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EU member state-building in Bosnia and

Herzegovina: Making them run before they

can walk?

Source: Sara Kurfeß, from unsplash.com

Katja Nacevski

Master’s Thesis presented for the Master’s degree in Political Science:

European Politics and External Relations (MSc)

Student ID: 12252662

Supervisor: Dr Dimitris Bouris

Second Reader: Prof Dr Jonathan Zeitlin

June 2019

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Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the people, who have supported me and stood by my side for the past ten months. Some say that as an individual, you are only as good as the company you keep. And my company, throughout this experience, has been truly incredible!

First of all, I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr Dimitris Bouris for his patient supervision, kind words of encouragement and persistent reminders of deadlines. Secondly, I thank my fellow researchers, and new friends for life, for hours of proof-reading and debates in CREA, political and otherwise. Thirdly, I am forever indebted to my parents, Nataša and Sašo, for their continued love and support, enabling me to pursue my goals. I aspire to always make you proud. And finally, Max. Thank you for always being there for me and encouraging me.

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ii | P a g e Key words:

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Western Balkans, European Union, member state-building, sovereignty

Word count (pure text):

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Abstract

This thesis engages with the concept of European Union (EU) member state-building, focusing on issues of internal sovereignty with the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It provides an overview of the literature on state-building, member state-building, EU external relations and sovereignty. These are theoretically analysed and operationalised with respect to the Police and (attempted) Constitutional Reforms in BiH at the beginning of the 21st century. Following the Thessaloniki Council Summit in June 2003, these reforms were introduced at a time of growing EU engagement in both the Western Balkans and BiH in particular. While the EU has since been intensely involved in numerous policy areas, the research focuses on Police and (attempted) Constitutional Reform as essential matters of state-building, identified through literature on peacebuilding and state-building.

By setting up relevant research questions, the thesis aims to narrow the gap in academic literature with regards to EU member state-building and questions of internal sovereignty. As a concept, member state-building remains relatively new and as such benefits from conceptual and empirical contributions. It has emerged as a combination of literatures on state-building and Europeanisation, in order to avoid conceptual overstretching. These contributions and findings are made possible through a more critical engagement of the concept of member state-building and the EU’s engagement in the post-conflict Western Balkans. By focusing on internal sovereignty, this research sheds light on the matters of post-conflict states and their integration into the EU. It notes that there is a lack of public acknowledgement of the power dynamics in the EU accession process, which does not allow for post-conflict states to strengthen their internal sovereignty. In summary, this research finds that in the early stages of Police and Constitutional Reform in BiH, the EU was not able to assert its influence and contribute to the strengthening of internal sovereignty. This has led to a diminished ability to push for reforms and advance the accession negotiations.

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List of Abbreviations

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation CEEC – Central and Eastern European countries

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy COM – European Commission

CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy DEI – Directorate of European Integration

DG NEAR - Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy DPA - Dayton Peace Agreement

EEAS - European External Action Service ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy

EP – European Parliament EU - European Union

EUFOR Althea - European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina EUPM - European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EUSR - European Union Special Representative

FBiH - Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ICB International Commission on the Balkans ICG – International Crisis Group

ICJ - International Court of Justice

ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia IFOR – Implementation Force

IPA - Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

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NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OBNOVA – Aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

OHR - Office of the High Representative

PHARE – Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy PIC – Peace Implementation Council

RS - Republika Srpska

SAA - Stabilisation and Association Agreement SAP - Stabilisation and Association Process

SFOR - Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SSR - Security Sector Reform

TEU - Treaty of European Union UN - United Nations

UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution UN SG – United Nations Secretary General

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ... i Abstract ... iii List of Abbreviations ... iv Introduction ... 1 Chapter 1: Methodology ... 3

1.1 Main research question and secondary research questions ... 3

1.2 Methodological approach and data collection ... 3

1.2.1 Interviews and data collection... 5

1.2.2 Primary and secondary sources ... 7

1.3 Case selection and justification ... 7

1.4 Limitations and disclaimers ... 8

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework ... 10

Introduction ... 10

2.1 Peacebuilding and statebuilding ... 10

2.2 State-building ... 13

2.2.1 Criticism of state-building ... 16

2.3 European Union state-building ... 19

2.4 EU Member state-building ... 22

2.5 Sovereignty – working definition and criticism ... 26

2.6 Operationalisation of the literature ... 29

Chapter 3: The EU and state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 30

Introduction ... 30

3.1 The fall of Yugoslavia and the birth the Bosnian state ... 30

3.2 International organisations in BiH after the war ... 32

3.3 The EU in the Western Balkans ... 36

3.4 The EU and BiH: State-building, enlargement and everything in between ... 40

Chapter 4: Impact of Police Reform on internal sovereignty in BiH ... 44

Introduction ... 44

4.1 Police Reform in BiH ... 44

4.2. Analysis ... 46

Chapter 5: Impact of (attempted) Constitutional Reform on internal sovereignty in BiH ... 49

5.1. Constitutional Reform in BiH ... 49

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Chapter 6: Discussion ... 55

Conclusion ... 59

Bibliography ... 62

Interviews and personal interactions ... 62

Primary sources ... 62

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Introduction

Bosnia is under my skin. It’s a place you cannot leave behind. – Lord Paddy Ashdown

Throughout its development, the European Union (EU) has continued to engage with its so-called neighbourhood. It cannot, however, be said that this engagement has been equal throughout different European regions. Ranging from enlargement policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and global engagement, the EU has established itself as an important player on the world stage (Bouris, 2014).

The Balkans, and more specifically the Western Balkans, have a long and complex history. They are sometimes misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is important to note that in the Balkans people remember. History, culture and identity are marks, which people have carried with them for centuries and will continue to, rarely laying them down in order for others to grasp a better understanding of them.

Even within the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a country, whose history continues to haunt, least the physical space. Almost a quarter of a century after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and at the heart of the region, it remains divided and highly politically charged. Since the Thessaloniki Council Summit in 2003, BiH remains a potential candidate country and, during the time of writing, received the European Commission opinion on its membership application, which maintained that the country still has a long way to come (COM, 2019). Bosnia remains one of the rare places, where it is possible to speak of the presence of the international community without overly generalising.

