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Disentangling deceptive communication : situation and person characteristics as
determinants of lying in everyday life
Backbier, E.H.F.
Publication date
2001
Link to publication
Citation for published version (APA):
Backbier, E. H. F. (2001). Disentangling deceptive communication : situation and person
characteristics as determinants of lying in everyday life. Thela Thesis.
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off the Acceptability of Telling
Lies s
Thee proposition that lying is to be rejected in most instances seems to be advocated not onlyy by social scientists and philosophers (see for instance Bok, 1978 or Barnes, 1994) but alsoo by lay people. From the group interviews conducted as a pilot study (see Chapter J), inn order to gain a deeper insight into the way people view lying and deception in everyday life,, it appeared that the interviewees reacted rather negatively to lying in general and even moree negatively to other people's lies. In contrast, however, the interviewees reported manyy instances in which they lied themselves, and showed a great deal of understanding forr their own lies. The interviewees did not seem to be aware of having a somewhat dual attitudee towards lying, and when confronted with it they did not seem to bother. In an attemptt to find an explanation for the observed discrepancy, we scrutinised the written protocolss and the literature with regard to lying.
Fromm the protocols several related explanations emerged. The interviewees stated, for instance,, that they themselves tried to avoid lying as much as possible but that sometimes lyingg was unavoidable; for example when trying not to hurt another person. Furthermore, theyy stated that they had the impression that others tend to lie more often and more easily thann they themselves, implying that others lie more often to benefit themselves. In addition itt could be inferred from the protocols that when confronted with the dilemma of whether orr not to lie, the interviewees assessed the 'gravity' of lying in relation to their goal, the situationn and the other person(s) involved. Since it is clear that the general norm towards
lyingg is negative, it seems plausible to conclude from the statements that the lies of others aree judged in the perspective of general norms and one's own lies in the perspective of the specificc context and the particular aim that is at stake. As a result, lying in general will be judgedd unacceptable but within a specific context one might decide that in that instance, it
iss (or was) acceptable or even preferable to tell a lie.
Althoughh scientific interest in lying and deception is growing rapidly (e.g. Lewis & Saarni, 1993;; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Keating & Heltman, 1994), an empiricall foundation of theories on lying is still lacking. Some researchers who have studiedd lying have based their investigations on the typologies of lies presented in the literaturee of moral philosophy (Lindskold & Walters, 1983; Lindskold & Han, 1986). Otherss have based their classifications inductively on data from their research but without aa clear underlying theory (Maier & Lavrakas, 1976; Pope & Forsyth, 1986).
Lindskoldd and colleagues (1983; 1986) developed statements and vignettes based onn Bok's (1978) typology of lies, and concluded that the acceptability of various types of liess is a function of their arrangement along a continuum of social motivation, ranging fromm altruistic to exploitative. Maier and Lavrakas (1976), who investigated the evaluation off liars under various circumstances, concluded that the reprehensibility of telling lies is relatedd to the monetary or psychological costs of these lies for the person lied to. What stimuluss material Maier and Lavrakas used, however, remains unclear. Pope and Forsyth (1986)) aimed to identify the perceptual dimensions that underlie the various kinds of lies suggestedd by the ethical literature. They used a representative selection of short descriptionss of situations in which one person is lying to another, previously written by psychologyy students and rewritten by the authors to increase comparability in length and language.. From the examples presented in the article, however, it appears that these descriptionss were not comparable with respect to the amount, relevancy and specificity of thee information they contained. The conclusion of Pope and Forsyth that the judgements of moralityy are most closely related to the intentions of the liars and the alleged consequences off the lies, therefore, may be attributable to the specific content of their stimulus material.
Thee judges in the previous studies were provided with statements or situation descriptions thatt contained either information about the aims of the liar, or about aims and the status of thee liar, or about the aims of the liar and the consequence of the lie for the dupe or the liar him/herself.. The studies, therefore, used different operationalizations of 'lying' leading to
differentt conclusions. An additional point of caution involves the fact that morally biased labelss were used on the answering scales (e.g. permissible to extremely wrong). Furthermore,, the results might be biased by the fact that judgements were made from the perspectivee of the outsider who after the (mis)deed decided about right and wrong. Althoughh it is perfectly legitimate to focus on the moral evaluation of lying, it is clear that thee previous studies have failed to provide an explanation for the discrepancy between the evaluationn of lies in general and of people's own lies. Neither do the studies provide an answerr to the question as to which factors people take into account when evaluating lies presentedd as their own reactions to real life dilemmas.
