‘We live together, we fight together’ : anarchism, solidarity and the politics of migrant wellbeing

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‘We live together, We fight

together’-Anarchism, Solidarity and the Politics of

Migrant Wellbeing

Note: The Above Picture is from the roof of Spirou Trikoupi 17

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Unreserved thanks go to my friends in Greece for welcoming me into their community, sharing their stories, and treating me like part of the family. I would also like to thank Dr Nel Vandekerckhove and Dr Polly Pallister-Wilkins for their guidance and support.

Max Roche 12082430

University of Amsterdam Social Sciences Department

MSc Political Science: International Relations Supervisor: Dr Nel Vandekerckhove

Secondary Reader: Dr Polly Pallister-Wilkins 21st June 2019

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Chapter One

1.1. An Introduction

The political violence inherent in the apartheid system of global mobility and the production of Europe as a territory of exclusivity has become shockingly apparent at the continental periphery. Greece itself represents a strategic point of entry into Europe for Middle Eastern and Central Asian migrants, and so with the unfolding of the so called ‘migration crisis’1_in 2015 the country saw a dramatic influx of individuals, the vast majority seeking to cross Greece and continue onto Western Europe. The numbers of arrivals reached an apogee in 2015 with around 850,000 crossing the Aegean or navigating the border between Greece and Turkey in the North. Since then the numbers have dwindled and so far around 15,000 have arrived in 2019 (UNHCR Data Report: Greece, 2019). Greece remained initially a European transit point given the quest for onward movement and mobility. However with the closure of the Balkan Route, a popular means of onward migration, as well as the signing of the EU-Turkey deal which has essentially turned the Aegean hotspots into islands of detention and deportation (See Pallister-Wilkins, 2018b), Greece has become a host territory. Those now effectively stuck in ‘Grease’2_{have been continually exposed to dehumanising living conditions within the hotspot} and mainland camps as well as a Kafkaesque asylum procedure already struggling prior the origins of the ‘crisis’ (See Amnesty International, 2016, Rozakou, 2012, Tsavdaroglou, 2018). Migrants within Greece are therefore experiencing a ‘crisis of reception’ (European Commission, 2016), or a ‘suppression of welcome’ (Gill, 2018), languishing and ghettoised in poorly equipped and often overrun camps, suffering under a stretched and inefficient asylum structure and largely unable to join mainstream socio-economic life. Coercion, immobilisation, exclusion and deportation therefore informs the geopolitical response to migration management in Greece.

These geopolitical narratives which reproduce a particular construction of certain non-European migrants as alien, threatening and Other, have however been challenged by certain

1_{There are numerous problems in labelling this phenomenon a ‘crisis of migration’. Crisis itself implies a}

disruption from the norm and something in need of remedying. Hence marrying the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘crisis’ paints incoming migrants as dangerous, threatening and destabilising, and invites political intervention to ‘solve’ the crisis (See De Genova and Tazzioli, 2015). In doing so it also obfuscates the post-colonial context of much migration into Europe which often draws roots from the political violence, or the violence of poverty, inflicted through the process of expansive and exploitative European colonisation (See Davies and Isakjee, 2018).

2_{One individual spoke of the popular joke amongst migrants that Greece should be renamed ‘Grease’ as so many}

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grassroots solidarity movements within Athens and elsewhere. The Greek solidarity movement itself refers to a non-homogenous collection of bottom-up social, economic and political movements which evolved ‘in light of the commodification of public space, rising unemployment and precarity’ largely following the 2008 financial crisis (Arampatzi, 2017, p.2158). With self-organisation, horizontality and self-empowerment central to their philosophy these movements sought to experiment with alternatives to a neoliberal paradigm which lies at the heart of the societal precarity within Greece (Arampatzi, 2016). It is within this framework of grassroots activism that the migrant solidarity movement within Athens must be situated. As a political experimentation with cohabitation and decentralised self-organization the migrant solidarity movement seeks to challenge the xenophobic orthodoxy of European geopolitics. Heavily influenced by the Marxist critique of philanthropy which understands the depoliticisation of charitable deeds as mere instruments for the maintenance of the status quo (Theossopolous, 2016), the migrant solidarity movement in Athens squatted a series of buildings during 2015 and subsequently opened them to otherwise abandoned and homeless migrants. Offering a different form of existence centred on collective struggle they vocalise and live through the popular slogan ‘We live together, We fight together’, which seeks to dismantle xenophobic narratives of exclusion, as well as ‘nationalised and territorialised understanding of political identities associated with the nation state’ through the union of citizens and non-citizens (Cantat, 2018, p.12). By occupying public buildings and working collaboratively with otherwise ostracised migrants these projects represent an intervention into a political landscape structured around containment, control and dehumanisation.

Migrant solidarity movements are not isolated to Athens, however a large number have proliferated within a particular neighbourhood in its urban core - Exarchia. Exarchia is home to a number of radical leftist currents, amongst which is the anarchist political movement which emerged as a coherent force within the neighbourhood in the 1980s (Kritidis, 2014). Anarchism has been central to the construction of the political identity of this neighbourhood with anarchist collectives involved in weekly clashes with the police on the outskirts of the neighbourhood to maintain the radical commitment to anti-authoritarianism. With the police ostracised to the outskirts of this territory it would be easy to conceptualise this as a radical leftist utopia - the reality is somewhat different with numerous stratifications and divisions within the leftist community. Nevertheless, this neighbourhood has historically been a hotbed of experimentation, ingenuity and opposition to dominant modes of living, with a strong history of squatting abandoned buildings and turning them into ‘spaces for subcultural activity, collective living, and dissident action’ (Tsavdaroglou, 2018, p.386). In contemporary Exarchia

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the continuation of such experimentation is not difficult to find with a number of migrant solidarity squats emerging post the summer of 2015 as a direct response to the growing numbers of migrants sleeping rough in Pedion toy Areos park. Solidarity squats, however, represent far more than abandoned buildings converted into neutral living spaces - they come imbued with leftist political ideology seeking to challenge and transform. As Makrygianni (2017, p.250) states, ‘the praxis of squatting can be understood as a response to enclosures, a crack in capitalism’s urban continuity, and a negation to capitalist relation, a negation to commercialization and intermediation of the everyday life from the capital’. Rooted in activist interventions into the homogeneity of urban neoliberalism, numerous pro-migrant squats within Exarchia operate along the lines of self-organisation, horizontality and consensus decision making, with self and collective empowerment at the heart of their ideology. They represent a rejection of neoliberalism, a challenge to the violence of European border policy, and a conscious experimentation with different forms of socio-political organisation.

