Integration courses in Europe : accomplishment or failure? : a comparative study of integration courses and language requirements concerning newcomers in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands

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Integration courses in Europe: Accomplishment or failure?

A comparative study of integration courses and language

requirements concerning newcomers in Austria, Denmark,

Finland, and the Netherlands

Borbála Wintermans (11129190)

Master’s Thesis Political Science – International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Jeroen Doomernik

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International migration, by definition, means the action when people migrate from one country to another. It would be too hasty to say, however, that the process of migrants crossing borders is this simple. In contrast, it probably has never been this complicated as the world is currently experiencing an influx of refugees coming mostly from war-torn Middle Eastern and African countries, that many of us refer to as a 'refugee crisis'. When newcomers arrive in their country of destination (may they be refugees or immigrants seeking a better future) it requires a lot of time to adjust to their new environment and they also need to settle down. Furthermore, action calls for reaction: host countries have to guide novices during their initial stage of existence in their new society.

Several European countries have adopted special integration policies in order to outline rights and obligations for newcomers. To support their advancement in integration, some of them have launched so-called 'integration courses', also referred to as 'civic integration courses' or 'integration trainings'. The main element of these integration courses is seemingly the language training component that will receive special attention in my research project. One can oftentimes come across arguments that these courses were unquestionably introduced to minimize the number of additional immigrants because they typically have to fulfill some requirements (such as taking an exam) in order to gain permanent residence. Another criticism that has been voiced in connection with the obligation to participate in civic integration courses is that they are only aimed at third country nationals: this is, on the one hand self-evident due to the free movement of individuals within the European Union, but on the other hand it can also be regarded as controversial why and on what grounds nationals of certain countries are excluded from this burden. This controversy is oftentimes explained by the fact that notion that immigrants need to be integrated is based on the idea that the receiving society can be characterized as an "already integrated, bounded society, which faces the risk of disintegration and unbinding due to immigration". (Joppke and Morawska 2014: 3) Joppke and Morawska (2014: 3) furthermore refer to postclassical sociology and the contradictory fact that - even before globalization - such a society has never existed, with only one exception: "in the imagination of some (especially political) actors".

To look at these policies from a different angle, there seems to be a paradox between the fact that Europe has always promoted diversity, cultural pluralism "firmly based on the respect of differences which implies equality, tolerance and non-discrimination" (Niessen

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2000:11) and the fact that numerous countries require immigrants to participate in integration courses and to pass language exams if they want to reside in the country. Christian Joppke (2007:14), one of the most prominent researchers on civic integration went even further calling it "an instance (...) of 'illiberal social policy' in a liberal state".

Nevertheless, by writing this thesis it is not my intention to deliver a judgement on the necessity or fairness of civic integration courses. My point of departure is rather the standpoint that Western liberal democracies generally advocate, namely that obtaining elementary knowledge of the host country's language is essential and indispensable if someone wants to participate and contribute to society. However, when it comes to civic integration courses and the obligation to pass certain tests in order to obtain (for example) permanent residence, I do suggest (as several prominent scholars researching this topic, whose academic work I will draw upon later) a critical approach. I will devote complete scrutiny to the comparison of existing civic integration policy measures and their outcomes in four member states of the European Union: Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. The logic behind choosing these four countries out of the present twenty-eight EU members is the fact that the above-mentioned four have all introduced certain policy measures regarding integration, but at the same time they have had (both in the past and present) different experiences when it comes to immigrants (if we consider their ethnic background, proportion and so on).

In spite of their different experiences, however, there is no doubt that immigration has been highly debated in the political sphere in all the four countries: we can generally see that since the 1990s nationalist parties either increased their popularity (notably the Finn's Party in Finland that in 1999 acquired one seat of the 200-member Finnish Parliament, but after an abrupt rise they now occupy thirty-eight seats) (The parliamentary groups 2015) or – although without any expansion – they delivered steady results regardless some fluctuation [see for example the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) (Nordsieck 2013)]. Pointing this out is indispensable due to the fact that we can see a tendency of immigrant policies themselves becoming "strongly politicized over the past decade". (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013)

My research furthermore focuses on the specific objectives and ambitions that Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands have proclaimed in their integration programs. These include involvement in the labor market (decreasing unemployment rates among immigrants), creating a generally more inclusive society (fighting segregation and

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discrimination) and securing better prospects for future generations (for example by means of improving educational attainment). In my research project I will have a closer look at whether one can justify that these aspirations have indeed been achieved. To sum up, my research question is thus formulated as the following:

What kind of outcomes (accomplishments and failures) can we observe after the implementation of civic integration courses in the Austrian, Danish, Finnish and Dutch societies regarding the inclusion of newcomers?

Do civic integration courses, as they aim to, create better opportunities for immigrants regarding their sociocultural and economic advancements, or is it just an illusion and a source of restricting immigration flows? Several authors have argued that as opposed to civic integration attempts, there is only one recipe in order to achieve an inclusive society, and that is time, or as Joppke (2008:539) put it, "the only temporal source of unity left is – the future" and thus that we have to interpret civic integration courses as remedies for the present. However, there is no doubt that we can identify achievements and deficiencies in the four chosen countries when it comes to integrating newcomers by means of civic integration courses and language trainings. As the requirements and logics differ from country to country, there is room for writing a comparative study on the matter.

In order to obtain a deeper understanding on the issue, I will more explicitly analyze the case of the Dutch language courses and try to detect practical hindrances in launching these language sessions that are meant to facilitate the inclusion of newcomers with a rather different ethnic, cultural and educational background. Data on this particular issue will be collected as primary data at the headquarters of the Dutch Council of Refugees1 where I oversee and give advice to candidates to choose the most suitable language track during their integration process.

The thesis first provides a detailed insight of the theoretical background. After specifying my research methods, the following part looks at the countries of analysis one by one so that the reader can gain better understanding of the consecutive section, which will discuss the developments regarding integration measures in the four chosen EU member states, as well as examine them in contrast. The last chapter will include concluding thoughts and seek to provide an answer to the research question, namely whether we can understand integration courses as an achievement or a failure.

