Could ‘likes’ save lives?
Survey research exploring the consequences of Facebook
‘liking’ on meaningful support for charity organizations.
Rosanne Koekkoek (11079193)
Master’s Thesis
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s programme Communication Science
Supervisor: dr. Ester de Waal Submission date: June 24, 2016
Abstract
Since social media has become an important part of daily routines for many citizens, charity organizations have broadened their horizon to this environment of online communication as well. The question rises whether investing in social media reaps any fruits beneficiary for
communication and marketing objectives, as worries have been expressed about the possible negative influence on people’s actual support to charities in the form of monetary donations or voluntary work. Supporting a charity on Facebook may ‘license’ people to engage in further moral behavior as they already have done a ‘good’ deed; this result is defined as slacktivism. On the contrary, suggestions have also been made stating the use of Facebook by charity
organizations could actually increase moral action. The present research investigates the influence of engaging in token support, which is defined as supporting an organization at low cost and/or effort, on intentions to provide meaningful support, which implies support that calls for more effort, higher costs, and/or behavior change. Specifically, liking a charity’s Facebook page as a form of token support will be the topic of interest. Online survey research was conducted especially among Facebook users between 18 and 35 years old. Intentions towards three kinds of meaningful support were measured, namely a one-off monetary donation, a monthly monetary donation, and subscription for voluntary work. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that liking a charity’s Facebook page does increase intentions to make a monetary donation on monthly basis, but only among those that have a strong moral identity. A negative main effect was visible for Facebook liking itself. However, it appears that the influence of moral identity outweighs the pattern of slacktivism. Effects on the other two dependent
variables remain absent. In conclusion, liking a charity’s Facebook page may indeed serve as a stepping stone to meaningful support.
Table of contents
Introduction ... 1
Theoretical framework ... 5
Inconsistent moral behavior ... 6
Moral balancing ... 6
Perceived visibility of Facebook liking ... 10
Consistent moral behavior ... 12
Method ... 14 Measures ... 15 Independent measures. ... 15 Dependent measures. ... 16 Moderators. ... 17 Control variables ... 19 Results ... 20
Effects of Facebook liking and its interaction with moral identity and perceived visibility ... 21
Effects of feelings and beliefs derived from Facebook liking ... 23
Discussion ... 24
References ... 30
1 Introduction
Social media has become part of the daily routines for many Dutch citizens. Nine of ten individuals are active users on one or multiple social media platforms. Facebook, one of the biggest and most often used platforms, contains 9.6 million accounts and has 6.8 million daily users (Oosterveer, 2016). Besides its interpersonal communicative function, platforms like Facebook are often being used for the purpose of civic engagement and social action as well (Warren, Sulaiman, & Jaafar, 2015). Being a good cause or charity organization, it seems sensible to go where you target group goes to expand your public and improve your relationship with them. Practitioners more and more attach value to social media tools and use them to reach organizational goals (Curtis et al., 2010). Several benefits arising from the use of social media have been mentioned, such as the easy and costless spreading of information, heightened exposure and possibilities to rich interaction with target groups (Jones, 2015; Marinov & Schimmelfennig, 2015). However, many non-profit organizations do not take advantage of the possibilities offered by platforms. One explanation for this is the lack of knowledge about the actual influence of connecting to a target audience through Facebook compared to traditional marketing and communication practices (Waters, Burnett, Lamm, & Lucas, 2009) or simply the lack of time and skills to sustain social media channels (Melki & Mallat, 2014). On the side of the consumer, engaging in charity ‘support’ has become increasingly easy with the rise of the internet and social media. The research of Jeong and Lee (2013), for example, shows that individuals are more likely to have the intention to support a cause when exposed to a cause’s page on a social networking site (i.e., support through liking or sharing) compared to a cause’s website (i.e., support through subscribing for a newsletter, signing a petition, donating money). Liking a Facebook page of an organization implies that one subscribes as a fan of the page. The
2 act of liking can therefore be understood as a form of token support for the particular
organization, which is defined as affiliating with a cause at low cost and/or low effort
(Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014). Other more traditional examples of token support are for instance signing a petition, or supporting a cause by wearing a pin or bracelet. Affiliation with a cause that requires higher costs, effort, or behavior change, such as donations or voluntary work, is defined as meaningful support (Kristofferson et al., 2014).
Several authors have raised questions about the consequence of such token support for the expression of meaningful support to the charity organization (e.g., monetary donations) as people may feel less obligated to donate after, for example, signing a petition (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013; Skoric, 2012). Concerns about the postulated negative effect of token support on the extent to which people engage in meaningful support makes that token support is often referred to as slacktivism; a contraction of the words slacker and activism. The term is therefore often used with a negative connotation, to describe those who only engage in feel-good, low-effort activism without actual impact.
Despite these concerns, few studies have been performed to investigate the actual influence of token support on subsequent meaningful support for charity organizations or good causes, such as monetary donations (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Kristofferson et al. (2014) analyzed several traditional types of token support (e.g.., wearing a poppy pin, signing a petition) and found no increase in people’s willingness to provide subsequent
meaningful support. Lee and Hsieh (2013), on the contrary, did find a positive effect of signing a petition on the likelihood of participation in subsequent action. Much discussed theoretical explanations for either negative or positive effects of token support on meaningful support are moral balancing (Khan & Dhar, 2006) on the one hand, and consistency processes (Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1962)on the other hand. While the first describes the balancing of moral behavior over
3 time, which implies that after a doing a good deed an individual feels licensed to behave less moral, the latter highlights people’s psychological need for consistency which makes it more likely that after engaging in token support, meaningful support will also be provided. Another explanation offered for the negative relationship between token support and meaningful support is based on impression management processes (Jeong & Lee, 2013; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). A critical factor here is the extent to which the initial token support is visible to others
(Kristofferson et al., 2014). People may want to come across as a moral person, which can be done through engaging in overt token support. As a result, one may feel less inclined to also provide meaningful support.