1.2. Objectives and Relevance

Scholarly inquiry into the effects of austerity in Greece has been widespread - what is lacking is investigation into grassroots movements seeking to counter and navigate its effects (Azampatzi, 2016). The same can be said for migrant solidarity initiatives within Athens. Much scholarly work has been focused at the geopolitical or institutional level investigating top down responses to the ‘crisis’, rather than a thorough engagement with bottom-up solidarity-based initiatives. A few specific studies have been conducted that are worth mentioning. Squire (2018) has looked at how solidarity seeks to overcome the narrative of abandoned and disposable lives through the shared precarity between migrants and activists. Tsavdaroglou (2018) has examined how squats in Exarchia enact a ‘right to the city’ for newcomers who are otherwise segregated in state-run camps, as well as the process of ‘commoning’3_{of resources} in a horizontal environment. Finally, Mitchell and Sparke (2018) have examined the creation of geosocial safe spaces through solidarity movements in contrast to the geopolitical spaces of detention and precarity fostered through top-down European initiatives. Thus far there has been no rigorous attempt to integrate the concept of solidarity into the broader political philosophy of anarchism to understand the roots of much solidarity praxis.

3_{The practice of ‘commoning’ refers to a rejection of private ownership or accumulation, and the ‘}_collective sharing of the means of (re)production and existence’ (Tsavalgou, 2018). Defined by Federici as a ‘politics of survival’ it is a process of bringing a community into being through a practice of horizontal sharing of resources. For more see (Federici, 2011, Hardt and Negri, 2009, King, 2016).

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It is worth mentioning that solidarity squats represent a non-homogenous form of intervention, each exhibiting differential characteristics in terms of political influence, composition and management, with numerous squats certainly not identifying as anarchist. The Hotel Oniro squat for example is reserved solely for Arabic migrants, whilst other squats such as 5th School are purely migrant run and without a strict political ideology guiding their organisation. City Plaza is perhaps the most well-known and largest solidarity squat and is more affiliated with leftists and communist ideologues than specifically anarchist ones. Finally, there are squats such as Spirou Trikoupi 17 and Notara which are run by migrants and European solidarians in collaboration and are guided specifically by anarchist ideologies. In main, most of the solidarity squats are however united by anarcho-inspired, or leftist ideologies of self-organisation, horizontality, solidarity, direct democracy and anti-discrimination in all forms. This thesis has focused specifically on Spirou Trikoupi 17, a solidarity squat within the heart of Exarchia, organised as much as possible according to the principles of anarchism. Situating the praxis of solidarity squats within the rich political framework of anarchism which locates individual empowerment, communal freedom and collective emancipation as the ultimate telos (Kropotkin 1987, Bakunin, 1953, Goldman, 1969 etc.), and the concomitant impact on migrant wellbeing, represents a serious gap within the debate.

The objective of the research is to ascertain the link between anarchist politics, the prefiguration of alternative spaces of solidarity, and the effects on migrant wellbeing within Athens. In keeping with the No Borders philosophy which understands the categorisation of individuals according to the logics of ‘asylum seeker, ‘refugee’ or ‘migrant’ as a means of exerting further division and control at the border (No Borders, 2015), the term ‘migrant’ will be adopted as a broad term for individuals on the move, unless a scholar has specifically used an alternative term. Whilst numerous solidarians working within Trikoupi are themselves of course migrants from Western European countries, they shall be referred to as solidarians for the sake of clarity. With this in mind the notion of migrant wellbeing will be examined through the dual but deeply interrelated prisms of anarchism as a politics of solidarity on the one hand, and anarchism as a politics of empowerment on the other. Both anarchism and humanitarianism can, at their root, be conceptualized as a relation or power dynamic between individuals. The first section will begin by examining how relations of horizontality, equality and parity within anarcho-solidarity initiatives mobilise the creation of a specific and alternative community structure. The second section will subsequently seek to build an analysis centred on the politics of empowerment by examining the principles of direct democracy and self-organisation. Both sections will draw upon a burgeoning body of academic literature on ‘camp studies’ (See

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Agamben, 1998, Ramadan, 2012, Bulley, 2014 etc.) which investigates the forms of relationality, power dynamics and social structures within humanitarian camps. Whilst not a comparative study between the solidarity squat and a specific camp, this thesis will draw broadly on the theoretical field to examine the relational and structural dichotomies which prevail, and how these may affect migrant wellbeing.

This thesis seeks to offer an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the praxis of solidarity by combining elements of political philosophy, human geography and well-being studies. It therefore hopes to advance the academic debate in a number of fields. As discussed, literature on migrant solidarity movements remains scant. Within the sphere of wellbeing studies whilst there has been a growing appreciation of the limitations of neoliberalism and its fetishization of Gross Domestic Product as a sufficient paradigm for social wellbeing (Smith and Reid, 2017), little has been done on radical leftist political philosophy as an alternative. The same rings true in terms of human geography and the humanitarian debate. Whilst the problematisation of humanitarian praxis is endemic to the field, far less has been done to examine alternative modes of engagement which are seeking to challenge dominant humanitarian discourse and praxis. Through an examination of Spirou Trikoupi 17 this thesis seeks to expand the debate within three academic spheres whilst simultaneously engaging with an otherwise marginalised and ostracised community within Athens. This logic of engaging with the stories of migration from below seeks to overcome the disempowering effects of much academic inquiry which speaks of ‘the migrant’, ‘the refugee’, ‘the asylum seeker’ in homogenising terms and largely in relation European border policy, geopolitics or institutional humanitarianism.

1.3. Thesis Outline

This first chapter has provided a brief overview of the situation in Greece and contextualised the emergence of the migrant solidarity movement within the broader geopolitical climate. It has also sought to elucidate the gap in current research and outline the salience of this study into migrant solidarity. The second chapter shall bring in a number of relevant theoretical debates to contextualise and underpin the discussion section. The poverty of neoliberal understandings of wellbeing shall be discussed and consequentially contrasted to my understanding of what an anarchist definition of wellbeing might look like. Having illustrated the contrasts between such political paradigms and their respective definitions of wellbeing, an overview of humanitarian praxis and camp literature will be offered to examine the elements

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of relationality and contingent forms of care which exist within humanitarian settings. The theoretical framework will broadly therefore examine the notion of wellbeing within structures of competition, horizontality and hierarchy respectively. Before moving into the discussion of Spirou Trikoupi 17 itself the third section will examine the methodological considerations which underpinned the study, outlining the conscious decisions taken to build an anarchist inquiry and fracture the notion of post-colonial knowledge production where possible.

