China's power and African agency : a 'win-win' structure? : a debate on Sino-African relations

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China’s Power and African Agency. A

‘Win-Win’ Structure?

A debate on Sino-African relations

June 23, 2017

Author: Merel Thijssen Supervisor: dr. M.O. Eze Second Reader: dr. R. Bellanova

MSc Thesis Political Science: Political Economy

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of African agency in the changing nature of Sino-African relations. It looks specifically at how African states, sub and non-state actors have been able to influence their relationship with China. In particular, this influence can be seen in the form of African resistance, setting boundaries for the negative consequences of Chinese projects and investments. To understand the essence of this issue, African agency must be situated in the structure of Sino-African relations. For this reason, this thesis approaches China-Africa relations from a structuralist perspective. As a result, this study takes the view that the nature of Sino-African relations must be seen as a structure, arguing that the structure of this relationship can be referred to as ‘win-win’, or positive sum. This means that China brings many positive contributions to African countries, which is confirmed by the positive dominant view of the public on China’s economic presence. Yet, this thesis also seeks to stress the unbalanced – soft - power distribution between China and African states. The consequences of this unequal power balance result in the fact that the direction of mutual positive relations is still decided upon by Chinese interests. This study will test these arguments through case studies of Zambia and Botswana – two Southern African states with which China has been engaged. On the basis of these cases, it suggests that African countries and actors are able to influence their relationship with China, although they are not – yet - able to exercise the agency to restructure these relationships.

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List of Abbreviations

AGTF Africa Growing Together Fund

BC Beijing Consensus

CEO

Chief Executive Officer

EY Ernst and Young

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa IFI International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund KCM Konkola Copper Mines ODF Official Development Finance PPI Foreign Private Financing PRC People’s Republic of China

SADC Southern African Development Community SOE State-owned enterprise

TAZARA Tanzania-Zambia railway

UN United Nations

WB World Bank

WC Washington Consensus

WHBC Wuxi Huaguang Boiler Company

List of Tables

Table 1: Hypotheses ...21 Table 2. Positive contributions – Negative consequences ...27

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“China-Africa relations have today reached a stage of growth unmatched in history. We should scale the heights, look afar and take bold steps. Let us join hands, pool the vision and strength of the 2.4 billion Chinese and Africans and open a new era of China-Africa win-win cooperation and common development.” - Xi Jinping, PRC President, December 4 2015

1. Introduction

This thesis will explore the recent debate on China-Africa relations. It will argue that African agency is an important aspect in the evolving partnership between China and Africa. Agency is seen as a concept within the agency-structure debate, considering the agents, structures and their interrelations (Wendt, 1987; Giddens, 1984; Hawkes, 2003; Gadzala, 2015). Therefore, to understand bilateral relations between China and Africa, this thesis approaches Sino-African relations from a structuralist perspective. Structuralism as a theory is a way of thinking about the world in structures. This means that, Sino-African relations are seen as a structure, based upon the actors within the relationship, i.e. China and Africa. In addition, this thesis will use power theories to illustrate the different dynamics of African agency and Chinese power, illustrating the complex nature of Sino-African relations. It will use the theory of ‘soft power’ of Joseph Nye, and the concepts of power by Russell, Lukes and Mann (Nye, 1990; Lukes, 1986; Mann, 2012). Accordingly, the main research question of this project is: ‘How do state, sub-state and non-state actors in Zambia and Botswana act in the structure of their relationship with China after the year 2000?’ This question has been broken down into three critical questions that emerge as a core to this project. First, it examines the structure of the relationship; can this relationship be described as mutually beneficial? Second, it addresses the structure of power relations between China and Africa, is there an equal balance of power? Third, it examines the modes of resistance and African agency as a result of the evolving Chinese influence. Do agency and resistance influence the course of their benefits from China?

Accordingly, this thesis will illustrate that the role of African countries and their inhabitants cannot be missed in the conversation on Sino-African relations. The question of agency in Africa’s foreign relations is surprisingly a recent one (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). Therefore it is highly relevant to do further research on African agency in their relationship towards China. However, it is essential to stress the differences in power between China and African states and non-state actors. This thesis will show that Sino-African relations can be described as mutual beneficial and positive-sum. However, it stresses the consideration that China has more power to shape these relations, making them more profitable. To illustrate these different bilateral dynamics, Botswana and Zambia will be used as case studies. While the literature often illustrates Sino-African relations as a zero-sum game, this thesis will show that Africa’s embrace of China is mutually beneficial. However, the power balance is leaning towards China. An appreciation of the power shift from the West to China is essential to understand the evolution of Sino-African relations.

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1.1. A shift towards China

The 1990’s, the era of Thatcherism and Reaganism, Western economic policy shifter into a neo-liberal framework of stability, privatization and liberalization (Rodrik, 2006, p.973). The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in reference to the common policy advice addressed by the Washington-based institutions as of 1989 (Williamson, 1990). The DC-based International Financial Institutions (IFI) refer to institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Anghie, 2004, p. 217). The IFI policy advice created a big wave of reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa that fundamentally changed the policy landscape of many African states (Rodrik, 2006, p.974). The consensus believed that the key to economic development was linked to a set of neo-liberal economic policies that a country should pursue (Bridsall et al., 2010).

The Washington Consensus as articulated by Williamson would come to represent in the mind of its advocates a mantra for capitalist economic development (Bridsall et al., 2010). In fact, the term Washington Consensus became synonymous to an ideology that embraced extreme market fundamentalism and a minimalist role for government interventionism (Williamson, 2000). For this reason, the ‘Washington Consensus’ became vulnerable to many criticism. It was caricatured in the public imagination as a ‘Washington-knows-best’ approach, an imperial attitude of telling other countries how to behave (Ramo, 2004, p.4). In Africa especially the IFI’s were extremely powerful institutions, even more influential than former colonial masters (Ake, 1991, p.41). They became a model for many donor agencies and NGOs who used their policies as a narrative script in their dealings with Africa. Structural Adjustment programs were a major critical issue. As their draconian policies were disastrous for many African economies (Easterly, 2003, p.362; Ake, 1991, p.41). As the Western Structural Adjustment programs became literally failed policy projects, a vacuum was created giving space for new actors and their policies; i.e. the Chinese. The meteoric rise of China presented the opportunity to fill the vacuum. The vacuum created by Western economic policies in Africa mediated a shift towards a new ‘physics of power and development’ focused on China (Ramo, 2004, p.4).