With regard token support on social media specifically, studies focused on the effect of joining Facebook group (Kristofferson et al., 2014), displaying a logo in one’s profile picture (Vie, 2014) or sharing a video (Jones, 2015). The effect of Facebook liking as a form of token support is still unclear and not yet investigated using intentions to provide meaningful support as a dependent variable. Vie (2014) and Jones (2015) discovered that social media token support can stimulate people’s positive thinking about a cause or organization (which may ultimately lead to further support), and Kristofferson et al. (2014) only studied the difference between joining either a private or public Facebook group on donating money.
As research on both traditional and social media forms of token support is still limited and produced diverse results (Jones, 2015; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013; Vie, 2014), the main focus in this master’s thesis will be on the effect of token support in the form of
Facebook liking on intentions to engage in meaningful support. Since both volunteerism and monetary donations are viewed as essential for reaching a charity’s goals (Peloza & Hassay, 2007), the influence of Facebook liking on several dependent variables measuring an overarching concept of meaningful support will be tested. The following research question has been posited:
4 RQ: What effect does liking a charity organization’s Facebook page (engaging in token
support) have on intentions to engage in meaningful support?
The possible consequences of engaging in token support are most interesting to study. Does the liking of a good cause or charity organization on Facebook really “alienate people from taking to the streets with banners and slogans” (Eranti & Lonkila, 2015) (i.e., decrease in meaningful support) and therefore actively damage organizations’ ability to achieve their strategic objectives (Jones, 2015), or could online engagement with such causes potentially lead to increased
awareness and interest regarding a certain topic (Skoric, 2012)? More importantly, what does the act of liking a Facebook page mean for recruitment of volunteers and monetary donations? The present study will expand existing knowledge by investigating the relationship between token and meaningful support in further depth, building upon moral balancing, impression management and consistency perspectives (Jeong & Lee, 2013; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Specifically, token support will be explored in the form of Facebook liking.
The outcome of the present research can be of great value for practice. The fact that the like-function on Facebook is used so often (Eranti & Lonkila, 2015) makes it interesting to investigate the consequences for meaningful support. In case token support for charities turns out to have a negative effect on the public’s engagement in meaningful support (i.e., appearance of slacktivism), this could have serious consequences for the development of an organization’s marketing goals. Satisfying people’s inner urge to support a cause or take action may thus harm ‘real’ action. In contrast, participation on social media may open possibilities for charity
organizations as getting people to like your Facebook page and inform them about the work you do is only the first step in retrieving monetary donations or other meaningful support. Therefore, the present research contributes to managing the expectations that charity organizations might have from investing in social media, Facebook in particular. Strategically, the outcomes could
5 assist practitioners in deciding how to utilize social media for communication or marketing
objectives.
Theoretical framework
Although ‘slacktivist’ activism suffers a lot of criticism (Morozov, 2009; Skoric, 2012), the influence of liking a charity’s Facebook page on subsequent meaningful support for the
organization is still unclear. Behavioral choices are, other than considering the costs and benefits of the particular behavior, often based on earlier behaviors or choices (Khan & Dhar, 2006). Whenever a previous behavior, which can be both positive as well as negative, is perceived relevant for a subsequent decision, it may influence the outcome behavior (Mullen & Monin, 2016). The initial behavior is then set as a reference or anchor point. The following of earlier choices may also appear unconsciously (Khan & Dhar, 2006). The outcome behavior can be influenced by the initial behavior in different ways; it can potentially be consistent or inconsistent on both positive or negative ends.
These two alternatives have been developed into different perspectives regarding the performance of moral behavior, namely 1) inconsistency of moral behavior over time and 2) consistency of moral behavior over time. In the first case, liking a charity organization on Facebook would result in a decreased willingness to dedicate significant cost or effort to the cause (Christensen, 2011; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Skoric, 2012), which can be substantiated with theory about moral balancing (Khan & Dhar, 2006; Meijers, Verlegh, Noordewier, & Smit, 2015) and impression management (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Jeong & Lee, 2013; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). In the second case, theory on psychological consistency (Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1962) suggests a positive relationship between the provision of token support and subsequent
6 meaningful support (Kristofferson et al., 2014; Lee & Hsieh, 2013). These two lines of reasoning will be discussed in further depth.
Inconsistent moral behavior
Morozov (2009) was one of the first to publicly express his worries about online token support as a precursor of slacktivism, since it may eventually lead to a decrease in actual meaningful
support. Different processes have been put forward as an explanation of this negative effect, amongst which theory on moral balancing and impression management motives are most often investigated.
Moral balancing. Moral balancing posits the ‘balancing’ of behaviors and can appear in two directions: moral licensing and moral cleansing. Lee and Hsieh (2013) described moral cleansing as follows: “If the individual performed an unethical deed in the past, the individual will feel that he or she needs to make up for the bad deed by performing more ethical choices” (p. 813). Moral licensing implies the opposite: when a person engaged in ethical behavior, he or she will subsequently feel as if he or she is ‘licensed’ to engage in less ethical behavior.
Evidence for moral balancing processes has been found in different domains (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010), for instance political correctness (Monin & Miller, 2001), consumption choices (Khan & Dhar, 2006), environmental friendly behavior (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), and donation behavior (Khan & Dhar, 2006; Krishna, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Khan and Dhar (2006) showed that boosting one’s self-concept through a first task (i.e., giving participants the opportunity to appear altruistic by engaging in a charitable act) leads to a licensing effect in the subsequent choice for either a utilitarian or a luxury item. That is, by ‘doing good’ at first, participants are more likely to choose a luxury item. In an additional study, they show that donations to charity among those in the licensing condition are lower compared to
7 participants in the control condition. The effect of doing a good or moral deed on subsequent behavior is confirmed by Mazar and Zhong (2010). The purchase of a green product (‘green consumerism’) was found to induce licensing effects and even lead to immoral and unethical behaviors. Krishna (2011) found that charitable donations decreased among people who purchased a cause marketing product (i.e., a product with which you support the organization), even if this product is perceived as costless to the consumer (i.e., he or she would have purchased the product without a connection to the cause as well). Since consumers perceive their purchase as a charitable gift they feel less obliged to donate money. Meijers et al. (2015) showed that donating money to charity result decreased intentions to behave environmentally friendly. Furthermore, the meta-analysis of Blanken, Van de Ven, and Zeelenberg (2015), containing 91 comparisons between a moral licensing and control condition, produced small to medium moral licensing effect.