This thesis attempts to connect some of the complexities through research on the impact of EU member state-building on internal sovereignty in BiH. The EU’s accession process in the country extends from the beginning of the 21st century into the distant future. EU member state-building originated in literature at a similar time as the start of membership negotiations. It has combined concepts and discussions of state-building and Europeanisation in order to better explain, what is actually happening between countries of the Western Balkans and the EU (Keil and Arkan, 2014; Denti, 2014). What has been lacking in discussions on member state-building is the consequence of power dynamics in the EU accession process in post-conflict states. Chapter 1 outlines the methodology of the present research, providing the main and secondary research questions, data collection and justification for the case study. Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the literature on peacebuilding, traditional and EU state-building,

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2 | P a g e member state-building and sovereignty. In addition, it includes the conceptual framework and its connection to the research and case study. The third Chapter to provide the reader with the historic background of the case study. The state of Bosnia has endured a long and complex history, making it difficult to present in an objective and succinct manner. Nevertheless, this is attempted by distinguishing between broader international involvement, the EU’s role in the Western Balkans more generally and up-to date details on the accession process in BiH. Chapters 4 and 5 dive deeper into the Police and (attempted) Constitutional Reform, respectively, undertaken in the early years of the EU’s intensive involvement in Bosnia. The Police Reform is an example of building security forces, while, though it eventually failed, Constitutional Reform is an example of constitution-building. Both areas are discussed and acknowledged in literature on state-building. These chapters include data gathered during the research, and attempts to provide a cohesive answer to the research questions, by linking them to the conceptual and historical frameworks. By tying together the main points presented in the analysis, chapter 6 revisits the main and secondary research questions.

The Balkans are difficult to understand. Whether or not the EU is going to succeed in moving past this fact and generate a comprehensive approach towards the Western Balkans, and Bosnia in particular, remains to be seen. While it has promised the Western Balkan countries a place among its established members, the EU rather seems to expect from countries such as Kosovo and BiH, to run before they can even walk. And one cannot help but wonder, if this is constructive. Or will the countries stumble yet again?

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Chapter 1: Methodology

This Chapter provides an overview of the research and methodological approach of this thesis. The first sub-section outlines the main and secondary research question. These questions guide the research throughout the thesis and tie all five chapters together. This is followed by a description of the methodological approach, in particular semi-structured and open-ended interviewing, and the method and sequencing of data collection. Penultimately, the sub-section on case selection and justification provides a short summary of the case study and why it has been chosen. The Chapter concludes with a sub-section, to acknowledge the limitations of the research and includes disclaimers pertaining to the specific topic.

1.1 Main research question and secondary research questions

Guiding the research are the main and secondary questions listed below. These have been chosen in order to fill gaps in the academic literature and widen the understanding of the topic. Main research question:

→ To what extent, has EU ‘member state-building’ strengthened the internal

sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Secondary research questions:

1. How did the Police Reform influence member state-building in BiH?

2. How did the (attempted) Constitutional Reform influence member state-building in BiH?

These questions have steered the research and dictated the direction of data collection through both primary sources and interviews.

1.2 Methodological approach and data collection

Interviewing is one of the most widely employed methods in qualitative research and the main types of interviewing include open-ended, semi-structured and structured interviews (Bryman, 2008: 436). While the latter is more often used for mass surveys and questionnaires, the first two types have been used as the methodological approach in this research. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews are also referred to as in-depth interviews in methodology and wider literature (Soss, 2006: 135). The collection of data through interviews is additionally completed with information gathered from primary sources.

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4 | P a g e Qualitative research is, in its basic form, interpretive and aims at uncovering context and meaning behind human behaviour (Della Porta and Keating, 2008: 26; Maxwell, 2012: 17-20). It allows the researcher to move beyond written accounts of his area of interest (Tansey, 2007: 771). The reason behind the chosen format of interviews is to give more room for interpretation, allowing the interviewee to ‘ramble’, give wider perspectives and yield more than ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses (Bryman, 2008: 437; Tansey, 2007: 766). In this way, the interviewee is predominately responsible for the formation of a meaningful dialogue, using language they are familiar with (Soss, 2006: 128, 132-133). Interviews are useful, when subjects cannot be directly observed during the course of significant events. They provide historical information and shed lights on hidden elements of political action, sometimes not clear from official documents (Creswell, 2014: 241; Tansey, 2007: 767). In addition, they can ‘cut through the noise’ of an excess amount of primary sources and point to the most relevant (Tansey, 2007: 767).

It must be acknowledged that the chosen methodology has not provided definitive answers to both the main and secondary research questions. However, these were not set out as such in the first place and allowed for more flexibility and interpretation throughout the data collection process. Causal and positivist explanations are difficult to construct to the extent where they would withstand all criticism, even with quantitative methods (Maxwell, 2012: 20). The afore mentioned flexibility also allows for more dynamic research compared to traditional hypothesis testing and has the ability to tackle some questions, not suited for quantitative scientists (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 36; Della Porta and Keating, 2008: 27; Creswell, 2014: 234). The data collection was conducted with the help of a loose interview guide, a selection of prompts and key topics to be covered in each interview (Bryman, 2008: 442). In addition, the interview guides were adapted to each specific interview and only basic questions were repeated, in order to establish a baseline of the subject’s understanding (Soss, 2006: 132-133). By asking a variety of introducing, probing, direct and indirect, structuring and other kinds of questions, the interviewed individuals were able to co-shape the process and to an extent indicate, which topics they found to be most important (Bryamn, 2008: 439, 456). Interviewees were also given the opportunity to ask questions in return, about the research and other interests, following the conclusion of the main discussion.

The main limitations to acknowledge with respect to the interview method are often discussed in relation to mass survey methods. The lack of reliability, no estimated parameters, absence of statistical controls, etc. have been pointed to as downfalls of qualitative methods in general

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5 | P a g e (Soss, 2006: 139). The interview method in particular is only considered to be a collection of reports, second-hand accounts of the interviewee and as such their personal accounts, which are subject to change over time (Creswell, 2014: 241; Soss, 2006: 141). In addition, some subjects might formulate a personal bias towards the interviewer, on the basis of his/her own social and physical identity. This is another factor to understand, since researchers are not a tabulae rasae and their personal narrative is often one for the reasons for pursuing specific research areas (Della Porta and Keating, 2008: 25). An interviewer should also consider that a subject might be lying or is intentionally providing partial or inaccurate data (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 38-41). This makes it necessary to evaluate who one is speaking to, for what purpose and under what circumstances (Tansey, 2007: 767).

With regards to both interviews and primary sources, the research aimed to remain critical towards the information presented by interviewees and official documents. Regardless of the fact that they manifest a certain level of authority over the information they are presenting, this should not be taken at face value (Booth, Colomb and Williams, 2008: 87). Primary sources were also used as a way of triangulating the information obtained through interviews and vice versa (Creswell, 2014: 251; Tansey, 2007: 766).