Since 2000, China has grown to be Africa’s largest trading partner, outpacing Britain and the United States (Dollar, 2016, p.1; Brautigam, 2009, p.2). Chinese direct investment in Africa and lending to African states has grown tremendously (Dollar, 2016, p.8). Moreover, China has given aid to almost every country in Africa (Brautigam, 2009, p.3). So far, 51 out of the 55 African countries have also established diplomatic ties with China (Chun, 2013, p.1). To formalize bilateral engagement and strengthen Sino-African relations even further, Chinese and African leaders have established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000 (FOCAC) (Cissé, 2012, p.1). This forum was created as a basis for strategic partnership between China and the African continent (Cissé, 2012, p.1).

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1.2. China’s attractiveness and inherent issues

Many reasons account for African countries’ attraction to the Chinese development approach (Ramo, 2004, p.3). First, African states feel attracted to the Chinese economic growth and its development success, highlighting a new development story (Hanauer & Morris, 2014, p.14). Second, China’s new development approach does not believe in uniform solutions for every situation (Ramo, 2004, p.3). For African states it is attractive to see what can be done if countries do what is best for themselves rather than what they are told by others (Breslin, 2011, p.1338). Third, China’s way of development stresses a positive image and friendly relations. The official Chinese trade policy recognizes the importance of sovereignty, non-interference and political equality (Thorborg, 2017, p.70). For her part, unlike the ‘Washington Consensus’ and IFIs, China treated Africa not as a continent in need of saving or lecturing but as a business partner (Brautigam, 2009). Joshua Cooper Ramo is the first who referred to this approach as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ (2004, p.4). As the Beijing Consensus came to be known as the alternative development model, it has to be contrasted with the widely-discredited Washington Consensus (Ramo, 2004, p.4; Ramirez & Rodriguez, 2014, p.57). Yet, it is important to note that the Beijing Consensus is not a widely accepted term (Rebol, 2010, p.7). Rebol argues that:

Rather than finding consensus on a single model put forward, Beijing recognizes the coexistence of commonality and difference. Africa is a continent that has been told for centuries by foreign powers which model to follow. In contemporary China-Africa relations, it is therefore not the successful “China Model”, but the absence of a single “Beijing Consensus” that makes China so attractive (2010, p.7).

At the same time, China’s appearance in Africa has led to a lot of controversy. Western and African civil society are criticizing China's failure to promote good governance and human rights (Dent, 2011, p.13). Moreover, the Sino-African relationship has caused considerable amount of discussion as to how these relations would benefit Africa (Mlambo et al., 2016). The growth of the Chinese’ economy has thrown up new challenges for African countries. Chinese global expansion led to concerns that its export growth displaces domestic production and employment on an economic level (Sekakela, 2014, p.10). Critics argue that these Chinese intentions are penetrating African countries (Bradley, 2016). They even describe Chinese interest in Africa as neo-colonial and mercantilism, stressing that China is exploiting Africa’s natural resources (Manero, 2016; Mlambo et al., 2016). The concept of neo-colonialism is usually traced back to Kwame Nkrumah, who explains neo-colonialism as: “[…] the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer it, it means exploitation without redress” (Nkrumah, 1966, p.2; Maekawa, 2015, p.317; Amin, 1973, p.62).

Yet not only China is blamed to behave in a neo-colonial fashion as both the West and China share common economic interests in Africa’s natural resources (Dent, 2011, p.13). Critics argue that China is in some way following the footsteps of the advanced industrial Western economies (Dent,

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2011, p.13). This economic interest has let to even more critique on both the West and China. Critics argue that it is a re-emergence of the ‘great game’, a form of new imperial geopolitics on the continent (Dent, 2011, p.13). Looking for economic gain on the African continent is now called the ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Ayers, 2013, p.227). This scramble includes both the West, multinational corporations and emerging economies seeking access to African resources and markets (Ayers, 2013, p. 227).

As an in principle still communist state, China will wish to avoid its actions in Africa as being labeled ‘neo-imperialist’, and is trying to stay out of repeating past mistakes by the Western Powers (Dent, 2011, p.15). As a result, the Chinese press often paints a picture of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation (Brautigam, 2009, p.3; Thorborg, 2017, p.70). The Chinese government claims that from both parties’ perspective there is a win in this relationship (Dent, 2011, p.15; Chitonge, 2015, p.193). Findings from Afrobarometer’s 2014/2015 survey in 36 African countries confirm the win-win and suggest that the African public holds a generally favorable view of economic and assistance activities of China (Lekorwe, Chingwete & Okuru, 2016). China’s role, it seems, is thus broadly welcomed across the continent (Moyo, 2012; Dollar, 2016, p.4). On this view, the public perception in most of Africa is that China’s economic and political role in Africa is beneficial (Lekorwe et al., 2016). China’s infrastructure, the availability of cheap products and business investments are the key reasons for their positive image (Lekorwe et al., 2016).

1.3. Structure, agency & power

What seems to be missing in this conversation however is non-recognition for the role of African countries and how they deal with Chinese interest (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016, p.1). African states are often seen as passive actors being stuck in an unequal relationship (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016 p.1). These African countries have been described as unable to deal with Chinese policies ( Farah et al., 2015, p.610). This thesis, however, is going to argue that African states are not passive recipients. There is no one sided-story where only China has an impact on their relationship with Africa. Not only is the African agency actively negotiated in the context of these bilateral encounters, in fact, the Chinese state seems to give space for their active involvement (Brautigam, 2009). Gadzala argues that: “Africans and their governments are shaping relations with China” (2015, p.1). She refers to agency as “on a basic level, agency implies the ‘capacity to do’ - the possession of causal power.”(Gadzala, 2015, p.19). Therefore the impact of Chinese trade, investment, and migration also depends on the agency of the country or the location of investment within the country (Dollar, 2016, p.4).

However, an agent's ‘capacity to do’ is not only defined by itself but also by the structure he is based in (Giddens, 1984, p.25). “An agent is always an agent of something” (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). Wendt states that society must be seen as a structure which influence the interactions of different actors, (1987, p.338). The social systems comprise the activities of agents (Giddens, 1984, p.25). Crucial to this idea is the theory of structuration, meaning that not only structure determines the

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activities of agents, but agents also change the structure around them. Therefore, the agency of both African leaders and civil society groups is seen as their ability to bargain and to effect change in structuring the nature of their societies, economies and their relation towards China (Kragelund & Carmody, 2016). Nevertheless, the power to change the structure is dependent on the relative balance of power (Kragelund & Carmody, 2016, p.8). In other words, the structure can always be changed but for some it is easier to change the structure than for others (Strange, 1975).