The discussed results suggest that behavior indeed follows prior decisions or acts and that individuals tend to balance their moral behavior on a scale from positive to negative. In the context of the present research, the discussed results imply that someone who liked the Facebook page of a charity organization may display a decreased intention to provide meaningful support (e.g., monetary donation). This leads us to the following hypothesis:
H1: Liking the Facebook page of a charity organization decreases the intention to engage
in subsequent meaningful support for a charity organization.
Khan and Dhar (2006) find that the effect of a first virtuous act on a subsequent behavior is explained by a boost in the relevant concept triggered by the first act. Negative
self-attributions that rise from a purchase of luxury products may be difficult to justify and therefore produce feelings of guilt. Having participants feel that they have done a ‘good’ deed reduces negative self-attributions otherwise related to buying a luxury product (i.e., the outcome
8 behavior). In case of an outcome behavior related to good causes or moral behavior, people generally hesitate to act immoral because they fear feeling or appearing immoral. However, people may feel more ‘deserving’ after a ‘good’ decision that was made before and thus an immoral decision is ‘justified’ by reflecting on the earlier behavior (Merritt et al., 2010).
One of the main critiques of token support is that it enhances the feel-good factor of those that participate in it (Christensen, 2011; Skoric, 2012). The reason why people may not engage in further meaningful support may thus depend on different feelings or thoughts they derive from liking a Facebook page. Several researchers mention the feeling of warm-glow resulting from behaving pro-socially (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Ferguson, Taylor, Keatley, Flynn, & Lawrence, 2012; Konow, 2006, 2010), which implies that the supporter derives a pleasurable feeling from supporting another, or, in this case, an organization. This is often seen as impure altruism as this is a seemingly selfish motive to support a charity (Andreoni, 1989; Konow, 2006). Crumpler and Grossman (2008) provided a direct test of warm-glow feelings and found that these feelings predict a substantial proportion of monetary giving. Also, the motivation to donate blood is strongly related to the expected warm-glow feelings derived from the behavior (Ferguson et al., 2012). Feelings of warm-glow may be a critical factor which explains the moral balancing phenomenon; feeling as if one has done a good deed ‘legitimizes’ the individual to not engage subsequent pro-social behavior.
In addition to an expected internal feeling of warm-glow, which is an affective state that may be derived from doing good, supporting a charity could also be motivated by more cognitive or rational processes. Pure altruism is defined as an act of giving that is not motivated by any social norms or conditions, but from the realization that one is able to help and in the opportunity to contribute to other people’s well-being in a positive manner (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Konow, 2006; Meier, 2006). It seems plausible that after expression of support, this may result in people’s
9 thinking that one has made a meaningful contribution to the cause since contributing to another one’s well-being was the motive for giving in the first place. As a result, the individual may feel licensed to not donate money (i.e., provide meaningful support) because a contribution has already been made. However, in case an individual does not feel as if he or she is contributing to the cause, he or she may still be inclined to donate or volunteer since a desire to help remains. As such, engaging in meaningful support may depend on the extent to which beliefs of contribution are derived from liking a charity’s Facebook page.
Warm-glow feelings (i.e., the supporter’s internal pleasurable feeling derived from supporting) and contribution beliefs (i.e., the supporter believes that he or she contributed to the charity) may be motives to like the Facebook page in the first place, but, if also resulting from liking a good cause on Facebook, may also have an effect on providing subsequent meaningful support. The research of Konow (2006) suggested that overall giving is not motivated by the expected warm-glow or pure altruism alone, but a combination of the two. Measuring both feelings of warm-glow as well as contribution beliefs may therefore present a more complete picture of the effect of derived feelings and thoughts on the intention to provide meaningful support. As such, the following two hypotheses have been posited:
H2: The more an individual feels as if he or she has done something good (warm-glow
feelings) after ‘liking’ a charity’s Facebook page, the lower the intention to engage in
meaningful support.
H3: The more an individual believes as if he or she made a contribution to the charity
after liking a charity’s Facebook page, the lower the intention to engage in meaningful
10 Perceived visibility of Facebook liking. Another explanation of the hypothesized decrease in intention is based on impression management theory (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). People often base their behavior on what they would like others to think of them (Goffman, 1959). That is, they try to ‘manage’ the impressions others form of them. Whether an individual engages in impression management depends heavily on the situation’s visibility for others; which makes the publicity of one’s behavior a crucial factor for managing expressions. The more public one’s behavior, the more likely it is that an individual adjusts his or her behavior to potential
expectations of the public, since concerns about how one is perceived by the audience are bigger (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).
The impression that is being managed by the performer is often idealized (Goffman, 1959). That is, people seek to claim attributes or characteristics based on a desired ‘self’ or identity, and the norms and values of the audience. Prosocial behavior, for example, is often seen as a ‘good thing’. Behaviors that are labeled as ‘good’ are used for signaling to others that one is being a good person, possessing the traits that are perceived important by the public (Ariely et al., 2009). Engaging in such ‘good’ behaviors in public may thus be used for impression
management. The assumption that people want others to know about their support or donation was already made by Glazer and Konrad (1996). Ariely et al. (2009) and Kristofferson et al. (2014) provide examples of studies that showed the increase of prosocial activity when this is displayed in public compared to private circumstances.