Lying:Lying: A Functional Communication Strategy
Inn contrast to earlier research, we prefer to take the position that lying is a functional communicationn strategy, albeit sometimes a reprehensible one. From this perspective a lie iss a message from a sender designed to influence a receiver in a certain way (Buller & Burgoon,, 1994) and a lie thus should not be regarded as an end but as a means to achieve a certainn goal (Miller & Stiff, 1993). In addition, we would like to stress that an answer or utterance,, is a lie only when the sender knows it to be not in accordance with his or her real belief,, knowledge, or feeling (Metts, 1989). As a result, we consider it more fruitful to studyy lying from the perspective of the actor than from the perspective of the observer. Withh regard to the evaluation of lies, we assume that the same factors that a sender weighs whenn involved in the decision whether or not to lie apply to the evaluation of a lie presentedd in a specific context. The results of our pilot interviews indicated that people see themselvess as having rather high standards when it comes to lying. Compared to themselves,, they believed others would lie more often and more easily. We will collect evaluationss from participants' own perspective as well as from the perspective of other personss to test whether the evaluation of lies from participants' own perspective consequentlyy will be more negative than from the outsiders' perspective.
Thee three factors expected to be of influence to the evaluation of lies are the goal, the situation,, and the person. The goal of the lie is defined as the motive of the sender for tellingg a lie. Although motives can vary from primarily social motives via individualistic motivess to egoistic motives (Meerum Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1992), only three different categoriess will be distinguished here. Social motives are at stake when the liar is trying to protectt others from feeling hurt or to favour others, individualistic motives are at stake
whenn the liar is trying to protect him/herself or to create a positive image of him/herself andd egoistic motives are at stake when the liar is trying to gain at the expense of others. In accordancee with the findings of Lindskold and colleagues (1983, 1986), we expect social liess to be judged most acceptable, egoistic lies least acceptable and individualistic lies in between. .
Byy 'the situation' we mean that in some situations lying is acceptable or even appropriate, whilee in other situations it can be wrong to lie. Compare the situation in which a friend askss you to comment on her new outfit for the holidays, with the situation where she asks youu to comment on her new outfit for a job interview. Lying in the first situation probably hass less far-reaching consequences than lying in the second situation. Although earlier researchh never took the importance of 'the situation' into account, it is expected that lying aboutt relatively unimportant matters will be judged more acceptable than lying about relativelyy important matters.
Thee third factor that presumably has an impact on lying is the relationship between the liar andd the person that is lied to. Since people in everyday life are assumed to interact most frequentlyy with persons with whom they have a social emotional bond, it seems wise to choosee persons with whom this bond clearly differs in intensity. According to Lindskold andd Walters (1983) friends do have a stronger bond than acquaintances, and as a result lyingg in the first relationship will hurt more and may be regarded as less acceptable. Furthermore,, Metts (1989) found, as we did in our pilot interviews, that most people seem too assume that one should (be able to) be honest towards friends. Lying to a friend thus will bee regarded as less acceptable than lying to an acquaintance.
Whenn asked to take the perspective of an outsider, we expect the three factors to influence thee judgements as well. Since there are several possible interactions between Motive,
SituationSituation and Relation for both the actor and observer perspective, we will test these
effectss for both perspectives separately.
Too summarise, the main objective of the present study is to find answers to questions about thee acceptability of telling lies as a function of the goal, the situation, and the relationship off the participants. In addition, we want to investigate in what situations persons judge lies too be acceptable. Finally, we want to test whether individuals think that most others judge
liess more acceptable than they do themselves, as suggested by our pilot-interviewees. In orderr to achieve these research aims, we decided to carry out an experiment in which lay peoplee are asked to judge several lies presented in scenarios in which the three factors are combinedd and systematically varied.
M e t h o d d
DesignDesign and Scenarios
Forr the scenarios, a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design was used, with the motive to lie varied on threee levels (social vs. individualistic vs. egoistic), the relative importance of the situation thatt the lie is about (important matter vs. unimportant matter) and the closeness of the relationn between the person that tells the lie and the person that is lied to (best friend vs. acquaintance)) on two levels. By crossing the three independent variables 12 different situationn categories could be distinguished.
