"
Master Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies Maaike Wit - 10834672 Supervised by: Professor Nanci Adler
Second reader: Dr Nicole Immler University of Amsterdam NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Word count (excl. bibliography and footnotes): 32,878 May, 2016
Abstract:
When the Bosnian Serb forces attacked the UN protected enclave in Srebrenica in July 1995, most women, children and elderly fled to the UN compound to seek shelter. However, the majority of the men of battle-age, the targeted victim group, decided to escape to free territory by foot. Which factors influenced their decision to flee, instead of joining their family members in Potočari? Every survivor and victim represents a personal, unique process of decision-making. Nonetheless, this research found four main factors determining the decision-making, based on the stories of survivors. Firstly, most male victims expected the Serb forces to kill them. Although it is very difficult to grasp the destruction process while being part of it, many of the victims had access to information about the Serb intentions and said that they were able to believe that information. In addition, they mistrusted the Dutch battalion's ability and intent to protect them. Some trusted their intuition, while others made a rational calculation that escaping would offer the best prospect for survival. This research shows that victims shape the process of genocide as well. They are not passive actors, but use a variety of personal survival strategies during genocide to live another day.
Keywords:
victims, genocide, oral history, Srebrenica, survival strategies, perpetrator-bystander-victim constellation, frame limits, escape, flight, instinct, Bosnia and Herzegovina, decision making.
Table of Contents
Abbreviations 5
Maps Bosnia and Herzegovina 6
The military operations in Srebrenica, July 1995 7
Preface and Acknowledgments 8
Introduction 11
Chapter 1: From the Disintegration of Yugoslavia to Genocide in Srebrenica - "And then one day, war." 22
1.1 The Fall of Yugoslavia 23
1.2 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 25
1.3 Srebrenica: Overpopulated, bombed and starved 27
1.4 Srebrenica Under UN Protection 31
1.5 Escaping Srebrenica 34
1.6 Victim Statistics 40
1.7 Conclusion 42
Chapter 2: Personal Calculations of Survival - "This is the end, there is no more." 44
2.1 Hiding 46
2.2 Resisting 47
2.3 Paralysis and Hoping for Rescue 53
2.4 Escaping 56
2.5 Conclusion 63
Chapter 3: The Decision to Escape - "Just the woods and I." 65
3.2 Victims' Information and Expectations 76
3.3 Credibility of Knowledge 83
3.4 Instinct versus Rationality 86
3.5 Conclusion 89
Conclusion 91
Abbreviations
ABiH The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Also known as BH Army or BiH Army
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina)
CDS Chief Defence Staff
DUTCHBAT Dutch Battalion Srebrenica
CANBAT Canadian Battalion
HVO Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane)
ICMP International Commission on Missing Persons
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
JNA Yugoslav People's Army
MSF Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIOD (Dutch) Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies
OP Observation Post
RS Serbian Republic in Bosnia (Republika Srpska)
SANU The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art
SOP Standing Operation Procedures
UN United Nations
UNCIVPOL United Nations Civilian Police
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMO United Nations Military Observer
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VRS The Army of the Republika Srpska
(Vojska Repubike Srpske)
Maps
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Srebrenica is located in the east near the border with Serbia.1
The military operations in Srebrenica, July 1995. The green arrows mark the route of the column of Muslim men fleeing to Tuzla.2
2 Bosnia: Srebrenica & Žepa, July 1995 (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Russian and European Analysis,
Preface and Acknowledgments
It was March 2015 when I visited Srebrenica for the first time, together with a counselor from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The mountains were still covered in snow. At the time, I was working as an intern at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Sarajevo to conduct research and organize activities in preparation of the twenty-year commemoration of the genocide in Srebrenica on July 11. We were visiting Srebrenica to speak to farmers, the mayor, factory owners and other returnees to make an inventory of how much they had benefitted from Dutch development aid after the war.
The embassy provided a car with a driver. The driver sat in front of me and spoke Bosnian to the UNDP counselor. I could not understand the language, but I realized their words were about war and pain. When we drove past the battery factory, former UN compound of Dutchbat, and the memorial and cemetery across from it, he pulled over to show me the site. According to Muslim customs, I covered my hair with a scarf, while we walked passed the innumerable graves. My colleague whispered that the driver was one of the few men who survived the genocide. In July 1995, he walked four days from Potočari to Tuzla to escape the Bosnian Serb forces, who were tightening their squeeze on the enclave with the intention to kill all Muslim men of battle-age. Back in the car, I looked at his friendly face in the rear view mirror and then at the many white pillars behind us. His decision to escape saved him from the mass graves and obscurity. I realized that every pillar represented a man like him. It was in that moment that decided I wanted to tell the stories of the men who had the courage, the luck and the strength to flee during the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995.
Our driver for that day in March did not want to share his story, as he was afraid to lose his job. He was not the only survivor who turned down the request. My nationality, internship at the embassy and age made some men suspicious about the sincerity of my intentions. And then there were those who were traumatized to such extent that they never talked about the war, those who wanted to move on with their lives and forget the past and those who were just not interested in sharing their life stories for the sake of knowledge and science.
On top of that, I had a bad timing coming to Srebrenica to talk about the past (ironically, the timing was also the reason I was there in the first place). The town has the world's attention during that period of the year. The annual commemoration was approaching and many international diplomats and high representatives would be
present on July 11, as exactly two decades had passed since the massacre. Journalists had taken over the city, asking for interviews repeatedly, bothering the survivors with questions. In additions, the ethnical tensions were high, due to several incidents between Serbian and Muslim inhabitants of the region. In June, former commander of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) Naser Orić was arrested in Switzerland based on a warrant from Serbia. Also, rumours were spread about damaged Muslim property, allegedly by Bosnian Serbs. Bodies were still being discovered and exhumed to be buried on July 11. One should realize that the commemoration in Potočari is a funeral as well, which makes the gathering even more emotional. The graves were dug at the cemetery during my last visit. In other words, it was a highly emotional time for the Bosnian population and it was understandable that a number of survivors did not feel like sharing their stories again.
Building a network to gain trust, meet people and ultimately find men willing to be interviewed took a lot of time and effort. I was in Bosnia and Herzegovina for only six months, having a full time job and a limited personal budget. Besides, the internship at the embassy put me in a precarious situation. I could not always simply use the network I had built through the embassy, for the obvious reason that my research had to be completely separated from the sensitive work I was doing for the Dutch government. The research had to be neutral, objective and personal, while the internship naturally came with professional, confidential and diplomatic obligations. This balancing act complicated the search for survivors even more. Nonetheless, with great help from colleagues, professors, friends, companies and institutions, I was able to find men, trustworthy interpreters and transportation to the isolated locations of the interviews. Some survivors even recognized me as "that blonde Dutch girl always visiting Srebrenica."
