José Alejandro Marchena 6048269
Masterscriptie Geschiedenis van de Internationale Betrekkingen Docent: Niek Pas
Tweede Lezer: Rimko van der Maar 18800 woorden
French-Argentine Relations between 1964-1981:
INDEX
INTRODUCTION 2
1. 1957-1962 The Third Way and the French Mission. 6 1.1-Troisième voie, Tercera Posición. 6
1.2-The French Mission 1955-1962. 10
2. 1964-1970 The American Challenge and Adapting GR. 14 2.1-AMX 13/30. 16
2.2-OAS, traditionalist Catholics and French Colons. 19 2.3-El Cordobazo: Conclusion of the 60's. 22
3. 1970-1975 Gaullist Pompidou, Perón's last term. 25
3.1-French Business, applying GR, Perón and International Events. 28 3.2-Gérard Pied. 30
4. 1976-1981The Dirty War and French Influence. 35 4.1-Giscard d'Estaing and the End of the Junta. 35
4.2-Human Rights Defenders, Exiles and Island Disputes. 37 CONCLUSION 46
INTRODUCTION
On 18 may 2003, French journalist Marie-Monique Robin interviewed Argentina's last dictatorial president Reynaldo Bignone in Buenos Aires, who ruled the country between July 1982 and December 1983.1 Robin was researching the French army's influence in teaching the Argentine military various counter-insurgency tactics of warfare, the findings of which she would later turn into a documentary and publish through a book. Bignone responded in the affirmative when he was asked about the French military influence in Argentina in the seventies:
Je dirais même que le processus de réorganisation nationale lancé par le gouvernement militaire, en mars 1976, est une copie de la bataille d'Alger. La seule différence, c'est que vous êtes intervenus dans une colonie, tandis que nous, nous l'avons fait dans notre propre pays. Sinon, nous avons tout repris des Français : le quadrillage du territoire, l'importance du renseignement dans ce genre de guerre, les méthodes d'interrogatoire... Il ne faut pas croire, nous avons combattu avec la doctrine et le règlement dans la main...2
This doctrine Bignone spoke of concerns a collection of courses that took place and publications that were spread by a French military mission roughly between 1957 and 1963. Many Argentine historians using Argentine sources claim that this French doctrine of Guerre Révolutionnaire (GR) gave the Argentine army the theoretical basis and practical knowledge to carry out the Dirty War between 1976 and 1983. A look into French diplomatic primary sources will show us in this article that French involvement in the Argentine political crisis in the sixties and seventies ran deeper than just GR. The purpose of this article is to widen our knowledge on French involvement relating to the increased political turmoil in Argentina in the period 1964 and 1983. In this introduction we will discuss the contemporary relevance of the Dirty War, followed by a detailed view of the academic relevance this topic has in our understanding of both French and Argentine history. We can then briefly discuss the historiography of French-Argentine relations concerning the Dirty War and its shortcomings. These shortcomings can guide us into formulating research questions that will be answered in this article. The primary sources used in this article are all found at the French diplomatic archives of La Courneuve in Paris and consist of French embassy and diplomatic documents between Argentina and France. The documents chosen concern embassy issues, migration, foreign policy, Argentine national policy, military and political relations.
To what extent should governments use controversial counterinsurgency techniques in asymmetric warfare? How far must democratic governments go to cooperate with dictatorial regimes in order to defeat a common enemy? These questions are relevant for political scientists and policymakers up 1
Marie-Monique Robin, Escadrons de la Mort, l'École Française (2004) 316.
2 Ibidem, 317.
until today. The recent publication of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Senate Intelligence Committee of the United States has rekindled public attention and disapproval on the use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” or torture in times of war.3 History has taught us that controversial war tactics can have long-lasting consequences. More than thirty years have passed since the end of the Argentine Dirty War in 1983, yet many continue to experience its aftermath up until this day. Various sources give different estimates concerning for example the eventual discovery of mass graves and the number of forced disappearances, ranging from 8.000 to 30.000.4 In contrast, news of the French army's influence in the Dirty War received almost no attention when Robin showed her documentary and published her book detailing her investigation in March 2004. The book she published contains interviews with former soldiers and high-ranking officers that passed through French courses and participated in the Dirty War, all of which corroborate the importance of GR in the Argentine army. She could only comment on the
apathie générale and denial shown by French politicians and the press.5 French officials claimed that Argentine generals would obviously blame the French for the counterinsurgency tactics of the Dirty War in order to avoid personal responsibility. France also took many refugees, and that French officials participating in the Dirty War did this out of personal choice.
French-Argentine relations present a very good example in order to answer the questions mentioned above. A moderate number of Argentine historians such as Daniel Mazzei, Samuel Amaral and most notably Mario Ranalletti have studied the way in which France developed GR and popularized it within the military sphere in Argentina. Their research has contributed firstly to our understanding of decolonization. The aforementioned historians agree on the importance of the French battles in Indochina and Algeria and how French officials tried to clarify the French defeat in these wars.6 These officials and their civil servants, Ranalletti summarizes, combined anti-communism, religion and social sciences in developing the theory of GR and interpreting the many conflicts in the Third World in the fifties.7 In practical terms, French officials such as Roger
Trinquier turned their aim towards conquering the “hearts and minds” and the “complete destruction of the enemy's clandestine activities whose purpose is to impose their will unto the population”.8 Another contribution of the study of GR concerns our understanding of the Cold War and the role of the Third World as the principal region during this period. Some Western historians such as Odd
3 Lee H. Hamilton, 'It's Time to end Torture', Huffington Post (01-14-2015)
4Argentines Argue over how many were Killed by Junta, Latin-American Herald Tribune (accessed 07-01-2015) 5 Robin, Escadrons, 395.
6
S.Amaral, 'Guerra Revolucionaria: de Argelia a la Argentina, 1957-1962', Investigaciones y ensayos, Nr 48 (1998) 175., D. Mazzei, 'La Misión Militar Francesa en la Escuela Superior de Guerra y los Origenes de la Guerra Sucia, 1957-1962', Revista de Ciencias Sociales, Nr 13 (1998) 110. M. Ranalletti, Du Mékong au Río de la Plata. La
Doctrine de la Guerre Révolutionnaire “La Cité Catholique” et leurs Influences en Argentine, 1954-1976 (2006). 53.
7
Ranalletti, Du Mékong. 104.