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II. Theoretical framework

In order to define some essential concepts to be used throughout my research project, the following chapter is allotted to theories that give a basis for my argumentation. My aim is to outline them one by one, followed by an explanation of why they are significant and how they are related to my subject matter. I have identified the following theories that could frame my research project:

One of the main theories that will guide me through my analysis is the liberal paradox, applied in the context of immigration. Even though the liberal paradox theorem was first applied in the field of economics (attributed to the Indian economist and Harvard professor Amartya Sen)2 , due to the fact that immigration has a considerable effect on the economy of nation states, the notion has been revisited by several scholars studying the area of immigration policies. As this thesis sets out to question the current approach of 'liberal' nation states towards immigration from third countries, the liberal immigration paradox rationale suggests an adequate frame for understanding why nation states tend to favor limiting immigration at all when in fact it is no secret that most countries, especially in the case of the ageing Europe, depend on and benefit from immigrants' labor. (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013: 1) The inaugural idea to construct the reasoning of the migration state and the liberal paradox is accredited to James F. Hollifield (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013: 2) whose point of departure is that there is indeed a challenge underlying the mobility of individuals across state borders (as well as the effects of transnational trade and cross-border investments) because they can "violate the principles of sovereignty, which requires a degree of territorial closure". (Hollifield 2004: 887) According to him the paradox lies between "the economic logic of openness" and the political and legal logic of closure. The question he rises is: "How can states escape from this paradox?" (ibid.: 887) It seems clear to me that states attempt to solve this ambiguity by imposing their immigration policies, which then lie between the economic interest of staying open, and the legal and political concerns of imposing restraints.

2_{The original theory can be found here:}_{Sen, A., 1970. The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of} political economy, 78(1), pp.152-157.

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Another conflicting point is the fact that in our interdependent world neo-liberal economies are very much in need of foreign labor: as Jørgensen and Thomsen (2013:2) point out, immigrants, "the negative perceptions in the populations – are a factor for economic growth" whereas in contrast the presence of immigrants has become highly politicized, with political parties repeatedly communicating denial and disapproval.

As Sara Wallace Goodman (2010: 767) once put it, the real challenge seems to be finding the balance between "liberalization pressures that push towards open borders, including economic needs" and "liberal/historical precedents" by which she refers to prior incidents such as family unification out of colonial affiliations, and current issues on the political agenda (public attitudes, security threats) that generally advocate the closure and control of borders.

When we move forward to civic integration courses, the paradox, in my opinion, lies in the logic why liberal nation states require citizens of certain (non-Western) countries to go through these processes, and on what grounds they do not obligate others. Christian Joppke (2008: 541) formulated a brilliant statement about this puzzle in the following way: "the exclusive and thus identity-forging dimension of particular universalism can be formulated as the notion that the liberal state is only for liberal people. This is, of course, a profoundly illiberal idea (...)". Moreover, Joppke (2008) also believes that civic integration practices as such are a sign of repressive liberalism because they aspire to liberal goals by illiberal means.

Another scholar who researched the origins, evolution and structuring of civic integration and was not all too positive about its advancement either is Dora Kostakopoulou

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who claimed that there was "no historic necessity or inevitability about the adoption of the civic integration paradigm". (2010b: 935) She also believes that advocating mandatory language requirements, immigration tests and civic integration courses as a prerequisite of permanent residence and identifying them as actions enhancing social cohesion is nothing but a political argument which tells us nothing about the inclusion of newcomers. (ibid.: 2010b) She notes that current practices are the renewal of old nationalistic features if we think of policy characteristics such as "the centrality of the national language, the uniqueness and the primacy of the nation, the culturalization of politics, the top-down definition of the 'good citizen' and the endemic belief that 'others', that is, non-nationals are deficient". (2010b: 949) Even though these policies might have nationalistic features, Christian Joppke (2007: 14) notes that it would be deceitful to associate them with “the rebirth of nationalism and racism”. In contrast, Kostakopoulou (2010a: 837) underlines civic integration’s essentialist and racialized dimensions, too, for example because of the fact that Western media oftentimes portray Islam as something irreconcilable with the respect of universal human rights, democracy or gender equality. Deducing Kostakopoulou’s prior-mentioned assertions, it appears to be evident that having such thoughts about civic integration practices suggests arguments for another proposition, that she explained the following way. If “fashionable language of integration represents a politically dated and normatively deficient approach to ethnic diversity” (Kostakopoulou 2010a: 830), then what exactly is the right approach to this issue? She proposes a completely different framework that she calls ‘pluralistic frame’. This frame includes elements such as affirming pluralism, reflecting the process-like nature of adaptation and settlement, prioritizing interaction, mutual learning and practices of cooperation in society (that says, with the inclusion of every citizen, resident and newcomer). (ibid.: 2010) According to her the reason why changing our attitude would be essential is because - as opposed to nationalistic perspectives – these factors do not “seek to impose an artificial unity in society” or “an ideal homogeneity” in beliefs and values. Nor do they rely on “performative acts”, by which she refers to the obligatory attendance of integration courses, taking exams and naturalization oaths. (ibid.: 2010b: 956) In summary, she maintains that neo-nationalism should be rejected, whereas reasonableness embraced.

One can without doubt notice that there has been a target group created in public debate as these policies are specifically aimed at non-Western immigrants. Arizonian researchers Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (1993: 334) have called this process the "social construction of target populations" by which they refer to "the cultural

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characterization of popular images of the persons or groups whose behavior is affected by public policy". They furthermore underline that these characterizations are "normative and evaluative, portraying groups in positive or negative terms through symbolic language, metaphors and stories". (Edelman cited in Schneider and Ingram 1993: 334) Hence, in our case the group of immigrants who are affected by the host country's integration policies. Jørgensen and Thomsen have revisited this theory in the context of the inclusion of newcomers. They suggest that when it comes to inclusion, target group constructions are more likely to reach exact opposite outcomes: they facilitate policy tools that marginalize and exclude these groups, "rather than enabling them to, for instance, enter the labor market". (Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2013: 4) Going one step further, they believe that divisive policy designs and valuing a certain target group differently will affect the target group's orientation to government, to identity, to political participation, to citizenship and to democracy itself in a rather negative way. (ibid.: 2013: 4)