Chapter four and five are concerned with the findings of the research. In analysing the politics of solidarity within Spirou Trikoupi 17 it will be suggested that the emphasis within anarchism on equality and the attempt to create ‘borderless societies’ helps overcome narratives of the disposability of migrant lives. In doing so solidarity helps create relations of parity which humanises the migrant experience in Greece and challenges geopolitical narratives which segregate and expose individuals to dehumanising conditions. This section will equally focus on the construction of a community centred on the anarchic concept of ‘mutual aid’ which seeks connectivity, collaboration and cooperation in pursuit of communal wellbeing. Having established how solidarity creates an alternative social structure attention will be paid to how anarchist methods of organisation offer a means of empowerment for members of the squat. Drawing on the ideas of direct democracy, consensus decision making and the logics of self-organisation it will be suggested that radical leftist forms of political self-organisation offer the means for the exercise or creation of political subjectivity which protests the geopolitical attempts to create a disempowered and depoliticised body of migrants languishing in camps. Ultimately however it will be suggested that whilst migrant solidarity squats represent a crucial political intervention into a broader unjust and racialised geopolitical discourse, genuine wellbeing for members of the squat is contingent on onward mobility. In light of this, whilst the salience of anarchism in prefiguring alternative spaces of inclusion, parity and humanity in the present ought not be overlooked, what is needed is a broader reconceptualization of the self at the European level in relation to ‘the Other’, such that the postcolonial orthodoxies of exclusivity, superiority and hierarchy might be overcome, and the ‘crisis of reception’ resolved.

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Chapter Two

2.1 Marxism before Marx - Adam Smith, Wellbeing and the Critique of Capitalism

Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.

[Edward Abbey, 1977]

Within the context of political theory the orthodoxy of capitalism, or more modern manifestations of neoliberalism, has encountered regular criticism. Popularly deified as a progressive force driving humanity on a linear path towards ever more advanced forms of existence, capitalism is fundamentally concerned with expansion, accumulation and growth. Defined through the emphasis on Gross Domestic Product as an indicator of economic success, national ‘wellbeing’ has consistently been aggregated into economic terms. The pursuit of GDP has become a political ideology in and of itself, and as such budget policy making is commonly structured around the health of the economy rather than that of society. There has been however an emerging trend to move away from Gross Domestic Product as an indicator of national development and instead opt for a more holistic framework that disaggregates economic growth and national wellbeing. Indeed, the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan first advocated the prioritisation of happiness rather than growth during the start of the 1970s, introducing the Growth National Happiness Index in 2008 (Aljazeera, 2019). Similarly, New Zealand became the first country the introduce a national ‘Wellbeing Budget’ earlier this year. The new budget sets to redefine the methods of defining ‘national success’, citing the poverty of GDP as a sufficient indicator. To quote Finance Minister Grant Roberston, ‘success has been declared on the basis of a narrow range of indicators, like GDP growth…New Zealanders want us to measure our success in line with their values – the importance of fairness, the protection of the environment, the strength of our communities’ (The Treasury – New Zealand, 2019). This emerging trend offers a reconceptualization of the role of the state in reorienting policy away from a blind neoliberal pursuit of growth as the ultimate telos of government and business. Instead it highlights an acceptance of growth not as an end in and of itself, but a means through which public and societal wellbeing can be achieved (Smith and Reid, 2017). Gross Domestic Product is therefore beginning to be understood for what it ultimately represents, the wellbeing of the economy rather than that of the individual.

Indeed, for an appreciation of the incongruity of economic and personal wellbeing one need look no further than the founding father of capitalism, Adam Smith, for an almost Marxian

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critique of the impact of capitalism on human wellbeing. Smith is worth quoting in full when he stated:

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become...His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilised society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

[Smith, [1776] 1937, p.734-35]

This unbeknown or overlooked passage from The Wealth of Nations elucidates the fundamental incongruity between unadulterated capitalism as a paradigm in pursuit of economic progression, and human wellbeing. The blind pursuit of economic growth through the division of labour fosters, according to Smith, the systematic debasement of the common labourer, the remission of their mental and social faculties, and a denial of full capacity and agency. It should come as no surprise that his seminal work is entitled The Wealth of Nations, and not The Wellbeing of Nations.

The neoliberal paradigm is however far more than an economic structure or political mandate for the pursuit of growth. As Read (2009, p.27) states ‘neoliberalism is not just a manner of governing states or economies, but is intimately tied to the government of the individual, to a particular manner of living’. It is not just a system supporting free markets and capital accumulation, but an ideology which organises social relations in line with the dominant rationality decreed by the market. Neoliberalism both exports and consequentially relies upon the production of a particular individual subjectivity and social relationality in the form of what Foucault (2008) has termed the Homo Economicus. According to Foucault both liberalism and neoliberalism have Homo Economicus, an economic understanding of the individual, at their

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heart. Yet whilst liberalism understands Homo Economicus as a being of exchange and barter, neoliberalism relies on an understanding of Homo Economicus as a being of competition (Read, 2009). The neoliberal subject is therefore produced as an atomised agent, one characterised by self-interest employing ‘rational choice and cost-benefit calculation to the express exclusion of all other values and interests’ within the social realm (Hamann, 2009, p.38). Foucault’s understanding of neoliberalism extends therefore beyond the economic sphere to examine the way in which the organisation of society around such principles of competition creates a specific form of citizenry (Lorenzini, 2018). The internationalisation of such discourses of competition and individual struggle represents the heart of neoliberal governmentality as the individual is essentially socialised into a personification of the principles of free market capitalism. This sort of individualisation of society and disaggregation into broken down and isolated units in pursuit of personal over collective gain is the essence of neoliberal subjectivity. This is perhaps no better illustrated than through the infamous quote from Margaret Thatcher in which she stated ‘[people] are casting their problems onto society. And you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families…people must look to themselves first’ (The Guardian, 2012).

Within this context of atomised and mutually competitive individuals, those that fail to thrive can only blame themselves as responsibility is transferred entirely from society onto the individual. Indeed the notion of society, as Thatcher claims, appears to break down. As Brown states, ‘a fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of public-minded; indeed, it would barely exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . .’ (2005, as cited in Hamann, 2009, p.44). A personalised and individualistic endeavour, wellbeing is therefore produced through the critical pursuit of self-interest often at the expense of, or with complete disregard for, other citizens. Any attempt to move beyond the neoliberal paradigm must therefore understand and confront it holistically as a system not just pertaining to economic structure, but as a project deeply bound up with individual subjectivity and social relationality. As Read (2009, p.36) states, ‘any opposition to neoliberalism must take seriously its effectiveness, the manner in which it has transformed work, subjectivity and social relationships’. The state-centric response from New Zealand to ‘de-privatise’ wellbeing and facilitate a more open and nationalised discourse represents an important intervention into the logics of neoliberal governmentality. Nonetheless what is produced is a re-hashed form of neoliberalism, one in which wellbeing takes on a more public and communalised identity, whilst the broader ethic of neoliberal atomisation and competition remains intact. Anarchism, as will be seen, seeks to rescue the individual from this

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form of social relationality, understanding wellbeing not as a compartmentalised or isolated field able to exist within neoliberalism, but something contingent on and emergent through the destruction of such subjectivities and the creation of new and alternative ones.