Thee scenarios were written departing from predetermined criteria and a fixed pattern. In contrastt to earlier research referred to in the introduction of this chapter, the scenarios did nott make it explicit that someone had lied, but instead it was made clear to the subjects that eachh scenario contained a 'prototypical' lie (Coleman & Kay, 1981). Within the scenarios, thee answer (the lie) given by the sender clearly is not consistent with the opinion of the sender,, and it is indicated why the sender intends to withhold or deny the truth. In order to ensuree that the results of the 12 situation categories would be comparable, and to enlarge thee representativeness of the results, for every motive four stories were written in which thee description of a relatively important situation was altered in a relatively unimportant situationn by replacing some words. The closeness of the relationship was altered by replacingg the best friend with a vague acquaintance. After the scenarios were tested for comprehensibilityy and familiarity, some minor (mainly textual) alterations were made.
Threee scenarios, representing three different situation categories, are presented here for the purposee of illustration (for a complete overview of all 48 scenarios see Appendix A):
SocialSocial Motive, Important Situation. Acquaintance.
Ann acquaintance made some snacks for a wedding party. You have been at that party andd your acquaintance asks you what you think of these snacks. You didn't like them butt in order not to hurt the feelings of the acquaintance, you say: "I enjoyed the snacks." "
IndividualisticIndividualistic Motive, Important Situation, Best Friend.
Att a party of your best friend you spill some red wine on the white carpet due to your ownn clumsiness. Your best friend asks you how it happened and in order to save your facee you say: "I dropped my glass because someone bumped into me."
EgoisticEgoistic Motive, Unimportant Situation, Best Friend.
Yourr best friend asks you to help her to assemble a cupboard. You absolutely don't feell like doing this and in order to wriggle out of it you say to your best friend: "I don'tt have time to help you."
ParticipantsParticipants and Procedure
Sincee we were primarily interested in situational factors, we tried to reduce the influence of possiblee confounding factors like age and sex as much as possible. Hence, we decided to recruitt only women in the age of 30 to 40.
Inn order to have each of the 12 categories, and thus each of the 48 scenarios, judged 15 times,, 180 suitable women were recruited on three consecutive days in June 1994 in a shoppingg centre of a large city in the middle of the Netherlands. The interviewers were five femalee advanced students of Psychology at the University of Amsterdam. Prior to the data collection,, the interviewers were trained intensively for three days. To ensure that the questionss would be administered in virtually the same way, the interviewers worked from a scriptt that contained an exact description of the data collection procedure. Each interviewer administeredd each category three times. To prevent order effects each interviewer administeredd the scenarios in herr own order, both within and between categories.
Thee interviewers only approached women who were on their own and who they thought weree between the ages of 30 and 40. There was a tally of how many women were either tooo old or too young to be included in the study and how many refused to co-operate.
Womenn who did not have a thorough enough understanding of the Dutch language or otherwisee were not able too complete the test were excluded.
Afterr the interviewer had approached a potential subject and this woman had agreed too co-operate, the interviewer introduced herself and gave a short introduction about the study.. Next, the procedure and the answering scale were clarified by means of a test scenario.. The participants had to rate their answers on an eleven-point scale that ranged fromm 'the lie is absolutely unacceptable' (0) to 'the lie is absolutely acceptable' (10). An eleven-pointt scale was chosen since it resembles Dutch school grading. As soon as everythingg seemed clear to the participant the first scenario was shown and read aloud by thee interviewer. After the participant had judged the four scenarios one by one for herself, thee same scenarios were presented a second time. The first time the question read: 'To what extentt do you find this lie acceptable?' The second time: 'To what extent do you think that mostt people will find this He acceptable?' Finally, the exact age and educational level of eachh participant were ascertained.
Thee complete design can be summarised as a 3 (motive) x 2 (situation) x 2 (relation) x 2 (self/otherss ~ repeated) mixed between-within subjects design, with 4 different story themess used as replications. Each individual participant judged 4 lies presented in the scenarioss from one of the situation categories formed by the crossing on the first three factors.. Each participant judged each lie from a 'self and a 'most other persons' perspective.