1.2.1 Interviews and data collection

Data collection took place through open-ended and semi-structured interviews in Brussels, Belgium and Sarajevo, BiH. Officials from DG NEAR and the Mission of BiH to the EU were contacted, as well as officials from the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, Office of the High Representative, Slovenian embassy in BiH and other independent experts. As part of the data collection, the decision was made to conduct an independent research trip to Sarajevo, in order to have the opportunity to interview a wider spectrum of individuals. Due to ethical considerations, none of the individuals are referred to in the text and references of the thesis by name. Only a very general description of their professional position is provided. It is important to note that all interviews and personal interactions took place, prior to the publishing of the Commission’s Opinion and Analytical Report on 29May 2019 (COM, 2019; 2019a).

Individuals were chosen and contacted due to their familiarity with the topic. This was an important step and some subjects were suggested during the course of interviews (also noted as valid in Tansey, 2007: 771). Interviews in Sarajevo were conducted in order to gain better understanding of the international community’s position on the ground and have the ability to conduct face to face interviews.

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6 | P a g e An interview with an employee from the Slovenian MoD was conducted over the phone as this was the preferred way of communication due to travel limitations. A large part of the discussion concerned BiH in a more general sense as the interviewee is an expert on both the history and the development of the state. It has to be acknowledged that one of the limitations in this case was the lack of face-to-face interaction and not being able to see the physical responses after posing a question (Bryman, 2008: 457). Additionally, the interview was mainly conducted in Slovenian, as the interviewee’s and researcher’s mother tongue, with some of the technical terminology being mentioned in English (words such as state-building, member state-building, peacebuilding, sovereignty). This is in part due to the fact that the Slovenian language lacks similar expressions for these concepts and the English versions are better known with regards to the context. For the purpose of analysis, the interview was self-translated into English. The interviews in Brussels were conducted on 6 and 7 May 2019. Both interviews, at the Mission of BiH to the EU and DG NEAR, were agreed upon through email communication. The Policy Officer at DG NEAR was contacted directly due to a prior interaction during a study trip to Brussels in April 2019. The BiH Official was initially contacted through the email provided on the BiH Embassy website (http://www.bhembassy.be/), however the responses came directly from the representative at the Mission of BiH to the EU. The employee from DG NEAR provided me with the contact details of the Academic expert from the University of Trento, with whom the interview took place in Sarajevo.

Both interviews were mainly conducted in English as this was the closest common language. The interviewees and researcher are not native English speakers, thus there could have been some misunderstandings in both questions and answers. Additionally, the beginning and end parts of the interview at the Mission of BiH to the EU was held in Bosnian, however this did not include data collection questions. During the course of the interview, the interviewee also resorted to the use several Bosnian words, which were later translated by the researcher for the purpose of analysis.

Interviews, which took place in Sarajevo, were arranged over email and through phone calls. The succession of interviews at the EU Special Representative (EUSR)/EU Delegation in BiH was to an extent an initiative of the Delegation, following the researcher contacting several of the heads of departments as well as the general email provided on the website (www.europa.ba). The interview with the Slovenian Diplomat was conducted in Slovenian with the use of technical vocabulary in English. The purpose of this interview was to gather the perspective of an EU member state diplomat on the situation. In addition, the Republic of Slovenia is, like

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7 | P a g e BiH, a former republic of Yugoslavia and a relatively ‘new’ member state of the EU, thus can somewhat identify with the history and position of BiH. Similarly, the official from the Office of the High Representative was contacted via email and the interview was conducted in Slovenian. Both interviews were then translated into English for the purpose of analysis. All translations of interview data are unofficial and could be slightly inaccurate due to linguistic differences.

1.2.2 Primary and secondary sources

Data collection was not limited to interviews and personal interactions. It also incorporates primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official EU documents and legislation which is pertinent to the case study. A full list is provided in the bibliography section, which among others includes European Commission (progress) reports, BiH’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement, European Security Strategy, Council of Europe conclusions, OHR documents, the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as International Court of Justice decisions. Secondary sources are used to inform the conceptual framework, literature section and background of this thesis. Significant works are used in order to provide context and outline the relationship between major concepts. These are drawn from academic journals, books, book chapters, articles, reviews and other scholarly publications. In addition, data was also drawn from news reports and other popular media outlooks. The main concepts in question are: state-building, EU member state-building and sovereignty. The empirical sections are then intertwined with the conceptual framework.

1.3 Case selection and justification

Empirical research in the Western Balkans remains relevant in the study of political science. The region’s relationship with EU is continuously changing and thus producing more data. The case of BiH has been chosen due to the fact that member state-building as a theoretical approach has mostly been used in the context of the Western Balkans, as the missing part of European integration between Greece and Croatia. Alongside these discussions, state-building and sovereignty literature is vast and difficult to operationalise in single case and small-n studies. Thus, member state-building presents a more detailed approach to the chosen case study. Taking this into account, the research also aimed to introduce more critical thinking with regards to EU member state-building as such. Critiques from traditional/liberal state-building theory are tested in comparison to the EU’s effort to build member states in the Western Balkans. The concept is still relatively young and requires exploration. In connection to this,

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8 | P a g e sovereignty is an interesting concept to consider. A more detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 2.

The research aimed to contribute to the study of EU member and traditional state-building literature. Though the particular research has focused on the case of BiH, the project can also be seen as an evaluation of the EU’s policies in the region. The focus on Police and (attempted) Constitutional Reform has been chosen in order to examine cases in further detail. Both reform packages were undertaken around a similar time and at a point, when the EU’s involvement in country was intensifying. The reforms set the tone for the EU’s involvement and have been identified as essential parts of traditional state-building literature. By giving attention to these and similar reform packages, the EU was involved in Bosnian state-building. However, in this case, these matters were also intended to streamline the state’s development towards EU accession. Many (Western) researchers continue to present this country, and region, in the same light as other countries, such as Russia, foregoing some considerable historical discrepancies. The narrative remains one of dependency on the good will of the West in helping countries to transform their state structures and ‘bring them up to speed’.