Social network sites offer great possibilities to present oneself to others (Eranti & Lonkila, 2015; Hunt, Atkin, & Krishnan, 2012; Krämer & Winter, 2008; Rosenberg & Egbert, 2011). Jeong and Lee (2013) found that the opportunity to join a cause on Facebook (i.e., liking a page) generates higher intentions to join (e.g., subscribe for a mailing list) compared to a regular website and that perceived visibility of behavior served as a mediator of this effect. As they
11 conclude: “[..] the opportunity to convey an individual’s desired image to fiends can be a strong motivator for joining a cause on SNSs” (p. 451).
Although the perceived visibility of behavior may be a key factor in people’s choice whether to like a charity organization on Facebook or not (Jeong & Lee, 2013), it may also influence future decisions concerning the provision of subsequent meaningful support for the charity (Kristofferson et al., 2014). Kristofferson et al. (2014) stated that “when an initial act of token support is made in a setting that is high in social observability, consumers will be less likely to help in response to a more meaningful follow-up request than when the initial act of token support is made in a setting that is low in social observability” (p. 1150). They showed that impression management motives automatically become activated in support situations high in social observability. When these motives are fulfilled through engaging in token support, the individual will not be motivated anymore to engage in meaningful support as well. From the reasoning and outcomes of Kristofferson et al. (2014) can be inferred that although fulfilled impression management motives may be the direct reason for not displaying subsequent meaningful behavior, this process is stimulated by the visibility of token support for others.
Since Facebook is a platform high in social observability already, based on above reasoning and results one would expect that intentions to provide meaningful support decrease after liking a charity’s Facebook page. Although Facebook is regarded as a platform high in social observability (Eranti & Lonkila, 2015), users have the possibility to adjust their visibility settings for managing if and who will be exposed one’s Facebook activity. Therefore, the concept will be measured as the perceived visibility of Facebook liking. The fourth hypothesis reads:
H4: The more liking behavior on Facebook is perceived as visible for others, the lower
12 Consistent moral behavior
Engaging in token support has also been seen as a good and fruitful behavior by supporters of slacktivism (Skoric, 2012; Vie, 2014). Liking a charity organization or a good cause on Facebook is, for example, perceived as ‘one step in the right direction’ (i.e., this might lead to meaningful contribution to the organization). The phenomenon of moral balancing has been remarked as being at odds with psychological findings concerning consistency in behavior by multiple researchers (e.g., Blanken et al., 2015; Merritt et al., 2010).
People’s desire for consistency is being discussed in, for example, the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) and the self-perception theory (Bem, 1972). According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), people strive to keep their beliefs, attitudes and
behaviors consistent with each other. Whenever this is not the case, people may feel
uncomfortable. Self-perception theory, in turn, describes the way people define their beliefs and attitudes by observing their own overt behavior. Whenever people perceive themselves as being moral through looking back on their previous actions, they tend to uphold this self-conception. That is, they do not want to violate their sense of self, which makes engaging in moral behavior again more likely.
Evidence of consistency patterns in people’s behavior has been found in the field of prosocial behavior.A much cited example of people’s tendency to behave consistently is the traditional foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). Whenever a person performed a small helpful act, he or she will be more likely to engage in subsequent helping behavior (Lee & Hsieh, 2013). Although the study of Freedman and Fraser (1966) contained explicit requests for support, consistency patterns also appear to hold when measuring people’s own initiative or past behavior. For instance, Thøgersen (2004) investigated people’s daily environmentally
13 shaping behavioral patterns” (p. 101). Jones (2015) found that people that were more willing to share a video to help a cause, were also more willing find out more about the organization. By presenting evidence of the relationship between willing to find out more and willing to provide meaningful support she presented her results as being confirmatory for the consistency line of thought. Kristofferson et al. (2014) showed an increase in meaningful support after the provision of token support, but only in private situations. Yet, from the study Lee and Hsieh (2013) appears that signing a petition increases the likelihood of participation in subsequent action.
The fifth hypothesis has been formulated as follows:
H5: Liking a charity’s Facebook page increases the intention to engage in subsequent
meaningful support for a charity organization.
A concept that provides an explanation for consistency patterns in moral behavior specifically is moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1983). Moral identity is considered as having a significant influence on moral behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and is defined as “a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1424). This definition of the moral self regulates and motivates moral actions and behavior. The extent in which the ‘self’ is centered around these moral traits determines to what extent this actually influences one’s moral actions. People that have a stronger moral identity will show these traits in a broader range of situations. Also, the more morality is central to one’s self, the more people are motivated to act consistent with that view of themselves (Blasi, 1983; Hardy & Carlo, 2005). This is highlighted by Shao et al. (2008) as well: “[..] a person’s moral identity can occupy different levels of importance within a person’s overall definition” and “the motivational potency of moral identity arises from the human desire for self-consistency” (p. 518).
14 Shao et al. (2008) and Hardy and Carlo (2005) both provided an overview of moral
identity research, however there are only a few studies that empirically investigated the influence of moral identity on moral behavior. Aquino and Reed (2002), for example, showed that students who have a strong internalized moral identity are more willing to donate food compared to students who do not have a strong internalized moral identity. Also, people with a strong moral identity also scored higher on a self-report scale measuring volunteerism. Reed and Aquino (2003) showed that a strong moral identity ‘expand’ people’s circle of morality to outgroups. Participants stronger in moral identity felt a greater moral obligation to show concerns for outgroups, evaluated a relief effort to outgroups as more favorable, and were more likely to donate money to outgroups.
In sum, the more important it is to act moral for the development and preservation of one’s identity, the more likely it is that the individual will act consistently with what one’s identity is supposed to be. Based on the previously discussed results, it seems plausible that the strength of one’s moral identity influences the relationship between Facebook liking and subsequent meaningful support. Specifically, it is hypothesized that a strong moral identity will strengthen the consistency pattern described in hypothesis 6:
H6: The stronger one’s moral identity, the higher the intention to engage in meaningful
support after liking a charity’s Facebook page.