8 Amaral, 'Guerra', 179.
Arne Westad describe how for most of the Cold War Asia, Africa and Latin-America were at the center of the various conflicts taking place as a consequence of the emergence of new states. This led towards much competition between the two superpowers of the Cold War.9 French-Argentine
historians have shown that smaller western powers such as France also participated in these
conflicts. These researchers have studied the doctrine's spread within the Argentine military and the way in which it contributed to the origins of the Dirty War. Political scientist Gabriel Périès is more concerned with the immediate effects of GR and singles out the “Plan CONINTES” of 1960, created by the Argentine army and put to use by the democratic government of Arturo Frondizi.10 This plan roughly translated to the strategy of military intervention within the country in the event that the state were to collapse because of revolutionary movements. Mazzei claims that the French military mission gave the Argentine military the theoretical, methodological and even semantical tools that guided the Argentine dictatorship in its repressiveness throughout the seventies against potential communists.11
Ranalletti expands on French non-state actors influencing the Argentine military by including French extreme-right organizations. He explains the disrespect of human rights in Argentina not only as a consequence of GR but also as being caused by the effect of the Cité Catholique, which we will expand on later in this article.12 This combination threw the Argentine army into a
“microclimat de psychose anticommuniste” putting them under the impression of carrying out a “Nouvelle Croisade”. Continuing the focus on non-state actors is Ranalletti's analysis of French migration to Argentina in the years of the Algerian Revolution.13 Ranalletti analyses that by 1963, the French and Argentine governments had signed a deal to help with the transfer of a large number of French Pied Noirs to Argentina, though apparently many French paramilitary terrorists managed to take advantage of this deal and the benefits it entailed.
The historiography of the French influence in the Dirty War so far does not to show the reasons for the French government to direct its attention to Latin America and Argentina in particular. Argentine historians have used Argentine sources to study what we can describe as the reception of French influence. The first goal of this article is to show the reasons for French state and non-state
expansion in this region of the world, the strategy France used and the competition it encountered. Some French authors studying French foreign policy such as Frédéric Bozo and Maurice Vaïsse can perhaps give us some clues as to how France became involved in Latin America and Argentina in 9
Odd Arne Westad, 'The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century', in The Cambridge History of
the Cold War. Vol. I Origins. (2010) 10.
10
G. Périès, 'Un Modèle d'Échange Doctrinal Franco-Argentin: Le Plan CONINTES', Armées, Pouvoirs en Amérique Latine (2004) 19-40.
11Mazzei, La Misión, 137. 12Ranalletti, Du Mékong, 507. 13
M. Ranalletti, 'La Guerra de Argelia y la Argentina. Influencia e inmigración Francesa desde 1945', Anuario de
Estudios Americanos 62,2 (2005) 285-308.
particular once Charles de Gaulle and the French presidents thereafter came to power. One could test their arguments of what they would argue to be De Gaulle's third way in Latin America by researching French documents and observing French motives to be involved in Argentina and French competition against the US.
Two other aspects concerning French-Argentine relations need to be expanded on in order to research the French reasons, strategy and competition in Argentina. The first aspect concerns the period being researched. Most researchers of French-Argentine relations only focus on the period between 1957 and 1963, and little else can be found regarding the period thereafter because of American competition. How did De Gaulle, Georges Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing's foreign policies concerning Argentina take form? The second aspect concerns the French actors involved in Argentina. Researchers of French-Argentine relations have primarily focused on the role of French military officials, paramilitary terrorists and traditionalist Catholic Frenchmen active in Argentina. How did French diplomats influence events in the Southern Cone? Were there only paramilitaries and Catholics in Argentina, or can we find other French civilians in the documents?
The goal of this article is research the period between 1964 and 1983, along with the various French actors involved in Argentine political agitation. The first chapter discusses the period
between 1957 and 1962 and introduces most of the historiography that can be found the influence of GR and the French extreme-right. This chapter will merge Argentine historiography with French research on the Troisième Voie. The following three chapters start with a short summary of the historiography concerning French politics in the respective period of the chapter being discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the French primary sources being researched and finally a judgment on whether the sources corroborate or falsify the historiography. The second chapter researches the years 1963 until 1969 in which France received much American competition on both the military, political and economic sphere. The third chapter focuses on the period 1969 until 1975 beginning with the presidency of Pompidou. The final chapter discusses the start of the Dirty War and observes both the military assistance given by France to the Argentine dictatorship while also taking into account the humanitarian movement by French civilians in Argentina.
1. 1957-1964 The Third Way and the French Mission.
Most researchers of French-Argentine relations and the Dirty War start with an introduction on the French army's colonial wars between 1945 and 1962 in order to sketch the development of GR. This chapter begins instead with a study of the secondary literature concerning the French strategy of foreign policy by De Gaulle. The next part of this article will discuss the French mission in Argentina between 1957 and 1962, followed by a discussion on the influence of French non-state actors in Argentina and their involvement in the Dirty War. This chapter will show how the current historiography on the subject focuses on a number of subjects and actors which will set the basis for how this article will continue. We can observe these as being the experience of French
decolonization, Argentine military students in France, French officials in Buenos Aires and the publications they produced along with French civilians that migrated to Argentina. Although few primary sources are used in this chapter we can more properly understand the implantation of the GR mission by combining its secondary literature with that of French foreign policy.
News of Charles de Gaulle's visit to Argentina in 1964.
1.1-Troisième voie, Tercera Posición.
Although popularized by De Gaulle's policies against the US and Soviets, it was actually Juan Domingo Perón a few years before him that first took up this form of third way foreign policy.14 Brought up in a neutral Argentina during the rise of Fascism in Europe, Perón travelled as a young officer through Francoist Spain and Mussolini's Italy where he was inspired by National Socialism and developed much antagonism against communism. Perón quickly climbed through the ranks and became president in June 1946, becoming reelected in 1952. His primary focus was conquering the working class through generous social programs, syndical organizations where extremists would be
14
Loris Zanatta and Mariano Aguas, 'Auge y Declinación de la Tercera Posición. Bolivia, Perón y la Guerra Fría, 1943-1954', Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 45, No. 177 (2005) 36.
banned and the use of a strong state. On the international arena, Perón defied the liberalism espoused by the US and American leadership in South America in the fight against Communism. He also managed to avoid the influence of American syndical leaders, the importance of democracy and argued for social justice instead of war as the antidote against Communism. Conservative generals, landowners and Catholic groups ultimately orchestrated a military coup in September 1955 through the Révolutición Nacional against Perón, who was exiled in Spain.15 His legacy would cast a large shadow on Argentine politics which he would try to influence from his position of exile through his Peronista supporters.
Researchers studying French foreign policy during the De Gaulle in June 1958 are also keen to observe the general's strategy of offering a Troisième Voie in international politics. We use this term in a flexible manner, since it does not encompass a fixed set of rules and there are also many other terms used in French foreign policy literature such as Grandeur and Gaullism that can vaguely describe what we are about to discuss. This starting point for French international politics is still influential today and can bring France at odds with the US according to some political scientists.16 How did this Troisième Voie become established in France? How did France present its Third Way in Latin America and Argentina in particular? A few primary sources, along with the writings of Bozo and Vaïsse can help us in answering this.
French sources from 1957 demonstrate some French interest in Latin America and the need for the US to give way to French influence in the region. Hervé Alphand, ambassador to France in
Washington, talked to American foreign minister John Foster Dulles about the need of “healthy and vigorous economic relations between Europe and the diverse American republics”.17 Alphand argued that the US should not reserve the region to itself, as certain maneuvers have shown which have stopped France from various equipment contracts. Dulles agreed with his French colleague and suggested that France should increase its economic activity in Argentina, since US strategy at the time was one of taking distance from the country.