Speaking about identity, Schwartz et al. (2006) conducted research on the role of identity in the acculturation process among immigrant people, which is an interesting study to review in this research project as well, especially because they outlined the experiences of non-Western immigrants moving to Western societies. One might raise the question why identity is regarded to be a crucial factor when it comes to the integration of immigrants. The answer, however, seems to be quite straightforward: Huntington (cited in Schwartz et al. 2006: 15) strongly believed that the “clash of civilizations” (in this case that of traditional and Western habits) “may be based fundamentally on identity”. Before advancing ideas about how acculturation and one's identity are related, it is necessary to define these two concepts. In the most general terms, acculturation can be defined as "the process of cultural change and adaptation that occurs when individuals from different cultures come into contact". (Gibson, 2001:19) In contrast, there is no academic agreement on the core definition of identity: Brubaker and Cooper even suggest that identity as such does not exist at all, but that the notion can represent "anything pertaining to the self" (Brubaker and Cooper, cited in Schwartz et al. 2006: 3). In order to draw on a more tangible definition, Schwartz et al. (2006: 5) suggest to borrow that of Erikson (1950) because he characterized identity as multidimensional, as well as embedded within cultural contexts. However, he only distinguished between personal and social aspects of it. Due to this reason, building on Erikson's theory, but developing it further, Schwartz et al. (2006: 6) described identity as a "synthesis of personal, social and cultural self-conceptions". Goals, values and beliefs that

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"an individual adopts and holds" constitute personal identity. Social identity stands for self-identified ideals, mores, labels and the group one identifies with, stands for and favors, in opposition to the outgroup(s) one distances himself from. (Erikson; Tajfel and Turner cited in Schwartz et al. 2006: 6) Finally, cultural identity implies to "a sense of solidarity" (ibid: 6) with the ideals of someone's own cultural group and the manifested beliefs, behaviors and attitudes towards another cultural group (and the ingroup as well). One can easily recognize the fact that these are attributes (someone’s attitude, belief and behavior) that can change or that can be changed. Schwartz et al. argue (2006: 6) that there is no doubt that an immigrant person gets exposed to the culture ideals of the receiving society, which is a result of social interactions in the new environment. Accordingly, the identity of the newcomer will “likely change”. Social identity - and even more so, cultural identity – change as a result of acculturation. (Schwartz et al. 2006: 10) Personal identity, in contrast, can be understood as “protective” to the self because its core is rather solid: our fundamental goals, values, beliefs and their coherence are to a high degree anchored in our mind, however, Schwartz et al. (2006: 10) found that personal identity with its “protective role (…) has the potential to stabilize the individual during the transition to a new society”. Hence, the relationship between identity and acculturation is that "social and cultural identity underlie acculturation", and furthermore that "personal identity can help to ‘anchor’ the immigrant person during cultural transition and adaptation". I believe this statement is rather important due to the fact that civic integration courses predestine to shape newcomers' identity to a certain extent. According to the aforementioned study, when it comes to acculturation, Western, non-European immigrant people (that my research project also concentrates on) face increased distress and difficulties among the receiving (Western) societies’ dominant cultural groups due to “greater cultural and phenotypic differences” (Schwartz et al. 2006: 12), such as the difference between individualistic and developed (Western) societies and the essentially collectivist and developing sending societies.

When it comes to integration, it seems axiomatic that we cannot overlook integration theory itself. The conceptualization of Johan Wets (2006) outlines three dimensions of integration: social, cultural and structural. The first dimension (social integration) refers to the degree of interaction and contact between immigrants and natives. Cultural integration (which I consider utterly important regarding my thesis because civic integration courses are meant to advocate it) refers to the degree to which immigrants and natives share values, norms and preferences. Last but not least, structural integration concerns the socio-economic

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and political aspects. (Wets, cited in Permoser and Rosenberger 2012: 39-40) Other academics (see for example Schiffauer, cited in Permoser and Rosenberger 2012: 39) have interpreted integration either as the equal treatment and equal access by migrants to the same rights and duties as local citizens, or as newcomers' adoption of the majority society's values and their way of life.

Another important theory that one needs to take into account is that of assimilation. In order to define assimilation, I suggest to borrow Rogers Brubaker's reasoning in which he stated that new practices and policies that we call assimilationist have to be interpreted as the endorsement of becoming similar, "in the sense of politically recognizing, legally constituting and symbolically emphasizing commonality, rather than difference". (Brubaker 2014:46) Without going into details, several European politicians have noted that integration policies in Europe were not of an assimilationist nature, as if the very notion assimilation had to be hindered and interpreted as something harmful for society. In contrast, Brubaker (2014) suggests a completely different approach to assimilation, underlining that we first have to understand the difference between two of its meanings. In the general meaning, assimilation can be interpreted as "increasing similarity or likeness". (Brubaker 2014: 42) It is thus a matter of degree as the emphasis is on the process of becoming similar, making similar or treating as similar. In addition, "assimilation designates a direction of change, not a particular degree of similarity". (Brubaker 2014: 42) For this reason, Brubaker argues (2014:42) that assimilation does not seem to be morally unacceptable or analytically fruitless. The explanation why it is still regarded to have negative moral and political connotations originates from the other meaning of assimilation: its specific and organic sense, where the root meaning is transitive. Brubaker (2014: 42) references the Oxford English Dictionary, according to which assimilation can be defined as "convert [it] into a substance of its own nature, as the bodily organs convert food into blood, and thence into animal tissue... to absorb into the system, [to] incorporate". However, it is clear that people do not (cannot) change as chemical substances - they can only become similar in certain respects - and so thinking about assimilation as complete absorption is empirically wrong.