Method
To investigate the research questions and test the proposed hypotheses, online survey research has been conducted. As charity organizations seem to have difficulties getting younger age groups (i.e., below 35 years) to donate money, Facebook seems to be a suitable channel for reaching them in the first place as they prefer supporting a charity through the internet (Depew,
15 2016; Srebro, 2015). Therefore, data has been collected especially among people between 18 and 35 years old, in the possession of a Facebook account. A convenience sample was taken from the social circles of the researcher in May and June 2016.
After survey development, the survey was first reviewed by six individuals from the social circles of the researcher for detecting possible mistakes or ambiguities regarding language, interpretation and survey flow. The revised survey was distributed by means of Facebook itself and e-mail. Before starting the survey, participants were informed about the subject and length of the survey, and assured that participation was completely anonymous and voluntary. To continue, participants were asked to confirm that they were aware of and understood these terms of
participation and the possibility to withdraw at any moment.
Data was collected from 241 participants. Only six people in the database did not possess a Facebook account, and were therefore excluded from further analyses. Analyses were
conducted with a remaining sample of N = 235 (male = 61). Their age ranged from 18 to 80 (M = 27.6; SD = 10.7), which means that a vast majority of the data (83.8%) was collected from people that fall within the target group. Most participants were higher educated (61.7%), which includes degrees from the Dutch higher education (i.e., HBO) and scientific education (i.e., WO) system. More than half of the participants earned a net salary of €0,- to €10.000,- a year (56.6%). 83% of them used Facebook multiple times per day. 150 participants (63.8%) had ever liked a charity’s Facebook page, and 130 of them (55.3%) had liked a page in the past two years.
Measures
Independent measures.
Past liking behavior. Participants were asked to indicate whether they liked a charity
16 were developed for the purpose of ruling out any different effects between liking activities that may have happened in the relatively recent or distinct past. Since was a large overlap between participants that liked a charity in the past and in the last two years (86.7%), only the item measuring if one had ever liked a page was included was used in the analyses. Past liking behavior is the independent variable in the present research and was computed as having two
categories, namely people that never liked a charity’s Facebook page before (n = 85, 36.2%) and people that liked a charity’s Facebook page before (n = 150, 63.8%).
If participants indicated that they had liked a charity organization on Facebook in the last two years, a list of fifteen charity organizations was provided. Participants could choose one or more organizations, or fill in an organization of their choice. The fifteen organizations displayed were selected from the list of Goede Doelen Nederland, a branch organization with more than 130 member organizations. The selected organizations are all well-known organizations that actively use their Facebook page. The four different working areas (international aid; health; nature, environment and animals; well-being and culture) distinguished by Goede Doelen Nederland were represented in the list used in the survey. See Appendix A, question two to five for the full question set regarding past Facebook liking behavior.
Dependent measures.
Intention. As people’s willingness to support a charity organization tends to vary
dependent on the type of support (Desmet, 1999; L. Lee, Piliavin, & Call, 1999), three separate measures were included in the survey. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed to the following statement, using a 7-point Likert scale, for measuring intention to make a one-off donation (M = 3.03, SD = 1.62), intention to make a monthly donation (M = 1.97, SD = 1.22), and intention to subscribe for voluntary work (M = 2.38, SD = 1.35): “When I get the opportunity
17 after filling out this survey, I am planning to [make a one-off/monthly donation; subscribe for voluntary work] to a charity organization” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The measure is based on the intention measure used by Oosterhof, Heuvelman, and Peters (2009). To reliably assess to what extent people intended to actually perform the behavior and reduce the risk of them answering the question socially desirable, a time indication (i.e., after filling out the survey) was added to the item. Also, participants’ thinking of a potential support opportunity after the survey was stimulated to measure their intentions more accurate. If participants scored four or higher on the scale, they were presented the same list of fifteen charities and were asked to indicate the charity (or multiple charities) they would support. A possibility for filling out the organization of one’s choice was also available. For the full question set regarding intentions for meaningful support, see Appendix A, question fourteen to nineteen.
Moderators.
Feelings of warm-glow. Feelings of warm-glow derived from liking a charity on
Facebook were measured with two items on a 7-point Likert scale, based on the research of Ferguson et al. (2012). The items read: “Liking a charity organization on Facebook makes me feel satisfied” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) and “Liking a charity organization on Facebook makes me feel like doing something good” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) and were strongly correlated, r = .80, p < .001. The two items were used to construct the scale warm-glow as the mean of the selected items (M = 3.68; SD = 1.57).
Contribution beliefs. Four items were constructed to measure the beliefs about
participants’ contribution to the charity organization through liking on Facebook. The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. As a scale had not been constructed for the concept before, the items are based on thorough thinking about thoughts people may derive after contributing to
18 an organization. An example item is “Through liking a charity organization on Facebook, I
contribute to reaching the charities goals” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). All items can be found in Appendix A, question 21. Principal component analysis showed that the four items used represent an uni-dimensional construct. Based on the eigenvalue greater than one criterion and the point of inflexion of the scree plot, one component was extracted (eigenvalue 1.96). The component explained 49.00% of the variance. Based on reliability analysis, the second item was deleted from the set. The scale was found to be moderately reliable, Cronbach’s α = .69, and the variable contribution was computed as the mean of the selected items (M = 4.75; SD = 1.04).