The friendly and diplomatic approach of Alphand stands in stark contrast to De Gaulle's attitude once he came to power in January 1959. According to Bozo, De Gaulle was primarily concerned with raising France's “rank” in the international scene. Reducing internal instability, bringing an end to the Algerian War and developing France's military strength were among his goals.18 De Gaulle had a wish to reorganize the international system's bipolarity into one where Europe could be seen as a third force in world politics. De Gaulle tried to give France a stronger role within the Western 15
Robin, Escadons, 205.
16 U. Krotz, J. Sperling, 'The European Security Order Between French Hegemony and American Independence',
European Security 20:3 (2011) 312.
17 Comission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF). 1957.
Tome 1 (1er Janvier – 30 Juin) (1990) 365.
18 F. Bozo, 'France, “Gaullism” and the Cold War', in The Cambridge History of the Cold War (2010) 166.
bloc in the Cold War as the leader of Western Europe by removing the 'Anglo-Saxon' dominance observed in the West. As early as September 1958, De Gaulle tried but did not manage to convince American and British leaders Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan of forming a tripartite “directorate” within the alliance.19 Afterwards, De Gaulle cooperated with the Germans in trying to establish the Fouchet Plan of 1961-1962. Bozo claims that French foreign policy was, by 1968, a crusade against US hegemony.20 Closely related to our topic was De Gaulle's attempt to reach out to the Third World. De Gaulle presented himself as an advocate of North-South cooperation and a champion of self-determination.21 This can be seen in the General's visit to Phnom Penh in 1966 where he condemned the US war in the country.
The French Third Way during 1960's in Europe, the Eastern bloc and the Third World have been well documented. How does Latin America fit into this picture? Vaïsse outlines a number of economic but especially political attempts at cooperation with the region by France. According to Vaïsse, De Gaulle wished to promote a Troisième Voie in Latin America designed to increase French influence in the continent. This influence would, according to De Gaulle's speeches, be based on equality and would be increased at the expense of the US.22 French representatives such as André Malraux had been promoting the Troisième Voie as early as 1959. When he visited Peru in that year, Malraux stated in a speech that Peruvians could not permit a colonisation de l'esprit by the US and the Soviets. France, according to Malraux, proposed instead cooperation in terms of equality.23 Was this Third Way truly based on equality against the US? The documents of 1960 show that French-Argentine relations began to take off on the political and economic sphere and both countries' leaders expressed their distrust of both the American and Soviet blocs in the Cold War. Democracy returned in 1958 in Argentina in the form of president Arturo Frondizi. In June 1960 Frondizi went to France to meet with De Gaulle.24 Frondizi discussed with De Gaulle the need for Argentina to receive European equipment and loans in order to achieve industrial development. Frondizi also explained that it was very important for Argentine agricultural products to get access in the developing European market, though De Gaulle explains that this was a very difficult deal for France to accept. Frondizi explained in the second conversation with De Gaulle on the need to avoid protectionist policies against Latin American products Europe, the need for Europe to buy more raw materials from his region and the wish for Europe to provide more long term loans. The last conversation between both statesmen revolved around the geopolitical developments in the
19 Ibidem, 166. 20
Ibidem.
21 Ibidem, 173.
22 M. Vaïsse, La Puissance, où l'influence?La France dans le Monde depuis 1958 (2009) 441. 23 Ibidem.
24
Comission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF) 1960.
Tome 1 (1er Janvier – 30 Juin) (1995) 863.
world and the spread of Communism in their respective regions. Both statesmen agree that the US was underestimating the dangers of Communism in Latin America and that the US had little experience in fighting the communist threat. They also agree on defending the French position in Argentina in the United Nations (UN). Both men promise to increase bilateral contacts and on the future possibility of Argentina being able to increase its beef exports in the European continent.25 The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 gave further confidence to de Gaulle, who observed Latin American distrust of the US and gave him a window of opportunity to exploit. The general decided to tour Latin America in 1964 to strengthen the ties with the region while giving various speeches in celebration of their common history, culture and their dislike of American hegemony.26 His visit was extremely well-received by the government, the media and even the Peronist protesters that were against the Argentine government.27 Their chants during this protests asked for the return of their own general, sur le signe de la troisìeme position, troisième force, according to French news observers.
Ties with Latin America became smaller during much of the 70's, though Vaïsse does not say much on this decade. Much of the continent experienced violence and dictatorial regimes during this period and one can assume that the French government chose to distance itself from this chaos. Vaïsse summarizes Latin America's troubles as being caused by “Endettement excessif, par la
théologie de la libération, et les coups de force”. Lastly, the years of French president François
Mitterand can be seen as France keeping a “low profile” in Latin America. Only some activity is discussed between 1981 and 1984 and particularly during the Falkland’s War, during which France strongly supported the United Kingdom according to Vaïsse.28
Historians have thus established that the general had indeed tried to develop a Third Way in international politics against the two superpowers of the Cold War, and this Third Way brought France into much disagreement with the US. Little analysis has been given on France's Third Way in Latin America and its individual countries. Further research on primary sources between 1963 and 1981 should focus on this aspect. We can do this by observing the motives for France to create foreign policy in the Southern Cone where this policy had its biggest success. With Argentina we have seen a series of political and economic forms of cooperation which both countries seem to have benefited from while also bringing France against the competing blocs of the Cold War. It is important to realize the Gaullist stance on foreign policy against the US and the increase in French interest towards Argentina in the political and economic sphere to understand France's willingness to also increase its military influence in Argentina.
25 Ibidem, 872. 26 Vaïsse, La Puissance, 445. 27 http://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/geolocalisation accessed 02-04-2015. 28 Ibidem, 453.
1.2-The French Mission 1955-1962.
The goal of most French-Argentine historians of the Cold War has been to show how the French army either contributed to the Argentine Dirty War or to the increasing disrespect for human rights by the Argentine army after the year 1957. The first phase begins with the exchange programs of Argentine military students in Paris at the École Superieure de Guerre in 1951 and receives much importance with a French military mission by army officers between 1957 and 1962.29
How do you define GR? Historians generally agree that GR was not a manual with a clear set of rules, but more a combination of ideas and guidelines. Pontoniero and Summo use writings of Ranalletti and Alistair Horne to define GR in the following way. The theoretical aspect of GR claimed that the world was in a permanent state of undeclared war between the democratic,
capitalist and Christian bloc against the totalitarian, communist, and atheist bloc.30 This meant that every internal conflict in the world had to be understood in this context, and that GR developed within the state and had the means to be spread by communists in every aspect of our lives. The goal of GR under communists was to subvert the established political order and replace it with a communist one. The practical aspect of GR revolved around a specific set of combat techniques to fight the communist threat. This threat developed from within the frontiers and within the
population, and therefore population control was essential. To do so, the country had to be divided in zones of military control (Quadrillage) forced under psychological warfare. The grimmest aspect of these tactics concerned the use of clandestine detention camps, kidnappings, torture to obtain information and cause death or forced disappearances.