Scholars in the field of integration, especially when it comes down to comparing integration practices, have noted that even though some decades ago we could undoubtedly observe differences between countries (pointing to two bigger groups: the republican and assimilationist group such as France and the multiculturalist group such as the Netherlands) (see for example Bertossi et. al 2015; Brubaker 1992; Goodman 2010; Joppke 2007), the

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contemporary view on this issue is that we can rather notice convergence than divergence. According to Christian Joppke (2007) it is ambiguous whether thinking about integration policy ‘models’ ever made sense, however, he also underlines the tendency of researchers still making a distinction. If this is the case though, what explains the fact that they indeed once have been constructed and that the conceptual framework of models still dominate academic literature? Moreover, how can we define these models to begin with? Drawing on other prominent scholars’ work (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Koopmans et. al 2005; Schain 2009), Bertossi et al. (2015: 60) explain that a national model of integration and citizenship is generally defined as a public philosophy, a policy paradigm, and institutional and discursive opportunity structure or a national cultural idiom. They can be originated from “pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding”, such as – to name one example - distinct views on state functions. The way integration is embraced varies “according to specific national histories”, as well as peculiar public perceptions of national identity. (ibid.: 2015: 59;60) Even though Bertossi et al. do not question whether framing one’s academic work in the concept of national models still makes sense or not, they do allude to some advantages and shortcomings for every researcher who would decide to do so. Firstly, they reveal that the way these national models oversimplify certain policies but at the same time amplify their “alleged coherency and consistency” seems to be quite problematic. After all, it may not be a coincidence that the Oxford dictionary defines the noun ‘model’ as the following: “a simplified description (...) of a system or process”; or “a thing used as an example to follow or imitate”. (Oxford dictionary online) Hence, semantics already tells us a lot about how we should interpret these models: undoubtedly not as something depicting complete reality. Nonetheless, relying on national models, as Bertossi et al. (2015: 61;62) argue, “seem to offer considerable advantages for comparative research on the incorporation of immigrants and their offspring into Western European countries”, but we have to remain judicious that they do not become perceived more than just a model. This can easily happen if a model “begins to shape our understanding and beliefs about policies”, which is false, because a model can never be an authentic historical reconstruction of policy. The process of convergence might have something to do with the fact that in 2004 the European Union introduced the so-called 'Common Basic Principles' regarding integration that incorporates EU initiatives to promote integration. In spite of immigrant integration policies prevailing to be the competence of member states, the Council of the European Union outlined the unbinding guidelines of common standards that every member state should take into consideration. We cannot leave

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this without mentioning due to the fact that Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands are all members of the EU.

The first principle underlines the two-way nature of integration, defined as the process of "mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States" (Council of the European Union 2004), suggesting that it is clearly not only the immigrant, but also the receiving society that has to change. Even though this seems like a fairly responsive approach, Joppke (2007: 6) calls our attention to its utmost improbability, at the same time acknowledging that it is inescapable for a receiving society to change: however, it does not change because it should, but because - as a natural result of migration - it eventually would.

In connection with the second common basic principle, which reads "integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union" Joppke (2007:6) remarks that these values (the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law) are political values, which is strange in a sense that if we accept that these are liberal values, and political liberalism has always advocated integration as opposed to assimilation, then imposing the majority society's culture on newcomers does not seem convincing.

When it comes to the third principle, it deals with one of the most crucial aspect of integration: employment. I believe that when it comes to employment, it is just as important regarding citizens of the host society as it is for immigrants. Being unemployed already maintains being an outsider to a certain extent. For this reason it is even more critical for immigrants to find a job so that they can contribute to society and in addition to make such contributions 'visible'. (Council of the European Union 2004)

The fourth common basic principle is particularly interesting in this research project because it concerns integration by the means of language. It furthermore mentions that knowledge about the host society's history and institutions is equally fundamental to successful integration (this also provides an explanation why countries have adopted historical and institutional questions in their integration exams).

Moving on to the fifth common basic principle, which lays out the gravity that education has in the process of integration it seems clear that there seems to be a strong connection between being educated and being integrated as education predicts employment, which once again results in actively contributing to society.

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The sixth principle promotes the standard of non-discrimination. According to Joppke (2007: 9), anti-discrimination and civic integration are in a "peculiar coexistence": the fact that they are both advocated by policy makers signals that in reality two-way integration (illustrated in the first common basic principle) "consists of two separate one-way processes". In the beginning, "the burden of change is all on the migrant" but later on "the burden of change is all on society": these two notions thus rest on explicitly reverse logics, civic integration addressing the beginning of the migration process, while anti-discrimination addressing the very end of it.

Even more notably, the seventh (and the last one acknowledged in this thesis) common basic principle describes that "frequent interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration". In other words, the lack of social inclusion and segregation encumber the already troublesome process of integration and should therefore be addressed as something to refrain from.

If we thus think in the context of the EU, the process of convergence is not that surprising anymore - after all, as Joppke (2007: 4) argues, Europeanization explains the very notion of convergence. In addition, I believe that the aforementioned EU principles can be interpreted as not only guidelines, but as objectives as well. Hence, following this logic we can identify the following targets: to integrate immigrants into the job market (fighting unemployment as newcomers are usually more vulnerable when it comes to finding a job), to make them acquire sufficient knowledge about the language of the host country, to provide proper education to immigrants (with a special emphasis on their descendants, clearly referring to students with a foreign background who tend to drop out from school earlier than locals), and last but not least, to fight discrimination and segregation by means of social inclusion. It is obvious that if there are targets, there have to be results (or a lack of them), too. Accordingly, the selected countries’ results (whether they failed or accomplished to move towards a more equal society), which I will seek to examine throughout my thesis, can be analyzed.

Whether it makes sense to think in the conceptual framework of models or not, I believe that even if we can notice inferior disparities nowadays, it undeniably still makes sense (as I will attempt to prove later on), to scrutinize and compare their outcomes in the countries of analysis.

Before making further advancements in comparing different outcomes in Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, I will first outline my methodology, followed by a short, one by

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one description of the countries of analysis so that one can gain better insight into their background concerning integration courses.

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Research methods

The purpose of this research project is to analyze whether we can regard integration courses as policies advantageously contributing to societies or whether we can notice and recognize that they have helped to develop societies for the better. I believe that on the grounds that the implementation of these courses is rather costly (paid for by the tax payers of the receiving country, at least in the form of loans) it is a desirable expectation that they also have traceable results. Their results should correspond their main aim, thus creating a more equal and more inclusive society, which is undoubtedly both beneficial for locals and newcomers as well. If one cannot contemplate verifiable outcomes, one could rightfully question why these policies are otherwise still enforced. It has to be acknowledged that concentrating on integration policies is limited in a sense that - appropriately summarized by the creators of the so-called Migrant Integration Policy Index "government policy is only one of a number of factors which affects integration, it is vital because it sets the legal and political framework within which other aspects of integration occur". (MIPEX 2015) The MIPEX stands for 'Migrant Integration Policy Index' measuring 167 policy indicators that promote integration (I will provide more details about it later).