R e s u l t s s
Inn total 1105 women were approached of whom 659 refused to co-operate (mainly 'no time'),, 233 were either too young or too old and 33 were 'unsuitable' (mainly because of a languagee barrier). Finally, 180 women were questioned, 36 by each interviewer. The mean agee of the participants was 34.8 years. The educational level of the women was quite high; almostt 25% stated to have graduated from college and another 24% from university.1
11
To enable a comparison between the Netherlands and the US, we provide an overly simplified description off the Dutch school system. After primary school, age 4 to 12, all children have to attend secondary educationn until the age of 16. Secondary education is provided on three schooi-types, corresponding to a lower,, average and higher educational level. Depending on their intellectual capacities and professional interest,, students enrol in one of these school-types. Students who graduate from a school for higher secondaryy education at the age of 18, usually continue their education to an advanced level. Those who aspire too a professional career will attend one of die schools for 'higher professional education' (college). Students
Tablee 2.1 Mean Acceptability of Lying, Standard Deviation and Rank Number per SituationSituation Category from the Perspective of Self and Others
Category y M M SD SD Rank k
Sociall Unimportant Acquaintance
Sociall Unimportant Best Friend
Sociall Important Acquaintance
Sociall Important Best Friend
Individualisticc Unimportant Acquaintance
Individualisticc Unimportant Best Friend
Individualisticc Important Acquaintance
Individualisticc Important Best Friend
Egoisticc Unimportant Acquaintance
Egoisticc Unimportant Best Friend
Egoisticc Important Acquaintance
Egoisticc Important Best Friend
Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s Self f Others s 5.05 5 6.50 0 4.85 5 5.72 2 5.35 5 6.12 2 5.07 7 6.75 5 4.50 0 5.75 5 3.85 5 5.85 5 3.45 5 5.85 5 2.60 0 4.95 5 3.63 3 5.20 0 2.60 0 4.67 7 2.50 0 4.73 3 1.98 8 4.75 5 1.59 9 1.85 5 1.53 3 1.54 4 1.56 6 1.56 6 1.02 2 1.13 3 1.96 6 1.54 4 1.69 9 1.27 7 2.10 0 1.34 4 1.48 8 1.25 5 1.54 4 2.07 7 1.16 6 1.48 8 1.19 9 2.25 5 1.75 5 1.53 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 7 7 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 5 5 6 6 6 6 4/5 5 8 8 4/5 5 9/10 0 9 9 7 7 8 8 9/10 0 12 2 11 1 11 1 12 2 10 0
whoo aspire to a higher professional career or who have a more scientific interest will attend one of the universitiess to earn their 'masters-degree' within about 4 to 6 years.
MeansMeans per Category
Inn order to determine the relative acceptability of each category of lies, for each participant twoo scores were calculated; the mean score of the four answers regarding the 'self-question' andd the mean score of the four answers regarding the 'others-question'. The mean for each off the 12 situation categories subsequently was calculated from the mean scores of the participantss that judged the scenarios from within the same category.
Inn Table 2.1, for the questions regarding both self and others, for each situation category, thee mean, standard deviation and rank order number is given. Worth noting is the fact that thee estimations to what extent 'most other persons' would judge the lies presented in the scenarioss to be acceptable, show that the participants perceive others to find all categories off lies more acceptable than they do themselves. The spread in acceptability, however, is largerr for the means with respect to 'self than with respect to 'others'. It seems that participantss do differentiate more in their own answers than they do in answering for others.. The difference between total means with regard to 'self (M = 3.76, SD = 1.89) and 'others'' (M = 5.57, SD = 1.69) is significant (r (179) = -13.05,/? < .001). As can be seen on thee right-hand side of Table 1, the order of the means within the two answering categories iss largely the same as is expressed by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of .85, p < .0011 (Van den Brink & Koele, 1987).
MainMain and Interaction Effects
Thee main and interaction effects for Motive, Situation and Relation were tested in two separatee 3 x 2 x 2 Analyses of Variance.2 The results applying to the questions with regard too 'self and 'others' perspectives, will be described below.
Self-perspective Self-perspective
Inn Table 2.2 the means for the three factors are reported. With respect to 'self a significant effectt for Motive was found ( F ( 2 , 168) = 33.30, p < .001). The three sublevels for Motive
22
Although we present two separate analyses of variance in the main text, a repeated measures analyses of variancee with Perspective (self/others) as a within-subjects factor provides information that is of additional interest.. The tests of between-subjects effects showed significant effects of the Motive (F (2, 168) = 31.52, p << .001), the Relation (F (1, 168) = 5.12, p < .05) and the interaction between Motive and Situation (F (2, 168) == 3.15,p < .05) on the combination of both perspectives. The test involving the within-subjects effect showed aa significant effect for Perspective (F (1, 168) = 176.46, p < .001), as well as a significant Motive by
PerspectivePerspective effect (F (2, 168) = 4.17, p < .05). Inspection of the combined means for Motive, revealed that
thee smallest difference between 'self and 'others' is found for the social motives (d = 1.26) and the largest differencess for the individualistic (d = 2.00) and egoistic motives (d = 2 .16).