How did GR become popularized within the Argentine military? Although they often use different structures and focus on different aspects in their work, all researchers study the same groups that we will present here. Most authors such as Amaral, Llumá, Mazzei, Robin and Ranalletti often begin with a study of how French theorists developed the doctrine of GR through the experience of the Second World War and decolonization which was briefly discussed in the introduction.31 These historians continue with research on how GR was “diffused” by the French army in Argentina and because of Argentine curiosity around 1955 beginning with various Argentine military journals and teaching establishments. This curiosity was further stimulated by another case study within French-Argentine relations, namely the French-Argentine officers such as Carlos Jorge Rosas, Manrique-Miguel 29
R. D. Llumá, Influence de la Mission d'Assesseurs Militaires Français Spécialistes en Guerre Contre Révolutionnaire,
dans la Formation des Officiers Argentins pendant la Période 1957-1970 (2003)., M. Robin, Escadrons de la Mort, l'École Française (2004)., M. Ranalletti, 'Una Aproximación a los Fundamentos del Terrorismo de Estado en la
Argentina: La Recepción de la Noción de “Guerra Revolucionaria” en el Ambito Castrense Local (1954-1962).',
Anuario del Centro de Estudios Históricos “prof. Carlos S.A. Segreti” Nr 11 (2011) 261-278., C. G. Velásquez, 'El
Impacto Ideologico de la Escuela Francesa sobre el Ejército Argentino', Persona y Sociedad Nr. 2 (2011) 55-72., M. Summo and E. Pontoniero, 'Pensar la “Guerra Revolucionaria”: Doctrina Antisubversiva Francesa y Legislación de Defensa en la Argentina (1958-1962)', Cuadernos de Marte Nr. 3 (2012) 285-305.
30
Summo, Pontoniero, Pensar, 288.
31 Amaral, 'Guerra ', 173. and Mazzei, 'La Misión ', 105.
Mom and Alcides López Aufranc that took military courses and established contacts with French military theorists in France at the École Superieure de Guerre.32 The French École was reserved for the military elite of Argentina, and many of its pupils were also involved at some point as lecturers at the ESG and as influential military men in the years that followed. Some of these foreign pupils received the opportunity to go to Algeria to observe and learn from French tactics. Aufranc was attending the École when the May 1958 Crisis took place. He recounted in a journal of the ESG how he was sent along with other foreign students to Algeria for two weeks in order to visit the post of the commander in chief near villages taken over by Muslim self-defense forces and even the electrical fences made by the French at the frontiers with Morocco and Tunisia.33
The French military mission officially started in 1957 and was initially carried out by French officials François Pierre Badie, Patrice Jacobe de Nourois, Robert Bentresque and Jean Nogués.34 Impressed by French publications and Argentine students in France, the Argentines had sent a letter to French minister of foreign affairs Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury on the 29th of March 1956. The letter explains that some of the members the army that recently participated in the Coup d'État against Perón had taken courses at the École and they wanted to organize reforms in the Argentine army in accordance with French ideas. Mazzei focuses on the publications these men wrote in Argentina, all of them based on French experiences such as observations on the French mechanized division, the guerilla warfare against the Germans in the Second World War and the use of
Psychological warfare. Ranalletti observes how military teaching establishments such as the
Servicio de Informaciones del Ejército (SIE) and their journals became slowly fascinated by
writings on French colonial wars such as in Indochina by well-known writers such as Bernard Fall.35 By 1959, half of the SIE's journal was occupied by discussions on counterinsurgency, the French approach to GR and even a manual on how to organize a conference on the subject. Another important establishment involved with GR was the Argentine Centro Naval and the Escuela
Superior de Guerra (ESG), an institution that by 1956 had 36% of its publications discussing
GR-related topics.36 This establishment and its journal provided French teachers and theorists with a venue where they could inform Argentine officials on counterinsurgency tactics. Some French articles by theorists such as Brigadier Chassin, colonel Jean Némo, Antoine Pinay and even Maurice Papon on the subject were translated into Spanish and published in these journals. It is important to note that so far the mission made official and permanent on February 1960. According to Llumá, De Gaulle's military strategy changed during this period towards that of “Nuclear Deterrence”, and all
32 Mazzei, La Misión, 115. 33 Ibidem, 117.
34 Ibidem, 111. Llumá, influence, 52. 35
Ranalletti, Una Aproximación, 265.
36 Ibidem, 268.
GR specialists had to be put aside.37
Was there already a sentiment of competition between the US and France on military matters in Latin America, aside from the aforementioned political and ideological competition seen throughout the promotion of the Troisième Voie? Robin's interviews and documents prove this to be the case. On October 1961, French military officers gave a Cours Interaméricain de Guerre
Contre-révolutionnaire. Fourteen countries within the Americas participated, among which we find the US.
French ambassador Blanquet du Chayla observes “une certaine jalousie” among Americans towards French military officers and French involvement with high-ranking Argentine staff and military schools.38 Robin's interview with Aufranc, who worked with French officers such as Bentresque to set up the military course, corroborates American jealousy during the course. Aufranc comments that the Americans were jealous to the point of demanding the departure of the French military mission. French colonel Bernard Cazaumayou, who went to Buenos Aires in 1962 to replace Bentresque and became friends with Aufranc, confirms American jealousy. French knowledge and superiority was apparently bothersome for the Americans, according to Cazaumayou.39
Did GR have any effects concerning the sphere of human rights at this early stage? It is worth mentioning that the Argentine army started its own educational programs on counterinsurgency in 1959 shortly after the French mission such as Operación Hierro and Hierro Forjado. The Argentine army even started to develop its own system of Quadrillage similar to the one used by the French in Algeria.40 One effect that is often discussed among historians is the Argentine army's legal
adaptation of GR elements within the Plan CONINTES between March 1960 and August 1961.41 A document by Argentine general Anaya discussing the development of CONINTES corroborated French influence herein. Once Russian ideological expansion started after the Second World War through GR, various European countries started to develop methods to contain the communist threat. One of these countries was France, and according to Anaya the development of CONINTES was based on French teachings and therefore one cannot view this plan as totalitarian.42
French writer Peries claims that CONINTES gave permission to certain actions that inevitably led to the intervention of the army within the political sphere through the use of violence in a fixed territory. Summo and Pontoniero give a similar description of it as a repressive system where Argentina was divided in zones, sub-zones and defensive areas under military authority. The local security forces were put under the control of the Argentine armed forces and war councils were created to judge those deemed subversive, often those loyal to the Peronist Resistance. By then, 37
Llumá, Influence, 66.
38 Robin, Escadrons, 212. 39 Ibidem.
40 Mazzei, 'La Misión', 130. 41
Summo, Pontoniero, 'Pensar', 292, Mazzei, 'La Misión', 130 and Périès, 'Un Modèle', 18-40.