My aim is to generate insight regarding the relationship between launching integration courses and the level of inclusiveness in the Austrian, Danish, Finnish and Dutch societies. As already presented in the theoretical chapter, I have detected the main measures that we can also understand as targets when it comes to fruitfully integrating immigrants: to reduce the unemployment rate among immigrants; to improve newcomers' language proficiency; to boost their educational attainment; and to enhance their social inclusion. Drawing on my theoretical framework, which advocated that integration courses are in theory rather incompetent, for example because perfect unity in society does not exist; because people's identity is multidimensional; or because assimilation, understood as becoming similar; is a long and complex process; it is now my task to prove or disapprove these theories. Correspondingly, integration courses that are meant to incorporate outsiders do not seem to offer too much remedy to social issues that can possibly emerge due to the arrival of immigrants, but of course the question is whether these theories can be justified or if reality tells us that they have to be rejected.

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my hypothesis is that integration courses do not foster the real inclusion of newcomers, which derives from the rather complex and lengthy nature of acculturation.

My methodology can be described as the following: countries will constitute my level of analysis, whereas the units of analysis are nationwide integration policies (integration courses) these countries have adopted. My data will be collected from international statistical sources, for example the statistical body of the European Union, Eurostat, as well as primary data on the outcomes of integration courses that I have collected at the Dutch Council of Refugees. The reason why I utilize these statistics is two-fold: first of all, collecting data that covers a big unit of society (non-EU immigrants) is technically impossible in a different manner, and secondly - as the Eurostat also underlines - probably the biggest advantage of its data is that it is comparable due to the fact that it must be collected based on common regulations and concepts in every Member State. (Eurostat 2015) Moreover, as country comparisons mostly suggest a quantitative approach, I firmly believe that statistical data will best contribute to the clarity of the argumentation of my research project. Data values will be identified for three key variables: unemployment, educational attainment and social inclusion. Furthermore, I will not only compare countries, but also include a diachronic comparison, thus the way integration courses have advanced in the past two decades, and if they did, whether they facilitated a move towards more inclusive societies or not. As it is undoubtable that the level of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of these courses are rather hard to measure, I propose the subsequent operationalization of the notion of inclusion: if statistical data demonstrates improvement of the variables (the above-mentioned unemployment, educational attainment and social inclusion) after the implementation of integration courses (within a five-year period that I will scrutinize), then it can be clearly understood as success, otherwise this is quite debatable. In order to clarify my operationalization method, and the questions to be answered I have created the following diagram:

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Furthermore, to analyze whether we can regard integration courses as having a positive effect on immigrants’ daily life and future chances, as well as to demonstrate my findings, I will introduce a chart. This chart will include my findings in a more sorted way: it aims to include whether countries could make progress in the above-mentioned variables. If they did, I will allot + 1 point. If the outcome is not clear or if the variable did not advance neither declined (more than one per cent), then I will assign 0 point. However, if the variable shifted in a way that we can understand as unfavourable for society (for example because the gap between natives and non-EU immigrants being at risk of poverty increased) I will mark every regression with - 1 point.

In the interest of making my research outcomes as decent as possible, I will additionally use the aforementioned MIPEX index. As I mentioned earlier, it measures 167 policy indicators that promote integration. Countries are given a score on a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the score, the more excelling a policy thrives in meeting "the highest standards for equal treatment", which is specified by experts. (MIPEX 2015) This data will support the reasoning whether we can regard certain outcomes as an achievement or a failure.

A smaller-scale database will be provided by the Dutch Council of Refugees that assists people (not only refugees) who are required to take the integration test find the most

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suitable course. Here I will collect my own data in order to find evidence about the accomplishments of integration courses that focus on language training. The reason why I consider language utterly critical in my research project is straightforward: in every society, speaking the local language can open many doors. In addition, speaking it on a higher level is without doubt a precondition to matters such as following an education, finding a well-paid job or being able to participate fully in society. This is apparently also what governments advocate as the incentive why newcomers have to participate in these courses. To name concrete examples, on the government website of the so-called Austrian Integration Agreement it is indicated that its objective is "to provide in-depth German language skills, in particular reading and writing skills, with an aim to enable third-country nationals to participate in the social, economic and cultural life". (Migration to Austria 2016) The official description about the Finnish immigrant integration training underlines the importance of measures to improve someone's language ability and equip them "with the skills required for further studies and the world of work", aiding individuals to "find their place in the social, academic and working world". (Amiedu3_{2016) Therefore I consider it to be indispensable to}

have a closer look at language trainings. Due to my limited time and resources I will conduct this research in the Netherlands. In this case I have taken a qualitative approach with the aim of identifying real dilemmas and puzzles when it comes to the realization of integration courses with the highest quality possible. I think it is that in such a controversial topic as civic integration and language training, it is not enough to detect possible failures, one also has to seek the answer why discrepancies can occur. As the subject of my research project is integration courses, I considered it to be a good idea to observe the participants of these courses. The data was collected in a period of four months, between March 2016 and June 2016. I actively participated in their 'intake' procedure, which meant that I first guided a conversation about their educational background, their motivation, their future goals and possible obstacles to attending the courses such as health issues or children of a young age to be taken care of. This part was followed by testing participants' initial Dutch knowledge (if any), checking whether they are illiterate and carrying out a logics test which is meant to decide whether someone can be regarded as a slow, an average or a fast learner. I will present my findings in the chapter specifically allotted for the critical analysis of difficulties of the implementation integration courses demonstrated by the Dutch example.

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III Country studies

Before further advancing in comparison of the outcomes, we first have to analyze the policies Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands have adopted. In the consecutive section I intend to reveal country-specific characteristics. It is essential to have a look at their background of immigration, too, due to the fact that I believe this knowledge will help us understand what their motivation was for approving select policies. In order to keep the alphabetical order, I suggest to start my summary with Austria, followed by Denmark, Finland and, last but not least, the Netherlands.

To include a general overview regarding the last few years (2010-2014), before going into details it is compelling to note that three out of four countries of analysis (Austria, Denmark and Finland) reportedly managed to make some progress according to their MIPEX index. (MIPEX 2015) So what kind of policies lie behind the Austrian, Danish and Finnish development and the Dutch repercussion?