Power is key in having agency. Power can be seen as the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion, this is what Joseph Nye (1990) calls soft power. Moreover, power is not only the achievement of your own will, but can also be something that is co-operatively held and exercised (Lukes, 1986, p.2). This thesis therefore claims that Sino-African relations can be described as a cooperative power relation. Still, there is an unequal distribution of power. “A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few” (Russel, 1986, p.20).As Mahmood Mamdani has argued the challenge of structuralism is its embedded binary in which “one end of the polarity determines the essence of the other” (1996, p.9). This means that one of the two actors is leading, while the other one is – partly – guided. In Sino-African relations, it seems that China is in some sense able to determine the quality of the relationship. However, this study tries to emphasize that this does not mean that ‘Africa’ as residual term does not have any power, or is a recipient in the relationship. African agency responds to this relationship and is somehow attracted by China. Africa’s embrace of China is therefore not a zero-sum game, whereby one party advances its position to the detriment or a corresponding loss for the other party (Springer, 2003).

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

Botswana and Zambia are used as case studies to do further research and confirm the above argument. Accordingly, this study will focus on the hypothesis that the relationship between China and the two African states are mutually beneficial though not on an equal level because of differences in power. The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one has outlined the central argument and the critical questions that emerge as central to this project. It gave a short introduction on the theories of power and structuration which this study is based on. The following chapters, chapter two and three, will exist out of the theory and literature that is a core to this thesis. The theory of structuration and concepts of power will be discussed. They give guidance to the hypothesis in chapter four, and the analyses in chapter six, seven and eight. The hypotheses are based on the mentioned critical questions that derive from the literature, and will be tested in the analyses. It will therefore focus on the structure of China-Africa relations and the embedded forms of power. Accordingly, this study will look at the stimulators of China’s power, among other things, China’s development model and economic investments. In final, chapter eight, will focus on Botswana/Zambian civil society and the law and rules of Botswana and Zambia to illustrate how these countries are responding to Chinese influence.

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2. Theory: the role of Agency and Structure

As already mentioned, the question of agency in Africa’s foreign relations is a very recent one (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). Scholarship and critique on Chinese engagement in Africa has mostly focused on China’s interest in resource-rich nations, stressing the asymmetry of those relationships (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016, p.2). As a consequence there is still little awareness of the reaction of African governments and (civil) society (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016, p.2). It is therefore important to shine a light on African agency.

Agency is seen as a concept within the agency-structure debate, considering the nature of agents, structures and their interrelations (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). This debate is grounded in structuralism which is based on the concept of structure (Hawkes, 2003, p.1; Giddens, 1984). In this theory agency refers to the possession of causal power (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). As Alexander Wendt points out: “Human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live” (Wendt, 1983, p.338). Consequently, agents are able to influence relations and the structure of society around them (Sewell, 1992, p.4). They are in some way able to use their capabilities to control the outcome of social and economic change (Giddens, 1984; Taylor, 2016, p.28).

2.1. The field of African agency

In the case of Africa there are different dimensions of agency. All attempts to describe a field that is as broad as ‘African agency’ has the possibility of over-generalization (Brown, 2012, p.1891). At the risk of oversimplification, this thesis distinguishes two forms of African agency, the agency of state-based actors and that of non-state and sub-state actors (Gadzala, 2015, p. 20; Brown, 2012, p.1891). The first is based on state level agency which is in the African context often problematized (Williams, 2013, p.129). The problem of state-level agency lies in the fractious relationship between the state and its society, as state agency is seen as state leaders and their representatives acting on behalf of national states (Brown, 2012, p.1891). The idea that actions of politicians and groups could be understood as the actions of the state in a more general sense is questioned because of the existence of authoritarian and partisan governments (Williams, 2013, p.129). In many state arenas leaders have a heavy stamp on a state’ foreign or bilateral relation (Brown, 2012, p.1892).

The problem of state level agency leads also to the second critique: that states do not act, only people do (Wight, 2004, p. 276). Both in Africa and elsewhere there is the objection that states do not have any form of agency (Wight, 2004; Kaviraj, 1997). Yet, this has been encountered by many theorists including Wendt and Waltz. They argue that, talking about states, in fact, turns them into agents (Williams, 2013, p.133 who in turn cites Wendt, 1999). Wendt illustrates that individual’s shared knowledge reproduces an idea of the state as a corporate ‘person’ (1999, p.218). This belief is formed by the thought of the state’s members as a ‘we’, a discourse about some sort of collective

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identity that is based on political legitimacy (Wendt, 1999, p.219). On this summation therefore, part of this thesis will look into African state agency, referring to actions that are made by the state, and therefore the government, assuming that there is political legitimacy. It will zoom in on Botswana and Zambia stressing the importance of context as no state is the same and different political and cultural backgrounds result in a different state relationship with China (Gadzala, 2015, p.20).

The second category exists out of non-state or sub-state agents that bring another dimension to African agency (Brown, 2012, p.1893). This category represents society which forms the missing piece and a response to the critique that the state and therefore the government are not able to represent the entire country. It shines a light on the agency of society that is missed by only focusing on state agency. These non-state and sub-state agents refer to civil society, community organizations, labor unions, private enterprises and other organizations that are non-state actors that complement the state (Gadzala, 2015, p.20). They have a role in shaping various kinds of state preferences and the external actions of the state-leaders (Brown, 2012, p.1893). This is because the cooperation and participation of non-state and sub-state actors are necessary for the implementation of policy (Brown, 2012, p. 1893). Furthermore, they interact with other non-state agents, international agencies and organizations. Therefore non-state and sub-state actors have a direct impact on the implementation of international policy (Brown, 2012, p.1893).

2.2. The importance of structure

An important aspect of agency is its embeddedness in a social or economic structure. Many agent-structure theorists have put effort in conceptualizing this relationship agent-structure (Waltz, 1979; Giddens, 1984; Wendt, 1987; Hawkes, 2003; Piaget, 1986; Wight, 2006). They have sought to mediate between the power of agency relatively to structure. As some scholars argue social outcomes and therefore ‘structures’ are the outcomes of the practices of individual agents (Giddens, 1984, p.25; Gadzala, 2015, p.19; Morgenthau, 1966). While others claim that structures are able to shape people’s practices (Waltz, 1979). Colin Wight (2006) illustrates that the opposition between the two views has played a fundamental role in social inquiry. He states that this is a question of a ‘methodological issue’ and therefore distinguishes ‘methodological structuralism’ and ‘methodological individualism’ (Wight, 2006, p.62). In this sense, methodological structuralism refers to the perception that ‘structure’ as a whole influences agency. Methodological individualism on the other hand focuses on the power of individual agents (Wight, 2006, p.62). In this sense ‘structure’ has been a highly elusive term (Hawkes, 2003, p.5). Therefore, many attempts have been made to describe this concept (Hawkes, 2003, p.5).