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2.2 Prefiguring an Alternative Present - Towards an Anarchist Conception of Wellbeing

The man Of virtuous soul commands not, nor obeys: Power, like a desolating pestilence,

Pollutes whate’er it touches, and obedience, Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth, Makes slaves of men, and, of the human frame, A mechanised automaton

[Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1813, as cited in An Anarchist FAQ, 2017] 2.2.1. The Anti-Authoritarianism of Anarchy

Understanding the preclusion to the emergence of genuine humanity differs according to which theoretical tradition one situates themselves in. As Feldman and Ticktin (2010) suggest the Marxist tradition understands this preclusion as grounded in material inequality. Unequal access to the means of reproduction necessarily leads to the privileging of some and the debasement of others. For postcolonial scholars the hindrance of universal humanity can be located in the categorisations according to race and the exclusionary policies which have accompanied its construction (Feldman and Ticktin, 2010). For anarchists the preclusion, pollution and obfuscation of genuine humanity is determined by hierarchical relations of power. The Sonvillier Circular (1871)4_{spelt out the anarchist renunciation of the nefarious} ends of power: ‘If there is one incontrovertible fact, borne out a thousand times by experience, it is that authority has a corrupting effect on those in whose hands it is placed. It is absolutely impossible for a man with power over his neighbours to remain a moral man’ (The Sonvillier Circular, 1871, as cited in Graham, 2005, p.96). Anarchy (An-archy), disentangled from popular conceptions, representations and usage as denoting some sort of Hobbesian State of Nature (Hobbs, [1651] 2007), of no laws and unceasing conflict, actually comes from the Greek meaning ‘no-top’ (Heckert, 2011). What this translates to in terms of a coherent political doctrine is the removal of dominating power in all forms of life and existence, such that the individual becomes the master of their own existence and is protected from undue an unjust coercion from above. It means no one on top directing or oppressing the rest. As Clifford Harper (1987, p.vii) states ‘[l]ike all great ideas, anarchism is pretty simple when you get down

4_{The Sonvillier Circular 1871 made clear the fundamental divide between the Marxist tradition of struggle which}

advocated revolution through seizure of the state through political representatives, and the anarchist tradition which understood the dangerous and nefarious consequences of any form of ‘revolution from above’ which upheld the hierarchical state apparatus.

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to it — human beings are at their best when they are living free of authority, deciding things among themselves rather than being ordered about’. This is not to suggest anarchism is a doctrine of absolute freedom and non-intervention, simply that, to echo Lucy Parsons (1905, p.3), ‘we are governed best when we are governed least’.

Built into this critique of power is an understanding of the State, and its hierarchical and centralised ordering of relations of power, as an institution concerned purely with self-replication, concentration of wealth, and accumulation of power into the hands of the ruling class (Kropotkin, [1913] 2018). Unlike the Hobbesian notion of government which understands the state as a social contract of arbitration raising barbaric animals out of a perennial state of conflict (Hobbs, [1651] 2007), anarchists understand the state as an unjust intervention into the lives of the many in the interests of the few. As Kropotkin ([1913] 2018, p.345-47) states, ‘power and abuse of power necessarily go hand in hand’, and hence the modus operandi of the state is necessarily ‘to dispossess the nation of a large part of the fruits of its labour, to the advantage of a privileged few’. Equally the idea of the state as a centralised body managing the affairs of the population involves a grievous abdication of political engagement (Malatesta, 1891). The delegation of power, especially through representative government serves to concretise power into the hands of the few and alienates the individual from a genuine right to participation. Built into the critique of the state is not simply the centralisation of formal mechanisms of power and authority, but the domination of the individual through systems of isolation which seek to ostracise individuals from exercising their rational faculties.

Dominating power is not simply found in the mechanism of the state however. As Routledge (2009, p.82) suggests,

Dominating power can be located within the realms of the state, the economy, and/or civil society, and is often articulated within social, economic, political, and cultural relations and institutions. Patriarchy, racism, and homophobia are all faces of dominating power which attempt to discipline, silence, prohibit, or repress difference or dissent. Dominating power engenders inequality, and asserts the interests of a particular class, caste, race, or political configuration at the expense of others.

Anarchism therefore commits itself not simply to the destruction of the state, but a fundamental opposition to systems of domination in all its forms and guises. In the pursuit of such ends anarchism proposes, ‘to rescue the self-respect and independence of the individual from all

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restraint and invasion by authority…[as] only in freedom can man grow to his full stature. Only in freedom will he learn to think and move, and give the very best in him.’ (Goldman, 1969, p.5). Anarchism is therefore an evolving doctrine seeking to elucidate and destroy contemporary imbalances of power which privilege some whilst curtailing and debasing others.

2.2.2. Social Individualism and the Salience of Prefigurative Politics

As a political philosophy concerned with destruction and emancipation anarchism is commonly, and reductively, identified simply as a negative doctrine seeking to oppose, destroy, and eradicate. Anarchism is equally however an eminently positive doctrine seeking to create and ‘re-build’. To understand the positive aspects of anarchism one must first appreciate the relationship between the social and the individual, a relationship which can perhaps best be described as symbiotic. To quote Goldman (1969, p.3) again, ‘the individual is the heart of society, conserving the essence of social life; society is the lungs which are distributing the element to keep the life essence - that is, the individual - pure and strong’. As a doctrine seeking development and emancipation anarchism is concerned fundamentally at the level of the individual, seeking their liberation from all oppressive and dehumanizing forces, and freeing within them all the ‘latent powers’ which will permit the individual to ‘think for himself, act freely, and live fully’ (Goldman, 1969, p.3). This form of emancipation must be distinguished however from ‘individualistic theories’ of rugged individualism or nihilistic Nietzscheism (An Anarchist FAQ, 2017) as it seeks to blend the agent into a wider social fabric of reciprocity which values emancipation insofar as it is communally established. If the individual represents the core focal point of anarchism, she becomes unintelligible once removed from her wider social fabric. As Bakunin (1953, p.159) writes, ‘society, preceding in time any development of humanity and fully partaking of the almighty power of natural laws, actions, and manifestations, constitutes the very essence of human existence’. For Bakunin human existence is inherently social. The individual is unable to develop as an atomised agent as meaningful development can only exist within a wider context of social inclusion. Anarchism sees individual freedom and development as emerging from within society itself, and as a consequence of the collective development of all, rejecting the incoherence of more absolute notions of freedom which can only exist once the individual is abstracted from society itself. In this way ‘all men, even the most intelligent and the strongest, are at every instant of their lives the producers and the products’ (Bakunin, 1953, p.167). The individual finds themselves engaged in a process of reciprocity, both shaped by and able to shape the society in which they co-exist. Hence, we arrive at the concept of ‘social individualism’ (An Anarchist FAQ, 2017)

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in which the individual is the fundamental unit, but they only become intelligible through their interaction and socialisation within society itself. As Murray Bookchin, (1986, p.79) writes, ‘the making of a human being… is a collective process, a process in which both community and the individual participate’.

