi violence. Approximately
ten thousand Tutsis died and roughly half of the Tutsi population in Rwanda fled or were driven out the country. 128 Amongst some of the refugees, specially in Uganda, the will to
return remained strong and they organized and trained into what later became the RPF.
In the meantime the position of Tutsi in Rwanda became more precarious. The identity card, issued by the Belgian administration in colonial times, was used during the Republic as a tool to identify and discriminate Tutsis.129 The Hutu officials reverted to stereotypes by
branding Tutsis as distinctive and foreign with the will to rule over Hutus.130 These
stereotypes were used as a justification for the violence and isolation. The anti-Tutsi violence had material and political advantages for the Hutu administration. It meant they could solidify their power, especially after 1967 when the attacks slowed down and the legitimization of Hutu power was being undermined by the Hutus themselves. The creation of the myth of the Hutu revolution was used to strengthen Hutu power.131 In the myth the revolution was
123 P. O. Daley, ‘Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa’, in: Third World Quarterly 27 (2006) no. 2, 303-319, 306.
124 A. J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda (Washington D.C. 2001) 7.
125 A. J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, ibidem. 126 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 36.
127 A. J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, 7.
128 B. A. Valentino, ‘Ethnic mass killings: Turkish Armenians, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda’, in: B. A Valentino, Final Solutions. Mass Killing and the Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca London 2004) 152-195, 179.
129 A. Des Forges, Leave None To Tell the Story, 36. 130 Ibidem, 37.
portrayed as a long and hard struggle against the oppression of the colonizer and the Tutsi elite, even though Hutus were aided by the Belgian administration. The myth contributed the idea that the majority had the right to rule over a minority, even if that ideology of domination wasn’t based on a democratic principle but ethnic groups.132 The idea of a Hutu revolution
played an enormous part in the Rwandan Genocide.
Parmehutu came to power when it used the narrative of oppression to unite the Hutu majority. However when the attacks by the Tutsi refugees after 1967 decreased, the Hutu majority faced an internal power struggle. Kayibanda and those surrounding him came from the Gitarama region, part of Southern Rwanda. A shift towards ethnic and regional power became apparent, leading towards a fracture between Hutus from the North and the South.133
Faced with the collapse of national unity, Hutu officials focused once more on a common enemy, leading to a flare up of anti-Tutsi violence in 1973. They also used feelings of revenge against Tutsis for their role in 1972 genocide in neighboring country Burundi. However, the damage within Rwanda was done and anarchy led to the coup of 5 July 1973.
On 5 July 1973 General Juvénal Habyarimana, Army Chief of Staff, dissolved the First Republic and created the Second Republic, which was to last until the outbreak of the civil war in 1990. Immediately he ousted the MDR Parmehutu party and imprisoned and, later, executed or starved to death, political leaders including the former president
Kayibanda.134 In 1975 President Habyarimana implemented the one-party system, with the
MRND as a state-party of which every Rwandan ipso facto became a member. 135
Habyarimana’s regime in the beginning portrayed itself as continuation of Kayibana’s leadership. Similar to his predecessor, Habyarimana implemented the policy of systematic discrimination against Tutsis by managing a quota system in universities and government services.136 Habyarimana’s measures led to increased ethnic and regional power by favoring
North-Westerners, the region he originated from, as opposed to the creation of equality, increasing opposition amongst Hutus.137
‘Habyarimana’s handling of the Tutsi question was complex. On the one hand, he ensured that there were no further violent attacks against Tutsi for the first 132 Ibidem.
133 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no.: ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 91. 134 Ibidem.
135 Ibidem, 92 136 Ibidem, 93. 137 Ibidem.