Wendt illustrates that society can be seen as a structure that forms the interactions of different actors (1987, p.338). This is also applicable on the international system which can be seen as a structure that is capable of guiding states (Waltz 1979; Haggard, 1991, p.405). The most important aspect of these structures are the rules and economic resources involved in institutions (Giddens, 1984, p.25). Consequently, agency can both be enabled and constrained by limitations and opportunities

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based in these social and economic – international - systems (Taylor, 2016, p.28; Giddens, 1984, p.25). Vico argues that once the world is structured by man, the structure can have the agency to be a mechanism that forms the practices of human beings (Hawkes, 2003, p.4 who in turn cites Vico, 1725). This structure embodies; a sense of internal coherence, transformation, and self-regulation (Hawkes, 2003, p.5 who in turn cites Piaget, 1986). Eventually people perceive and experience this ‘man-made’ world as ‘natural’ (Hawkes, 2003, p.4 who in turn cites Vico, 1725). As such Giddens describes structures as: “structures […] refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ‘systemic forms’” (Giddens, 1984, p.17).

Yet, the transformation of structures that shape social practices does not evolve by itself (Hawkes, 2003, p.4 who in turn cites Piaget, 1986). Therefore, this evolution of a structure is determined by individual agents who are able to influence the structure of society around them (Giddens, 1984, p.17). In this sense structure is not ‘external’ to individuals, states and organizations, it is in some way more internal than exterior to their practices (Giddens, 1984, p.25). Thus, systemic structures are not exogenous to agents (Wendt, 1995, p.73). Agents are in some way able to use their capabilities and control the outcome of social and economic change (Giddens, 1984; Taylor, 2016, p.28). They have the ability to influence society and the world around them.

On the one hand individuals, organizations and states are capable of changing relationships and systems, but on the other hand structures are also capable of shaping people’s practices. This is what Giddens (1984) calls the ‘duality of structure’ - it works both ways. Taken together this suggests that agents and social structures are in some way or another interdependent (Wendt, 1987, p.338). “That is, man constructs the myths, the social institutions, virtually the whole words as he perceives it, and in so doing he constructs himself” (Hawkes, 2003, p.3).

2.3. Theory of structuralism

The essence of structure and agency is based in a theory called structuralism. Structuralism as a theory is a way of thinking about the world which is determined by the perception and description of structures, as described above (Hawkes, 2003, p.6). It uses features of the international and national order in an explanatory way (Haggard, 1991, p.404). In this world relationships are central and the true nature lies in the perception of relationships (Hawkes, 2004, p.6). This principle can be called ‘structuralist’, it claims that the nature of a situation is dependent on the relationship with the other elements. Therefore an entity is determined by the structure it is integrated in; it is always a part of something (Hawkes, 2003, p.6). Thus, only through the connection of patterns and experience people are able to describe or define something (Radford & Radford, 2005, p.67).

Moreover, structuralism is not only about the establishment of what ‘man himself made’ (factum) it is also about ‘what man recognizes as true’(verum) (Hawkes, 2003, p.3). The focal point of

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structuralism is to identify how people make sense of the world rather than what the world is (Radford & Radford, 2005, p.65). This is referred to as the principle of verum factum. (Hawkes, 2003, p.3). The shape of the structure around people is viewed from a certain perspective, it springs from the human mind (Hawkes, 2003, p.3). Therefore, structuralism denies any final or absolute scientific truth. It aims to identify the underlying, invisible structures that create societies and their institutions (MCnabb, 2015, p.245). This making process includes the continuity of creating forms which Giambattista Vico refers to as structuring (Hawkes, 2003, p.4; who in turn cites Vico, 1725). Therefore, a structure is not static but must be seen as a process, Giddens calls this the ‘theory of structuration’ (Giddens, 1984; Hawkes, 2003, p.4; who in turn cites Piaget, 1968).

2.4. The role of Power

Within structuralism, the social world itself is inserted with different forms of power-relations. On the one hand there is the will of agents to change the structure by exercising their power to restructure (Bourdieu, 1991, p.14). On the other hand there is an integrated power in social structures which enters the consciousness of individuals, states and organizations (Giddens, 1984, p. 181). This form of power is unnoticed by people that are subjected to it (Bourdieu, 1991; Jensen, 2014, p.7). Bourdieu calls this ‘symbolic power’ and argues that these forms of power have become a ‘doxa’; a state of mind when the ‘socially constructed’ is seen as how it naturally is (Bourdieu, 1991; Jensen, 2014, p.7).

In this sense, agency and structure are related to power. Whereby power is referring to (1) the ability to get other to do things that they would otherwise not do and (2) the capacity to persuade others to do what it want without force or coercion (Lukes, 1986, p.2; Nye, 1990, p.166). Whereby the first is called ‘hard power’ and the second is what Joseph Nye calls soft power (1990, p.166). How much agency and therefore power individuals, states and organizations have is dependent on the relative balance of power (Kragelund & Carmody, 2016, p.8). The relative balance of power points to the one that is most powerful. Which explains why changing the structure is easier for some agents and most painful for those that are least able to adjust the structure (Strange, 1975). Agency therefore depends on the different power-relations.

Mann distinguishes two forms of power-relations; distributive and cooperative (Mann, 2012, p.6). Distributive power-relation is the structure of a zero-sum game; if A has power over B, for B to gain power, A must lose some (Mann, 2012, p.6). With a collective/cooperative power relation, in pursuing the same goals it is the structure of a positive-sum game. Referring to a win-win situation in which both parties win. Power is therefore not only the achievement of your own will, but can also be something that is co-operatively held and exercised (Lukes, 1986, p.2). In this sense, African agency is not contrasting with ‘Chinese power” since the two terms can be seen as inter-constitutive (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016, p.9). Nevertheless, even in this relationship it is important to note that “A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few” (Russell, 1986, p.20).

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Thus in structuralism exists an integrated power-relationship. The social and economic structure in this relationship is determined by an embedded power difference. These power relations can refer to what is called ‘binary oppositions’. As Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has argued, the challenge of structuralism is its embedded binary. This means is that within the process of structuring social reality is created and perceived through a program of what is called binary oppositions (Hawkes, 2003, p.13). In binary oppositions ‘one end of the polarity determines the essence of the other’ (Mandani, 1996). This is a complex pattern of paired functional differences (Hawkes, 2003, p.13). For example: ‘cold and warm’, or ‘high and low’, but also ‘developed and underdeveloped’. With this last example the focus lies on one concept, the other word is dependent on the essence of the first. Eze refers to this challenge as the lead term (developed) and the residual term (underdeveloped). The ‘lead term’ determines the essence in the relationship between the two. The other term, the ‘residual term’ on the other hand is (partly) guided by the ‘lead term’ (Eze, 2010, p.149). The power is therefore leaning towards the lead term which has more power to determine the relationship.