1.4 Limitations and disclaimers

This section presents the most note-worthy limitations this thesis was foreseen to encounter as the research progressed. Firstly, the research was limited in time and scope of the thesis project (word-limit). While it is not certain how much additional time and scope could have aided the research, it nevertheless remains a limit. It is impossible to know how many interviews are necessary before enough data is gathered (Bryman, 2008: 461). Similarly, since only one BiH official was interviewed, this research cannot claim to present a balanced view on the issues of EU member state-building and accession process in BiH. The researcher also acknowledges that since the interviewees were speaking in their professional roles, they were presenting the official position of their place of employment and rarely presented their personal opinions. Another limitation is the lack of generalisation possible, following the research conducted. Single case and small-n studies have often received criticism for attempting to generalise. This study does not attempt to generalise its findings, mostly due to the conceptual limitations of EU member state-building. However, case-specific research also presents an opportunity to develop necessary and meaningful analysis. In certain cases, single case studies or experiments can lead to significant scientific developments or ‘falsification’, as referred to by the renowned philosopher Karl Popper (Flyvberg, 2011: 304-305). Additionally, as the interviews took place

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9 | P a g e with individuals from different organisations, their statements and answers to questions cannot be generalised to represent the entire organisation and/or can only be taken as personal opinions and informed by the limited information available to them.

Interviews were not recorded nor transcribed, as part of the attempt to make interviewees comfortable with ‘speaking their mind’, especially when it came to open-ended questions. Therefore, any notes obtained from interviews, were taken by hand on the spot and later filled out from memory.

A significant limitation of the research has been language and not being able to communicate with all interviewees in the same language, as well as not in respective mother tongues. Interviews, which were conducted in Slovenian, were translated by the researcher and not a translation expert. In speaking to the BiH Official and some interviews held in Sarajevo, English was the first common language, however not all interviewees were entirely comfortable with some technical terms and more complex questions. At the same time, the ability to conduct interviews in both English and Slovenian as well as having a basic understanding of Bosnian, has given this research added value.

Due to the sensitivity of the research topic, the following disclaimers are presented: Throughout the thesis, Bosnia and Herzegovina is referred to with several abbreviations and, what some would consider, partial references. The ones used most frequently are BiH (abbreviation for Bosna i Hercegovina) and Bosnia. While they are abbreviations, they refer to the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with no prejudice towards any of the entities or territorial areas. In addition, when referring to the population as Bosnian, it does not to exclude different ethnic identifications within the state. I acknowledge the uses are ones of brevity and not accuracy. Following United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244/1999 and International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2010/25, Kosovo will be treated as an independent country in the entirety of this research (United Nations (UN), 1999; ICJ, 2010). The European Union continues to refer to Kosovo by stating: ‘This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence’ (DG NEAR website, May 2019).

Following the Prespa Agreement signed between Greece and Macedonia on 17 June 2018, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has been renamed to Republic of North Macedonia. Any references to FYROM or Macedonia are direct quotations from official documents and literature published prior to the agreement or quotes from interviewees.

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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Introduction

The following Chapter aims to introduce the main theoretical and conceptual background to this research. The literature review begins with a discussion on peacebuilding as the main umbrella concept, from where both state-building and member state-building are seen to emerge from. The discussion on peacebuilding is followed by a thorough evaluation of state-building, as one of the main concepts of the research. In order to cover all aspects of literature, the chapter includes a sub-section on the criticisms of state-building, some of them originating from early criticisms of peacebuilding. The following sub-section acts as a bridge between state-building and member state-building, discussing the beginnings of EU policies and their implications. The chapter then moves into a discussion on the emergence of member state-building as a product of research into Europeanisation and state-building in the Western Balkans. Further context specific information is introduced in the following chapter (Chapter 3: The EU and state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina). As a final concept, the sub-section on sovereignty presents an extensive debate on the definition of the concept, as it will be used in this research, its many faces and the viewed relationships between internal and external sovereignty. The Chapter concludes with a sub-section on the operationalisation of literature and presents it as part of the analytical framework.

2.1 Peacebuilding and state-building

Peacebuilding has, in the past, been defined as the ‘effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote security of the individual, societal groups and the state, and to nurture features that create the conditions for a stable peace’ (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 26). The concept can to some extent be traced back to the after-math of World War II, the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan (Ryan, 2013: 26). However, as with many other concepts and theories in social science, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of peacebuilding. Therefore, it remains a highly discussed and contentious subject, with only subjectively ‘correct’ definitions and a matter of perception (Paris, 2018: 1-2).

The record of peacebuilding has been mixed since 1989 (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 11; Ryan, 2013: 25). It was initially undertaken by the United Nations (UN) in post-conflict situations (Sisk, 2009: 196). Some of the major shifts in peacebuilding occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the 1990s, the UN recognised the shortfalls in some of their peacebuilding and state-building efforts, notably after their unsuccessful attempts to create a safe zone in Bosnia,

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11 | P a g e Somalia and Rwanda (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 5; Ryan, 2013: 29; Paris, 2018: 3). During the Cold War, traditional peacekeeping had been the main task for international actors and organisations such as the UN. The UN Charter prohibited direct intervention with regards to matters which were essentially domestic concerns (UN Charter, Article 2 (7) quoted in Paris and Sisk, 2009: 4). Responsibilities remained in the hands of the domestic governments, not with the peacekeepers.

Changes were introduced following the end of the Cold War. In 1992, then UN Secretary General (UN SG) Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) wrote the Agenda for Peace, which distinguished between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Keil and Kudlenko, 2013: 473, Chesterman, 2013: 2). However, credit for the original formulation for peacebuilding can be traced to Galtung (1976) and his tripartite conflict resolution, which is reflected in the Agenda for Peace. As the Cold War came to an end, post-conflict peacebuilding became the most important of the three approaches. It became obvious that these could not be easily distinguished from one another (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 5). However, the international community was not yet prepared to deal with the conflicts it had intervened in in the first place. Cases such as Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and, at the end of the day, Bosnia and Herzegovina had changed the playing-field. UN SG Kofi Annan (mandate 1997-2006) announced that there would be No Exit without Strategy (UN SC, 2001; Paris and Sisk, 2009: 7). In 2000, the Brahimi report emphasised that the use of peacebuilding should not be confined to post-conflict situations and the development of stronger peacebuilding capacities. The events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) altered many views on state failure and post-conflict situations and proved that instability has global repercussions (Paris, 2018: 4). The desire became to build peace on more than just the absence of war (negative peace) (Keil and Kudlenko, 2013: 473; Ryan, 2013: 30).

While in the past, peacekeeping was dependent on quick fixes such as rapid elections and bursts of economic privatisation, missions became more extensive than ever (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 7). Since then, the UN has led and been involved in monitoring missions in post-conflict situations. In many cases, ending conflict is only half of what is necessary for achieving sustainable peace (Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009: 5). While most missions of such nature are UN-led, other organisations such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and the EU, as well as individual actors, began to take charge in specific situations during the 1990s (Chappuis and

Hänggi, 2013: 173; Paris, 2018: 4). State-building has become a major component of

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12 | P a g e accepted and authors have pointed to the need for differentiation between military intervention and complex peacebuilding as state-building interventions.