Perceived visibility. For measuring whether the effect of token support on meaningful
support differs between more or less socially observable situations, a measure for perceived visibility of Facebook liking was included in the survey (M = 5.20; SD = 1.32). The item was based on a similar measure of Jeong and Lee (2013), and reads; “To what extent do you think that ‘liking’ a Facebook page is visible for other users?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Moral identity. The moral identity scale was directly derived from the moral identity
internalization scale of Aquino and Reed (2002). A total of five items (see Appendix A, question 23) on a 7-point Likert scale was included in the survey. Participants were exposed to a series of personal characteristics that are typical for someone high in moral identity (e.g., caring, helpful, friendly; see Appendix A, question 23 for full list) and asked to imagine what a person with these characteristics would feel, think and how he or she would act. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate statements such as “It would make me feel good to be a person with these
characteristics” (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Two items were measured reversed, and were recoded before conducting factor analysis and reliability analysis. Principal component analysis was conducted using the five items measuring moral identity. One factor was extracted
19 using the eigenvalues greater than one and the point of inflexion of the scree plot (eigenvalue 2.09), and explained 41.80% of the variance. Reliability analysis was conducted with all five items. The third item (“I would be ashamed if I possessed these characteristics”) was deleted to increase Cronbach’s α = .62 to Cronbach’s α = .66, which represents a moderately reliable scale. The remaining four items were computed into the variable moral identity (M = 5.30; SD = .81).
Control variables. Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, income and level of education (see Appendix A, question 45 to 48). Additionally, the following two control
variables were included in the survey.
Involvement with charity organizations. Previous research indicated that involvement
with a particular cause influences an individual’s intention to provide support (Bennett, 2003; Jeong & Lee, 2013). Involvement with charity organizations was measured using three items on a 7-point scale (e.g., “Charity organizations are important/unimportant to me; see Appendix A, question 22 for all items), derived from Jeong and Lee (2013). Using principal component analysis, one factor was extracted from the items that were used to measure the involvement variable. One component was observed using the eigenvalues over one criterion and point of inflexion of the scree plot (eigenvalue 2.20), and explained 73.36% of the variance. The three items measuring involvement with charities were found to form a reliable scale, α = .81, and as such computed into the variable involvement (M = 4.79; SD = 1.19).
Past meaningful support. Participants were asked if they donated money to or engaged in
voluntary work for a charity organization in the past and in the last two years. Again, two separate measures were developed to take into consideration that support expressed in the relatively distinct past could have a different effect compared to support in the recent past. If participants indicated that they engaged in meaningful support, a same list of fifteen charity
20 organizations was provided, of which participants could choose one or more organizations or fill out the organization of their choice. The questions regarding past meaningful support can be found in Appendix A, question six to thirteen.
Results
Based on contradictory results from earlier research, the influence of liking a charity’s Facebook page on one’s intention to engage in meaningful support was described in two opposing
hypotheses (i.e., hypothesis 1 and 5 respectively). On the one hand, it was expected that the liking of a charity’s Facebook page would lead to lower intentions to provide meaningful support, while this relationship may also be positive and as such leading to higher intentions. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that perceived visibility would strengthen a negative relationship between Facebook liking and intentions to provide meaningful support, while moral identity would strengthen a positive relationship. Lastly, feelings of warm-glow and contribution beliefs derived from Facebook liking were hypothesized to have a positive effect on intentions to provide
meaningful support.
A series of regression analyses using the full sample was conducted to investigate the effect of Facebook liking, moral identity, and perceived visibility, and interaction terms between either of those and Facebook liking (hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 6), on the dependent variables intention to make a one-off donation, make a monetary donation, and subscribe for voluntary work. To test whether feelings derived from Facebook liking have an effect on meaningful support (hypotheses 2 and 3), separate regression analyses were conducted using feelings of warm-glow and contribution beliefs as independent variables and the three measures of
meaningful support as dependent variables. Involvement, past donation behavior, age and gender were included as control variables in all regression analyses. Table 1 and 2 show the hierarchical
21 regression analyses for the three dependent variables capturing meaningful support, namely intention to make a one-off donation, intention to make a monthly donation, and intention to subscribe for voluntary work.
Effects of Facebook liking and its interaction with moral identity and perceived visibility Step 2 of each analysis in table 1 displays the effect of liking a charity on Facebook on the intention to provide meaningful support. Regression models for all three dependent variables were significant at this stage of the analysis; F(5, 234) = 2.64, p = .024, R2 = .05; F(5, 234) = 6.66, p < .001, R2 = .13; and F(5, 234) = 3.01, p = .013, R2 = .06, for intention to donate one-off, donate monthly and volunteer respectively. For both intentions to donate one-off and monthly, Facebook liking appears to be a positive predictor, b* = .14, t = 2.04, p = .041, 95% CI [0.18, 0.90] and b* = .13, t = 1.98, p = .049, 95% CI [0.00, 0.64] respectively. A significant effect remains absent for intentions to volunteer, b* = .06, t = .90, p = .369, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.53].
Adding the main effects of moderator variables moral identity and perceived visibility to the model led to an insignificant model for outcome variable intention to make a one-off
donation, F(7, 234) = 2.04, p = .051. With respect to intentions to make a monthly donation, the effect of Facebook disappeared, b* = .11, t = 1.71, p = .088 while the model remained significant, F(7, 234) = 5.05, p < .001, and explained 14% of the variance in the outcome variable (R2 = .14).
Introduction of the interaction terms of moral identity and perceived visibility with Facebook liking in step 4 produced changes in both models. With regard to intention to make a one-off donation, the model became significant again, F(9, 234) = 1.95, p = .047, which
explained 7% of the variance in the outcome variable, R2 = .07. Looking at the coefficients, the main effect of liking disappeared, b* = -.59, t = -1.19, p = .234, 95% CI [-5.27, 1.29] presumably as a result of the inclusion of the liking and moral identity interaction term. Although, the
22 interaction variable approached significance, b* = .77, t = 1.77, p = .078, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.98] only the constant in the model remained of significant influence in the final model. Neither the variable perceived visibility nor as its interaction with liking did produce any significant effects.