differedd significantly (Tukey-HSD, p < .05). Social lies are judged as more acceptable than individualisticc and egoistic lies. Individualistic lies in turn are judged more acceptable than egoisticc lies. Furthermore, significant effects for Situation and Relation were found. Tellingg lies towards an acquaintance was judged more acceptable than telling lies towards thee best friend (F (1, 168) = 7.25, p < .01). The hypothesis that it would be more acceptablee to tell lies about relatively unimportant matters than about relatively important matterss was confirmed as well (F(l, 168) = 5.36,/? < .05).
Others-perspective Others-perspective
Thee differences between the means and the range in which these means fall (see Table 2.2),, are much smaller in case of'others' than in case of'self. For 'others' only a significant effectt for Motive was found (F (2, 168) = 12.04, p < .001). Social lies do not differ significantlyy from individualistic lies, but social lies do differ significantly from egoistic liess (Tukey-HSD, p < .05).
Tablee 2.2 Mean Acceptability of Lying for each Level of Motive, Situation and Relation from
thethe Perspective of Self and Others
Motive e Situation n Relation n Social l Individualistic c Egoistic c Important t Unimportant t Bestt friend Acquaintance e Self f M M 5.01 1 3.60 0 2.68 8 3.49 9 4.03 3 3.45 5 4.08 8 SD SD 1.44 4 1.91 1 1.52 2 1.99 9 1.75 5 1.82 2 1.91 1 M M 6.27 7 5.60 0 4.84 4 5.52 2 5.61 1 5.45 5 5.69 9 Other r SD SD 1.55 5 1.38 8 1.83 3 1.69 9 1.70 0 1.53 3 1.84 4
MotiveMotive by Situation Interaction
Probablyy of more practical significance seems the fact that a significant interaction effect wass found between Motive and Situation (F (2, 168) = 4.07, p < .05). As is shown in Figuree 2.1, telling lies about relatively unimportant matters is judged somewhat less acceptablee than telling lies about relatively important matters in case of social motives ( F ( l ,, 174) = 0.91, p = .341). In cases of individualistic and egoistic motives, however, tellingg lies about relatively important matters is judged significantly less acceptable than tellingg lies about relatively unimportant matters (F (I, 174) = 7.86, p < .01, respectively F ( l ,, 174) = 4.55, p < .05). Because the spread in means regarding important matters is broaderr than the spread in means regarding unimportant matters, Motive seems to have a greaterr impact in relatively important situations than in relatively unimportant situations.
—m—m 'Individualistic 5,211 a Egoistic
Importantt Unimportant Situation n
Figuree 2.1 Acceptability of Lying as a Function of Motive and Situation from the PerspectivePerspective of Self
D i s c u s s i o n n
Inn accordance with our expectations, from the participants own perspective, Motive,
SituationSituation and Relation were each found to influence the judgement of the acceptability of
lies.. Of the anticipated interactions, only the interaction between Motive and Situation appearedd to be significant. The judgments of the categories of lies varied from 'absolutely unacceptable'' to 'somewhat unacceptable' when evaluated from participants' own perspective.. When the participants were asked to take the perspective of most other persons,, only a significant main effect for Motive was found. From this second perspective, thee judgements of the categories of lies varied from 'somewhat unacceptable' to 'somewhatt acceptable'. When participants took the perspective of most other persons they thuss tended to assign higher acceptability scores to the lies.
Despitee the fact that the results strongly suggest the motive of the liar to be of major importancee to the acceptability of telling lies within different contexts, the proportion of systematicc variance in the sample that is associated with Motive only is moderate from the perspectivee of 'self (tf^ = .28), and even less substantial from the perspective of 'others' (( %ar = -12). The finding that the relative importance of the situation is also of influence on thee acceptability of telling lies, to the best of our knowledge, had not been found earlier. Althoughh the association between Situation and acceptability is weak (if r= .03), lying
aboutt relatively important matters was found to be less acceptable than lying about relativelyy unimportant matters. Of more practical meaning is the finding that Motive and
SituationSituation interact (/£,,= .05). Our participants judged lying about important matters
slightlyy more acceptable than lying about unimportant matters in cases of social motives. Theyy judged lies about unimportant matters relatively more acceptable than lies about importantt matters in case of individualistic and egoistic lies. Based on the conclusions of otherr research, the expectation was that lying to one's best friend would be judged significantlyy less acceptable than lying to an acquaintance. However, the association betweenn Relation and acceptability is also weak (if = .04).