Much like peacekeeping, the development of the peacebuilding agenda has been ad hoc and difficult to foresee (Ryan, 2013: 32). There is no one-size fits all approach when it comes to both peacebuilding and state-building (Ashdown, 2007: 107). Examples, such as conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Baltic states, North Macedonia and South Africa, are sometimes ignored as relevant examples. They were less invasive and, arguably, supported lasting peace (Ryan, 2013: 33). Conflict situations have been known to contain multiple variables, making them difficult to transform (Mac Ginty, 2013: 2; Paris and Sisk, 2009: 1). This research does not attempt to engage with the concept of peacebuilding as both an academic term and a practice. However, context matters and this sub-section serves as a reminder to that. The international community, together with the EU, considers peace in BiH to have been achieved through the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina/Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA, also referred to as Dayton). Whether this is undeniably true, will be discussed in the reminder of the thesis.

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13 | P a g e 2.2 State-building

‘Statebuilding is an ambitious and time consuming enterprise’ – Edelstein, 2009: 83 State-building has evolved from discussions on peacebuilding and is one of the main concepts in this research. It is considered to be an approach to peacebuilding and as one of the main concepts under this umbrella term in political science and international relations (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 2-3; Chesterman, 2013: 4). However, it is not one which has been traditionally associated with the European Union. Post-war state-building refers to the strengthening or reconstruction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries, which are emerging from conflict (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 1-2; Podder, 2014: 1618; de Guevara, 2010: 114). It has been used in different forms, and literature has subsequently yielded sub-components of state-building. Examples of these are security sector reform (SSR), constitution-building and the role of election. These are relevant to the research at hand, notably to the policy focuses within the case study, and the secondary research questions. On the other hand, SSR and constitution-building are seen as being built on ideals and thus, can also be considered as critiques of state-building.

In the beginning of the 21st century, the United States found itself involved in a growing number of international governance initiatives (Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 7). While the development of state-building has not been linear, in 2004 many authors pointed to the need for more attention to be given to institution-building as a part of state-building (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 8). Academics such as Fukuyama, Chesterman, Krasner, Paris, Fearon and Laitin criticised the peacebuilding and state-building operations in Kosovo and Bosnia (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 8; Fukuyama 2004: 17-18). Where institutions had been destroyed over the course of the war, they claimed exit was nearly impossible. There was/is too much risk involved to allow unconsolidated states to emerge from conflict on their own without the involvement of major powers (Fearon and Laitin, 2004: 43; Richmond, 2013a: 307). Following the attacks of 9/11, it could no longer be claimed that the consequences of these events were purely local (Fukuyama, 2004). It is important to note that liberal state-building includes a Western rational, legal and normative agenda, which generally includes benchmarks of transparency, liberal democracy, elections and good governance (Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013: 170; Podder, 2014: 1616; Richmond, 2013a: 299; 2013: 3).

Traditionally, the state is required to have monopoly over force and violence. SSR is an even newer concept than state-building and it is built on the liberal state-building ideal (Juncos, 2018: 95; Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013: 168). Most approaches to SSR take on a more practical and functional perspective, aiming to evaluate successes and failures (Schroeder and Chappuis,

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14 | P a g e 2014: 133-134). It has become more recognised within the donor community. The political transitions involved in the Arab uprisings arguably showed how important security is to democratisation. Additionally, post-conflict security sector (re)construction has been a part of international stabilisation operations. However, this remains a challenged reform agenda. It cannot be denied that SSR, alongside state-building, is a political process. To some extent, it is driven by the claims that an underdeveloped security field obstructs the development of the state in general (Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013: 168). The afore-mentioned monopoly over force and violence of the state is thus an important aspect of internal sovereignty. Therefore, non-state armed groups or traditional authority play different roles in non-state-building (Podder, 2014: 1619). While security is one of the essential parts of post-conflict state-building, democratic control is necessary for this security to work for the people and not against them (Edelstein, 2009: 81; Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013: 169). However, it should be acknowledged that this cannot replace the political solutions necessary for the larger process to be successful (Edelstein, 2009: 82).

On the other hand, constitution-building has been seen as a way to confront dependency issues. It is a key opportunity to shape the institutional and governance framework of a state (Samuels, 2009: 173). Who is included in the process of building a constitution remains relevant. Stakeholders can strive for both a top-down and bottom-up process and this has resulted in different trends in modern-day constitution-building: elite roundtables, national conferences, participatory constitution-making processes, etc. The latter should remain important to the international community (Samuels, 2009: 176-178). In many instances, the constitution process is tied to the peace process, making the inclusion of armed groups considered a provocation and a contentious issue. This is also important to the building of internal sovereignty for post-conflict countries. As a decline in state structures and legitimacy may lead to the creation of alternative forms of governance (Podder, 2014: 1617). However, history has taught both practitioners and academics that the interests of armed groups are often tied to elite political interests (Arab uprisings as an example). This makes broader inclusion even more important and will inevitably have to involve compromises. Another issue, which interveners have had to keep in mind, is implementation. The process does not end with adoption, rather continues through challenges of implementation and constitutional reform. Societal issues cannot be resolved with the signing of a legal document (Samuels, 2009: 192).

Similarly, the role of elections is both encouraged and criticised as a form of state-building. Research has shown that elections are necessary for moving beyond civil war and that

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15 | P a g e proportional and accountable elections can have positive effects on issues of post-war environments (Sisk, 2009: 196). A fundamental choice is that of the electoral system. As in the case of constitution-building, there are strong reasons for the international community to remain engaged, beyond election results and peace accords (Sisk, 2009: 221). However, the occurrence of elections has tended to point towards the end of international involvement. In order for this to come to fruition, electoral management, monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms are required. They have been seen as a popular mode of acquiring legitimacy for post-war regimes (Sisk, 2009: 217).

It has become difficult for both academics and practitioners to distinguish between state-building and attempts at post-intervention stabilisation such as was witnessed in Iraq (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 11). To an extent, current state-building practices attempt to reproduce the positive aspects of empire (inward investment, pacification, etc.) (Chesterman, 2013: 13). What has largely distinguished peacebuilding from state-building is the afore mentioned emphasis on institutions. While the fall of communism gave some reasons for a retraction and reduction in the size of the state, post-conflict state-building remains on the agenda (Fukuyama, 2004: 17-20). At the end of the day, it is difficult to impose something, which took Western European countries centuries to build (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 23; Agnew, 2005: 441; de Guevara, 2010: 119). In order to provide a nuanced account of state-building, it is necessary to acknowledge criticism of traditional state-building practices.