In contrast to intention to donate one-off, adding the interaction coefficients produced a significant change in the final model of intention to donate monthly, F(9, 234) = 4.85, p < .001, R2 = .16. By adding these variables, the explained variance in intention increased with 3%. Although the main effect of Facebook liking turns significant again, the effect suddenly becomes negative, b* = -1.02, t = -2.15, p = .032, 95% CI [-4.92, -0.22] which means that liking a charity on Facebook leads to less intention to make a monthly donation. The interaction term of
Facebook liking and moral identity has a positive effect on the outcome variable, b* = 1.12, t = 2.72, p = .007, 95% CI [0.14, 0.88]. The higher one’s moral identity, the higher his or her intentions will be to make a monthly donation when having liked a charity on Facebook. An effect of perceived visibility or its interaction with Facebook liking remains absent.
Adding the moderating variables to the model of intention to volunteer led to an
insignificant model, F(9, 234) = 1.82, p = .065, R2 = .07. From the data presented in table 1 can be concluded that none of the variables inserted in step 2, 3 and 4 have an impact on the outcome variable.
From the discussed results can be inferred that liking a charity on Facebook can lead to a change in intentions to provide meaningful support. For intentions to donate one-off holds that Facebook liking produced an effect until the interaction term between liking and moral identity was inserted. Although this term turned out to only approach significance, the positive main effect of Facebook liking fully disappeared. None of the hypotheses 1, 4, 5 and 6 is therefore accepted for intention to make a one-off donation as dependent variable. A comparable pattern appeared in the model using intentions to donate monthly as the outcome variable. Facebook
23 liking seemed to have a positive effect in step 2, yet this effect turned over to a significant
negative effect in step 4. These results partially (since only for one dependent variable) confirm hypothesis one. The interaction of Facebook liking and moral identity, however, produced a significant effect. The stronger an individual’s moral intention, the higher his or her intention to make a monthly donation when having liked a charity’s Facebook page. Hypothesis 6 can therefore be accepted for the specific intention to donate money on a monthly basis. Perceived visibility had no significant influence in any of the two models, which means that hypotheses 4 can be rejected. None of the variables showed a significant effect on intention to subscribe as volunteer; hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 6 can be rejected with regard to this specific dependent variable.
[Insert table 1 here]
Effects of feelings and beliefs derived from Facebook liking
Table 2 displays the effects of feelings of warm-glow and contribution beliefs on intentions to provide meaningful support. Only likers were taken into account for these analyses. The model predicting intention to make a one-off donation by feelings of warm-glow and contribution was insignificant, F(6, 161) = 1.55, p = .165, R2 = .04, and hence we will not interpret the model further. The model using intention to make a monthly donation as outcome variable was significant, F(6, 161) = 4.69, p < .001, and explained 15.4% of the variance in the outcome variable, R2 = .15. No main effects were observed apart from involvement with charities, b* - .25, t = 3.20, p = .002, 95% CI [0.10, 0.44] which was inserted as a control variable. Although
correlation analysis showed a weak but positive relationship with intention to make a monthly donation, r = .25, p = .002, contribution beliefs had no significant effect in the model, b* = .15, t = 1.71, p = .090, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.40]. With regard to intention to subscribe as volunteer, the
24 model became insignificant after adding the warm-glow and contribution variables, F(6, 161) = 1.69, p = .127, R2 = .06. The first, significant model, F(4, 161) = 2.57, p = .040, which explained 6% of the variance, both involvement with charities and age played a significant role, with b* = .17, t = 2.18, p = .031, 95% CI [0.02, 0.38], and b* = -.18, t = -2.32, p = .022, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.63] respectively.
From these analysis can be concluded that neither warm-glow feelings nor feelings of contribution derived from liking a charity organization on Facebook predict intentions to provide meaningful support. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected.
[Insert table 2 here]
Discussion
Liking a charity organization’s Facebook page does influence people’s intentions to subsequently engage in meaningful support, however only intentions to make a monthly donation. Facebook liking in itself decreases the extent to which people have the intention to donate (hypothesis 1). However, the effect of liking also depends on the strength of the liker’s moral identity. The higher one’s moral identity, the more likely it is that he or she intends to donate money to a charity (hypothesis 6). As such, both balancing and, for those possessing a strong moral identity, consistency effects were observed in the present study.
The negative relationship between Facebook liking and intentions to make a monthly donation corresponds to outcomes of studies testing the moral balancing phenomenon (Khan & Dhar, 2006; Krishna, 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Meijers et al., 2015), although no clear explanation for this effect can be given on the basis of the present study. Enhanced warm-glow feelings and beliefs that one contributed to the charity’s goal (Crumpler & Grossman, 2008; Ferguson et al., 2012; Konow, 2006, 2010; Merritt et al., 2010), and perceived visibility of their
25 Facebook behavior (Ariely et al., 2009; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Leary & Kowalski, 1990) did not play a role in this relationship. A consistency pattern in moral behavior is present when the individual has a strong moral identity, as proposed by Aquino and Reed (2002). This means that the liking of a charity on Facebook does lead to increased intentions to make a monthly donation among those that perceive morality as a greater part of their identity. This finding specifically answers Kristofferson et al. (2014), who suggested to investigate the influence of moral identity on the relationship between token support and meaningful support.
In sum, engaging in token support (in this case Facebook liking) can certainly lead to adjusted intentions to engage subsequent meaningful support, but evidence was only found for intentions to make a monthly donation. Regression analyses showed a similar pattern for
intentions to make a one-off donation, yet the interaction term between liking and moral identity only got close to the level of significance. This is rather surprisingly looking at the average income level of participants (i.e., €0.- to €10.000,- net per year), since a one-off donation is relatively low in cost compared to a monthly donation. Also, most people that give money nowadays do this via a one-off donation (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2015). Besides, participants were relatively young (i.e., 27.6 on average). According to Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (2015), people younger than 35 spend the least of their income to donations. A possible explanation of the effect of liking on intentions to make a one-off donation remaining absent, and this effect being present for intentions to make a monthly donation, is that people higher in moral identity may tend to support charities on the long term only, and consistently support the
organization instead of just once. Another possible explanation for the difference between
outcomes of intentions to make a one-off and monthly donation is based on the different role that involvement with charity organizations plays in these two dependent variables. Intentions to make a one-off donation is not influenced by involvement, whereas the concept has as an effect
26 on both intentions to donate monthly and subscribe for voluntary work. This may indicate that making a one-off donation is motivated by different considerations; people may not have an intrinsic motivation to donate (which was tested in the present study) but are, for instance, more inclined to donate when they received an explicit request (cf. foot-in-the-door technique of Freedman & Fraser, 1966). In this case, a different outcome measure may be needed in future research to test the relationship between token and meaningful support.