Thee results of this study lead us to the following conclusions. First, although the effect sizess are not impressive, the results strongly suggest that the acceptability of telling lies indeedd is determined by the motive, the situation and the relationship to the other person
involved.. As a consequence, it seems justifiable to argue that participants weigh the same factorss that our pilot-interviewees in the interview groups said they weighed when involvedd in the decision whether or not to tell a lie.
Second,, the results do suggest that participants weigh the role of the motive of the liarr in combination with the relative importance of the situation when judging the acceptabilityy of telling a lie. In doing this, they seem to take into account that in cases of sociall motives, the person who is lied to has the greatest interest in lying, and in cases of individualisticc and egoistic motives the person who is lying has the greatest interest in lying.. Translated in terms of acceptability it can be argued that a) as the interest of the personn that is lied to becomes greater, lying becomes more acceptable; b) as the interest of thee liar becomes greater, lying becomes less acceptable.
Third,, the results suggest that with respect to an acquaintance it seems to be regardedd as more acceptable to tell a lie in order to maintain or create a positive image of oneselff than with respect to the best friend. As mentioned in the introduction, people seem too assume that one should (be able to) be honest towards friends.
Finally,, the results suggest that the women in the present study hold the same opinionss as the students in our interview groups. It can be argued that the women have inferredd from their perception that others (are predisposed to) lie more often than they do themselves,, that others find it more acceptable to lie. Although we instructed participants too take the position of most other persons when estimating the judgement of others, we learnedd from their spontaneous comments that they tried to imagine or remember what otherss (would) do in that kind of situation. Therefore, the judgement attributed to others probablyy reflects literally the perception of what others do and not what others think. Nevertheless,, the systematically 'higher' estimations of acceptability attributed to others doess indicate a 'false-uniqueness effect' (e.g. Suls & Wan, 1987).
Thee results seem very clear and straightforward, but it should be stressed that we present aggregatedd scores, and our interpretations of the results thus hold at the group level and not necessarilyy at the individual level. As can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 the standard deviationss are rather large indicating different response patterns but also different opinions withinn the group of participants. Some variation in response patterns is fairly normal in researchh using questionnaires, but the individual scores and the spontaneous comments of participantss made us aware of some personal factors that in future should be taken into accountt when studying attitudes towards lying in everyday life. The first factor concerns
thee fact that some individuals reject lying under all circumstances while others accept lying inn almost all situations. The second factor concerns the fact that the same score not always stemss from the same consideration. For example, some lies were rejected because participantss found the matter or reason too trivial to lie about, while other lies were rejectedd because participants found the matter or reason too important to lie about.
Thee studies of Lindskold and colleagues (1983, 1986) and Maier and Lavrakas (1976) suggestedd that social lies tend to be judged acceptable. This more tolerant judgement could bee due to the fact that the former authors used other labels for their answering scale (permissiblee to totally wrong) possibly causing a tendency away from being a 'moralist'. Alsoo it could be due to the fact that their participants had to judge rather vague descriptions thatt referred to lying which produced a more distant judgement. One of the limitations of ourr study, on the other hand, is the fact that we 'interviewed' the participants face-to-face, possiblyy encouraging a tendency to present oneself as being an honest person. The study onlyy involved females and questions were provided in only one order. The fact that participantss were interviewed under circumstances in which they could easily be distracted fromm the interview, might have considerably reduced effect sizes.
Inn sum, the results of the present study show that situational characteristics are indeed importantt determinants of the perception of lying as (un)acceptable. The results furthermoree indicate that the outcome of studies that applied Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) theoryy of reasoned action or Ajzen's (1985) theory of planned behaviour to predict lying andd related behaviours heavily depend on the specific characteristics of the situation which participantss had in mind (e.g. De Vries & Ajzen, 1971; Enker, 1987; Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Furthermore,, these authors seemed largely unaware of the fact that some circumstances are likelyy to produce lying (Millar & Tesser, 1989), and that in some situations hardly anyone willl lie while in others almost everyone will.