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16 | P a g e

2.2.1 Criticism of state-building

In post-conflict environments, criticisms often primarily fall upon the government, society and population of the place, where intervention was deemed necessary by the international community (Richmond, 2014: 11). However, state-building as a concept and practice has also suffered from a range of issues and thus faced critiques. These have focused on the role of external actors, international donors, financial agencies and others in the building of liberal peace (Richmond, 2013: 382-383). Among them have been coordination, coherence, lack of local ownership in the process, legitimacy, capacity-building, dependency on the interveners and the footprint and duration dilemma (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 3). State-building has, arguably, fallen into the same traps as its predecessor, imperialism, full of good intentions but unable to deliver on its promises (Richmond, 2010: 174; 2014: 2). Therefore, the likelihood that there will ever be an end point to the evolution of state-building is doubtful. Understanding what works will require more than lessons from past missions. There is a need for an overall recognition of the enormity and complexity of the task in building states in the aftermath of conflict and war. Here, we question what kind of states are emerging from international state-building exercises (Richmond, 2014: 1). Some of these operational challenges have resulted in deeper tensions which are not so easily explained (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 15).

Found in most criticisms of state-building are comments of ignoring the local context and lacking historical awareness (Richmond, 2014: 4; de Guevara, 2010: 112). Local actors must often comply with liberal peace at the instructions of both the international community and local elites (Richmond, 2013: 379). The distinction between local elites and local populations also remains an issue, connected to the question of inequalities. The global capitalist system implies that inequalities produce ‘healthy’ competition and advance the interests of those who are capable. However, in a post-conflict situation, inequality as a characteristic of capitalism and liberal peace, tends to only produce more conflict (Richmond, 2013: 450). In cases of international intervention, we find real tensions between liberal and local, where the former is assumed to be without agency (Richmond, 2010: 167). On the other hand, there are very real structural similarities between efforts at state-building, which do not necessarily originate in the contextual nature of any given conflict. Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Ossetia and Liberia – to only mention a few (de Guevara, 2010: 113-114).

One of the major criticisms of state-building, as a system, is the danger of only making cosmetic changes: creating weak, dependent states (Samuels, 2009: 173; Keil, 2013: 345). The rise in observer missions introduced new concerns of modern forms of colonial rule and imposition

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17 | P a g e (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 11). Salient in these discussions are the footprint and duration dilemmas. A diverse number of peacebuilding and state-building missions can be differentiated between each other in term of how long they were present and how heavy-handed the particular interventions were. For example, missions in Afghanistan, BiH, Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone were deployed with a heavier footprint. On the other hand, a lighter footprint was/is present in missions in Kosovo, Central African Republic and Burundi. These variations usually reflect the size of a mission and its role for external actors in supporting SSR agendas (Chappuis and Hanggi, 2013: 174). It remains difficult to find a ‘sweet spot’ between keeping the situation on the ground under control and not monopolising the work of national forces. External actors also lack some of the contextual knowledge and often face language barriers. Coupled with these issues, is the dilemma of duration. History shows the presence of foreign forces often comes with a time limit and faces strong pressure, internal and external, to withdraw as quickly as possible (Edelstein, 2009: 81).

An interesting comparison between state-building and state formation is made by Richmond (2014), where the former is presented as Jekyll and the latter as Hyde1. International state-building is meant to produce the good version of the state, and local state formation processes present the backwards version. This further assumes that state formation, through local actors, is flawed, especially when it is not immersed into global norms and markets and will ultimately lead to further violence (Richmond, 2013: 390; 2013a: 300). However, both peacebuilding and state-building are informed by state formation literature, thus making these assumptions somewhat contradictory (Richmond, 2013a: 299).

Further criticism of state-building include the afore mentioned SSR, constitution-building and elections. Highlighting the ways in which ideal versions can go wrong. SSR can be described as neo-colonial, imperialist, paternalistic and a form of historical social engineering, especially when it comes to long-lasting interventions with a heavy footprint (Chappuis and Hänggi, 2013: 181). Alternatively, constitution-building and post-conflict elections come with their own dangers. It should matter in what way government is set up and the subsequent connections to power-sharing dynamics. There is increasing pressure on local actors to adopt a system of democratic governance (Samuels, 2009: 183). This brings up questions of what and for whom the state is for (Richmond, 2014: 4). Ownership and partnership are to some extent used as catchy words, describing a very one-sided process (de Guevara, 2010: 121). Consider the fact that elections tend to heighten social divisions and enhance differences through the political

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18 | P a g e area of a state, newly formed or ‘old’. The addition of trying to hold elections in post-conflict situations adds pressure, since trust is already weakened between the protagonists of power. This is why a ‘state-building first’ approach is defended, emphasising the need for institution-building (Sisk, 2009: 198). While elections do not provide a strong foundation for state-institution-building in all post-conflict situations, they can provide critical points in transitions (Sisk, 2009: 217). As with constitution-building, how the process is structured and what kind of system is put in place, matters in the long term.

In addition, interveners must also be aware of potential threat environments. These can be internal or external, presenting danger for either the primary security of the territory and its population from external powers or internal threats towards the interveners (Edelstein, 2009: 82, 95-96). Neither UN, EU or NATO missions are immune to the presented dilemmas and criticisms (Edelstein, 2009: 94). Intervening powers must recognise the limits of what military force can achieve in the context of state-building missions. Upon intervention international leaders must be familiar with some of the above-mentioned dilemmas (Edelstein, 2009: 100). State-building has different outcomes when applied to both similar and different contexts. And while limits to contemporary state-building have been somewhat recognised, it is only considered to be the newest chapter in the history of state-building (de Guevara, 2010: 123-124). Criticism continues to focus on the technical aspects of the process and somewhat neglects the problems of the people which it affects (Richmond, 2010: 170; 2013: 396; de Guevara, 2010: 114). This has not been an exhaustive overview of the critique on state-building, but has highlighted major points in the literature relevant to this research project. The following sub-section will outline the EU’s history with regards to state-building in order to provide context to the concept of member state-building.

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19 | P a g e 2.3 European Union state-building

‘The EU is not an experienced state-builder’ – Börzel, 2013: 174 The EU has been involved in peacekeeping and has been considered to be a peace union, peace actor, peacebuilding enterprise, etc. (Tocci, 2007). While it has never been solely inward-looking, explicit foreign policy objectives were specified for the first time in the treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The Treaty laid out conflict resolution, promoting regional cooperation, international security, combating international crime and promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Community, 1992: Article J: 1; Tocci, 2007: 10; Bouris, 2014: 25). These priorities were later repurposed in following Treaties (Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2001 and Lisbon 2007). It has used peacekeeping operations and processes, demobilisation, disarmament, SSR, civilian administration, good governance, democratisation, etc. as instruments of its state-building practices (Bouris, 2014: 27). Nevertheless, statements by EU bodies have not established a link between accession and peacebuilding (Kappler, 2012: 614).