3. Literature: optimism versus pessimism

The literature on Sino-African relations outlines a broader discussion on the negative consequences and positive contributions of China’s economic engagement with Africa. Accordingly, the discussion on China’s interest offers different perspectives on the nature of Sino-African relations. The pessimistic view will be discussed first, focusing on neo-colonialism and the critique based on China’s behavior. Second, this chapter illustrates the optimistic view, looking at the benefits of China’s interest including the Beijing Consensus.

3.1.1. Pessimistic view: a zero-sum game

Within the body of literature on Sino-African relations a number of scholars say that there is an unequal power distribution whereby China has more power to determine the nature of the relationship (Farah et al., 2015, p.610). Critics therefore say it is harder for African governments to coordinate China’s policies than it is for China to do business in Africa (Farah et al., 2015, p.610). Size and wealth asymmetries create a disadvantage for African countries when dealing with major powers (Whitaker, 2017). As Youngman illustrates in an interview “people feel that China is now the second-biggest economy in the world. If, you say negative things, do you really want to upset such a huge power?” (2013, p.7).

China’s deepening engagement with Africa has therefore led to a lot of controversy (Dollar, 2016, p.9).This include claims that China wants to buy up Africa’s land, and that it hires Chinese employees rather than local labor (Esposito & Tse, 2015). Moreover, the pattern of Chinese investments is claimed to be centered on raw material and minerals (Balasubramanyam, 2014, p.21). This looks similar to the colonial pattern and that creates suspicion and distrust in these investments

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(Balasubramanyam, 2014, p.21). As a consequence critics claim that Chinese behavior is mercantilist, exploitative and neo-colonial (Manero, 2017; Mlambo et al., 2016).

3.1.2. Neo-colonial structure

The term ‘neo-colonialism’ became common in the early 1960’s and traces back to Kwame Nkrumah (Maekawa, 2015; 1966, p.317) After celebrating the ‘year of independence’ it was argued that independence did not ensure economic self-reliance (Maekawa, 2015, p.317). From this perspective the independent nations were still indirect victims of a form of domination by political, economic and social means (Maekawa, 2015, p.317). According to Nkrumah, the essence of neo-colonial structure, is that the state’s economic system is directed from the outside world (1966, p.1). He illustrates that even though it looks like the state is independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty it is still controlled by others (Nkrumah, 1966, p.1). Therefore, neo-colonialism is seen as a form of colonialism that is exerted by developed countries without the occupation by military power (Nkrumah, 1966, p.1).Nkrumah states that: ‘‘Neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer it, it means exploitation without redress” (1966, p.2). This is pointing to the exerted political power over African countries by (mostly) The West, mainly through their investments in natural resource industries (Balasubramanyam, 2014, p.21). Amin describes neo-colonialism as the structure of a dependent society (1973, p.62). Whereby the society has no real autonomy and cannot be understood without the (European) society who dominates it (Amin, 1973, p.62).

3.1.3. Western and African critique on China

Since China’s rise in influence in Africa, Western scholars have been criticizing China for their role in Africa (Dollar, 2016, p. 9). As Western news headlines often portray an exploitative and neo-colonial relationship: ‘Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush’; ‘China’s Investment in Africa: The New Colonialism? ; ‘China and Nigeria: Neo-colonialism, South-South Solidarity, or both?’ and “Clinton warns against new colonialism in Africa” (French, 2014; Manero, 2017; Cafiero & Wagner, 2011; Dollar, 2016). The last title is based on Clinton’s trip to Africa where she warned African leaders about co-operation with countries that want to exploit the continent’s resources (Gosh, 2012). Other Western scholars have argued that Chinese companies only provide substandard services and products that also weaken local competitors (Lekorwe, Chingwete & Okuru, 2016, p.1). Moreover, China has severely been criticized by the West for its engagement with autocratic regimes (Lekorwe et al., 2016, p.1). Consequently, in Western perspective, China fails to promote good governance and human rights (Dent, 2011, p.13).

Yet, not only is the West criticizing China’s behavior. There are also anti-Chinese sentiments within African countries. One example of the anti-Chinese debate within an African country is the case of the Zambian copper mines (Adem, 2013). A number of fatal accidents in the mines triggered

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the debate in the 2006 Presidential election campaign in Zambia (Adem, 2013). Michael Sata the candidate for the main opposition party Patriotic Front said that: “We have to be very careful because if we leave them unchecked, we will regret it. China's Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa is sucking from us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our wealth” (Chimangeni, 2007). Lamido Sanusi (2013), the former central bank governor of Nigeria urged fellow Africans that they ‘must get real about Chinese ties’ (Dollar, 2016, p. 5). He explains that the African love with China has to be removed as a precondition for development (Sanusi, 2013). In this sense, he argues that Africa has to recognize that China is in Africa not for African interest but for its own (Sanusi, 2013). Sanusi claims that:

China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw materials and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism.

The days of Non-Aligned Movement that united us after colonialism are gone. China is no longer a fellow under-developed economy - it is the world’s second-biggest capable of the same forms of exploitation as the west. It is a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and underdevelopment (Financial Times, March 11 2013).

3.2.1. Optimistic view: a positive sum game

China can also be seen as an attractive alternative to continued structure of dependency on the West (Campbell, 2015, p.512). Many studies have argued that Sino-African cooperation has become mutually beneficial, explaining that the interest of China in the African continent has been advantageous for both sides resulting from business partnerships and investments (Dollar, 2016; Brautigam, 2009; Aguilar & Goldstein, 2009; Carolina & Murphey, 2009; Ado & Su, 2013, p.44). The official line that China refers to is that cooperation with the African continent is win-win (Dollar, 2016, p.10). It is argued that trade and direct investment are based on comparative advantage resulting in a mutual beneficial relationship; based on the classical trade theory (Dollar, 2016, p.10; Chitonge, 2015, p.193). Thus, win-win is referring to an approach that creates a win for both parties that are involved (Chitonge, 2015, p.193).