First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to the Muslim survivors who have welcomed me into their homes, entrusted their personal stories about the most horrible moments of their lives to me and gave me essential insights through the victims' perspective. They even did so during the Ramadan and the emotional week before July 11. Thank you Zulfo Salihovic, Muhizin Omerović, Ahmed Ustić, Hajrudin Mešić, Riza Tabaković and those who wish to remain anonymous. You have given me life lessons, which are impossible to learn from books. I will carry them with me into my future career and life.
support. I was fortunate to be supervised by you, either at distance by Skype or in the comfort of your office at the NIOD institute. I am also appreciative of Nicole Immler's commitment to be my second reader. I was privileged to study the theory of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the University of Amsterdam, while putting that theory into practice at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Sarajevo. H.E. Ambassador Jurriaan Kraak and Loes Lammerts guided me, gave me the chance to develop myself, made me feel welcome, and showed me around in the world of international diplomacy. It was an experience I dreamed of since I was a little girl. Hannah Atić, Melika Bašić and Sabina Glasić, thank you for listening with me and translating for me. It was comforting to have you beside me during emotional conversations and in difficult situations. Lidija Zulomovic, Sacha Penà-Vos, Denisa Saraljic, Puco Danilović, Dragana Jovanović, Branka Antić-Stauber, Fatima Krivosija and Leila Fetahagić always helped me finding the right persons at the right time, even in times of enormous workloads. Mak Kapetanović, a special thank you for your pleasant company and driving me to Srebrenica in your spare time. Selma Leydesdorff and Iva Vukusic shared by email their experience of conducting oral history in beautiful Bosnia and Herzegovina and victimology in general.
My friends in the Netherlands and in Bosnia were always there for me, to celebrate with me and mourn with me. They were forced to listen to my endless stories about Srebrenica, but never complained. I am especially indebted to Tess, for all the hours we sat side by side toiling away at our theses, with endless cups of excellent coffee and incredible lunches. Let's celebrate our friendship and graduation on our tour through the Balkans this summer. My dear friend Robyn Brice was incredibly kind to proof read every word of this thesis on the other side of the world. Your time and effort is very much appreciated.
Jurriaan, you always make me happy. I cannot wait to revisit Sarajevo with you this May and show you its beauty. And last but definitely not least, my parents Frans and Helma and sister Wieteke are irreplaceable in every aspect of my life. They have always supported me. I love you!
"I am still confused, but at a higher level."
Maaike Wit, May 2016
Introduction
"When I was fleeing through the woods, I did not think I would live. I was reconciled
with my fate. I accepted it. But then I thought: I will try to live another day."3 Muhizin Omerović was one of the many Muslim Bosniaks living in the multiethnic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Bosnian Serb forces, supported by the Serbian government, attacked the country in order to unify and secure Serb territory in 1992. Three years of war, ethnic cleansing and struggle for territorial control followed. The Muslim population in the east of Bosnia was attacked in particular, due to their strategic position close to the Serbian border and the fact that 74,8 per cent of the prewar population was Muslim.4
Srebrenica, once famous for its silver mining and spa facilities, is located in the region near the border with Serbia. In April 1993, Srebrenica was on the verge of falling to Bosnian Serb forces. The United Nations declared the town and surrounding area a UN-protected safe haven, overseen first by Canadian troops and later by the Dutch. That safe haven was the home and alleged safe sanctuary for the male survivors who contributed to this research, until the Bosnian Serbs decided to implement their final solution.
On July 10 and 11, 1995, the Army of the Republika Srpska (the VRS) occupied the region of Srebrenica. The women, children and elderly of the enclave attempted to find shelter in the compound of Dutchbat in Potočari. A very small number of men of battle -age were among the crowd at the UN facilities as well. Without firing a single shot, the Dutch Battalion watched how the Serb forces defeated the weak Muslim resistance. The men in Potočari were systematically separated from the children and women. They were transported to killing fields. The women and children were allowed to leave the enclave in buses.5
Research question
To an outsider, looking for the protection of international armed soldiers, seems a logical choice to make. Taking into consideration the physical and mental conditions of the enclave inhabitants (they were living under siege for almost three years), the isolated geographical location of Srebrenica in the Drina valley and the dangers of enemy
3 Muhizin Omerović, author interview at Konjević Polje, July 4, 2015.
4 International Court of Justice. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment (February 26, 2007), 299. 5 Laura Sjoberg, Gender, War, and Conflict (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2014), 68.
attacks and landmines, one would expect the men to join their women and children in the Dutchbat facilities. But only a few decided to go.6 Instead, approximately 10.000 to 15.000 men sought to flee through the surrounding hills to Muslim-controlled territory.7 The decision between going to the UN compound or fleeing to Tuzla was a free choice. Not only non-combatants, but also soldiers were allowed to make an individual decision.8 It is difficult to determine whether Dutchbat actively encouraged the targeted men to seek shelter at their compound. First of all, Dutchbat had not made any plans for dealing with a massive flow of refugees at the compound before the actual attack. This suggests that Dutchbat would not have encouraged the population to come to the compound in case of an attack before the actual attack, as it was a scenario they were not prepared for. Several rules and regulations were in force at the time, which led to even more confusion regarding protection of the population. The Standing Operation Procedures (SOPs) stated: "It is an UNPROFOR principle to protect non-combatants threatened by physical violence." Its definition of non-combatants also applied to former combatants hors de combat (out of action). The primary mandate and limited resources were not allowed as an excuse to remain passive. However, in reality, Dutchbat relied mostly on its own Standing Orders, which were in Dutch. Those incorporated only the most 'relevant' Standing Operation Procedures and did not include the SOPs' addition regarding the principle to protect non-combatants. As even the Dutch soldiers were confused about their duty to protect the population, it is likely that the male victims were not fully aware of their formal rights either.9
There was great confusion when the VRS started to attack. It was an absolute state of chaos and panic. On July 11, before 7 p.m., Dutchbat did urge the population to come to Potočari. The compound's officer in Srebrenica town convinced the terrified crowd to flee in the direction of Potočari, even though a decision whether they would be allowed in the compound still had to be made. Dutchbat soldiers actively encouraged the population to keep on walking, lifting people from the roadside. Dutch Corporal Erik van der Linden explained: "We were focused on only one thing: getting those people to Potočari, to safety."10 However, the men joining the column were not even in Srebrenica
6 The ICTY estimates that 1,000 military aged-men were among those 26,000 who went to the UN compound.6 Other sources'
estimations vary between 100 to 3,000.