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20 Austria

The Republic of Austria, a country long known for its neutrality, is an interesting case because until 2002 it did not adopt any integration measures in particular. (Permoser and Rosenberger 2012) At the same time, when it comes to civic integration measures, it was one of the pioneer EU countries (along with the Netherlands) to implement such policies, termed the 'Integration Agreement' (Integrationsvereinbarung). (Permoser 2012; Permoser and Rosenberger 2012).

Austria, in fact, has long been an immigrants' destination country, even though the Austrian government has always advocated the opposite, rejecting the notion that immigrants residing in the country should be integrated, regardless that it soon became evident that foreigners were in a disadvantaged position. (Permoser and Rosenberger 2012) Carrying out extensive research on the Austrian integration policy, Permoser and Rosenberger (2012: 41) furthermore assert that due to the fact that Austria (as well as the Netherlands which I will reflect on later) set up a guest workers program in the 1960s and 1970s, the Austrian administration deemed these laborers (mostly with Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian origin) who would eventually leave the country. It is thus not a surprising matter that immigrant children were "often" offered mother tongue instruction at school, to endorse their integration to their home country's educational system. (ibid.: 41)

In Austria, the question of integration is still rather politicized. The Integration Agreement, which was considered to be a major breakthrough, was openly communicated as a legislation which meant to keep out immigrants as it now became more perplexing to settle in the country. Although the Agreement can on the one hand be regarded as favorable due to the fact that (third-country) immigrants were encouraged (required) to learn German if they wanted to stay in the country, which in the future could boost their opportunities, the idea itself originated from the far-right party (FPÖ), known for their anti-immigrant campaign. (ibid: 47) According to an official government source though, the Agreement's real purpose is to "provide in-depth German language skills, in particular reading and writing skills, with an aim to enable third-country nationals to participate in the social, economic and cultural life in Austria". (migration.gv.at. 2016) We also have to note that these regulations have become more stringent, requiring A1 level in 2002, raising to A2 in 2005. As it stands now, the Government has divided the Integration Agreement into two parts: Module 1 and the consecutive Module 2. Module 1 is obligatory for third-country nationals, except for those

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who already obtain a "Stay Permit", an "EU Blue Card" or long term residence permit. Upon completion of the first module the applicant has to demonstrate a solid knowledge of elementary German on the above-mentioned A2 level. An applicant has to complete this module within two years after receiving temporary residence permit. (migration.gv.at 2016) The completion of Module 2 (requiring B2 level German) is not mandatory, however, it is a prerequisite if someone wants to apply for a long-term residence title or citizenship. (International Organization for Migration 2013: 50) Those who want to acquire Austrian citizenship have to pass a civic education test, too, containing questions about Austrian geography, history, Austrian culture and the province they reside in. (Perchinig, cited in Permoser and Rosenberger 2012: 48) Financial assistance is available for only a certain group of migrants, however, this is up to a significant 50 per cent of the course expenses. (Permoser and Rosenberger 2012: 48)

It is quite obvious that when it comes to integration measures, Austria concentrates on cultural integration (language training), with compliance (in case of Module 2) and non-compliance (in case of Module 1) both having rather serious consequences (either attaining permanent residence or risking deportation). (ibid.: 48) Yet when it comes to structurally integrating immigrants, one can observe several discrepancies. To name an example, it seems to be distressing that none of Austria's integration policies tell us anything about the involvement of people who do not possess a residence permit, such as asylum seekers (who are not obligated to sign the Integration Agreement and therefore do not have to learn German) or holders of a temporary permit. This is quite a dilemma because these people are thus systematically excluded "from participation in mainstream institutions such as the labor market and the educational system". (ibid.: 50) Nevertheless, this is certainly the result of the government's official position, namely that "only those categories of immigrants with a residence permit should be offered the possibility of becoming integrated". (ibid.: 50) If we take current advancements in Austrian politics4_{into consideration, I highly doubt this} standpoint would change in the near future.

4_{Mind for example Austria's anti-migrant rhetoric of building a fence on the Italian border to keep out refugees}

(Politi and Ghiglione for the Financial Times, 5 May 2016) or the fact that on 22 May 2016 the Alpine nation almost elected a far-right President. Norbert Hofer, representing the radical FPÖ received 49,7 per cent of the votes while Alexander van der Bellen, a pro-EU independent backed by the Greens eventually triumphed by obtaining 50,3 per cent of the votes. (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2016)

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22 Denmark

When it comes to immigration, one could argue that the Kingdom of Denmark has had similar experiences as Austria (and in a sense to that of the Netherlands, too). In fact, immigration to this rather homogenous Scandinavian nation of roughly five million seven hundred thousand inhabitants, (Folketal, Danmarks Statistik 2016) started with a guest workers' program with laborers recruited from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s. (Meer et al. 2015: 716) In the consecutive years these workers were undoubtedly regarded as people who would eventually return to their home country, and indeed, Denmark has also long rejected the idea of becoming a country of immigration. (ibid.: 717-719)

Another phenomenon that characterizes the evolution of Danish immigration policies is the fact that the Danish approach changed substantially on the grounds of the prevailing political party. (Meer et al. 2015) Based on his logic, in a very clear-cut and detailed study on Danish immigration policies, Meer et al. (2015) distinguish four time periods. Originally, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Danish elite advocated a tolerant approach towards immigrants, emphasizing equal treatment and authorizing newcomers to vote in local elections after three years of residence. (ibid.: 717)

Following the arrival of a considerable number of refugees in the 1980s, immigration became high on the agenda and the emphasis shifted to the "obligations of individual immigrants to make an effort to integrate into Danish society" (ibid.: 717) as regulations stiffened. The third stage from around 1990 was framed by the emergence of real integration efforts concentrating on "Danish values integration, active citizenship and attempts to counter Islamic radicalization". At the same time however, mother tongue teaching was publicly funded until 2002. The integrationist path, that several scholars have even defined as "effectively assimilationist" (ibid.: 718), was ratified in 1999 when the so-called Integration Act introduced a mandatory introduction program led by municipalities (Adamo 2012: 5) and (up to) a noteworthy two thousand hours of language training as well as skill development training (ibid.: 5). Even though the language program is mandatory for three years, it is also free of charge. (ibid.: 6) As the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party5_{became a coalition} partner of the right-wing government that ruled the country between 2001 and 2011, their "pet idea" - as Meer et al. (2015: 718) call it – that is, a rather challenging history, politics and "high culture citizenship" test was introduced, simultaneously with strengthened