3.2.2. Africa’s benefits from China

Benefits for Africa include improved infrastructure (roads, railways, and telecom systems), cheap products, additional revenue due to business investments and therefore a boost in African social and economic development (Ado & Su, 2013, p.44; Lekorwe et al., 2016, p.1). The reason for this is that Chinese firms are simply willing to invest where western companies are not (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014, p.2). Investment in infrastructure has been helpful to Africa’s manufacturing sector and freed up domestic resources for other critical needs such as health care and education. In addition,

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infrastructure has helped every potential investor by making it easier to do business with different African countries (Lituchy, Galperin & Punnett, 2016, p.239; Wharton University of Pennsylvania, 2016). China has therefore created more jobs that would otherwise not exist without their investment (Campbell, 2016, p.512; Pigato & Tang, 2015, p.5). In addition to investments China also provides cheap consumer and capital goods in Africa. These products are represented mostly textiles, clothing, footwear and consumer electronics (Pigato & Tang, 2015, p.5). Chinese products are often less expensive than similar products imported from the European Union or the United States which contributes to a positive image of China in African countries (Lekorwe et al., 2016, p.19).

As an addition, Africa-China relations have increased Africa’s strategic importance and therefore African power influence in the global context has grown. China’s push into Africa has given African countries a new and powerful trading partner (Shelton & Kabemba, 2012). Furthermore, China’s demand for minerals has increased the global prices of commodities, such as copper and aluminum (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014. p.2). This demand for minerals has provided much more revenue for African governments and a reverse in the price decline (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014, p.2). Brown and Harman (2013) argue that the greater prominence of African states over the past decade give Africa more space to maneuver.

3.2.3. Beijing model

Another argument from China optimists is that cooperation with China provides Africa with the opportunity of charting its own way of development; i.e. a new development model (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016, p.7). This optimism is related to what some may call the ‘Beijing model’ or ‘Beijing consensus’ which focuses on state control and national sovereignty (Asungu & Nwachukwu, 2016, p.7). The Beijing Consensus (BC) as a concept has been utilized to make a distinction between China’s economic development experience and the Washington Consensus (WC) ( Yağcı, 2016, p.30). The BC points to China’s high economic development over the last three decades; it offers an alternative to the policy toolkit of WC institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Yağcı, 2016, p.30). China’s success has made it attractive to many developing countries (Nye, 2006). “Welcome aboard China’s train of development.” Xi Jinping, president of China said. “You can take a ride on our express train or just make a hitchhike all are welcome” (Ulan, 2014).

Joshua Cooper Ramo was the first who described China’s development as a new physics of power referring to the Beijing Consensus (2004, p.4). He argued that China’s new ideas are having a gigantic effect outside China (Ramo, 2004, p.4). China is marking a new path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order (Ramo, 2004, p.4). ‘Change, newness and innovation’ are the keywords that describe the power of this consensus (Ramo, 2004, p.5). The consensus is about using economics

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and governance to improve society, this is what reflects the appealing spirit of the new Chinese physics (Ramo, 2004, p.5).

The optimists further argue that China stands for non-interference and friendly relations which all together create a positive image (Hanauer & Morris, 2014, p.14). China wants to draw a clear distinction between its development model and with the European colonial past and Western influence, which China thinks derive from paternalism and political interference (Hanauer & Morris, 2014, p.14). Therefore, the country promotes its presence in Africa as based on equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit (Hanauer & Morris, 2014, p.14). It is treating Africa not as a continent in need of saving or lecturing but as a business partner (Brautigam, 2009, p.3). Padraig Carmody and Ian Taylor (2010) use the term ‘flexigemony’ to refer to the way China adapts their strategies to particular histories of different African states. Yet, it is important to note that the Beijing Consensus is not a concept that is widely accepted (Rebol, 2010, p.7). Rebol argues that because Beijing recognizes the coexistence of commonality and difference, there is not one successful ‘China model’ and therefore the absence of the ‘Beijing Consensus” makes China so attractive (2010, p.7).

3.3. China as an actor

China’s involvement in Africa derives from the broader context of its “Go Global” (走出去) strategy (Thrall, 2015, p.12).Contrary to the conventional perception that China’s involvement in Africa is purely based on Africa’s natural resources, China’s interests in Africa have more driving factors (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014; Sun, 2014, p.3). Hanauer and Morris (2014) argue that China has three other overarching strategic interests in Africa: (1) markets for Chinese exports, (2) political legitimacy and (3) prosperity, security and stability on the continent to ensure safety of China’s investments (p.5). Brautigam adds to this by arguing that the Chinese interest is “a reflection of the Chinese society’s ideologies and values” (Brautigam, 2009, p.15). China’s key drivers are mostly based on economic interests. The overwhelming majority of Chinese companies that operate in Africa are profit-driven (Thrall, 2015, p.12). It therefore succeeds on its own commercial merits, rather than as a state directed tool only. The country wants to secure its natural resource imports, a market for export and investment and an opportunity for Chinese firms to increase their employment and global experience (Thrall, 2015, p.12). China is benefitting from the exceptional young African population as a work force (Param, 2017). Though, while it is true that Chinese manufacturing sector has created an increasing demand for natural resources, Wenjie Chen, an economist in the African Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said that “there is not really this pattern where you see more deals going into natural-resource-rich countries” (Wharton University of Pennsylvania, January 19 2016).

Focusing on Africa in Sino-African relations makes it easy to take China for granted (Gadzala, 2015, p.23). However, it essential to show that ‘China’ as one unitary actor does not exist. China is very complex, and in most cases the explanation of what is meant by China is very blurred (Gadzala, 2015, p.23). In this sense, it is important to separate Chinese investment actors in Africa into

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owned enterprises’ (SOE) and ‘private entrepreneurs’ (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014, p.3). While state-owned enterprises are driven by the interest of the Chinese government, investing mostly in the extractive industry, private entrepreneurs are driven by market forces and go beyond this sector (Ayodele & Sotola, 2014, p.7). Gadzala emphasizes that these distinctions have to be made when talking about ‘China’. She describes the state China as: “at the center is Beijing: the Chinese Communist party, around which extend many bureaucratic arms; party committees; government agencies; the People’s Liberation Army and state security forces; enterprises, including state-owned oil, construction, and telecommunications firms; banks and other financial vehicles, including sovereign wealth funds” (Gadzala, 2015, p.23).

Gadzala elsewhere stresses that the most significant implication of the relationship between China and Africa is in the continent’s informal sector where many migrants are today active participants (2015, p.24). What some may call ‘unofficial China’ has developed as a part of daily life: most importantly ‘private entrepreneurs’, running small-scale shops and roadside kiosk, but also teachers, traders, smugglers, journalist, waitresses, farmers, prostitutes, and taxi drivers (Gadzala, 2015, p.24). The everyday realities of the relations between African and Chinese agents take place beyond the spectacle of high-level meetings and handshakes and in the ordinary day to day (Gadzala, 2015, p.24).