42 Périès, 'Un Modèle', 26.
some military officials such as commander in chief Carlos Toranzo Montero were convinced that they were stumbling into a “vast subversive organization”; an “internal enemy” that was developing its actions in the context of a Guerra Revolucionaria.
A second consequence which some attribute to GR is the development of the Projecto de ley de
Defensa in1960 and 1961 when it was supported by president Frondizi.43 Firstly, the Projecto defined threats to national security as originating from the vast transformation the world was experiencing with no clear line between peace and war carried out by two ideological blocs. These blocs carried out their fight within all aspects of power be they military, political or psychosocial. Furthermore, this war was one that would not officially be declared, that would be fought within the national territory and could be fought in other ways aside from through military means. Lastly, Argentine officials began to publish their own studies and analysis on various topics related to GR. Mazzei claims that Mom, Tomas Sanchez de Bustamente and colonel Osiris Guillermo Villegas became established theorists and writers on the matter.44 Colonel Mario Orsolini regretted this development within the Argentine army in 1964. Argentina, he claimed, was being placed in the perspective of two competing blocs, instead of his country having to see the world through its own Argentine perspective. “The first perspective defines us as anti-communists before Argentines, and the second perspective defines us as Argentines rather than anti-communists.”45
Born out of the wish to create a France-led Europe as a third force in world politics, De Gaulle promoted an antagonistic third way once he came to power in 1958. Little is known of French foreign policy in Argentina, but already we can see an increase in political and economic
negotiations promoting military friendship against communism in the Cold War, a slight antagonism against the US and the promotion of French investments in Argentina and European imports of Argentine products. These developments can give some positive nuance if one compares it to the military aspect of this cooperation. This third way interpretation of French foreign policy is complemented by an increased military influence by France through GR in Argentina. The French mission was diffused by publications and courses and gave the Argentine army both the Cold War interpretation of world affairs and the controversial combat techniques it would use up until 1983. These techniques slowly took legal shape in the form of the Plan CONINTES and the Projecto de
ley de defensa, which established how and when the army was allowed to intervene within
Argentine politics. This military cooperation between Argentina and France even sparked
competition between France and the US as can be seen during the Cours Interaméricain de Guerre
Contre-révolutionnaire and as how we will see in the next chapter.
43 Summo, Pontoniero, 'Pensar', 295. 44
Mazzei, 'La Misión', 132.
45 Ibidem, 134.
2. 1964-1970-The American Challenge and Adapting GR.
The few publications that can be found on this period give us some interesting insight on the change in French-Argentine relations that occurred. Unfortunately, primary sources discussing the French military mission since this year are classified. The studies of Slatman and Llumá share the same approach of discussing Argentine political history in this period and pointing out to developments in this period that reference GR. Llumá uses this approach while also referencing some diplomatic and military exchanges between France and Argentina. This article focuses more on the second form of research and expands on other types of exchange between both countries. This chapter gives partial attention to French GR in these sources and gives more focus other aspects of French influence. In following the order we established in the first chapter we can begin with a brief summary of secondary sources discussing French foreign policy and argentine political history. This concerns how between 1964 and 1968 the French army encountered difficulties in Argentina because of American competition and the pro-American stance of Argentine military leaders. On the other hand, this period is also seen as one in which the French teachings become more implanted in the Argentine military.46 Later on we can expand through primary sources on another area of military influence that the French government utilized, namely that of providing weapons to the Argentine military. We will then finish with a discussion on French migration to Argentina after the Algerian War, along with their influence in Argentine politics.
A look into other secondary sources not related to French GR influence in Argentina is necessary to understand why the Argentine military became gradually pro-American and disapproving of French influence in Argentina. Frondizi was overthrown by a military coup in March 1962 for his willingness to maintain relations with Cuba during the Cuban Crisis and for trying to incorporate the Peronistas into political life.47 This event was shortly followed by what Bozo refers to as the emergence of De Gaulle's polarizing Politique à l'Est in 1963. De Gaulle increasingly aimed at intensifying the various cultural, scientific, technological and economic forms of exchange with the Soviet Union in order to change East-West relations.48 As stated in the first chapter, political
support becomes increasingly important for France as De Gaulle visits South-America in 1964 between the 20th of September and the 16th of October to lobby for his Third Way.49 De Gaulle's increased attempts to change East-West relations were also implemented in Latin-America, at a time when Argentina found itself in increased political turmoil.
46 Llumá,Influence, 79., E. D. Pontoniero, 'Pensamiento Militar y Legislación de Defensa en la Argentina: La
Caracterización de la Amenaza a la Seguridad Interna. Continuidad o Ruptura? (1963-1970)', Historia y Problemas
del Siglo XX, Vol. 3 (2012) 149-165., M. Slatman, 'Una Doctrina Militar Contrarrevolucionaria para la Nación
Argentina. Análisis de la Discursividad Oficial del Ejército Argentino durante la Guerra Fría (1957-1976)', in R. García Ferreira, Guatemala y La Guerra Fría en américa Latina 1947-1977 (2012) 431-459.
47 J.C. Torre and L. de Riz, 'Argentina since 1945', The Cambridge History of Latin America (1991) 113. 48
Bozo, 'France', 170.
49 Vaïsse, La Puissance, 445.
This period also sees both growth within the Argentine economy and an increase in Argentine revolutionary activity by some guerrilla groups. In 1964 alone we can observe a growth of industry, a decline in unemployment and a decline of the exterior debt.50 The year 1964 was also one of shock for the Argentine government as discoveries were made of camps, weapons and a network of subversive sympathizers in Salta and Tucumán. Foreign minister Zavala explained these findings through echoing French GR by describing the discovery as a threat of “Guerra Revolucionaria” and later blaming this threat on Communism.51 Moreover, the first armed revolutionary group makes its appearance in Argentina in the form of the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) in November 1968, which was discovered by accident in Taco Ralo, Tucuman.52
How did American influence materialize? How did the French react to this? Although more research needs to be made on Argentine decision-making for distrust towards France, one can see these events as a partial cause of the increased influence of the US within the Argentine military. Frondizi's pro-Peronist and De Gaulle's pro-communist actions, made distrust against the French more likely, and the increased subversive activity meant that the Argentine army needed more Western help against this threat. The presidency of Arturo Illia starting in October 1963 is characterized by the rising influence of the American “National Security Doctrine” in Argentina. Llumá points out towards the growth of a pro-American faction of conspirateurs within the
Argentine army headed by Argentine general Alejandro Agustin Lanusse, who was often connected to the American embassy according to French diplomat Christian de Margerie.53 Llumá refers to the French military strategy after 1965 as going from teaching techniques on anti-subversive warfare to the provision of weapons.54
One important aspect of secondary literature concerning GR is the way in which Argentine political repression implemented various GR methods that were learned between 1957 and 1962. Historian Llumá has pointed out how French subversive ideas persisted in this period and even spread from the military sphere towards the political arena.55 The Argentine army was under
restructuring in 1964 by general Juan Carlos Onganía in accordance to what French observers called the French teachings the military had received.56 Firstly, this restructuring was meant to diminish the military expenses. Secondly, part of this restructuring involved sending the army far from large Argentine cities in order to both avoid another military coup and to deal with the frontier disputes with Chili. Argentine GR disciples also participated in creating a “Interamerican Military System”
50 Ranalletti, Du Mékong, 457. 51 Pontoniero,'Pensamiento', 153. 52 Llumá, Influence, 98. 53 Ibidem, 81. 54 Ibidem, 89. 55
Pontoniero,'Pensamiento', 153., Slatman,'Una Doctrina', 437. and Llumá, Influence, 79.