The significance of this emphasis on mutual exchange within the context of wellbeing is grounded in the performative capacity of prefiguratism within anarchism. Raekstad and Gradin (n.d., p.9) define prefigurative politics as: ‘the deliberate experimental implementation of desired future social relations and practices in the here-and-now’. They continue (n.d., p.43) ‘if it means anything at all, prefigurative politics means being committed to the idea that if we want to replace certain structures with other very different ones, then we need to reflect some aspect(s) of that future structure in the movements and organisations we develop to bring it about’. Social change therefore relies not simply on having an idealised goal which a community strives towards, but an experimentation with the present and an attempt to inaugurate a new form of social organisation which the future society will centre around. Anarchist emancipatory projects place a special emphasis on transforming the present, not simply because they espouse and want to live by certain values, but because they understand transformations in the present as yielding transformations in the future. To quote Raekstad and Gradin (n.d., p.31) again, ‘the development of people’s powers and capacities; their drives, wants, and needs; and their consciousness can only be made sense of through an understanding of the forms of praxis that they are part of and emerge through’. By dismantling structures of social, cultural and political hierarchy and creating alternative models of social engagement, anarchism suggests a broader process of individual and community emancipation and development can be inaugurated. The interrelation between society and the individual means that by prefiguring an alternative social structure, method of organising, or way of relating in the present, one can prefigure an alternative way of being in the future.

2.2.3. An Anarchic Utopia

The question remains; what sort of society do anarchists seek to prefigure? This is perhaps where the doctrine becomes somewhat more fractured. Nonetheless anarchism can be seen to be grounded in a commitment to the following three principles; liberty, equality and solidarity (or mutual aid) (An Anarchist FAQ, 2017). These principles may be seen to emerge from a moral commitment to the absolute and inherent value of all individuals. As Bakunin (1953, p.147) writes,

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All human morality, every collective and individual morality, rests basically upon human respect. What do we mean by human respect? It is recognition of humanity, of human right and of human dignity in every man of whatever race, colour, and degree of intellectual and even moral development he may be...Only at the price of showing such respect can I retain my own human dignity.

The radical commitment to the absolute equality of all members of the community and emphasis on organising society according to parity and horizontality reflect the intrinsic value of all and the injustice of coercing any such member through the instrumentalisation of power. Equally what this passage highlights is the concept of reciprocity. Personal dignity can only be achieved within the social context of extending that dignity and respect to all members of the community. Any infringement on that mandate results in the debasement of self and other.

The concept of solidarity or mutual aid as a fundamental tenet of anarchist society stems from Peter Kropotkin's rebuttal of Darwinism. Kropotkin ([1902] 1987) rejected the idea that nature was chiefly grounded in perpetual struggles between organisms for resources and suggested instead that nature is equally defined by collective struggles within species against external forces such as the environment or predators. He states ([1902] 1987, p.20), ‘there is an immense amount of warfare and extermination going on amidst various species; there is, at the same time, as much, or perhaps even more, of mutual support, mutual aid, and mutual defence.... Sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle’. Correct or not in his attempt to derive a socio-political theory from biological habit, the concept of mutual aid or solidarity has been fundamental to anarchism in providing a rationale for the concept of mutual struggle against an exterior threat or oppressor. Solidarity therefore concerns itself with mutual cooperation and protest in the name of a shared ambition or interest. As a normative sentiment it is therefore markedly different to altruism which is more an act of generosity or non-reciprocal kindness (Williams, 2010). As Gould (2007, p.157) suggests, ‘solidarity thus differs from charity, in part because of its connection to eliminating an oppressive situation and its appeal to a shared struggle, in which the aim or project predominates’.

Drawing on the ideas of mutual aid, anti-authoritarianism, and social individualism, the anarchist notion of liberty is eminently social and reciprocal. To conceptualise this Bakunin is worth quoting in full. He states (1953, p.156),

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The primitive, natural man becomes a free man, becomes humanized, and rises to the status of a moral being,—in a word, he becomes conscious of, and realizes within himself and for himself, his own human form and his rights—only to the degree that he becomes aware of this form and these rights in all his fellow-beings. It follows that in the interests of his own humanity, his own morality and personal freedom, man must aspire toward the freedom, morality, and humanity of all other men.

In this passage Bakunin extols the virtues of communal freedom and concretely rejects individualist and absolute notions of freedom, later condemning absolute freedom removed from a social context as a form of ‘non-being’ (Bakunin, 1953, p.168). Freedom is therefore fundamentally relational and bound to the fate of the wider community. In this regard freedom is something that must be communally nurtured and respected - a social process in itself which safeguards against incursions or coups of power, unjust authority, and control. As Bakunin (1953, p.156) goes on to state ‘respect for the freedom of someone else constitutes the highest duty of men. The only virtue is to love this freedom and serve it. This is the basis of all morality, and there is no other basis’. If dominant political systems structured around hierarchies of power serve to alienate the individual from their true power and maintain a state of unconscious dormancy, anarchism proposes to awake within the individual consciousness of herself through emancipation and the protection of liberty (Goldman, 1969).