7 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area
(Amsterdam: Boom, 2002), 2472-2473.
8 NIOD Interview with Osman Suljić , March 3, 1998. 9 NIOD, Srebrenica, een 'veilig' gebied, 2601.
10 Hendrina Praamsma, Jet Peekel, and Toni Boumans, Herinneringen aan Srebrenica. 171 soldatengesprokken (Amsterdam:
town at that time to let the Dutch influence their choice. They made the decision to flee before, as they were already gathering at the central assembly point in Šušnjari in the afternoon of July 11 (see the map on p. 8).11 In the hectic circumstances, some Dutch soldiers did not even notice their absence.12
So, if the men's survival strategies were not influenced by the ABiH commanders or the Dutch soldiers and were able to make an individual choice, why did so many victims make the risky decision of escaping when the Serb army took over the region of Srebrenica, while an international protective force was right there, to whom they had entrusted their family members? Why did they not choose to stay with their women and children in the UN compound in Potočari, as the journey ahead of them was full of danger, uncertainty and risks? What did they presume to know? Was their response counterintuitive? What milestone moments in the decision-making process during the attack do the survivors remember? All these questions are encompassed in the main research question: Which factors influenced the decision-making process of the victims during the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995? 13 The entire process of decision-making will be studied over the course of July 1995, instead of focusing only on July 11, 1995 when most of the victims escaped. Therefore, the entire time frame of the start of the VRS assault until reaching free territory is researched.
Remarkably enough, one of the most comprehensive studies into the events in Srebrenica in 1995, the report of the NIOD, Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, attempts to answer this crucial question in less than a paltry two pages (while, for the record, the entire work consists of 3.368 pages).14 Historian and expert in war studies Jan Willem Honig acknowledges this deficiency in the NIOD report. He criticizes shifting abruptly from a consideration of why the men of Srebrenica thought they should flee to a much more elaborate on of why they thought they could flee.15 The NIOD report tends to be, according Honig, led by available information rather than by questions of importance. "The report as a whole pays remarkably little attention to this issue [the men's expectations in the context of their understanding of the nature of war]
11 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. IT-98-33-T, para. 61, August 2, 2001. 12 Praamsma, Peekel, and Boumans, Herinneringen aan Srebrenica, 106.
13 The lack of attention to victim behaviour en victims during genocide in general is not limited to Srebrenica. Other
secondary sources concerning genocide in different regions show a similar gap. Indeed, the survival strategies of the Holocaust victims is to some extent researched and there are exceptions to the rule with regard to the genocide in Rwanda, taking place only one year before Srebrenica, as well. The report 'Leave None to Tell the Story' by Human Rights Watch (1999) is again an exception, occasionally touching upon the subject of Rwandan victims' strategies.
14 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 2478-2480.
15 Jan Willem Honig, "Strategy and Genocide: Srebrenica as an Analytical Challenge," Southeast European and Black Sea
and how it determined strategic and tactical behaviour, like the escape attempt."16At least Honig acknowledges the importance of addressing these themes, but he does not provide answers either.
It is a serious shortcoming that the question of why victims behave during genocide like is not addressed, while answers would give great insight into the behaviour of victims with mortal fear and the dynamics of perpetrator, victim and bystander relations. Future comparative research could even establish if the factors influencing the decision-making in Srebrenica are universal or specific. When the key factors for personal survival strategies are more researched, one could better predict victim movement and behaviour in the future. Ultimately, it might improve accurate and efficient assistance to victims, as the context and circumstances in which the victims have to make decisions can be better anticipated on. By ignoring victim behaviour in genocide studies, scholars dehumanize victims in a way, as if they are objects during genocide without any opportunities, thoughts or chances.
Characteristics of the victim group
The victim group studied in this research will be defined as those who were targeted. The massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina are an example of gender-selective mass killings. Mary Anne Warren originally coined the term gendercide in 1985 to describe such selective destruction of the male or female component of a group (or of dissident sexual minorities).17 The gender variable interacts with age. The men targeted were of battle-age, between sixteen and sixty years old.18 In other words, 'victim' or 'survivor' will refer henceforward to a Muslim male of battle-age in Srebrenica.
The years of conflict, starvation and mental challenges leading up to July 1995 increased the vulnerability of the enclave's population.19 The escape towards Tuzla was an incredible physical and mental ordeal. The distance of approximately 55 kilometres had to be covered by foot. The victims were so numerous, that the length of the entire column amounted to five and ten kilometres. The NIOD report states that it took the few who managed to reach Tuzla safely around five days.20 However, for many the journey took a considerably longer time period. One example is a survivor who was not familiar
16 Ibid.
17 Mary Anne Warren, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Lanham: Rowman & Allanfield Publishers, 1985). 18 Adam Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), 323.
19 Nicole Rafter and Sandra Walklate, "Genocide and the dynamics of victimization: Some observations on Armenia," European
Journal of Criminology 9 (2013): 517.
with the directions to Tuzla. After staying in Udrč for a month, he decided to go back to Srebrenica, where the Serbs were still looting. He dug a cave to live in, until he was discovered and had to run again. It took him nine months to reach free territory. "When I reached safety, at the age of sixteen, I looked like an old man."21
The gender and age characteristics of the victim group may not be explanatory for the question of why they chose escaping over other options, but it definitely enabled the option of escape. Several times, survivors mentioned that they only trusted their wives and children to go to the compound, because they were physically simply not able to flee. In addition, the children and elderly were either too young or old to undertake the journey. Riza Tabaković was an exception to the rule and fled with his wife. "My family went to Potočari, except for my wife. She insisted to go with me, even though she was very young."22 Despite her age and gender, she joined the column of men.23 Another
survivor was reunited with his wife during the night of July 16. "I arrived in Živinice [south of Tuzla] and went to relatives who had a flat there. I called my wife. She was in Tuzla living in student housing, as all refugees were. She was in tears. She could not believe that I was alive. Her birthday is on July 17. It was the best present."24 Most of the individuals in the column were thus male, as women were considered as physically too weak to undertake the journey.