56
Llumá, Influence, 85.
of cooperation between Latin-American countries by Argentine general Lanusse. The Argentine officer Mario Benajamin Menéndez, an old student of the French École was active as military instructor in Bolivia in 1967, the year that the mythical Guerillero Ernesto “Che” Guevara was captured and executed.57 By 1968 Argentine officers were already in dialogue with Brazil with the purpose of creating a more solid system of communications.
Slatman and Pontoniero approach the matter by arguing that French and American doctrines were
combined by the Argentines to different degrees. Slatman and Robin make the interesting analysis that the American National Security Doctrine was something the Americans learned from the French, meaning that the Americans were essentially transmitting French teachings to the
Argentines.58 Some American tactics even went hand in hand with French tactics such as the French system of population control through Quadrillage. Furthermore, the French theory of the internal subversive enemy stayed in place. In a juridical sense, these teachings contributed to the
development of various military strategies in Argentina between 1968 and 1969 that further defined Argentine revolutionary warfare concerning (un)traditional warfare, emergency zones and the proceedings to be used during “psychological actions” in (un)conventional warfare.
2.1-AMX 13/30.
Secondary literature has shown an increase in American competition, the early signs of subversive activity, an increase in arms trade and the implantation of GR. What can French documents add to this? Llumá has written about most of the sources one can find in this period, but a few additions can still be made. Diplomatic visits, educational trips and cooperative exercises were made by various Argentine and French representatives during this period. An interesting development takes place in 1965 when the French embassy noticed Onganía's wish to travel to Europe in 1965 and his goal of passing through France incognito, at a time when the Argentine general was favoring relations with the US.59 French representative La Grandville suggested that this incognito visit might have been meant to improve the Argentine general's image in front of the American faction within the Argentine army while also assuring the stay of the French military mission. Admiral Varela, Argentine chief of naval operations also made an extensive visit to France in November 1967.60 His visit involved meeting with various French military officers, observations of French industrial sites and even the French ministers of the army and armaments, Pierre Messmer and general Fourquet. A following visit took place sometime around May 1968 by general Alsogaray,
57 Ibidem, 91.
58 Slatman, ‘Una Doctrina’, 437, Robin, Escadrons, 314-340. 59 Llumá, Influence, 88.
60
Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE) Série Amerique 1964-1970 Sous-Série Argentine, Document, 141, 'Visite Officielle de l'Amiral Varela, Chef des Opérations Navales de la Marine Argentine.', (08-11-1967).
commander in chief of the Argentine ground forces.61
The Argentine school of aviation and specially the ESG went to Pechiney, Saclay and various military conferences in France in 1965.62 A similar visit in Salon and Paris was planned to take place between the 15th and 20th of November by 8 officers and 83 students of the Argentine aviation school in 1966, though it is not entirely clear from the documents that the visit officially took place.63 The Argentine aviation force also took the time to carry out a Vol d'Instruction in Europe planned for the 30th of November 1967, the delegation of which would plan on passing through Marseille and Paris.64 One interesting development was the invitation by the Argentine gendarmerie in having the chiefs and three officers of their French counterparts visit Argentina between the 2nd and 11th of October in that same year.65
One large document discussing events between 1964 and 1966 extensively analyzes the visit that took place in Toulon by the cadets from the frigate Libertad along with roughly another 100 unarmed soldiers wishing to pay homage to the unknown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe in 1964.66 The Libertad made another trip to France between the 10th and 20th of October in 1965, this time in Marseille.67 Lastly, the document finishes with further plans to organize trips by the Libertad 1966 between the 8th and 10th of November and between the 14th and 22nd in Boulogne and Brest. The argentine and French navies even cooperated in performing military a series of maneuvers in November 1968 under the supervision of an old Argentine student of the French military school, Jorge Isaac Anaya.68 The document that Llumá cites for this observation discusses another interesting event, namely the visit of three Escorts d'Escadre or escort squadrons from France in Buenos Aires. These squadrons were well-received by the Argentine naval officer and the Colonie
Française in the Argentine capital. With great financial effort, the document points out, the French
colony organized various social, sportive and touristic manifestations in honor of the French squadrons.69 What importance can we give to these various visits, educational trips and social events carried out between the French and Argentine armed forces? The ambassador attending points out the political importance of this event which was discussed by various Argentine
newspapers and gave France much publicity, at a time when various Western-European statesmen (Italians, Germans, Dutch) were in Argentina pursuing their own countries' interests. Moreover, one can see this change in French-Argentine relations as focusing less on the theory of warfare and 61
AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Projet de Visite en France du Général ALSOGARAY, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée de Terre Argentine', (16-05-1968).
62 Ibidem.
63 AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Séjour en France de l École d'Aviation Militaire Argentine', (12-10-1966). 64
AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Vol d'Instruction en Europe', (21-11-1966).
65 AMAE, Am. Document 141, (19-09-1967).
66 AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Visite à Paris de Cadets Argentins', (25-07-1964).
67 AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Escale à Marseille d'un Navire-École Argentin', (24-08-1965) 68
Llumá, 'Influence, 94
69 AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Manoeuvres Navales Franco-Argentines', (27-11-1968)2.
more on the practical application of techniques. Unfortunately the sources do not show the exact content of these trainings. Nevertheless the correlation found between the practical exchange in all military and cultural spheres following the theoretical exchange of GR and preceding Argentine turmoil is interesting and should be viewed with attention.
The issue of armament becomes important as the US offers the Argentine government a “Military Aid Program” (MAP) in 1962, only two years before the economic growth of 1964 took place. The US begins to provide armaments to Argentine army through MAP in which the French also
participated in according to Llumá.70 If French doctrinal influence diminished in this period, it was contrasted by the increased influence of French armaments in the South-American country as the French ambassador pointed out. The Argentine military wished to arm themselves through European weapons within their “Plan Europa” during Onganía's dictatorship since the American MAP program failed to properly materialize.71 The early provision of armaments by France to Argentina involved material deemed necessary to carry out GR such as AMX 13 tanks. Roughly sixty tanks, some Mirage jets and helicopters are said to have been sold in this period, and in
February 1968 the Argentine army signed a contract with French arms company SOFMA in order to construct French AMX 30 tanks on Argentine soil.