However, both peacebuilding and state-building exercises have been built on the acquis communitaire and the largest changes to the Union’s state-building process happened with further accessions (Bouris, 2014: 24, 28). The 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements brought the EU closer to contested states and disputes territories, not recognised by the majority of the international community (Bouris and Kyris, 2017: 755). The EU has subsequently struggled to effectively engage with the some of these states and their developing government structures (Bouris and Kyris, 2017: 766; Börzel, 2013: 173). Furthermore, with the publishing of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the EU committed itself to crisis resolution and state reconstruction (ESS, 2003; Bouris, 2014: 25-26). In the ESS, the EU identified five main threats and mentioned fragile states under the topic of ‘Security and Development Nexus’ (ESS, 2003: 19).

The EU has used tools such as conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement to promote peace in the neighbourhood (Tocci, 2007: 10; Noutcheva et al, 2004). Not all have been equally effective; to some extent, the EU has seen the value of benefits, credibility of obligations and political management influence its impact. The carrot of membership is considered more credible in countries which have already been handed perspective and it has smaller influence in countries of the ENP, where it is considered too remote (Bouris, 2014: 31). In different ways, these factors have contributed to how successful the EU has been as a state-builder (Tocci, 2007: 18). Despite its efforts, like traditional state-building actors, the EU has

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20 | P a g e been criticised for issues of legitimacy, coherence and ability to fully implement its missions (Bouris, 2014: 24).

While the above factors continue to cause issues for the EU, authors have argued that the Union is a novel polity in the international order, a sui generis actor, resembling all and none, at the same time (see articles by Manners, 2002; 2012; Damro, 2012; Zielonka, 2006; Del Sarto, 2016; Bull, 1982; Duchene, 1972; Aggestam, 2008; Wagner, 2017 and others). A significant section of European studies engages with the discussion on what the EU is and what kind of power it is/has. Therefore, it would, to an extent, make sense that it is involved in a different kind of state-building (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 26). The EU’s involvement ranges from the Balkans and South Caucasus to Africa and the Middle East (Boris, 2014: 26). In one of its first state-building attempts, the EU was considered weak in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, incapable of solving the conflict. Since then it has had issues connecting to the local population and risks creating and nurturing a patronising dynamic (Kappler, 2012: 615; Bouris, 2014: 32).

Conceptually, it is interesting to consider that the EU has constructed itself as a peaceful regional actor. In her article, ‘Representing Peace? The EU’s Temporal Selves and its Statebuilding’, Cebeci (2018) posits that it has been able to do so by making its violent present its other. The present peaceful-self remains essential, being fed by the violent past-self and aspirations for a future-self. When policies fail, the future-self is a justification for continuing to pursue the established goals. In order for the narrative to continue, its state-building logic has continuously been confined to liberal peace logic, while employing the term peacebuilding and refraining from the use of state-building (Cebeci, 2018: 2, 9-10; Bouris, 2014: 30-31). In cases of contested statehood, it uses its own example of leaving behind violence and normalising relations among neighbours and member states (Cebeci, p. 8). Almost as a consequence, enlargement is seen as a peacebuilding exercise extending peace through the continent as well as into the wider world (Juncos, 2012: 68).

While the EU has been keen in its attempts to impose liberal peace, criticism has pointed to avoidance of direct responsibilities (Chandler, 2007: 594; Venneri, 2010: 162). It is unable to impose liberal reform coalitions or build states, where there is no consensus on the national unit (Börzel, 2013: 183). It continues to favour a developmentalist approach as the world’s largest donor of development aid, and can only lead by example, due to a predominately civilian power structure (Bouris, 2014: 29; Börzel, 2013: 184).

According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU currently has 6 military and 10 civilian CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions around the world with

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21 | P a g e around 5,000 deployed personnel (EEAS website, March 2019). Peacekeeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international security remain the main objectives, supporting the rule of law and prevention of human trafficking and piracy. The EU can thus be seen as helping build specific aspects and domains of states (Bouris, 2014: 32). Along with these, the EEAS also presents a list of 18 completed/concluded CSDP missions. In connection to traditional state-building practices, the EU has taken up SSR as a central part of its CSDP missions. However, this also means that the criticism of this and similar practices apply.

Overall, the EU has not been considered an effective and successful state-builder, due to its inability to convert conditionality into state-building efforts, or vice versa (Bieber, 2011: 1785). While the role of the EU as a state-builder has been questioned, it nevertheless continues to evolve (Keil, 2013: 345). The gap between technical enlargement and security-driven EU state-building is clearly demonstrated in the Western Balkans as a case study. The attempt to fill it with member state-building is presented in the following sub-section.

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22 | P a g e 2.4 EU Member state-building

The future of the Balkans is within Europe - European Council Thessaloniki, 2003: 1 The concept of member state-building emerged in the beginning of the 21st century and took off in its further development, when the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) published their conclusions in 2005 mentioning the ‘need for member state-building’ (ICB, 2005: 164). Therefore, it is a relatively young and still-developing academic concept. In its report, the ICB added that ‘the accession strategy should be a mixture of classical state-building policies with those aimed at transforming nation states into member states’ (ibid). However, it is important to note that while this concept is directly connected to the EU, it is not used in any official documents or statements, since some current member states might not be comfortable with such language (Interview with Policy Officer, 7 May 2019).

Member state-building has been described as ‘a special form of state-building that is directly aimed at EU member states (Keil and Arkan, 2015: iii). It could be seen as a way for creating sustainable states, while also ensuring that they become members of the EU (Woelk, 2013: 470; Venneri, 2010: 154). Geographically, the use of the term is limited to the Western Balkans, currently the region containing the largest number of potential candidate and candidate countries to the EU. Along with Albania, the countries of former Yugoslavia (excluding Croatia and Slovenia, as current member states) are referred to as the WB-6. Until the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, the region was referred to as South-Eastern Europe, however as both ‘south’ and ‘east’ have negative connotations, it has since been referred to as the Western Balkans (Interview with MoD Employee, 4 May 2019). At the June 2003 summit, the EU promised membership to these countries, but only ‘when they are ready’ (DG NEAR website, February 2019). To some extent, use of the term can be narrowed even more to BiH and Kosovo, as the region’s unconsolidated and contested states. However, it is important to keep in mind the post-conflict contexts of other states in the region.