There was no relationship found between liking and intentions to subscribe for voluntary work. Although voluntary work as a type of meaningful support was never tested in relation to token support, at least we are able to conclude that Facebook liking as a form of token support does not affect intentions to subscribe as a volunteer. Also in this case, people may have different considerations for subscribing as a volunteer compared to donating money. Besides a high level of involvement, which was supported by the present study, doing voluntary work may take a lot of time and effort compared to doing a monetary donation. Research on the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966) suggested that a heightened engagement in follow-up behavior may not occur whenever the two requests are two different in nature or size. One could wonder if liking a charity’s Facebook page would lead to meaningful support or if it is one bridge too far for most people.
The fact that perceived visibility of Facebook liking did not influence intentions to provide meaningful support directly contradicts the outcomes of Kristofferson et al. (2014). On average, people were of the opinion that their liking behavior on Facebook is open for others to see, which, according to Kristofferson et al. (2014), should lead to a decrease in intentions to provide meaningful support. Even though the proposed decrease in intentions is visible, perceived visibility of Facebook liking does not explain this effect. A possible explanation for these differentiating results is the greater time span between token support and possible
27 meaningful support due to the use of survey research. People were asked if they had liked a charity’s Facebook page in the past, whereas Kristofferson et al. (2014) tested people’s provision of meaningful support almost directly after token support was provided.
With respect to charity’s social media objectives, the use of a Facebook page to attract users and expand your public reaps the fruits for meaningful support whenever users possess a strong moral identity. Otherwise, liking of a charity’s Facebook page only produces a counter effect. The negative effect on intentions to donate monthly among those with a relatively weak moral identity should, however, not discourage charity organizations for using Facebook as a means to increase awareness, since the positive effect for those higher in moral identity
counterbalances the negative effect for those lower in moral identity. Also, people relatively high in moral identity are more inclined to like a charity’s Facebook page in the first place. Overall, after liking a charity on Facebook people are more likely to donate money on a monthly basis. The outcomes of the present study should stimulate charity organizations to attract Facebook users and getting them to like the organization’s Facebook page, as this could make a real contribution for the recruitment of donors.
Then, can Facebook liking be seen as a sign of slacktivism because it would lead to less meaningful support? The answer is no. Overall, it can be said that slacktivism does not occur through Facebook liking, as neither positive nor negative effects are found for the totality of forms of meaningful support. For intentions to donate monthly, specifically, the liking of a charity’s Facebook page even leads to increased intentions to engage in meaningful support for those possessing a strong moral identity. Although a negative effect appears for people lower in moral identity, the positive effect overrules the existence of slacktivism. In conclusion, Facebook can indeed serve as a stepping stone to meaningful support and may therefore ultimately
28 Table 1: The influence of liking a charity’s Facebook page and other factors on the intention to provide meaningful support to
charity organizations.
Intention to make one-off donation Intention to make monthly donation Intention to subscribe for voluntary work
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Constant 1.67** 1.60** 1.96* 3.21* -.03 -.08 -.39 1.10 1.50** 1.47** 1.62* 2.13* Involvement with charities .12 .11 1.12 .11 .25*** .24*** .23*** .22** .16* .15* .15* .16* Past donation behavior .11 .11 .11 .10 .07 .07 .07 .06 .05 .05 .05 .04 Age -.01 -.03 -.03 -.02 .13* .11 .11 .12 -.12 -.13 -.13 -.12 Gender .05 .02 .03 .04 .07 .04 .04 .05 .12 .11 .12 .12 FB liking .14* .13 -.59 .13* .11 -1.02* .06 .05 -.25 Moral identity .01 -.11 .08 -.09 .01 -.00 Visibility -.06 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.04 -.12 Liking* Moral identity .77 1.12** .03 Liking* Visibility -.01 .06 .28 R2 .04 .05 .06 .07 .11 .13 .14 .16 .06 .06 .06 .07 F 2.22 2.64* 2.04 1.95* 7.26*** 6.66*** 5.05*** 4.85*** 3.57** 3.01* 2.19* 1.82 ΔR2 .02 .01 .01 .02 .01 .03 .00 .00 .01 ΔF 4.21* .58 1.57 3.91* 1.02 3.70* .81 .20 .55
Note: cell entries are betas from hierarchical regression analyses
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
29 Table 2: The influence of feelings of warm-glow and contribution derived from liking a charity’s Facebook page on the intention to provide meaningful support to charity organizations.
Intention to make one-off donation Intention to make monthly donation Intention to subscribe for voluntary work
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Constant 1.96** 1.35 -.01 -.63 1.98*** 1.96** Involvement with
charities
.14 .12 .28*** .25** .17* .17* Past donation behavior .10 .10 .11 .10 .03 .03
Age .02 .01 .12 .09 -.18* -.18* Gender -.04 -.06 -.03 -.05 .02 .02 Contribution .06 .15 .01 Warm-glow .11 .03 -.00 R2 .04 .06 .13 .15 .06 .06 F 1.51 1.55 5.89*** 4.69*** 2.57* 1.69 ΔR2 .02 .02 .00 ΔF 1.61 2.11 .00
Note: cell entries are betas from hierarchical regression analyses
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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