One important document of August 1968 concerning armaments in Argentina gives a slightly different view of the influence of GR in the country which views Argentina as primarily having an internal threat to security.72 The document explains what appears to be attempts by Chili's
ambassador to discover the amount of weaponry in Argentine possession. The document also shows French knowledge of accusations among South-American countries of how they have been raising their military expenses, and how this has led to military competition between the countries in the continent. The ambassador warned against not supplying the Argentine military that had much desire to become independent of US' support on armaments and had many other European weapon providers to choose from. The letter finishes with a warning towards the Minister of Foreign Relations about how La Grandville just learned about an Argentine purchase of 8 Fokker F-27 transport airplanes from the Netherlands. This letter shows two aspects that will be important later on in our article, namely, that the Argentine military was not only concerned with internal threats but often had frontier disputes with Chili and therefore was not always operating under the idea of GR. Secondly, Plan Europa had also attracted other European arms providers which were also competing with France.
70 Llumá, Influence, 80 71
Ibidem, 95.
72 AMAE, Am. Document 141, 'Achat de Matériel Militaire Français par l'Argentine', (05-08-1968).
AMX 13 and AMX 30 tanks are very often mentioned in armament deliveries to Argentina.
What do the sources show on the political strategy and exchanges between France and Argentina in this period of increased competition? How did France assess this period? Two documents are particularly helpful to observe the French strategy. The first document concerns the French ambassador to Argentina's report on his mission in the country between 1963 and 1968 can be helpful in explaining this. This document presents an extensive analysis on French Pieds Noirs in Argentina, Argentine distrust of US dominance in Latin America and Argentina's growing ties with various Western European countries to compensate for this. The ambassador considers political ties to be amicable thanks to De Gaulle's visit in 1964 and the recognition by France of Onganía's dictatorial regime after the military putsch in 1966.73 Argentine criticism is observed by the ambassador thanks to the disapproval by French journals against the Argentine dictatorship,
France's increased ties with the Soviet Union and French antagonism against the US. In spite of the growth of the National Security Doctrine, the French ambassador nevertheless gives a rather positive judgment towards French doctrinal influence in Argentina. On the military sphere, the ambassador points out to the French military mission of three assesseurs, which partially balances the American mission in the country and the Argentine order of AMX 13 tanks.74
2.2 - OAS, traditionalist Catholics and French Colons.
A final aspect of French-Argentine relations and their contribution to the Dirty War concerns the influence of migrants, often from the extreme-right. Some interesting groups have received attention such as exiled collaborateurs that worked with Germans during the Second World War, but for our article we must focus on those migrants affected by the Algerian War. One of the first 73
AMAE, Am. Document 133, 'Rapport de fin de Mission: 1963-1968', (14-041968) 25.
74 AMAE, Am. Document 133, 'Rapport de fin de Mission: 1963-1968', (14-041968) 26.
French far-right groups in Argentina were members of the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS). Many of these Algerian migrants were well-meaning Pieds Noirs that were faced with the choice to either leave to Spain or Argentina once the Algerian War finished and accords were made with the Argentine government in 1963 to allow Pied Noir migration.75 Ranalletti observes two
important sentiments shared by the French migrants: a furious anti-communist attitude and exacerbated Catholicism which made them sympathetic to the Argentine situation they found themselves in. Ranalletti follows the pattern of French migration in this period through various cities, culminating into roughly 160 families of Pied Noir ancestry two years later. Various ex-OAS members, according to Ranalletti and Robin, took advantage of the French-Argentine accords to install themselves in the South-American country.76 Others were expulsed from Spain to Latin-America under French pressure. OAS generals Paul Gardy and Bertrand de Gorostarzu had only to accept De Gaulle's deal with the OAS to relocate in Argentina in order for them to stop their assassination attempts against the general. Colonels Jean-Yves Gardes and Allain Serien arrived in 1963 and were picked up by representatives of the Ciudad Catholica of Argentina (CCA), which was the office in Buenos Aires of the CC.
How did these OAS migrants influence the Argentine military sphere? Little else is known on
what these OAS members did since documents on this subject have not been declassified by the French and Argentine governments. It is speculated by Robin and Ranalletti that OAS members established strong contacts with the CC and ICHTUS and stimulated their growth and influence in Argentine politics. Furthermore, speculation is added to the idea that the ex-OAS members took part in training the Argentine military in interrogation techniques.
To understand the importance of these speculative claims is to observe the influence of CC in Argentine politics and society. The most important publication is perhaps Ranalletti’s thesis on the subject which combines both GR and CC’s teachings.77 Ranalletti first explains the existence of a far-right traditionalist Argentine movement before the CC arrived through father Julio Meinvielle in the early twentieth century and the existence of another European traditionalist group, the
Coopérateurs paroissiaux du Christ-Roi (CPCR) which later established ties with the CC. The CCA
is said to have been established sometime between 1957 and 1959 by father Georges Grasset.78 As Grasset himself stated in a 1959 publication, the goal of CCA was to contact young, patriotic and Christian officers through courses and conversations in order to turn them into “Christian heroes”. Ranalletti claims that the CC was influential in maintaining GR ideas within the Argentine army after 1962 through various literary publications and their journal Verbo. The crucial element various
75 M. Ranalletti, 'La Guerra ', 292. 76 Ibidem, 295.
77
M. Ranalletti, Du Mékong, 202.
78 Ibidem 340.
publications lobbied for was that of the use of torture within revolutionary warfare in order to obtain information from the enemy. He summarizes that the CC was influential in establishing three
important themes for the Argentine army during the Cold War. The first concerns the elaboration of hypotheses concerning conflict; the second involves the interpretation of the past and present; the third concerns the preparation for a new way of intervening in Argentine politics. The CCA's preacher Julio Meinvielle is said to have inspired paramilitary groups at some point in the sixties such as the Tacuara. This group was composed by privileged youths of Buenos Aires and
participated in street combats and anti-Semitic actions in the city. Meinvielle motivated the fracture of this group after its expansion and increased contacts with Perón's followers.79
Other authors present similar conclusions. Author Scirica dedicates 2 articles on the CC which created its own office in Buenos Aires in 1959.80 Her approach on the matter concerns a study of the publications of CC through their journal Verbo in the sixties. Verbo was published throughout much of the period in this article and became well-known among right-wing and military circles. These publications handled counterrevolutionary themes and supported authoritarianism, with particular attention towards the incorporation of spiritualism in the lives of university students during the dictatorship of Onganía. One way of researching CC has been through interviews conducted by Robin during her research concerning one of CC's most influential members by the name of Georges Grasset.81 Grasset became head of CC's journal Verbo and helped CC develop close ties with influential politicians such as future dictator Onganía, Roberto Gorostiaga, Carlos Caballero and Jorge salimei. Other studies such as that of Introvigne also focus on the individuals within CC such as Jean Ousset.82 His almost biographical account on the founder of CC offers some relevant information on French-Argentine relations such as his contacts with OAS members, influential Argentine priests, French priests such as Grasset and Argentine officers Juan Francisco Guevara. Was Argentina only home to ex-OAS members and traditionalist Catholic practitioners promoting GR, as the secondary literature shows? The difficult experiences of these families have been somewhat discussed by Ranalletti, but one can add a few extra details found in some primary sources.83 Document 131 summarizing the French diplomatic experience in Argentina between 1963 and 1968 cites 12.069 French nationals in Buenos Aires and Rosario-Cordoba, along with the attempt of installing 200 familles d'agriculteurs réfugiés d'Algérie, which according to the diplomat
79 Ranalletti, Du Mékong, 438.
80 E. Scirica, ‘Visión Religiosa y Acción Politica. El Caso de Ciudad Católica Verbo en la Argentina de los Años
Sesenta’, Revista del Programa de Historia de América Latina. Vol.2 (2010) 26-56. and E. Scirica, ‘Educación y Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria. Una Propuesta de Ciudad Católica – Verbo’, La Historia Enseñada Nr. 11 (2007) 119-140.