Most women who stayed in Potočari survived, as the Serb forces allowed them to leave. The fact that women and children are not the main focus of this work and not the targeted victim group should not imply that they were left untouched. Serb soldiers and paramilitaries were even better able to commit acts of sexual violence against women, as the community males were murdered or captured and unable to protect them.25 In addition, the women were forcibly removed from their homes and many have lost their husbands, fathers, and sons.26
Historiography
The genocide in Srebrenica has been widely written about, but little scholarly literature has been devoted to victim behaviour during genocide, let alone to the specific case of Srebrenica. Nonetheless, the historical overviews of the events in Srebrenica are useful
21 Hatidža Hren, Srebrenica: het verhaal van de overlevenden (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1999), 49-51. 22 Riza Tabaković, author interview at Bare, August 4, 2015.
23 Ibid.
24 Confidential interviewee, author interview at Gornji Potočari, July 4, 2015. 25 Jones, Genocide, 324.
to provide context, as decisions are not made in a vacuum. The three main works used are the extensive research report published by the NIOD and the chronology of events
Under the UN Flag by survivor and interpreter for the United Nations Hasan
Nuhanović. Both are useful backdrops giving accurate context for the victims' decision-making. In addition, they enforce each other as respectively Dutch researchers and a primary witness and member of the victim group wrote them. This will enhance reliability and secure objectivity. The third overview is by social scientist Ton Zwaan and professor of Intelligence and Security Studies Bob de Graaff27. Crisis and Genocide
in Yugoslavia, 1985-2005 offers a detailed description of how the fall of Yugoslavia led
to genocide. The book is based on a report of both authors, written at the request of the ICTY for the Slobodan Milošević case.
A victim is a conception of reality as well as an object of the imagination of the perpetrators.28 A number of works that deal with victimology can help constitute a framework for a better understanding of the Muslims' responses, despite their frequent main focus on the Holocaust.29 In The Destruction of the European Jews (1961) preeminent Holocaust scholar Raul Hilberg was one of the first to propose five categories of victim responses: resistance, alleviation, evasion, paralysis and compliance.30 He concludes that the reaction pattern of the Jews is characterized by an almost complete lack of resistance.31 Hannah Arendt supports Hilberg's claim by stressing the Jewish responses of compliance and paralysis. She argues that the Jews complied with the Germans in assisting the administrative and police work.32
The academic reactions to Hilberg's and Arendt's alleged Jewish passivity were myriad. For example, Reuben Ainsztain emphasized the armed resistance of the Jews during the war in his Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe,33 while Isaiah Trunk drew attention to the difficult position a Judenrat found itself in. Trunk stresses that the Jewish leaders were foremost trying to ease the lot of the Jews in the ghettos under impossible conditions.34
Hilberg's book has thus strongly influenced the subsequent historiography and gave
27 Bob de Graaff was also one of the researchers of the NIOD investigation. 28 Richard Quinney, "Who is the Victim?" Criminology 10 (1972): 314.
29 For research on victimology, see for instance: Hans von Hentig, The Criminal and His Victim: Studies in the Sociobiology of
Crime (1967. Reprint, New York: Schocken Books, 1979). Or: Hans J. Schneider, The Victim in International Perspective (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982).
30 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). 31 Ibid., 662. This statement is reiterated in the edition's reprint in 1985 at page 1030.
32 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), 117. 33 Reuben Ainsztein, Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe (London: Paul Elek, 1974).
rise to an outpouring of research on the subject of victim responses, but the discussion was mainly focused on only four of the five categories: compliance, paralysis, alleviation and resistance. It was only in 2001, historian Gunnar Paulsson focused on evasion in his contribution "Evading the Holocaust: The Unexplored Continent of Holocaust Historiography" to the book Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in
an Age of Genocide (2001). He criticizes Hilberg for perceiving evasion as a marginal
response of scant importance. Paulsson concludes that Jewish behaviour patterns were not monolithic, but a sum of individual responses to an impossible situation. He emphasizes that evasion is the most reasonable, rational and normal response by powerless people to an external threat. "Flight unquestionably offered the best chance of survival, took place on a large scale and raises many important issues. Its neglect by the historical community is unjustified."35 His comments provide a valuable foundation for
this research.
Sociologist Martin Shaw also stresses the importance in What is Genocide? of moving away from the subjective meaning of genocidal action for the perpetrator to understanding the social relations of genocide, between the perpetrators and the victims and among victims.36 In "The Perpetrator-Bystander-Victim Constellation: Rethinking Genocidal Relationships" historian Robert M. Ehrenreich and social historian Tim Cole indeed move away from emphasizing one particular actor. Their work is useful in providing insight in the interrelationship between perpetrators, bystanders and victims and how that influences the victim group. They also discuss the option of escape within the constellation. 37 Yet much of their article falls short in terms of the specific role of the victim in the genocide dynamic.
Oral history methodology
Clearly, secondary literature alone is insufficient to provide insight in the victims' decision-making process. Memoirs would provide a key source for learning about the reasoning of victims during genocide from the perspective of a former victim, but seem to be virtually nonexistent in English.38 Indeed, memoirs of bystanders are available,
35 Gunnar S. Paulsson, "Evading the Holocaust: The Unexplored Continent of Holocaust Historiography," in Remembering for the
Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, ed. John K. Roth and Elisabeth Maxwell. (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 305.
36 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 82.
37 Robert M. Ehrenreich and Tim Cole, "The Perpetrator-Bystander-Victim Constellation: Rethinking Genocidal Relationships,"
Human Organization 64 (2005): 213-224.
38 On April 18, 2016, one of the survivors interviewed announced on social media that he has recently published a memoir:
such as Srebrenica, Getuigen van een Massamoord by journalist Bob van Laerhoven39 who visited Tuzla in 1995 commissioned by Médecins Sans Frontières or UNHCR staff member Larry Hollingworth's Merry Christmas, Mr. Larry.40 They offer firsthand testimonies, but are unable to provide a victim's perspective.
Therefore, use of oral history is essential.41 The memories of the survivors are the primary sources for this research.42 They can fill in the gaps that written sources do not provide, but most importantly: The victims have seen, heard, felt and thought. They are the only ones who actually had to made decisions during the genocide. They are our key to a better understanding of how victims respond during genocide. The relationship between the literature research and the findings with regard to oral history, will be bi-directional, complementing and enhancing each other. On the one hand, theories will need individualization to give insight into personal considerations and emotions. On the other hand, personal narratives will need secondary literature to put them into context. In this manner, a general pattern can be distinguished and a balanced answer can be provided to the main question, without homogenizing the victim group.