2.2.4. Towards a definition of Wellbeing

What is offered above is an attempt to produce a limited and condensed version of a dense, and at times non-homogenous, political philosophy in order to arrive at an anarchist conception of wellbeing. By way of beginning it is worth mentioning that as much as anarchism is a philosophy concerned with structural societal change, it is equally fundamentally a relational doctrine promulgating an alternative form of social relationship. The state, capitalism and neoliberalism, in this regard, can be conceived not simply as institutions or apparatus, but exporters of forms of relationality (Heckert, 2010). To quote Landauer (2005, as cited in Heckert, 2010, p.200), ‘the state is a relationship between human beings, a way by which people relate to one another; and one destroys it by entering into other relationships, by behaving differently to one another’. The malaise of modern society, or the preclusion to genuine humanity, cannot simply be found in the existence of institutions or structures, but in the relationality and methods of ‘being’ which such structures and paradigms both export and rely upon. Anarchist conceptualisations of power therefore appear largely coterminous with

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Foucauldian notions of neoliberal governmentality, in that power is understood not simply to exist within dominant social or political structures, but exists through the regulation of the self and in the relationships between self and other. Arriving at an anarchist conception of wellbeing therefore involves a dual, but deeply interrelated, stratagem. Primarily it involves structural change, premised on the need to remove any structures of domination and authoritarianism. This means a movement towards communal self-organisation, horizontal political engagement through the use of general assemblies, and bottom-up collective ownership, often through the ‘commoning’ of resources. Structural change in and of itself however is rarely a sufficient conduit for the emergence of genuine horizontality and an alternative sense of being. Anarchist scholars have commented on the limits of a reliance on structures of horizontality alone when seeking to overcome systems of intersectional oppression (See Raekstad and Gradin, n.d.). In light of this, progressive anarchist movements seeking to prefigure alternative ways of ‘becoming’ need to demonstrate a level of reflexivity and self-critique in order to genuinely prefigure a different form of relationality. Wellbeing in this sense is produced through the entering into of different forms of social relations, supported by alternative social, political and economic structures, which ought to foster the evolution of an all-together nourishing and enlightened form of society. Anarchism is somewhat non-prescriptive in outlining specific models of revolution or blueprints of utopian society, recognising that to do so would delimit and confine the borders of revolutionary society. Instead it is premised on set on egalitarian moral, social and political relations which, when duly implemented and structurally supported, ought to bring about true humanity, empowerment, consciousness of the self and of others, a framework for cooperation and development, integrity, dignity, and a fully human existence.

Whilst not adverse to marches, demonstrations and protests, anarchist movements locate revolutionary power in the potential of changing the present, and the prefiguration of alternative methods of relating and being. Revolution within the anarchist conception of the term, cannot be conceived in terms of a moment, an event, a temporal rupture, but must fundamentally be seen as a process of reform and continual engagement. There is therefore a concrete link between the prefiguration of alternative social structures, alternative methods of engaging with one another, and what Heckert (2010) has termed, an alternative sense of ‘becoming’. As he states ‘the anarchist is not born, he is made’ (2010, p.199). In contrast to Benthamite Hedonism which is concerned with the instrumental outcome of certain acts, and Aristotelian Eudaimonia which is commonly linked to the pursuit of certain virtues, anarchism is principally grounded in a different form of relationality and a reconceptualization of

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ourselves and ‘the Other’. The anarchist conception of wellbeing exists not as some ‘Platonic form’, in a pure and unadulterated sense, or something to be striven towards and individually achieved. Wellbeing is, in essence, something that is performed in the present. It is both a process and a communal practice – deeply political in the connection of all to political structures of horizontality, economic in the movement towards collaboration rather than accumulation, social in the production and recognition of absolute equality, and cultural in the appreciation and welcoming of difference and non-homogeneity. Situating this process within the context of social individualism emphasises the reciprocal process in which the wellbeing of the individual is implicated. The individual is an agent whose wellbeing is shaped by the external community, and an individual capable of affecting the wellbeing of others by upholding or rejecting the principles and structures on which society is premised. As Malatesta (1891, p. 23) states ‘we are all egoists, we all seek our own satisfaction. But the anarchist finds his greatest satisfaction in struggling for the good of all, for the achievement of a society in which he [sic] can be a brother among brothers, and among healthy, intelligent, educated, and happy people’. Positioning wellbeing within this environment of communal interaction and production recognises that ultimately there is no telos or pre-defined end to wellbeing. By upholding said structures and inaugurating a different form of relationality the potential for empowerment, growth, development and wellbeing is essentially undefined. To quote Rudolph Rocker (2005, as cited in Ince 2012, p.1652) ‘I am an anarchist not because I believe in anarchism as a final goal, but because there is no such thing as a final goal[;] Freedom will lead us to a continually wider and expanding understanding and to new social forms of life’. Anarchism, at its core, is therefore far more than a political philosophy advocating structural change – it is a relational practice, a state of mind, a way of being, and a process of becoming.

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2.3. (Problematizing) Humanitarianism: Ideology and Praxis

The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.

(Foucault 1971, as cited in Harrell-Bond, 2002, p.53) 2.3.1. Intervention and the Sanctity of Victimhood

Humanitarianism is an expansive modern practice concerned with global intervention. Grounded in the normative sentiment to treat global suffering the modern manifestations of humanitarian intervention can be defined as ‘any activity that is intended to relieve suffering, stop preventable harm, save lives at risk, and improve the welfare of vulnerable populations’ (Barnett, 2013, p.383). Institutional humanitarianism, understood through this narrative of top-down intervention guided by normative sensibility, commonly operates through the creation of humanitarian spaces or the espace humanitaire (Rony Brauman, as cited in Pallister-Wilkins, 2018a). Such spaces of intervention are characterised according to principles of political neutrality and independence from state politics, as well as reliant on domestic governments to uphold the space of operation such that vulnerable populations might receive support (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012, pg.1).

Through the creation and upholding of humanitarian space, humanitarian practice can be said to be grounded in the principle of ‘transversality’ - the process of ‘occupying and charting new territories while escaping the spatial confines in which one was previously located’ (Debrix, 1998, p.832). Drawing on the practice of Medecins Sans Frontiers, Debrix suggests humanitarianism can be seen to be engaged in a dual process of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’. Intervention into the sovereign and top down ordering of state territory on the one hand serves to destabilise ‘fixed disciplinary policies/tactics of sovereign states’, resulting in a process of deterritorialization (Debrix, 1998, p.839). On the other hand, the admittance of members to the space and the subsequent identification of members within that space according to the logic of victimhood, means institutional humanitarian practice becomes a process of ‘reterritorialization’, engaged in a practice of spatial ordering and exporting notions of victimhood (Debrix, 1998). Indeed, the reliance on paradigms of victimhood is fundamental to the smooth functioning of the humanitarian machine. To quote Ticktin (2012,

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p.80), ‘while much of the new humanitarianism is driven by the moral imperative to stop suffering, the logic whereby victimhood is considered sacred is still an integral part of the compassion that drives humanitarianism’. The construction and reliance on notions of victimhood is not solely important in terms of upholding the normative sentiment to prevent suffering and ‘save the distant stranger’, it is equally relied upon in mobilising financial capital. As Harrell-Bond (2002, p.57) points out, ‘the external justification for funding the institutional/administrative structure set up to distribute aid relies in important ways on portraying refugees as helpless and desperately in need of international assistance’. The twin practices of spatial reterritorialization, and exporting of images and narratives, of victimhood and helplessness are fundamental in producing ‘the humanitarian subject’- a reductive construction of migrants, depoliticised, homogenised and rendered ‘supplicant bodies in need of intervention and protection’ (Sanyal, 2017, p.5).

The creation of humanitarian spaces and the construction of victimhood means humanitarian praxis manifests through the production and maintenance of numerous hierarchies. Perhaps the most obvious is the dichotomy is between the ‘giver’ and ‘receiver’ of aid. As Fassin (2007, p.512) writes, ‘the ontological principle of inequality finds its concrete manifestation in the act of assistance through which individuals identified as victims are established. They are those for whom the gift cannot imply a counter-gift, since it is assumed that they can only receive. They are the indebted of the world’. This hierarchical and deeply asymmetrical relationship is the foundation of humanitarianism - a sentiment concerned with saving ‘the Other’ which operates through hierarchical structures centred around relations of dependency and ultimately disempowerment. Within this context the humanitarian subject is rendered as a passive recipient of care whilst humanitarians, as the upholders of the necessary conditions for life become active agents, guided by sentiments of compassion, altruism and care, and empowered subjects controlling the security and welfare of the disempowered population.

2.3.2. Conceptualising the Camp - Modalities of care, control and violence

Humanitarianism as an institutional praxis remains largely disconnected from the political dimensions of any given crisis, and unconcerned with providing resolutions. In this regard it operates within a paradigm of temporal liminality - cut off from origins and solutions and committed to upholding what can only be described as an optimised present with its focus on ‘reduction and alleviation rather than transformation’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2019, p.142). Indeed it is this focus on reduction and alleviation within the immediate present which means

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humanitarianism is often viewed through the Foucauldian prism of biopolitics - as a system concerned with the biopolitical regulation of life (See Foucault 1978, 2003, 2008). Biopolitics is concerned with the sovereign power over life itself. It refers to the politicisation of life as a concern of government and its transmutation from a biological into a political issue. Biopolitics is discussed by Foucault as a series of strategies or techniques through which life itself comes to be managed, controlled and regulated (Foucault 1978, 2003, 2008). In the regulation of the present, especially within camp environments, humanitarianism can therefore be seen as an eminently biopolitical practice, endowing humanitarian agents with the power to foster life on a mass scale. The camp hence becomes a spatial technology of control and regulation (see Malkki, 1995). Equally, As Fassin (2010) has noted, it is precisely this necessary focus on fostering life on a mass scale that results in the production of quantitative rather than qualitative results. The institutionalised machine that is modern humanitarianism, and its modus operandi to uphold the necessary conditions for life en masse, often results in a concretely biological understanding of human needs. In describing this phenomenon Redfield (2008, p.166) has mobilised the concept of ‘biopolitical minimalism’, stating ‘the humanitarian project...remains a largely minimalist endeavour, focused on fostering existence rather than enhancement. Its biopolitics are those of survival’. The structural and temporal limitations of humanitarian engagement are therefore commonly mirrored in the forms of assistance provided. To quote Ticktin (2006 as cited in Rozakou, 2012) the emphasis on biological existence fosters ‘a limited version of what it means to be human,’ a ‘minimalist humanity’.

Equally paradigmatic in conceptualizing the production of life within camp environments is Giorgio Agamben. His work draws on Foucault’s notion of biopolitics whilst qualifying it somewhat to account for the power of the sovereign in distinguishing between and producing different forms of life (Agamben, 1998). For Agamben biopolitics pertains to a relationship between the sovereign power and Other in which the former has the power to preclude the latter from normal socio-political inclusion. Distinguishing between bare-life, as biological life common to all creatures, and bios, as genuine socio-political existence, biopolitics becomes the means through which the sovereign is able to produce and differentiate between different life forms, including some whilst excluding and abandoning others (Agamben, 1998). Agamben therefore suggests the camp represents the ‘fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West’ (1998, p.102) as a space in which migrant others are produced as bare-life through the exclusion of the individual or community from more socially and politically qualified forms of existence. Criticised for offering a homogenised and reductive reading of camp spaces as purely top-down constructions (See Katz, 2017, Bulley, 2014, Ramadan, 2012), Agamben’s

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work is certainly useful in delineating the hierarchical and asymmetrical power dynamics between sovereign and Other, and the capacity for geographical segregation, control and abandonment within camps.

Within the context of Greece, it is perhaps equally worth mobilising Mbembe’s (2003) concept of necropolitics and the idea of a postcolonial construction of migrant bodies as something to be segregated and controlled. Necropolitics differs from biopolitics in the sense that it is concerned with the regulation of death or harm rather than life. It manifests in a situation in which ‘disposable Others are not actively killed, but are instead kept injured, dehumanized and excluded, often through the deliberate and harmful inactivity of the state’ (Davies and Isakjee, 2018, also see Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017). Within Greece the geographical exclusion of migrants is evident through the incarceration of individuals into spatially segregated camps on the islands or outskirts of major cities. Around Athens the state-runs camps are often geographically isolated and marked by ‘a dire lack of amenities’ meaning they commonly ‘appear unfit for habitation’. Indeed, ‘in most of the cases there is no access to health and security services and facilities.’ (Tsavdaroglou, 2018, p.382). This image of spatial segregation and exposure to dehumanising living conditions is equally exemplified, and perhaps intensified, in relation to the conditions within the Aegean Hotspots. As Pallister-Wilkins (2018b) suggests, the hotspots as places of detention and immobility function as spaces of regulation and control in order to make migrant bodies known, calculable and ultimately manageable as humanitarianism becomes a form of government itself. While the hotspots cannot be conceptualized therefore through the logic of state inactivity, the conditions within the hotspots are such that the notion of a necropolitical exposure, or abandonment, to dehumanizing and damaging conditions becomes applicable. Indeed commenting on conditions within Lesbos Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) stated,

While these vulnerable people await the conclusion of their asylum application, it strikes me that the appalling living conditions and the exposure to constant violence, the lack of freedom and rights accorded to migrants, the severe deterioration of health and mental health, and the everyday stress and pressure placed on all inhabitants of the island, has caused Lesbos to resemble an old-fashioned mental asylum, not seen in parts of Europe since the mid-20th century.

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Framing the institutional reaction in Greece therefore necessitates a movement away from a purely biopolitical paradigm in terms of managing, controlling and upholding life. As Mbembe, (2003, p.27) states, necropolitics represents ‘the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not’. The unilateral exposure to a Kafkaesque asylum procedure, as well as the failing system of hospitality which confines many to ‘carceral spaces’ (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018b) characterised by inhumane living conditions, render migrants within Greece as something abandoned, disposable, segregated, and ‘kept injured’. This speaks to the incongruity of being both migrant, and fully human whilst languishing on the peripheries of Europe, and relates to Davies and Isakjee’s (2018, p.3) understanding of the European refugee camp as a post-colonial construction subjecting subaltern and ‘disenfranchised Others to hegemonic control or abandonment’. Thus the racialised element of the institutional response comes to the fore. The migrant body as something to be controlled, abandoned, exposed to inhumane living conditions as well as something alien and ultimately less than its European counterpart exposes the ‘irremediable paradox in one’s ability to be considered both human and a refugee simultaneously’ (Wallace, 2018, p.14).

The management of the ‘Other’ within Greece is therefore neither solely one of biopolitical regulation, nor necropolitical abandonment. The structures of ‘hospitality’ which exist are different within different camps in Greece, with certain spaces existing in a grey area between attempts to biopolitically manage and make visible such migrant bodies, whilst simultaneously exposing them to degrading and harmful material conditions. Appreciating the logics of sovereign power therefore seems fundamental to the situation within Greece. Indeed one final useful framework for understanding the dynamics of power within Greece is the act of hospitality itself. Rozakou (2012) is worth mentioning here as her work has sought to advance the debate beyond Agamben’s notion of bare-life by analysing the act of hospitality and the ‘production of the worthy guest’ within Greece. According to Derrida (2010, p.16) the concept of hospitality is concerned with how ‘we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners’. The interaction is inherently bound up in relations of power as it ‘supposes a reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate, control, and master according to different modalities of violence’ (Derrida, 2010, p.17). As the distant stranger becomes the proximate stranger on the peripheries of Europe, Rozakou has spoken of the strong boundaries created through the relations between insiders and outsiders, and the sovereign relations of control hospitality generates over ‘the other’. To quote (2012, p.565), the practice of hospitality

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sets the boundaries between outsiders and insiders, and it is a practice of sovereignty and control over the stranger. It is a one-way offer and also a means of dealing with alterity. It is an act of interest and, at the same time, one of power...Guests are temporarily placed in the moral universe of the hosts; they are obliged to comply with the rules and accepted forms of behaviour, whereas the privilege of agency is attributed solely to the hosts.

Practices of hospitality are therefore never neutral and non-problematic. Often philanthropic in principle, hospitality reproduces and is grounded in social divides between those included and those excluded, exposing the latter to a hierarchical system of management and containment within camp environments insofar as they remain ‘the worthy guest’ - depoliticised and disempowered (Rozakou, 2012). The creation of ‘the guest’ therefore means hospitality emerges as a practice of the citizen on the non-citizen, rendering the guest as an immobilised subject on the legal, political and geographical fringes of society. Hence they reside ‘in a zone between the outside and the inside, exclusion and inclusion’ (Rozakou, 2012, p.570). In terms of Agambenian terminology, the individual is no longer produced purely in terms of bare life, but the transience and liminality precludes full political subjectivity. As temporary members of their ‘hosts household’ the individual resides within the zones of political subjectivity and bare life.

The intention of this final section has not been necessarily to outrightly reject or dispel humanitarianism as a form of intervention. It has simply been to problematize it, highlight some its philosophical and practical underpinnings and elucidate the relations of power it both relies upon and reproduces. Within Greece deconstructing the reception of ‘the Other’ requires a composite blend of theory as humanitarian spaces cannot be neatly surmised according to segregated logics. One cannot necessarily refer to ‘the camp’ in a homogenised way as sovereign power manifests differently within different spaces. The above framework does however run the risk of becoming somewhat totalising in itself as little heed has been payed to migrant agency and the ability of groups to challenge or subvert such logics. Nevertheless what this section has sought to elucidate is the difference between solidarity, humanitarianism and state intervention within Greece in terms of their relationality with ‘the Other’. It has focused on the systems of governance and hierarchy which the migrant is often implicated within, attempting to unpack how the normative principle of care, once translated into an institutionalised practice, reveals a far more politically and morally contentious form of intervention grounded in neoliberal rationalities of control, reified hierarchies, the limiting of the individual to the transient state of ‘the guest’, as well as the reduction of ‘bodies on the

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move’ into mere passive victims. Hence the ‘political violence’, alluded to above by Foucault, is revealed. The following analysis will discuss how that practice of solidarity and principles of anarchism associated within Spirou Trikoupi 17 seek to challenge, subvert and contest this narrative.

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Chapter Three

- Anarchism, Post-Colonialism and the Academy - Building an Anarchist

Methodology

This thesis is based on seven weeks spent in Athens between March and May 2019 during which one solidarity squat was qualitatively studied. Initially there were a number of challenges in gaining access to the field. Some groups have had negative experiences with researchers in the past expressing concerns that the research produced was not greatly beneficial to their cause, and the process intrusive. Equally the anarchist movement in Exarchia is somewhat introverted and phobic at times. The major challenge was therefore to satisfy potential groups that the research would be non-intrusive, ethically conducted, and also important in and of itself. Initially I made contact with a number of solidarity groups based in Athens such as Spirou Trikoupi 17, Oniro Hotel, City Plaza Hotel, Notara, and 5th_{School. Having had received} varying levels of response and spoken to other researchers within the scene in Athens, meeting in person seemed fundamental to allaying concerns and building the initial trust that would allow access.

As mentioned the solidarity squats are not homogenous in their political ideology or method of organising. Having conducted some prior research Spirou Trikoupi 17 seemed to aligned well with the type of community I wanted to study as an anarchist building practicing the principles of self-organisation. On arrival I therefore approached them first to discuss the prospect of conducting research within their community. Given that most of these movements are anarchist affiliated or attempting to proffer a system of horizontal decision making, of course no one alone could sanction my project, and so I was invited to present my research to the general assembly of the building. This gave me the opportunity to meet with the community and provide an outline of my research proposal. It equally offered an opportunity for community members to voice their opinions, questioning both the benefits to users of the space, as well as voicing scepticism towards my project as simply an extended piece of journalism. The general assembly therefore offered the chance to discuss the potential benefits in terms of garnering project funding from international solidarity groups5_{by spreading information, as} well as distinguish my project as an independent piece of research rather than an extractive form of ‘drive-by research’ or journalism (Fernandez, 2009). The general assembly of Spirou Trikoupi 17 (henceforth known as Trikoupi) was the first assembly I attended, and the reaction

5_{Spirou Trikoupi 17 rejects state and NGO funding and runs through the help of local and international}

‘We live together, we fight together’ : anarchism, solidarity and the politics of migrant wellbeing