81 Robin, Escadrons, 230.
82 M. Introvigne, ‘Jean Ousset et la Cité Catholique. Cinquante Ans après Pour qu’il règne’, Cristianià, anno XXXVIII
n. 355 (2010) 9-61.
83 Ranalletti, Du Mékong, 444.
had been a process with many setbacks.84 A more unfortunate picture is painted by an instructive
document by the ministry of foreign affairs to the ambassador in April 1968. The 150 rapatriés
d'Afrique du Nord were having financial and social problems out of proportion with the state help
they have been receiving. Only a quarter of the rapatriés could be considered succesful or tiré
d'affaire, while the rest had already exhausted their initial loan which they could not pay back. The
French embassy has had extra help by a specialized institution called B.D.P.A in order to deal with these problems and hinted at the possibility of the French government being able to give more loans to rapatriés in need hereof. Strangely, in spite of these setbacks the Argentine government was interested in renewing certain accords with the hope of receiving more French migrants.85 Another document of 1970 re-examining French service abroad describes the experience of roughly 130 French-Algerian colons sent to Argentina for agricultural exploitation. The loans the colons needed for this were guaranteed by an institution called COFACE. The commercial counselor tasked with dealing with various disputes arising from these loans is discussed as being overburdened. The ambassador who wrote this letter to the ministry of foreign affairs had one regret, namely, that the loans given to these colons would never be reimbursed to his office because of the failed
agricultural pursuits the colons experienced.86
A brief report was made on Pieds Noirs in Argentina by INA.FR.87
2.3-El Cordobazo: Conclusion of the 60's.
Jeremi Suri summed up the protests of these decades by explaining that during “the 1960s and
84 AMAE, Am. Document 133, 'Rapport de fin de Mission: 1963-1968', (14-041968) 24. 85 AMAE, Am. Document 133, 'Instructions du Département', (29-04-1968) 10.
86 AMAE, Am. Document 133, 'Reéxamen des Mission et des Moyens des Services Français à l'Étranger.', (02-02-1970)
16.
87 http://www.cdha.fr/argentine-terre-daccueil , accessed on 02-02-2015
1970s, an international counter-culture, comprising countless local groups, exposed the problem that had no name. The counter-culture challenged not only existing authority, but also the basic assumptions about the “good life” that underpinned social order.”88
The period discussed in this chapter closes off with various social upheavals that took place in various regions of the world. Some of these upheavals would lead to change in both the French and Argentine political landscapes. Gaullist France was gripped by a student's revolt and social
upheaval in May 1968, leading to an economic crisis which according to Bózo symbolized a state of internal crisis and weakened diplomacy in the country.89 Charles de Gaulle resigned in April 1969 after a failed referendum proposing political decentralization. A month later, El Cordobazo took place in the city of Cordoba, Argentina.90 One can easily add this Argentine upheaval to Suri's analysis of protests in the late sixties. Dissatisfaction was brewing among labour and Peronist parties in Argentina, mainly because of Onganía's closing off of the legal and extra-legal framework within which these parties participated. Workers and students ultimately led a massive protest against the military government that spread to other parts of the country where they sacked government offices and attacked the property of foreign firms. “Finally, urban guerilla warfare made its appearance” according to Argentine researchers on the subject.91 Onganía's attempt at stopping the protests involved a change in leadership within the ministry of economy, a plan that backfired and led to massive capital flight and an economic crisis. The military junta under which Onganía ruled was increasingly forced to use repression against the protests, motivating them to demand a greater say in Argentine politics. They deposed the Argentine general when he failed to give them what they wanted in June 1970. Charles de Gaulle would pass away in November of that same year. Argentine foreign minister M. de Pablo Pardo was the only Latin-American minister to have attended the ceremonies organized after the general's death.92
The first part of this chapter combined secondary literature to show why US influence increased in Argentina, partly because of Frondizi and De Gaulle's controversial moves towards Peronist and communist factions in the Cold War, and the increased political turmoil in this period. Primary sources have also deepened our knowledge on military exchanges within the army, the aviation school, the navy and even the gendarmerie. These exchanges ranged from educational trips and exercises by both French and Argentine armies and high-ranking officials. The exact influence of these activities is hard to measure, but we can at least speculate that Argentine officers either further 88
Jeremi Suri, 'Counter-cultures: The Rebellions against the Cold War Order, 1965-1975', The Cambridge History of the
Cold War. Vol. II Crises and Détente (2010) 481.
89 Bozo, 'France', 173.
90 Torre and de Riz, 'Argentina', 136. 91
Ibidem.
92 AMAE, Am. Document 183, 'Relations entre la France et l Argentine', (16-04-1971).
perfected whatever strategies were taught to them in the years before or learned new techniques popular at the time under their French counterparts. At least one document taught us that these exchanges served France's popularity abroad. The ambassador attending pointed out towards the political importance of these exchanges in serving French interests against other competing Western countries. Documents discussing the delivery of armaments also show French-American
competition in this area in a period in which the economic circumstances made this possible for the Argentine military. Furthermore, knowledge of Argentine-Chilean disputes as early as 1964 and how armaments contributed to the distrust between both countries. One can arguably say that, by the time El Cordobazo and the events of May 1968 took place, the Argentine army was well-equipped and well-trained by both French and American military doctrine, contacts, exercises and armaments.
Historians have argued that the French migrants in the sixties were anti-communist and
traditionalist Catholic individuals from the OAS and CCA that might have contributed to the Dirty War. Primary sources have sketched the social and economic state this group found itself in. The migration from Algeria to Argentina was difficult. By the time El Cordobazo took place, three quarters of these pieds noirs were in financial troubles because of failed agricultural pursuits or insufficient loans, and little concern was expressed by French diplomats concerning their future in Argentina. Perhaps many of these colons went on to lead normal lives as law-abiding citizens. On the other hand, it is not difficult to speculate that the economic woes experienced by a group of French rejects might have contributed to whatever actions they might have taken concerning the political crisis Argentina was slowly descending into.