Policy-wise, member state-building is linked to enlargement policy, however the Western Balkans present a novel challenge for the EU. The region is seen as the limit of the transformative power of Europe and at the same time, Europeanisation as the only way to bring stability to the region (Juncos, 2012: 60). The Union has become an active state-builder, promoting specific institutional arrangements and adjusting political systems in South-eastern Europe (Börzel, 2013: 173; Keil and Arkan, 2015: 6). Much of this logic is linked to previous enlargement cycles in Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC), notably the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement of 2004 and later the joining of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Here, conditionality

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23 | P a g e developed further and the concept of different ‘carrots and sticks’ became common in literature surrounding EU enlargement (Tocci, 2007: 17). To some extent, the Stabilisation and Association Policy (SAP) was simply a repacking of cooperation with CEEC (Börzel, 2013: 175). However, this has not yielded the same results and it has been recognised that even in the CEEC, the process demands fewer changes compared to the SAP. Further benchmarking has been put into place and yet some argue that the same results cannot be achieved in the Western Balkans (Juncos, 2012: 61; Denti, 2014: 10; Bieber, 2011: 1791; Börzel, 2013: 180; Aybet and Bieber, 2011: 1920). A critical question may thus arise. Does the EU want the Western Balkans to turn out like the CEEC? Conditionality, nevertheless, continues to play an important role (Džankić, Keil and Kmetić, 2019: 5). It is tied to the legacy of the Yugoslav wars of succession and the persistence of nationalist extremism (Anastasakis, 2005: 83). Membership remains the key driver in the region and, at the same time, the EU has to think carefully about which reforms to promote, which actors to engage with and how to deal with obstructive elites and spoilers in the process (Woelk, 2013: 480). The factor of post-conflict societies makes conditionality more difficult to implement (Aybet and Bieber, 2011: 1926).

Another difference, when it comes to the East and West is also the voluntary nature of the process. While it has never been claimed that the East has been forced to integrate with the EU, there is more of an external control and ‘governance’ character to the EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans (Woelk, 2013: 470). Nevertheless, the EU has been reluctant to engage in territorial issues or help reconcile ethnic disputes (Börzel, 2013: 181). It has, however, both de-territorialised and re-de-territorialised existing states through its use of infrastructural power and pull of membership (Agnew, 2005: 443).

In academic theory, member state-building has been described as the result from the merging of state-building and Europeanisation literatures (Denti, 2014: 10). Both large concepts on their own, they were seen as conceptually overstretched, when it came to the Western Balkans. Conceptual overstretching is not new as it is not uncommon for concepts to become fashionable and their usefulness extends beyond the original meaning (Flyvberg, 2011: 37). To some extent, Europeanisation has become central to understanding the dynamics of norm transfer between member states and EU level, and vice versa (Džankić, Keil and Kmetić, 2019: 4; Denti, 2014: 11). The literature on the topic developed exponentially with regards to enlargement into CEEC. Analyses have shifted from internal functioning to external effects in potential member states and countries of the ENP (Juncos, 2012: 60; Denti, 2014: 12). However, Europeanisation has proven difficult to operationalise and too vast to engage in alongside the already presented

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24 | P a g e concepts. For member building itself, the issue arises as European integration and state-building have traditionally been done on separate occasions and combining traditional enlargement policies with traditional state-building has proven more difficult (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 16; Denti, 2014: 10; Woelk, 2013: 477).

Integration will only become possible with the renouncing of some parts of national sovereignty. ‘Old’ member states on the other hand, have seen these European standards enshrined in their legal orders. Previous changes to constitution and legislation during enlargement rounds have been limited and did not include whole state-building exercises. While the constitutional changes stemmed from obligations to the acquis, the Western Balkans present a different situation (Woelk, 2013: 470). The question of state sovereignty is somewhat unaddressed by the EU as it continues to remain present though a variety of instruments in both enlargement and ENP countries.

Therefore, the EU has had to result to the use of new tools. Among them are direct intervention (cases of BiH and Kosovo), political coercion (alongside close monitoring, focused on power-sharing) and stricter conditionality. The aim of transforming these states into liberal democracies is to prevent further conflict and violence in the region and secure its own neighbourhood (Simić, 2015: 192; Woelk, 2013: 469). Using new tools, however, comes with new challenges. By being directly involved in the processes, the EU’s actions have undermined some basic principles of democratic decision-making, democratic progress and mounted the levels of dependency. As a state-builder the EU cannot simply continue to depend on the acquis and cannot pick up and retract from the process, when the region doesn’t follow its orders (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 20).

These countries continue to be fragile and are young, fresh from a tradition of authoritarian rule. Countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo have never been independent before (Keil, 2013: 247). While Freedom House does not rate any of the states to be fully consolidated democracies, it would be interesting to see how current member states rank on this scale, especially those from recent enlargement rounds. Nevertheless, lack of consolidation remains at the heart of the issue (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 22). On the other side of negotiations, the process remains focused on political elites and, as it stands, these profit from the status quo. It has to be admitted that the Balkans are different to the CEEC and conditionality does not have the exact same impact (Juncos, 2012: 61). The relationship is a highly asymmetric one and the EU has failed to act with one voice, contributing to the confusion in the region over its role and importance (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 27).

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25 | P a g e Being in its early stages of development, there has been a lack of substantial criticism of EU member state-building. The concept continues to grow in academia, as there is still no clear notion to what exactly it refers to, where it can be used and why it should be used. In some ways, the EU suffers from similar issues to traditional state-building, such as their connection with local populations and attempting to introduce the same blueprint across the region of the Western Balkans (Juncos, 2012: 61). Rather, it can be seen as creating new dependencies due to its predominant engagement with local elites and not building EU member states (Keil, 2013: 249). As such it cannot really be treated as a long-term approach by the EU, since many decisions in the accession processes of these countries are being done ad hoc. For many of the issues, short term solutions have undermined the long-term problem at hand (Keil and Arkan, 2015: 22). Additionally, it is unclear with what kind of research design one should study the EU’s attempt to build member states in former Yugoslavia (ibid., 28).

The EU’s policies in the Western Balkans continue to raise questions. In its 2005 report, the ICB claimed that the EU is going to have to ‘chose between enlargement and empire’ (ICB, 2005: 162). However, without a consistent and structured approach neither of these ‘solutions’ help the Western Balkans towards much needed reconciliation. According to Woelk (2013), the EU should become an interested moderator, avoid making new protectorates and not ignore the differences in opinion, which continue to exist (Woelk, 2013: 477). It is the ‘interested’ in interested moderator, that researchers must not avoid examining. As any international actor with a foreign policy, the EU has many interests.

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