3.4. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

Most of the interaction between African and Chinese actors takes place in daily life. The Sino-African communication in high-level meetings occurs in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC is a platform established by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and ministers from over 40 African countries for collective consultation and discussion (Taylor, 2010). Established in 2000, the FOCAC summits happen every three years (Taylor, 2010). The policy papers that are adopted at these summits represent a blueprint for future cooperation between China and Africa including issues such as; economic, and education cooperation, as well as China’s commitments in the field of security (Ronji, 2000; Monika, 2016, p.160). The existence of FOCAC might be best seen as the institutionalization of Sino-African relations during already intensified interaction (Taylor, 2010, p.1). The idea of organizing the FOCAC is to foster friendship and consensus on equal level between China and Africa (Adem, 2016, p.74).

Our closer cooperation in this area will enable us to give full play to our respective advantages, speed up our economic development and help us to shake off poverty and backwardness to the benefit of all our peoples. - Furthermore, it will help deepen and expand South-South cooperation and improve the standing of the developing countries in North-South dialogue so as to facilitate the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order. (Zhu Ronji, premier of the State Council, October 12 2000).

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The 6th Forum on China- Africa Cooperation was held in South Africa in December 2015. This was the fifteenth anniversary of the FOCAC and, an important occasion to highlight the developments regarding Sino-African relations (Chau, 2015 who in turn cites Brautigam, 2015). President Xi Jinping announced that China’s financial commitment to Africa will rise from $20 billion in loans in 2012 to $60 billion in investment (Chau, 2015 who in turn cites Brautigam, 2015). In the next three years, FOCAC priority areas include human resource development, agriculture, infrastructure development, investment and trade. The implementation of specific projects is mainly done at the bilateral level. (Adem, 2016, p.74). Xi Jinping made the intimacy of Sino-African relations clear when stating that:

“China and Africa share a common future. We Chinese and Africans have forged a profound

friendship through our common historical experience and our common struggles” (Kuo, 2015 who in turn cites Xi Jinping). As the quote of Xi Jinping illustrates, China is carefully giving attention to the African continent (Monika, 2016, p.159).

4. Hypotheses

This thesis approaches the recent debate on China-African relations from a structuralist perspective. Structuralism as a theory is a way of thinking about the world in structures. Within this world, relationships are central and the true nature lies in the perception of these relationships (Hawkes, 2003, p.6). Therefore, this study will look at the structure of Sino-African relations; i.e. mutual costs and benefits, institutions and power instruments (Hawkes, 2003, p.6). Consequently, African agency - African state, sub-state and non-state actors - must be seen in connection to the relationship it is based upon. In other words African agency is integrated in their relationship with China.

First, it must be determined what kind of relationship Botswana and Zambia have with China. Can these relationships be described as neo-colonial (zero-sum) or win-win (positive-sum)? Second, is there an equal balance of power? This thesis will examine the structure of power relation between China and Botswana and Zambia. Third, it is essential to shine a light on African agency as this seems to be an important factor in the way these relationships are formed. The level of agency will be discussed at a top-down level (state agency) and bottom-up level (civil society).

The goal of this study is to confirm the main hypothesis that the relationship between China and the two countries - Botswana and Zambia - are mutually beneficial though not on an equal level because of differences in power. Moreover, this study will attempt to show that the structure - neo-colonial or mutually beneficial - is in some way influenced by African agency. Thus the main research question is: ‘How do state, sub-state and non-state actors in Zambia and Botswana act in the structure of their relationship with China after the year 2000?’ To answer this question, the following sub hypotheses will be discussed. These hypotheses will be seen as building blocks to have the ability to make a statement on the aforementioned thematic thesis.

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4.1. A ‘win-win’ structure

H1: In both Zambia and Botswana Chinese relations can be described as win-win.

As indicated earlier, China claims to create a win-win structure by having bilateral relationships on an ‘equal’ basis with countries on the African continent. In contrast, there is a lot of critique on the Chinese influence. Critics claim that Chinese behavior is mercantilist, exploitative and neo-colonial (Menaro, 2017, Mlambo et al., 2016). Yet, this thesis will test the assumption that African states aren’t dormant recipients in this relationship. Moreover, it will explore the benefits of Chinese interest.

In this sense, a win-win structure is also referred to as a mutual beneficial relationship. In other words, both parties gain from the structure they are in. This is also seen as a positive-sum game whereby the sum of winning and losing is greater than zero for both parties involved (Spranger, 2003). In this case, everyone gets at least a part of what they want or need (Spranger, 2003). Win-win can therefore be a term to describe the relationship, a positive sum game is used to show the outcome of the relationship (Spranger, 2003).

A contra argument of the hypothesis is derived from colonialism. The theory of neo-colonialism assumes a dependent society, whereby the African society has no real autonomy and cannot be understood without the society who dominates it (Amin, 1973, p.62). In this regard, China has political power over Zambia and Botswana through investment in natural resource industries (Balasubramanyam, 2014, p.21). The African state’s economic system would therefore be directed by China. In this stage of neo-colonialism, it means that African countries are stuck in an unequal relationship. The outcome of this relationship can be referred to as ‘zero-sum’ whereby one party advances its position to the detriment or a corresponding loss for the other party (Spranger, 2003). In this case, it means that for China to gain Africa must lose.

4.2. An unequal distribution of power

H2: There is a power difference in favor of China in comparison to Botswana and Zambia.

Both within the neo-colonial and win-win structure an integrated form of power that influences the Sino-African relationship exists. Within this structure Mann (2012) distinguishes two forms of power-relations; distribute and cooperative. A distributive power-relation refers to the zero-sum game and the cooperative power relation is seen as a positive-sum game. In this sense, power is not only the achievement of one country's own will, but can also be something that is collectively held (Lukes, 1986, p.2).

As the first hypothesis is claiming that Sino-African relations are a win structure, a win-win structure must be seen as a cooperative power relation. Therefore, Chinese and African powers are not oppositions (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016, p.9). In this explanation, for Africa to gain power, it is not a necessity that China loses some. For example, the power of China in international economics and relations arises because of African oil and mineral imports. Consequently African power rises because

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of rising commodity prices as a result of a growing demand (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016, p.9). Yet, this thesis is stressing that even though the relationship between China and African countries are win-win, China holds more power and is therefore able to achieve more intended results than the African countries (Russell, 1986, p.20).