5_{The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) was founded on 6 October 1995. (Dansk Folkeparti Historie}

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language requirements. Participation in integration measures was made compulsory for third-country nationals, while the conditions for attaining social assistance augmented. (Liebig 2007: 4) These measures "effectively blocked citizenship for most non-European and nonacademic applicants". (Meer et al. 2015: 718) Hence, it is quite questionable whether we can interpret these policies as practices that would endorse the integration of newcomers in effect. Nevertheless, the amended version of the Integration Act from 2005 still maintains that "an object of the Act is to ensure that newly arrived aliens are given the possibility of using their abilities and resources to become involved and contributing citizens on an equal footing with other citizens of society". (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2005)

The next change came by the switch of the government in 2011, when the center-left government of Denmark's first female Prime Minister, Helle Thorning Schmidt took over the lead and eased for example the rigorous language requirements. (Meer et al. 2015: 719) Thorning Schmidt's government set itself the aim of making integration, rather than exclusion, the real priority.

Nonetheless, it would be too hasty to say that Danish integration policies have become more uncomplicated. In fact it is such a complicated system that I will not attempt to outline it in detail, but instead I will summarize the most important set of rules that are currently applicable and relevant in my research project. As the immigration test also applies to family reunification applicants, they are advised to learn Danish on at least A1 level before arriving in the country. Moreover, if someone wants to obtain a permanent residence permit he or she has to meet the requirements of an excessive point system. This point system consists of two parts, the so-called basic requirements (such as having resided legally in Denmark for at least six years - except if someone meets all supplementary requirements, then this is reduced to four years; having passed a Danish language exam on B1 level; having been full time employed or self-employed for at least two years and six months within the last three years; having signed the 'Declaration of integration'6_{etc. (Danish Immigration Service} 2016) It is evident that obtaining permanent residency in Denmark resemble "the conditions required for obtaining citizenship status". (Adamo 2012: 8) What we also have to note is that the emphasis is still clearly on language requirements and labor market integration. Denmark,

6_{By signing the Declaration of integration one reaffirms: "I understand and accept that the Danish language and}

knowledge of the Danish society is the key to a good and active life in Denmark. I will therefore do my best to learn Danish and acquire knowledge about the Danish society as soon as possible. I understand and accept that I can learn Danish by attending Danish classes offered to me by the district council. " (Adamo 2012: 5)

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however, seems to lack offering specific integration measures that would improve immigrants' educational background. However, we once again must acknowledge that according to the Migrant Integration Policy Index, Denmark has gained remarkable 10 points from 2010 to 2014, a figure that no other country7 achieved. (MIPEX 2015)

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25 Finland

Thinking about Finland, if we want to be straight to the point it seems to be the odd one out of this group of four EU member states. The reason for its oddity is simply the fact that in Finland we can see a tendency of policies implemented in a less rigid way. This might be explained by the fact that Finland, compared to the other countries of analysis, has relatively fewer immigrants that need to be integrated. It is quite clear why Finland had to take up with less newcomers: Finland, as such, only exists since 1917 when it gained independence from Russia (Martikainen et al. 2012)8_{which is important to underline because} as a result "integration policy has developed simultaneously with state restructuration". (ibid. 2012) As Finland transferred into a Nordic welfare state as it is today, its integration policy developed over decades in the same framework. In addition, a big share of its immigrants originate from other Nordic countries, especially from the neighboring Sweden, which also explains why Swedish is the second official language. However, the number (and diversity) of people arriving in the country has increased promptly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which makes Finland a great subject to analyze how it dealt with this (back then) unfamiliar situation. The Finnish approach towards integration implies the safeguarding of multiculturalism. The Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (1999) defines integration as "the personal development of immigrants, aimed at participation in working life and society while preserving their own language and culture" including "measures taken and resources and services provided by the authorities to promote and support such integration". It is thus clear that the main emphasis is on labor market integration which Finland facilitates by offering vocational trainings to newcomers. By the same token, discrimination is a crime. (Infopankki 2015)

In Finland, integration policies are implemented on the regional and local level. The Employment and Economic Development Centers coordinate integration on the regional level, and they cooperate with local municipalities that further develop, plan and monitor the integration of immigrants. (Martikainen et al. 2012) Newcomers can consult immigrant advisors at the Employment and Economic Development Offices and municipalities have to give personal advice concerning their integration process. Even though Finland does offer language training (either in Finnish or Swedish) to immigrants, in the above-named definition

8_{I have to acknowledge the all-encompassing academic work of Tuomas Martikainen, Kathleen Valtonen and}

Östen Wahlbeck as a valuable source due to the perceived lack of other scholars in the field of Finnish integration policies who would publish their findings in English.

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we have to acknowledge another vital element: the preservation of one's own language and culture. Finnish municipalities (as well as the state) support immigrants with feasible funding so that they can organize their own cultural activities. This kind of support is even more visible at schools which are "obliged to provide education in the pupil's own language and religion" (ibid. 2012), given that there is enough demand for it. This is remarkable in a sense that it is obvious that nowadays immigrant receiving countries tend to follow reverse logics, for example as we have affirmed in the case of Austria and Denmark. However, Martikainen et al. (2012) also underline that the Finnish approach predates contemporary integration legislation. Note that also the rhetoric of Finland is completely different from the other countries of analysis: while other countries have strict requirements for learning the language and taking part in other integration measures as a channel for gaining permanent residence (whereas non-compliance can result in penalties), Finland's Migration Strategy "views migration as an opportunity". (Ministry of the Interior 2016) Hence, the connection between integration measures and residency can be understood the other way round: in Finland, "immigrants settling permanently in the country have the right to a personal integration plan" in which language training and vocational training "might" be included. Vocational trainings are available for every newcomer who already speaks Finnish on level 3-4 (an equivalent of CEFR B1-B2, i.e. independent, intermediate level knowledge of a language), otherwise they are required to take basic Finnish language courses first. (Finnish National Board of Education 2016) Having received an integration plan which is based on everyone's own need - prepared by the Employment and Economic Development Office and local authorities (Amiedu 2014) gives an individual the right to receive labor market subsidies for a period of maximum three years as these studies require fulltime effort. However, an integration plan is always prepared if someone is unemployed, relies on income support or is under 18 years of age without a guardian in Finland.