The use of oral history is not without potential pitfalls.43 Firstly, it is important to realize that the survivors' stories are not straightforward accounts of the course of events. Like all memories, they are based on perceptions of the present. "They are deeply moving accounts that shift back and forth between frozen memories of atrocities and the later reconstruction and interpretation of the hostilities they suffered," explains Selma Leydesdorff.44 In other words, survivors' memories offer a unique peek into the personal decision-making process during genocide, but are always recounts of the past in the present. Emotional memory and objective historical research are interwoven and inseparable,45 and this research is no exception to that.
Secondly, a major issue that complicates determining the factors that influenced the
39 Bob van Laerhoven, Srebrenica, Getuigen van een massamoord (Antwerpen: Icarus, 1996). 40 Larry Hollingworth, Merry Christmas, Mr Larry (London: Heinemann, 1996).
41 For research on collective memory and oral history, see for instance: Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992) or Kim Lacy Rogers, Selma Leydesdorff and Graham Dawson, Trauma. Life Stories of Survivors (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
42 The methodology of the interviews conducted was mainly based on: Lynn Abrahams, Oral History Theory (London and New
York: Routledge, 2010).
Kathryn Anderson and Dana C. Jack. "Learning to Listen: Interview Techniques and Analyses." In The Oral History Reader, ed. by Robert and Alistair Thomson (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
Baylor Institute for Oral History. "Introduction to Oral History." http://www.baylor.edu/oralhistory/index.php?id=23566. Accessed February 18, 2015.
Thomas E. Charlton, Lois E. Myers and Rebecca Sharpless, Handbook of Oral History (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2006).
43 See for instance: Anna Sheftel and Stacey Zembrzycki. "Only Human: A Reflection on the Ethical and Methodological
Challenges of Working with ‘Difficult’ Stories." The Oral History Review 37, no.2 (2010): 191-214.
44 Selma Leydesdorff, "When Communities Fell Apart And Neighbors Became Enemies: Stories of Bewilderment in Srebrenica," in
Memories of Mass Repression. Narrating Life Stories in the Aftermath of Atrocity, ed. Nanci Adler, Selma Leydesdorff, Mary Chamberlain, and Lelya Neyzi (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 23.
victims' decision-making on a micro level is that many of those who had to make a decision are not among us anymore to reflect on it. The survivors are exceptions of the victim group studied, while the majority of the group perished. Their memory would have made this research much more complete, as their fate was different and their number high. In addition, we will never hear the stories of those who wish not to speak. Such complications lead to the question of how many testimonies are enough to draw conclusions. Academics disagree. While historian Omer Bartov argues that only a large number of testimonies suffice, historian Tony Kushner states that a small number can be enough.46 Oral historian Henry Greenspan adds to this that multiple interviews with the same interviewee are necessary.47 This was not achievable for practical reasons.
Fourteen survivors are interviewed once, seven of whom agreed to be recorded. That is roughly estimated to be 0,28 per cent of the total number of survivors (5,000) of the escape.
This research has been conducted with the thought that every interview is useful, as long as it is put in the right context. Every individual made a personal survival strategy, so every comment coming from a survivor has relevance. Without exception, each story is extremely valuable. By looking for common trends and themes in the variety of personal narratives, the main factors of influence in the victims' decision-making will be defined. It is assumed that every individual experience represents a class of experiences. With deductive reasoning, the experiences of that particular group can be generalized as long as the individual experience is placed in the right context.48
Nonetheless, the survivors of Srebrenica have been interviewed many times before. Hatidža Hren was one of the first to collect the stories of female and male survivors of the genocide in Srebrenica in Udruzenje gradana 'Zene Srebrenice'. The interviews considering the male survivors consist mainly of detailed descriptions of the flight. Why the men decided to flee is not addressed. Most testimonies skip the part where the decision is made and continue along the lines of "and then we escaped." Hren does not interpret these stories in any way.
Professor of oral history and culture Selma Leydesdorff conducted interviews with Srebrenica survivors as well, resulting in several articles and books, of which Surviving the Bosnian genocide: the women of Srebrenica speak is the best known, mainly
46 Tony Kushner, "Holocaust Testimony, Ethics, and the Problem of Representation," Poetics Today 27 (2006): 276-277. 47 Henry Greenspan, On Listening to Holocaust Survivors: Recounting and Life History (New York: Praeger, 1998).
48 A similar approach is used for example by Nanci Adler, in: Nanci Adler, Keeping Faith with the Party. Communist Believers
focusing on women.49 The Cinema for Peace Foundation provides an excellent database of over 1.000 video recorded testimonies of Srebrenica survivors, including women.50 In addition, the ICTY database contains several eyewitness accounts, although some are protected due to privacy. And finally, the NIOD report is also, to some extent based on interviews. The general picture that emerges from these sources is quite unambiguous; the men were certain they had to escape.
These sources had different aims and intentions. The Cinema for Peace
Foundation's testimonies and Hren's collection of sources are raw testimonies, without
interpretation or context. The ICTY has a clear juridical purpose of establishing justice and truth, while the NIOD report was the result of a governmental request to research the "events before, during and after the fall of Srebrenica."51 None had the intention to
research why the men escaped. They all confirm the mainstream assumption that they "just knew" they had to escape, but do not research analytically why they knew. The testimonies are quite descriptive and factual with regard to the course of events, rather than engaging in the reasoning why certain decisions were made. The explanation for this is that it was simply not the purpose of the conducted interviews and therefore the questions were not asked. The interviews conducted for this research draw the same conclusions as the existing consensus. The Muslim men were absolutely convinced that escaping was the only option. But these interviews had as primary intention finding out
why, and were therefore able to provide a more profound analysis by distinguishing
general factors that influenced the decision to escape. These factors include the mistrust in the protection of the United Nations, victims' knowledge about the perpetrators' intentions and the credibility of that information, and instinct versus rationality.
Outline
To answer the question of why the majority Muslim men decided to escape in July 1995 in Srebrenica, the first chapter consists of a chronological historical overview of the events that led up to the genocide in 1995. The perspective will shift from a macro analysis of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia to a meso level of the ethnic tensions and violence between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
49 Selma Leydesdorff, Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebrenica Speak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2011).
50 Cinema for Peace Foundation. "Testimonies of Srebrenica Survivors." Last modified August 17, 2015.
http://cinemaforpeace.ba/en/testimonies. Accessed August 19, 2015.
51 For the exact wording of the commission and the accompanying conditions and regulations see: Proceedings of the Dutch
focusing on the region of Srebrenica. Individual experiences of Muslim men between 1992 until the summer of 1995, the micro level, will complement the historical overview continuously. By understanding the course of events, the victims' options and decisions can be put into the right context. A variety of secondary sources are used, as well as primary reports of non-governmental organizations present at the time and ICTY court records.
The second chapter continues to analyze the Srebrenica region by systematically studying the variety of victims' options and their viability in the case of Srebrenica. The discussion follows a largely chronological format. This will explain why resistance and hiding were only temporary solutions until two options remained; going to the UN compound or escape. Other academic theories, with regard to perpetrator-victim relations and the psychosis of fear, will be used in addition to the interviews with survivors.
After establishing the context in which decisions were made and the options available to the victims, the third chapter allows an analysis of why the most of the victims chose to escape. It finds that the influencing factors consisted of the (mist)trust in the protection of the UNPROFOR troops, the victims' knowledge and expectations of the perpetrators' intentions, the credibility of that knowledge, and the biological factors of intuition and rationale. This chapter is mostly a micro-analysis based on primary sources due to its requirement for details and the gap in secondary literature. In conclusion, this research examines the decisions and strategies of the victims during the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995 and reflects on the factors that influenced this decision-making process.
On a final note, victims' actions and thinking can barely be judged in normal terms of responsibility, personal choices and morality. The circumstances in which they had to try to survive were extreme and so violent, that such terms are no longer applicable or useful. Providing a judgment is not only of no academic relevance, it is inappropriate and invaluable at the same time. Therefore, this research aims to understand the choices, rather than providing a value judgment. Victims may often be portrayed as docile lambs going to the slaughter, controlled by their perpetrators, devoid of agency. But many tried everything to just live another day.
22
1
From the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
to Genocide in Srebrenica
- "And then one day: war."
From the Disintegration of Yugoslavia to Genocide in Srebrenica
"You have to understand what happened between 1992 and 1995 in Potočari. Too many skip this part in telling the story. You have to know what happened before, in order to understand the situation in July 1995," answered a Bosniak genocide survivor after asking him about his escape in 1995.52 "What happened before" is an extremely complicated history of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and ethnic hatred between the members of the new autonomous states, ultimately resulting in the act of genocide in an isolated region of Eastern Bosnia, tucked away in the Drina valley: Srebrenica.
1.1 The Fall of Yugoslavia
In Tito's Yugoslavia (1953-1980), the members of different ethnic groups co-existed relatively peacefully. Tito had put a tight lid on nationalism. Despite his efforts, difficult economic times in the 1960's and 1970's revived nationalistic feelings amongst the citizens. The relations among the six republics and different ethnicities deteriorated even further when Tito died in 1980. The fall of Communism led to disorientation as a power vacuum arose. Serbia desired a stronger federal authority, while Croatia and Slovenia wanted greater autonomy within the confederation. In the beginning of the next decade, there was no effective authority at the federal level. The government of Serbia was therefore able to increase its influence by replacing the representatives of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo with loyalists of the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. He sought a centralized federation dominated by the Serbs.53
The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (SANU) officially published a memorandum on the political, social, economic and moral crisis on April 23, 1993, but it had already circulated unofficially in 1986. A strong notion of historical Serbian victimization was represented in the document. It was time, according to the memorandum, to put a halt to the humiliations inflicted on Serbia.54 When Yugoslavia disintegrated, Serbia should put its national interests first.55 The memorandum
52 Muhizin Omerović, author interview at Konjević Polje, July 4, 2015.
53 Ton Zwaan and Bob de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië 1985-1995 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 2005), 64. 54 On 1 February 1989, the memorandum was published in Nase teme, no. 33, pp. 182-263; in June 1989, it appeared as a in the
Belgrade magazine Duga in Belgrade. Finally, it was formally published on 23 April 1993. For an official English-language version, see: Mihailovic/Krestic, Memorandum, 125.
functioned as a platform to the Serbian nationalism and became the basic principle of Milošević' ideology.56
Milošević adhered to a utopian ideology of Velika Srbija, a 'great Serbia' where all Serbs would be united.57 The disjointed parts with Serb inhabitants would be linked to realize this living space.58 In November 1991, in a referendum organized by the Bosnian Serb representatives of the Bosnian parliament, the Serbs living in Bosnia almost unanimously voted for being part of this Velika Srbija.59 The Muslims living in Bosnia stood in the way of their utopia.60
The tensions between the two ethnicities were already rising in 1990, before the outbreak of the war. For example, the Muslims living in the Srebrenica region started to avoid the Serbian village of Kravica and the Serbian inhabitants on their turn the Muslim area of Potočari. Several armed violent incidents took place in these years, as both sides were pushing each other limits with racist harassments.61
In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence. The Yugoslav federal government declared the independence illegal and requested the assistance of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to save the unity of the confederation. The JNA had evolved into a Serb-dominated force, as sixty per cent of its members were Serbs and Serbian officers were appointed.62 The JNA tried, together with nationalist Serb forces, to prevent Bosnian citizens from voting in their independence referendum. They failed. On February 29, 1992 almost 99 per cent of the Bosnian population voted for independence.
The three leaders of the ethnical groups joined for a meeting in March on how to establish cantons. Radovan Karadžić, representing the Bosnian Serbs, insisted on a division on the basis of ethnicity. When the Muslim president of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović did not agree, Karadžić stated that if he would not change his stance, a horrible civil war would break out with many deaths and destroyed cities. The outcome would be three ethnic cantons anyway. Neither the Muslim representative nor the Croatian gave in to his threat.63 As a response, the Bosnian Serbs declared their entity the Republika Srpska as independent with Karadžić as its
56 Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković, Serbia since 1989. Politics and Society under Milošević and After (Seattle and London:
University of Washington Press, 2005), 4.
57 Ibid.
58 Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia. The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 23. 59 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië, 166.
60 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 589.
61 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië, 170. 62 Ibid., 124.
president.64 They claimed more than half of the Bosnian territory, did not acknowledge the Bosnian president or the Bosnian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but wished to keep their powers and membership of the Bosnian parliament.65 The new entity mobilized also its own forces: the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under command of lieutenant general Ratko Mladić. Simultaneously, Izetbegović was preparing for war bymobilizing The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) and a police reserve.66 The ABiH collaborated with the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), as the Catholic Croats wanted to secure a part of Bosnia as well.67
1.2 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In April, the European community and the United States recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any military intervention without permission of the Security Council would now be considered as international aggression.68 Nonetheless, the VRS together with the JNA, attacked the cities of Zvornik and Bijeljina and the non-Serbian inhabitants were expelled. The capital city Sarajevo came under siege a month later.69 By June, the Serb forces had occupied most of Bosnia.
Eastern Bosnia, where Srebrenica is located, was strategically important to the Serbians as it connected Bosnia with Serbia.70 Occupation of this area would mean a great step in the plan of a Velika Srbija. Survivors Senahid Ahmetović and Muhizin Omerović were living in this area. They were sixteen and seventeen years old, respectively, when the war started. Senahid lived in Srebrenica city. He currently lives in a social housing in Potočari, near Srebrenica, with his wife and children.71 Reluctant to speak about the past so shortly before July 11 and dealing with health issues, he canceled the interview appointment twice. When we met, he explained:
Nobody expected that it would come to war, especially youngsters. In April 1992 when this horrible war started, we all had– or at least I did– a feeling that this would soon end. I did not know what gunfire was or what ammunition was. I thought this was going to last for a short while.72
64 The Republika Srpska was already informally established in the beginning of 1992. 65 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis,168.
66 Ibidem, 172.
67 At the end of 1992, the tensions between the allies of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats rose and resulted in the Croat-Bosniak
War. With mediation of the United States, a peace treaty was signed between Bosniaks and Croats.
68 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië, 171.
69 Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade. Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
113.
70 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië, 172.
71 This concerns the social housing project "Sustainable Srebrenica - social housing and economic reintegration”, a project is funded
by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS).
His young age, characterized by optimism and a lack of war experience, made him hopeful that the war would only be temporary.
Muhizin was eager to speak about the past. We met in his rebuilt house in Konjević Polje, an area occupied by the Serbs in early 1993. When his father was killed in their house in March 1993, Muhizin fled to Srebrenica. After the fall of Srebrenica, Konjević Polje was an important key point at which the Bosnian Serb forces attacked the column of refugees in July 1995 and killed many fleeing Muslim men at the town's school. While driving up the road to his isolated premises, the signs with "mass grave excavations" are a reminder still of those massacres today. When we arrived in the evening, he was still working in the fields. It was Ramadan, so he first ate some dates before we sat on his balcony with Bosnian coffee. Two of his neighbors, who escaped during the genocide as well, joined us later. We overlooked the hills of Konjević Polje, as Muhizin explained how he was fleeing for his life across those same hills twenty years ago. Muhizin had the same feeling as Senahid: "I never thought it could be war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though there was war in Croatia and Slovenia. And then one day, war."73
War in the villages
After the most important cities in Eastern Bosnia were under control, the Bosnian Serbs started focusing on smaller cities and villages to increase their dominance. Srebrenica and Bratunac were also targets now (see the map on p. 7). For instance, the police forces in Bratunac became ethnically divided and TV transmission towers were blown up so the local population could only receive Serbian channels.
Throughout April, Skelani and Bratunac became under the control of the JNA and VRS. Srebrenica and Potočari remained controlled by Muslims. When the Muslims did not respond to the Serb request to hand over all their weapons, the villages were attacked more intensely: During the spring of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs burned villages and committed atrocities. They started carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1992 in the area of Visegrad, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Zvornik and Srebrenica. In May already, they had murdered hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men from Bratunac and surrounding villages at a soccer field, for example.74 The Muslim population responded
to this by attacking Serbian villages from May 15 onwards, under the leadership of
73 Muhizin Omerović, author interview at Konjević Polje, July 4, 2015.
Naser Orić. He remained the most powerful man in the region during the war, despite the establishment of the War Presidium of the municipality of Srebrenica.75
As a consequence of these atrocities, by April and May 1992 a part of the population
started fleeing to the only enclaves still standing: Srebrenica, Žepa, Cerska and Goržade.76 Many already fled their homes in the surrounding villages, before arriving in Srebrenica. It took some of them weeks before they reached the safe enclave, as they were trying to avoid enemy ambushes, while carrying as much of their belongings as they could.77 The VRS brought the Muslims who had chosen to stay in the concentration camp Sušica, where they were tortured, killed or otherwise transferred to another camp in Bijeljina. The women and children were deported to Tuzla, raped or killed.78
1.3 Srebrenica: overpopulated, bombed and starved
Life inside the enclave of Srebrenica was extremely hard. The Bosnian Muslim forces and civilian population were bombed throughout the summer and autumn of 1992. The bombing hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as the humanitarian relief flights were attacked while airborne. These threats moved the UN Security Council to ban all military flights in the airspace of the entire country.79 Resolution number 781 officially proclaimed Bosnia and Herzegovina a 'No Fly Zone' on October 9, 1992. The resolution stated that military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina were banned, with exception to United Nations Protection Force Flights or humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the Council established that "in the case of violations, further measures necessary to enforce this ban should be considered urgently."80
The air strikes reduced at the end of 1992, but never completely stopped. It paralyzed life in Srebrenica completely.81 Senahid, who could not imagine war in April, changed his mind by September:
Time went by, people got killed. In September 1992, I lost my mother. When I lost my mother, it felt like she was just gone somewhere. She was supposed to come back. I could not understand that my mother was killed in a war. That someone actually killed her, an innocent woman. My wife’s sister was also killed. She was only fourteen years old. At this point, we started to understand that this
75 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 1208.
76 Zwaan and de Graaff, Genocide en de crisis van Joegoslavië, 178. 77 Leydesdorff, "When Communities Fell Apart", 34.
78 Nuhanović, Under the UN Flag, 15.
79 Timothy P. McIlmail, "No-Fly Zones: The Imposition And Enforcement Of Air Exclusion Regimes Over Bosnia And Iraq,"
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 17 (1994): 37-38.
80 UN Security Council 3122nd Meeting, Resolution S/RES/781, October 9, 1992. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u921009a.htm. 81 Nuhanović, Under the UN Flag, 41-42.
was actually war.82
In other words, the loss of his mother made Senahid realize the gravity of the conflict. Her death was so incomprehensible and unreal to him that it that it made the war
realistic. The consequences of war had now affected his personal life and family. The
circumstances in Srebrenica would deteriorate even further from that moment on.
Famine and humanitarian assistance
The winter of 1992-1993 was the toughest of the entire wartime for the enclave population, because humanitarian assistance was almost non-existent until the UNPROFOR arrived in April 1993. In the mean time, an increasing number of refugees entered the enclave. Another wave of refugees came to Srebrenica from Žepa, after the town was attacked by the JNA in September.83 The first food convoy of the UNHCR did not arrive before November 28, 1992, seven months after the start of the war. By then, many had died of exhaustion and hunger.84
Some scholars state that the VRS deliberately induced this famine, such as sociologist Kurt Jonassohn and Bosnian Professor of Security Studies Edina Bećirević. Jonassohn emphasizes the importance of studying genocide, famine and refugees not in isolation, but as different aspects of the same phenomenon. Famine can be seen as evidence of genocide, as genocide without first starving the victims is rare in the late-twentieth century.85 He argues that the Bosnian victims were starving while Serbia was exporting food to Russia in exchange for technology and weapons.86 In other words, there was no shortage of food, but it was used in the war industry. A besieged area like Srebrenica is easily cut off from supplies. By placing the town under siege, the social enemy would become exhausted and an easier target.87
Despite these difficult physical and psychological circumstances, Orić and his forces managed to drive the VRS further back at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. The general mood amongst the Bosnian Serb forces was deteriorating and many had returned to Serbia. However, mid January, a power shift took place and the VRS and JNA steadily regained territory.88 The Bosnian government responded by exerting
82 Senahid Ahmetović, author interview at Potočari, July 4, 2015. 83 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 1257.
84 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, IT-95-4-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, July 4, 1996. Annex 53, testimony Karremans. 85 Kurt Jonassohn, "Famine, Genocide, and Refugees," Society 30 (1993): 74.
86 Ibid., 73.
87 Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 131. 88 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 1210.
pressure on the UNHCR to send assistance to the enclaves. If Kamenica, Konjević Polje and Cerska fell, even more refugees would come to Srebrenica. The Bosnian government estimated the population at 42,000 in the beginning of 1993, while the UNHCR reported a number of 46,000 inhabitants. The latter was however possibly exaggerated in order to receive more development assistance. Despite knowing the exact number at that time, it was certain the town was overcrowded and in great need of assistance. Hajrudin Mešić was living in Vlasenica at the age of eighteen when the war started. He lost four brothers during the war and the genocide, of which only one has been identified to this date. Today, he lives in Vogošća, a suburb of Sarajevo where many Srebrenica survivors settled after the war. He remembered: "The living conditions were horrible in the small protected zone. Five families were living in one apartment. The town used to have 6,000 inhabitants and suddenly it had over 40,000 in an already destroyed city."89 Srebrenica became even more crowded than that: Another wave of refugees arrived just before the fall of Konjević Polje, Kravica and Glogova in March. The refugees had to find shelter in schools and factories. Those who arrived last had to spend the nights on the streets.90 On top of that, the VRS blocked the UNHCR convoys in February 1993.91
General Philippe Morillon, UNPROFOR commanding officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina, started to fear a humanitarian crisis. He invited UNHCR representatives, a medical expert from the World Health Organization, a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) team and (MSF) staff to visit the region with him. They arrived in Srebrenica on March 11, 1993.92 The situation they encountered was worse than they had expected. There was no food or medication available, resulting in twenty deaths a day. While Morillon had a meeting with Orić in the post office building, the UNHCR staff walked around town. One of them, Larry Hollingworth, gave an account of what they witnessed in his memoir Merry Christmas, Mr. Larry. He describes how people were sitting in circles around fires, most of them without coats. They were hungry and had madness in their eyes.93 MSF reported that the situation in the hospital was inhumane. All operations were executed without anesthesia or sterile tools, bandages covered in blood were drying to be reused and the only light came from an improvised
89 Hajrundin Mešić, author interview at Vogošća, July 1, 2015. 90 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 1215
91 Ibid., 1213.
92 Patrick McCarthy, After the Fall. Srebrenica Survivors in St. Louis (St Louis: Missouri Historical Society Press, 2000), 32. 93 Hollingworth, Merry Christmas, Mr. Larry, 170-183.
source of a car battery.94
Morillon wanted to leave the enclave the day after, but the population blocked the
road. The night after he tried to depart again, but enclave inhabitants did not let him go. Ultimately, three days after his arrival, he held a speech from the hospital's balcony. He announced that the enclave was now under protection of the United Nations. Morillon declared: "We will not abandon you!" and with those words, the UN flag was hoisted over Srebrenica.95 After this, the population allowed him to leave.96 Nine UNMO's, eight Canadian soldiers and two UNHCR representatives remained in Srebrenica to report about the situation and developments in the enclave after Morillon left.
Mladić agreed to a ceasefire shortly after Morrilon's promise, on March 18.
Therefore, the first UNHCR convoy could arrive in the enclave the day after, bringing some relief to the hunger. Enormous chaos emerged however, when the UNHCR trucks wanted to leave for Tuzla. Many tried to climb on the vehicles, children were suffocated and the police had to fire shots. Nonetheless, 700 managed to leave the enclave like this. Two weeks later, this situation was repeated. The NIOD estimates that between mid March and the beginning of April, at least 5,560 people were evacuated in this way.97 One of the survivor's wife and children were among them: "When the UNPROFOR came in 1993, my wife and two daughters left with their first convoy. They had to leave because we did not have any food. It was my luck that my children are female. If they were boys, the Serbs would not have allowed them to leave."98
Helicopter evacuations were unsuccessful as the Serbs attacked them.99 Muhizin's brother was one of the few who managed to leave the enclave by helicopter. "Because Srebrenica was at this point overpopulated, they were sending wounded people to Tuzla. My brother was transported to Tuzla by helicopter. He was underage. I was already over eighteen years old." Muhizin looked away and laughed cynically: "I was already ready to be killed."100
Mid-April 1993, Orić became pessimistic. The enclave covered only 900 to 140
square meters. Ahmed Ustić's father had a hair salon in the city center of Srebrenica. We met in that same salon, which he reopened after the war. After he flipped the sign on his door from open to closed, he offered us seating in the barber chairs. He sat down
94 Laurence Binet, MSF and Srebrenica 1993-2003 (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015), 15. 95 Patrick Mccarthy, After the Fall, 33.
96 David Hirsch, Law against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (London: The GlassHouse Press, 2003) 83. 97 NIOD, Srebrenica, een ‘veilig’ gebied, 1218.
98 Confidential interviewee, author interview at Gornji Potočari, July 4, 2015. 99 The reason for this remains unclear in the NIOD report. The source is confidential. 100 Muhizin Omerović, author interview at Konjević Polje, July 4, 2015.