This thesis will therefore explore the field of Chinese power in relation to Zambia and Botswana. It will focus on the embedded power difference subsisting with binary oppositions (Mandani, 1996). On face value, all emphasis seems to lie on China, yet one cannot underestimate the fact that the African continent is equally guided by the course of this relationship. This does not mean that African countries lack power or that they do not gain from the Chinese. The hypothesis is that China has more power to gain out of their bilateral relations with African countries, and therefore, the balance of power is leaning towards China.

In this study, the concept of power is described as the capacity to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion, which is referring to Nye’s soft power (1990, p.166). Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument (Nye, 2004, p.6). Moreover it points to the ability to attract people or a country which leads to acquiescence (Nye, 2004, p.6). Soft power can therefore be seen as a form of attractive power (Nye, 2004, p.6). Chinese soft power is reflected in soft power resources that produces attraction; institutions like the FOCAC, Beijing Consensus and economic investment.

4.3. African resistance and Agency

H3: African resistance and Agency have in turn shaped the course of their benefits from China

The question as to what extent the Chinese are able to guide African states with their soft power has everything to do with African agency (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016). Agency refers to the possession of causal power (Gadzala, 2015, p.19). It includes the ability to act and change the nature of a relationship. What this means is that African state, sub-state and non-state agent can use their capabilities to control the outcome of their relationship with China, try to have an influence into making it a positive-sum game rather than a zero-sum game.

African states are often seen as passive actors, lacking agency, as these countries seem to be stuck in an unequal relationship where it is hard to deal with Chinese policies (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016; Farah et al., 2015, p.610). However, as Whitaker argues: “if mercantilist, colonial-style domination really were China’s primary motive, you can be certain that most Africans, mindful of a bitter past would resist it fiercely” (Al Jazeera, March 23 2017). From this perspective, this study will explore African agency as an important factor in the nature of Sino-African relations. African agency has responded to relations with China, and the Chinese seem to give space for their active involvement (Brautigam, 2009). What this means is that, following the concept of African agents, African states, sub-state and non-state actors are able to influence the structure they are based in - in relation to China. Moreover, it is important to note that looking at different countries’ agency (Botswana and Zambia)

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the kind of relationship with China is different. It is essential to focus upon the bilateral relations of China and different African states, as these states differ in context (size, economy, politics and history) and their attitude towards China.

In summary, this study will do further research in to the above hypotheses. First, it will focus on the claim that Sino-African relations are win-win, looking at Botswana and Zambia. Second it will explore the assumption that China has more power than Zambia and Botswana and is therefore able to gain more. Third, it will examine African agency as actors that influence or restructure their relationship with China in order to get more out of their relationship.

Table 1. Hypotheses

Hypotheses Africa China Claim

Hypothesis 1

₊

= Win-win

Hypothesis 2

₊

₊₊

= China is more powerful and therefore creates more gains Hypothesis 3

‘+’

₊₊

= African agency can create more gains

5. Methods: research strategy & research design

The focus of this study is to explore Chinese and Zambian/ Botswana relations with a focus on African agency, this thesis will therefore take a deductive, qualitative research strategy and a comparative or multiple-case study design. A qualitative research approach is described as a research strategy that enters into the ‘black box’ of how social phenomena are constituted (Silverman, 2016; Becker, Bryman & Ferguson, 2012, p. 78). For this study, a qualitative approach is useful because it focuses on exploration of reality with a context (Becker et al., 2012, p.390). In this sense, theory could be something that emerges out of the collection and analysis of data, but this thesis uses theory mainly as something that is tested by qualitative data (Becker et al., 2012, p.390). This study will use data collection - secondary literature and news articles - to explore the context of Sino-African relations. Consequently, it applies existing theories to get an in-depth understanding of the structure of Sino-African relations. Therefore, this thesis has a deductive research approach, the theory of structuration and power give guidance to the hypotheses and ideas. Overall, the hypotheses are going to be tested with qualitative data, which gives the ability to emphasize natural settings and context (Becker et al., p.387). Besides this, a qualitative research approach has a tendency to show how events and patterns unfold over time which is essential in the Sino-African case.

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5.1.1. Research design

To get a comprehensive view on bilateral relations with China and African countries, this thesis will focus on two cases, Botswana and Zambia. It will use a comparative-case or multiple-case study as research design. Specifically it will use a Most Similar System Design, which is also referred to as Mill’s Method of Difference (Anckar, 2008). This design entails studying two relatively similar cases using more or less the same method (Becker et al., 2012, p.387). The logic behind choosing two cases is the benefit of understanding social phenomena better when they are compared with other cases (Becker et al., 2012, p.72). This thesis focuses on countries as unit of analyses and therefore Zambia and Botswana as case studies. As for both cases, research into H1 and H2 should have the same outcome for both countries, namely, that there is a win-win structure in the relationship between China and Zambia/Botswana but China has more power to profit. Thus, in testing these hypotheses Botswana and Zambia – assuming that they are somewhat similar - will be taken together. This means that the research will look at the structure of Sino-Botswana/Zambia relations, and the power of China in Botswana/Zambia.

The most similar system design comes at hand when studying agency, this variable should be different in each country and could therefore determine the different outcome in Sino-African relations. In this regard, a similar-similar system design is referring to countries - like Botswana and Zambia - that are relatively similar, but have a different outcome in terms of their relationship with China (Anckar, 2008, p.1).Thus, for the third hypothesis the similar-similar system will be used to see if agency is the variable that determines a different outcome in Sino-African relations. Trying to both explain and describe the differences and similarities in Botswana and Zambia’s relationship towards China, this thesis will both be descriptive and explanatory (Ragin, Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 1996, p.184).

5.1.2. Strength & weaknesses

The strength of a qualitative research strategy is its ability to discover a wide variety of social economic and political factors potentially related to China’s relation with Zambia and Botswana that may not be known beforehand (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.49). Furthermore, because it will be able to match theoretical ideas with concepts and observations over a long period of time there is a high internal validity (Becker et al., 2012, p.390). This means that there should be a good match between the observations and the theoretical ideas. Besides this, a qualitative research approach is able to give a thick description making possible for others to transfer findings to another context.

Yet, a weakness of this approach is that interpretations of findings may result in difficulty of observational and integrative ability. Lack of this control makes it hard to establish real causalities, and generalizations (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p.40). For this reason, a weakness of a qualitative case study method is its external validity. Accordingly, it is difficult to meet the criterion on external reliability; i.e. the degree to which a study can be replicated (Becker et al., 2012, p.390). Furthermore, it is almost

China's power and African agency : a 'win-win' structure? : a debate on Sino-African relations