To sum up, they do not have to participate in these measures, in contrast they have the right to personal guidance. The downsides of Finnish integration measures however, as Annika Forsander (cited in Martikainen et al. 2012) argues, is the fact that despite all the effort, it seems that many immigrants are still in a disadvantaged position. According Forsander's acumen, this flaw originates from the very nature of Nordic welfare societies: their ideal is based on national homogeneity and the reality that "social structures do not adapt easily to respond to the growing diversity of present-day society". Another scholar who criticized the Finnish idealistic vision of multiculturalism and collectivism is Pasi Saukkonen

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(Saukkonen, cited in Martikainen et al. 2012) who insisted that in reality Finnish integration policies are more pragmatic than ideological and more assimilative than one would assume after reading the prior description of policies.

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The Netherlands

"To integrate, you must learn Dutch. You must then learn how the Dutch people live and work. This is required by the government as indicated in the Civic Integration Act." "You had three years to integrate. That is the integration obligation. Did you not integrate on time? Then you will be fined." (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2016) The above cited message awaits immigrants who wish to inform themselves about integration in the Netherlands: a society once entirely based on multiculturalism. The message seems unambiguous for everyone: given that you come from outside the European Union, integration is undoubtedly a strict requirement and nonconformity will be penalized.

When it comes to integration courses, the Netherlands can be regarded as the country that introduced the prototype of integration measures that nowadays dominate in immigrant receiving countries of our continent, such as mandatory civic integration courses which conclude with exams to be passed. In the last few decades, immigrant integration policies have come a long way. Until the 1980s, besides from immigrants from former colonies such as Indonesia or Surinam, the biggest volume of newcomers (mainly from Morocco and Turkey) were regarded as guestworkers who would eventually go back to their home countries (these experiences undoubtedly resemble that of Austria outlined earlier). Therefore, as Han Entzinger (2014: 61; 2014: 80) indicates, policies until the 1980s could not even be seen as policies with the aim to integrate, their objective could rather be interpreted as stimulating social protection (for example housing, healthcare and unemployment subsidies, as well as public assistance) equally accessible for everyone, including temporary workers who were encouraged to preserve their own cultural identity. Without going into details, starting with policies such as the minorities' policy (Minderhedennota, 1983), the subsequent Contourennota (in which the need for integration was recognized) from 1994 and the Law on Civic Integration for Newcomers (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers, 1998) adopted in 1998, we can take notice of the Netherlands abandoning multiculturalist elements in its integration policy, with policies becoming more involuntary of nature. (Entzinger 2014: 72-77) These developments can be explained by for example the fact that in the first decade after the implementation of the minorities' policy, the size of ethnic minorities almost doubled in size (from half a million to one million by 1990) which suggested that another resolution was necessary. (ibid. 2014: 69) In addition, as Entzinger reveals (2014:81), in the 1990s started to receive rejection because it failed to contribute to the elimination of "migrants' socially deprived position", and by the same token it offered little remedy of solving high

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unemployment rates and low educational attainment among immigrants and their descendants. In contrast, segregation was increasing. According to Entzinger (2014: 85), multiculturalism was also meant to fail because it was based on "a static implementation of culture, rather than on a dynamic one".

The question then remains whether current measures can do any better. Suvarierol and Kirk (2015: 248) maintain that whether contemporary civic integration courses can contribute to integration is "highly contingent on how the adopted policy tools are translated into practice in particular national contexts". This statement in fact motivated me to carry out participant observation in an environment where I clearly see how these courses work in practice. It also made me think whether a shift from the "caring approach" of the 1970s and 1980s and mother-tongue teaching in primary schools for migrant pupils, the consecutive inauguration of free integration courses (outlined in the Law on Civic Integration for Newcomers, 1998), and the present-day strict requirements to integrate and mandatory courses paid by immigrants themselves really makes a difference whether someone becomes an active citizen of the Dutch society or not and whether the society as a whole becomes more inclusive. Today, immigrants from non-Western countries need to pass the so-called integration exam consisting of an A2-level language test, a test about someone's "Knowledge of Dutch Society", and, as a novelty, candidates who were obliged to integrate after 1 January 2015, are also assessed in an exam "Orientation on the Dutch Labor Market" (which is rather a conversation about someone's future plan in the labor market based on a presentation of his or her portfolio). Even though candidates can also choose to prepare for these exams on their own, they are discouraged to do so. (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2016) Family members already need to take an exam on A1 level in their home country before even coming to the Netherlands.

Another option to integrate is to take the Dutch state exam on B1 or B2 level. Students before 2015 did not need to take the two additional exams (Knowledge of Dutch Society and Orientation on the Dutch Labor Market), however, now they are required to as well, which signals that the rules have become even stricter. In my opinion it is quite contentious that the current Law on Civic Integration demands newcomers to acquire Dutch on an elementary A2 level (which does not presume fluency and accuracy, nor does it certify someone to enroll in vocational training or tertiary education). In contrast, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science defines the other option to integrate (taking the Dutch state

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exam on B1 or B2 level) as "useful if someone wants to work or study in the Netherlands".9 (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2016) However, as Suvarierol and Kirk (2015: 252-253) argue, by linking language skills to labor market participation, the policy made language a commodity, moreover, that the policy became more rigorous because "a lack of tangible policy impact was the result of a lack of migrant responsibility for their integration".

Can we thus, in 2016, observe better outcomes as a result of stricter rules? Does more migrant responsibility contribute to a more inclusive society? What kind of accomplishments and failures can we observe after the implementation of civic integration courses in the Austrian, Danish, Finnish and Dutch societies? This is the question that I will aim to answer in the next chapter.

9_{Own translation from Dutch.}

Integration courses in Europe : accomplishment or failure? : a comparative study of integration courses and language requirements concerning newcomers in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands